HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND MIGRATION

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Handbook of Culture and Migration

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ELGAR HANDBOOKS IN MIGRATION

Migration is an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family.

Ban Ki-Moon (UN Secretary General), 2013

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Preface

We began our work on this volume in 2018. Our discussions focused on the themes we would cover and the contributors we hoped would join us as together we explored the central role culture plays in human mobility while preserving the turns and twists that are part of the story of migration. Our invitations to researchers went out in early 2019 and by the start of 2020, we had their contributions in hand.

January 2020 seems so very long ago! Never for a moment would we have imagined how much the landscape for research would change and in only a few months. As we organise our volume and prepare to turn it over to the press, we are confronted by a pandemic that has fundamentally changed the world and human mobility. Yet migration continues, and we would argue that while Covid-19 has changed the ways we live, it has not diminished the role that culture plays in decisions people make about their mobility, nor the value of past migration experiences on which we tend to build our migratory plans.

We bring together 34 essays by 45 scholars in the *Handbook of Culture and Migration* and map new pathways to research on human mobility. We hope that readers will find much of interest in our collection and we thank the many researchers who shared their words. Building upon the articles collected here, it is our desire that our readers will continue to drive the growth of migration theory into the future.

1.   *Handbook of Culture and Migration*: an introduction

Jeffrey H. Cohen and Ibrahim Sirkeci

Despite the debates and an ever expanding literature, migration remains an exceptional process that has long interested scholars (Spencer 2011: 6). Yet, despite ongoing debates and improved theories, much of the research on contemporary migration continues to echo Ravenstein's laws of migration (1889) and emphasise the economic logic of mobility. And while the economic foundation of migration and migration decision-making is a critical element if we are to understand human mobility, it is not the only or potentially the most important of drivers. There is a myriad of influences beyond jobs and wages as noted in the literature (e.g. De Jong and Graefe 2008; Fussell and Massey 2004).

Humans move for many reasons, and perhaps the most important point we make in this collection is also the most simple: culture (of migration) matters. The decisions that movers make are founded in culture and social practice and over time, patterns emerge in a population's sojourns. The patterns that come to characterise migration pathways are defined in the discussions that movers and potential movers have with their families and friends and determined by their access to resources as well as the securities and insecurities that are present at points of origin and destination (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011, 2016; Sirkeci 2009).

THINKING ABOUT MOBILITY AND DEFINING A CULTURE OF MIGRATION

Migration is an historical process, and while contemporary movement can seem extraordinary, the phenomenon is rooted in history and largely influenced by family and communities along with the contextual factors and the desires and wants of the individuals. In other words, migration isn't a solitary act or a singular decision about where a mover might just go. It is about the decisions that migrants, potential migrants and non-migrants make as members of households and in response to family and friends as well as the broader contexts in which those decisions are embedded. A household decision, migration is also a response to aspirations and opportunities, as well as community and resources—whether real or imagined. Migration is about perceived levels of security and insecurity which arise from and around conflicts, disagreements and discomforts that challenge movers and their families (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Sirkeci 2009).

Our definition of migration is founded upon the belief that the household is an adaptive unit in which social actors make decisions based upon their hopes and dreams, the aspirations of those around them as well as the resources that they manage, own and can access (Carling and Collins 2018; Cohen 2001; Wilk 1991). Quite plainly, migrants come to their decisions in discussions with the members of their households and with friends and relatives at points of origin and destination; and while there are times when a migrant will ignore her

or his household—or alternatively, times when the household will overwhelm a mover with demands—the household is always present. Resources, whether real or imagined, fixed or flexible, also foster outcomes as movers and their households manage wealth, education, experiences and connections (see for example Barglowski 2019; Cederberg and Villares-Varela 2019; Conway and Cohen 2002; Kofman 2018).

Mobility is a decision that reflects on security and perceptions in sending and destination communities (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Sirkeci 2009). It is clear that migrants leave their homes and their communities in search of work and economic security, but here we expand on the idea and argue that security is more than an economic outcome and driver. Security is a cultural response (as is insecurity), and often security and insecurity are organised in response to assumptions about wellbeing, aspirations and opportunities that can reach well beyond economic concerns to include things like education and personal freedom (see for example Cohen 2004; Gartaula et al. 2012; Okamoto and Wilkes 2008; Sirkeci 2006).

Migrants approach security as individuals and as members of households and communities. Migrants are social agents and their decisions to move are not made in a vacuum; rather they reflect on broader debates, material and non-material challenges (Icduygu et al. 1999) and physical as well as mental violence (van Kooy and Bowman 2019). Of course, migrants seek to live well, but it is critical that we understand the context of wellbeing and the challenges that movers—particularly from marginalised backgrounds—are trying to leave behind. Refugees face daily challenges to wellbeing; for them, insecurity can seem quite clear. Nevertheless, many refugees never leave their homelands, seeking to rebuild security rather than leave for parts unknown (Mzayek 2019).

There are many "kinds" of movers, the skilled mover, the unskilled migrant and the pilgrim and the refugee among others. These "kinds" of movers demand an asymmetry in both our theories and in our conceptualisation of power at points of origin and destination (and see Akileswaran and Lurie 2010; Green 2011; Luna and Rahman 2019; Wanzo 2020). The relationships we study between movers and stay-at-homes or refugees and the state can no longer be overlooked whether the outcomes are cultural, geographic, economic, or social.

In addition to understanding the ways in which power affects migration, contemporary theories look beyond the assumption that migrants followed direct pathways to new destinations where they settle and begin life anew and instead recognise the dynamic ways in which movers travel, following circular routes, relocating to meet new calculations and celebrating new opportunities (see Kearney 1996; Pries 2013; Schiller et al. 1992) as well as new identities (Lin 2020; Stephen 2017). And even as migrants organise and balance desires, demands, security and opportunity, they are sometimes challenged by conflicts and these can come in myriad forms. Disputes around belonging and citizenship are conflated with xenophobia and rising nationalism to complicate outcomes as well as opportunities.

While migration can look like the quick choice of an independent social actor, it is not. In fact, if migration was the choice of a person with little regard for their future, migrants would not succeed and mobility would be too messy to study. If however, as the research included in this volume argues, migration makes sense and follows specific patterns in response to inequalities, insecurities and cultural traditions, then we can make sense of it as a cultural process, an economic move, a political move, and a social event.

Understanding general facts, for example, that there were at least 272 million international migrants according to the UN,[1] is a starting point from which we can explore macro-level trends. At the other end of the migration spectrum, a focus on movers (regardless of their

motivations) emphasises choices and impacts of movement beyond the individual. We argue for a cultural approach that addresses the meso-level while embracing macro-level trends as well as the individual's needs and aspirations and taking into account how decisions are made as parts of households and communities (Faist 1997). While decisions matter, the desire to migrate is neither easy nor easily acted on. Migration is costly. Movers need social capital, human capital, financial capital and physical capability to set on migration (Sirkeci et al. 2019).

A complex phenomenon, we cannot define migration using only a single academic approach (and see Brettell and Hollifield 2014). To capture and understand the dynamic nature of human mobility demands we look across the social sciences and in this collection you will find the voices of anthropologists, geographers, sociologists, political scientists and more. Combined, the approaches represented by the researchers who have contributed their work capture the complexity of migration and why culture is critical to understanding.

We have organized the papers collected into four parts: Theory and Mobility; National Patterns; Tracing Mobilities in Space and Place; and Health and Mobility. Our goal is to capture the breadth of possibilities, anticipate some of the questions that drive research and model patterns that greet movers and non-movers, as well as the states they transit as they make their choices. In addition we are able to gain a sense of the dynamic ways that movers plan their sojourns, base their choices around real and perceived needs (and resources) and manage the concerns and aspirations of those around them. Offering a range of cases from across the globe while covering a variety of movers and myriad motivations, these contributions provide a realistic map of human mobility.

NOTE

1.   https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp.

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PART I

THEORY AND MOBILITY

2. Ask an "open" question and you'll get a surprising answer: counterintuitive findings on Mexican migration to the United States

Judith Adler Hellman[1]

When teaching a "fieldwork methods" course or counseling graduate students who are about to set out for the field, my parting advice is that they try always to remember the wise words Ruben Blades offers us at the very end of his hit song in which he recounts the story of "*Pedro Navaja*." Blades sings: "*La vida te da sorpresas, sorpresas te da la vida*." And so, I tell the students: "I wish you all the best and I hope that you will have at least one stunning surprise every day."

Why should it be necessary to suggest to inexperienced researchers that they should be on the lookout for, and take pleasure and satisfaction in, the moments when they receive answers to their questions that they never anticipated, or when they stumble upon a gathering or a scene that they never once pictured in their minds before they set out into the field, or when they dig deeper and deeper into archival material only to uncover the very opposite of what they had expected to find?

I have come to think that the answer lies in the *formula* for a dissertation proposal or a post-doc project, or even a mid-career research grant that *requires* candidates to choose, in advance, a theoretical framework that will underpin their inquiry and help to structure and make meaningful the material that the research will uncover. The problem is that this way of conceptualizing the task leads some researchers to cherry-pick both their research subjects *and* the responses those subjects offer up so that, in effect, the researcher is able to "find" the "findings" that demonstrate precisely what the pre-selected theoretical framework predicts are there to be found.

But serious research is not about *selectively* scooping up bits of evidence to fit an explanatory model in such a way that enables us to demonstrate or even "prove" the validity of the predictive framework we have chosen. And if the world that we set forth to study were, indeed, populated with research subjects who could be relied upon to provide responses to questions and show themselves to hold attitudes that are precisely the ones that we imagined we would find when we wrote up our proposal, then there would be no need for us to set forth and engage in fieldwork at all. We could just sit in the library and read the books and articles that reinforce the positions that we already hold.

If required to declare a framework or approach that has guided my own research, I would confess to having a keen interest in the interplay of structure and agency in the lives of the people I study. An approach like this is one that often produces astonishing surprises as we begin to distinguish the elements in people's lives that they can alter or control from those that are fixed. In this chapter, I reflect on some of the unexpected findings that have emerged in the course of fieldwork that began in 1967 and continues today—a stretch of time that, if I were a baseball player, I would be permitted to express as having played the game in six different

decades. I will draw on my experience in the study of national and international migration to illustrate the perils of adopting research techniques and, in particular, a "schedule" of questions that wittingly or, more likely, unwittingly, are designed to *reconfirm* the expectations that we bring with us into the field. In addition, I will also show how deeply-felt desires to "make the world a better place" for "downtrodden" or—if we prefer the term—"subaltern" people may lead us to pose questions to informants that are formulated in such a way as to confirm our *own* pre-conceived ideas about the sufferings these people endure. Worst of all, our concern for the poor and powerless may cause us to miss clear evidence of the research subjects' agency, innate diversity and complexities, individual traits and attitudes, the slow or rapid evolution of their thinking and, above all, their resourcefulness, resilience, and often immediately evident, well-developed sense of humor.

SURPRISES RAIN DOWN UPON THE RESEARCHER

My very first research experience in the north-central desert of the Comarca Lagunera[2] provided no end of unexpected interactions with *campesinos* who were *ejidatarios*, that is, beneficiaries of the land reform carried out by Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1937. Although in possession of *ejido* lands, these men were exceedingly poor because the post-Cárdenas regimes had denied them the credit, seed, fertilizer, agricultural equipment, and, above all, their proper share of irrigation water captured by the Lázaro Cárdenas Dam upstream on the Rio Nazas. In short, the *ejidatarios* lacked the resources that could have enabled them to support their families on the modest profits to be made growing cotton, the long-time export crop of the region.

 A stroke of luck had placed me in the job of *encuestadora* just three days after completing my course work at Cornell when Professor Henry Landsberger hired me to work as assistant to his assistant, Cynthia Hewitt, who, only two years my senior, became my mentor (and life-long friend). My job was to coordinate a "team" of three students from the Escuela Rural Normal, and the four of us were to collect responses to a lengthy questionnaire that we were to read aloud to a pre-selected, random sample of *ejidatarios*. Among the thirty or so questions we were to ask, one that came along right after the basic data on date of birth, years of school-ing, number of irrigated and non-irrigated hectares of land the *ejidatario* possessed was: "Have you ever worked in the United States as a *bracero*?[3]

 Some of the respondents answered simply and directly: "*¡por supuesto que sí!*" ("but, of course!"), an emphatic reply that, in itself, surprised me for the spirited manner in which it was delivered, as if to say: "how could you imagine otherwise?" But, when I, a young gringa—as distinguished from my three research colleagues who were local teenagers—administered this questionnaire, most respondents took the opportunity to elaborate on their experiences as *braceros* in the 1940s and 1950s. Although I braced myself to hear deeply upsetting accounts of abuse, I was surprised that the overwhelming majority of former braceros recalled their time as temporary migrant workers in the United States as a period of personal liberation from grinding poverty, a significant rite of passage, and something of a grand adventure in which a previously impoverished agricultural worker could reasonably hope to return to Mexico behind the wheel of a second-hand Chevrolet.

 Some of the most surprising responses I heard in these interviews touched on the former braceros' admiring observations of U.S. political campaigns and local elections (which they

explained were *not* fixed, as in Mexico). Many also described the pleasure they took in the fact that they were often in the employ of a "farmer" who, along with his sons, worked side by side with them in the fields—an experience in striking contrast to older *ejidatarios*' memories of the pre-land reform days when they had worked as *peones* on the cotton plantations. Finally, many recalled the admiration they felt for the farmer's wife whose ethereal beauty was often mentioned to me, along with her kindness to any worker who might fall ill.

Apart from the surprising, highly interesting and strikingly similar responses that randomly selected individual respondents, distributed across a vast region, had given to one straightforward question, this first opportunity to take part in a fieldwork-based, ethnographic research project reshaped my thinking of what, today, we speak of as "positionality."

I arrived in rural Mexico apprehensive and concerned (though not obsessed) that Mexicans would dislike me for being a *gringa.* I didn't think that they would hold me personally responsible for the loss of half their national territory; but I did anticipate that they might assume that I was a supporter of the war in Vietnam, and I looked for subtle ways to communicate to them that I had a respectable history of opposition to that war and also to the U.S. invasions of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the embargo against Cuba, and U.S. imperialism in general.

Gradually, I came to see that my position on these issues might have mattered to some urban intellectuals. But I was in the countryside and among people who never imagined that *they* might influence the domestic or foreign policy of their own political elites. And possibly for this reason, it likely didn't occur to them that I could have any say over matters of war and peace, invasions of foreign countries, or imperialist intervention. In this respect, and from their point of view, I had nothing to answer for.

On the other hand, I would gradually come to learn that with regard to me, what *was* on the minds of the men and women I encountered in the countryside was the inexplicable fact that I, an unmarried, unaccompanied woman in her early twenties was, from their perspective, running around unchaperoned. And once they established that I was not an evangelical missionary (as I was originally assumed to be) the single alternative that came to mind was not a positive one.

Happily, my team of researchers who were, in fact, only in the process of pursuing teaching degrees, were *already* being addressed by the members of the rural community as "*maestro*" and the three of them took to referring to me as "*la Maestra Judit.*" This title proved to be a great blessing as it gave everyone a name to call me and a highly respectable category in which to place me: that of a rural elementary school teacher, a woman generally held in high regard.

Today, students preparing to launch their fieldwork often read extensively on "positionality." Moreover, in the graduate programs in which I have been active, students prepare for their research in seminar situations in which they "self-interrogate" with respect to their position, their privileges, their unacknowledged biases, and presumed limitations to understanding those they will meet in the field.

Notwithstanding the confidence that I have seen so many students and colleagues place in these exercises, nothing I have experienced in the field over the 50 years since the Laguna fieldwork has led me to think that we can *ever* know in advance or guess accurately what will turn out to be the most salient aspects of our research subjects' perceptions of us. Moreover, over time it has seemed to me ever more clear that being an "outsider," and "looking different" from the people we study and possessing other "strange" and unfamiliar qualities that we

sometimes think will represent insurmountable barriers to acceptance in the field are, instead, more likely to provoke interest and confidence in the people we hope to interview and with whom we would like to interact and, if all goes well, become friends. At times I have even speculated that a flying saucer could land in a village and discharge a Martian who might receive a more enthusiastic reception than a well-known, but widely disliked, neighbor from the next block; a person whom a prospective research informant might detest for a series of reasons that we might never be able to figure out.

CLOSED AND OPEN QUESTIONS AND THE WIDELY DIFFERENT RESPONSES THEY ELICIT

As I have suggested, some of the most exciting and gratifying moments of fieldwork come about when we find that our expectations are up-ended and we are forced to spin around 180 degrees. What I would like to emphasize in setting out a series of examples of the surprises that I encountered in my own research is that these unexpected revelations and the insights that they provide are only available to us as researchers when we are open to changing our minds and, as such, when we formulate genuinely open questions. To illustrate this point, I will draw on two studies that involved fieldwork in both Mexico and the United States (Hellman, 1994, 2008).

The Temptation to Elicit the Answers We Want to Hear

There is little controversy about the fact that when we go into the field, we need to win the trust and cooperation of people we hope will become our interlocutors and that part of successful fieldwork involves coaxing people into speaking to us in the most open and informative way possible. Thus, we work to ingratiate ourselves with our research subjects. But if we are successful in winning their confidence, we run the risk that our respondents may be "nice" to us by serving up answers that we have *signaled* we want to hear.

What sort of preferences might we, as researchers, inadvertently signal to informants? In general, this is a problem most often associated with scholars who study people whom they view as oppressed. These are scholars who think of themselves not just as researchers, but as activists who are obliged to advance an agenda for change that is consistent with their vision of what a better world would look like.

The danger of such an approach is that once we start to think of research subjects as victims, it becomes ever more difficult for us to perceive that the people we are studying—however poor they are and however limited their prospects—inevitably have some degree of human agency that they can exercise. This is particularly the case when we are studying immigrants, given that immigrants usually figure among the most forward looking, dynamic, adventurous, risk-taking people in the communities from which they have emigrated. Under the circumstances, it would be very odd if we could *not* find any evidence of the ways in which these people take initiatives and successfully take charge of their lives.

When I first moved the focus of my research from sending communities in Mexico to Mexican migrants in the United States, I was struck by the number of books and articles written by people who researched and wrote with the explicit goal of advocating for comprehensive immigration reform, a position with which I was in complete agreement. The difference,

however, between the collective portrait of undocumented Mexicans drawn by many of these people and the situation I found on the ground in my own fieldwork was notable. I attribute this difference to the fact that many writers seemed to think that the best way to rally support for the immigration bills under consideration in Congress at the time (2006–2007) was to build sympathy for the plight of the undocumented by emphasizing every form of cruelty and every indignity suffered by the people for whom these authors were advocating.

However, in so doing, these writers risked leaving out of the picture the breathtaking range of personal and collective political and social activities in which immigrants were engaged. They would be giving little or no coverage to the highly inventive solutions and ingenious initiatives that made undocumented people feel that they were, to a significant degree, in charge of their own lives and able to carve out a reasonably satisfactory, indeed, entirely livable space in this strange land—with or without papers. Moreover, these authors often overlooked the rapid pace at which immigrants acquire "social capital" (Putnam 1995), learning how and where to find the organizations that could help them *act* to defend their basic human rights.

A good example of such an institution would be Asociación Tepeyac in lower Manhattan, where, in this same period of research, I worked as a volunteer. A non-profit, community-based organization, Tepeyac offered a variety of services to immigrants, including ESL classes, health care information, protection of tenants' rights and defense of labor rights, above all with respect to the recovery of unpaid wages and the enforcement of minimum wage laws which was the area in which I was helping out. This help mostly involved translating for the day laborers who wished to report the details of how they had been abused and cheated out of their pay. My other task was to accompany these men to the New York State Department of Labor where—to their amazement—they found that they enjoyed full protection under New York State labor regulations, and would not, under any circumstances, be reported to the *migra* since the Department of Labor was a state, not a federal, authority (Hellman, 2008:155). In the end, most immigrant workers who accessed Tepeyac's services recovered the wages owed to them.

Avoiding Facile Assumptions and Stereotypes

If we want to avoid the pitfall of ignoring the degree of social capital and agency that immigrants possess, we need to steer away from the presupposition that they are, above all, victims, and instead credit immigrants with the will and intelligence to make informed decisions. What I would argue is that through the very simple, basic formulation of an "open question" that research subjects can answer any way they like, we can learn a great number of very interesting, and potentially unexpected, things about their lives—things that enable us to avoid constructing stereotypical portraits of immigrants as victims.

