

Topography of the FX Derivatives Market: A View from London*

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Abstract

We use 100 million transactions in the London FX derivatives market – by far the largest global center for currency trading – to shed light on the currency risk-taking behavior of financial and non-financial firms. We construct *daily firm-level* net currency derivatives exposures by currency cross and document significant within-sector heterogeneity and market concentration. Net positions are an order of magnitude smaller than gross positions. Pension and investment funds, insurers, as well as non-financial corporations use FX derivatives primarily for hedging purposes. Dealer banks accommodate these hedging needs. In contrast, hedge funds predominantly utilize FX derivatives to speculate, with trading activity consistent with carry trade, momentum, and macroeconomic news investment strategies. These facts are important for our understanding of international finance and financial stability policies.

Keywords: FX Derivatives, Exchange Rates, Non-Bank Financial Institutions, Banks, Non-Financial Corporations, Hedging, Speculation, Macro News.

JEL Codes: F30, F31, G15, G20

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1 Introduction

Exchange rate (FX) markets are at the center of trade and financial flows. They affect financial stability, economic activity and the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. FX derivatives are among the most traded instruments in financial markets with an average daily turnover of \$5.4 trillion in 2022.¹ Borio et al. (2022) point out that US dollar debt from FX derivatives is huge, growing and “in a blind spot” since they are off-balance sheet—the \$80 trillion in outstanding obligations to pay USD via FX swaps, forwards, and currency swaps exceeds the combined stock of Treasury bills, repo, and commercial paper.

Yet the inner workings of FX derivatives markets remain largely unknown. Existing papers have provided useful but partial views of these markets, focusing on a specific sector in a single country (i.e. non-financial corporations in Chile as in Alfaro et al. (2021)) or relying on infrequent filings and company reports with incomplete coverage across sectors, currency pairs and jurisdictions. As a result, regulators face difficulties identifying speculative versus hedging use of derivatives instruments across market participants and have very limited visibility on the structure of those markets. These considerations are key for financial stability and the likelihood of market disruptions. Another implication is that the international finance literature has had to make assumptions about hedging practices of financial and non-financial firms based on very limited empirical foundations (e.g., Gopinath and Stein, 2021 assume that firms are fully unhedged while Camanho et al., 2022 assume that investors are fully unhedged for equities and fully hedged for bonds). Such assumptions are very consequential for the theoretical predictions and policy implications of these models.

This paper provides the first high-frequency, granular topography of the largest FX market in the world. It brings the weight of more than 16 million daily firm-level observations of FX derivatives transactions based on more than 100 million transactions to bear on characterizing speculative and hedging strategies of all market actors (pension funds, investment

¹Bank of International Settlements (2024).

funds, insurers, dealer and non-dealer banks, hedge funds and non-financial corporations). It does so, unlike most of the literature, at the firm level and across currency pairs, highlighting interesting differences across sectors, firms within sectors, and geography.

As of 2022, over 70% of global FX turnover takes place in derivatives markets, as compared to only 30% in spot markets. FX turnover in London represents 38% of the global total turnover, twice the share of the second largest center for FX trading (New York) and more than the share of New York, Singapore and Hong Kong combined². For the first time, we make comprehensive use of high-frequency contract-level data of the over-the-counter (OTC) London FX derivatives market, a daunting database of over 100 million observations. Our analysis is underpinned by the construction of more than 16 million *daily net* FX derivatives exposure observations at the firm currency cross level for the over 16,000 firms active in the UK FX market over our sample from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2020. Thus, our measures innovate in two dimensions relative to the existing literature. First, we study daily firm-level net FX derivatives exposures for all sectors and currency-crosses— and second, we do so for a large and meaningful share of the global FX market. We study the near-universe of firms trading in the UK. Existing studies with wide coverage have instead used either sector-level gross exposures as in the BIS Triennial Survey, or, more recently, sector-level net exposures, as in Du and Huber (2024). None of these studies document firm-level net exposures, let alone their high-frequency dynamics. As this is an important limitation for their use by policy institutions, our paper is a very useful complement to theirs.

Our unique data allow us to uncover important new facts. First, our measure of the size of the London FX derivatives market, which we carefully calculate from the absolute value of firm-level net currency-cross exposures, is an order of magnitude smaller than the Borio et al. (2022) measure, based on adding up firms' notional exposures. More precisely, we find that the London market is on average \$3 trillions over our sample period, which is very large,

²See 2022 BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of FX and OTC Derivatives Markets, henceforth “BIS Triennial Survey”).

but far less than the \$37 trillions gross measure implied by Borio et al. (2022)³. Thanks to the granularity of the data, we can see that the very large difference between gross and net exposures of market makers and dealer banks is a major factor behind the discrepancy, highlighting their role as key intermediaries in the market. Net exposure measures are an indispensable complement to gross measures to study resilience to exchange rate risk and financial stability issues. They are a key input for the calibration of swap lines in crisis times for example (Bahaj and Reis (2022)).

Second, we present a detailed breakdown of the composition of the market, reporting e.g. transaction volumes of each player, countries of residence, net exposures, maturities of contracts. Asset managers dominate the landscape, accounting for 70% of individual firms, followed by non-financial corporates (25%). Within asset managers, 89% are investment funds (at the fund-level), 8% pension funds, and 3% hedge funds. Non-financial firms are important participants in the derivatives market in terms of net exposure. In terms of turnover, 21 dealer banks account for about 72% of all transactions. Market makers come second with about 18% of the transaction volumes. The characteristics of these intermediaries should ideally inform our models of exchange rates with capital market frictions (see e.g. Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) or Hau and Rey (2006)).

Third, we make full use of the firm-level dimension and comprehensiveness of our data to study market concentration and heterogeneity within sectors. We find high levels of concentration over our entire sample period: the largest 5 firms account for a majority of a sector's total net FX exposures. Dealer banks and market makers, followed by insurers and hedge funds are the most concentrated. Investment funds, non-financial corporations and non-dealer banks are the least concentrated sectors; they are also the most heterogeneous in terms of direction of their net exposures. These results are key to understand systemic risk and set up appropriate financial stability policies: heterogeneity in the directionality of ex-

³The latter value is calculated from the \$97 trillion gross size of the global FX market in 2022 quoted by Borio et al. (2022), times the 38% UK market share quoted by the 2022 BIS Triennial Survey.

posures is important to assess aggregate resilience vis-à-vis exchange rate risk; concentration within sectors is key to understand transmission of shocks and how the idiosyncratic risk of one player, say, may spillover to the whole market (see Bippus et al. (2023)).

Fourth, we use the high frequency nature of our data to shed light on firms' hedging versus speculative motives across different sectors. Net FX derivatives exposures at the firm level are a key choice variable since they are directly linked to firms' profits. To help us interpret the data, we present a partial equilibrium model in which firms trade FX derivatives for two reasons: (i) to speculate, based on their exchange rate expectations; and (ii) to hedge the currency risk associated with their non-derivatives profits. A key distinction emerges: hedging demand is often one-directional, since firms' non-derivatives operations tend to persist over time. For example, UK investment funds that are consistently long US fixed income assets would hedge the currency risk associated with their non-derivatives portfolio by maintaining persistently net-short USD and net-long GBP FX derivatives exposures. In contrast, firms' speculative demand is unlikely to be one-directional since exchange rate expectations move frequently with market developments.⁴ Thus, the direction and persistence of firms' net FX derivatives exposures over time is informative about whether firms generally use FX derivatives to speculate or hedge.

We find that over 70% of individual pension funds, insurance companies, and non-financial corporations, and about 65% of investment funds, maintain the same one-sided net exposures to the USD, EUR, and GBP over at least 80% of our sample. This suggests that hedging demand is the primary factor driving FX derivatives use among most individual firms in these sectors. Persistent one-sided net exposures are less prevalent among individual hedge funds and non-dealer banks, suggesting a larger role for speculative FX derivatives demand in these sectors.

Finally, we shift attention to firms' speculative FX derivatives demand by examining

⁴This should be especially true for the currencies of advanced economies, for which it is rare to have persistent trends in nominal exchange rates.

how firms adjust their net exposures “on the margin” with respect to three well-known FX investment strategies, namely, the carry trade, momentum, and trading on the arrival of macroeconomic news. Our findings shed light for the first time on how net exposures equilibrate across the entire FX derivatives market in response to moves in interest rates, exchange rates and macro news. We find that hedge funds robustly adjust their derivatives exposures in accordance with all three investment strategies, consistent with their use of FX derivatives to speculate. Such speculative demand should apply price pressure that pushes exchange rates back in line with fundamentals, suggesting that hedge funds play a key role as arbitrageurs in FX derivatives markets. Additionally, some investment funds and non-dealer banks also appear to engage in some speculative FX derivative trading in line with the studied investment strategies, although the results are less statistically significant than for hedge funds. On the other hand, non-financial corporations, and to a lesser extent pension funds and insurers, adjust their net exposures opposite to these investment strategies, suggesting they may play the role of “noise traders” in international macro models, due to their hedging demand. Differently, dealer banks—who are on one side of almost all transactions—are able to insulate themselves from these investment strategies by taking offsetting exposures with arbitrageurs and noise traders, suggesting they play the role of toll-taker more so than arbitrageur in the market (Duffie et al. (2005)).

These novel results clarify how sectors map to distinct agents in international macro models (Jeanne and Rose (2002) and Itsikhoki and Mukhin (2021)), help refine asset demand based models of exchange rates that assume no hedging (Koijen and Yogo (2020), Jiang et al. (Forthcoming), Camanho et al. (2022)) and help calibrate those where hedging demand plays an important role (Liao and Zhang (2024a), Brauer and Hau (2023)).

Related Literature

While the literature is growing rapidly, there are relatively few papers that study FX derivatives use in advanced economies with wide coverage. An important exception is Du and

Huber (2024) who document stylized facts about foreign investors' USD securities and derivatives positions using sector-level data across various jurisdictions. They merge data sources (mainly annual or quarterly) to estimate sectoral hedge ratios and link CIP deviations to hedging activity. Our work, which exploits daily firm level data of the whole London market and explores speculative and hedging motives, is highly complementary to theirs. Abbassi and Bräuning (2021) use transaction-level FX derivatives data in Germany to show that German banks use FX derivatives to "window-dress" end-of-quarter FX exposure.⁵ Based on quarterly SEC filings, Sialm and Zhu (2021) and Opie and Riddiough (2024) study the use of currency derivatives by US international fixed income mutual funds and US international equity mutual funds respectively. For non financial firms, Alfaro et al. (2024) provides an excellent survey of currency hedging with an emphasis on emerging markets.⁶ Kuzmina and Kuznetsova (2018) hand-collects data to show that German corporates tend to use FX derivatives if they are net exporters or importers and when exchange rate movements are larger, while Lyonnet et al. (2022), relying on survey data, finds that large EU corporates are more likely to hedge currency risk if they price in foreign currency. Finally, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) use aggregate CFTC currency futures data to examine non-commercial traders' (speculators') unwinding of carry trades during risk-off episodes while Ostry (2023) uses the same data to document a flight-to-USD by commercial traders (hedgers) during such episodes. In contrast to that literature, our paper investigates investment in FX derivatives by a broad and heterogeneous set of non-US investors and non financial-firms at the daily frequency, drawing on more than 100 million FX derivative transactions. We find evidence of large market concentration and large heterogeneity in positions within some sectors. Those findings are important for financial stability considerations.

Our paper also relates to the vibrant literature that studies the link between hedging

⁵Abbassi and Bräuning (2023) argues, based on the same data, that the Brexit shock affected local credit supply by impacting banks' profits via their currency derivatives positions.

⁶Much of the earlier literature on FX derivatives has focused on non-financial corporations in emerging markets, where data has been more readily available. Alfaro et al. (2021) e.g. show that Chilean firms supplement their limited operational hedging with significant financial hedging via FX forwards.

demand and asset prices, in particular exchange rates, both empirically and theoretically (see e.g., Liao and Zhang, 2024b, Czech et al., 2021, Ben Zeev and Nathan, 2024a, Brauer and Hau, 2023).⁷ Several papers use data on derivatives to study deviations from covered interest rate parity (CIP) (Avdjiev et al., 2019, Du et al., 2018, Ben Zeev and Nathan, 2024b, Aldunate et al., 2023, Khetan, 2024, and Kloks et al., 2024). Bahaj and Reis (2022) show that central bank swap lines put a ceiling on CIP deviations. Hau et al. (2021) use contract-level data to document price discrimination in OTC FX derivatives markets that is consistent with the failure of CIP since the financial crisis. Cenedese et al. (2021) use UK transaction-level FX derivatives data to relate the breakdown of CIP to the dealer balance-sheet constraints resulting from post-crisis financial regulations. Ferrara et al. (2022) draws on the same data to examine how dealer banks that drew on swap lines adjusted their FX exposures during the Covid-19 recession. Kubitza et al. (2024) exploits euro-area transaction-level FX derivatives data to show that investors sell USD bonds when they want to roll over their existing currency derivatives positions and CIP deviations widen.

