Suitable function

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This file and referenced files are on the address https://github.com/danielnager/xifrat/

We will work with tuples of two elements inside $\mathbb{Z}_p$ with p a large enough prime. The set is defined as:

$S = \{(a, b) \mid a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p, a^2 \neq b^2\}$

With elements of this set let's define a function of two parameters:

$f((a, b), (c, d)) = (ac - bd, ad - bc)$

The following two properties hold:

$f(f(a, b), c) \neq f(a, f(b, c))$ – non-associativity in general

$f(f(a, b), f(c, d)) = f(f(a, c), f(b, d))$ – restricted commutativity

Next we define a list of N elements of S to meet the size required. For 256 bits we at least need $p \approx 2^{64}$, and $N = 2$, or we an use $p \approx 2^{32}$ and $N = 4$.

Next we define a mixing procedure of elements of this kind, t and k, N-element lists of numbers in S.

The mixing procedure is:

```
function m(t,k) returns t

    for M number of rounds -- 64 for example
        //one-to-one mixing of k and t
        for i in 0..N-1
            t[i]<-f(t[i],k[i])
        end for
        // accumulative mixing of t with itself, t[-1]=t[N-1]
```

```
            for i in 0..N-1
                t[i]<-f(t[i],t[i-1])
            end for
        end for

    return t
```

The function m is neither associative nor commutative, and meets the restricted commutativity property:

$m(m(a,b),m(c,d)) = m(m(a,c),m(b,d))$

With this a Secret agreement and a Digital signature can be done as explained in the document:

https://github.com/danielnager/xifrat/blob/raw/cryptosystem.pdf

The computationally hard problem proposed is:

in $c = m(t,k)$, knowing c and t, find k.

Now lets define the secret agreement and the digital signature using the mixing function m. To put it more clear we will use the following notation:

$m(a,b)$ is written as (ab)

$m(m(a,b),m(c,d))$ is written as $(ab)(cd)$

$m(m(a,b),c\dots)$ is written as $(abc\dots)$

For the secret agreement the procedure is the following:

Both Alice and Bob agree on some constant C. Alice chooses a random key K, and Bob does the same choosing a random key Q. Alice sends to Bob (CK), Bob sends to Alice (CQ). Alice computes using bob sent value $(CQ)(KC)$, and Bob does the same and computes $(CK)(QC)$.

By the property of restricted commutatitvity $(CQ)(KC) = (CK)(QC)$

For the signature the procedure is the following:

Alice, the signer, chooses a public value C and a two random keys K,Q. Its credentials are C, (CK) and (QK). To sing a value, H, Alice computes $S = (HQ)$.

Bob needs to verify if Alice has signed H. Computes $(HQ)(CK)$ and $(HC)(QK)$. Both values must be equal due to restricted commutativity if (HQ) is a valid signature from Alice.

In order to do smaller signatures, of 128 bits in this case, there's an approach that must be carefully tested.

We apply the following equality:

$$(QCCK)(KH_1H_2Q) = (QK)(CH_1)(CH_2)(KQ)$$

In this formula, C is 128 bit public constant provided by Alice, the signer, K and Q are two 128 bit keys known only by the signer, and H_1 and H_2 is a 256 bits value to be signed split in two halves.

The credentials of Alice are $(QCCK)$, (QK) and (KQ).

In order to sing a value represented by H_1 and H_2, the Alice computes $S = (KH_1H_2Q)$.

To verify the signature Bob computes (CH_1) and (CH_2), and checks for the initial equality to hold, as Bob has all the elements needed. If the equality holds then is a valid signature from Alice.

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