I can say that the most successful open question that I came to employ was simply: "What do you like most about …?" and "what do you like least about …?" with the blanks filled in with: "your work," "your co-workers," "your involvement with your Hometown Association," "your church," "living in the Bronx," "living in East L.A.," "living in the U.S. rather than in your pueblo back in Mexico" and so on.

To illustrate the wide-ranging responses that can be elicited with such a simple pair of questions, I will mention only a few of the findings that came to light when I asked my research informants what they liked most and least about their work.

"Sara," a street vendor of *elotes* (corn-on-the-cob), explained that she might have been happy with a house cleaning job, which is what many of the women in her circle aspire to

do. But, as she expresses it, she is a person who was "born to sell," and was never happier as a child than when she was permitted to help in her aunt's tiny grocery story. And thus, she insisted that persuading passersby to buy her *elotes* in an East Los Angeles parking lot worked perfectly for her. The business model "requires long hours and great energy," but, as she notes, "it can bring in as much as $100 a day" and, moreover, as Sara says: "I like being my own boss" (139).

But when asked what she likes least about this work Sara confided:

> Every once in a while, the police come along and they say "I can't let you sell here because you don't have a license. In L.A. everyone who sells food has to have a license and has to be inspected. Next time I see you doing this I'm going to have to give you a fine. I don't want to see you here next time I come around." And then, every three months or so, they come around and I get a fine and it comes to $80. (142)

Although the conversation between Sara and the police officer unfolds entirely in Spanish—as the police who serve in East L.A. are overwhelmingly Mexican American—Sara is unsettled by the uncertainty this kind of exchange provokes and she shared with me her opinion that:

> It would be better the way it is in Mexico where you pay the police a set number of pesos [every day] to leave you alone and you can figure out what the cost is for you to pay off the policemen and you can calculate that when you add up your expenses. (143)

Other interesting insights can come from just these two simple, open-ended questions regarding the "networks" so central to all discussions of migration. Overwhelmingly networks are seen both by migrants and the people who study them as a very positive element in immigrant life. Family, neighborhood and village networks are crucial to the would-be migrant who hopes to finance the journey through what is effectively a loan, or an "advance on future wages" offered by a relative or friend in the United States that will be paid off gradually once the newly arrived immigrant finds housing and a job—both of which are also generally obtained through the same network. Moreover, these networks also provide significant advantages to employers, as Wayne Cornelius (1998:126) has written: "No costly advertising is required; no employment agency fees need be paid. Job vacancies can be filled almost immediately; in most cases, immigrants already working in the firm know that a vacancy is about to occur even before the employer does."

And so, it would seem that everyone is delighted with their networks. However, when I posed my two questions in interviews I carried out with seven Mexican kitchen workers in lower Manhattan, I found here—as in similar workplaces filled with people from the same small town—tellingly divergent views with respect to individual satisfaction with this arrangement.

As one informant told me:

> Basically, just about everyone working in the deli comes from the same pueblo in the State of Morelos, and we all owe our jobs to one another. Even the guy who brought so many of us to this restaurant was originally recommended by a cousin of his from our village, a guy who's now back in Morelos.
> To give you an idea, almost everyone I work with is either one of my brothers or a cousin or a nephew who is actually close to me in age, or an uncle who is, likewise, not much older than me.

All this sounds really nice, but it can also be stressful in many ways because people bring their long-standing issues with them: quarrels that go back to when they were teenagers, jealousies of all kinds.

And then there are other resentments that build up once we're here. The worst, at this moment, is among three brothers who are my cousins. Because one of them, "Raymundo", picked up English much more rapidly than the other two, he has the most prestigious job which involves picking up the phone and ordering ingredients from suppliers and translating and communicating the chef's work orders to everyone else on the prep line. Raymundo doesn't earn any more than the rest of us because from the most recent guy hired—who would be washing pots and pans—to the worker with the most advanced skills, like the *supero* [the person in charge of soup], we all make roughly $350 a week. But what causes the tension is that Raymundo is the youngest of the three brothers and is, in effect, overseeing his older brothers and telling them what to do.

In contrast, in the very same workplace, one of the "prep men", who worked as a *saladero* and occasionally as a *sandwichero*, told me that he and some of his *compadres* who came from this same town all golfed together every Sunday at a public course in Queens where the greens fees were relatively low. When I expressed surprise, he reminded me that they all came from Morelos, which is a close ride by super highway to many of the most elite Mexico City neighborhoods, and that's why the state is dotted with golf courses. "Ricardo" explained:

What used to be the hacienda where our great-grandparents worked as peons, is now a fancy golf course. And who do you find on a golf course apart from very rich people? Caddies, that's who. And what do caddies do in their downtime? They teach their sons to hit golf balls, starting when they're very little. This is how come all of us guys who golf on the weekends were competing in and winning kid tournaments all over Morelos before we even turned twelve.

So, everybody knows us on this course out in Queens: the staff, the other golfers who are regulars, everyone. Often the other golfers let us play through because they like to watch what we do. But none of these other guys we see on the course will take a bet, I mean no one will play us for money—which is too bad when you think about it because it could be a nice hustle. Still, the "regulars" really do seem to like to run into us because none of them has ever seen a Mexican play golf—except for Lee Trevino. And they certainly don't imagine that the guy cranking along on a bicycle delivering fancy sandwiches to their law office is someone they're going to run into on the golf course the next weekend.

In a way, the most important piece of the puzzle on "networks" was put in place for me in a chance encounter I had with an immigrant from Mexico City whom I met on the subway. When I asked him what kind of job he had found, he said he worked in a hardware store in Brooklyn and really, really liked it. And when I asked what he liked about it, he said:

What I like is that there are no other Mexicans working in this store. Actually, there are no other *hispanicos* at all. Apart from me, there are Africans from a couple of different countries, a Chinese guy, a Pakistani, an Indian and a Russian. So, we have no choice but to speak English to one another which has been a huge help to me because moving ahead with your English is the key to everything. But mostly it's because I really like all of them. It's a kind of brotherhood that we have in the store. Maybe that's because we all try harder to get along than we might if we were in the midst of people from our own country.

More Surprises

Equally surprising to me as the range of feelings about the networks was a similarly unexpected series of responses that forced me to reconsider other aspects of the common wisdom that I had accepted without sufficient reflection.

It is the case that I found a stunning level of uniformity in the responses given by undocumented Mexicans when I asked what future they saw for themselves in the United States. While the dominant discourse around immigration is that "strangers come to our shores because they want to live the American Dream," overwhelmingly, the people I interviewed shared with me their "Mexican Dream" which was to find work in the U.S. and stay as long as it would take to put together $15,000, the amount most often cited as the requisite to realize any plan to build a house and/or set up a business back in one's village and, once they had the $15K in hand, to return "home."

The centrality in the interviews of informants' testimonies about working toward the $15K nest egg (even if their continued obligation to send remittances to sustain relatives back home often made that goal elusive) led me to see my research subjects as moved principally by economic needs and desires. But a surprising series of responses to the like/dislike question I posed offered clear evidence that much more than money was at stake.

Belonging, Respect, and Dignity

One particularly unexpected finding was the intensity with which the undocumented immigrants came to embrace the state or region where the labor market had, to a certain degree, *randomly* led them to settle—often in towns and cities where very few Mexican migrants had historically clustered. Several research subjects mentioned that in the absence of U.S. citizenship, they had become "attached" to the state where they had found work and increasingly identified as "Georgians" or "North Carolinians," or "real New Yorkers." And an interesting aspect of that loyalty was that it frequently found expression in the "bragging rights" that go along with becoming a passionate fan of a city's or region's sports teams. One informant, who moved to the Bronx a decade before the current concentration of Mexicans had settled in this borough, put it this way:

> I never played baseball as a kid and I never spent two minutes following baseball when I lived in Puebla. But now I go to Yankee Stadium as often as I can and when I do, I become part of this huge mass of fans all shouting at the same time and jumping out of our seats at the same time. I feel Yankee Stadium is a place where I belong—not to mention that the Yankees *always* win.

In 1990, "Adelita," a woman from the State of Michoacán who had spent years working in maquiladoras in Tijuana, described to me the satisfaction she found in crossing the border to clean houses in San Diego where she earned $200 for three days of work, a sum three-and-a-half times what she had taken home after a 48-hour week in a *maquila*. But, as she took pains to explain to me, "it wasn't only the money."

> Cleaning is hard work, but at least you can go at your own pace. The people I work for are all older people who have retired. They've all come from a place called Nebraska. I find them very polite, very gracious and trusting. They leave me alone in the house to do my cleaning. They put money for me on the windowsill or in a jar, and that's it. Nobody stands over me telling me what to do. (Hellman, 1994:170)

I was reminded of this exchange with Adelita when, thirteen years later in New York, "Luis" related this to me:

> I have this friend, Humberto, who every time I see him, he's got a new job. First, he's working in a dry-cleaners pressing pants, and then he's delivering menus for a Thai restaurant, and then he's working as a stock boy in a supermarket. And I say to him: "Berto, why are you working a new job? What happened to the old one?" and he always says something like: "The manager was disrespectful to me" or "The boss ordered me to pick stuff up, but he didn't say 'Please'."
>
>   You know Humberto's not wrong to demand respect. Let's face it: whatever job he gets, it's going to be hard work and he's going to make between $300 and $350 a week. So, he might as well work in a place where people are polite to him. (Hellman 2008:xiv–xv).

In one of many interviews I carried out with "Angel" in this same period, he shared with me the ins and outs of bicycle delivery work, touching on what by now was emerging for me as a key theme.

> I like being out on the bike riding through the streets. If the weather's good, I really prefer to be outdoors than fighting with people for space in the kitchen … And when the weather's bad, and especially if it snows—well, that's okay too, because that's when you really do well with tips. You get a huge number of orders because even people who normally go out for lunch don't want to go out and they're grateful to you for bringing their food to them. On days like that, people come to the door and see you standing there dripping water from your jacket, with water pouring off the beak of your hat, and a bag of sandwiches and hot soup in your hand, and they say to you, "Hey, take it easy out there with the ice and the snow." Or they say, "Keep warm" or "Stay dry" or "Watch out for the cabs—they're crazy." It's like the customers are worried about you personally. (131)

Moreover, as Angel went on to say:

> There's times when you're delivering food to people's apartments rather than their office and customers ask you to wait and you think maybe they're coming back with a tip. But instead, they come back with some kind of rain jacket or a heavier coat that they want to give you. It's happened to me more than once.

Still, with respect to these residential deliveries, Angel has had both good and bad experiences:

> The worst thing is that there are doormen [in residential buildings] who are total despots. It's like they're the king of the building and you can only enter the realm by their favor. I'm not kidding. It's like they don't want to see that you're trying to earn a living, just like them.
>
>   But, then, the best doormen are the Dominicans and the Puerto Ricans because they ask you where you think you are supposed to be delivering the food, and they put you in the elevator, press the button and tell you whether to walk left or right when you get out. Then, next time you come to that building, they greet you—*¿Cómo estás? ¿Qué Hay?* —like a friend and fellow worker. (131–2)

CONCLUSIONS: OPEN QUESTIONS AND SURPRISES THAT AWAIT US IN THE FUTURE

I have made the argument that if, in the interest of moving the reader to tears and from tears to action in favor of immigrant rights, we think it best to collect and focus upon deeply troubling stories of abuse, we can, indeed, probe our research subjects for that kind of material, and they may do their best to oblige us by recalling whatever ugly experiences they have lived in the process of crossing the border, in the workplace, in their neighborhood, or, more broadly, in their lives. But if our approach to interviewing research subjects is one that invites people to share with us *whatever* they choose to share, it becomes clear that their lives, like our own, are complex and marked by all sorts of ups, downs, and unexpected turns.

In this chapter, I have shared some of the stories that illustrate what interesting insights into character and the human condition are available to us if we listen hard and are truly ready to have our assumptions upended. In 2007, when I had to sit down to write the conclusions to my book (2008), I noticed that the chapters that were set in Mexico (the section titled, "The Rock") related a variety of unquestionably sad human experiences above all for the women left behind in small villages and towns when their husbands crossed the border in pursuit of their family's fortune, that is, their $15K. But when it came time for me to reread and summarize the latter chapters, set in "The Hard Place," that is, New York and Los Angeles, there was no way to disguise the fact that in so many different respects, those who had migrated—even as they continued to live the "Mexican Dream" of returning to their country—were, in real time, enjoying a lively, fulfilling, interesting life, full of novelties, adventures, and, in particular, the gratifying opportunity to learn new things, even if that "new thing" was only decorating a large white plate on which a small portion of chocolate mousse would be served with a delicate drizzle of raspberry coulis and an elaborate border of chocolate shavings (133).

In the end, I came to see that the undeniable good cheer and optimism of those I interviewed in the United States reflected, in part, the need that migrants feel to justify *to themselves* why they stay on in a place so far from home. I also had to consider whether this finding was also due to a kind of "sampling bias" because the people available to interview in Los Angeles and New York were the immigrants who had stayed on. Those who were, for whatever reasons, deeply unhappy with their circumstances as migrants to the United States had packed it in and returned home to Mexico and were, therefore, people I would never have the chance to meet in the course of my research in California or New York.[4]

I believe that the attitude set and techniques I have recommended in this chapter have real relevance with respect to the study of migration and what we likely would all agree can and should be described as the greatest humanitarian crisis on the U.S.–Mexican border in our time. The separation of children from their parents, the tens of thousands of Central American and other refugees currently stuck on the Mexican side waiting to have their request for refugee status assessed by the authorities, and the would-be refugees along with thousands of other "ordinary" border crossers who have been detained on the U.S. side present an unprec-edented tragedy but one that, fortunately, has received a great deal of media coverage. Thus, these circumstances cannot be a secret to any of us.

The question I would raise here is whether the research approach I have proposed in this chapter would be applicable in a humanitarian crisis. Can any of us imagine ourselves asking a refugee sitting on the ground in the fetid encampment in Tijuana: "Can you think of anything

good that happened to you in the course of your journey, or indeed, since you made the decision to leave home?"

Possibly the only reason I can even *imagine* raising such a question is that I was born in 1945 and my childhood was populated by people who, I was told, had "returned from the dead." These were relatives and friends of my parents who were thought to have died in concentration camps but, instead, had been located at the end of the war by the International Red Cross in "Displaced Persons Camps."[5] They were people who had lost absolutely everyone, including their children who—as today on the U.S. border—had been ripped from their arms. Yet, they had, in fact, survived and, almost as amazing, they had arrived in New York in the company of partners whom they had come to love and had married in DP camps.

Based on this early life lesson that there is no experience so dark that it cannot produce episodes of love, generosity, solidarity, friendship, and caring that enable us to press on at the worst of moments, I would not hesitate to ask Central American refugees whether they had met anyone among their fellow travelers who had lifted their spirits, provided support and enabled them to carry on when they might have felt ready to give it all up. To avoid asking this question would be to see the refugees primarily as hapless victims rather than actors capable of connecting and bonding even under the most difficult of circumstances.

NOTES

1. The author would like to thank Steve Hellman and Sean Bellaviti for extremely helpful comments and encouragement.
2. The Comarca Lagunera is an agricultural region just under 45,000 square kilometers that extends from the southwest corner of Coahuila to the northeast corner of Durango, Mexico.
3. The bracero program brought an estimated 12 million Mexican agricultural and industrial workers into the United States under contract. Put in place in 1942 to cope with wartime labor shortages, the program ran until 1964 when it was terminated under pressure from the U.S. labor movement (see Hellman, 1983:109–10).
4. It is not an accident that "Julio," whose hair-raising account of the few days he spent in Los Angeles selling ice cream, then pizza slices, and finally crack, before he was arrested, managed to escape police custody, and hop a bus back to Mexico, was an interview that I collected in Puebla, not in the United States (69–76).
5. In 1945, some 11 million survivors of World War II, including people whose towns and villages had been reduced to rubble, along with former slave laborers, prisoners of war, and Jewish, Roma, socialist and communist survivors of concentration camps, were categorized as "displaced persons," of whom almost 1 million spent months and sometimes years in "DP camps."

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3.   Conflict model of migration and perception of human insecurity

Deniz Eroğlu-Utku and Pınar Yazgan

INTRODUCTION

It has been fourteen years since Castles and Miller (1993) defined most of human history as 'ages of migration'. The current age probably deserves the accolade more than any previous time with 70.8 million displaced people worldwide (UNHCR 2019). This number constantly increases as more and more people risk their lives to reach other countries, joining a growing volume of regular migration. In the last decade or so, we have also seen significant growth in the number of scholars studying the dynamics of human movements. Following this flourishing growth of literature on migration, our chapter discusses a novel theoretical framework focused on conflict and its potential value to scholars. A conflict model of migration is built on two pillars: first, the perception of persons whose migration experiences are being analysed; and second, the perception of scholars working on migration.

Notable literature dealing with migration questions that are focused on migration's motivations (e.g. Castelli 2018; De Haas 2014; Massey 1999) tend to emphasise the pulls of target countries and how these pulls motivate mobility. In their book *Cultures of Migration*, Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) argue an alternative that brings the conditions in the countries of origin to the fore. Conflicts, latent or explicit, in these places are shown to be the main drivers of migratory movements. These conflicts cause a perception of insecurity and, therefore, migration occurs as a function of conflict. This model was drawing on the earlier writings of Sirkeci (2003; 2006) and called the 'Conflict Model of Migration' to explain the motivations behind human mobility in a dynamic fashion (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011).

The Conflict Model has been utilised in several studies and to explore different concerns (see Sirkeci 2003; 2005; 2006; 2008; Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous 2007; Sirkeci et al. 2012; 2016; Sirkeci and Martin 2014; Tuzi 2019). These studies show that the environment of human insecurity leads to outmigration as people choose to avoid conflicts. Here, it is important to remember that conflicts are defined in a broad sense following Dahrendorf who stated they 'embrace a range of simple tensions, contests, competitions, disputes, explicit and latent tensions as well as violent clashes and wars arising from incompatible differences in relations' (Dahrendorf 1959 cited in Sirkeci and Cohen 2016: 384). In other words, the approach goes beyond armed conflicts to include social, political, cultural, environmental and economic discomforts.

In a recent study, Sirkeci et al. (2019) unpack the sources of the conflicts causing the environment of human insecurity. Sirkeci calls this the 3Ds of migration referring to Democratic Deficit, Development Deficit and Demographic Deficit as the root causes of human insecurity at the macro level. It is not only in the countries of origin but also in transit and in destination that these perceptions of insecurity may emerge and lead to further or return movements. Sirkeci et al. (2019) argue that when the intensity of these three deficits increases, people are

more likely to consider migration as a strategic option. They assert that despite the fact that many people face the same conflicts, perceptions of (in)security vary among individuals and groups and only those who have the capacity would migrate. Sirkeci (2018) summarises the reality facing migrants as consisting of human capital, social capital, financial capital and physical capability, or what he calls the 4Cs. Despite the deficits and caused perception of insecurity, people who don't have the adequate combination of capitals do not migrate. In this chapter, however, we explore when someone with the capability decides to migrate. Hence, we focus on the 'perception of insecurity' and how these deficits are perceived differently by different people.

Individual perceptions of insecurity are of crucial importance; although social, political and economic pressures exist in almost all societies not everybody migrates. The total volume of international migrants was 258 million by the end of 2017. In other words, out of the world population of about 7.5 billion, only 3.2 percent were officially defined as immigrants (Sirkeci et al. 2019: 164). Conflicts, including armed conflicts, affect a much wider population. Yet, many of those who are confronted by insecurity will not migrate. Even the most recent Syrian case shows us that migration is not the only answer to conflicts even when they are violent and life threatening. Between 2011 and 2019, over 6 million Syrians fled the country due to the civil war. The question is why the remaining three quarters of the Syrian population did not emigrate although they were confronted by the same violence and faced the same deficits (3Ds). Why Syrians stay in their country lies partly in terms of their capabilities (4Cs) and partly in terms of their 'perceptions' of insecurity. Migration only becomes an option when movers recognise their deficits as unsurmountable and perceive insecurity as unbearable.

Therefore, it is important to explore the concept of 'perception' further to provide an operational model for those who wish to study migration. Now it is time to move from macro-level factors to the micro level to understand the role of perceptions. To establish how the perceptions are formed, we have to ask some basic questions:

When do conflicts become intolerable for people and turn out to be a reason for mobility?
How and why are people affected differently from conflicts?
What are the physiologic and sociologic aspects of insecurity perception?

