# Financial applications of blockchains and distributed ledgers

Master's program in Financial Engineering

Jiahua (Java) Xu

Session 2



# Housekeeping

Jiahua (Java) Xu 2 / 40

### Time and venue

Three sessions: 15:15 - 16:10, 16:25 - 17:20, 17:35 - 18:30

Tuesdays, on Zoom, https://epfl.zoom.us/j/4897861984

## To-do's

- 1. From a group.
- 2. Vote for the submission deadline.
- **3.** (optional but appreciated) Contribute to the class discussion, on Moodle or live on Zoom.
- 4. (optional) The missing recording from last time . . .

# From the previous lecture

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# Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe and Venezuela

- 1. Deficit government spending
- 2. National debt
- **3.** Heavy money-printing

# Special Drawing Right (SDR)

- 1. "IMF members can also use SDRs in operations and transactions involving the IMF, such as the payment of interest on and repayment of loans, or payment for future quota increases."
- 2. Facebook's Libra: "LBR will not be a separate digital asset from the single-currency stablecoins. Under this change, LBR will simply be a digital composite of some of the single-currency stablecoins available on the Libra network. It will be defined in terms of fixed nominal weights, such as the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) maintained by the International Money Fund (IMF). LBR can be used as an efficient **cross-border settlement coin** as well as a neutral. low-volatility option for people and businesses in countries that do not have a single-currency stablecoin on the network yet."

# Recap

- 1. Double spending
- 2. Digital signature
- 3. Cryptographically secure hash function
- 4. Proof of work

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# Bitcoin consensus algorithm (simplified)

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## Proof-of-Work

- 1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
- 2. Each node collects new transactions into a block.
- In each round, a random node gets to broadcast its block.random: not selected, but through competition (work)
- **4.** Other nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid (unspent, valid signatures).
- **5.** Nodes express their acceptance of the block by including its hash in the next block they create.

What do miners compete to solve?

#### Hash puzzle

## H(nonce || PrevHash || tx1 || tx2 ||) < target




Figure 1: A block on the Bitcoin blockchain hased in a merkle tree

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### Benefit of using Merkle tree

Efficiency in data validation and storage: checking and downloading in branches

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Solving hash puzzles is probabilistic, because nobody can predict which nonce is going to solve the hash puzzle.

recall: Sybil attack

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51% Attack?

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Attacker has to subvert not only **the consensus process** (by having 51% computing power) but also the cryptography!

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## Adjustable difficulty level

- ► Average block time: 10 min
- ► Target recalculated every 2,016 blocks every two weeks.

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## **Fork**




Figure 2: A blockchain fork


Miners diverge and start adding blocks to two chain branches

#### Heuristic

Follow the longest chain

## **Incentives**

#### **Block reward**



**Figure 3:** Total supply of bitcoins with time. The block reward is cut in half every 4 years, limiting the total supply of bitcoins to 21 million. This is a simplified model and the actual curve looks slightly different, but it has the same 21 million limit

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#### Transaction fee

- ► The initiator of any transaction can choose to make the transaction output(s) < input(s).
- Whoever creates the block that first puts that transaction into the block chain gets to collect the difference, which acts a transaction fee.

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## One stone two birds:

- 1. Encourage block building
- 2. Encourage honest behavior

# The economics of mining

$$MiningReward = \underbrace{BlockReward + TransactionFee}_{Probablistic}$$
 $MiningCost = \underbrace{HardwareCost}_{FixedCost} + \underbrace{OperatingCosts}_{Variable Cost}$ 

If MiningReward > MiningCost, then the miner makes a profit.

### **Complications**

- Other miners' hash rate?
- ► Denominations: USD/Bitcoin?
- Honest/dishonest?

#### Research question

Is the default miner behavior a *Nash equilibrium*? That is, does it represent a stable situation in which no miner can realize a higher payoff by deviating from honest behavior? (Narayanan et al. 2016)

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## Other consensus mechanisms

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# Proof of stake (PoS)

- Randomized block selection based on size of stake
  - Nxt
- Delegated proof of stake
  - ► EOSIO: Users stake EOS tokens to their favored block producers (BPs, 21 in total) and can choose to remove their stake at any time.
  - Tezos (Liquid Proof of Stake): number of consensus participants—or "delegates"—changes.

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# XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol (XRP LCP)

Each user sets up its own unique node list of validators (UNL) that it will listen to during the consensus process. The validators determine which transactions are to be added to the ledger.

26 / 40

# Bitcoin vs. Ethereum

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# Record-keeping model



Figure 4: UTXO (Unspent Transaction Output)

Privacy through change addresses

#### **ETH**



Figure 5: Account/Balance Model

Simple, intuitive.

# Language

#### **BTC**

#### Bitcoin scripting

► Simple, not Turing complete

## Transaction to Bitcoin address (pay-to-pubkey-hash)

OP\_DUP OP\_HASH160 <371c...313> OP\_EQUALVERIFY OP\_CHECKSIG where

<371c...313>: pubKeyHash.

OP\_DUP: Duplicates the top stack item.
OP\_HASH160: The input is hashed twice.
OP\_EQUALVERIFY: OP\_EQUAL + OP\_VERIFY

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#### **ETH**

#### Solidity

► Sophisticated, Turing complete

#### Deposit to own account

```
function deposit() payable {
  deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value;
};
```

# Decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)

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# Company vs. DAO

### Company

- Rules enforced top-down
- Difficulty to change the rules depends on the management team

#### DAO

- Rules hard coded, enforced digitally
- ▶ Technically difficult to change the rules once they are deployed

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## The DAO

- Purpose: Crowd-funding
- Process
  - Investors pay ETH in exchange for DAO (representing voting rights)
  - Investors vote for projects and winning projects receive ETH from the DAO
- Vulnerability
  - Loophole: a smart contract retrieves ETH first and then update the balance
- Attack
  - retrieve ETH recursively before updating the balance
- Consequence
  - ► Hard fork: Ethereum vs Ethereum Classic

## **Decentralized finance**

## Decentralized exchange (DEX)

- ▶ DEXs on Ethereum
  - Automated market makers (AMM): Uniswap, Bancor . . .
- DEXs on XRPL
  - Ledger gateway

# **Cross-platform communication**

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## **Oracle**

Oracles aredata feeds into smart contracts and by relying on some third party provide amechanism for accessing off-chain information.

# **Atomic swap**

Hash Timelock Contracts

# Thank you!

#### Contact

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## References I

Narayanan, Arvind, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller, and Steven Goldfeder. 2016. *Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction*. https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10908.html.