Relative to this branch of the literature, we provide the first detailed assessment of firm-level currency derivatives usage by all types of financial and non-financial firms active in the Mecca of Foreign Exchange (London). We identify within this ecosystem and using information contained in more than 16 million observations the net exposures of each of our players, thereby contributing to the literature linking hedging demand, exchange rates and CIP deviations and opening the door to the use of granular instruments. Moreover, we also seek to identify the investment strategies of each of our players, finding some evidence for momentum, carry and macroeconomic news strategies for a subset. Our empirical analysis thus goes a step further to inform the design of theoretical models of exchange rate determination, which sit at the heart of international finance.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notation,

⁷This literature builds on models of spot exchange rate determination in imperfect financial markets, e.g., Hau and Rey 2006, Gabaix and Maggiori 2015, Ivashina et al. 2015, Stavrakeva and Tang 2021, Gourinchas et al. 2022, Greenwood et al. 2023, Bippus et al. 2023.

define our key variables of interest and provide a theoretical framework for decomposing firms' FX derivatives holdings into speculative and hedging components. Section 3 then discusses the UK FX derivatives data we use throughout the paper. Leveraging insights from these previous sections, Sections 4 and 5 detail the behavior of participants in the UK FX derivatives market, focusing on the market's structure and firms' net FX derivatives exposures, respectively. Lastly, Section 6 examines how firms' adjust their net FX derivatives exposures with respect to well-known FX investment strategies. Section 7 concludes.

2 Notation and Theoretical Framework

Before turning to the data, we first introduce notations and define the two key variables we study in the paper: firms' *net* currency-cross and currency derivatives exposures. We then present a theoretical framework that decomposes these net FX derivative exposures into speculative and hedging components, which we will use to interpret our empirical results.

Each FX derivatives contract refers to a currency pair, denoted by $\{k, m\}$, with k and m indexing the two different currencies. The contract reports two notional values linked to these two currencies. For example, if firm i is long currency k and short currency m via an n -period $\{k, m\}$ FX forward contract entered into at time t , the contract specifies that the firm will receive the notional amount $N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} > 0$ in currency k and will pay the notional amount $-\tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} > 0$ in currency m in n periods.⁸ The transaction-and-firm specific n -period FX forward rate is then defined as $F_{t,n}^{i,m/k} = -\frac{\tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}}{N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}}$, such that an increase implies a forward appreciation of currency k against currency m .⁹

Let c^i denote the currency of operation of firm i . Firm i 's profits in units of currency c^i

⁸If firm i is short currency k and long currency m via a $\{k, m\}$ contract, then it pays the notional amount $-N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} > 0$ in currency k and receives the notional amount $\tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} > 0$ in currency m in n periods.

⁹A client i chooses the notional for only one leg of the contract, $N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}$, and is quoted the forward rate by a market maker or dealer bank. Together, these determine the notional of the second leg of the contract.

from this derivatives transaction, realized in $t + n$, are:

$$\pi_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\},deriv} = N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} S_{t+n}^{c^i/k} + \tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} S_{t+n}^{c^i/m} = S_{t+n}^{c^i/m} \left(S_{t+n}^{m/k} - F_{t,n}^{i,m/k} \right) N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}, \quad (1)$$

where $S_{t+n}^{m/k}$ is the bilateral m/k spot exchange rate that prevails at $t + n$, with units of currency m per one unit of currency k . So long as firm i is long currency k and short currency m ($N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} > 0$), the transaction is profitable if $S_{t+n}^{m/k} > F_{t,n}^{i,m/k}$. That is, the transaction is profitable if the relative value of currency k to currency m in the spot market at $t + n$ is greater than the relative value implied by the n -day forward rate. We refer to $N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}$, our first key variable, as firm i 's net currency-cross exposure with respect to the $\{k, m\}$ cross at horizon n from this contract.¹⁰

In practice, firm i may enter into multiple n -period derivatives contracts across a range of currency crosses. Firm i 's total profits in units of currency c^i from all time- t n -period FX derivatives transactions can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{t,t+n}^{i,FX,deriv} &= \sum_{\{k,m\} \in \Omega_n} \pi_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\},deriv} = \sum_{\{k,m\} \in \Omega_n} \left(N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} S_{t+n}^{c^i/k} + \tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}} S_{t+n}^{c^i/m} \right) \\ &= \sum_l S_{t+n}^{c^i/l} \underbrace{\left(\sum_m N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{l,m\}} + \sum_k \tilde{N}_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,l\}} \right)}_{N_{t,t+n}^{i,l}}, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where Ω_n is the set of all derivatives contracts issued at t of horizon n , indexed by their currency pair $\{k, m\}$. We refer to $N_{t,t+n}^{i,l}$, our second key variable, as firm i 's net currency exposure with respect to currency l at horizon n . $N_{t,t+n}^{i,l}$ captures the net amount of currency l that firm i will receive (or pay if negative) at $t + n$, which is constructed by netting out all bilateral net currency-cross exposures in which firm i receives or pays currency l .¹¹

In summary, from equation (2), we see that firm i 's profits from trading FX derivatives are

¹⁰We use this terminology since $N_{t,t+n}^{i,\{k,m\}}$ reflects firm i 's net exposure to the bilateral exchange rate $S_{t+n}^{m/k}$ from this FX derivatives contract. When we move to the data, we will account for the fact that firm i may enter into multiple contracts in the same currency cross $\{k, m\}$ (and $\{m, k\}$) by netting the exposures from each contract, as we detail below.

¹¹ $N_{t,t+n}^{i,l}$ captures firm i 's net exposure to the $S_{t+n}^{c^i/l}$ exchange rate from all n -period FX derivatives contracts entered into at t .

a function of their net currency exposures, which in turn, via equation (1), depend on their net currency-cross exposures. This is why these two net FX derivative exposure measures are the two key variables we study in this paper.

There are advantages to studying *both* variables. On the one hand, it is very common for firms to transact “through the USD” due to the liquidity of crosses involving the USD in FX derivatives markets. For example, if a firm wants to short the *MXN* and long the *EUR*, it will often short the *MXN* and long the *USD* and, simultaneously in a second transaction, short the *USD* and long the *EUR*. These two contracts together are neutral with respect to the *USD*, a feature that would be ignored if we examine firms’ net exposures at the currency-cross level, which highlights a key benefit of focusing on firms’ currency exposures. On the other hand, investment strategies that use FX derivatives, such as the carry trade, are typically defined with respect to a currency cross, i.e., to go net-long a ‘higher-interest-rate’ country’s currency and net-short a ‘lower-interest-rate’ country’s currency. Thus, in order to investigate whether firms adjust derivatives positions in line with these FX investment strategies, we also consider firms’ net currency-cross exposures.

Building on these definitions, we introduce a framework for decomposing firms’ FX derivatives holdings into hedging and speculative components.¹² Consider, for simplicity, a UK-based firm, whose currency of operation is the *GBP*, that trades only the $\{USD, GBP\}$ cross using one-period FX derivatives. The firm solves a two-period optimization problem, $t = \{0, 1\}$, in which the total profits of firm i in *GBP* are given by $\pi_1^i = \pi_{0,1}^{i,FX,deriv} + X_1^{i,H}$, with $X_1^{i,H}$ denoting the non-FX derivatives profits of firm i , which are potentially exposed to the USD/GBP exchange rate. If firm i is a financial institution, $X_1^{i,H}$ reflects profits from the rest of the investment portfolio. If, instead, firm i is a non-financial corporation, $X_1^{i,H}$ reflects its operating profit. Assuming that firm i has mean-variance preferences and takes $X_1^{i,H}$ as given (e.g., because FX derivatives decisions are operationally disjoint from the rest

¹²This theoretical framework is suited to analyze the behavior of clients in the FX derivatives market.

of the firm), then firm i solves the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{N_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}} \tilde{E}_0^i \left(\pi_{0,1}^{i,FX,deriv} + X_1^{i,H} \right) - \frac{\rho}{2} Var \left(\pi_{0,1}^{i,FX,deriv} + X_1^{i,H} \right),$$

where $\pi_{0,1}^{i,FX,deriv} = \left(S_1^{GBP/USD} - F_{0,1}^{i,GBP/USD} \right) N_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ and \tilde{E}_0^i denotes firm i 's expectations, which can be subjective or objective. Firm i 's optimal net $\{USD, GBP\}$ derivatives exposure is:

$$N_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}} = \underbrace{\frac{\tilde{E}_0^i \left(S_1^{GBP/USD} - F_{0,1}^{i,GBP/USD} \right)}{\rho Var_0 \left(S_1^{GBP/USD} \right)}}_{Spec_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}} - \underbrace{\frac{Cov_0 \left(S_1^{GBP/USD}, X_1^{i,H} \right)}{Var_0 \left(S_1^{GBP/USD} \right)}}_{Hedge_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}}, \quad (3)$$

where we define $Spec_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ as the speculative component of firm i 's net FX derivatives exposure and $Hedge_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ as the hedging component.¹³ The sign of $Spec_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ is governed by firm i 's expectations about how the future spot exchange rate will compare to their contract-specific forward rate. Intuitively, the speculative component does not depend on firm i 's profits from their non-derivatives investments. Instead, these non-derivatives profits determine the sign of $Hedge_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ via their covariance with the future spot exchange rate. The relative magnitude of these two components is a function of firm i 's risk aversion ρ , where lower risk aversion increases the relative size of the speculative component compared to the hedging component.

To gain further intuition, consider the following concrete examples. First, assume firm i is an investment fund that holds the US stock market in its non-derivatives portfolio. In this case, $X_1^{i,H}$ increases if the USD appreciates against the GBP, i.e., $\frac{Cov_0 \left(S_1^{GBP/USD}, X_1^{i,H} \right)}{Var_0 \left(S_1^{GBP/USD} \right)} > 0$. This covariance results in a hedging component of FX derivatives holdings in which firm i is net-short the USD. Such a position is profitable when the USD depreciates against the GBP, providing a hedge against the FX risk from firm i 's non-derivatives portfolio. If firm i 's position in the US stock market is persistent and its hedging demand for FX derivatives

¹³Since firm i trades only the $\{USD, GBP\}$ cross and its currency of operation is the GBP , its net $\{USD, GBP\}$ currency-cross exposure $N_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$ is equivalent to a net USD currency exposure $N_{0,1}^{i,USD}$.

dominates its speculative demand, then we would expect firm i to be net-short the USD ($N_0^{i,\{USD,GBP\}} < 0$) over the whole sample.

Another example is if firm i were a non-financial corporation that operates in the UK (i.e., produces and pays wages primarily in the UK) and also, on net, exports to the US. As was the case for the UK investment fund, we would expect that $Hedge_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}} > 0$, i.e., net-short the USD, if firm i 's USD exports are priced in USD. This is because the firm's operating profits $X_1^{i,H}$, which depend on its USD sales revenue and its GBP input costs, increase as the USD appreciates against the GBP. The opposite is true if firm i is a net importer from the US, with imports priced in USD. Since the speculative component of non-financial corporations' FX derivatives positions are likely small (due to high risk aversion), and their net importer/exporter statuses and currencies of invoicing are relatively persistent, we would also expect non-financial corporates to have one-directional net currency exposures over the whole sample.¹⁴

In contrast, if firm i 's speculative demand, $Spec_{0,1}^{i,\{USD,GBP\}}$, dominates its hedging demand for FX derivatives, which might be the case if firm i is a financial firm with low risk aversion such as a hedge fund, we are unlikely to observe one-directional net currency derivatives exposures over the *whole* sample. This should be especially true for the currencies of advanced economies, for which it is rare to have persistent trends in nominal exchange rates that would show up in firms' exchange rate expectations and thereby lead to persistent one-directional exposures for speculative reasons. Instead, we would expect that firms' overall currency exposure should fluctuate and change sign in response to changes in firms' expectations, which may be linked to classic FX investment strategies such as the carry trade, momentum or macro-news based strategies. We investigate this hypothesis in detail in Section 6.

Online Appendix A.1 presents derivations for the general optimization problem with a firm

¹⁴Interestingly, Garofalo et al. (2024) document a significant decrease (increase) in the extent to which UK non-financial firms invoice in GBP (USD) following the Brexit referendum. Our data will allow us to see whether this was accompanied by a similarly dramatic change in UK firms' USD/GBP exposures.

that trades a range of currency crosses. The main difference is that the hedging component of the firm’s FX derivatives holdings also include an “across” FX derivatives hedging term. This additional term takes into account that the firm might trade the $\{USD, GBP\}$ currency cross, for example, to hedge FX risk that arose from the trading of different currency crosses.

3 Data

Turning to the data, this paper uses the UK segment of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) Trade Repository (TR) dataset of FX derivatives transactions, which we access via the Bank of England.¹⁵ This data contains all FX derivatives (e.g., swaps, forwards and futures) transactions that have either a UK entity as a counterparty or that have an EU entity as a counterparty, provided that the transactions take place on a UK trading venue or include the GBP.¹⁶ We retrieve these transactions from the two largest trade repositories for FX derivatives in the UK, Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) and UnaVista.¹⁷

Our analysis is conducted at a daily frequency and at the firm-level. To construct our final dataset from the raw second-by-second transaction-level data, we use two types of TR files: (i) daily activity files, which record the flow of new transactions that occurred on a given date; and (ii) end-of-month state files, which contain all open transactions, i.e., transactions that have not yet matured, as of that date. Using these two types of files, we construct a list of clean transactions, as described in Online Appendix B.¹⁸ We then aggregate each firms’ transactions on a given day to construct a series of end-of-day firm-level variables. We discuss how we construct these firm-level variables throughout the paper.

¹⁵This data was collected under EU EMIR.

¹⁶As only one of the counterparties needs to be a UK or EU firm—and because the UK is the world’s largest centre for currency trading—we also observe transactions involving non-UK and EU firms.

¹⁷Having examined other TRs, we are confident our sample covers the vast majority of UK FX derivatives trading over our sample. Of note, UnaVista is now known as LSEG Regulatory Reporting Limited.

¹⁸We have carefully cleaned the data and addressed the various data issues we detected, of which there were many, while still keeping as many transactions as possible. Figures B.1 and B.2 in the Online Appendix underscore the critical importance of data cleaning.