When the perception of migrants constitutes the first pillar of the theoretical framework, we do not think it provides a comprehensive tool to work on human mobility. We do believe that researchers' positionalities and self-reflexivity play a role in understanding the perception of individuals. In other words, positionality should be considered part of the data quality assessment. It is to say that the perception of migrants may be filtered by the perception of researchers. Hence, we pose a set of further questions:

How is the perception of insecurity studied by researchers?
What is the role of researchers in collecting data on the perception of migrants?
What kinds of beliefs and dispositions of the researchers does affect the study of insecurity
    perception among migrants?
Why should the reflexivity be part of the perception research in a qualitative design?

We do not answer all of these questions, rather we pose them to motivate a theoretical discussion that will support more complete analysis. We argue that working on migration at the micro level reflects the outcome of interactions between the two perceptions: migrants and

researchers. We first define the importance of perception of insecurity underlining human mobility. Then, we discuss the researcher dimension to the model drawing attention to the role of the perception of researchers.

PERCEIVED INSECURITY BEHIND HUMAN MOBILITY AND ITS REFLECTION TO THE RESEARCHER

Starting with Abraham Maslow (1943), a great deal of literature has indicated the need for security as one of the basic needs for human beings (Özmen 2017). There is consensus that security is a crucial part of humanity, but the question remains why the same conditions do not create the same kinds of insecurity or the same kinds of feelings among individuals. In other words, the perception of insecurity varies from one person to another and in relation to broader systems of reference; this is a fundamental part of the Conflict Model, as the perception of insecurity is the key to the understanding and analysis of human mobility. It is important to clarify the perception of insecurity that has roots in both psychology and sociology. Therefore, this study composes objective and socially constructed components of security that shape our perception.

Perception of insecurity might have originated from the public space within which a person lives. Carro et al. (2010) define three latent factors based on Fernández and Corraliza's study in 1997 to capture how individuals perceive insecurity. They call the first group 'Personal Competences to Cope'. This category includes personal characteristics that are related to feeling insecure in a given place but that create a sense of security that is not overwhelmed and therefore will not drive exit. These variables are stated as personal vulnerability (age, gender), coping strategies: social support and cognitive (belief in one's capacity), emotional (fear of crime) and behavioural control (active or passive self-protection). The second category of individuals are defined by 'Representation of the Space'. This second category includes variables that determine one place as dangerous, but still one where social influence can temper insecurity. Carro et al. (2010) define the last category as the 'Dangerous Environment'. This category includes variables 'both physical (such as visual control, illumination, vandalism or time of the day) and social aspects (such as presence of potential aggressors, available opportunities of social support or patterns of space occupation)' that threaten wellbeing and opportunity (Carro et al. 2010: 305).

While Carro et al. (2010) emphasise the roles these variables play in relation to public spaces, we argue that a broader sense of human insecurity acknowledges how these variables work in individual lives. We also regard the perception of security as self-fulfilling. In other words, people are always working to minimise insecurity. In response, what constitutes security likely changes as well. Therefore, we add the concept of 'self-actualisation' that was originally developed by Maslow and relied on several studies in the field of psychology. Here we remember how Maslow defines 'self-actualisation'.

> Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he/she is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualisation. (Maslow 1943: 382)

Ivtzan describes self-actualisation as 'as an individual's expression of their full potential and a desire for self-fulfilment' (Ivtzan et al. 2013: 119). The essence of the concept is related to real self-discovery, its expression and development; hence, people maximise their full potential if the self-actualisation is achieved (Jones and Crandall 1986: 63). In this sense, any obstacle before self-actualisation might be a reason for the perception of insecurity. The examples of Sirkeci et al. in 2019 are illustrative. LGBTQ persons' security concerns in the gender discriminatory societies, structured obstacle before talented artists living in a rural area or parental pressures on women who wish to get education are all related to perceived insecurity. (Sirkeci et al. 2019: 165). Three areas of conflict resulting from inequalities, deficits in the origin countries are defined as the 3Ds. Each individual might feel the level of conflict differently. One's perceived obstacle might be different from another person's perceptions. To make it more concrete, an authoritarian regime – which is defined as part of the Democratic Deficit – might be an obstacle for a person with a liberal world-view, but might not be perceived as insecurity for those who are part of the dominant political views or party. This is how insecurity plays out for these populations.

Insecurity is multidimensional. The first dimension defines the physical nature of insecurity and assumes a direct response. The two other dimensions demonstrate how perceived security emerges in response to concrete beliefs that are defined in public spaces and constrain self-actualisation. However, insecurity is also distinctly related to personal feeling, as Özmen (2017: 14) notes: 'Life is an illusion that is shaped by our perception'. Taking this 'illusion' into account, there is the possibility that we do not have concrete, obvious reasons to feel insecure, yet, as the examples above suggest, feelings of insecurity and anxiety, even when they are illusory, can become real. Here, we require a third dimension that is related to the emotional element (Kinnvall 2017) and enhance the perception of insecurity by adding Giddens' (1991) and Laing's (2010) ontology and 'existential anxiety' into the model. Combining these two authors, Mitzen defines ontological security as referring 'to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realize a sense of agency' (Mitzen 2006b: 342).

The ontology of security is captured by Giddens who explains the importance of routines through the use of Kierkegaard's insights:

> the prospect of being overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of our coherent sense of 'being in the world'. Practical consciousness, together with the day-to-day routines reproduced by it, help bracket such anxieties not only, or even primarily, because of the social stability that they imply, but because of their constitutive role in organising an 'as if' environment in relation to existential issues. (cited in Giddens 1991: 37)

Following this argument, Giddens shows habits and routines as fundamental elements for ontological security because they support the individual as he or she avoids anxieties (1991: 39). Trust of other people, then, plays an important role place in Giddens' approach as it is only through trust that the individual can avoid existential anxiety (Giddens 1991: 38–39). Building further on the ways in which individuals manage anxiety, Roe (2008: 782) offers a clarification:

> Existential anxiety refers to the knowledge that within everyday life lies the 'chaos' of a plurality of potential dangers; that you might be attacked while walking home, a car might run you down, your husband/wife might leave you, or you might get sacked from your job.

In this example, ontological insecurity emerges as a formidable block before human beings defined by existential anxiety that 'constitutes a grave threat to identity development and self-actualisation' (Danermark and Möller 2008: 120) on its own. Taking the ontological security argument into account, we approach human mobility as a search for physical as well as ontological security. This means that survival might not be at stake but 'being a human being' might be (Steele 2005: 525–526). Accordingly, 'Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves' (Mitzen 2006b: 342). In this approach we are able to move beyond the physical definition to security and the focus on the agents themselves. Ontological security is needed to achieve goals, assess environments and make choices (Mitzen 2006a: 272).

Taken all together, perception of insecurity conceptualised as such, understanding insecurity is a micro-level way to model macro-level processes and to define why people respond differently to similar challenges. Accordingly, if these reasons are, therefore, in the framework we offer, conceptualising insecurity depends upon both objective and imagined elements of security. Borrowing from theoretical approaches in the literature, we hold that physical security is not the only kind of security that individuals seek; persons also need their existential fulfilment. The model we suggest here includes multiple forms of a human insecurity perception rather than a static and constant one.

When it comes to qualitative studies, the role of the researcher is important as we have argued. Van Mol et al. note that 'reflexivity of researcher position on the insider/outsider continuum is of key importance in qualitative methodologies' (Van Mol et al. 2016: 69–70). Berger indicates reflexivity as 'a major strategy for quality control in qualitative research' (Berger, 2015: 219). In the framework, we posit that the influence of researchers' beliefs and their own assumptions on the phenomenon under study is a factor that influences the quality of the research. Therefore, we argue that it is important for the researcher to be aware of his/her positioning to the subject. Research demands the critical evaluation of the conduct of inquiry and techniques used. That is, a reflexive and reflective assessment becomes central and one of the most critical parts of qualitative research. Thinking over experiences is a process of confrontation and learning, which in itself is a mirror that transforms the researcher. The researcher must question his/her ontological position before and during the research process, and this may become a practice of transformation.

Roth and Breuer (2003) assert that cognition, emotion or motivation cannot be understood outside actual praxis. And all three are factors as we define how insecurity is both perceived and understood; how its emotional impact and motivational qualities can be explained; and how we can approach the field of study and process of mobility from a perspective that recognises the value of both migrants and researchers. This takes us to the topic of subjectivity. As Roth and Breuer (2003: 2) remark that 'knowledge is … inherently structured by the subjectivity of the researcher', we suggest that subjectivity needs to be well reflected and explained in the qualitative research.[1]

What questions the researcher asks and why he/she manages the conduct of inquiry is subjective and reflected by the researcher's position. The concept of reflexivity emphasises that is how we perceive, define and establish social reality as simultaneous and layered reality. The researcher, like the participants of the research, perceives and interprets social reality

but this time from the migrants' eyes. During the research process, the researcher conducts his/her research with the criteria of his/her choice among the research methods and analyses how the perception of insecurity is constructed. In other words, reality is constructed in the social sphere within the framework of the environment of the action and the participants' conditions and perceptions. Therefore, it would be reflected on and discussed as a part of research methods and the data production process. The participant transmits this reality and the researcher rebuilds it. Ultimately, the researcher makes an advanced contribution to the research process by evaluating this process and this contribution is important as a method (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu 2004).

Within a given area, the attitude of the agent is determined by the types and amount of his/her different kinds of capital. The attitude of the participant, as it is, is made up of what he/she carries from the past and the researcher interprets that in the present time and also during the data analysis process, over and over. Bourdieu (2004) argues that the reality that the agent perceives in his/her direct relationship with his environment and the reality of objective conditions (social categories, classes, possibilities, rules, sanctions) intersect in the same historical reality fiction as they produce in each other. When this relationship is established with the researcher, it is intertwined. This intersection produces a sense of reality that fixes the certain historical period of the action to the present. In Bourdieu's words, this acceptance is the product of the 'ontological complicity between mental structures and objective structures' (Bourdieu 2004; Mücen 2007).

On the whole, scientific investigations are a part of a double reflective strategy and a research tool that is continuously developed in the fieldwork and data analysis process. From this point, we suggest that it could be used in every moment of research and writing. Scientific confrontation, as Bourdieu said, is not a researcher's seeing and learning from his/her own mistakes but confronting the attitude of ontological complicity in the relationship of scientific attitude (habitus) with the field. It is mostly part of the attitude and approach from both ontological and epistemological stances. Scientific confrontation is a constructive critique of the existing ontological and epistemological position (Bourdieu 2004; Carroll 2006; Mücen 2007; Swartz 2012).[2]

IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION

We began focused on one of the common questions in the field of migration: why do people migrate? The starting point for this inquiry was *Cultures of Migration* and the Conflict Model developed by Cohen and Sirkeci (2011), as this approach diverts from the commonly used push-and-pull explanation of human movements. This model focuses on the features of original countries and seeks to explore the factors that motivate persons to move from these places. Borrowing from Dahrendorf's broader understanding of conflict, the model argues persons tend to migrate when conflicts reach intolerable levels for them and their perception of insecurity becomes high. The key term in this equation is 'conflict'; hence, it has been dealt with by some distinguished studies. What we suggested here is to propose a theoretical tool for scholars who wish to explore how conflicts create different perceptions of insecurity for different persons. In other words, why do people not migrate at the same time in spite of the existence of conflicting factors for everyone? The answer to these questions requires narrowing down the focus to the micro level. Therefore, we constitute the first level of our theoretical

tool by indicating another key phrase of the Conflict Model: perception of insecurity. Lastly, we develop the idea of the reflexive nature that relates the epistemic subject and the research object for future research studies in the context of insecurity and mobility.

NOTES

1. This is connected to the concept of reflexivity, which is developed and discussed by Pierre Bourdieu (2004) in social sciences research.
2. It is also critical to look at the research experience itself – the relationships developed during this experience and the role of the researcher within this network of relationships with migrants in migration and mobility studies as well. Sayer (2009: 113) draws our attention with the statement 'how people talk to themselves about their situations and concerns' in his paper from this point. Additionally, Cohen-Cole (2005: 108) mentions 'a double reflexivity', as in '…linking the scientist's self to the human subjects (Ss) studied and, at the same time, connecting self-knowledge to knowledge of the world.' Reflexivity involves reflections of the researcher's way of her/his doing research and data production and awareness of her/his involvements in qualitative research.

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4. A culture of mobility? Perspectives on the human rights-based migration government

Markus Kotzur and Leonard Amaru Feil

INTRODUCTION: THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OF MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS

Migration law is often described as a law of conflict. And indeed, migration, and especially international migration, is a potentially conflictual phenomenon. Conflicts almost inevitably arise when persons, groups, or even masses start to move in search of opportunities for survival or better conditions for life. When this happens, movements can become encounters and encounters can become confrontations. In this context, migration law is likely to be interpreted as a tool for the prevention of conflicts, and the prevention of migration and settlement.

The area of conflict encompasses the fact that migration always takes place in the light of everchanging social, political and economic conditions, that is to say the real-world context (Fisher 2014). Rooted in their own time and context, migratory movements thus can very well challenge fundamental assumptions about the establishment of political communities. Furthermore, it is in particular the lesser-developed regions of the world, for example the African continent, which have to deal with a disproportionally large share of the global migratory movements (UNHCR 2019: 17f) – an issue likely to be missed in Eurocentric discourses (Straubhaar 2015: 238), which is unfortunate considering Europe's colonial past (on colonialism and migration see Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho 2018; Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018; Harper and Constantine 2010; Smith 2003).

Dealing with conflicts arising from migration becomes more complex when realising that, despite all approaches to categorise migratory movements by type, migration cannot be explained in a monocausal way. It is difficult, or sometimes impossible, to draw a clear line between different forms of migration, such as forced migration, labour migration, and lifestyle migration (on these forms of migration from a sociological perspective O'Reilly, 2012), which argues for a wide understanding of migration (Boeles et al. 2014: 5). Who can say where exactly the extrinsically forced pursuit of survival ends, and where the intrinsically motivated pursuit of happiness starts?

The complexity of migratory phenomena is illustrated by the inner conflicts of the individual. On the one side, there is the cosmopolitan desire of the individual, articulated in Seneca's well-known phrase, "*patria mea totus hic mundus est*" (Epistulae morales – Epistula 28). In an interconnected and globalised world, this cosmopolitan ideal seems ever more sizeable. At the same time, the insecurities of the age of globalisation provoke a desire for protection provided by the nation state as a space of security. This apparent paradox of the individual's desires is reflected in human rights law: the *universalism of human rights* (Arnold 2013; Dundes Renteln 1990; Mutua 2004) stresses for the concept of global citizenship and challenges the place of the nation state. In contrast, the right of peoples to *self-determination*, understood as democratic sovereignty and based in human rights (Griffioen 2010: 50ff.; see also Fisch 2015:

61f.), allows for the formation of consciously distinct political communities on the basis of exclusion and inclusion.

POINT OF DEPARTURE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS A RESOURCE FOR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Acknowledging that human rights do not only function as a limitation for measures aiming at the prevention of migratory movements leads to the assumption that human rights can also serve as a means of managing migration. Due to the conflictual nature of migration, the question how to deal with the movement of persons should not be subjected to the free play of political forces. There is a need for a *normative* management plan to prevent conflicts before they occur, as they are ongoing and once started. Human rights law is not the only possible management resource for the conflicts arising in the context of migration. Yet, as the contradictions between the universalism of human rights and the right to self-determination demand we examine the potential of human rights guarantees for the management of migration.

On Legal Management, Migration and Human Rights

While the need for migration management is evident, the idea of human rights as a means of management implies that migration can actually be managed, and that international human rights law offers an adequate and effective course of action. This might seem questionable, as international law has often been criticised for lacking effective enforcement mechanisms (Goldsmith and Posner 2005; critically, van Aaken 2006; on the effectiveness of international law in general, American Society of International Law 2015). This might be true for many other areas of international law, but especially in the field of human rights law, with its differentiated mechanisms of monitoring and control, it has proven useful. The jurisdiction of regional human rights courts serves as an example (Shani 2014: 253ff.), as well as the impacts of the discussion about a human rights-based "responsibility to protect" (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001; Stahn 2007). And, as already mentioned, human rights do not only serve as a limit for states' attempts to impede migration, which is their *status negativus.* More than functioning as a limit to and defence of state power, human rights also oblige states to act, which is their *status positivus*, *status activus* or *status processualis*. In other words, human rights serve as an orientation point allowing migration and limiting migration, but always from the perspective of human freedoms. In this way, human rights activate courses of action, as they oblige the responsible actors both within and beyond the state to be creative.

  Law can be used as a means of management in two ways: reactively and proactively. Reactive legal management can be used to design a framework that is necessary to process social and political changes. Law can also serve as an instrument to proactively shape processes of change. In the first case, law follows reality, while in the second case, reality follows law. In any case, law cannot (and should not) dictate social developments. Regarding migration, this means that law can build a framework, serve as an orientation point in response to migration, and guide the handling of migratory movements. This is only possible if the *rule of law* is comprehensively secured in all matters of migration. Hasty retreats into states of

emergency which are beyond the law make the required normative management of migratory conflicts impossible.

Legal management by the means of international law is management in a broader sense than in national law. But unlike parliamentary legislation, norms of international law can bind state and non-state actors, using the mechanisms of multilevel governance through the establishment of "international benchmark norms" (Calliess 2006: 593: "Maßstabsnormen") that serve as orientation for national law making and national law enforcement (on multilevel governance, Enderlein et al. 2010; Pernice 1999; in the context of European migration law, see Boeles et al. 2014: 21ff.). Even if international law lacks the high degree of effectiveness and precision of management through national law, it has the advantage of being able to address transnational phenomena like migration much better than national law and can have an integrating effect. Due to these dynamics, national sovereignty does not constitute an impermeable shield against international legal management impulses anymore. This applies particularly to the international human rights system with its differentiated possibilities of individual complaints. The individual's right to make a claim directly under various human rights regimes helps to activate international law as a resource. Lastly, human rights are suitable for migration management as they do not take the simple perspective of protection against dangers emanating from migration, but the perspective of migration as a question of individual freedoms and liberties. In this way, human rights capture the problems and conflicts in the context of migration much better than solely defensive approaches. Such a human rights-based approach to migration management may be structured into the three parts of the "responsibility to protect": the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild (Hurwitz 2009; Martin 2010).

Human Rights-Based Belonging as the Central Category for a Human Rights-Based Migration Management

Sovereignty and individual freedoms mark the starting points of migration management based on human rights. The classical sovereign nation state has the authority to freely decide at its own discretion who may enter its territory, be it for temporary or for permanent stay (Jennings and Watts 2008: §400). This leaves only a little room for migration management through human rights, as long as the state has not bound itself to relevant human rights treaties. But once this happens, the protective armour of sovereignty starts to open, and a humanisation of sovereignty can be witnessed. There are good reasons to believe that the principle of sovereignty (Art. 2 para. 1 UN Charter) can no longer be understood as a value solely serving itself, but that the modern, human rights-rooted nation state is at the service of *humanity* (Peters 2009).

It would therefore be wrong to assume that sovereignty and humanity must be antagonisms. It might be true that the construct of sovereignty implies the territoriality of the state and the sedentariness of its people, so that international migratory movements conceptually challenge it more than they do universal human rights guarantees. But this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that sovereignty automatically closes borders, and that freedom of movement automatically opens them. Both are social constructs, and as such they are susceptible to absolutist argumentations. Still, painting an irreconcilable contrast between self-determined territorial sovereignty and self-determined individual freedom does not do justice to the complex relation between the two. Sovereignty has been losing its claim to exclusivity.

Discussions about a humanitarian intervention (see Bellamy and McLoughlin 2018; Fonteyne 1974; Tesón 2005; Verwey 1986), the "responsibility to protect", the concept of "human security" (Tomuschat 2014: 159ff.), or about human rights-based relativisations of state immunity (De Sena and De Vittor 2005; Fox 2006; Parlett 2006) illustrate this development, even if the legalisation of these approaches may be doubtful. Then again, human rights can also establish state obligations towards its own nationals, which can be invoked against non-nationals, together with the right to self-determination. As an example, Art. 32 para. 2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention can be read as acknowledging this ambiguous nature of human rights when it stipulates that refugee protection does not always prevail over fundamental security interests of the community (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 234ff.; Hathaway 2006: 342ff.; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003: 128ff.). But to formulate such fundamental interests of the community on a human rights basis helps to reveal where the real conflicts lie, and where, in contrast, the reference to sovereignty is only a pretext for arbitrary exclusion. In this way, more concrete standards for the balancing of the different interests involved can be obtained.

