

# **Basics II**

CSE 40537/60537 Biometrics

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Spring 2022




# Today you will...

*Get to know*  
Biometric system errors  
Metrics to compare Biometric systems  
Types of attacks to Biometric systems

# Biometric Systems


RECAP

## Enrollment Modules



# Biometric Systems

## Verification Modules



**RECAP**

✓ genuine

✗ impostor


output  
device

decision

Decision

# Biometric Systems

## Identification Modules



**RECAP**

✓ ID: John Doe

✗ Null: unknown

output device


ID or Null

Decision


# Biometric Systems

RECAP


## Open-set vs. Closed-set Identification



**Query**  
(Liam Hemsworth)



### Feature Space



### Closed Set

**Output**  
This is  
Chris Hemsworth!




### Open Set

**Output**  
I don't know  
this person!



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




### Attended operation?

“I’m seeing here in my notes  
that you are already enrolled.”

# Biometric Systems


## Enrollment Revision



**Unattended operation?**  
The system must deal with  
re-enrollment attempts.


# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




### Fast Enrollment

There might not be time to process these 2 modules. E.g., if you have millions of enrolled users, or a distributed template database.



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision



# Biometric Systems


## Deployment



From all modules integrated within single chips...



To disperse modules independently deployed in diverse platforms.



# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to consider?

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

### Cooperative or non-cooperative users? (1/5)

Do users want to be identified?

Don't appeal to covert deployment.



# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to consider?

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

### Habituated or non-habituated users? (2/5)

Do users interact with the system frequently or sporadically?





# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to consider?

Things to consider when designing  
a Biometrics system, besides trait.

### Attended or unattended operation? (3/5)

Will somebody be  
helping users?





# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to consider?

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

## Controlled or uncontrolled environment? (4/5)

How do the environmental conditions change?  
(temperature, illumination, etc.)



# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to consider?

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

## What are the computational requirements? (5/5)

Consider memory footprint, processing time, response time, and system availability.



# Biometric Systems

## What do we want to avoid?

### **X Covert deployment**

Users must be aware of the Biometric system collecting their data.

Respect their privacy.



### **X No data confidentiality**

Collected data must be confidential. Avoid function creep.

### **X Unsafe system**

We will get to know threats (attacks) that may harm a system's integrity.

# Biometric System Errors

## Denial of Access (1/3)

### Verification

Jane Doe: Here, I'm Jane Doe.

System: No, you're not.

### Identification

Jane Doe: Here, my fingerprints.

System: I don't know you.



# Biometric System Errors

## Denial of Access (1/3)

### Possible Causes

**Intrinsic failure:** intra-user trait variation, due to different sensors, hardware malfunction, pose, illumination, make-up, aging, illness, cosmetic surgeries, etc.

**Adversarial attack:** malicious alteration of template database, etc.

# Biometric System Errors

## Intrusion (2/3)

### Verification

Jane Doe: Here, I'm Jane Fonda.  
System: Welcome, Jane Fonda!

### Identification

Jane Doe: Here, my fingerprints.  
System: Welcome, Jane Fonda!



<https://www.wired.com/story/10-year-old-face-id-unlocks-mothers-iphone-x/>

# Biometric System Errors

## Intrusion (2/3)

### Possible Causes

**Intrinsic failure:** inter-user high similarity, due to low trait uniqueness, poor trait capture, etc.

**Adversarial attack:** impersonation, spoofing, etc.



impersonation



spoofing

# Biometric System Errors

## Repudiation (3/3)

### Verification

Jane Doe: See, I'm not Jane Doe.

System: Yeah, you're right.



### Identification

Jane Doe: Here, my fingerprints.

System: Yeah, I don't know you.

# Biometric System Errors

## Repudiation (3/3)

### Possible Causes

**Intrinsic failure:** hardware malfunction, intra-user trait variation.



obfuscation

**Adversarial attack:** obfuscation.


# Biometric System Errors

## Math Model

Objective definition of 2 events:

### 1. False Non-Match (FNM)

A comparison of two features of the same individual should lead to a match, but it led to a non-match.  
It causes either a denial of access or helps repudiation.




Let's see how to compute them!

### 2. False Match (FM)

A comparison of two features from different individuals should lead to a non-match, but it led to a match.  
It helps an intrusion.


# Metrics

## Verification




# Metrics

## Verification




# Metrics

## Identification



# Metrics

## Identification



### Similarity Score $s$ and Threshold $\tau$

Take the highest similarity  $s$ .

if  $s > \tau$ :


    decision="You're Jane Doe."

else:


    decision="Don't know you."

ID or Null


# Metrics



In case of distances...



