

1. Introduction

Adv. Macro: Heterogenous Agent Models

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Introduction

Introduction

- Teacher: Nicolai Waldstrøm
- Central economic questions:
 - 1. What explains the level and dynamics of heterogeneity/inequality?
 - 2. What role does heterogeneity play for understanding consumption-saving dynamics in partial equilibrium?
 - 3. What role does heterogeneity play for understanding business-cycle fluctuations in general equilibrium?
- Central technical method: Programming in Python
 Prerequisite: Intro. to Programming and Numerical Analysis

Complicated: Close to the research frontier

- Plan for today:
 - 1. More about the course
 - 2. Consumption-saving models
 - 3. Numerical dynamic programming

Macroeconomic Models with Heterogeneous Agents

Model components:

- 1. Optimizing individual agents (households + firms)
- 2. Idiosyncratic and aggregate risk (uncertainty)
- 3. Information flows (who knows what when \Rightarrow often everything)
- 4. Market clearing
- Insurance/markets: Complete → idiosyncratic risk insured away
 representative agent Incomplete → agents need to self-insure by saving
- Heterogeneity: Ex ante in preferences, abilities etc. Ex post after realization of idiosyncratic shocks
- HANC: Heterogeneous Agent Neo-Classical model (Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget-Imrohoroglu or Standard Incomplete Market model)
- HANK: Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model (i.e. include price and wage setting frictions)

Teaching method

■ **Lectures:** Wednesday 15-18 ~2 hours of »normal« lecture ~1 hour of active problem solving (no exercise classes)

Content:

- 1. Explanation of computational methods
- 2. Discussion of research papers
- 3. Examples of code for central mechanisms (you should run the notebook codes simultaneously)
- Material: Web: sites.google.com/view/numeconcph-advmacrohet/
 Git: github.com/numeconcopenhagen/adv-macro-het

Code:

- 1. We provide code you will build upon
- 2. Based on the GEModelTools package

Assignments and exam

- Individual assignments (hand-in on Absalon)
 - Assignment I Deadline: 9th of October (must be approved before exam)
 - 2. **Assignment II** <u>Deadline</u>: 20th of November (*must be approved before exam*)
 - 3. **Assignment III** with essay on a relevant model extension of own choice and a simple implementation <u>Deadline</u>: 11th of December
- All feedback can be used to improve assignments before the exam
- Exam:
 - 1. Hand-in 3×assignments
 - 2. 36 hour take-home: Programming of new extension
 - $+ \ {\sf analysis} \ {\sf of} \ {\sf model} \ + \ {\sf interpretation} \ {\sf of} \ {\sf results}$

Python

- 1. **Assumed knowledge:** From Introduction to Programming and Numerical Analysis you are assumed to know the basics of
 - 1.1 Python
 - 1.2 VSCode
 - 1.3 git
- 2. Updated Python: Install (or re-install) newest Anaconda
- 3. Packages: pip install quantecon, EconModel, consav
- 4. GEMoodel tools:
 - 4.1 Clone the GEModelTools repository
 - 4.2 Locate repository in command prompt
 - 4.3 Run pip install -e .

Course plan

See CoursePlan.pdf in repository

Knowledge

- 1. Account for, formulate and interpret precautionary saving models
- 2. Account for stochastic and non-stochastic simulation methods
- Account for, formulate and interpret general equilibrium models with ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, and with and without pricing frictions
- 4. Discuss the difference between the stationary equilibrium, the transition path and the dynamic equilibrium
- 5. Discuss the relationship between various equilibrium concepts and their solution methods
- Identify and account for methods for analyzing the dynamic distributional effects of long-run policy (e.g. taxation and social security) and short-run policy (e.g. monetary and fiscal policy)

Skills

- 1. Solve precautionary saving problems with dynamic programming and simulate behavior with stochastic and non-stochastic techniques
- 2. Solve general equilibrium models with ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, and with and without pricing frictions (stationary equilibrium, transition path, dynamic equilibrium)
- 3. Analyze dynamics of income and wealth inequality
- 4. Analyze transitional and permanent structural changes (e.g. inequality trends and the long-run decline in the interest rate)
- Analyze the dynamic distributional effects of long-run policy (e.g. taxation and social security) and short-run policy (e.g. monetary and fiscal policy)