The awareness that human rights do not exclusively convey free movement of persons should not lead to the reinterpretation of the individual right to asylum as a solely objective guarantee. With an individualised understanding of asylum as a subjective and actionable right, the individual is empowered to step on the scene as an actor in the migration game, and – with the help of courts – to enforce the rule of law, which is a prerequisite for normative migration management. Here, the development of the EU Dublin system can serve as an example: while initially the Dublin regulation was interpreted as a purely objective interstate law for the organisation of the EU asylum system between the member states (opinion of Advocate General *N. Jääskinen*, 18th April 2013, C-4/11 (Germany v. Kaveh Puid), ECLI: EU:C:2013:244, para. 58; confirmed by the ECJ, 14th November 2013, C-4/11 (Germany v. Kaveh Puid), ECLI:EU:C:2013:740, paras. 24ff.), the reform of the Dublin III regulation in 2013 created individual rights of asylum seekers to challenge states' transfer decisions based on the regulation, and thus, enabled them to insist on the observation of the rule of law in times of crisis (ECJ, 7th June 2016, C-63/15 (Mehrdad Ghezelbash v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie), ECLI:EU:C:2016:409, paras. 34, 51; ECJ, 26th July 2017, C-670/16 (Tsegezab Mengesteab v. Germany), ECLI:EU:C:2017:587, paras. 55ff.).

But when a binary codification of international migration law between sovereignty on the one side and human rights and freedom of movement on the other is too simplistic, what other categories are there to approach migration legally? In the end, sovereignty and human rights imply different forms and levels of *belonging* to political communities (one could also speak of "allegiance" or "identity"; on these categories, Jenkins et al. 2014). The idea of belonging is the core question of migration management: it is about balancing wishes to belong with abilities and possibilities of belonging. Human rights offer a differentiated system of belonging, which starts with the basic right to survival, emanating from belonging to the human family. Human rights-based belonging is organised in statuses, from the defensive *status negativus*, to rights of participation (*status positivus*, *status activus*) and procedural rights (*status processualis*). This interpretation of human rights as a system of belonging is where their potential for migration management lies.

Belonging on the grounds of human rights does not end with the basic right to survival. A "bare life" alone would be nothing more than an empty shell, if there was not at least a *right to have rights* (Owens 2010), to secure the right to life and to allow for a development of the personality in dignity. It is the minimum condition for seeking opportunities in life, be they

related to education, work or personal freedoms. The right to survival applies long before the formation of political communities, and therefore it must be fundamental for all attempts to manage migration. Once political communities constitute, and the more specific they become, the more specific become the rights of the individuals. The spectrum of rights and players ranges from the most fundamental human rights to the right to self-determination, from the elusive international community to the nation state, also encompassing other intermediate, regional entities such as the European Union. Faced with migratory movements, international law has the task to design a normative framework based on human rights, in which political communities can form their own regimes of belonging, according to the principle of subsidiarity and – most importantly – under the observance of the fundamental belonging of migrants to the human family (for different constructions of belonging in mobile societies, see Kostakopoulou 2006: 84).

THE FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING MIGRATION: THE RELEVANT NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW

Terminology: International Migration Law

International law addresses migration phenomena in a number of legal fields, classically in the international law of aliens (on the international minimum standard concerning the treatment of aliens see Crawford 2019: 591ff.; Hailbronner and Gogolin 2013; Roth 1949; Verdross 1931; on the roots of universal human rights protection in the international law concerning the treatment of aliens see Kotzur 2013), furthermore in international refugee law, in the law of migrant workers (Cholewinski 1997), or in universal human rights catalogues. Still, the term *migration* is not clearly defined in international law. Thus, when talking about migration it must be done with sensitivity. The term migration, as used in everyday language, is problematic, linked to all the potential conflicts that have already been described. This is why it has been suggested to speak of "mobility" (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011: 7) or "movement of persons" (Boeles et al. 2014: 5) rather than "migration". This notional differentiation makes sense not least because "migration" implies sedentariness as the norm and mobility as the exception, while "movement" is the rule and the reality of the globalised 21st century with its mobile societies (Sassen 1998: XXI) – and has probably always been throughout human evolution. Furthermore, "movement" and "mobility" are better able to express that the concepts of belonging and the respective attributions of identity have become more variable and have started to move themselves.

Nevertheless, migration is the well-established term in jurisprudence and literature, which is why we want to stick to this nomenclature – however, always having in mind the semantic nuances and the normality of mobility. Therefore, we want to suggest a wider understanding of migration, leaving out domestic migration, and defining migrants as "persons who leave their country of origin or the country of habitual residence, to remain either permanently or temporarily in another country with the possible consequence of establishment" (Kugelmann 2009: MN 4). International migration law can therefore be understood as the entirety of all norms of international law dealing with migration in the aforementioned sense.

The Institutional Infrastructure: Fragmentations and Cooperative Responsibility

Certainly, this definition of international migration law does not establish an independent field of public international law, nor does it lay claim to intradisciplinary status. International migration law is in fact fragmented. This is true for the substantive law as well as for the institutional framework. For some specific parts of international migration law there is a certain level of institutionalisation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the area of refugee protection, or the EU and its institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, with regard to the EU regime of free movement of persons, serve as examples. Beside these two actors, the UN Security Council can step on the scene as a player when it activates its powers according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter by defining migratory pressure due to armed conflicts as a threat to international peace and security (for examples see Krisch 2012: MN 23).

The pluralism of institutions and the diversity of their respective areas and sub-areas of international migration law reveal the lack of a coherent governance structure (Benz and Hasenclever 2010; and in general Blome et al. 2016). This becomes evident in the light of mass migration scenarios, when cooperative structures between players would be most needed. Even the 1951 Refugee Convention does not entail an international obligation of states to cooperate and includes only a vague appeal for international cooperation in its preamble, stating that "the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution […] cannot […] be achieved without international co-operation". The absolute absence of a specific legal framework for people fleeing from natural disasters and other consequences of climate change completes the fragmented picture of international migration law (Ferris 2017; McAdam 2012: 187ff.).

At the same time, cooperation is of fundamental importance for the effectiveness of all attempts to manage international migration. International migration law is indeed international law of cooperation par excellence. The fact that the legal framework is in practice often dominated by the strategic considerations of power politics (Betts 2010), thus retaining a certain anarchic character (Hurrell 2010: 86), does not change the necessity of cooperation. Regardless of whether duties of cooperation can arise from an international law principle of solidarity (see Kotzur and Schmalenbach 2014), the question here shall be what potential human rights have for the governance of cooperation. In the first place, human rights create subjective rights for individuals. What might *prima facie* seem as a factor limiting their potential for cooperation management can become a genuine duty to cooperate, when the least protection of the individual becomes impossible without a certain degree of cooperation, as for example in cases of mass migration (on burden-sharing Fonteyne 1978–1980; Hilpold 2017a; on the question whether fix refugee quotas are helpful for burden-sharing, Hilpold 2017b). In the globalised world with transnational migratory movements, the *status processualis* expands to a cooperative *status infrastructuralis*. Those bound by human rights guarantees are obliged to provide at least the minimum of procedural infrastructures, without which the individual rights would in their substance be empty. In this context, it is important to note that "procedure" should not be understood in a narrow and formal sense, only meaning judicial remedies. This logic is illustrated by the idea of the "responsibility to protect", where a single state is unwilling or unable to guarantee the most fundamental human rights of its population, so that the responsibility to protect shifts to the international community as a whole. The realisation of this shared subsidiary responsibility goes along with a responsibility to cooperate. The

UN Security Council with its extensive Chapter VII policy could in terms of competences well take this responsibility, also in the context of migration (for an overview of the Security Council's policy, see Krisch 2012: MN 23ff.).

The Normative Resources Beyond All Fragmentations: Human Rights Norms

From a human rights perspective, two dimensions define the freedom of movement. Firstly, there is the freedom to leave a country. This dimension of freedom is normatively recognised and protected in several human rights texts. Art. 13 para. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly resolution 271 (III) A) stipulates the right to leave any country, including one's own, and so do Art. 12 para. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as Art. 2 para. 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights. In contrast, the counterpart, the freedom to enter a country, is hardly accepted in international law. It is generally in the discretion of all nation states to decide whom to let into their territory and whom not. In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

> It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. (U.S. Supreme Court, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States et al. 142 U.S. 651, 142)

Even Art. 14 para. 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which grants everyone the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution, was in its genesis not intended to establish a right of the individual to be granted asylum, and is thus commonly read in a sovereignty-centred way: it is "the right of every state to offer refuge and to resist all demands for extradition", as the British delegate phrased it during the drafting of the declaration (Lauterpacht 1948: 373). The declaration does not accord the individual a "right to be granted asylum", only a "right to enjoy asylum", establishing no obligation for the state (for more on this aspect of the drafting history, see Boed 1994: 9f.).

However, state practice has evolved since 1948. In 1951, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was signed in Geneva and has, together with its 1967 Protocol, become the core document or "Magna Carta" (Read 1953) for international refugee law (on the historical development, see Einarsen 2011; Skran 2011). The Convention, which in its preamble classifies itself as a human rights treaty, provides for a limited individual right to asylum in Art. 33. The prohibition of expulsion or return (so-called *refoulement*) of a refugee to territories where his or her life or freedom would be in danger, contained in this provision, is generally interpreted as applying in situations at the border (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 306ff.), and in this way establishes a right to enter the state territory in which he or she seeks protection.

In universal human rights treaties, no express right to asylum can be found. Neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) nor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contain a parallel provision to Art. 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, general human rights provisions have a reinforcing effect on the principle of *non-refoulement*. While Art. 3 para. 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment expressly prohibits *refoulement*, similar obligations not to expel a person can originate from the Convention on the Rights of the Child (for example Arts 9 and 10), or from general human rights obligations, such as the right to life (contained for example in Art. 6 para. 1 ICCPR,

Art. 2 para. 1 ECHR) and the prohibition of torture (Art. 7 ICCPR, Art. 3 ECHR). Such a prohibition of *refoulement* from Art. 3 ECHR has been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in several cases (ECtHR, 7th July 1989, application no. 14038/88 – *Soering*, para. 91; ECtHR, 15th November 1996, application no. 22414/93 – *Chahal*, para. 74; ECtHR, 28th February 2008, application no. 37201/06 – *Saadi*, para. 125ff.). On one occasion, the Court has also considered that "an issue might exceptionally arise under Article 6 [ECHR] by an extradition decision in circumstances where the individual would risk suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country" (ECtHR, 27th October 2011, application no. 37075/09 – *Ahorugeze*, para. 113). In the case of general human rights treaties, the establishment of a right to enter a country faces the problem of the very limited extraterritorial applicability of the respective treaties, even though the ECtHR has assumed a relatively wide extraterritorial responsibility of the parties to the ECHR (see ECtHR, 29th March 2010, application no. 3394/04 – *Medvedjev*; ECtHR, 7th July 2011, application no. 55721/07 – *Al-Skeini*; ECtHR, 23rd December 2012, application no. 27765/09 – *Hirsi Jamaa*; see also ECtHR, 1st September 2015, application no. 16483/12 – *Khlaifia*; with regard to maritime borders, Fischer-Lescano et al. 2009). As a consequence, human rights convey "complementary protection" (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 285) to the prohibition of *refoulement*, reinforcing it once the person has reached the territory of the state bound by the human rights treaty. Some regional human rights treaties go even further (on Europe, Klug 2011; on Asia, Blay 2011; on Africa, van Garderen and Ebenstein 2011; on the Americas, Piovesan and Jubilut 2011). The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains additional protection, for example from collective expulsion in Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4, or residence rights (Art. 8 ECHR).

And yet, the international freedom of movement, complementing the freedom to leave a country with a corresponding freedom of entry, only seems to have a chance when, based on international treaty law, more comprehensive processes of integration take place as for example in the case of the EU. The EU has established a legal space with an advanced regime of free movement of persons for the citizens of the Union (see for example Arts 20, 21 and 45 TFEU and Art. 45 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). This shows that it is often more effective to seek regional or even bilateral answers to global challenges, using regional instruments and institutions of international law and unfolding the potential of the close relations of the respective players. It might by all means be fruitful to think global, but to act and react local.

THE CONSEQUENCES: POSSIBILITIES FOR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT OF THE BASIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Management Ahead of Migratory Movements

To act locally when faced with the global issue of migration starts before migration occurs. In this stage, migration management – from the perspective of human rights – is preventative. In a narrow sense of the word, it is about the prevention of unwanted causes of migration. Preventive migration management in a wider sense also encompasses the dismantling of existing infrastructural barriers to freedom of movement. What can be framed as a "responsibility to prevent" can address migration in all its facets: from precarious economic situations to the lack of opportunity for young people (on factors for migration, Lee 1969: 285ff.), from envi-

ronmental disasters as a reason for displacement (Cohen and Bradley 2010; Farber 2014) to human rights violations in civil wars and other armed conflicts. Of course, deep rooted ethical, religious, political or cultural conflicts cannot be solved by legal management alone. But conflict resolution, being first and foremost a political process, can and should be normatively accompanied and safeguarded by law. This implies the usage of the common instruments of good governance, protection against forced displacement as part of the freedom of movement, as well as the usage of international criminal law instruments against gross violations of human rights. Other issues to be envisaged are the strengthening of international institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Cohen and Bradley 2010: 138), and a focus on international environmental law and development policies. The EU Agenda on Migration defines "the development of the countries of origin" as one goal of the EU's legal migration policy (COM (2015) 240 final: 16). Human rights-based migration management is thus a cross-sectional task of international cooperation, involving various fields of international law.

Management of Migratory Movements

There is a need for reactive management once migration occurs. Compliance with this "responsibility to react" is difficult due to the many deficiencies of international migration law. It starts with the 1951 Refugee Convention that assumes refugees will only stay temporarily in the host countries. In reality, permanent resettlement is the rule. This challenges societies and their ability to integrate migrants whom they might consider a threat to self-determination. On the other side, permanent emigration can potentially cause problems for the countries of origin, when they experience "brain drain" and lose their capacity to rebuild after conflict resolution. Furthermore, the problem of mass exodus scenarios remains inadequately solved in international refugee law. While the 1951 Refugee Convention remains silent with regard to mass influxes of refugees, Art. 3 of the UN General Assembly resolution of 1967 establishes an exemption for mass influx scenarios:

1. No person referred to in article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State where he may be subjected to persecution.
2. Exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons. (UN General Assembly, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967, Res. 2312 (XXII))

This is, however, not a satisfying solution because particularly in such occasions of mass displacement, when the protection of human rights is at stake on a massive scale, refugees are vulnerable. At the same time, a single state cannot handle the need for protection alone. Acknowledging this, the EU in 2001 adopted a directive on "minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof" (EU Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20th July 2001). The directive has, however, never been activated (Koo 2018, who argues that the concept of temporary protection has failed; but see also Ineli-Ciger 2016).

Migration management by the means of the Refugee Convention becomes even harder with its restrictive refugee definition in Art. 1, limiting the Convention's applicability to individual persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and excluding other important factors for forced migration, such as armed conflicts or environmental disasters. But the crucial point from a human rights perspective is that the Convention requires successful flight. The core principle of refugee protection, the prohibition of *refoulement* in Art. 33, only applies once the refugee has – be it legally or illegally – entered the territory of the state, or at least reached the border (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 246; Hathaway 2006: 315ff.; Kälin et al. 2011: MN 105ff.; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003: 113ff.). Yet, some of the greatest threats for life and physical integrity of refugees lie on the route to the countries of destination. The lack of legal entry possibilities in the countries of destination results in illegality becoming the only way to make use of guaranteed human rights, and it incentivises the taking up of dangerous journeys in the hands of criminal traffickers. The issue of humanitarian visa, as proposed by the Advocate General *P. Mengozzi* in a case before the European Court of Justice with regard to situations where there is a genuine risk of infringement of certain human rights (opinion of the Advocate General *P. Mengozzi*, delivered on 7th February 2017, Case C-638/16 PPU (X and X v. État Belge), ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, paras 109–175), would be difficult to put into practice, considering the potential run on the diplomatic and consular missions in the countries of origin, and does therefore not serve as a practicable solution. Still, it does put a light on the imminent need of legal pathways to security.

Coping with the shortcomings of the existing international legal framework is only possible by complying with the already mentioned duty to cooperate, deduced from human rights obligations. The challenges posed by (mass) migration require international solidarity, burden-sharing and cooperation (see UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII), Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx (1981)). Given the challenges of enforcement, the key is to create a mix of established instruments of international law, such as self-commitments. It might also be worth thinking about transferring governance mechanisms from other contexts to the area of migration. A system, inspired by emission trading rules, that defines certain refugee quotas, and at the same time establishes financial compensation obligations in the case of falling short of the quota, might *prima facie* seem unusual in the context of human rights. But it can serve as pragmatic approach to "flexible solidarity" (Drachenberg 2016; see also Kotzur 2016). Such quotas must not be misinterpreted as rigid maximum limits for the admittance of refugees, though, which would be incompatible with human rights. In any case, as long as there is no realistic chance for a comprehensive multilateral reform of the universal legal framework for migration, regional and bilateral solutions – in the form of refugee resettlement agreements or even bilateral migration regimes – should be sought. This should certainly always encompass the necessary institutional and procedural instruments for migrants to be able to enforce their individual rights.

Management in the Aftermath of Migratory Movements

In the aftermath of migratory movements, the "responsibility to rebuild" demands efforts to rebuild the political system in the countries of origin, (re-)establishing the necessary institutions and precautionary measures for the guarantee of fundamental human rights and security. Here, coping with the consequences of migration has at the same time a preventive function of

the kind described above, serving the future "responsibility to prevent". Nevertheless, in the light of the realities of migration in the countries of destination, the task for human rights-based post-migration management is to provide constructive perspectives for the integration of those who will most likely stay permanently. It aims to provide the framework for the nation states to fulfil their responsibility for integration autonomously and in a self-determined way, but with respect for the requirements of human rights law. The "responsibility to rebuild" turns into a responsibility "to build" (on this idea see Werner-Pietsch 2018: 21). That applies to the law of residence, the access to the labour market, family reunification, and all other areas of public life. For example, limited diplomatic protection for non-citizens has to be provided (Vermeer-Künzli 2007). The management potential of the human rights-based approach proposed here lies in the dismantling of the dichotomy between exclusion on the grounds of self-determination and inclusion on the grounds of human rights freedoms, opening up a perspective of a differentiated status of belonging.

A Differentiated Status of Belonging as the Overall Perspective

The initial thesis of human rights creating a system of differentiated statuses of belonging is based on the acknowledgement that, in principle, it is the right of political communities to decide who may participate. This cannot be neglected without giving up a fundamental principle of international law. However, with the principle of self-determination being itself rooted in human rights, human rights convey rights to belong, to participate in the community, differentiated by the degree of threat for the individual. In concrete terms this means: the more existential the threat for the individual, the greater the individual's right to belong to the political community, weakening the exclusionary force of the community's will to self-determination.

The 1951 Refugee Convention provides for the very minimum in terms of belonging to a political community, limiting the status to the fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (on the reasons for persecution, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007: 70ff.; comprehensively on the refugee status, Hathaway and Foster 2014). Persons fleeing from armed conflicts do, thus, not fall under the Convention protection (Boeles et al. 2014: 307f.). However, the Convention itself follows a logic of differentiated statuses of belonging. It differentiates between rights of refugees physically present, rights of refugees lawfully present and rights of those lawfully staying (Hathaway 2006: 154ff.) The stronger the attachment between a refugee and the receiving state becomes, the more rights the refugee is attributed by the Convention. With its status of subsidiary protection, EU law has created an additional, wider status of belonging, in order to cope with the deficiencies of classical refugee protection vis-à-vis the threats from armed conflicts, when there is no individual persecution on the aforementioned grounds. The range of imaginable reasons for other, further rights of belonging extends from a colonial past (Tendayi Achiume 2017) to utopian concepts like a responsibility based on participation on the global market. It is up to regional communities of responsibility to create and further develop new models of belonging. The path the EU has taken, with the "market citizen" having emancipated to a genuine "citizen" (Boeles et al. 2014: 30 and 49), is only one possible way (on citizenship, Dahrendorf 1994). In all this, thinking in human rights-based categories of belonging is certainly much more effective than a desirable, but elusive, concept of global citizenship.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Faced with the partly substantial deficiencies of the institutional and normative framework of international migration law and contemporary migration phenomena, comprehensive reforms – a reform of the international legal instruments, the creation of a new international organisation for migration with wider competences, the inclusion of an explicit right to asylum in human rights treaties, the taking up of civil war and climate "refugees" into the 1951 Refugee Convention, or the development of adequate normative responses mass refugee movements – might appear more desirable than ever. But with today's renaissance of sovereignty-oriented politics and restrictive migration regimes, it might be more promising to pursue a consequent "piecemeal engineering" (Popper 1945: 138ff.) on the basis of the existing human rights instruments. The belonging to the human family and the "freedom from fear" as a new global common, together with a protective responsibility of the international community, could serve as the leitmotif in this process, as the leading utopia for international cooperation in the service of humanity.