Our daily firm-level analysis begins on January 1, 2015, except for banks, where it begins on July 1, 2016. Although EMIR commenced in early 2014, the data quality is not adequate for our analysis in the beginning of the sample due to the transition to EMIR reporting.¹⁹ We also end our analysis on December 31, 2020. Due to the regulatory and reporting changes after the UK’s exit from the EU, the data after December 31, 2020 ceases to include reporting by EU-based entities, affecting data coverage.

Finally, to facilitate our analysis, we manually classify individual firms into broad sectors and sub-sectors. The five broad sectors we consider are: (i) asset managers; (ii) non-financial corporates; (iii) insurance companies; (iv) (non-bank) market makers;²⁰ and (v) banks. Within the asset management sector, we consider three sub-sectors: hedge funds, investment funds and pension funds. Within the banking sector, we consider two sub-sectors: dealer and non-dealer banks. In addition, we also sort firms based on their country of residence. Online Appendix B.4 provides further details on our sector classifications.

4 Overview of the UK OTC FX Derivatives Market

To introduce the OTC FX derivatives market in the UK, we provide summary statistics on the market’s participants, their transactions, and the market’s average size over our sample.


4.1 Firms and Transactions

We begin by tabulating the number of firms in each sector that transact in the UK OTC FX derivatives market at least once over our six-year sample. Figure 1a summarizes the statistics, which highlight that asset managers make up roughly 70% of the over 16,000

¹⁹We detected data issues for banks in 2015 and the first half of 2016, which were not present for other types of firms, and so begin analyzing banks on July 1, 2016.

²⁰Within non-bank market makers are all agents that plausibly play a market-making role in FX derivatives market, namely, FCA-authorized market makers, FX brokers, FX services firms, clearinghouses and financial market administrators.

Figure 1: Firms in the UK FX Derivatives Market



Note. Number of unique firms in the UK FX derivatives market, by sector and type of Asset Manager, and their countries of residence. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.


individual firms that we observe.²¹ The next largest segment are non-financial corporations, which make up close to 25% of all firms. The remaining 5% of firms are split roughly evenly between banks, insurance companies, and market makers. Within banks, we identify 21 dealers, with the remainder classified as non-dealer banks.

Investment funds are by far the most common type of asset manager trading FX derivatives (see Figure 1b), making up 89% of the 11,500 asset managers in our sample. Pension funds' share sits significantly lower at 8% while hedge funds' share is even lower at 3%.

²¹The entity of observation is at the fund-level, e.g., “Blackrock US Small Cap”, not at the institution-level, e.g., “Blackrock”.

Figure 2: FX Derivative Transactions by Sector

(a) Transactions per year by Sector (b) Transactions per year by Fund Type



Note. Average number of transactions per year across all currency-crosses and maturities, by sector and type of Asset Manager (i.e., type of fund). Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

Overall, since the vast majority of FX derivatives transactions have a dealer bank or market maker on (at least) one side of the contract, these statistics showcase the significant asymmetry between the number of clients and dealers/market makers in the OTC FX derivatives market.²²

Figure 1c sorts firms according to their country of residence. At one extreme, the vast majority of individual non-financial corporates, dealer banks and market makers in the UK FX derivatives market over our sample are UK-resident entities. At the other, over 2/3s of the individual investment funds and non-dealer banks in the UK market are resident in Europe. Lying in between are pension funds and insurance companies, whose countries of residence are split roughly evenly between the UK and EU. Interestingly, nearly 80% of the hedge funds in our sample are resident outside the UK and EU, with many in offshore tax havens. The significant share of non-UK entities in our sample highlights London's role as a global center for currency trading.

Moving from firms to their transactions, Figure 2a presents the yearly average number of FX derivatives transactions taken by all firms in each sector. The banking sector, as a whole,

²²Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix presents the number of firms in each sector trading FX derivatives in 4 “major” crosses. Figure A.2 presents the same for types of asset managers.

transacts 18 million times per year, on average, across all maturities and currency crosses, by far the most of any sector. This transaction volume is dominated by dealer banks (17 million per year). Market makers transact the second most, at about 4.5 million per year. Among clients, the asset management sector transacts the most, at nearly 2 million per year, followed by non-dealer banks (1 million per year), non-financial corporates (500 thousand per year) and insurance companies (50 thousand per year). Within the asset management sector, as shown in Figure 2b, the investment fund sector (900 thousand per year) and hedge fund sector (750 thousand per year) transact significantly more than the pension fund sector (120 thousand per year). On a per fund basis, however, individual investment funds and pension funds transact in similar amounts, whereas individual hedge funds transact over 20 times more frequently. That dealers transact significantly more than their clients showcases that the vast majority of transactions in the UK FX derivatives market occur between dealers.

In the Online Appendix, we break down each sector's and sub-sector's transactions by maturity (Figures A.3, A.4 and A.5) and currency-cross (Figures A.6, A.7 and A.8). Focusing first on the maturity profile, we find that 80% of market makers' transactions have a maturity of under 1 week, consistent with their use of high-frequency trading to limit the currency risk on their balance sheets. On the other hand, non-financial corporations tend to have much longer investment horizons, with over a third of their FX derivatives transactions having maturities of longer than 3 months. These longer-maturity contracts may be chosen to more-closely match the maturity of corporates' foreign-currency revenues and liabilities.²³ The majority of asset managers', banks' and insurers' derivatives transactions have maturities between 1 week and 2 months, with pension funds and insurers opting for slightly longer-maturity contracts than investment and hedge funds.

Shifting to the currency-cross composition of firms' transactions, we document that although the EUR/USD, EUR/GBP and USD/GBP crosses dominate as a share of firms'

²³Longer-maturity contracts are well-suited to hedge the FX risk associated with long-term foreign-currency investments. However, it is common for firms to hedge long-maturity FX exposures by continually rolling over short-maturity derivatives contracts, which are more liquid.

transactions, there is significant heterogeneity across sectors. For example, transactions in these three crosses account for between 44% and 58% of all FX derivatives transactions by investment funds, pension funds, insurers and non-financial corporations. However, the fraction is significantly less for dealer banks and hedge funds, where these three crosses account for only 26% and 21%, respectively, of all their transactions.

4.2 Market Size

From firms and transactions, we next move to a notion of market size based on the *stock* of firms' net currency-cross derivatives exposures.²⁴

To calculate firm i 's net currency-cross stock exposure for the $\{k, m\}$ currency cross at time (end-of-day) t , we net-out, across all maturities, all of firm i 's transaction-level $\{k, m\}$ cross exposures from all non-expired FX derivatives contracts, indexed by μ , as of t :

$$Stock_t^{i,\{k,m\}} = \sum_{\mu: \tau_{start}^\mu \leq t < \tau_{end}^\mu} N_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu,i,\{k,m\}} + \sum_{\mu: \tau_{start}^\mu \leq t < \tau_{end}^\mu} \tilde{N}_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu,i,\{m,k\}}, \quad (4)$$

where $N_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu,i,\{k,m\}}$ and $\tilde{N}_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu,i,\{m,k\}}$ are defined in Section 2.²⁵ The start and end timestamps for a contract μ are τ_{start}^μ and τ_{end}^μ and are measured in seconds while the time index t is at a daily frequency and is measured end of day. Therefore, $Stock_t^{i,\{k,m\}}$ reflects the net amount of currency k that firm i will receive (or pay if negative) in the future from all non-expired FX derivatives contracts in the $\{k, m\}$ cross as of the end of day t .²⁶

To measure the size of the UK FX derivatives market, we examine the sum of firms' *absolute* net currency-cross stock exposures, in USD and averaged over time, for each sector S , which is given by $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,\{k,m\}} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_t S_t^{USD/k} \sum_{i \in S} |Stock_t^{i,\{k,m\}}|$. This variable represents a measure of sector S 's daily footprint in the market for $\{k, m\}$ FX deriva-

²⁴Our measure of 'net market size' is constructed at the currency-cross level in order to compare with the 'gross market size' measure used by the BIS Triennial Survey.

²⁵In Section 2, we omitted the contract index μ since firm i traded only one contract in the $\{k, m\}$ cross.

²⁶To give a concrete example, to construct the net stock exposure on the 5th of January 2020, we consider all contracts that were entered into *prior* to the end of the day on the 5th of January 2020 and that are still open as of the end of the day on the 5th of January 2020.

tives in the UK based on how exposed firms in sector S are, on average, to the m/k bilateral exchange rate. The more firms there are in sector S , and the larger are these firms' net stock exposures, the greater is sector S 's footprint. Summing across all currency crosses yields sector S 's average daily footprint in the UK FX derivatives market $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,FX,deriv} = \sum_{\{k,m\} \in \Omega^{cross}} |\overline{Stock}|^{S,\{k,m\}}$, where Ω^{cross} is the set of all currency crosses.²⁷ We refer to this quantity as sector S 's "Market Size" in Figure 3. Finally, summing over all sectors gives the average daily size of the entire UK FX derivatives market $|\overline{Stock}|^{FX,deriv} = \sum_S |\overline{Stock}|^{S,FX,deriv}$ based on firms' net currency-cross stock exposures.

Figure 3 showcases that, across all sectors and crosses, the average (absolute) size of the UK FX derivatives market in net terms, $|\overline{Stock}|^{FX,deriv}$, is about 3 trillion USD, far less than the 37 trillion USD gross figure quoted in Borio et al. (2022).²⁸ The large discrepancy between measures of the gross and net size of the UK FX derivatives market points to a substantial amount of long and short derivatives positions in the same currency cross at the same time for the same firm.

In terms of the market sizes of individual sectors, $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,FX,deriv}$, the banking sector averages 2 trillion USD in absolute net stock exposure over our sample, the largest of any sector in the UK FX derivatives market. These stock exposures are taken predominantly by dealer banks (1.6 trillion USD see Figure A.10). This stands in marked contrast to market makers, who, despite their significant transaction volume, average only 10 billion USD in stock exposures over our sample. This highlights an important distinction between the behaviour of dealer banks and market makers in UK FX derivatives markets.²⁹

²⁷We ensure there is no double counting since if $\{k, m\} \in \Omega^{cross}$ then $\{m, k\} \notin \Omega^{cross}$ as the definition in equation (4) ensures that we consider both orderings when constructing our net stock exposure variable.


²⁸The latter value corresponds to the 97 trillion USD gross size of the global FX market in 2022 quoted by Borio et al. (2022), times the 38% UK market share quoted by the 2022 BIS Triennial Survey of FX Markets. The gross size is constructed by adding up the notional of all outstanding contracts across all firms, rather than netting contracts at the firm-level.

²⁹Note that we do not observe the FX derivatives positions of UK dealer banks in other jurisdictions, such as the US, and, as a result, do not observe dealer banks' global net exposure across all jurisdictions. In contrast, the non-bank market makers in our dataset are unlikely to have significant FX derivatives positions elsewhere, which explains their limited net exposures from contracts reported in the UK.

Figure 3: Average Absolute Value of Firms' Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures by Sector


(a) Asset Managers

Market Size: 600 Billion USD




(b) Non-Financial Corporates

Market Size: 250 Billion USD




(c) Insurers

Market Size: 70 Billion USD




(d) Market Makers

Market Size: 10 Billion USD



(e) Banks

Market Size: 2 Trillion USD



Note. Average absolute value of firms' *net* currency-cross stock exposures in USD across all firms in a sector $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,\{k,m\}}$ and across all currency crosses $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,FX,deriv}$. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

In terms of clients, asset managers have the largest footprint in FX derivatives markets, with absolute currency-cross net stock exposures averaging 600 billion USD, followed by non-dealer banks (450 billion USD), non-financial corporates (250 billion USD), and insurance companies (70 billion USD). Within asset managers, as shown in Figure A.9, hedge funds have limited net stock exposure, averaging only 40 billion USD, despite their significant transaction volume. Investment funds, by contrast, have significant net stock exposures averaging nearly 350 billion USD, with pension funds lying in between at 200 billion USD.³⁰

Turning to the composition of sectors' FX market footprint, $|\overline{Stock}|^{S,\{k,m\}}$, the EUR/USD and GBP/USD crosses represent the two largest currency-cross markets, as measured by firms' net stock exposures, for all sectors. For asset managers, namely pension funds and investment funds, as well as non-financial corporates and insurers, the EUR/USD and GBP/USD crosses capture a majority of their sectors' overall net stock exposures, with shares ranging from 51% to 70%. By contrast, for banks, market makers and hedge funds, the share of sector-wide stock exposures accounted for by these two "major" crosses are smaller, ranging from only 27% to 34%, since these sectors take positions in a much wider array of currency crosses. Aside from these two major crosses, the EUR/GBP and JPY/USD crosses also represent a significant share of each sectors' overall net cross stock exposure. More generally, sectors' net cross stock exposures are dominated by crosses involving G7 currencies. In terms of emerging market currency crosses, the CNY/USD cross is the most prevalent, especially for banks and hedge funds, although these average figures are skewed by the large exposures that these sectors built up during the US-China trade war. Overall, differences in the currency-crosses traded across sectors may reflect differences in the size and currency denomination of their assets/liabilities as well as differences in the degree to which they use derivatives to hedge versus speculate.

³⁰Of note, the average absolute net cross exposures of dealers (1.6 trillion USD) and clients (1.3 trillion USD) need not be equal for two reasons: 1. dealers take cross exposures with other dealers; and 2. dealers take cross exposures with foreign entities, especially through intra-group transactions.

5 Currency Positions

This section documents a series of novel facts related to firms’ and sectors’ net *currency* stock exposures from FX derivatives. We focus on net currency exposures since firms’ profits and losses when trading FX derivatives depend on the net amount of, e.g., USD, they are set to receive or pay in the future, regardless of the underlying composition of trades across different currency crosses (see Section 2). This makes firms’ net currency stock exposures central in theoretical models.