Competencies

- Independently formulate, discuss and assess research on both the causes and effects of heterogeneity and risk for both long-run and short-run outcomes
- 2. Discuss and assess the importance of how heterogeneity and risk is modeled for questions about both long-run and short-run dynamics

History of heterogeneous agent macro

- 1. Heathcote et al. (2009), »Quantitative Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Households«
- 2. Kaplan and Violante (2018), »Microeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Shocks«
- 3. Cherrier et al. (2023), »Household Heterogeneity in Macroeconomic Models: A Historical Perspective«

Consumption-Saving

Generations of models

- 1. Permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) or life-cycle model (Modigliani and Brumburg, 1954)
- Buffer-stock consumption model (Deaton, 1991, 1992; Carroll, 1992, 1997)
- Multiple-asset buffer-stock consumption models (e.g. Kaplan and Violante (2014))

Consumption-saving

$$egin{aligned} v_0 &= \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} eta^t u(c_t) \ & ext{s.t.} \ a_t &= (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t \ a_{T-1} &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Variables: Consumption: c_t Productivity: z_t End-of-period savings: a_t (no debt at death)
- Parameters: Discount factor: β Wage: w Interest rate: r (define $R \equiv 1 + r$ as interest factor)

It is a static problem

$$v_0 = \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{T-1}} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \beta^t u(c_t)$$
 s.t. $a_t = (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t$ $a_{T-1} \geq 0$

It is a static problem:

- 1. **Information:** z_t is known for all t at t = 0
- 2. **Target:** Discounted utility, $\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \beta^t u(c_t)$
- 3. **Behavior:** Choose $c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_{T-1}$ simultaneously
- 4. **Solution:** Sequence of consumption *choices* $c_0^*, c_1^*, \dots, c_{T-1}^*$

Substitution implies Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC)

$$a_{T-1} = Ra_{T-2} + wz_{T-1} - c_{T-1}$$

$$= R^2 a_{T-3} + Rwz_{T-2} - Rc_{T-2} + wz_{T-1} - c_{T-1}$$

$$= R^T a_{-1} + \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} R^{T-1-t} (wz_t - c_t)$$

• Use **terminal condition** $a_{T-1} = 0$ (equality due utility max.)

$$R^{-(T-1)}a_{T-1} = 0 \Leftrightarrow s_0 + h_0 - \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} R^{-t}c_t = 0$$

where $s_0 \equiv Ra_{-1}$ (after-interest assets) and $h_0 \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} R^{-t} w z_t$ (human capital)

FOC and Euler-equation

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \beta^t u(c_t) + \lambda \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} R^{-t} c_t - s_0 - h_0 \right]$$

First order conditions:

$$\forall t: 0 = \beta^t u'(c_t) + \lambda (1+r)^{-t} \Leftrightarrow u'(c_t) = -\lambda (\beta R)^{-t}$$

• **Euler-equation** for $k \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$:

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{u'(c_{t+k})} = \frac{-\lambda (\beta R)^{-t}}{-\lambda (\beta R)^{-(t+k)}} = (\beta R)^k$$

 Equates Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) with relative price of postponing consumption k periods

Consumption choice

• CRRA: $u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$ imply Euler-equation

$$\frac{c_0^{-\sigma}}{c_t^{-\sigma}} = (\beta R)^t \Leftrightarrow c_t = (\beta R)^{\frac{t}{\sigma}} c_0$$

Insert Euler into IBC to get consumption choice

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} R^{-t} (\beta R)^{t/\sigma} c_0 = s_0 + h_0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$c_0^* = \frac{1 - (\beta R)^{1/\sigma} R^{-1}}{1 - ((\beta R)^{1/\sigma} R^{-1})^T} (s_0 + h_0)$$

Finite horizon solution to the consumption-saving problem

Infinite horizon

• Infinite horizon. Assume log utility, $\sigma=1$. For $\beta<1$: Let $T\to\infty$ to get solution to consumer propblem at time 0 :

$$c_0^* = (1 - \beta)(s_0 + h_0)$$

- \bullet Consume a constant fraction $1-\beta$ out of initial wealth + lifetime human capital
- In this model the MPC of windfall income $\frac{\partial c_0}{\partial s_0}$ is:

$$\frac{\partial c_0}{\partial s_0} = 1 - \beta$$

- Note from euler equation $\frac{u'(c_t)}{u'(c_{t+1})} = \beta R$ so a steady state will feature $\beta R = 1 \Leftrightarrow 1 \beta = \frac{R-1}{R} \Leftrightarrow 1 \beta = \frac{r}{1+r} \approx r$
- Standard model with no borrowing constraints or uncertainty features a small MPC