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5. The sexual dimension of migration: from sexual migration to changing lovescapes[1]

Martina Cvajner and Giuseppe Sciortino

Occidente, by Ferdinando Camon (1975), narrates the socio-cultural changes triggered by the Italian economic miracle. Very early in the plot, Franco, a neo-Nazi leader with a good deal of existential anguish, explores the deserted Italian countryside. He is looking for an isolated area that can be used as a training ground for his terrorist group. While he visits a string of dilapidated and abandoned migrant settlements, he cannot help but fantasize about the new lives of the former occupants. He finds several unopened letters rotting in a mailbox. Franco wonders why the recipient – a young woman – never gave the sender her new address. He answers his own query with an interpretation of the migration experience, worth quoting in full:

> She must have liked him; she must have liked him a lot. Otherwise, he would have never taken the freedom to write her so openly, so publicly. I know why: she cannot bear love anymore. She does not know anymore what it is. [Before emigrating] the priest had once refused, when her boyfriend had touched her breasts, to absolve her. Well, not really touched, he just wanted to know if they were hard. She was trembling all over, fearing to get pregnant. Now she is there, in the city. She sees the billboards, the posters in the movie theaters, the magazine covers. The first week, she could not sleep. Every night, she thought "if God exists, tonight he will send the flood." Two years have passed, and the flood has not arrived. She does not know any more if God exists. If her boyfriend would visit her, how should she behave? She does not know. Better not to write him. (Camon 1975: 55)

In his fantasy, Franco – although a literary character (and a rather disturbing one) – evokes a common narrative about the changes introduced by emigration in the intimate lives of migrants (and particularly of migrant women). Movement is seen as a traumatic experience, a move from a social environment defined by traditionalism and endemic social control to a radically different context where the palette of possible behavioural options is broader, group-level social control is weaker, and much is left to individual choice. It is the narrative of emigration as an anomic experience that shatters the sexual persona of the migrant.

Although popular, this is not the only narrative available. Sometimes emigration is narrated as a journey of sexual discovery and personal enrichment. In 2011, to celebrate 50 years of Turkish migration to Germany, Yasemin Ergin travelled from Istanbul to Berlin with a group of 35 former *Gastarbeiter*, re-staging their original five-day journey. In the beginning, everything appeared as it normally does in literature memorializing migration: tales of pain and sorrow, memories of humiliating physical inspections, of families divided and "black trains". In the endless hours of the trip, however, the reminiscences shifted remarkably. Some travellers admitted their emigration was also "pulled" by the attraction of a world in which women could frequent cafés and speak freely to men. Others remembered dreamily the romantic encounters they had had while in Germany (several of the encounters matured into stable unions). Many joked that the ability to speak German fluently was a proxy for having had some kind of affair with a German woman (Ergin 2011). A similar description is embedded in the popular novels by Marina Lewycka. Her Eastern European migrant women think of the UK as

a place to find work and make money; as well as a space in which different forms of dating and mating are not only possible but socially prescribed. In this second script, sex, love, intimacy and romance turn out to be subdued, but far from marginal, dimensions of migration. Migrants do consider these dimensions (at least *inter alia*) both in their migration decisions and in their settlement strategies. Far from being ravaged by loneliness and "shocked" by the liberties in their new environment, migrants rely on deep-seated processes of anticipatory socialization.

The polarized narratives of anomic disorganization versus positive modernization are focused on the *individual* changes introduced by emigration. Sex, however, is never a matter left to individuals. Sexual lives, whether actual or imagined, nearly always contribute to shaping the collective boundaries of belonging, the system of expectations that regulates interactions among immigrants and natives. Cross-ethnic romantic encounters occur, or fail to occur, in social contexts shaped by shared ethno-sexual expectations. In recent reportage, for example, Başak, a Turkish academic living in Germany, complains about the fact that her online partners never identify her as a Turk. She argues that online daters simply anticipate that Turkish women, "by default Muslim, in their eyes – cannot be doing something the obvious purpose of which is casual sex" (Turkmen 2019).

Collective expectations have a powerful influence in giving birth to ethno-sexual categories and subcultures, nearly always in heavily moralized terms. Immigrants may be denied social membership, and sometimes humanity, on the basis of their presumed unruly, wild or predatory sexual mores. Their exclusion, however, may also be derived from their native practices: the controversial Dutch requirement that prospective migrants watch a video highlighting the liberated mores of the Netherlands is only one example of this identification of "foreignness" with "sexual repression" (Bredström 2005). Just as there exists exclusion based on othering, so there exists the opposite: migrants can be welcomed, exalted and desired as passionate lovers able to open forbidden, transgressive worlds. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the eye-opening, existentially challenging, experience of (often homosexual) sexual encounters with Arab immigrants had been used by some French intellectuals to legitimate their participation in the anti-colonial struggle (Shepard 2018).

These anecdotes – taken from novels and media accounts – different as they are, converge in highlighting how sex, love and intimacy are important dimensions of the migration experience. They are exemplars of the very different ways in which the nexus between migration and sexual change is perceived and expected, taken for granted or challenged.

Our paper surveys the growing body of academic literature that explores the sexual lives of migrants and the role of sexual boundaries in the migration process. In the last decades, the sexual dimension of migration has slowly become a legitimate topic for research. It has never coalesced, however, into a systematic research program.

In the following pages, we will not look for a single, straightforward "sexual outcome" of geographical mobility. On the contrary, we will survey several different conceptual frameworks, each of them highlighting a piece of a complex puzzle that remains largely unexplored.

SEX, LOVE AND INTIMACY AS RESEARCH FIELDS: BRINGING MIGRATION IN

While quickly expanding in coverage and sophistication, the studies of the sexual dimension of migration are still largely justified by social scientists through "external" considerations. They are presented as driven by humanitarian, critical or emancipatory concerns, while their analytical significance is rarely stressed.

Unsurprisingly, the available literature is heavily clustered around a limited number of topics. If we search for "sexuality" and "migration" using Google Scholar, we receive a little more than 200,000 items. An impressive number of them deal with sex work, an economic niche that has been traditionally staffed by migrant labour. A roughly equivalent number of items are focused on sex trafficking. A third, much smaller, selection is dedicated to migration as a strategy through which members of sexual minorities try to improve their social conditions (and sometimes save their lives). A search on academia.edu brings similar results: the available papers on "migration" and "sexuality" are clustered around the same nodes.

A large majority of the available work is either policy-oriented or classifiable (broadly) within the critical-public tradition of the social sciences. There is no doubt these massive streams of literature have provided some important public function, contributing to the development of important advocacy campaigns. A case in point is the contribution that sexuality scholars have brought to refugee studies. They have documented how LGBT asylum seekers, escaping persecution on sexual grounds, often find it difficult to articulate their own self-understanding of sexual orientation within the (very different) sexual categories "naturalized" in Western legal systems (Akin 2017; Adur 2018).

The importance of this work, however, does not imply that the study of the sexual changes brought by migration make sense only when framed in reference to a social problem. On the contrary, we argue that the time is ripe for an analytical, generalized attempt to understand the sexual dimension of migration. We wish to put forward the thesis that better knowledge of the sexual dimension of migration is important for the development of migration theory (Cvajner 2018). First, a better understanding of sexual change during migration constitutes an important resource for the study of migration as an experiential process. As migration is a process of social mobility through motility, it often implies the crossing of boundaries imbued with (real or alleged) sexual differences. Crossing these boundaries requires a variety of interactional experiences, which, in turn, support and create a new, and often unexpected, social self (Aguilar 1999). These new selves are subsequently stabilized (or not) through the development of new circles of recognition, each sustained by its own folk-knowledge, morality and, indeed, aesthetics. Migration does not simply transport people. It also transforms them. As migration takes place within an emerging global culture that makes sex a key element of selfhood and personal authenticity, the experience of migration inevitably touches changing sexual meanings (Cvajner 2019).

A second important rationale for increased analytical attention to the sexuality of migration is that it provides key materials to answer some of the major questions within migration studies: how "far", how "deep" is the transformation brought about by geographical mobility? Does migration change migrants also in their private, personal, intimate lives? Does it have an impact on what many, indeed most (including migrants themselves), perceive as an unchangeable inner nature? Does the experience of mobility across geographical and socio-political boundaries change the way migrants experience not only their actions but also their "desires"?

How do the new experiences shape the ways in which mobility is narrated, interpreted and circulated? To what extent does the arrival of newcomers strengthen the established vocabulary of motives in the new location, rather than irritating or challenging it? To study how various forms of mobility interact with the erotic and sexual lives of those involved is an important way to explore in detail the subjective and cultural impacts of geographical mobility. Answering these questions sheds light on the cultural consequences of spatial mobility, the ways in which living under a different sun triggers the birth of new discourses, rhetorical tropes and even specific subcultures.

A third justification for the study of the sexual dimension of migration concerns the centrality of sexual elements in the definition of migration-related social boundaries. As we have already stressed, the boundaries crossed by migrants are associated with various sexual meanings. Sexual categories are often invoked by natives to make sense of migrants' presence and roles (Shield 2019). The development of different kinds of ethno-sexual boundaries in migration has also been observed. Alleged sexual differences have been used by some migrants to define themselves as a "group" in opposition to the "natives". Filipino mothers preach chastity to their daughters as a way to highlight a Filipino-American identity sharply differentiated through opposition to the promiscuity of "white girls" (Espiritu 2001). In contrast, Eastern European women in Italy have developed an equally strong social boundary against Italian women – usually their employers – through the adoption of a passionate, hyper-feminine presentation of the self (Cvajner 2012). We believe the study of ethno-sexual boundary-making has great potential for the study of migration, ethnicity and race.[2] The study of the processes of "sexotization", the intertwined elaboration of sexualization and exoticization (Schaper et al. 2019), offers fertile ground for more balanced, culturally nuanced accounts of social boundaries.

A fourth rationale for fully including love, romance and sex in "normal" analyses of migration processes has to do with their role in the settlement process. Too many debates on integration processes fail to pay attention to the fact that the context of reception nearly always includes a specific "lovescape". How do sexual relationships and networks impact the wider social capital of migrants (Nyanzi et al. 2004)? How do migrants navigate the – often conflictual – intimate pressures deriving from "here" *and* "there" (Liu-Farrer 2010)? How are previous sexual experiences and norms re-interpreted and moulded during the migration process? How do sexual experiences contribute to restoring a modicum of intimacy in migrant lives (Faier 2011)? How, and to what extent, does the sexual life of migrants interact with prevailing modes of incorporation? Do sexual practices provide them with resources (and constraints) that play a significant role in the settlement process? How do migrants participate in the erotic spheres of their destinations? To what extent do they become "citizens" of emerging lovescapes? These questions have only started to be addressed recently, although almost exclusively by looking at the lives of members of sexual minorities (Manalansan 2006; Cantú et al. 2009). They are, however, quite important in enabling us to describe adequately the actual agency of all types of migrants (Kalra and Bhugra 2010).

The systematic analysis of the sexual dimension of migration is potentially important outside the field of migration studies. It provides a useful set of conceptual tools for the development of social science in general. All the above-mentioned questions are logically connected to key research questions central to the very core of the social scientific project. Exploring how migration changes sex means exploring how changes in behaviours and beliefs are brought about by changes in the social environment. It requires us to understand better the degree to

which cultural and structural forces are able to modify the practices and self-understandings of individuals and groups, the role played by social groups and networks in triggering, regulating or repressing potential changes. The erotic life of migrants is a wonderful form of "strategic research materials" (see Merton 1987).[3]

UNPACKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEXUALITY AND MIGRATION

Given the broad applicability for the social sciences, it is puzzling that the topic of sexuality and migration has been only roughly surveyed. Several scholars studying the connections between sexuality and migration have taken for granted that this topic had been ignored, if not even silenced. Such a claim is an effective rhetorical move. It is, however, empirically unfair.

Many studies – classic and contemporary – have actually dealt with the relationship between mobility and ethno-sexual frontiers. Classical urban scholars have argued that the loss of communitarian social control, caused by migration and urbanization, implies the possibility for radical changes in the sexual behaviour of migrants, particularly women (Thomas 1923). Demographers have long explored how migration contributes to changes in sexual norms in both sending and receiving communities (Hirsh 2003; Parrado and Flippen 2010). The barriers to the development of intimate relationships between native-born and outsiders, usually accompanied by forms of sexual prejudice, represent an ongoing concern in assimilation theory, constituting the roots of an interest in mixed dating and mating (Gordon 1964). There have been studies of sexual acculturation, showing how the process of settlement has in-depth consequences for the sexual life of migrants (Ahmadi 2003). Epidemiologists have regularly taken into account the sexual dimension of the mobility of populations, as migrants often function as bridge populations. The risk behaviours embedded and enabled by mobility play a key role in the spread of diseases, including those sexually transmitted (Vearey 2012). Historians of migration have shown how the history of many immigrant groups has been marked by strong forms of sexual prejudice, systematically employed to discourage their social participation. This is particularly true in the migration of women, nearly always suspected to overlap with sex work (Doezema 1999). Psychologists and psychiatrists have often linked territorial displacement with the diffusion of sexually traumatic experiences (Jelloun 1997).

While research interest in sex and sexuality has never been completely silenced in migration studies, scholars have largely failed to generate systematic research programs. The growing number of full-fledged studies reclaiming the importance of studying the sexual lives of migrants has remained largely scattered and isolated. They have made sex a legitimate topic in migration research, without providing the line for a specialized framework (though see Mai and King 2009).

We argue that one reason for such failure is the unsatisfactory level of internal differentiation. Many researchers have tried to make their research on migrant sexualities subsuming and conflate different perspectives and research problems under a broad generic reference (Cvajner and Sciortino 2019). This has required the frequent use of a broadly defined – if not utterly suggestive – vocabulary, able to subsume within the same terminology a variety of disparate occurrences. This has, in turn, impeded the development of more specialized debates. Any attempt to develop an analytical framework must start distinguishing different perspectives. While they are not necessarily in conflict, each of them needs its own research frame.

In the following pages, we distinguish between three different research perspectives focusing on the relationships between sexuality and migration. While they may sometimes overlap in empirical terms, they articulate clearly distinct research questions.

They deal respectively with (a) sexuality as a motivation for migration (we label such a perspective *sexual migration*), (b) the nature, depth, meaning and consequences of the sexual changes by geographical mobility (we label this perspective *sexuality of migration*) and (c) the collective socio-cultural changes in the sexual stratifications and categorical systems of the erotic spheres established in sending, transit and receiving spaces (which we define as *lovescapes*). The first two research perspectives are clearly connected with the ways in which mobility intersects the "sexual projects" of individuals and groups (Hirsh 2015). The third defines the attention to the cultural – and socio-economic – elements that sustain, shape and regulate the systems of ethno-sexual categories defining the socially shared differences between migrants and those left behind, between migrants and the native born and among different "kinds" and "types" of migrants. Studying such lovescapes is key both for exploring them as a dimension of the context of reception and for delineating the contribution of migration to the structuring of contemporary erotic spheres.

SEXUAL MIGRATIONS

The first of the current lines of research on sexuality and migration stresses the importance of sexual aspirations as a *driver for migration*. Mobility is here seen as a tactic or as a way through which members of disadvantaged sexual categories try to escape repression or pursue greater autonomy. Carillo (2004: 59) argues relocations motivated by the sexual project of migrants are "sexual migrations". He includes within such a label a variety of sexually related motivations "connected to sexual desires and pleasures, the pursuit of romantic relations with foreign partners, the exploration of new self-definitions of sexual identity, the need to distance oneself from experiences of discrimination or oppression caused by sexual difference, or the search for greater sexual equality and rights" (ibid.).

It is difficult to overestimate the potential importance of sexual aspirations among the motivations for mobility. Migration destinations often appear surrounded by the lure of a promising, "modern" sexual life (Weston 1995). Nor it is necessarily a new phenomenon. At least since early modernity, European cities have been marked by the development of increasingly diverse sexual subcultures, that have in turn developed their own attractive potential for those wishing to participate (Rocke 1996). Even in early modernity, the increase in anonymity allowed by urban life made it possible to pursue sexual encounters that would have been difficult in rural areas. For members of sexual minorities, the sheer numbers of people living in close proximity made it easier to find sexual partners and hide preferences. In fact, urbanization has been the structural precondition for the emergence of many dissident sexual subcultures (Aldrich 2004).

Several of these mechanisms remain operative today. Migration still makes it possible to escape mechanisms of social control in order to be able to explore a broader range of sentimental and erotic options. This is, for example, the experience of many Eastern European homosexuals, who migrate to Northern Europe looking both for better professional opportunities *and* for an environment in which they hope to explore a broader range of sentimental and erotic options (Mole et al. 2014). The importance of sexual orientation as a trigger for migration is

not necessarily fully formed before departure. Studies of "gay" Mexican migrants to the US document how the exploration of new erotic potentialities is often only one factor in a complex and ambivalent set of migratory motivations (Epstein and Carrillo 2014). Research has also shown how even migrants who consciously pursue migration as an emancipatory strategy often face a clash with the very different ways of understanding sex and sexuality embedded in the receiving context (Cantú et al. 2009).

Most current studies of sexual migrations deal with LGBT migrants. The logic of sexual migration can be applied more widely. Middle-aged women excluded by local romantic networks owing to age discrimination may discover that in other locations they are considered fully within the acceptable boundaries of dating and mating activities. For those who first experience it, migration may become an experience of re-sexualization (Lulle and King 2016). The possible re-inclusion in the circuit of intimate memberships becomes subsequently part of the migration lore in the areas of origin, developing into a factor in the decision-making of other prospective migrant women (Cvajner 2011). A similar, if more controversial, case in point is the migration of older Western men to countries where they expect to be able to reclaim their masculinity from age-marked stigmas, as well as gain access to intimacy and care (Scuzzarello 2020).

THE SEXUALITY *OF* MIGRATION

The empirical importance of sexual migrations, however, should not lead researchers to underestimate a second, broader process of interaction between geographical mobility and individual sexual projects. The experience of geographical mobility triggers many important sexual changes that are not intentionally pursued (that may be intentionally avoided). These changes are manifold, taking place in sending and receiving areas, among migrants and those left behind. We refer to these changes in practices, desires, narratives and norms as the "sexuality *of* migration". This is the area of behavioural and symbolic transformations that subjectively accompany the crossing of one or more ethno-sexual boundaries.

These changes do not necessarily derive from a pre-emigration aspiration to modify one's sexual location and biography (Cvajner and Sciortino 2019). On the contrary, many forms of mobility are predicated on the normative expectation that "nothing will change" in the erotic persona of the migrant (as well as of those left behind). Many migration spells are described as mere "parentheses" at the end of which migrants will return to their previous affective lives unscathed. Many other migration movements are oriented not toward sexual emancipation but rather toward sexual reproduction: migration is seen to gain the resources necessary to "reproduce" the traditional sexual order challenged by new socio-economic trends. At the same time, the consolidation of the experience of mass migration nearly always implies the development of noticeable changes in the ways in which sexual lives are conceived, thought and practiced (Chirwa 1997; Runganga and Aggleton 1998).

To acknowledge the importance of geographical mobility as a frequent trigger for changes in the sexual lives of migrants does not require that we assume similarity or the existence of a straightforward directionality. In fact, these changes can be quite motley and ambivalent. Migration opens an increased contingency in the sexual expectations of and for migrants. Their actual train of experience, however, is shaped by their pre-emigration background, by

the experiences encountered during the migration process and by the new balance of opportunities and constraints that shape the migrants' life-worlds.

