Daniil Larionov

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ZEW Mannheim
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Academic employment

- *ZEW Mannheim*, Postdoctoral researcher, 2022 - present

Education

- PhD in Economics, 2022, *University of Mannheim*
- MSc in Economics, 2017, *University of Mannheim*
- BSc in Economics, 2014, *Saint Petersburg State University*

Research fields

Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Market Design

Working papers

- **Full Surplus Extraction from Colluding Bidders**

  I consider a repeated auction setting with colluding buyers and a seller who adjusts reserve prices over time without long-term commitment. To model the seller's concern for collusion, I introduce a new equilibrium concept: *collusive public perfect equilibrium (cPPE)*. For every strategy of the seller I define the corresponding "*buyer-game*" in which the seller is replaced by Nature who chooses the reserve prices for the buyers in accordance with the seller's strategy. A public perfect equilibrium is collusive if the buyers cannot achieve a higher symmetric public perfect equilibrium payoff in the corresponding buyer-game. In a setting with symmetric buyers with private binary *iid* valuations and publicly revealed bids, I find a *collusive public perfect equilibrium* that allows the seller to extract the entire surplus from the buyers in the limit as the discount factor goes to 1. I therefore show that a patient, non-committed seller can effectively fight collusion even when she can only set reserve prices and has to satisfy stringent public disclosure requirements.

- **First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition**

  with Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita, and Shuguang Zhu

  We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent from the state, we show that there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.

Teaching (TA) - University of Mannheim

PhD level

- Advanced Microeconomics III
  Spring 2021, Spring 2020, Spring 2019

- Advanced Microeconomics I
  Fall 2017

Master's level

- Advanced Microeconomics
  Fall 2021, Fall 2020

- Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies
  Spring 2022, Spring 2021, Spring 2020, Spring 2019, Spring 2018

Bachelor's level

- Game Theory
  Spring 2021

November 21, 2022