

VULNERABILITIES AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMMING

INF-744: SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR IOT

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Introduction

We classify software vulnerabilities in:

- 1. Input representation: buffer overflows
- 2. Interface abuse dangerous functions
- 3. **Time and state:** synchronization errors and race conditions
- 4. Error handling: function return values and exception handling
- 5. Memory management: memory allocation and liberation
- Security mechanisms: design and implementation of cryptography

Tools: For static or dynamic code analysis, cppcheck, flawfinder, Fortify, Coverity, Valgrind.

VULNERABILITIES

Vulnerabilities can have different impacts in security properties:

- · Integrity: corruption of memory and execution state
- Availability: denial of service by exaggerate resource consumption
- · Confidentiality: exposure of secret data by interface
- · Access control: privilege escalation
- · Predictability: software behavior can become unpredictable


Main vulnerability in the C programming language, occurs when the adversary writes more data than the buffer is able to store, overwriting local execution contest and aiming to continue execution in an attacker-provided code segment.


Example:


```
#include <string.h>


void foo (char *bar) {
   char c[12];
   strcpy(c, bar); // Vulnerable call...
}


int main (int argc, char **argv) {
   foo(argv[1]);
}
```














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Defenses:

- Manual/automatic static/dynamic verification
- · Canaries for detection
- · Address randomization
- Safe functions
- Non-executable stack

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Heap overflow

Analogous to a stack overflow, but in the heap. The attack usually overwrites pointers in the double linked list implementing the heap in a way that when memory is freed, the return address will be overwritten.

Defenses: Same as stack overflow.

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Return to libc

Buffer overflow that overwrites the return address with the address of a function of interest in the program or supporting libraries. Context is usually built on the stack for the function execution.

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Return-oriented programming

When the program does not provide useful functions, one can construct arbitrary code from the chaining of useful execution sequences.

Defense: Address randomization, canaries and dynamic monitoring.

Integer overflows

Consists in the manipulation of integers to reduce buffer capacity, facilitating a buffer overflow exploit.

Defense: Manual or automatic verification of valid values, native multi-precision support in the programming language.

Example:

```
char *buf;
int i, len;

read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));

/* OOPS! We forgot about the negatives! */
if (len > 8000) { error("too large length"); return; }

buf = malloc(len);
read(fd, buf, len); /* Overflow after sign conversion */
```

Important: The attack is also possible without involving type conversion.

Example:

```
char *buf;
size_t len;
read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
/* Forgot to verify maximum size */
buf = malloc(len+1); /* +1 can overflow to malloc(0) */
read(fd, buf, len);
buf[len] = '\0';
```

OTHER INPUT VULNERABILITIES

Command injection

Programs running under privilege and with shell execution functionality can be forced to execute arbitrary commands.

Non-trusted libraries can be manipulated to execute arbitrary code during load.

Defense: Reduce privileges and unnecessary support for commands. Consider static linking.

Resource abuse

Allows the adversary to manipulate resource identifier to force a program to corrupt or read protected files.

Defense: Minimize privileges.

OTHER INPUT VULNERABILITIES

Illegal pointers

Manipulating pointers returned by functions to point to other buffers of interest can substantially change the behavior of the program.

Defense: Verify pointers returned by functions and reject invalid values.

Record forgery

Manipulate specific events after a buffer overflow to hide attacker actions.

Defense: Use cryptography to protect integrity of log records.

INTERFACE ABUSE

Dangerous functions

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Inconsistent implementations

Using functions with inconsistent implementations in different platforms can make the program behavior unpredictable.

Defense: Restrict function calls to standard and portable ones.

TIME AND STATE

Synchronization errors

Acquisition and liberation of locks can affect unavailability.

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Race conditions

The time between the verification of a file property and using the file can allow privilege scalation, specially if files are temporary.

Defense: Atomic file manipulation calls.

Example:

```
char *filename; int fd;
do {
    filename = tempnam (NULL, "foo");
    fd = open (filename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_RDWR, 0600);
    free (filename);
} while (fd == -1);
```

ERROR HANDLING

Insufficient handling of return values

Not handling return values can change program behavior in case of error.

Defense: Verify all return values and handle errors correctly.

Exception triggering

Non-captured exceptions can affect availability of software.

Defense: Handle rigorously all exceptions threw by the program.

MEMORY MANAGEMENT

Double free

Freeing the same memory position consecutively can cause a buffer overflow through manipulation of the pointer metadata in the doubly linked list used to implement the heap.

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Use after free

Referring to memory already free can crash the program (unavailability), corrupt the execution state and even allow execution of arbitrary code.

Defense: Careful memory management with a dynamic analysis tool, assign **NULL** to invalid pointers.

CASE STUDY: HEARTBLEED

