




14. Advanced HANK Topics

Adv. Macro: Heterogenous Agent Models

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Introduction

Introduction

- **So far:**
 - Utilize HANK framework to study **how** stabilization policy (fiscal, monetary) affects the economy
- **Today:** How does *policy recommendations* change with the introduction of heterogeneous agents?
 - I.e what is the optimal policy in response to adverse aggregate shocks?
 - Is it affected by heterogeneity?
- This topic is at the **research frontier**
 - At the end of lecture I will briefly mention other topics at the frontier

Optimal Policy

Optimal Policy

- What is the problem of the social planner?
 - Consider example where the central bank/social planner chooses the path of interest rates
- **Goal:** Maximize aggregate welfare of **all households**
- Subject to:
 - The model (equilibrium conditions, firm + HH behavior, budget constraints etc)
 - Aggregate shocks
- This problem is more complicated than calculating **optimal steady state policy**
 - Optimal steady state: Maximize one function as a function of 1 or 2 variables (ex: labor income tax+capital income tax)
 - Here: Choose entire **path** (length T) of instruments subject to entire dynamic model

Optimal Policy - computation

- Two Approaches:

1. Start from **efficient** steady state

- Harsh assumption
- No distortions in steady state
 - No monopolistic competition, tax distortions
 - No motive for redistribution (i.e. incomplete markets)
- Can then derive quadratic loss function
- Easy to minimize \Rightarrow Yields optimal Policy

2. Start from **inefficient** steady state

- Larger role for inequality and redistribution
- Much more difficult - see end of lecture

Optimal policy around efficient steady state

- Standard NK model features **inefficient** steady state due to monopolistic competition
- Simple steady state policy can restore efficiency: Give firms a labor subsidy τ such that they charge lower prices
- Around **efficient steady state**, can derive the following approximation of household welfare (see e.g. Woodford book):

$$\mathcal{W} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) - \nu(L_t)] \approx - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (d\pi_t^2 + \lambda_Y dY_t^2)$$

- Maximizing welfare same as minimizing loss function
 - Planner want to stabilize (variance of) inflation and output

Solving the planner prob. - efficient steady state

- Sequence-space social planner problem ($\beta = \text{diag}(1, \beta^1, \beta^2, \dots)$):

$$\min \pi' \beta \pi + \lambda_Y d Y' \beta d Y \quad \text{s.t.} \quad H(Y, \pi, i, \Gamma) = 0$$

- Stack target variables in vector $x = (\pi, Y)'$ and weights $\lambda = (\mathbf{1}, \lambda_Y)$. Then:

$$\min x' (\beta \lambda) x \quad \text{s.t.} \quad H(x, i, \Gamma) = 0$$

- Choose interest rate to solve this problem. Solution:

$$i^* = - [J'_{x,i}(\beta \lambda) J_{x,i}]^{-1} \times [J'_{x,i}(\beta \lambda) J_{x,\Gamma} d\Gamma]$$

- Easy** to solve for optimal policy given shock $d\Gamma$ - just need jacobians around ss
 - We need jacobians for π, Y w.r.t to the shock Γ , and the policy instrument i

- How to interpret optimal policy formula:

$$i^* = - [J'_{x,i}(\beta\lambda) J_{x,i}]^{-1} \times [J'_{x,i}(\beta\lambda) J_{x,\Gamma} d\Gamma]$$

- Solution to least-squares problem: \Rightarrow Same form as a OLS least squares estimate ($\gg \text{cov}(\frac{\partial x}{\partial i}, \frac{\partial x}{\partial \Gamma} d\Gamma) / \text{var}(\frac{\partial x}{\partial i}) \ll$)
 - If the instrument and the shock co-vary strongly \Rightarrow Instrument is good at offsetting shock, should react more
 - If variance of instrument is large (i.e. it has large effects on target variables) \Rightarrow Don't need to change instrument much to get effect

Optimal policy in HANK - Efficient ss

- How does this work in **HANK**?
 - Main reference: McKay and Wolf (2022)
- Steady state is **not efficient** due to incomplete markets (i.e. borrowing constraint)
 - But need efficient steady state to get quadratic loss function
- Choose general social welfare function (i.e. objective of planner):

$$\mathcal{W} = \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t E_t \int \phi_j [u(c_{jt}) - \nu(L_t)] D_{jt} dj$$

- where $\{\phi_j\}$ is a pareto weight. McKay and Wolf (2022) calibrate these weights such that initial steady state efficient according to objective \mathcal{W}
 - If ss features some HHs with low income/wealth with high marginal utility, then planner will place **low weight** on these

Welfare approximation


- Given $\{\phi_i\}$ we can derive a second-order approximation of social welfare:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{W} &= \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t E_t \int \phi_j [u(c_{jt}) - \nu(L_t)] D_j dj \\ &\approx - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(d\pi_t^2 + \lambda_Y dY_t^2 + \lambda_\omega \int (d\omega_{jt})^2 D_j dj \right)\end{aligned}$$

