# When the Winner Comes Third: Simulating Candidates' Winnability With Inaccurate Polls

Daniel Marcelino and Alejandro Tapias

5 de agosto de 2014

	Λ. Ι	Average Estimates
Candidates	Actual	3 Weeks ( <i>n</i> =10)
Russomanno	18.84	29.08
Serra	26.83	20.84
Haddad	25.28	18.25
Others	23.63	24.53
Undecideds	_	07.30

		Average Estimates			
Candidates	Actual	3 Weeks (n=10)	1 Week (n=5)		
Russomanno	18.84	29.08	24.56		
Serra	26.83	20.84	22.48		
Haddad	25.28	18.25	19.90		
Others	23.63	24.53	26.06		
Undecideds	_	07.30	07.00		

	Pollster						
	Datafolha Ibope Veritá VoxPop						
Candidates	n=2	n=2	n=1	n=1			
Russomanno	+	+	+	+			
Serra	-	-	*	-			
Haddad	-	-	-	-			
Others	+	+	+	*			


- (1) Economic vote models
- (2) Electoral cycles models
- (3) Models using prediction markets
- (4) Models that use polling data as the primary predictors

- (1) Economic vote models
- (2) Electoral cycles models
- (3) Models using prediction markets
- (4) Models that use polling data as the primary predictors

- (1) Economic vote models
- (2) Electoral cycles models
- (3) Models using prediction markets
- (4) Models that use polling data as the primary predictors

- (1) Economic vote models
- (2) Electoral cycles models
- (3) Models using prediction markets
- (4) Models that use polling data as the primary predictors

## Political polls: The size matters



A poll is likely to be wrong, yet...

#### House effects

- Rounding
- Non-response bias
- Wording and Ordering
- Mode bias

## A poll is likely to be wrong, yet...

#### Context: local elections in Brazil

- (-) High number of candidates (12)
- (-) Local elections = polls shortage (28)
- (-) Few pollsters (4)
- (-) Poor sampling designs
- (+) Face-to-face surveys
- (.) Political system features may cause high volatility

How can we cope with irregular and inaccurate polls to fit regular political support?

#### Bayesian inference

• The estimand parameters are considered random variables, but these are still related to one another.

## Example

If a candidate X at  $t_1$  had 28% of the popular vote, it is very likely that at  $t_2$  he will be alos close to 28% once  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  are close to one another in time. Therefore, if one know  $\theta$  for X at  $t_1$ , this information would change your beliefs about the likely values for X at  $t_2$ . Moreover, given this information we would like to know the probability of X winning the election.

#### Bayesian inference

 The estimand parameters are considered random variables, but these are still related to one another.

## Example

If a candidate X at  $t_1$  had 28% of the popular vote, it is very likely that at  $t_2$  he will be alos close to 28% once  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  are close to one another in time. Therefore, if one know  $\theta$  for X at  $t_1$ , this information would change your beliefs about the likely values for X at  $t_2$ . Moreover, given this information we would like to know the probability of X winning the election.


#### Bayesian inference

- The estimand parameters are considered random variables, but these are still related to one another.
- Incorporate data from various sources as well as uncertainties associated with the data.
- Prior distribution → Posterior distribution.

#### Bayesian inference

- The estimand parameters are considered random variables, but these are still related to one another.
- Incorporate data from various sources as well as uncertainties associated with the data.
- Prior distribution → Posterior distribution.

## Priors: Advertising slots



#### Prior Distribution

Candidates	$\alpha_i$	Prior mean	Prior var	Prior sd
Serra	280	0.28	0.101	0.317
Haddad	270	0.27	0.099	0.314
Russomanno	170	0.17	0.071	0.266
Others	280	0.28	0.101	0.317
Total	1,000	1.00		

 $(y_{t1:k}) \sim Multinomial(n, \alpha_{t1:k}).$ 

## Evidence: Polling data

A poll by Vox Populi with 1,000 voters conducted roughly 15 months ahead the election ( $13^{th}$  July 2011) gave this:

• Serra: 26%

Russomanno: 14%

• Haddad: 2%

• Others: 58%

#### Posterior Distribution

Candidates	$\alpha_i + y_i$	Posterior mean	Posterior var	Prior sd
Serra	540	0.27	0.066	0.256
Haddad	290	0.15	0.041	0.203
Russomanno	300	0.15	0.044	0.209
Others	580	0.43	0.082	0.286
Total	2,000	1.00		

$$p(\alpha_{t1:k}|y_{t1:k}) \sim Dirichlet(b_{t1:k} + y_{t1:k}).$$

$$p(\alpha_{t1:k}) = \frac{\Gamma(b_{t1:k})}{\Gamma(b_{t1:k})} \alpha_{t1:k}^{b_{t1:k}-1} \dots, \alpha_{tk}^{b_{tk}-1}$$