Uncertainty and always borrowing constraint

$$egin{aligned} v_0(z_0,a_{-1}) &= \max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^\infty eta^t u(c_t)
ight] \end{aligned}$$
 s.t. $a_t &= (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t$ $z_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{Z}(z_t)$ $a_t \geq \underline{a}$ $\lim_{t o \infty} (1+r)^{-t} a_t \geq 0 \quad \text{[No-Ponzi game]}$

- Stochastic income from 1st order Markov-process, Z
- A true dynamic problem:
 - 1. **Information:** z_t is revealed period-by-period
 - 2. **Target:** Expected discounted utility, $\mathbb{E}_0\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)\right]$
 - 3. **Behavior:** Choose c_t sequentially as information is revealed
 - 4. **Solution:** Sequence of consumption *functions*, $c_t^*(z_t, a_{t-1})$

Euler-equation from variation argument

- Case I: If $u'(c_t) > \beta R \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{t+1})]$: Increase c_t by marginal $\Delta > 0$, and lower c_{t+1} by $R\Delta$
 - 1. **Feasible:** Yes, if unconstrained $a_t > \underline{a}$
 - 2. Utility change: $u'(c_t) + \beta(-R) \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{t+1})] > 0$
- Case II: If $u'(c_t) < \beta R \mathbb{E}_t \left[u'(c_{t+1}) \right]$: Lower c_t by marginal $\Delta > 0$, and increase c_{t+1} by $R\Delta$
 - 1. Feasible: Yes (always)
 - 2. Utility change: $-u'(c_t) + \beta R \mathbb{E}_t \left[u'(c_{t+1}) \right] > 0$
- Conclusion: By contradiction
 - 1. Constrained: $a_t = \underline{a}$ and $u'(c_t) \ge \beta R \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{t+1})]$, or
 - 2. Unconstrained: $a_t > \underline{a}$ and $u'(c_t) = \beta R \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{t+1})]$
- Note: Can also derive using Lagrangian/Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions

Further resources

- 1. Lecture notes by Christopher Carroll
- 2. Lecture notes by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
- 3. The Economics of Consumption, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017)
- »Liquidity constraints and precautionary saving « Carroll, Holm, Kimball (JET, 2021)

Dynamic Programming

Dynamic solution: Bellman's Principle of Optimality

- To actually solve the stochastic period-by-period consumption-saving problem we need dynamic programming
- In math:
 - 1. Instead of looking at entire lifetime utility stream $\mathbb{E}_0\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)\right]$, use *recursive* from

$$v_t(z_t, a_{t-1}) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[v_{t+1}(z_{t+1}, a_t)]$$

s.t. $a_t = (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t \ge \underline{a}$

where v_t is the value function

2. Policy function, c_t^* : Is the same as

$$c_t^*(z_t, a_{t-1}) = \arg\max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[v_{t+1}(z_{t+1}, a_t)]$$

s.t. $a_t = (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t \ge \underline{a}$

Vocabulary

$$v_{t}(z_{t}, a_{t-1}) = \max_{c_{t}} u(c_{t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t}[v_{t+1}(z_{t+1}, a_{t})]$$
s.t. $a_{t} = (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_{t} - c_{t} \ge \underline{a}$

- 1. State variables: z_t and a_{t-1}
- 2. Control variable: c_t
- 3. Continuation value: $\beta \mathbb{E}_t[v_{t+1}(z_{t+1}, a_t)]$
- 4. **Parameters:** r, w, and stuff in $u(\bullet)$

Note: Straightforward to extend to more goods, more assets or other states, more complex uncertainty, bounded rationality etc.

Infinite horizon: $T \to \infty$?