Based on equation (2), firm i ’s net currency- l stock exposure is constructed by netting all of firm i ’s transaction-level currency-cross exposures from all non-expired contracts in which it receives or pays currency l :

$$Stock_t^{i,l} = \sum_{m \neq l} \left\{ \sum_{\mu: \tau_{start}^\mu \leq t < \tau_{end}^\mu} N_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu, i, \{l, m\}} + \sum_{\mu: \tau_{start}^\mu \leq t < \tau_{end}^\mu} \tilde{N}_{\tau_{start}^\mu, \tau_{end}^\mu}^{\mu, i, \{m, l\}} \right\}. \quad (5)$$

$Stock_t^{i,l}$ therefore measures firm i ’s net exchange-rate exposure to currency l from all FX derivatives contracts that remain open as of time t . To help interpret $Stock_t^{i,l}$ in the data, we leverage insights from our theoretical framework in Section 2, which showed that firms’ net currency exposures are comprised of a hedging component—which is often one-directional due to persistence in firms’ non-derivatives operations—and a speculative component—whose direction is likely to fluctuate over time due to changes in exchange-rate expectations.

5.1 Net Currency Stock Exposures

We begin by presenting sector-level net currency stock exposures, constructed by summing the positive and negative net stock exposures of firms in a given sector S , i.e., we report $Stock_t^{S,l} = \sum_{i \in S} Stock_t^{i,l}$. This variable captures how exposed sector-level aggregate profits from FX derivatives are to movements in the currency- l exchange rate (vis-à-vis the firms’ currencies of operation). Figures 4 and 5 display sector-level net currency stock exposures for the three major currencies traded in the UK: the USD, EUR, and GBP. We further break

down these sector-level net exposures into the net exposures taken by UK- and EU-resident firms, which are presented in Figures A.11 and A.12 in the Online Appendix.³¹ Together, these figures reveal a number of noteworthy facts.

I. Direction


The first set of facts relate to the direction of firms' net currency stock exposures. The asset management sector—namely pension funds and investment funds—along with the insurance sector, always maintain a stock of net-long exposures to both the EUR and GBP and net-short exposures to the USD. Strikingly, these positions are highly stratified according to firms' country of residence: EU-based firms in these financial sectors carry net-long EUR and net-short USD exposures while UK-based firms hold net-long GBP and net-short USD exposures. Notably, EU- (UK-) based firms in these sectors retain minimal net exposure to the GBP (EUR). Through the lens of our framework in Section 2, these one-directional net currency exposures are consistent with a strong hedging demand for FX derivatives. Specifically, these positions are consistent with the UK- and EU-based financial firms in these sectors holding persistent long positions in USD-denominated securities, with obligations indexed in either GBP or EUR, which they seek to hedge via FX derivatives.³²

Turning to non-financial corporations, the sector is net-short the USD for most of the sample, net-long the EUR and, different to financial firms, net-short the GBP. Most of the non-financial sector's net-short USD exposure is held by EU-resident corporates, who are also commensurately net-long the EUR. These positions may once again be driven by hedging demand. Specifically, if EU corporates are net-exporters to the US and invoice US sales in USD, then they would hedge future profits from US sales by maintaining a stock of net-short USD derivatives exposures. In terms of the other currencies, the corporate sector's net-short

³¹We present this decomposition by country of residence only for the client sectors, since there are too few market makers and dealer banks in some cases to preserve anonymity. Similarly, since there are very few UK hedge funds in our sample, we decompose the hedge fund sector's net exposures into the exposures by EU and non-EU hedge funds.


³²Although the magnitudes are small, the UK asset management and insurance sectors are persistently net-short the EUR while their EU counterparts are persistently net-short the GBP. These one-directional exposures are also consistent with a hedge by these UK (EU) firms of their EUR (GBP) denominated assets.

Figure 4: Sector-Level Net Currency Stock Exposures to Major 3 Currencies



Note. Sector-level net currency stock exposures, calculated as the net currency stock exposure (see equation (5)) of firms in a particular currency vis-à-vis all other currencies and then aggregated across firms in a particular sector, for the major three currencies—USD, EUR, GBP. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

Figure 5: Asset Manager Types' Net Currency Stock Exposures to Major 3 Currencies



Note. Types of asset managers' net currency stock exposures, calculated as the net currency stock exposure (see equation (5)) of firms in a particular currency vis-à-vis all other currencies and then aggregated across firms in a particular sector, for the major three currencies—USD, EUR, GBP. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 and December 31 2020.

GBP exposure, as well as much of their net-long EUR exposure, can be rationalized by the hedging demand of both UK- and EU-resident non-financials. Specifically, UK-based corporates may be net-short the GBP and net-long the EUR to hedge the cost of future intermediate inputs imported from the Eurozone. Relatedly, EU-based non-financial firms may be net-exporters to the UK and choose to hedge their UK sales revenue, priced in GBP, by taking net-short GBP and net-long EUR derivatives exposures.

We next move to the currency positions of hedge funds and non-dealer banks. Different to the other sectors, hedge funds' net currency stock exposure to all three major currencies

changes signs repeatedly over time. This may be due to frequent FX derivatives rebalancing in response to market developments, indicative of a stronger speculative demand for FX derivatives, as compared to hedging demand. For instance, hedge funds move to being net-long the USD at the start of the Fed hiking cycle in 2015, a period in which the USD appreciated. Similarly, non-dealer banks' USD exposure is also volatile and changes sign over our sample, which suggests that speculative demand may play a role for their overall FX derivatives positions as well. Interestingly, the direction of the net stock exposures taken by EU and non-UK hedge funds over time are similar. Conversely, the positions taken by UK and EU non-dealer banks are distinct, with EU-based entities' net exposures being more stable and one directional compared to those of UK-based entities. This suggests that hedging demand may be more prominent for EU-resident non-dealer banks than for UK-resident ones.

In the case of market makers, we would expect that if we observe all of their transactions, their net exposure should be very close to zero. This is precisely the case for the GBP. The net exposure with respect to the EUR is close to zero as well. However, their USD exposure sometimes deviate from zero, most likely due to us not observing some of their USD transactions, reported elsewhere. Having said that, the value of the market making sectors' net USD stock exposure is generally below 10 billion USD, despite the tens of thousands of daily transactions we document for market makers.

In contrast to these other sectors, the 21 large dealer banks in our sample are net-long the USD and net-short the EUR and GBP. Dealer banks therefore appear to be the primary sector accommodating clients' FX derivatives demand in the UK market by taking the complementary net currency stock exposures.


Importantly, due to potential within-sector heterogeneity in firms' FX derivatives use, sector-level net exposures may obscure whether individual firms' net exposures are one-directional or change signs frequently over time. To address this, Figure 6 presents the fraction of days that individual firms in a given sector have net-long currency stock exposures

to the EUR, GBP and USD. This firm-level analysis allows us to evaluate the share of firms within each sector that have one-directional net exposures over most of our sample.

We find that over 70% of individual pension funds, insurance companies, and non-financial corporates maintain the same one-sided exposures to the USD, EUR and GBP over at least 80% of our sample. This is consistent with strong one-directional hedging demand by the majority of individual firms in these sectors. The proportion is slightly lower for the investment fund sector, where about 65% of individual investment funds maintain the same one-directional net exposure at least 80% of the time. Individual hedge funds and non-dealer banks are even less likely to maintain persistent one-sided net exposures, especially to the USD, with shares ranging from only about 50-60%. This suggests that speculative demand may play a larger role in the FX derivatives use of firms in these sectors. Overall, these firm-level findings are in line with the conclusions from our sector-level analysis.³³

³³Of note, from Figures A.13 and A.14 in the Online Appendix, we see that UK investment funds (EU non-dealer banks) tend to be more one-directional than their EU (UK) counterparts.

Figure 6: Distribution of Firms' One-Directional Net Currency Stock Exposure by Sector



Note. Figure 6 presents the distribution of the fraction of days that individual firms in a given sector have net-long (positive) currency exposures to the EUR, GBP and USD, for eight sectors. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.

II. Magnitude

The second set of facts relate to the magnitude of sectors' net currency stock exposures. Over our sample, the asset management sector's net currency stock exposure is significantly larger than those of the other client sectors. At its peak in 2017Q3, asset managers as a whole had a net-short position in the USD of just under 450 billion USD—reflecting the roughly 250 and 200 billion USD net-short positions by pension funds and investment funds, respectively. They were, in this period, also net-long the EUR and GBP to the tune of 300 billion EUR and 110 billion GBP, respectively. By comparison, non-financial corporates', non-dealer banks' and insurers' net currency exposures are smaller. In the case of corporates and non-dealer banks, as we document in the next sub-section, the sector's relatively small net currency exposure, as compared to their absolute exposures displayed in Figure 3, reflects significant within-sector heterogeneity in the direction of firms' currency derivatives use.

While dealer banks absorb UK clients' net currency demand, the two groups' currency exposures are not equal and opposite to one another, pointing to substantial cross-border leakage from the UK FX derivatives market. For example, in 2017Q3, dealer banks have a net-long USD exposure of over 1 trillion USD, whereas all other sectors combined have a net-short USD position of less than 700 billion USD. This discrepancy is due to dealer banks' transactions with foreign entities, in particular, with their foreign headquarters and/or subsidiaries. These intra-group transactions allow dealer banks to manage their currency exposures while continuing to meet client demand.

III. Patterns and Trends

The third set of facts relate to patterns in sectors' net currency stock exposures over time. The asset management sector's net USD and EUR stock exposures decrease dramatically from 2017Q3 to 2018Q1, shrinking from -450 billion to -100 billion USD and from 300 billion to 30 billion EUR, respectively. While their net USD exposures partially rebound to near -200 billion USD, their net EUR exposures do not. The sector's net GBP exposure declines as well, although more mildly, before fully rebounding. As can be seen in Figure 5, about

70% of the initial decline comes from a reduction in pension funds' net exposures, with the remainder due to a fall in investment funds' net exposures. Beginning a year later, we also observe a significant but more gradual decline in the net USD and EUR exposures of non-financial corporates and dealer banks, although these are not accompanied by movements in their GBP exposures.

To interpret these trends, we decompose these sectors' net currency exposures by firms' country of residence, as well as by firms' size, in order to help distinguish between the intensive and extensive margins of adjustment. Beginning with pension funds, we observe that about 70% of the decline in this sector's USD net exposures can be attributed to the departure of a handful of very large European pension funds from our sample over this period (see Figures A.12 and A.22).³⁴ This extensive margin adjustment cuts the European pension fund sector's net EUR exposure in the UK derivatives market to near zero in early-2018.

The remaining 30% of the decline in pension funds' USD net exposures, as well as most the decline in the sector's GBP net exposures, comes from UK pension funds along the intensive margin (see once again Figures A.12 and A.22). UK pension funds may have had an incentive to build up larger net exposures in 2016 and 2017 as a hedge against greater economic uncertainty in the UK—tied to the Brexit referendum—and in the US—tied to the presidential election—which they then unwound from 2017Q3 to 2018Q1.

A similar pattern is present for the investment fund sector: about 70% of the decline in the sector's net USD exposure reflects reduced exposures by EU investment funds—including by the largest funds—with the remaining 30% due to reduced exposures by UK investment funds, mostly along the intensive margin (see Figures A.12 and A.23). The intensive-margin adjustment may once again reflect the unwinding of net exposures built up during the period of heightened geopolitical risk in 2016-2017. Interestingly, UK investment funds' net exposures, especially with respect to the GBP, rebound following their trough in

³⁴To assess the contribution of the departure of large funds, Figure A.22 separately aggregates the exposures of funds that are net-long and net-short as well as highlights the net exposures taken by the largest funds, as outlined in the next Section 5.2.

2018Q1.

Turning to non-financial corporates, we observe that the erosion of their USD and EUR net exposures can be almost entirely attributed to a reduction in exposures by EU-based entities (see Figures A.11 and A.20). In terms of dealer banks, the decline in their USD and EUR net exposures occurs predominantly via the EUR/USD currency cross.³⁵ In both cases, while these sectors' USD and EUR net exposures decline considerably, we do not observe any changes in their net GBP exposures.

In all, these patterns are consistent with the reduction of EUR trading and the departure of EU-based entities from the UK FX derivatives market in anticipation of Brexit-related regulatory changes, which eventually came into effect at the end of 2020.

5.2 Heterogeneity and Concentration

Next, we leverage our firm-level data to examine within-sector heterogeneity and concentration in firms' currency derivatives net stock exposures. Relative to the previous section, rather than netting out the positive and negative currency stock exposures across firms in a sector, we separately aggregate the exposures of firms who are net-long and net-short particular currencies to generate sector-level net-long and net-short currency stock exposures. Specifically, we construct $Stock_t^{S_t^+, l} = \sum_{i \in S_t^+} Stock_t^{i, l}$ and $Stock_t^{S_t^-, l} = \sum_{i \in S_t^-} Stock_t^{i, l}$, where S_t^+ and S_t^- correspond to the set of firms in sector S that are net-long and net-short currency l at time t , respectively. This enables us to explore within-sector heterogeneity in the direction and magnitude of firms' currency exposure.