An adequate understanding of the factors shaping the process of migration-related sexual change is still far away (Kalra and Bhugra 2010). The available studies identify four variables that interact with geographical mobility and contribute to shape the extension, intensity and direction of migration-related sexual changes: the gender of the migrant, social status, the position in the migration sequence and the type of migration system in which one participates.

The fact that migration is a highly gendered process is, by now, considered obvious (Donato and Gabaccia 2015). In the past, most studies have taken for granted that migrants were mostly men, while women were among the left behind. The volume and significance of women-centred migration systems has started to be appreciated only recently (Cvajner 2018). Migration-induced forms of sexual changes are strongly differentiated according to the gender composition of the flows and the way geographical mobility is contingent upon household dynamics. Given the highly gendered segmentation of sexual subcultures, the experience of geographical mobility is likely to have a different impact for migrant men and women from the very beginning (Belloni 2019). Women and men experience, internally and externally, the sexual dimension of migration in different ways. Internally, male and female migrants elaborate different narratives about the meaning of sexuality in mobility (Dune et al. 2015; Birger and Peled 2017). Externally, migrant women are much more often exposed to stigma, concerning their morality, the "true" reasons for their emigration and their responsibility towards those left behind. Their presence in a new location is often perceived as highly ambiguous, often triggering moral panics and attempts to de-sexualize them (Constable 1997; Cohen et al. 2008).

The social status of the migrant is another important variable for understanding the sexual changes brought about by migration. "Expats", as opposed to "migrants", are not usually requested to "adapt" to the (idealized) sexual mores of the place they have settled. On the contrary, they often feel entitled to bring with them sharply different sexual attitudes and practices and describe these practices as modern (Walsh 2007). The same applies to many forms of lifestyle migration, in which men (usually, but not always) move to locations where they expect, thanks to their resources, to be highly competitive on the dating and mating scene (Scuzzarello 2020). They may even be able to influence local legislation, aligning it with their "modernized" understanding of sexuality (Suen 2019). At the other extreme, vulnerable migrants may find mobile life a constant source of sexual frustration, ripe with health risks (Jelloun 1997; Sebo et al. 2011; Huang et al. 2016; Dias et al. 2019).

The impact of migration on sexual lives is also strongly shaped by the position of the migrant in the dynamics of the migrant flow. The potential sexual stance of migrant women is very different if they are pioneers, moving to a location where co-nationals are absent, or if they are followers, migrants who move through already established networks and communities (Blanchard 2018). Similarly, women pioneers experience new lovescapes in ways that are markedly different from those women who join already established migrants as parents, spouses or children (Gonzales-Lopez 2005; Cvajner 2019).

Finally, a major difference exists between migrants participating in systems organized around family-justified, kin-related migration chains and migrants involved in migration systems dominated by one gender. The latter seems to provide a fertile ground for the development of specialized sexual subcultures centred around double standards. These migration subcultures usually prescribe markedly different sexual norms and aspirations for the life

"in emigration" and "at home," sometimes including precise norms for the liminal periods between the two (Hirsh 2015). The sharp distinction between "here" and "there" is easily justified by the experience of loneliness that defines many phases of the individual trajectories within such systems: to prevent such loneliness from "eating up" their lives, many migrants "have to" see their emigration environment as a different world, in which the erotic sphere is regulated in a radically different way (Munoz-Laboy et al. 2009; Levy and Lieber 2011). Once such a geo-social split is institutionalized, the meaning of sex can change dramatically: in conditions of loneliness and social marginalization, sexual activity may acquire the meaning of a basic, bedrock sociability, the "essential" element that proves to immigrants their intrinsic human worth (Cvajner 2019).

The importance of the separation between "here" and "there" does not imply that sexual change cannot penetrate sending areas. Emigration is a powerful factor also for the changing sexual mores in sending places. Returning migrants may support ideals and practices linked to "modernized" sexuality, such as the strong (and enduring) importance of intimacy in the life of the conjugal couple (Hirsh 2003). And they may contribute to the spread of STDs, precisely because the expectation of having been faithful in emigration prevents them from adopting precautions with their partners (Štulhofer et al. 2006; Vearey 2012).

The study of the sexual changes brought about by migration inevitably brings to the fore the question of the convergence between the sexual style of immigrant populations and native born. How much do settlement processes lead to assimilation to the sexual folkways of the native-born population? Are there differences between empirical and normative sexual assimilation? Do migrants change their sexual attitudes over time? Do migrants differentiate over time along different sexual subcultures? Does sexual acculturation become noticeable only in the second generation? Under which conditions may sexual experience and aspirations become grounds for oppositional identities and boundary-making interactions? (Röder and Lubbers 2016; Soehl 2016; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018). These are quite important research questions, which will only be answered when a larger and more systematic set of data on migrant sexualities becomes available.

CHANGING LOVESCAPES: MIGRANTS IN THE EROTIC SPHERES

The first two lines of research reviewed are largely directed at individual behaviour and they explore changes at the individual level, focused on sexual aspirations *for* mobility or sexual consequences *of* mobility. The social significance of sexuality, however, is hardly an individual-level phenomenon, nor is it exclusively behavioural. Sex lives are shaped by shared discourses, desires and norms; symbols are involved in sex at least as much as bodies (Cvajner and Sciortino 2019). Migration provides a potentially life-changing event for the individual migrant. It also frequently creates new objects of loathing and desire, new sexual opportunities and constraints, new formalized scripts and new interactional ambivalences, thus altering the "lovescape" of both sending and receiving communities.

Migration modifies the sexual stratification shaping the various erotic spheres (Cvajner 2016). A dimension of this change is demographic: migration disturbs the balance between prospective partners, the quantitative "supply" and "demand" of suitable matches. A number of studies inspired by the theory of status-exchange mating have shown how migration pro-

vides the "weak" sectors of the native-born population with new opportunities for mating upwards (Guetto and Azzolini 2015). While often exploitative or stigmatized, such exchanges may nonetheless open new spaces for the sexual agency of migrants and the native born alike (Hoang and Yeoh 2015; Hewamanne 2016).

It would be a mistake to reduce the role played by migration in the erotic sphere to changes in supply and demand. Migration may change the constitutive definition of the erotic sphere, having impacts on the shared criteria of desirability, introducing new categories of erotic objects and opening up new possibilities for erotic recognition. Sexuality is among the main markers employed in ethnic boundary-making: ethnic groups and nations are deeply eroticized symbols (Nagel 2000; Friedland 2005).

The new chances for dating and mating opened up by migration trigger the development of new systems of sexual expectation as well as new regulations (Cvajner 2016). These normative systems and regulations establish the existence of a set of naturalized collective categories, each matched by proper erotic features, meaningful sexual practices, ritual ties and rules of conduct. These different "groups" are taken as part of an explicitly descriptive, implicitly normative, symbolic environment or a lovescape mandating their location in the general ranking of socially recognized desire and the "appropriate" sexual relationships to be developed among group members. These systems of expectations are usually rooted in the widespread belief linking ethno-cultural differences (real or imagined) to differences (real or imagined) in sexual inclinations and lifestyles. In contemporary global society, one of the most important legacies of colonialism is precisely the vast repertoire of regional and/or racial sexual icons and stereotypes that evolved during the colonial experience (Voss and Casella 2012). These banks of knowledge are frequently used to characterize immigrants as sexually different, through the heavily gendered joint processes of ethnicization and sexualization (Schaper et al. 2019).

Through such signification, migrants become sexually attractive precisely because they are considered erotically "different" from the native born. Systems of sexual expectations may become reference points for the very same attempts of immigrant groups to attain recognition and respect, making their "difference" a sign of higher desirability (Chang and Groves 2000; Bloch 2018; Cvajner 2019). Unsurprisingly the alleged "sexual differences" of migrants often play an important role in attempts to exclude them. Migrants are depicted as either "over-sexed" or "under-sexed", either too aggressive or too passive. And such attributes are employed, among others, to claim they are unfit for full societal membership.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that a systematic study of the sexual dimension of geographical mobility can provide an important contribution to better understanding the migration experience. We have also claimed that the time is ripe for a more analytical, generalized attempt to understand sexual change as part of the wider interest in the culture of migration. In recent decades, a series of important works have presented important analyses of the relationship between migration and sexual change. While they have succeeded in making visible the sexual dimension of migration, they have failed to coalesce into a recognizable research program. In order to develop a conceptual framework, we have identified three different theoretical perspectives useful to explore the topic: the role of sexual aspirations in motivating specific forms of mobility (so-called "sexual migration"), the sexual changes in practices, narratives and norms caused by the migration experience (the "sexuality of migration") and the changes brought by migration to the collective systems of social expectations that structure the erotic spheres (the evolution of "lovescapes").

NOTES

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2. Instrumentalist accounts of changing boundaries tend to explain cultural changes as the outcome of changing social boundaries. See Wimmer (2008). For a critique, see Sciortino (2012).
3. Merton (1987: 1–2) defines strategic research materials (SRMs) as those "sites, objects, or events that exhibit the phenomena to be explained or interpreted to such advantage and in such accessible form that they enable the fruitful investigation of previously stubborn problems and the discovery of new problems for further inquiry".

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6. Kaleidoscopic relations in emerging destinations

Ruth McAreavey

International migration is no longer solely an urban experience. The arrival of new residents has profoundly changed, and continues to change, the cultural environs and the social and economic structure of non-metropolitan areas. There are clear east to west pathways evident in Europe and south to north migration corridors in the Americas. And yet migration remains a contested and hotly debated phenomenon as borne out in recent voting patterns across Europe and in the USA. It is closely connected to national identity and the national psyche: '[O]ur national imagination – who we think we are – fundamentally shapes migration and refugee politics and debate. In turn, migration shapes who we will become' (Bauder 2014: 10). Classic migration theory tends to assume that it is solely an economic decision, indeed Portes (2018) argues that migration is the one thing that economists can agree on as it contributes to economic development.

In this chapter I will largely focus on the 'different' migrants, including refugees and economic migrants, who have moved to non-metropolitan migration destinations in post-industrial economies. By using the term 'different', I recognise the diversity of this label. While it is used in a general manner to depict a group of people in society, it actually includes individuals with very distinct interests, backgrounds, aspirations and profiles. I consider these distinct types of individuals under the umbrella term of 'migrant', recognising that this underplays the fundamental drivers of mobility and the special status afforded to refugees as defined under the 1951 UN Convention.[1] Broadly speaking, the destination communities to which these migrants are moving have had relatively little experience of immigration until the recent past. At a country level, some of these places have a history of significant immigration, e.g. Australia, but within certain localities, immigration is a new phenomenon (Hugo and Morén-Alégret 2008). In focusing on emerging migration destinations, I am interested in the shifting mosaic of social relations emerging across different social scales. (Although I am also interested in the ongoing connections that these migrants have back to their countries of origin and of the wider political and economic factors driving that migration, they are not the focus of this chapter.) I start by elaborating on the specificity of emerging destinations, including the social context of non-metropolitan space, before moving on to consider some of the complex relations that evolve in these places, viewing those relations from macro-, meso- and micro-level perspectives. These different viewpoints are of course inter-connected as, for example, individuals interact with macro-level structures on a daily basis.

EMERGING MIGRATION DESTINATIONS

Existing literature shows how migrants today are moving beyond traditional metropolitan gateways to settle in regional towns and rural areas. The culmination of a complex set of social, cultural and economic factors that include persecution, limited economic opportunities and restructuring of particular sectors of the economy such as agriculture and food processing has created opportunities for economic mobility. New and emerging immigration destinations have 'a limited history of immigration and, therefore, few established institutional or infrastructural supports for the generally large numbers of settlers who arrive, often from minority ethnic and language communities' (McAreavey and Argent 2018: 268). This sudden arrival of migrants has taken many host societies by surprise, meaning that the support structures to accommodate increased diversity lags behind the realities that exist on the ground, creating fissures that are filled by third sector organisations (McAreavey 2017b). New migration destinations are further characterised by sudden and substantial influxes of predominantly, but not exclusively, voluntary international labour into rural nodes of primary (e.g. agriculture, forestry) and secondary (e.g. meat processing, construction) production (Lichter 2012; Winders 2014).

Many migrants in new destinations are segmented in labour markets where participation means being flexible and willing to work in poor conditions for low wages (Rye and Andrzejewska 2010; Papadopoulos et al. 2018). Emerging destinations are visible across Europe as migrants have moved to Ireland, Scotland, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Portugal and Spain seeking work and/or refuge, arriving from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from Southern America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East (see, for instance, Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2005; Jentsch and Simard 2009; Collantes et al. 2014; Hedberg and Haandrikman 2014). In Australia, Canada and the USA, countries with a long tradition of immigration, migrants have moved beyond established gateways to non-metropolitan areas, not only transforming communities along the way (see, for instance, Broadway 2007; Preibisch 2007; Hugo and Morén-Alégret 2008; Jensen and Yang 2009; Lichter and Brown 2011; Marrow 2011; Winders 2014), but also substantially altering the spatial distribution of migrants across a region. In the context of the USA, Lichter (2012: 3) clearly states: 'Immigration and the new ethnoracial diversity will be at the leading edge of major changes in rural community life as the nation moves toward becoming a majority-minority society by 2042'.

Fluid relations are found in these destination societies with a differential reception for migrants as they are welcomed in some places; in others, they receive a chillier reception and in yet other places they simultaneously experience conviviality and exclusion (see, for example, Jensen and Yang 2009; McAreavey 2017b). As already indicated in this handbook, migration is not 'simply' about movement from A to B. Depending on the type of migration it can involve wider transnational circuits, with migrants staying for some time before moving on, or moving home (Pollard et al. 2008; Meissner and Vertovec 2015). Migrants create 'communities that sit astride political borders and that, in a very real sense, are "neither here nor there" but in both places simultaneously' (Portes 1997: 3). Traditional linear models of migration are thus no longer applicable, with intentional and unintentional predictability resulting in protracted migratory processes and complex and uncertain pathways (Drinkwater et al. 2009; Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Doyle 2018), often to new destinations.

The nascent social relations that a migrant experiences are complex, indeed kaleidoscopic and shifting. Migration encompasses myriad issues relating to economic opportunities;

relationships and families; gender; social structures and social networks; culture; identity formation and promises of a better future (Ryan and Sales 2013; Krivokapic-Skoko and Collins 2014). Problems arise in new migration destinations because policymakers by and large operate with the singular perspective of migration as an economic proposition failing to recognise the breadth of social space and thus failing to give sufficient attention to cultural and social dimensions (McAreavey and Argent 2018).

The Specificities of Non-Metropolitan Space

Challenges exist with regard to ethnic relations in rural space which are, by and large, viewed as static and socially conservative. Increasingly the literature challenges this perception, underlining the constellation of social relations in emerging immigration societies (Crowley and Knepper 2018). On the one hand, hospitality and welcome acts are extended to newcomers, and on the other, hostility can be directed towards them. Social openness is not shared by everyone, being embedded in a place can generate resistance to diversity as it normally provides frames of reference that focus on how things were in the past (Gimpel and Lay 2008) or how they should be currently (Moore 2019). The arrival of migrants can challenge fundamental social values and norms (Marrow 2011). Popke (2011) notes that while some long standing residents are open to the transformations accompanying the arrival of migrants, others are uneasy and angry about changes to their region. This latter view is closely connected to the popular notion that the countryside is a white place and not multi-cultural, indeed that 'whiteness' is a symbol of rurality (see, for example, Cloke 2004; Missingham et al. 2006; Lichter 2012). It is notable that in many rural places, ethnic diversity is not necessarily visible. The literature explains how whiteness can 'protect' against outright racism and discrimination (Halej 2014; Chakraborti and Garland 2011): migrants that look similar to the local community are more likely to fit in and be accepted (Eriksen 2002). Mackrell and Pemberton (2018: 54) describe how their research respondents felt 'lucky' to be white as it reduced their vulnerability and prospects of facing discrimination while also supporting their inclusion in everyday life. This reflects the fact that most migrants wish to belong rather than remain solely within a static social group, often with essentialised identity (Probyn 1996). However, it raises some tricky questions about inclusion and diversity as it suggests the superiority of whiteness and the perpetuation of deep-seated discriminatory attitudes and behaviour.

Accordingly, the literature points to spatial and social hierarchies of class and race whereby migrants are contained and made to live in particular areas of a community. Furthermore, they are segmented in the labour market ensuring that the 'white' rural citizenry is maintained (Nelson and Hiemstra 2008; Panelli et al. 2009). Moore (2019) similarly found the maintenance of a firm social boundary between (white) Eastern European migrants and residents of an English village. At one level they were seen to 'blend in' with the working village image, but at another level, their different shade of white limited their ultimate inclusion and recognition in society thus upholding asymmetric relations as migrants are ambivalently tolerated by the villagers as workers (Moore 2019). Unfortunately mere tolerance has limited social value: individuals can tolerate one another through gritted teeth, failing to recognise them or their legitimacy as social actors. Although this type of tolerance exists in both urban and non-urban settings, it is more prevalent in rural areas (King and Lulle 2016) and the impact is heightened in emerging destinations as there are typically not as many migrant networks and fewer support options (McAreavey 2012).

The literature also reveals more positive encounters between migrants and the local populations. Stenbacka (2018) describes an 'everyday' or 'vernacular' cosmopolitanism whereby individuals are actively creating and they go out of their way, sometimes bending rules, so that they can support newcomers. Krivokapic-Skoko et al. (2018) argue that cosmopolitan migrants, that are emerging in non-metropolitan spaces, do not belong to just one place but are connected to multiple parts of the world, they are oriented towards shared humanity, and are open to social and cultural transformation. The chapter continues with analysis of emerging relations from macro, meso and micro perspectives.

MACRO STRUCTURES: SHIFTING FORMS OF STATE INTERVENTION

A full elaboration of migration governance is beyond the reach of this chapter. However, a number of interconnected issues are worth mentioning as we consider kaleidoscopic interactions between migrants and social structures. Firstly, a re-scaling of migration governance outwards, upwards and downwards is a key feature of modern, neo-liberal societies (Varsanyi 2011). Migration is therefore dealt with by different institutions and actors, reflecting the fact that the issues facing migrants as they 'get in' to a country differ from those facing them as they 'get on' with their life in that country. The grassroots configuration of migration policies may prevent their integration into everyday life as local agents implement higher level policies (Wells 2004; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2012). This can create tension at the local level as macro policy is implemented in ways that run counter to their original design and intent. In areas with little experience of immigration, with little precedent on which to base current actions, actors can operate in an overly risk-averse manner. For instance, landlords may be fined if they rent properties to undocumented migrants in both the USA and the UK, leading some to act in an extremely risk-averse manner and deny rental to all migrants (Varsanyi 2011; Migrants Rights' Network 2014). Equally, vulnerable individuals may fall prey to the action of employers and agents who act with impunity. Employers have been known to keep workers captive, creating a complex situation of precarity as employees live in tied accommodation in fear of losing their jobs while working excessive hours (O'Sullivan et al. 2014; Lichter et al. 2016; McAreavey 2017b). In these ways, the interpretation of macro policies may exclude an individual from achieving economic mobility within the labour market for reasons of discrimination or fear of falling foul of the law, a matter that is intensified in emerging destinations (McAreavey and Krivokapic-Skoko 2019).

Secondly, macro policies are not always judiciously considered. Despite a fairly clear economic case to support migrants and migration, the political viability of migration is under severe scrutiny (Goldin et al. 2018). Responses to electoral pressure, that is often channelled through the media, can result in knee-jerk and reactionary policies, that are primarily created to bolster uncertainty and hostility rather than to address structural inequalities. Poorly devised policy can create and perpetuate inequalities and they can create an aura of uncertainty and fear. The latter was the case when the EU expanded in 2004 and again in 2007 and did not properly anticipate the impact of free movement of people. Reactionary migration policies prevailed in the UK under the New Labour government (1997–2010) which passed six Acts of Parliament in 13 years (Mulvey 2010). Such policy solutions demonstrate a government that is 'muddling through' rather than one that is creating clear objectives (Mulvey 2010). This at

a time when tabloid newspapers in the UK had a sustained campaign to demonise migrants (Threadgold 2009). In a similar vein, the Trump administration has used the media as a vehicle for advancing anti-immigrant sentiment in the USA dating to the president's campaign in 2015. Mulvey (2010) further argues that immigration policy can drive political tension, institutionalising hostility towards migrants and creating a discourse around acceptable and unacceptable categories of migrants. That discourse is frequently taken up by the media who in turn become strong influencers of a malleable public. Right-leaning media frequently portray negative stereotypes and images of migrants which in turn feeds the political response to migration indicating a strong connection to the policymaking process (Bauder 2008). So long as the economy is suitably buoyant, local media in emerging destinations may counter national hyperbole, acting in a more positive way. This was demonstrated by Berg-Nordlie's (2018) study of the media's coverage of migration in rural Norway. He found that immigrants were recognised positively as workers and participants in cultural life in the press and by political leaders. This was in contrast to refugees and asylum seekers who were perceived as economic burdens.