- where $d\omega_{jt} \equiv \frac{c_{jt}}{C_t} - \frac{c_{j,ss}}{C_{ss}}$ is the change in individual j 's consumption share
- Introducing HA give additional motive to social planner to **stabilize consumption shares**
- Implications of inequality for opt. policy depend on distributional incidence of policy
 - Heterogeneity matters for monetary policy if this affect cross-sectional consumption dispersion $\left(\frac{\int (d\omega_{jt})^2 D_j dj}{di_t} \neq 0 \right)$

Monetary policy effects


- Match model to empirical effects of monetary policy on labor income + capital gains across wealth distribution:
- Model implied consumption response across wealth distribution:



- Relatively flat - mon. pol. affect c of all HHs proportionally \Rightarrow consumption shares relatively stable, $\frac{\int (d\omega_{jt})^2 D_j dj}{di_t} \approx 0$
 - HHs at bottom of dist. respond to changes in labor income
 - HHs at top of dist. respond (less) to large fluctuations in cap income (stock prices + house prices)


Optimal monetary policy - distributional shock

- Application: Optimal monetary policy response to *distributional* shock (transfer from poor to rich)
 - Dual mandate = No inequality term (loss $= - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (d\pi_t^2 + \lambda_Y dY_t^2)$)
 - Monetary only = Dual mandate + inequality term
- Inequality term barely affects optimal policy since monetary policy is ill-suited to offset dist. incidence



Optimal joint monetary-fiscal policy

- If we consider joint monetary **and** fiscal policy:




- Fiscal policy good at redistribution - no need for monetary policy here
- Typical sentiment: Fiscal policy should handle redistribution, not monetary policy

Quadratic approx: What do we lose?

- McKay-Wolf loss function builds on second-order approximation of aggregate utility (assume log utility):

$$\int \phi_j u(c_{jt}) dj \approx u'(C) \times dC_t - \int \frac{\phi_j}{c_j^2} dc_{jt}^2 dj$$

- Weight on variance term dc_{jt}^2 of individual j :
 - Efficient steady state ($\phi_j = u'(c_j)^{-1} = c_j$): $1/c_j$
 - Inefficient steady state and Utilitarian planner ($\phi_j = 1$): $1/c_j^2$
- Weights in standard model



Optimal Policy from inefficient steady state (Ramsey)

- If we do not use planner weights, HA ss is not efficient \Rightarrow Cannot derive quad. loss function
- **How to solve for optimal policy?** Example in simple HANK with optimal monetary policy
- Simple model with HA, linear production and TFP shock - CB controls real rate r (**policy instrument**)

$$\max_{\{r_t, c_{it}, L_t, Y_t, w_t, a_{it}\}_{t=0}^T} \mathcal{W} = \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t E_t \int [u(c_{it}) - \nu(L_t)] D_{it} di$$

s.t.

$$c_{it} = c_{it}^*$$

$$c_{it} + a_{it} = w_t e_{it} + (1 + r_t) a_{it-1}$$

$$Y_t = \Gamma_t L_t$$

$$w_t = \Gamma_t$$

$$Y_t = \int c_{it} D_{it} di$$

Lagrangian I

- In Lagrangian form (substitute in and use $w_t = \Gamma_t$) and $\mathbf{x} = \{L_t \Gamma_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^T$

$$\mathcal{L} = \max_{\{r_t, L_t, \lambda_t\}_{t=0}^T} \sum_{t=0}^T \left\{ \beta^t E_t \int u[(c_{it}^*(\mathbf{x})) - \nu(L_t)] D_{it}(\mathbf{x}) di \right. \\ \left. + \lambda_t \left[\Gamma_t L_t - \int c_{it}^*(\mathbf{x}) D_{it}(\mathbf{x}) di \right] \right\}$$

- **FOC** (just w.r.t r_s):

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial r_s} \left[\sum_{t=0}^T \left\{ \beta^t E_t \int u(c_{it}^*(\mathbf{x}) - \nu(L_t)) D_{it} di \right\} \right. \\ \left. - \frac{\partial}{\partial r_s} \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \int c_{it}^*(\mathbf{x}) D_{it}(\mathbf{x}) di \right] = 0$$

Lagrangian II

- Denote $\mathbf{J}^{\mathcal{U},r}(\mathbf{x})$ as jacobian of \mathcal{U} w.r.t \mathbf{r} evaluated at \mathbf{x}

$$\sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{U},r}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathbf{C},r}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

- First term is (sum) of jacobian of agg. utility \mathcal{U} w.r.t \mathbf{r} (gradient)
- Second term is (sum) of jacobian of agg \mathbf{C} w.r.t \mathbf{r}
- We know how to compute these using fake-news algorithm**
 - We can **evaluate** the FOCs