Furthermore, to investigate within-sector concentration in firms' currency derivatives positions, we also distinguish the positions taken by the largest firms in each sector—those with the largest sample-average absolute net stock exposures—from those taken by smaller players. Specifically, we decompose, e.g., $Stock_t^{S_t^+, l}$ into the exposures of three mutually exclu-

³⁵Figures A.26 and A.27 in the Online Appendix present sector-level net *currency-cross* stock exposures for the major crosses. Figures A.28 and A.29 do the same broken down by firms' country of residence.

sive groups denoted by $Stock_t^{S_t^{+,m},l}$, where $m \in \{5 \text{ Largest Players}, \text{Next 10 Largest Players}, \text{Smaller Players}\}$, with $Stock_t^{S_t^-,l}$ decomposed analogously.³⁶

Sectoral net-long and net-short USD stock exposures, broken down by firm size, are displayed in Figures 7 and 8. The corresponding figures for the EUR and GBP are shown in Figures A.15 – A.18 in the Online Appendix. Figures A.19 — A.25 in the Online Appendix further break down the sectoral net-long/short exposures by firms' countries of residence.³⁷

I. Concentration

Beginning with results on sectoral concentration, we first highlight that the investment fund industry is significantly less concentrated than other sectors, as seen by the relatively small share of the sector's overall USD, EUR and GBP net stock exposures maintained by the largest 5 (and next largest 10) players, which are shaded in light (dark) blue. This result holds for both UK and EU investment funds. The corporate sector's net stock exposures are also distributed relatively evenly across firms, although this result is driven entirely by UK-based non-financials. Similarly, while the net stock exposures taken by the UK pension fund sector are more dispersed, the EU pension fund sector's net positions are attributable to only a handful of large firms. The opposite is the case for non-dealer banks, where UK-based firms' exposures are more concentrated than those of their EU-resident counterparts.

Instead, even when broken down by country of residence, the insurance, market making, hedge fund and dealer bank sectors are all highly concentrated. At the extreme, the five largest dealer banks hold on-average about 90% of the sector's entire USD net stock exposure.

II. Heterogeneity


Second, we observe considerable heterogeneity in the direction of individual asset managers', corporates' and non-dealer banks' net stock exposures. The heterogeneity in asset

³⁶For example, $S_t^{+,5 \text{ Largest Players}}$ is the aggregated net-long currency- l stock exposure at time t of firms in sector S that are among the 5 Largest Players in sector S in terms of sample-average absolute net stock exposure in currency l .


³⁷Figures A.30–A.38 in the Online Appendix present sectoral net-long/short *currency-crosses* stock exposures for the major crosses, again distinguishing between large and small players. Figures A.39–A.45 do the same broken down by firms' country of residence.

Figure 7: Firms' Net-Long and Net-Short USD Stock Exposures Across Sectors


(a) Asset Managers




(b) Non-Financial Corporates




(c) Insurers




(d) Market Makers



(e) Non-Dealer Banks




(f) Dealer Banks



Note. Sectoral net-long and net-short USD stock exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the net stock exposures of firms in a sector that are net-long and net-short the USD vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short USD stock exposures, which is shown in Figure 4. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms (players) in the sector in terms of average net USD stock exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller firms. USD stock exposures are measured in units of USD. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.

Figure 8: Firms’ Net-Long and Net-Short USD Stock Exposures Across Fund Types



Note. Types of asset managers’ (funds’) net-long and net-short USD stock exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the net stock exposures of firms in a sector who are net-long and net-short the USD vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short USD stock exposures, which is shown in Figure 5. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average net USD stock exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller players. USD stock exposures are measured in units of USD. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

managers’ net exposures is primarily due to the investment fund industry. As a result, while the net USD stock exposure of the asset management industry peaks at around -450 billion USD, the sum of the absolute value of individual funds’ net-short and net-long stock is nearly 750 billion USD, reflecting short positions of 600 billion USD and long positions of 150 billion USD. This cross-sectional heterogeneity in the direction of asset managers’—namely, UK and EU investment funds’—USD positions may reflect differences across funds in the currency denomination of their assets/liabilities or the extent to which they use derivatives to hedge

vs. speculate. A similar pattern is present for UK-resident non-financial corporations and EU-resident non-dealer banks.

In contrast, there is limited within-sector heterogeneity in the direction of UK and EU pension funds' and insurance companies' net exposures. This may reflect within-sector similarities in firms' non-derivatives portfolios alongside strong hedging demand.

6 FX Investment Strategies

The previous section studied patterns in the cross-section and time series of firms' net currency stock exposures, which primarily shed light on the hedging component of firms' FX derivatives use by sector and country of residence. In this section, we shift focus to the speculative component of firms' FX derivatives demand by examining how firms adjust their exposures "on the margin" with respect to three well-known FX investment strategies: the carry trade, momentum, and a strategy based on the arrival of exchange-rate-relevant macroeconomic news.

Our empirical analysis is once again motivated by the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2, which showed that firms' FX derivatives demand is comprised of a hedging component and a speculative component. In particular, equation (3) expressed the speculative component of firms' FX derivatives demand as a function of their expected excess return. These expectations, and hence firms' net exposures, may load on classic FX investment strategies.

To evaluate this, we use firms' net *currency-cross* stock exposures, defined in equation (4), since FX investment strategies are defined with respect to a currency cross. We focus on the net exposures of the most-traded currency crosses in our dataset, namely, the EUR/USD, GBP/USD, EUR/GBP and JPY/USD. For a given currency cross $\{m, k\}$ and a series of horizons (days) $h = [0, 90]$, we estimate three sets of firm-level panel regressions, by sector, to assess the extent to which the net cross exposures of firms in a given sector adjust in ways

consistent with the three FX investment strategies. Each set of regressions estimates:

$$\frac{Stock_{t+h}^{i,\{m,k\}} - Stock_{t-1}^{i,\{m,k\}}}{|Stock^{i,\{m,k\}}|} = \alpha_i^h + \beta^h Z_{t+h}^{m,k} + u_{i,t}^h, \quad (6)$$

where, as before, $Stock_t^{i,\{m,k\}}$ is firm i 's net currency-cross stock exposure in cross $\{m, k\}$ defined such that an increase corresponds to a greater net-long (short) stock exposure to currency m (k). The change in exposure is scaled by the sample-average absolute firm-level net exposure, $\overline{|Stock^{i,\{m,k\}}|} = (1/T) \sum_t |Stock_t^{i,\{m,k\}}|$. We winsorize the dependent variable at the 1% and 99% levels to remove outliers. α_i^h is a firm fixed effect and we examine horizons $h = [0, 90]$ (days) to capture the fact that firms may re-balance over different horizons. In each set of regressions, $Z_{t+h}^{m,k}$ is a variable that defines the FX investment strategy in terms of country m and k observables, as outlined below.

It is important to point out that the hedging component of firms' FX derivatives holdings are subsumed in the residual $u_{i,t}^h$. This implies that estimates of β^h will capture both trading in line with the given FX investment strategy and co-movement between firms' hedging demand and the variable $Z_{t+h}^{m,k}$.

I. Carry Trade

Given the well-known forward premium puzzle, firm i may expect to earn a positive excess return from an investment strategy in which they go net-long a 'higher-interest-rate' country's currency and net-short a 'lower-interest-rate' country's currency. In other words, firm i may believe that $\tilde{E}_t^i (S_{t+h}^{k/m} - F_{t,h}^{i,k/m})$ is increasing in the country m versus k interest rate differential, $r_t^m - r_t^k$. This implies a specification with:

$$Z_{t+h}^{m,k} = (r_{t+h}^m - r_{t+h}^k) - (r_{t-1}^m - r_{t-1}^k)$$

We use 10-year nominal government bond yields to measure interest rate differentials in our baseline, but find similar results when using 1-year nominal government bond yields.

As a concrete example, consider the EUR/USD cross where $m = USD$ and $k = EUR$.

Firms speculating based on the carry trade strategy on the margin would increase their net-long (net-short) stock exposure to the USD (EUR), through the EUR/USD cross, as US interest rates rise relative to German yields. This will result in a more positive β_h . A negative β^h would instead likely reflect a covariance between interest differentials and the hedging component of firms' FX derivatives demand.

II. Momentum

Another well-known FX investment strategy is momentum, where firm i may expect that if one currency has appreciated against another over the past month, it will continue appreciating in the future in excess of the forward rate, i.e., $\tilde{E}_t^i \left(S_{t+h}^{k/m} - F_{t,h}^{i,k/m} \right)$ may be increasing in the log exchange rate change, $s_t^{k/m} - s_{t-30}^{k/m}$. This implies a specification with:

$$Z_{t+h}^{m,k} = (s_{t+h}^{k/m} - s_{t-30+h}^{k/m}) - (s_{t-1}^{k/m} - s_{t-30-1}^{k/m})$$

Again, considering an example with $m = USD$ and $k = EUR$, firms that trade on a momentum FX strategy will increase their net-long derivatives positions in the USD and their net-short positions in the EUR as the 30-day USD appreciation against the EUR grows. This results in a more positive β^h . Conversely, if firms take a “reversal” investment strategy of decreasing their net-long (net-short) USD (EUR) derivatives exposure as the USD’s appreciation against the EUR grows, we would see a more negative β^h . Again, however, a negative β^h would more likely be due to firms’ hedging demand.

III. Macro News

Lastly, we consider how firms adjust their FX derivatives exposures based on the arrival of macroeconomic news that moves exchange rates. Specifically, firm i ’s expectation for future exchange rate movements, $\tilde{E}_t^i \left(S_{t+h}^{k/m} - F_{t,h}^{i,k/m} \right)$, may be related to contemporaneous and lagged macro news surprises, with each surprise defined as the difference between the actual value released for a macroeconomic variable, such as GDP, unemployment or inflation in country k or m , and the consensus expectation for that variable from survey responses.

To examine how firms adjust their net FX derivatives exposures in response to macro news, we estimate: This implies a specification with:

$$Z_{t+h}^{m,k} = \mathbf{MacroNews}_{t-1,t+h}^{m,k}$$

where $\mathbf{MacroNews}_{t-1,t+h}^{m,k}$ is an aggregate between dates t and $t+h$ of a daily FX macroeconomic news index. Similar to Stavrakeva and Tang (2024), this FX macroeconomic news index is the fitted value from the following daily regression:

$$\Delta s_t^{k/m} = \alpha + \gamma \mathbf{MacroSurp}_t + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $\mathbf{MacroSurp}_t$ contains contemporaneous and lagged macroeconomic surprises.³⁸ As this FX macroeconomic news index explains 50-60% of monthly and quarterly exchange rate movements (Stavrakeva and Tang, 2024), it may correlate with firms' exchange-rate expectations.

Taking the $m = USD$ and $k = EUR$ example, firms may adjust their FX derivatives demand in a way that propagates macro news to exchange rates by increasing their net-long stock exposure to the *USD* vis-à-vis the *EUR* over the same period in which US and Euro-area macro news appreciates the *USD* against the *EUR*. Such behavior would result in a more positive β^h . Conversely, if firms adjust FX derivatives exposure in a manner contrary to the transmission of macro news to exchange rates, then this would push β^h to be more negative, which may again be due to firms' hedging demand.

6.1 Adjusting Net FX Derivatives Exposures “On the Margin”

Figure 9 presents results by sector from estimating regression (6) in the *EUR/USD* cross for each of the three FX investment strategies. In particular, Figure 9 displays results for three sectors—hedge funds, non-financial corporates and dealer banks—since, as we discuss


³⁸We use the lag structure $\{0, 1, 2, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180\}$ for the macro surprises in the estimation, where if a macroeconomic surprise is not present on a given date, we use the latest available surprise. For the full list of macro surprises, see section B.5 in the Online Appendix.

below, these three sectors define three distinct patterns of “on-the-margin” adjustment, with the other sectors’ behavior aligning—albeit less consistently across the different strategies and currencies—into one (or more) of these patterns. The results for the other sectors and other crosses, which we discuss in this section as well, are displayed in the Online Appendix A.4. By studying the adjustment of all sectors, we can shed light for the first time on how net exposures equilibrate across the entire FX derivatives market in response to moves in interest rates, exchange rates and macro news.

First, we find clear and robust evidence that hedge funds adjust their net derivatives exposures in line with the carry trade, momentum and macro-news FX investment strategies, with their positive rebalancing coefficients evident across almost all adjustment horizons up to 1 quarter. Furthermore, these FX adjustments hold not only for the EUR/USD cross but also for the GBP/USD, JPY/USD and EUR/GBP crosses as well (see Figures A.46–A.48). Given that FX derivatives hedging demand is likely second order for hedge funds, these estimated coefficients predominantly reflect changes in hedge funds’ speculative demand for FX derivatives in response to changes in interest differentials, exchange rates and macro news. Importantly, by increasing their net exposures to higher-yielding and appreciating (both independent of and due to macro news) currencies, hedge funds likely exert price pressure that pushes exchange rates back toward their fundamental values. Hedge funds therefore appear to play an important role as arbitrageurs in FX derivatives markets.

Speculative demand also appears to play some role in investment funds’ and non-dealer banks’ overall FX derivatives demand, although the results are weaker than for hedge funds and depend on the currency cross, investment strategy and horizon h (see Figures A.49–A.52). In particular, investment funds appear to perform the carry trade in the EUR/USD, JPY/USD and EUR/GBP crosses, but not in the USD/GBP. Further, there is little consistent evidence that investment funds trade speculatively on momentum and macro news. There is also some evidence that non-dealer banks perform the carry trade in the EUR/USD, GBP/USD and JPY/USD crosses and trade speculatively on macro news in the EUR/USD

Figure 9: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' EUR-USD Derivatives Exposure



Note. Figure 9 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—hedge funds, non-financial corporates and dealer banks—in the EUR/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

and GBP/USD crosses, although again the results are much weaker than for hedge funds.