Economic or Social Objectives?

Modern economies rely on immigration to alleviate demographic headwinds and to contribute to economic growth objectives (van Nimwegen and van der Erf 2010). Migrants tend to be younger than the receiving society and net contributors to the economy (Goldin et al. 2018). The economic importance of migration is reflected in migration policies, such as in Canada where the – chiefly economic – system explicitly measures labour market flexibility, language capacity, age and experience (Bauder 2008).

In Spain where the foreign-born rural population rose steadily by 15.8 per cent between 2000 and 2008, immigration countered economic decline and depopulation due to youth emigration, falling fertility rates and an ageing society (Collantes et al. 2014). The positive impact of immigration on depopulation is explicitly recognised by certain governments who create conditions to attract migrants, representing 'new paradigms in international migration' because they oppose and challenge the predominantly metropolitan settlements of migrants from the 1950s onwards (Hugo et al. 2006). Hence we see regional governments with declining populations successfully developing policies to expand immigration: in Canada, the Manitoba Provincial Nominee Programme is something of a poster-child for successful regional migration policy. It has successfully plugged labour market gaps through migration while also countering ageing and population decline (Carter et al. 2008; Kyambi et al. 2018). Similar successes have been achieved elsewhere including more widely in Canada (Derwing et al. 2005) and in Australia where regional policies challenge predominantly metropolitan immigration (Hugo et al. 2006; Krivokapic-Skoko and Collins 2014). From the mid-1990s temporary migration was encouraged in Australia as a way to fill gaps in the labour market; it also allowed foreigners to work while in the country (Hugo et al. 2015). Such is the strength of regional migration policy, that calls have been made for devolved migration policies in the UK (Griffith and Morris 2017).

MESO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES AND EMERGING RELATIONS

We know from Durkheim (1984 [1893]) that the positive connections between social actors are considered a normal condition of society, without which we might expect conflict and a dysfunctional wider social system. It is hardly surprising then that policymakers are concerned with social stability, security and general prosperity. This is especially evident in places with newfound diversity where policymakers actively promote interventions that will lead to migrant integration, often blandly labelling initiatives as 'migrant integration projects'.

Researchers have pointed to the challenge of integration, not least that it is ideologically driven, it is one dimensional and it assumes 'integration into a given social fabric' (Anthias 2013: 328; see also Bauböck 1994: 10). As a normative concept, integration is embedded within many policy agendas, exhibiting different meanings across Europe (Penninx et al. 2008). Traditional conceptions of integration fail to take account of the fact that migrants are generally mobile, their lives are constantly changing and they employ complex strategies that reach beyond their country of settlement.

Dimensions of Integration

Integration is increasingly recognised as a complex process. Four domains are identified by Ager and Strang (2008) to illustrate its multi-dimensional nature and they comprise access to services and the labour market; social connections; cultural assets and citizenship rights. Similarly, Ryan's (2018) notion of 'differentiated' embedding reflects a more dynamic interpretation of integration. She argues that embedding rather than embeddedness better describes the process, going on to describe how 'migrants negotiate attachments and belonging … in different social and structural settings', showing how it involves temporal, spatial and relational processes (Ryan 2018: 235). Place and space are important influencers: socio-political context can privilege or subordinate migrants, creating different opportunities for mobility (Erel and Ryan 2019) while different places offer different employment options (Lalani et al. 2014).

Mobilising different forms of capital is important in achieving upward mobility and thus for successful integration. Standing (2011) identifies a number of different sources of social income: directly or privately produced goods, salary or wages, family or community support networks, employee benefits, state benefits and private benefits (i.e. savings and investments). Migrants are in a more vulnerable position than the mainstream because their sources of income differ, relying more heavily on family and on wages. This is heightened for migrants in emerging destinations as there are fewer migrant and family networks. Here, migrants are likely to rely on community support to bolster weaker forms of capital. Indeed, third sector organisations have played a critical role in accommodating migrants in newly emerging host societies offering all kinds of services including form filling, help with accommodation and language training (Parra and Pfeffer 2006; McAreavey 2012).

Economic Integration

The acceptance of migrants within non-metropolitan destinations is typically fragile, closely connected to the state of the economy and inherently changeable, something that Woods describes as 'precarious rural cosmopolitanism' (2018: 172). This means that in the good times, migrants can easily find employment, but during tougher times such as in economic recession,

things can become tricky for migrants (McAreavey 2017b). Countless migrants in emerging destinations work well below their qualifications level, others are segmented in the labour market and for others employment restrictions curtail their economic mobility (McAreavey 2017a). Although this has also been found to be the case in established migration destinations in the UK (see, for instance, Sirkeci et al. 2017), in a non-metropolitan space, fewer options can mean that migrants become locked into their position. Furthermore, a 'pecking order' exists that privileges some migrant groups over others (McAreavey and Krivokapic-Skoko 2019: 342). Consequently 'it is those migrants who lack access to upward social mobility, and therefore to social incorporation, who find themselves on the margins of local society and who are therefore more affected by labour precarity' (Papadopoulos et al. 2018: 201).

Many of the jobs that migrants do in emerging destinations are characterised as 3D – dangerous, dirty and demeaning. These are jobs with little security that local people refuse to do and so they are filled by migrants (Hoggart and Mendoza 1999; Anderson and Ruhs 2012; *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food* 2012). Where third parties operate as agents connecting migrants to jobs, they have a heightened role in a new destination where there are fewer social networks. This can create potentially harrowing conditions for the individuals involved if agents turn out to be bogus (McAreavey 2017b).

Importantly, migrants are not benign actors in the process of getting on in the labour market. Depending on the resources to hand, migrants may exert agency and have been known to circumvent barriers so that their qualifications better 'fit' to local contexts (Nowicka 2014). In emerging destination societies where migrants are over represented in semi-skilled or low-skilled work, there is distinct evidence of a migrant identity that seems to very quickly become the established norm. That identity can be assigned by others, such as the creation of a 'good', 'hardworking' or 'exploitable' migrant (Shubin et al. 2014) or it can be enacted by migrants themselves as they seek to integrate into the labour market (McAreavey 2017a). In general the evidence suggests that rather than being afforded outright equal treatment, migrants are not always recognised as having full entitlement to equal treatment as the mainstream and are endured and assigned as 'good' workers, their work justifying, but simultaneously limiting, their presence (Shubin et al. 2014; McAreavey 2017a).

Social Integration and Language Learning

Language provision is part of a wider state macro-scale policy agenda to advance integration which is enacted by meso-level actors and is supposed to bridge the language gap as migrants become settled in a new place (Hoang and Hamid 2016). Mayes and McAreavey (2017) point to the 'everyday' material and localised politics of both formal and informal English language teaching and learning. They show how the site of English language classes provides an opportunity for the creation of new friendships and networks, offering emotional and practical support as well as cultural knowledge to migrant women. The provision of a safe space to learn English can become a 'stepping stone' to many other connections for migrants (Mayes and McAreavey 2017: 8). This provides important social and cultural support, but it also creates a safe and visible public space for migrants to meet and so contributes to positive social relations and multi-cultural space (Miraftab and McConnell 2008). Because of their smaller size, non-metropolitan areas tend to have singular spaces in the public realm such as a library school or a shop and it is imperative that newcomers are able to fully utilise those spaces.

The role of third-sector organisations has been closely scrutinised by Shortall and McAreavey (2017) who show how migrants are essentialised by advocacy groups and consequently face discrimination. Agents in emerging destinations, operating on behalf of advocacy groups, are blindsided by the belief that migration is a short-term phenomenon; they frequently fail to recognise wider social and structural shortcomings that prevent full participation in society. For example, the lack of recognition of overseas qualifications hampers economic inclusion and it negates the expected benefits for both the host economy and for migrants (McAreavey and Krivokapic-Skoko 2019). By and large, the actions of advocacy groups are typically well meant, they effectively alleviate short-term gaps as policy struggles to keep up with changes on the ground. Nevertheless, in the absence of state action, their impact can be limited with emerging social relations in danger of reinforcing inequalities and injustices. Papadopoulos et al. (2018) show the limited success of a migrant social movement in the strawberry fields of Manolada in Greece. It was facilitated by external third sector organisations but it had overall limited success in terms of eradicating exploitation for the migrant labourers involved.

INDIVIDUAL TACTICS ON BEING A MIGRANT

Settling in a new place is an ongoing process – it emerges on a constant basis and it is influenced by changing social networks and aspirations. But what does it mean at an individual level to be a migrant? As a very minimum it means success; migrants want to report a better life to their family back home. According to Scalettaris et al. (2019), the 'art' of being a successful migrant involves careful negotiation of social norms, and juggling seemingly complex social relations including agency and restraint; and autonomy and social pressure. Yuval-Davis (2006) distinguishes between three interrelated levels of belonging and relating to social locations, emotional attachments and value systems. I consider these dimensions of belonging through the prisms of intergenerational mobility and language.

Intergenerational Mobility

Migrants may put up with discrimination and poor treatment as part of an active strategy because of the benefits that they perceive. Torres et al. describe this as a silent bargain where the '*tranquilidad* (tranquility) of the rural experience becomes an acceptable trade-off for serving as a low-paid workforce subject to exploitation' (2006: 60). Furthermore, migrants perceive a cost which is about securing economic stability for their family, often forfeiting their personal career for that of the next generation. Alba and Foner (2015) argue that this 'deal' is jeopardised due to the rising inequalities and the way in which global economies are developing, which means that migrants have heightened potential to fall into poverty compared to the mainstream society. Missingham et al. (2006) show that without adequate opportunities to advance in a rural community, migrant families take measures to secure a good education for their children, ensuring they are socially mobile. In a context of rural Norway, Rye found that the children of migrants were 'negative about their parents' careers and do not plan to follow their trajectories' (2018: 196) and had selected subjects to support further studies in urban areas moving to the city. The obvious issue then for emerging destinations is to carefully consider where a future malleable and flexible workforce will come from.

Language

One of the weaknesses of emerging destinations is the lack of infrastructure to accommodate diversity (Winders 2014). This includes translation and interpretation services which can be limited by lack of expertise and/or lack of resources. Children have been called upon to translate for key services such as health, housing and education. Where this happens, it results in significant re-orientation of family relations. The child can become a filter to the new community and parents may resent this new role if their self-esteem is eroded, their position within the family has shifted and if they are forced to exist on a different side of the 'fault line' to other family members (Alba 2005: 41).

Language is of course about more than communication: different languages are linked to different memories, expectations, emotions and cultural scripts; moving between the two affects identity (Pavlenko 2005). Retention of the native language is used by migrant families as part of a strategy of positive coping and parenting such as improving parent–child communication while instilling knowledge and pride of migrants' heritage (Perriera et al. 2006). Thus, many families speak their native language in the home and the language of the host society in public.

Children tend to learn the language of their new country more quickly than their parents (Anderson 2001). This language competency affords bilingual children language choices according to different circumstances (Valentine et al. 2008). It is not unusual for childrens' immersion in the host language and culture to be accompanied by rejection of the language of their parents; leading to dissonant acculturation within the family unit, particularly where the parents are monolingual (Portes and Hao 2002). Parents risk alienation from their children if they have limited ability to speak the language of the host society (Perreira et al. 2006). Gowricharn (2009) describes the need for a type of 'social detachment' that an individual needs to possess if they are to settle and get in touch with other communities. Meanwhile, positive social and economic benefits are evident where the children of migrants admire their parents' cultural heritage while also developing new language skills (Portes and Hao 2002; Kymlicka 2003). The tendency for migrants in emerging destinations to be segmented in the labour market reduces the opportunities for the development of new language skills and risks inter-generational alienation.

CONCLUSIONS

Many high-income countries in Europe, the USA, South Africa and Australia have witnessed accelerated migration to new and often non-urban places. These places often have potential to accommodate more migrants because of economic decline and/or depopulation due to youth emigration, falling fertility rates and an ageing society. Emerging relations in non-metropolitan host societies are not straightforward. The literature reveals positive and negative attitudes towards migrants. This is closely related to the local context including the state of the economy. Acts of cosmopolitanism go hand-in-hand with the segmentation and marginalisation of migrants into particular elements of society. Both contribute to kaleidoscopic relations in rural space, challenging the stereotype of the static rural and ultimately transforming rural space. However, the extent to which certain groups of newcomers, with socially conservative attitudes, are becoming incorporated into inherently discriminatory social structures thereby

reinforcing inequalities is not clear. Secondly, it is not apparent whether and to what degree economic or social mobility will follow for families of migrants working in precarious jobs.

This chapter shows the manifold pressures faced by migrants in non-metropolitan spaces. They face pressure from their home society; part of what it is to be a migrant is to succeed. They are also keen to 'fit in' to the host society. This involves moving between different identities and employing a number of different strategies in the labour market and more widely in society. Individuals with access to greater economic, social and cultural capital are more successful in this endeavour. Language competency is a crucial part of this process. Many migrants rely heavily on third sector organisations who play a critical role in emerging destinations, plugging a gap left by sluggish state action that typically lags behind fluid and changing needs. It is imperative that the third sector retains a strategic role, in the longer term challenging critical shortfalls in state action while addressing more immediate shortcomings. Otherwise, there is a grave danger that new arrivals will continue to fill the most precarious positions in the labour market, reinforcing the segmentation of the labour market. The economic precarity of migrants in emerging destinations suggests that they are being used to shore up vulnerable sectors. Wider scrutiny should be directed towards the overall quality of employment.

The full impact of migration to non-traditional gateways on families is not wholly understood due to their relatively recent arrival. There are gendered implications, including issues relating to transnational caring and shifting roles within families. Questions remain in relation to their economic and social mobility, but evidence suggests that the children of migrants will not follow their parents to work in precarious jobs. This has important implications for the economy of the receiving societies who rely on a steady and pliable workforce.

Many western governments adopt an unrealistic stance towards migration. They try and juggle the needs of the economy with the demands of the electorate and in so doing attempt to control rather than facilitate migration resulting in a lack of policy and programme capacity. While policy rhetoric typically underlines the importance of migration vis-à-vis the economy, social practices and lived experiences can reveal fissures as individuals interpret kaleidoscopic state regulations according to their own values, circumstances and beliefs. With little institutional infrastructure and capacity to appropriately accommodate a diversifying population, the potential shortcomings of social infrastructure are heightened in a new migration destination. If we are to understand the emerging constellation of relations, we need to scrutinise wider social relations and context including policy development, community infrastructure and micro-level encounters. The role of the state and other actors in migration governance and the extent to which their actions are harmonised would certainly merit further investigation.

NOTE

1. The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol defines refugees as persons who flee their country due to 'well-founded fear' of persecution due to reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and who are outside of their country of nationality or permanent residence and due to this fear are unable or unwilling to return to it.

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7.   Mirrored selves: reflections on religious narrative(s) in the lives of migrants
Eric M. Trinka

INTRODUCTION

It is well documented that religion plays important roles for many migrants at all points of the migration undertaking (Goździak and Shandy 2002; Saunders et al. 2016). Religion is embedded in the social world of migration decision making and informs understandings of and responses to (in)security. Religious affiliations and attachments offer personal and socially located criteria by which one constructs a complex evaluative schema for determining if and when to leave as well as how to respond to particular opportunities, dangers, successes and failures along the way. Religious identity can be seen, along with other micro-factors of solvency, such as economic or social capital, to influence both perceptions and realities of choice for migrants as well as sending and receiving household units (Sadouni 2009). With each of these things in mind, it is clear that religion plays an integral role in forming and perpetuating cultures of mobility. This chapter takes up the subject of migrant enactments of religion. In particular, it focuses on ways migrants instrumentalize religious narratives at various junctures of their experiences.[1]

Thomas Tweed (2006: 62) invites 'scholars to attend to the multiple ways that religious flows have left traces, transforming people and places, the social arena and the natural terrain'. Among the different tangibly intangible products of religion are the narratives that persons construct, carry, transform, and draw upon in contexts of movement. A growing body of anecdotal and ethnographic research demonstrates that migrants knowingly and unknowingly instrumentalize religious narratives throughout their moves. In what follows, I draw from the fields of narrative psychology and the psychology of religion in order to investigate processes that include textual embodiment, application, and re-enactment.

Narrative is an exceptionally powerful element of the human experience. Stories and story-telling wield profound influence over our daily lives. They are the stuff by which we are able to understand our worlds, move through them, relate to others, confer and receive knowledge, produce and reify notions of self and other, and generally be human (Gottshall 2012). It is for this reason that Maria Buietelle and Hetty Zock (2013: 3) argue 'that self-narratives are the medium par excellence through which to study the rich variety of manifestations and functions of religion, as these narratives are personal constructions based on the cultural options and material that individuals and groups have at hand'. Religious narratives are resources migrants draw on to make decisions, to negotiate cultural differences and challenges, to bolster emotional resilience, and to construct coherent meaning out of incoherent and often traumatic experiences (Goździak and Shandy 2002; Knott 2016). Yet, narratives do still more than these things.

It is increasingly common to focus on migrants' religiosities as means of sense-making. And while that is an element of the religious experiences of many migrants, religion cannot be

reduced to a meaning-making endeavour.[2] Therefore, I take an approach that does not ignore the meaning-making aspects of religious life, but rather places them in the broader context of place-making (Vásquez and Knott 2014). Religious idioms, as language and praxis, are not merely descriptive of the worlds in which they take place. They are elements by which those worlds are constructed (Orsi 1997). In this way, telling or hearing a religious narrative is not simply a cognitive enterprise but is, instead, a practice that contributes to the constitution of what Bourdieu (1990) calls one's habitus.[3]

This chapter presents means by which religious narratives constitute experiences of planning, decision-making, moving, resettling, remitting, and other aspects of identity negotiation for a variety of migrants. Much of my analysis focuses on the textually oriented Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This is due in part to the reality of my expertise as a biblical scholar, but also to the fact that the practitioners of various forms of Christianity and Islam constitute the majority of movers in the modern world (Pew Center 2012).[4] Adherents to these faiths are often shaped—consciously and unconsciously—by the migration-informed character of the texts they have inherited through the stream of linked but divergent traditions. What Knut Holter (2014) astutely recognizes about biblical texts is applicable to other religious narratives engaged by migrants. That is, that migrants employ the bible—and I argue, other religious narratives—to 'interpret the other' and to 'interpret themselves' (Holter 2014: 58–59).

DEFINING RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS NARRATIVE

Any serious account of religiosity among migrants must proceed with an established definition of religion. I understand religion as a dynamic set of culturally formed practices, beliefs, and values, that, in the case of migratory decision-making and travel, includes ritual or petitionary behaviours intended to access superhuman powers for the purposes of achieving beneficial outcomes and avoiding negative ones (Trinka 2019).[5] As such, religion is identifiable primarily via embodied praxis rather than as a collection of beliefs, and is, therefore, not reducible to cognitive existentialism or meaning-making, though it certainly can include such processes (Smith 2017).

Without essentializing religion, it is possible to explain it from both emic and etic perspectives as a causative endeavour.[6] Thus, when describing religious expression, one must address its performative nature (Mason 2019). In its many forms, whether theistic or non-theistic, text-based or not, the focus of religious behaviours and assumptions influences the realities of practitioners. Writ large, religious praxis is driven by efficacy, meaning practitioners tend to privilege those elements of religion that 'work', to the effect that hybridity and eclecticism are common characteristics of most people's religious toolkits (McGuire 2008; Smith 2017; Trinka 2019). Insomuch, religion provides individuals and social institutions with cultural foundations that include both beliefs and practices that enable one to grapple with the challenges incurred through human movement (Hagan 2006).

Moving forward, I explore several ways religious narratives function as constitutive praxis in the lives of migrants. This task entails highlighting several means by which religious narratives inform cultures of mobility and migration. It also includes exploring instances in which migrants see themselves within their religious narratives. Articulating these goals begs the question, what is a religious narrative? The answer, as readers may have guessed, is opaque.