#### Weighted average

Each poll has its own precision:  $p=1/\sigma^2$ . DataFolha of n=3,959 lbope of n=1,204

$$\bar{y}_{di}^* = \frac{p_D y_D + p_I y_I}{p_D + p_I} \tag{1}$$

#### Predicting vote intentions

Ignorance about  $\theta$  can be expressed by making the prior precision small. That is, by making prior variance  $\sigma_0^2$  large.

$$y_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2) \tag{2}$$

### Predicting vote intentions

Given that polls lack precision:

$$\mu_i = \alpha_{ti} + \delta_{ji} + \Delta \tag{3}$$

where  $\delta_j$  is the bias of polling firm j, an unknown parameter to be estimated.  $\Delta$  is an unknown parameter to be estimated of event change.



#### Predicting vote intentions

To model change in vote intentions, we use a random-walk model as that

$$\alpha_t \sim N(\alpha_{t-1}, w^2), t = 1, \dots, T \tag{4}$$

where  $w^2$  is a linear interpolation component that detects event discontinuity (before vs. after campaign advertising on TV).



#### Predicting vote intentions

With an uniform distribution of prior beliefs, that is before we see any polling data:

$$\alpha_{ti} \sim Uniform(l, u)$$
 (5)

where l and u denotes lower and upper limits for the range of plausible electoral outcome for a candidate.

## Random-walk model (drunkard's walk)

#### Candidates are the drunkards

- Stagger left(right) = gain(lose) support.
- Noisy signals = opinion polls.
- Kalman filtering: Learn about likely path given polling data.

# We know which bar you left








## We know the direction of travel













# We have a belief how a candidate would fare on the election before it takes place



# Polls are noisy signals, but we can "learn" about most likely deviations given these signals



## Computation

#### Computation details

- Software WinBugs (OpenBugs)
- The MCMC sampler was run on a single chain with an adaptation period (burn-in) of 100,000 iterations, followed by 500,000 iterations in which every  $500^{th}$  draw was kept for the analysis.
- The resulting data set is a pooled sample of 1,000 valid cases (elections).


## Average estimates for the house effects parameters

	Russom	anno (PRB) Serra (PSDB) Haddad (PT)			Serra (PSDB)			)	
Pollters	Estimate	2.5%	97%	Estimate	2.5%	97%	Estimate	2.5%	97%
Datafolha	3.98	2.00	5.89	-2.14	-3.78	-0.39	-5.40	-7.09	-3.77
Ibope	3.51	1.50	5.69	-4.52	-6.34	-2.53	-4.88	-6.65	-3.00
Veritá	3.00	-0.09	6.17	-1.03	-3.77	1.97	-3.60	-6.16	-1.21
VoxPopuli	3.37	0.84	5.52	-3.58	-5.56	-1.38	-4.75	-6.97	-2.90


### Simulation Results

		Average Estimates
Candidates	Actual	Last day(n=1,000)
Russomanno	18.84	20.20
Serra	26.83	26.18
Haddad	25.28	24.32
Others	23.63	24.10
Undecideds	_	05.02


# Simulation Results: Share and pointwise for Russomanno (PRB)




# Simulation Outcomes: Share and pointwise for Serra (PSDB)



# Simulation Results: Share and pointwise for Haddad (PT)



# Simulation Results: Probabilities of Haddad (PT) beat Russomanno (PRB) and advance in the runnoff




Simula

#### Conclusions

- In Brazil as everywhere polls lack precision. Precision is mainly affected by two sources: sample size and house effects. After account for them, we could improve the predictions; consequently the information about the election.
- In Brazil, the institution of campaign advertising on TV and radio may cause significant breaks in vote intention, which needs to be modeled accordingly, otherwise, a violation of the linearity assumption may occur.

37 / 40



## Polls fielded over the last 3 weeks to the election

		Average error				
Candidates	Actual	Mean n=10	Datafolha n=4	Ibope n=4	Veritá n=1	VoxPopuli n=1
Russomanno	18.84	29.08	9.41	10.66	6.96	15.16
Serra	26.83	20.84	-4.33	-7.58	-2.43	-9.83
Haddad	25.28	18.25	-7.28	-6.03	-4.78	-8.28
Others	23.63	24.53	6.09	8.49	7.19	2.23
Undecideds		7.30	5.75	8.00	5.00	13.00

Actual vote is in bold face.

#### Polls fielded over the week before the election

			Average error				
Candidates	Actual	Mean n=5	Datafolha n=2	lbope n=2	Veritá n=1		
Russomanno Serra Haddad Others	18.84 26.83 25.28 23.63	24.56 22.48 19.90 26.06	5.15 -3.33 -5.78 -2.05	5.66 -6.33 -5.28 -3.05	6.96 -2.43 -4.78 -4.75		
Undecideds		7.00	6.00	9.00	5.00		

Actual vote is in bold face.