Overall, the lower β^h 's and wider error bands for investment funds and non-dealer banks

compared to hedge funds likely reflect the significant within-sector heterogeneity in firms' FX derivatives use. In particular, many firms in these sectors likely have strong hedging demand for FX derivatives, which may be associated with negative β^h 's, muddying the results. Disentangling this within-sector heterogeneity is an interesting avenue for future research.

Turning to the behavior of non-financial corporations, Figure 9 highlights that firms in this sector robustly move in the opposite direction to hedge funds across all three investment strategies, decreasing their exposures on the margin to higher-interest-rate and appreciating (both independent of and due to macro news) currencies. Analogous to hedge funds, these negative β^h 's hold across horizons h and for the GBP/USD and EUR/GBP crosses as well (see Figures A.46–A.48).³⁹ These negative coefficients most likely reflect a co-movement between corporations' hedging demand and the variables defining these investment strategies. Taking the EUR/USD cross as an example, higher U.S. interest rates that appreciate the dollar, potentially due to positive U.S. macro news, may be associated with greater USD-denominated sales revenues for non-financials, which they may chose to hedge by going more net-short the USD in derivatives markets. Importantly, this hedging demand would exert price pressure that pushes exchange rates away from their fundamentals, suggesting that non-financials appear to be an important class of "noise traders" through the lens of international macro models.

In addition to non-financials, there is some evidence that pension funds and insurance companies also move in the opposite direction to hedge funds with respect to these investment strategies, which suggest they can behave as noise traders as well (see Figures A.53–A.56). The results are clearest for pension funds in the USD/GBP currency cross and for insurance companies in the EUR/USD cross. For these sectors, however, the direction of their rebalancing depends on the currency cross, suggesting the presence of cross-specific correlations between pension funds' and insurers' hedging demand and the variables defining these investment strategies. As a result, even if ultimately tied to their hedging demand,

³⁹The results are not present for the JPY/USD cross, where non-financial corporates are much less active.

pension funds and insurance companies do not always behave as noise traders.⁴⁰

Finally, dealer banks appear largely insulated from exposure to these three investment strategies, as shown in Figure 9 as well as in Figures A.46–A.48 for the other crosses. Since dealer banks are on (at least) one side of almost all transactions in the FX derivatives market, this suggests that they take offsetting exposures with speculative arbitrageurs—like hedge funds—and hedging noise traders—like non-financials—as well as potentially offload exposures to their foreign headquarters/subsidiaries (which we do not observe). Despite being net-neutral on the margin, banks presumably still earn profits from their positions by discriminating between the forward rates charged to arbitrageurs and noise traders, suggesting a toll-taking (e.g., Duffie et al. (2005)) rather than an arbitrageur business model for dealers in the FX derivatives market.

Market-makers, on the other hand, are less able to remain neutral with respect to most investment strategies (see Figures A.53–A.56). They sometimes appear to accommodate speculators’ demand, although the magnitudes are usually small, suggestive of a desire to offset these exposures à la dealer banks.

7 Conclusion

This paper uses contract-level data to document important facts about the use of FX derivatives by firms, both financial and non-financial, in the largest center for currency trading, London.

We construct the daily *net* FX derivatives exposure at the *firm-level* for the near-universe of firms trading FX in the UK over the period 2015–2020. This measure, which contrasts with the sector-level net or gross exposures used in many existing studies, enables us to better capture within- and across-sector heterogeneity in the degree to which firms’ profits

⁴⁰To properly understand how the observed FX derivatives rebalancing co-moves with the firms’ hedging demand, we would require additional information on the rest of these firms’ portfolios/balance sheets, which are not readily available for the wide-range of sectors we consider here. We leave these explorations for future work.

are exposed to exchange rate fluctuations from FX derivatives. Leveraging our firm-level net FX derivatives exposures, we show that individual pension funds, insurance companies, non-financial corporates and, to a lesser degree, investment funds, maintain persistent one-directional net-short exposures to the USD and net-long exposures to their currencies of operation over our sample, consistent with their use of FX derivatives for hedging purposes “on average”. Dealer banks accommodate these firms’ hedging needs by maintaining persistent net-long USD exposures.

Shifting to firms’ speculative use of FX derivatives, we examine how firms adjust their net FX derivatives exposures “on the margin” with respect to three well-known FX investment strategies: the carry trade, momentum and macro news-based FX trading. Our findings show that hedge funds, and, to a lesser extent, non-dealer banks and investment funds, speculate on the margin using FX derivatives, whereas most other clients most likely adjust exposures on the margin in a manner consistent with hedging. Owing to the heterogeneity, dealers are able to remain neutral on-the-margin with respect to these investment strategies.

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A Appendix

A.1 Derivations

Here we derive the general optimization problem of firm i with currency of operation c^i .

Firm i solves the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}}} \tilde{E}_0^i [\pi_1^i] - \frac{\rho}{2} Var_0 (\pi_1^i) \\
&= \tilde{E}_0^i [\pi_1^{i,FX,deriv} + X_1^{i,H}] - \frac{\rho}{2} [Var_0 (\pi_1^{i,FX,deriv}) + Var_0 (X_1^{i,H}) + 2Cov_0 (\pi_1^{i,FX,deriv}, X_1^{i,H})] \\
&= \tilde{E}_0^i \left[\sum_{\{k,m\}} \left[S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m} \right] N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}} + X_1^{i,H} \right] \\
&- \frac{\rho}{2} \left[\begin{array}{l} \sum_{\{k,m\}} Var_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}) (N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}})^2 + \\ 2 \sum_{\{l,n\}: \{l,n\} \neq \{k,m\}} Cov_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}, S_1^{c^i/l} - (F_{0,1}^{i,n/l}) S_1^{c^i/n}) N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}} N_{0,1}^{i,\{l,n\}} \\ + Var_0 (X_1^{i,H}) + 2 \sum_{\{k,m\}} Cov_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}, X_1^{i,H}) N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}} \end{array} \right], \\
N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}} &= \frac{\tilde{E}_0^i [S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}]}{\rho Var_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m})} \\
&- \frac{\sum_{\{l,n\}: \{l,n\} \neq \{k,m\}} Cov_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}, S_1^{c^i/l} - (F_{0,1}^{i,n/l}) S_1^{c^i/n}) N_{0,1}^{i,\{l,n\}}}{Var_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m})} \\
&- \frac{Cov_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m}, X_1^{i,H})}{Var_0 (S_1^{c^i/k} - (F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}) S_1^{c^i/m})}
\end{aligned}$$

Consider the case where one of the legs of all derivative transactions has the same currency as the currency of operation of the investor, i.e. $m = c^i$. Then the expression above simplifies to:


$$N_{0,1}^{i,\{k,m\}} = \frac{\tilde{E}_0^i [S_1^{m/k} - F_{0,1}^{i,m/k}]}{\rho Var_0 (S_1^{m/k})} - \frac{\sum_{\{l,m\}: \{l,m\} \neq \{k,m\}} Cov_0 (S_1^{m/k}, S_1^{m/l}) N_{0,1}^{i,\{l,m\}} + Cov_0 (S_1^{m/k}, X_1^{i,H})}{Var_0 (S_1^{m/k})}$$

A.2 Supplement to Overview of Market


A.2.1 Firms

Figure A.1: Number of Unique Firms Trading Derivatives by Currency Cross


(a) EUR/USD Derivatives




(b) USD/GBP Derivatives



(c) EUR/GBP Derivatives




(d) JPY/USD Derivatives




Note. Number of unique firms trading FX derivatives in major currency crosses, by sector. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.2: Breakdown of Asset Managers Derivatives Trading by Currency Cross


(a) EUR/USD Derivatives




(b) USD/GBP Derivatives



(c) EUR/GBP Derivatives



(d) JPY/USD Derivatives




Note. Share of types of asset managers trading FX derivatives in major currency crosses, by sector. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


A.2.2 Transaction

Figure A.3: Maturity Profile of FX Derivatives Transactions by Sector


(a) Asset Managers




(b) Non-Financial Corporates




(c) Insurers



(d) Market Makers




(e) Banks




Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by sector and maturity, taken by firms reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) to December 31 2020. To construct this chart, we sort transactions into bins based on their maturity. The x-axis labels denote the upper bound of each bin, e.g., “1 week” refers to transactions with a maturity $\in (1 \text{ day}, 1 \text{ day}]$, “1 month” refers to transactions with a maturity $\in (1 \text{ week}, 1 \text{ month}]$ and so on. Since our analysis is conducted daily, we do not consider intraday transactions.

Figure A.4: Maturity Profile of FX Derivatives Transactions by Type of Asset Managers



Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by type of Asset Manager and maturity, taken by firms reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from January 1 2015 to December 31 2020. The remaining notes from Figure A.3 apply here.

Figure A.5: Maturity Profile of FX Derivatives Transactions by Bank Type




Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by bank type and maturity, taken by banks reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from July 1, 2016 to December 31, 2020. The remaining notes from Figure A.3 apply here.

Figure A.6: Volume of FX Derivatives Transactions by Currency Cross and Sector


(a) Asset Managers

Transactions per Year: 1.75 Million




(b) Non-Financial Corporates

Transactions per Year: 500 Thousand




(c) Insurers

Transactions per Year: 45 Thousand




(d) Market Makers

Transactions per Year: 4.5 Million



(e) Banks

Transactions per Year: 18 Million




Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by sector and currency-cross, taken by firms reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from January 1, 2015 (July 1, 2016 for banks) to December 31, 2020.

Figure A.7: Derivatives Transactions by Types of Asset Managers and Currency Cross


(a) Pension Funds

Transactions per Year: 120 Thousand





(b) Investment Funds

Transactions per Year: 900 Thousand



(c) Hedge Funds

Transactions per Year: 750 Thousand




Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by type of Asset Manager and currency-cross, taken by firms reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2020.

Figure A.8: Derivatives Transactions by Types of Bank and Currency Cross


(a) Dealer Banks

Transactions per Year: 17 Million



(b) Non-Dealer Banks


Transactions per Year: 1 Million



Note. Number of FX derivatives transactions per year, by type of bank and currency-cross, taken by banks reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories from July 1, 2016 to December 31, 2020.


A.2.3 Market Size

Figure A.9: Average Absolute Value of the Stock of Firms' Net Cross Exposures by Fund Type



Note. The average absolute value of firms' *net* outstanding stock of FX derivatives contracts across all currency-crosses, maturities and fund-types over our sample period, measured in USD, by type of asset manager. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 and December 31 2020.

Figure A.10: Average Absolute Value of Firms' Net Currency-Cross Exposures by Bank Type




Note. The average absolute value of firms' *net* outstanding stock of FX derivatives contracts across all currency-crosses, maturities and bank-types over our sample period, measured in USD, by type of bank. Banks included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between July 1 2016 and December 31 2020.

A.3 Supplement to Currency Positions

A.3.1 Net Currency Stock Exposures by Sector and Country of Residence


Figure A.11: UK & EU Sector-Level Currency Exposures to Major 3 Currencies




Note. UK and EU Sector-level currency exposures, calculated as the net currency exposure of firms in a particular currency vis-à-vis all other currencies and then separately aggregated across firms in a particular sector that are UK- and EU-resident, for the major three currencies—USD, EUR, GBP. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

Figure A.12: UK & EU Fund-Level Currency Exposures to Major Three Currencies


(a) Non-EU Hedge Funds




(b) EU Hedge Funds




(c) UK Investment Funds




(d) EU Investment Funds



(e) UK Pension Funds




(f) EU Pension Funds




Note. EU and UK Sector-level currency exposures, calculated as the net currency exposure of firms in a particular currency vis-à-vis all other currencies and then separately aggregated across firms in a particular sector that are EU- and UK-resident (non-EU-resident for hedge funds), for the major three currencies—USD, EUR, GBP. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 and December 31 2020.

Figure A.13: Distribution of UK Firms' One-Directional Net Currency Stock Exposure by Sector



Note. Figure A.13 presents the distribution of the fraction of days that individual UK firms (non-EU firms for hedge funds) in a given sector have net-long (positive) currency exposures to the EUR, GBP and USD, for six sectors. The other sectors are not included due to their limited number of firms. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.


Figure A.14: Distribution of EU Firms' One-Directional Net Currency Stock Exposure by Sector



Note. Figure A.14 presents the distribution of the fraction of days that individual EU firms in a given sector have net-long (positive) currency exposures to the EUR, GBP and USD, for six sectors. The other sectors are not included due to their limited number of firms. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.