- So far: Finite horizon (finite T) with some terminal condition
 - For instance: Consume everything in final period
- Contraction mapping result: If β is low enough (strong enough impatience) then the value and policy functions converge to $v(z_t, a_{t-1})$ and $c^*(z_t, a_{t-1})$ for large enough T
- Maximum upper limit for β : $\frac{1}{1+r}$
- In practice:
 - 1. Make arbitrary initial guess (e.g. $v_{t+1} = 0$)
 - 2. Solve backwards until value and policy functions does not change anymore (given some tolerance)

Timing of shocks

- Realization of shocks: First in the period before choices are made
- Beginning-of-period value function (before realization):

$$\underline{v}_t(z_{t-1}, a_{t-1}) = \mathbb{E}_{t-1}[v_t(z_t, a_{t-1})]$$

End-of-period value function (after realization):

$$v_t(z_t, a_{t-1}) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \underline{v}_{t+1}(z_t, a_t)$$

s.t. $a_t = (1+r)a_{t-1} + wz_t - c_t \ge \underline{a}$

Discretization

- Income z_t and savings a_t typically continuous variables. How to handle on computer?
- Discretization: All state variables belong to discrete sets ≡ grids,

$$z_t \in \mathcal{G}_z = \{z^0, z^1, \dots, z^{\#z-1}\}$$


 $a_t \in \mathcal{G}_a = \{a^0, a^1, \dots, a^{\#_a-1}\}$
 $a^0 = \underline{a}$

- Issue: If households make continuous savings choice a_t^* but only know continuation value $\underline{v}_{t+1}(z_t, a_t)$ on grid.
- How to compute $\underline{v}_{t+1}(z_t, a_t^*)$? \Rightarrow interpolation

Linear interpolation

Linear interpolation

• Approximate y = f(x) using linear approximation between known points



Linear interpolation

- Linear interpolation in math
 - 1. Assume \underline{v}_{t+1} is known on grids $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$ (tensor product)
 - 2. Want to evaluate $\underline{v}_{t+1}(z^{iz}, a)$ for arbitrary a
 - 3. Find place in grid G_a where $a^l < a < a^{l+1}$
 - 4. Compute interpolation:

$$\begin{split} \underline{\breve{v}}_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a) &= \underline{v}_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a^l) + \omega(a - a^l) \\ \omega &\equiv \frac{v_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a^{l+1}) - v_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a^l)}{a^{l+1} - a^l} \\ I &\equiv \text{largest } i_a \in \{0, 1, \dots, \#_a - 2\} \text{ such that } a^{i_a} \leq a \end{split}$$

Discretization of income process


• Assume that idiosyncratic income z_t follows an AR(1) process:

$$\log z_t = \rho_z \log z_{t-1} + \psi_t, \ \psi_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\psi}^2)$$

where
$$\mathbb{E}[z_t] = 1$$

- Since shocks ψ_t are normally distributed z_t is continuous ⇒ Need to discretize
- Tauchen (1986) or Rouwenhorst (1995): Can approximate AR(1) with discrete Markov chain that features:
 - Same variance
 - Same serial correlation
- Use algorithm from either paper to get grid \mathcal{G}_z and transition probabilities $\{\pi_{i,i}\}$ given ρ_z and σ_ψ
- Households move between states (points in \mathcal{G}_z) with transition probability $\pi_{j,i} = \Pr[z_t = z^i \,|\, z_{t-1} = z^j]$

Transition probability matrix



Value function iteration (VFI)

Beginning-of-period value function:


$$\underline{v}_t(z^{i_{z-}}, a^{i_{z-}}) = \sum_{i_z=0}^{\#z-1} \pi_{i_{z-}, i_z} v_t(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{z-}})$$

End-of-period value-of-choice:

$$egin{aligned} v_t(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{3-}}) &= \max_{c_t} v_t^{Choice}(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{3-}} | c_t) \ & ext{with } c_t \in [0, (1+r)a^{i_{3-}} + wz^{i_z} + \underline{a}] \end{aligned}$$
 $egin{aligned} v_t^{Choice}(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{3-}} | c_t) &= u(c_t) + reve{
u}_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a_t) \ & ext{with } a_t &= (1+r)a^{i_{3-}} + wz^{i_z} - c_t \end{aligned}$


- Inner loop: For each grid point in $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$ find $c_t^*(z_t, a_{t-1})$ and therefore $v_t(z_t, a_{t-1})$ with a numerical optimizer
- Outer loop: Backwards from t = T 1 (note $\underline{v}_T = 0$, or known)

Convergence (t = T - 1 - k)



with $z_t = 0.87$

Converged policy functions



Precautionary saving:

- Consumption function concave
- Savings drift imply buffer-stock target
 - Impatience vs. precautionary saving

Numerical Monte Carlo simulation

- Initial distribution: Draw $z_{i,-1}$ and $a_{i,-1}$ for $i \in \{0,1,\ldots,N-1\}$
- **Simulation:** Forwards in time from t = 0 and in each time period
 - 1. Draw z_{it} given transition probabilities
 - 2. Use linear interpolation to evaluate

$$c_{it} = \breve{c}_t^*(z_{it}, a_{it-1})$$

 $a_{it} = (1+r)a_{it-1} + wz_{it} - c_{it}$

- Review:
 - Pro: Simple to implement
 - Con: Computationally costly and introduces randomness ⇒ Need large N to avoid noise

Numerical histogram simulation - general idea

- Alternative to Monte Carlo simulation that avoids stochasticity: histogram method
- End goal: obtain discretized distribution directly on the grids $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$
- If households only make choices on grid (i.e. no continuous choice) then obtain distribution as follows:
 - Initial distribution: Choose $\underline{D}_0(z_{-1}, a_{-1})$, which is defined on $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$ and sum to $1 \equiv histogram$
 - **Simulation:** Forwards in time from t = 0 and in each time period
 - 1. **Distribute stochastic mass:** For each i_z and i_{a-} calculate

$$D_t(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{a-}}) = \sum_{i_z=0}^{\#_z-1} \pi_{i_z-,i_z} \underline{D}_t(z^{i_z-}, a^{i_{a-}})$$

- 2. Initial zero mass: Set $\underline{D}_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a}) = 0$ for all i_z and i_a
- 3. Distribute endogenous mass: For each i_z and i_{a-} do:
- 4. Find $I \equiv i_a \in \{0, 1, \dots, \#_a 2\}$ such that $a_t^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{a-}}) = a^I$ (on grid assumption)
- 5. Increment $\underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_{t+1}(z^{i_z},a^l)$ with $\boldsymbol{D}_t(z^{i_z},a^{i_{a-}})$

Numerical histogram simulation I

- If households may choose savings policy $a_t^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a})$ which is not on the grid \mathcal{G}_a how do we distribute mass across the grid?
- Use »lottery«: Find neighbouring grid points for policy function $a^l < a_*^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a}) < a^{l+1}$
- Assume that a fraction ω of households goes to a^l , remaining share goes to a^{l+1}
- Weight ω should satisfy:

$$\omega a^{l} + (1 - \omega) a^{l+1} = a_{t}^{*}(z^{i_{z}}, a^{i_{a}})$$

Such that we get right asset level on average.

Solve for weight:

$$\omega = \frac{a^{l+1} - a^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a})}{a^{l+1} - a^l}$$

Numerical histogram simulation II

- Initial distribution: Choose $\underline{\mathcal{D}}_0(z_{-1}, a_{-1})$, which is defined on $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$ and sum to $1 \equiv histogram$
- **Simulation:** Forwards in time from t = 0 and in each time period
 - 1. Distribute stochastic mass: For each i_z and i_{a-} calculate

$$D_t(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{a-}}) = \sum_{i_z = 0}^{\#_z - 1} \pi_{i_z - i_z} \underline{D}_t(z^{i_z -}, a^{i_{a-}})$$

- 2. Initial zero mass: Set $\underline{\textbf{\textit{D}}}_{t+1}(z^{i_z},a^{i_a})=0$ for all i_z and i_a
- 3. Distribute endogenous mass: For each i_z and i_{a-} do

3.1 Find
$$I \equiv \text{largest } i_a \in \{0,1,\ldots,\#_a-2\}$$
 such that $a^{i_a} \leq a_t^*(z^{i_z},a^{i_{a-}})$

3.2 Calculate
$$\omega = \frac{a^{l+1} - a^*(z^{lz}, a^{la} -)}{a^{l+1} - a^{l}} \in [0, 1]$$

- 3.3 Increment $\underline{D}_{t+1}(z^{i_z}, a^l)$ with $\omega D_t(z^{i_z}, a^{i_{a-}})$
- 3.4 Increment $\underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_{t+1}(\boldsymbol{z}^{i_z}, \boldsymbol{a}^{l+1})$ with $(1-\omega)\boldsymbol{D}_t(\boldsymbol{z}^{i_z}, \boldsymbol{a}^{i_{a-}})$
- Review:
 - 1. Pro: Computationally efficient and no randomness
 - 2. Con: Introduces a non-continuous distribution