Lagrangian FOCs I

- Standard techniques (i.e. Fake-news) allow us to evaluate the following system of FOCs:
 - T eqs. for each (instrument, endogenous variable, lagrange multiplier)
- How do we **solve** the system for the optimal policy response?
- Use (Quasi-)Newton/Broyden's method as usual [solve $f(x) = 0$ using $f'(x)$]
- Continue example from before. Jacobian of residual w.r.t r_k :

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{U},r}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{C},r}(\mathbf{x}) = 0 \\ \Rightarrow & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \frac{\partial \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{U},r}}{\partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \frac{\partial \mathbf{J}_{t,s}^{\mathcal{C},r}}{\partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) = 0 \\ = & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{U}_t}{\partial r_s \partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{C}_t}{\partial r_s \partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Lagrangian FOCs II

- Last equation repeated:

$$= \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{U}_t}{\partial r_s \partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) - \sum_{t=0}^T \lambda_t \frac{\partial^2 C_t}{\partial r_s \partial r_k}(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

- What is the issue here?
 - We need **second** order derivatives to solve this
- Expensive to get - recall:
 - Jacobian of HH problem requires T^2 iterations to get for each input (Fake-news reduce this to T)
 - Hessian (size: $T \times T \times T$) requires T^3 iterations to get
 - Can get down to $\frac{T^2}{2}$ if we use Fake-news + symmetry
 - Still slow if $T = 300 \Rightarrow 45,000$ evaluations of HH problem for each input
 - Getting standard J with Fake-news only requires $T = 300$ evaluations
 - Intuition for why this is difficult: the action of every agent c_i, a_i is a choice variable in the planner's problem \Rightarrow **massive** max. problem

- Bhandari, Evans, Golosov, & Sargent (2021)
 - Use small-noise expansions to approximate model w.r.t to both idiosyncratic states + aggregate shocks
 - Can handle aggregate uncertainty, but not occ. binding borrowing constraints
- Le Grand & Ragot (2022)
 - Truncation of state space. Can then derive FOCs by hand
- Dávila & Schaab (2023)
 - Formulate model in continuous time following Nuño & Moll (2018)
 - can get FOCs of planner problem by hand
 - Extended to discrete time in Waldstrøm (2024) - use numerical tools from *deep learning* literature to efficiently compute derivatives
- Literature not settled - no preferred solution yet

Other HANK Topics

Other HANK topics

- Brief introduction to optimal policy in HANK
- **Many** other very interesting topics where household heterogeneity potentially matters
- I will give you some very brief examples
 - *Could serve as inspiration for master thesis*

- Schaab and Tan (2023) »Monetary and Fiscal Policy According to HANK-IO«
- Alves & Violante (2023) »Some Like It Hot: Monetary Policy Under Okun's Hypothesis«
- Faccini, Lee, Luetticke, Ravn & Renkin (2024) »Financial Frictions: Macro vs Micro Volatility«
- Ferriere Navarro (2024) »The heterogeneous effects of government spending: It's all about taxes«

- Schaab and Tan (2023) »Monetary and Fiscal Policy According to HANK-IO«
- A multi-sector HANK model where:
 - Households work in different sectors (earnings heterogeneity)
 - May matter for transmission if high MPC HHs work in sectors that are more cyclical
 - Buy goods from sectors (expenditure heterogeneity)
 - May matter for transmission if higher MPC HHs primarily buy goods from sectors with more flexible prices
- Calibrate the model to match these channels using micro data
- They find that the contribution of earnings and expenditure heterogeneity channels in the transmission of monetary policy is small

Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy

- Alves & Violante (2023) »Some Like It Hot: Monetary Policy Under Okun's Hypothesis«
- Poor households are more exposed to business cycles through LM transition
 - Separation rates + job finding rates are more cyclical
 - Recession have long lasting effects on earnings (recession \Rightarrow leave the LM \Rightarrow hard to get back in)
- **Trade-off** for CB: Running the economy hot generates inflation (bad) but keeps poor household in labor market (good)
- Use a HANK model to quantify this trade-off

- Faccini, Lee, Luetticke, Ravn & Renkin (2024) »Financial Frictions: Macro vs Micro Volatility«
- Borrowers and savers pay different interest rates
- The spread (interest on loans minus savings) is countercyclical
 - A monetary policy shock that increases the interbank rate causes banks to raise rates on loans more than on savings
 - This reduces the mass of household at $a < 0$ who move to $a = 0$ through deleveraging
- The aggregate MPCs increases by up to 5% in **response** to a monetary policy shock due to this mechanism

Progressive Taxes

- Ferriere & Navarro (2024) »The heterogeneous effects of government spending: It's all about taxes«
 - Uncover *Progressivity-dependent fiscal multipliers*
- Observation: Low income households:
 - 1) Have higher MPCs
 - 2) Have larger labor supply elasticities
- Result: Government spending shocks which are financed by more progressive taxes have higher multipliers
- Consistent with empirical evidence

Conclusion

Conclusion

- **Today:**
 - A brief look into current research frontier on HANK
 - **Many** other papers which we have not covered
- **Now:** Exam