A.3.2 Net Currency Stock Exposures by Sector: Heterogeneity & Concentration

Figure A.15: Heterogeneous and Concentrated EUR Exposure Across Sectors




Note. Sectoral net-long and net-short EUR exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the exposures of firms in a sector that are net-long and net-short the EUR vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short EUR exposures, which is shown in Figure 4. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller players. EUR exposures are measured in units of EUR. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.16: Heterogeneous and Concentrated GBP Exposure Across Sectors




Note. Sectoral net-long and net-short GBP exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the exposures of firms in a sector that are net-long and net-short the GBP vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short GBP exposures, which is shown in Figure 4. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller players. GBP exposures are measured in units of GBP. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.17: Heterogeneous and Concentrated EUR Exposure Across Asset Management Types



Note. Types of asset managers' net-long and net-short EUR exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the exposures of firms in a sector who are net-long and net-short the EUR vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short EUR exposures, which is shown in Figure 5. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller players. EUR exposures are measured in units of EUR. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.18: Heterogeneous and Concentrated GBP Exposure Across Asset Management Types




Note. Types of asset managers' net-long and net-short GBP exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, are calculated by separately aggregating the exposures of firms in a sector who are net-long and net-short the GBP vis-à-vis all other currencies. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short GBP exposures, which is shown in Figure 5. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the exposures of the smaller players. GBP exposures are measured in units of GBP. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


A.3.3 Net Currency Stock Exposures by Sector & Country of Residence: Heterogeneity & Concentration

Figure A.19: UK and EU Asset Managers' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies


(a) UK Asset Managers' USD Exposures




(b) EU Asset Managers' USD Exposures




(c) UK Asset Managers' EUR Exposures




(d) EU Asset Managers' EUR Exposures



(e) UK Asset Managers' GBP Exposures




(f) EU Asset Managers' GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Asset Managers' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.20: UK and EU Non-Financial Corporates' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies


(a) UK Corporates' USD Exposures




(b) EU Corporates' USD Exposures




(c) UK Corporates' EUR Exposures




(d) EU Corporates' EUR Exposures



(e) UK Corporates' GBP Exposures




(f) EU Corporates' GBP Exposures



Note. UK and EU Corporates' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU corporates that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


Figure A.21: UK and EU Insurers' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies




Note. UK and EU Insurers' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU insurers that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.22: UK and EU Pension Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies


(a) UK Pension Funds' USD Exposures




(b) EU Pension Funds' USD Exposures




(c) UK Pension Funds' EUR Exposures




(d) EU Pension Funds' EUR Exposures



(e) UK Pension Funds' GBP Exposures




(f) EU Pension Funds' GBP Exposures



Note. UK and EU Pension Funds' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU pension funds that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


Figure A.23: UK and EU Investment Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies




Note. UK and EU Investment Funds' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU investment funds that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.24: Non-EU and EU Hedge Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies


(a) Non-EU Hedge Funds' USD Exposures




(b) EU Hedge Funds' USD Exposures




(c) Non-EU Hedge Funds' EUR Exposures




(d) EU Hedge Funds' EUR Exposures



(e) Non-EU Hedge Funds' GBP Exposures




(f) EU Hedge Funds' GBP Exposures



Note. Non-EU and EU Hedge Funds' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of Non-EU and EU hedge funds that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


Figure A.25: UK and EU Non-Dealer Banks' Exposure to the Major 3 Currencies



Note. UK and EU Non-Dealer Banks' net-long and net-short currency exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currencies are calculated by separately aggregating the currency exposures of UK and EU non-dealer banks that are net-long and net-short each currency. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency exposure over the sample. In beige are the currency exposures of the smaller players. Currency exposures are measured in units of local currency (i.e., in GBP for GBP exposures). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


A.3.4 Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures by Sector

Figure A.26: Sectoral Currency-Cross Exposures for Major Three Crosses



Note. Sector-level currency-cross exposures, calculated as the sum over net currency-cross exposure of firms in a particular sector, for the major three crosses—USD/GBP, EUR/GBP, EUR/USD. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown in each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.


Figure A.27: Asset Manager Types' Cross Exposures to Major Three Crosses



Note. Types of asset managers' currency-cross exposures, calculated as the sum over net currency-cross exposure of firms in a particular sector, for the major three crosses—USD/GBP, EUR/GBP, EUR/USD. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown in each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

A.3.5 Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures by Country of Residence


Figure A.28: UK & EU Sector-Level Cross Exposures to Major 3 Crosses




Note. UK and EU Sector-level currency-cross exposures, calculated by separately summing over the net currency-cross exposures of UK and EU firms in a particular sector, for the major three crosses—USD/GBP, EUR/GBP, EUR/USD. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown in each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 (July 1 2016 for Banks) and December 31 2020.

Figure A.29: UK & EU Fund-Level Cross Exposures to Major Three Crosses


(a) Non-EU Hedge Funds




(b) EU Hedge Funds




(c) UK Investment Funds




(d) EU Investment Funds



(e) UK Pension Funds




(f) EU Pension Funds



Note. UK and EU Sector-level currency-cross exposures, calculated by separately summing over the net currency-cross exposures of UK (non-EU for hedge funds) and EU firms in a particular sector, for the major three crosses—USD/GBP, EUR/GBP, EUR/USD. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown in each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1 2015 and December 31 2020.


A.3.6 Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures by Sector: Heterogeneity and Concentration

Figure A.30: Asset Managers' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Asset Managers' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.31: Non-Financial Corporates' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Non-Financial Corporates' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.32: Insurers' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Insurers' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.33: Market Makers' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Market Makers' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.34: Non-Dealer Banks' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Non Dealer Banks' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between July 1, 2016 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.35: Dealer Banks' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Dealer Banks' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between July 1, 2016 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.36: Pension Funds' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Pension Funds' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.37: Investment Funds' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses



Note. Investment Funds' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.38: Hedge Funds' Exposure to the Major 4 Currency Crosses




Note. Hedge Funds' net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 4 crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the currency-cross exposures of asset managers that are net-long and net-short each currency cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short currency-cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average currency-cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


A.3.7 Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures by Sector and Country of Residence: Heterogeneity and Concentration

Figure A.39: UK and EU Asset Managers' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Asset Managers' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Asset Managers' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Asset Managers' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Asset Managers' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Asset Managers' EUR/GBP Exposures




(f) EU Asset Managers' EUR/GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Asset Managers' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU asset managers that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.40: UK and EU Non-Financial Corporates' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Corporates' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Corporates' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Corporates' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Corporates' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Corporates' EUR/GBP Exposures




(f) EU Corporates' EUR/GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Non-Financial Corporates' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU corporates that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.41: UK and EU Insurers' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Insurers' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Insurers' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Insurers' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Insurers' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Insurers' EUR/GBP Exposures




(f) EU Insurers' EUR/GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Insurers' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU insurers that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.42: UK and EU Pension Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Pension Funds' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Pension Funds' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Pension Funds' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Pension Funds' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Pension Funds' EUR/GBP Exposures




(f) EU Pension Funds' EUR/GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Pension Funds' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU pension funds that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.43: UK and EU Investment Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Investment Funds' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Investment Funds' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Investment Funds' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Investment Funds' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Investment Funds' EUR/GBP Exposures




(f) EU Investment Funds' EUR/GBP Exposures



Note. UK and EU Investment Funds' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU investment funds that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.


Figure A.44: Non-EU and EU Hedge Funds' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses




Note. Non-EU and EU Hedge Funds' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of Non-EU and EU hedge funds that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

Figure A.45: UK and EU Non-Dealer Banks' Exposure to the Major 3 Crosses


(a) UK Non-Dealers' EUR/USD Exposures




(b) EU Non-Dealers' EUR/USD Exposures




(c) UK Non-Dealers' USD/GBP Exposures




(d) EU Non-Dealers' USD/GBP Exposures



(e) UK Non-Dealers' EUR/GBP Exposures



(f) EU Non-Dealers' EUR/GBP Exposures




Note. UK and EU Non-Dealer Banks' net-long and net-short cross exposures, highlighted in blue and beige, for the major 3 currency crosses are calculated by separately aggregating the cross exposures of UK and EU non-dealer banks that are net-long and net-short each cross. The black line refers to the sum of the net-long and net-short cross exposures in each panel. Shaded in light and dark blue are the net-long and net-short positions of the largest 5 and next largest 10 firms in the sector in terms of average cross exposure over the sample. In beige are the cross exposures of the smaller players. Currency-cross exposures are measured in units of the base currency (with curr/base shown above each panel). Positive (negative) values refer to firms being net-long (net-short) the base currency. Firms included are those reporting under EMIR to the DTCC and UnaVista trade repositories between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2020.

A.4 Supplement to FX Investment Strategies


Figure A.46: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' USD-GBP Derivatives Exposure

(I) Carry Trade


(a) Hedge Funds



(b) Non-Financial Corporates




(c) Dealer Banks




(II) Momentum


(d) Hedge Funds



(e) Non-Financial Corporates




(f) Dealer Banks




(III) Macro News


(g) Hedge Funds



(h) Non-Financial Corporates



(i) Dealer Banks




Note. Figure A.46 presents the β^h s for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—hedge funds, non-financial corporates and dealer banks—in the GBP/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.


Figure A.47: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' JPY-USD Derivatives Exposure

(I) Carry Trade


(a) Hedge Funds



(b) Non-Financial Corporates




(c) Dealer Banks




(II) Momentum


(d) Hedge Funds



(e) Non-Financial Corporates




(f) Dealer Banks




(III) Macro News


(g) Hedge Funds



(h) Non-Financial Corporates



(i) Dealer Banks




Note. Figure A.47 presents the β^h s for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—hedge funds, non-financial corporates and dealer banks—in the JPY/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.


Figure A.48: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' EUR-GBP Derivatives Exposure

(I) Carry Trade


(a) Hedge Funds



(b) Non-Financial Corporates




(c) Dealer Banks




(II) Momentum


(d) Hedge Funds



(e) Non-Financial Corporates




(f) Dealer Banks




(III) Macro News


(g) Hedge Funds



(h) Non-Financial Corporates




(i) Dealer Banks




Note. Figure A.48 presents the β^h s for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—hedge funds, non-financial corporates and dealer banks—in the EUR/GBP currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.49: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' EUR-USD Derivatives Exposure




Note. Figure A.49 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 2 sectors—investment funds and non-dealer banks—in the EUR/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.50: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' USD-GBP Derivatives Exposure




Note. Figure A.50 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 2 sectors—investment funds and non-dealer banks—in the USD/GBP currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.51: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' JPY-USD Derivatives Exposure



Note. Figure A.51 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 2 sectors—investment funds and non-dealer banks—in the JPY/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.52: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' GBP-EUR Derivatives Exposure




Note. Figure A.52 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 2 sectors—investment funds and non-dealer banks—in the EUR/GBP currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.


Figure A.53: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' EUR-USD Derivatives Exposure

(I) Carry Trade


(a) Pension Funds



(b) Insurers




(c) Market Makers




(II) Momentum


(d) Pension Funds



(e) Insurers




(f) Market Makers




(III) Macro News


(g) Pension Funds



(h) Insurers



(i) Market Makers




Note. Figure A.53 presents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—pension funds, insurance companies, and market makers—in the EUR/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.


Figure A.54: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' USD-GBP Derivatives Exposure

(I) Carry Trade


(a) Pension Funds



(b) Insurers




(c) Market Makers




(II) Momentum


(d) Pension Funds



(e) Insurers




(f) Market Makers




(III) Macro News


(g) Pension Funds



(h) Insurers




(i) Market Makers




Note. Figure A.54 resents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—pension funds, insurance companies, and market makers—in the GBP/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.55: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' JPY-USD Derivatives Exposure


(I) Carry Trade



(II) Momentum




(III) Macro News



Note. Figure A.55 resents the β^h s for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—pension funds, insurance companies, and market makers—in the JPY/USD currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

Figure A.56: Investment Strategies and Changes in Firms' EUR-GBP Derivatives Exposure



Note. Figure A.56 resents the β^h 's for $h \in [0, 90]$ from estimating firm-level panel regressions (6) for three FX investment strategies—Carry Trade (Row I), Momentum (Row II) and Macro News (Row III)—for 3 sectors—pension funds, insurance companies, and market makers—in the EUR/GBP currency cross. Results for the remaining sectors and crosses are in Appendix A.4. Inner and outer shaded areas correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed using two-way clustered standard errors by firm and time.

B Data Appendix

B.1 EMIR Trade Repository Data

UK-reporting entities meet their EMIR reporting obligations by submitting their derivatives transactions to trade repositories (TRs). We use the two largest TRs in the UK to which UK-reporting entities report: Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) and Unisys. Although EMIR reporting is highly standardized by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)⁴¹, there are differences in reporting between the two repositories regarding coverage and variable names. For each TR, there are two file types per trading day: state and activity files. The state file of a particular date contains the stock of open transactions, which have not matured, as of that day. The activity file contains the flow of transactions that take place on that day.

We use daily activity and end-of-the-month state files to construct a definitive list of clean transactions, as outlined below. A transaction, defined by the two counterparties involved and its unique trade ID, can appear multiple times in the data. First, both counterparties can report the transaction. Second, an intermediary can report it on the counterparties' behalf. Third, for both cases, there are different types of ‘actions’ a particular transaction can be labelled as. These are new (N), modification (M), corrections (R), error (E), cancellation/termination (C).⁴² After a new transaction appears in the data, its modification (e.g. a change in its maturity or notional) or correction can appear at any time before the maturity date. Similarly, a transaction can be terminated early, before its maturity. Fourth and last, if a position is open for a long while, the same transaction would appear multiple times in the end-of-the-month state files. We need to address all such cases carefully to ensure we retain all the relevant information and discard the duplicates.

⁴¹Extensive explanations of the EMIR reporting standards can be found in Regulatory Technical Documents (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0148>) and Implementing Technical Standards (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R1247>).

⁴²We do not take into account valuation (V) or position (P), given these actions do not constitute any importance for our analysis.

There are also several other issues related to reporting mistakes, which we attempt to fix to the best of our abilities as we outline below.

B.2 Basic Cleaning Steps

Below we outline the steps we take to clean the data. We go through the data cleaning steps for each TR separately first. Note that there is a reporting change in 2017Q4 that leads to changes in variable names and the number of variables that is collected for each transaction. Before following the cleaning steps listed below, we reconcile all the daily TR files by going over all the files manually to make sure the variable names are synchronized. Amongst the extensive list of variables reported under EMIR for each transaction, we keep the following variables in our sample: asset class, reporting time stamp, trade ID, reporting counterparty ID, ID of the other counterparty, report submitting entity ID, counterparty side, product ID 1, product ID 2, notional currency 1, notional currency 2, deliverable currency 1, deliverable currency 2, currency of price, notional, notional amount leg 2 (if it exists), execution timestamp, maturity date, termination date, exchange rate 1, forward exchange rate, exchange rate basis, contract type, action type.