# Metrics



$$\boxed{\quad} \quad FNM(\tau) = \int_{-\infty}^{\tau} g(s) \, ds$$


$$\boxed{\quad} \quad FM(\tau) = \int_{\tau}^{\infty} i(s) \, ds$$


# Metrics

## In Practice


False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and False Match Rate (FMR)

$$FNMR(\tau) = \frac{\#(\text{false nonmatches for } \tau)}{\#(\text{genuine comparisons})}$$




$$FNM(\tau) = \int_{-\infty}^{\tau} g(s) \, ds$$

$$FMR(\tau) = \frac{\#(\text{false matches for } \tau)}{\#(\text{impostor comparisons})}$$




$$FM(\tau) = \int_{\tau}^{\infty} i(s) \, ds$$

# Metrics

## In Practice

False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and False Match Rate (FMR)

$$FNMR(\tau) = \frac{\#(\text{false nonmatches for } \tau)}{\#(\text{genuine comparisons})}$$

How many of the genuine comparisons are wrongly computed by the system?

$$FMR(\tau) = \frac{\#(\text{false matches for } \tau)}{\#(\text{impostor comparisons})}$$

How many of the impostor comparisons are wrongly computed by the system?

# Metrics


## In Practice

Interpretation of \*R values.

**Suppose a face recognition system with FMR=0.1%**

FMR=0.001, one error in every 1K comparisons.

Is it good?



**Suppose the Newark airport**


5K people per hour, 14h per day (70K people per day)

Suppose a suspect watch list with 100K people: 7 billion comparisons per day.

Average number of false matches per day: 7 million people to double check every day.

**Terrorist watch list in 2016: 1,8 million people**

# Metrics



**What is the impact of changing the decision threshold?**

**The larger the value of  $\tau$ :**  
The larger the value of FNM;  
The smaller the value of FM.

FNM and FM are inversely proportional.

# Metrics

## What to choose?

### **Small FNMR**

Suitable to avoid denial of access  
and repudiation.

Increases intrusion probability, though.




### **Small FMR**

Suitable to avoid intrusion.

Increases denial of service and  
repudiation probability, though.

# Metrics



**What to choose?**

**Equal Error Rate (EER)**  
Common practice.  
Pick the threshold where  
FNMR = FMR.

# Metrics


**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

**Compare both systems' FNMR and FMR at EER (1/3)**

Take the one with smaller FNMR and FMR values.

What to do when system A has smaller FNMR than system B, but larger FMR (or vice-versa)?



# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

**Use a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (2/3)**






# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .



Compute FMR and FNMR for a variety of thresholds.



# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .




**Which one is better?**  
Compute the  
Area Under The Curve  
(AUC).  
The best solution  
presents larger AUC.

# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

**Compute the difference between impostor and genuine distributions for each system (3/3)**



impostor      genuine

**Which one is better?**

Take the one with better separation of impostor and genuine observations.

It is System A!  
How do we compute it?

# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

**Compute the difference between impostor and genuine distributions for each system (3/3)**

**Which one is better?**

Take the system with larger **d-prime**:

$$d' = \frac{\sqrt{2} \times |\mu_{genuine} - \mu_{impostor}|}{\sqrt{\sigma_{genuine}^2 + \sigma_{impostor}^2}}$$

Hypothesis: the distributions are Gaussians (with mean  $\mu$  and standard deviation  $\sigma$ ).

The larger the separation between the distributions, the larger the value of d-prime.

# Metrics

## Other Metrics (1/4, 2/4)

### Failure to Acquire (FTA)

Rate of falsely rejected biometric samples due to problems in acquisition.

### Failure to Enroll (FTE)


The same as FTA, but during enrollment.

Smithsonian  
MAGAZINE

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### Adermatoglyphia: The Genetic Disorder Of People Born Without Fingerprints

The extremely rare disease causes no problems—apart from occasional difficulties with the authorities



The finger pads of a person with adermatoglyphia are entirely smooth. (Photo by Sprecher et. al.)

By Joseph Stromberg  
SMITHSONIANMAG.COM  
JANUARY 14, 2014

<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/adermatoglyphia-genetic-disorder-people-born-without-fingerprints-180949338/>

# Metrics

## Other Metrics (3/4, 4/4)

### ***Positive Metrics***

#### **True Non-Match Rate (TNMR)**

$$\text{TNMR} = 1.0 - \text{FMR}$$

#### **True Match Rate (TMR)**

$$\text{TMR} = 1.0 - \text{FNMR}$$

You want to maximize these instead of minimizing.






# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

Compute FMR and FNMR for a variety of thresholds.






# Metrics

**How to compare two different systems?**

Biometric systems  $A$  and  $B$ .

Compute FMR and FNMR for a variety of thresholds.



# S'up Next?

**First Coding Day**  
Implementation of metrics.

**Bring your computers**  
Don't have one?  
Please let me know ASAP.



Be ready! :)  
Tools: Python 3 (important), PyCharm IDE (optional).