Small example

- Grids: $\mathcal{G}_z = \{\underline{z}, \overline{z}\}$ and $\mathcal{G}_a = \{0, 1\}$
- Transition matrix: $\pi_{0,0} = \pi_{1,1} = 0.5$
- Policy function:
 - Low income: $a^*(\underline{z},0) = a^*(\underline{z},1) = 0$
 - High income: Let $a^*(\overline{z},0) = 0.5$ and $a^*(\overline{z},1) = 1$
- Initial distribution: $\underline{\mathbf{D}}_0(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z_{it} = \underline{z} \text{ and } a_{it} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$
- Task: Calculate by hand the transitions to


$$D_0, \underline{D}_1, D_1, \dots$$

See simple simple_histogram_simulation.xlsx


Infinite horizon: $T \to \infty$?

- Initial guess: Can be arbitrary.
 - 1. Everyone in one grid point, or
 - 2. Ergodic distribution of z_{it} and everyone has zero savings,
- Convergence: Simulate forward until the distribution does not change anymore (given some tolerance)

Converged CDF of savings



MPCs



Side-note: Matrix formulation

• The histogram method can be written in **matrix form**:

$$oldsymbol{D}_t = \Pi_z' \underline{oldsymbol{D}}_t \ \underline{oldsymbol{D}}_{t+1} = \Lambda_t' oldsymbol{D}_t$$

where

 $\underline{\boldsymbol{D}}_t$ is vector of length $\#_z \times \#_a$

 $extbf{\emph{D}}_t$ is vector of length $\#_{ extsf{\emph{z}}} imes \#_{ extsf{\emph{a}}}$

 Π_{z}' is derived from the $\pi_{i_{z-},i_{z}}\mbox{'s}$

 Λ'_t is derived from the *I*'s and ω 's

- Note: Example shown in notebook
- Further details: Young (2010), Tan (2020), Ocampo and Robinson (2022)

EGM

Characteristics of VFI

- Value function iteration (VFI) is the standard method for solving dynamic programs
 - Robust
 - Easy to implement for a wide class of models
 - Well known convergence properties (c.f. contraction mapping theorem)
- But significant drawbacks in terms of computational speed
 - Computationally expensive since we have to use a numerical optimizer at every point in the state space
 - Have to do interpolation at every evaluation of the optimization problem
- Solution: Endogenous grid-point method

Endogenous grid-point method (EGM)

Alternative to VFI using Euler, i.e. $c_t^{-\sigma} = \beta(1+r)\mathbb{E}_t[c_{t+1}^{-\sigma}]$:

1. Calculate post-decision marginal value of cash:

$$q(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a}) = \sum_{i_{z_+}=0}^{\#_z-1} \pi_{i_z, i_{z_+}} c_+ (z^{i_{z_+}}, a^{i_a})^{-\sigma}$$

2. Invert Euler-equation:

$$c(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a}) = (\beta(1+r)q(z^{i_z}, a^{i_a}))^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

3. Endogenous cash-on-hand:

$$m(z^{i_z},a^{i_a})=a^{i_a}+c(z^{i_z},a^{i_a})$$

4. **Consumption function:** Calculate $m = (1+r)a^{i_3-} + wz^{i_2}$ If $m \le m(z^{i_z}, a^0)$ constraint binds: $c^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_3-}) = m + \underline{a}$ Else: $c^*(z^{i_z}, a^{i_3-}) = \text{interpolate } m(z^{i_z}, :)$ to $c(z^{i_z}, :)$ at m

Practice

In practice

- **EconModel:** Go through notebook 01. Using the EconModelClass (except part on C++)
- ConSav: Look at the 04. Tools folder.
- Todays notebook: Consumption-Saving Model show implementation of solution and simulation methods.

Summary

Summary and next week

Today:

- 1. Introduction to course
- 2. Consumption-saving models
- 3. Numerical dynamic programming
- Next week: More on consumption-saving models

Homework:

- Ensure that your Python installation is working, and that you can use ConSav, GEModelTools
- Familiarize your self with today's code and the basic concepts of dynamic programming