Once we keep the relevant variables and clean the data in both repositories, we merge them to construct our time series data. The cleaning steps involved are listed below.

1. Once we obtain state and activity files separately from both TRs, we drop if counterparty IDs, i.e. LEI codes of either counterparty, are not 20 characters.
2. We only keep asset classes of Forwards (FW), Futures (FU) and Swaps (SW).
3. For each currency cross, we group transactions by unique transaction identifier: reporting counterparty, other counterparty, trade ID.
4. We drop the transaction if the notional value is zero, missing, 1, or negative.
5. We drop the transaction if trade ID is missing or zero.
6. We drop the transaction where the execution date is listed after the maturity date.

Note that we keep the observations if the execution date and the maturity date are the same.

7. We drop the transaction if counterparty side, which indicates if the counterparty is the buyer or seller, is missing.
8. We delete the transaction if one of the records of action type indicates an error (E).
9. If any of the action types of a particular transaction is correction (R), we backward fill what is corrected at a later date, such that we reflect the correction in the previous records of it.
10. If cancellation/termination (C) appears within the group, we carry backwards the termination date to earlier records of the transaction as the maturity date.
11. If a transaction is modified (M), counterparties do not have to report all the variables they reported in the previous transactions but only the mandatory ones. We forward-fill all the missing entries if there are any modifications.
12. After eliminating duplicates, for a given date, we keep the closest reporting date prior to this of a non-expired transaction, which allows us to use the correct modified transaction to calculate our variables of interest for a particular date. As discussed, modifications occur a lot in the data.
13. Unavista reporting includes notional 2, i.e. notional that the counterparty would receive at the end of the maturity of the contract. DTCC, however, only reports notional 1 and forward rates. We explain below in detail how we handle the issues around forward rates. At this stage, for DTCC, we treat notional 2 as missing. For Unavista, we drop the transaction if notional one and two are the same.
14. We keep the transaction only if its execution date is after 1990.
15. We retain only transactions involving one of the following major currencies: GBP, USD, EUR, JPY, CHF.
16. We merge DTCC and UnaVista activity and state files of the same file dates.

17. Although rare, merging DTCC and Unavista might introduce duplicates. For a given counterparty, currency cross, notional, same execution date and maturity date, forward rate and buyer/seller, we sort all the transactions by reporting date and drop duplicated transactions. We keep the record of the transaction with the earliest reporting date.
18. We then merge all daily files to construct our time series data.


Note that, based on a manual mapping of external data sources, including Company House and the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), we consolidate corporate firms that belong to the same holding company. This ensures that transactions are not potentially double-counted, as we remove duplicate transactions at the group level. For example, BP p.l.c. initially reported under seven different entities, which we have grouped into a single entity. This grouping does not apply to other players as they manage their currency exposures separately. For instance, the BlackRock UK Equity Fund manages its currency exposure independently from the BlackRock Japan Equity Fund, and therefore they are treated as separate entities. Additionally, asset manager holding entities are excluded from the analysis.

B.3 Constructing new variables

After the cleaning steps, we construct the new variables that we need for our analysis. While we do not study all these variables in this paper, we describe how we construct them for completeness.

Forward Rates There are multiple records of which currencies are involved in the transaction, such as notional currency 1 and 2, deliverable currency 1 and 2, currency of price. Accompanying these, there are different exchange rates reported in the data, such as exchange rate 1, forward exchange rate and exchange rate basis. All of these variables collectively identify which currency is being sold and bought, what the spot and forward exchange rates are. However, there are many errors in the data. Often we observe that the currencies involved are flipped during reporting, i.e. that the exchange rate basis variable has been


Figure B.1: USD/GBP Forward Rates of Non-Financial Corporates (Maturity \leq 1 Month): Pre- and Post-Cleaning



Note. Figure B.1 compares the mean and median USD/GBP forward rates for non-financial corporates (transactions with a maturity of 1 month or less) against the spot exchange rate, both before and after data cleaning.

misinterpreted by the reporters. This is clear when we consider e.g. JPY/USD where an erroneous flipping of the currency cross would lead to large swings in the exchange rate from e.g. below 0.01 to over 100. However, errors in currency-cross reporting become more subtle when we study currencies where the exchange rate between two currencies is close to 1, e.g. EUR/GBP. In this case, we detect the issue either by using the two notional, when available, where this mistake is not present, to construct the forward rate or by plotting the forward rate distributions. In some cases, some values of the forward rate are multiplied by numbers such as 10^5 or 0.00001 either due to mistakes or due to differences in reporting conventions. These issues collectively affect a significant share of the data. Therefore, we construct multiple versions of forward rates to account for all sorts of wrongful reporting in the data and design robust cleaning algorithms which allow us to retain as much information as possible. The algorithm for detecting and correcting mistakes leverages the bi-modality of the reported forward rate distribution, supplemented by external information from spot rates. Using the raw data without correction would be inaccurate, given the numerous errors detected, as illustrated in Figures B.1 and B.2.

Figure B.2: USD/GBP Forward Rates of Non-Financial Corporates (Maturity \leq 1 Month, Transaction on 27th November 2018): Pre- and Post-Cleaning



Note. Figure B.2 shows the distribution of USD/GBP forward rate transactions for non-financial corporates with a maturity of 1 month or less on November 27th, 2018, before and after data cleaning.

More specifically, when constructing forward rates, the first step is to determine the base currency. According to EMIR reporting standards, exchange rates are quoted as the price of the base currency in terms of the quote currency. The first currency in the pair represents the base currency, and the second represents the quote currency. For example, in the JPY/USD currency pair, USD is the base currency, and JPY is the quote currency. We expect the forward rate for this pair to be in three digits, as 1 US dollar is approximately 145 Japanese yen at the time of writing.

Our remediation process to clean the forward rate includes the following steps:

1. Correcting decimal point errors in the forward rate:

- (a) We calculate a variable called the *transform index* by dividing the spot exchange rate by the forward exchange rate. This result is rounded to the nearest power of 10. If the *transform index* falls within the range [0.2, 5], we set it to 1, indicating no major discrepancy.
- (b) We define the *adjusted forward rate* as the reported forward rate multiplied by the *transform index*.

(c) Finally, we calculate the absolute differences between the spot exchange rate and both the *adjusted forward rate* and the *reported forward rate*. We keep the forward rate with the smallest difference.

2. Correcting flipped forward rates:

- (a) We classify forward rate values as outliers if they fall outside the range of the spot exchange rate plus or minus eight times the one-month standard deviation of the spot exchange rate.
- (b) For the identified outliers, we calculate the *flipped forward rate* as $\frac{1}{\text{forward exchange rate}}$.
- (c) We then apply the same process used in step 1 to the *flipped forward rate* to address cases where both the decimal point and the forward rate are inverted.
- (d) If the *flipped forward rate* remains an outlier after this correction, we replace it with a missing value.

For forward rates derived from reported notional values, we only correct for flipped values, as it is not possible to identify which leg of the transaction has the decimal point error.

3. Handling missing forward rate values:

In many cases, the reported spot exchange rate corresponds to either the reported forward rate or the forward rate derived from notional values. When the reported forward rate is missing, we replace it with the reported spot exchange rate—this occurs because reporters often mistakenly enter the forward rate in the spot exchange rate field. However, this substitution is made only if the reported spot exchange rate significantly deviates from the true spot rate, i.e., it falls outside a band of the spot exchange rate plus or minus 0.1 times the one-month spot exchange rate standard deviation.

Net Currency-Cross Stock Exposures We compute the daily stock, intraday flow, non-intraday flow, and expiring positions at the firm level, where the change in stock is equivalent

to non-intraday flow minus expiring positions. This involves aggregating the notional value of each transaction and using buyer/seller information to determine if the firm is short or long. This computation is done for each currency cross and various maturities. Reporting issues in the notional values are corrected by cross-referencing with our cleaned forward rate series.

Profits Profits are computed in two ways: based on notionals, trade direction, and either the realized exchange rate at maturity or the exchange rate at the execution date.

Net Currency Stock Exposures We have constructed net currency exposure by summing both legs of each transaction for a given currency. For instance, USD exposure is obtained by summing leg 1 and leg 2 of all transactions involving USD. This currency exposure is computed daily at the firm level.

Returns Returns are calculated as profits divided by the absolute value of the notional, representing the average return per transaction for each currency cross and maturity for each firm.

Mean and Median Maturity We have calculated the mean and median maturity of transactions for each firm and currency cross on a daily basis by determining the number of days from the contract initiation to its expiration.

Number of Transactions Similar to positions, we have constructed variables indicating the stock of outstanding contracts, opening intraday flow transactions, opening non-intraday flow transactions, and expiring transactions.

Counter-parties We have a variable that measures the number of unique counter-parties for each reporting entities to capture the network dimension.

B.4 Firm Classifications

Below, we describe the sources we use to manually classify firms into broad sectors and sub-sectors. The five broad sectors we consider are: (i) asset managers; (ii) non-financial

corporates; (iii) insurance companies; (iv) (non-bank) market makers; and (v) banks. Within the asset management sector, we consider three sub-sectors: hedge funds, investment funds and pension funds. Within the banking sector, we consider two sub-sectors: dealer and non-dealer banks. Using GLEIF, we also sort firms based on their legal jurisdiction: UK, EU and other. Other sectors such as charities and universities, which make up a small share of firms in the data, are not included in our analysis.

- Hedge funds: Manuel mapping with the help of AUM 13F - AUM Metrics Analysis (<https://aum13f.com>), Section 4 of SEC Form D (Industry Group: Pooled Investment Fund - Hedge Fund) and website of the funds.
- Investment funds: Sourced from various databases, including ECB investment funds (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_corporations/list_of_financial_institutions/html/index.en.html#if), the subcategory Money Market Fund of Monetary financial institutions dataset (MFIs), and ESMA Money Market Funds (<https://www.esma.europa.eu/publications-and-data/databases-and-registers>). Additionally, we referenced the GLEIF file for entity legal forms (e.g., “FUND”, “ICVC”, “POOL”, “UNIT TRUST”) and employed manual classification.
- Pension funds: Classified as pension funding, plans, and schemes using EIOPA Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision, along with string matching (e.g., ”FONDO PENSIONE”, ”PENSION FUND”, ”PENSION SCHEME”, ”Pensioenfonds”), and manual classification.
- Non-Financial Corporations: Use the 2021 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) key as a guideline incorporating four levels of classification: Type, sector, industry, and sub-industry. Type is the broadest classification while sub-industry is the narrowest. We extend upon the GICS to accommodate for a wider range of types of businesses than what already exists within the GICS framework. Within each level of classification, our aim is to be as consistent as we can regarding the types of businesses that fit within each sub-category of the classification. The subset of firms we consider

are majority companies incorporated within the UK and also appear on Companies House. This provides us with a way to obtain the NAICS UK SIC 2007 classification standard per company.

- Insurance Companies: Classified as insurance, life insurance, reinsurance entities, and insurance brokerages using data from the ECB Insurance Corporations (ICB: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_corporations/list_of_financial_institutions/html/index.en.html#ic), EIOPA Insurance Corporations, and supplemented by manual classification.
- Non-bank Market Makers: Classified, through manual classification, as FCA-authorized market makers, FX brokers, FX services firms, clearinghouses and financial market administrators, as well as some payment services firms, electronic money institutions (identified from <https://thebanks.eu/emis>) and trade finance institutions, who all plausibly play a market-making role in FX markets.
- Banks: Classified as credit institutions (identified by the ECB or EBA), investment banks, and private banks. This includes credit institutions from the ECB Monetary Financial Institutions database, credit institutions registered with the EBA (<https://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-and-data-analysis/data/registers/credit-institutions-register>), and supplemented by manual classification. Dealer Banks are FCA-authorized primary dealers (<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/documents/market-makers-authorised-primary-dealers.pdf>).

B.5 Macroeconomic Announcement Surprises

When constructing the FX macro news index we include both the US and the other country surprises in the daily regressions. We use surprises for the following indicators for each country. When both Bloomberg and Informa Global Markets (IGM) publish expectations for the same indicator, we choose the source based on data availability. In a few rare cases in which indicators are discontinued, we splice the surprise series with a close substitute.

- Euro area:
 - Germany: (Activity) ifo Business Climate Index, industrial production, total manufacturing new orders, manufacturing PMI, ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment
 - Euro area: (Inflation) CPI; (Activity) GDP, manufacturing PMI; (External) current account balance, (Monetary) ECB main refinancing operations announcement rate, 3-month and 10-year interest rate futures
- Japan: (Inflation) Tokyo core CPI, PPI; (Activity) unemployment rate, industrial production, GDP, core machinery orders, tertiary industry activity, manufacturing PMI, (External) current account balance; (Monetary) M2 money supply, 10-year interest rate futures
- United Kingdom: (Inflation) CPI; (Activity) claimant count rate, GDP, industrial production; (External) trade balance; (Monetary) Bank of England official bank rate, 3-month and 10-year interest rate futures
- US: (Inflation) CPI, core CPI, core PPI; (Activity) capacity utilization, Conference Board consumer confidence, University of Michigan consumer sentiment, new home sales, initial jobless claims, industrial production, leading indicators index, nonfarm payrolls, ISM manufacturing index, unemployment rate, GDP, retail sales; (External) trade balance, oil surprises from Käenzig (2021); (Monetary) Fed funds target rate, 3-month Fed funds rate futures, 4-quarter eurodollar futures, and 10-year Treasury yields