Narratives need not exist in textual form to be counted. Not all religions have sacred texts, but all religions have narratives that are variously embodied by their practitioners. As I explore migrants' engagement with religious narratives as causation-oriented praxis, the terminology of narrative is employed broadly and refers to both textualized and non-text forms of story, history, myth, and other means of collective knowledge transfer that have been codified in religious traditions.

What distinguishes a narrative as religious is similar to what distinguishes religion as a unique enterprise among other social behaviours; that is, the underlying assumptions held by its devotees and users regarding the origins or efficacious nature of its content in relation to superhuman powers. Religious narratives convey information regarding ultimate reality and provide means for persons to locate themselves in that reality as active participants. This holds true whether a composition is believed to be an orally transmitted tradition or inspired text.

Many of the tendencies observable among migrants are not behaviours that are exclusive to contexts of movement and can also be observed among religious actors in non-migratory settings. Yet, as with other elements of migrants' religious repertoires, experiences of heightened insecurity that instigate and attend the migration undertaking frequently drive migrants to expand their religious toolkits and draw on established practices in new ways. The same kind of interpretive creativity marks migrants' instrumentalization of religious narratives.

Identifying the importance of religion in the lives of migrants is not the same as arguing that religion functions as a selection mechanism for migration (Connor 2012; Neudörfer and Dresdner 2014). What is verifiable is that migrants often come to understand their movement in religious terms by analogizing their experiences with those of persons depicted in religious narratives (Grzymała-Moszczyńska and Kanal 2019). Moreover, migrants frequently characterize their experience of relocation as a spiritual journey, with perils encountered along the way being accounted for in spiritual terms, and moments of rescue often described as miraculous or divinely ordained occurrences (Hagan 2008; Obadare and Adebanwi 2010). Practices of self-identification with text or character as catalysts and coping mechanisms are not unique to contexts of migration. The work of nonmovers as agents of charity and assistance often take place through religious structures, and though less often recognized as such, through migrants who have since resettled and often work in assistive capacities. The reasons given by some who undertake these roles are rooted in religious convictions regarding care for those in interstitial social locations, many of which rest on narrative foundations of divine preference for the marginalized or divinely sanctioned duties for social justice.[7]

NARRATIVES AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The appeal and power of narratives are not simply situated in their construction, contents, or telling, but in the common human tendency to see ourselves into the story. In this regard, narratives are like mirrors, reflective and reflexive realities in which we see ourselves and reality projected back to/on us from a different perspective. As with Foucault's (1986) heterotopias or Derrida's (2002) naked encounter with his cat, the mirror facilitates moments of self-reflection, sometimes yielding different and deeper self-understanding, and ultimately showing us a world that only exists when viewed within its frame.

The process of mirror-gazing renders us narrators. In the words of narrative psychologist Michele Crossley (2000: 10), '[I]ndividuals understand themselves through the medium of

language, through talking and writing, and it is through these processes that individuals are constantly engaged in the process of creating themselves'. For many people, religious activity, and the associated narratives by which those religious worlds are made intelligible, form a significant piece of this self-creation puzzle. To step in front of the mirror of the story is both a momentary event of seeing ourselves and one that is perpetuated after one walks away from the mirror since the image of oneself endures. In that way, one comes to live inside the frame of the mirror even when one is not looking into it.

One influential approach to studying the emplacement of the self in narrative is Hjalmar Sundén's (1966) role taking theory (cf. Lindgren 2014). The process of role-taking is seen by Sundén as two-fold. In the midst of a crisis moment, a person takes on the roles of a character/ author of a religious narrative while also assuming the role of God. The outcome is a narrative circuit by which their experience first mirrors the character/author in some aspect and second, interprets a divine response to their situation. The outcome of this process is that a person comes to view their experience as integrated in a larger religious narrative, or sometimes, as part of a divinely sanctioned plan.

In its earliest instantiations, Sundén's theory was characterized as an explanatory framework for understanding religious coping and was applied to readers of biblical texts (Sundén 1982; 1987). In the intervening decades since its introduction, a variety of scholars have challenged his assertion that role-taking is limited to situations of distress (Hamilton et al. 2013; Krause and Pargament 2018; Lundmark 2019).[8] While certain patterns of role-taking behaviour attend experiences of insecurity, illness, and trauma, role-taking behaviours also occur in settings of success and well-being. Likewise, scholars and practitioners have deepened their accounts of the complex processes constituting acts of religious coping (Ganzevoort 1998).

Narrative psychology has adeptly stepped into the gap left by Sundén's theoretical framework by grounding humanity's narrative tendencies in the scientific study of human development, cognition, interaction, and identity creation (Belzen 1995; 1996). Additionally, other psychological theories, such as Mead's symbolic interactionism, have been brought into supportive dialogue with Sundén's ideas (Alma and van Uden 1995). The result has been a far more robust account of the influence of context, socialization, and agency on the processes surrounding enactments of religiosity.

Observations of the self, though couched in terms of the individual and requiring personal agency, are not fully solitary in character. All participation in reality, including the construction of knowledge, of which narratives are a part, takes place within the context of socially located selves that are responsive to, and influential over, material and immaterial aspects of reality (Hjelm 2014; Smith 2010). Insomuch, our sense of self develops in 'dialogue with different images of the self-taken from the past and future and mediated by the anticipated responses of significant and generalized others' (Crossley 2000: 13). Self-understanding, as well as our understandings of others and the world around us, takes place through contingent and reciprocal practices of narrative reception, reflection, and application/(en)action. Thus, to an extent, the world becomes what it is to each of us through the stories that we receive, adopt, live out, and pass on.

NARRATIVES AS ELEMENTS OF MIGRANT PLACE-MAKING

It is important to recognize that many religious narratives are the products of migration experiences, and while it is impossible to catalogue all the movements that have led to the development of the world's many religions, we can at least point to key historical instances of migration that have played formative roles in the formulation of major world religions. For example, the movements of Aryan peoples into the Indus Valley in the Bronze Age likely provided a foundation on which Hinduism, and its later expansion on Vedic traditions, was established (Parpola 2015). Likewise, Judaism emerged through encounters with the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian empires—all which maintained large-scale imperial regimes of population relocation. I cite these two instances of migratory origins because as each tradition spread, they were transformed and gave birth to other new systems of praxis and belief that represent the majority of religious adherents today. All along the way, the contents and contours of the central narratives of these traditions were formed through experiences of religion on-the-move.

Human movement is as socially constructed and meaning-laden as the spaces through which it takes place (Cresswell 2006). Doreen Massey (2005: 130) notes, 'If space is rather a simultaneity of stories-so-far, then places are collections of those stories, articulations within the wider power-geometries of space'. Place is never static. The stories that compose it are continually in transition because society is essentially mobile (Urry 2007). The meanings associated with movement depend not only on the bodies that move or on external perceptions of bodies in motion in particular physical and social contexts, but on the stories that are told about movers and movement which situate those bodies as socially located persons (Aguiar et al. 2019). For the majority of humanity, religious narratives are elemental aspects of our different cultures of mobility and place.

Migrants instrumentalize religious narrative not only to understand and explain their experiences, but also to direct the outcomes of their experiences. Place-making is a ubiquitous human activity accomplished through varying modes of spatial engagement, including storytelling (Trinka 2019). In the contexts of mobility and migration, movers must actively negotiate and construct new spaces in environments that often lack stable social networks or familiar cultural elements (Boccagni 2017; Vásquez and Knott 2014). Religiosity, shaped by personal and collective narratives, is for many migrants a means of engaging extant places and of creating their own (McMichael 2002).

Narratives perform multiple duties as place-making praxis. By example, Buddhist migrants may on one level draw inspiration and solace for their journeys in recalling the Buddha's period of wandering and self-discovery before finding enlightenment. On another level, Buddhism's framework for spiritual and ethical existence is partially couched in terms of bodily movement. Attainment of enlightenment is commonly characterized as a journey and those in its pursuit follow the Eight-fold Path.[9] Together, various cognitive and physical structures of their lives become contoured to the religious narratives associated with the tradition.

Maintaining the instrumentalization of religious narratives as constructive praxis requires a brief discussion of how those narratives travel across generations and between populations. In the preservation and transmission of religious narratives, issues of translation are central (Smart 1999: 426–7). Not all religions regard the textualization of religious narratives in the same way. Some resist textualization altogether, giving prominence to oral tradition. Others have moved to codify oral traditions in textual forms, as have members of the Nepali Gurung/

Tamu diaspora in the UK (Gellner et al. 2014). Still others, as is the case with Islam, propound the idea that there is one authentic form of the text—in this case, the Qur'an—which is preserved in Arabic, the original language of revelation. On the other hand, Judaism and Christianity have generally maintained open dispositions to scriptural translation. An attendant discussion in many religious traditions involves the roles that artistic representation plays in preserving narratives and reifying religious assumptions. There is no consistent correlation between textualization and religious art. Most religious traditions maintain an appreciation of the aesthetic. Differences typically arise over the choice of whether divine entities can be depicted. Such is the case in certain monotheistic traditions such as Judaism and Islam, which tend toward aniconism. Nevertheless, both are still artistically rich traditions that have codified their central narratives and beliefs regarding aniconism through robust artistic heritages.

One's identity as a migrant can be informed by one's perceived social location within the historical narrative(s) of one's faith, and 'We must therefore examine the ways in which believers use symbols and ideas to imagine and locate themselves within religious landscapes and analyze how religious and political geographies overlap with one another' (Levitt 2003: 861). Collective memories of migration drawn from the wells of ancient traditions facilitate imaginative reasoning and give migrants ways to envision and enact their own successes. It is this deep narrative well that prompts Jacqueline Hidalgo (2018: 22, 28) to describe the Bible as a 'homing device' and 'language world' for migrants. Likewise, the Qur'an, as well as hadith and sunnah, function in similar ways for migrants by giving them narrative structures of response to a variety of life events (Kanal 2019a; 2019b).

Narratives might contain shared memories of religious attachment to particular places or landscapes and make possible the overlay of such attachments on new places. Yet, not all religions or religious narratives travel equally (Smart 1999). Certain expressions are less bound to unique sites of ritual enactment than others. For some, attachments to particular places can be mitigated by re-constitutive praxis. Aspirations of missionizing in light of particular eschatological frameworks can spur the growth of religiosities that promote tautological notions of universal emplacedness which are ultimately placeless in the sense that the 'here' of religious enactment can take place anywhere (Hanciles 2008; Tuan 2009). For others, dislocation from a religiously significant locale can render religious participation impossible.

Broad motifs of human experience also guide instrumentalization of religious narratives. The typologies of exodus, exile, diaspora, and wandering have loomed large in the minds of Jews, Christians, and Mormons through thematic associations with their own journeys (Padilla and Phan 2014; Posman 2016; Semi 2016). As Jehu Hanciles (2008: 139) observes, 'the "spirit of migration" permeates the biblical record and defines biblical religion'. The contents and contours of the TaNaK reflect the realities that Judaism emerged in contexts of imperial hegemony and forced relocation. Those initial experiences of exile and diaspora have shaped the worldviews and lifeways of Jews for millennia. This migration-informed textual tradition is the genetic basis for Christianity's Old Testament and parts of Islam's Qur'an. Throughout the biblical corpus, provision and punishment are repeatedly set in constructive juxtaposition to explain the emergence, dispersion, and restoration of a Covenant Community marked primarily by their experiences of divinely ordained movement. While the Qur'anic accounts of these events are both similar and different, the overarching assertion of Allah's presence and provision in the process of human movement is readily apparent.

Self-association with religious narratives is a common coping response among migrants. Identifying one's experience with religious narratives can take the form of direct character

association whereby a person identifies with portrayals of migratory persons in the narrative. In this way, Liberian migrants in Minnesota can come to understand their own journeys as recapitulations of Joseph's experience in Genesis 37, 39–50 whereby they interpret Joseph's suffering and their own as elements of God's plan to bring broader redemption and restoration (Ludwig 2011). In a similar fashion, widowed migrant women may see elements of their own experience in the biblical story of Ruth, a Moabite widow who settles with her mother-in-law, Naomi, in the land of her deceased husband (Carroll 2015). Biblical scholar and Chinese internal migrant Lin Yan (2014) has interpreted the experience of movers like herself through the rubrics of Hebrew prophetic literature. She demonstrates not only that prophetic figures like Amos and Micah were inter-regional migrants, but also that their messages of justice for the poor and marginalized who suffer as a result of necessary participation in subjugating economic systems resonates with modern Chinese internal migrants who also find themselves thrust from their home regions by insecurity only to settle in urban centres where exploitation and insecurity persist in new forms.

For Christians, the New Testament narratives of migration concern both forced relocation and missionary endeavours. Migrants under duress of forced migration might view their experiences in light of the Holy Family's flight to Egypt to escape the terror of Herod's massacre of the innocents (Matthew 2). Reverberating with earlier narratives of exile and exodus, this story provides support for Christian migrants who see in it the claim that God, through the act of incarnation, also experienced the trials of migration (Cornell 2018; Pope Francis 2018). The Exodus narrative has deeply informed liberation theology which has taken root among Central and South American Christians, some of whom have come to associate the complex nexus of both spiritual and physical oppression and empowerment with the experiences of migration (Grau 2013). Still other Christians, who possess more agency in their migratory decision making, may position their movements as recapitulations of early Church leaders like Aquila, Priscilla, Paul, or Peter travelling with the intent of spreading the faith. In a related way, Mormonism has been shaped by its own historical narratives of persecution and migration in the United States which are themselves undergirded by the origin story that they have descended from Judahite exiles who, during the Babylonian incursion, moved to North America.

For Muslims, the historical moment of Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina (Yathrib) in 622—better known as hijrah—is the generative event of the umma and marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Their own moves might awaken memories or re-enactments of this journey, or the earlier call for members of the community to flee to Abyssinia. Those who are familiar with other stories of migration in the Qur'an or hadiths may also see their trajectories as reflections of Ibrahim's departure from his father's house, of Ismail's mother Hajar—another wife of Ibrahim in addition to Saarah—who is made to wander in the wilderness with her child, or of Moses' own wandering in the desert following his escape from Egypt (28:20–28) (Hollenbach 2014; Netton 1993).[10]

It is also possible that readers or hearers of these narratives operationalize them indirectly. Migrants draw from texts and narratives that are not explicitly about migration but may be about the need for patience in the midst of suffering or mercy in times of trial.[11] Naveed Baig (2017) reminds readers that in times of crisis, Muslims may be encouraged to draw on the Qur'anic admonition that Muslims will one day be with Allah (96:8). Hope for eternal union with their Creator can assist one in coping with the most dire of situations. Baig's work also

indicates that in times of crisis, modern practitioners appeal directly to the Divine for answers and that such efforts are being affirmed in new ways by Muslim spiritual care providers.[12]

Qur'anic narratives of migration have provided the foundations for a robust theology of migration and for the ethical treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim migrants alike (9:100) (Rahaei 2009; Saritoprak 2017). Sunni and Shi'ite understandings of the law of migration (also known as hijra) have differed considerably across the centuries. While Sunnis compose a larger number of Muslim migrants, attention should be paid to the unique ways distinct Islamic traditions have interpreted the Qur'anic account of hijrah in light of their own experiences (Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh 1996; Darwish 2014). In its broadest sense, hijrah contains the mandate for practising Muslims to migrate to a Muslim-controlled region. In a plain-sense reading of Surah 4:97–100, migration is the legitimate response for Muslims experiencing religious persecution. Yet, more than the notion of personal religious safety underpins the mandate to migrate. Cross-referencing other Surahs (2:218; 3:195; 57;10; 59:8–9), one finds that hijrah is also characterized by a deep sense of duty to God and a willingness to leave behind the structures of everyday dependence in complete submission to and dependence on Allah, as well as for the sake of deeper belonging within the umma (Darwish 2014). In this way, one can understand the association of hijrah and jihad, in which migration, perhaps spurred by insecurity but also laden with notions of vocation, can be simultaneously understood as physical and spiritual struggle (Hollenbach 2014).

As migrants envision their journey as part of a larger historical dispensation or as a symbolically repetitive act associated with an event in their religious tradition, overlap and contradiction become two aspects of such religio-spatial associations. Different groups can appropriate the same narrative in drastically different ways. For example, African slaves in the American South maintained the account of Israel's Exodus from Egypt as their story of coming salvation while the very colonists and slave owners subjugating them and wiping out native Americans often interpreted their existence as a mirror of Israel's entry into the Promised Land with a mandate to rid it of idolatrous and morally destitute inhabitants (Cherry 1998). In addition to the Exodus motif, the experience of settlement among Anglo-European colonists was informed by overlaying the book of Revelation's account of the 'New Jerusalem' onto the landscape of the 'New World' (Agosto and Hidalgo 2018: 11). Holter (2014: 58–59) recounts a similar application of the Exodus theology in the experience of Boer settlers in South Africa who saw their own colonial efforts in the 'Great Trek' as a modern Exodus and entry into the Promised Land whereby the native inhabitants were also construed as the removable other. Similar theological assertions that a particular place might serve as the site of significant eschatological events have been apparent among Muslim migrants who have journeyed from around the world to join the Islamic State in its quest to re-establish the Caliphate in Dabiq.

Religious narratives shape more than the spaces of our perceptual worlds. They can also be at play in communal projections of reality into public spaces. As Agosto and Hidalgo remark in the case of biblical narratives: '[P]eople do not just read the Bible for making meaning, but biblical texts become embodied in buildings, images, dances, and songs, all of which fill migrant sensory landscapes in ways that cannot simply be distilled to the contestation of meaning' (2018: 11). The religious artwork of migrants often displays appropriations of narrative symbolism and idiom to express the role of the divine in the migration experience (Durand and Massey 2010; Giffords 1974; Solis 2018). These observations can be extended to other Abrahamic traditions and religious contexts. Consider the ways that Qur'anic calligraphy adorns architectures throughout the world, even some that are not distinctively religious in

character. Think also of the characteristics of many of those structures whose lines and ornate geodesic décor are themselves inspired by textually derived understandings of aniconism in Islam. Beyond these examples, Hindu ritualistic practices of gateway and threshold decorations map mythic narratives onto profane spaces of movement and serve as points of access to transcendent realms (Tuan 2009). In a related way, Hannelore Roos (2014) documents how Hindus and Jains in Antwerp, Belgium have worked to substantiate their identity and educate their neighbours regarding the narratives of their religious and cultural identities through public celebrations of the Ganesh(a) festival.

Religious narratives are also observable in the spaces of migrants' bodies and physical self-care. Migrants often face dissonant realities of medical perspectives and services between home and host settings. One of the underlying reasons for this dissonance is the presence of disparate socio-cultural understandings about the nature of health and healthcare. For persons from places where non-Western forms of medical intervention are more common than or privileged over Western methods, different aetiologies of illness often obtain (Napolitano 2002). Thus, seeking appropriate medical care in a host setting raises multiple challenges, and either because of preference or unmet needs, many migrants continue to appeal to traditional forms of relief or healing. Not only do religious narratives frequently undergird aetiologies of illness—such as understandings of mental illness as demon possession—justifications for operationalizing traditional therapies are also often derived from religious narratives of illness and healing (Napolitano 2002). In instances when death is the outcome of an illness or accident along the way, religious narratives can provide grounding for practical responses to the realities of death in a foreign place. Burial practices and other post-mortem treatments of the body are often responsively formed around narrative portrayals or embedded prescriptions.

Other practices associated with well-being integrate religious narratives and texts in embodied forms. One example is that of Sunni Hanafi Norwegian-Pakistani women requesting the creation of a personal tawiz, or amulet—usually with protective purposes—from local imams (Taj 2014). The significance of these objects for this presentation lies in the fact that a tawiz is typically an excerpt of the Qur'an that can be referenced for support, prayed, and generally expected to actively mediate the experience of the one holding it. In another instance, Dmitriy Oparin (2017) documents the way migrants in Moscow make various requests of local imams not only to visit them for Qur'an readings, but also to perform Qur'an readings in characteristically 'unorthodox' situations related to food purification and moving rituals the migrants have brought to Russia from their homelands.

CONCLUSIONS

Narrative appears to have been an essential element of place-making from the earliest of times. Our daily lives are premised on stories and constructed through them. Although the end of the twentieth century witnessed the end of many grand social narratives that reigned supreme in the modernist era, narrative did not cease to exist. In fact, among those most powerful accounts of reality which persist are the religious narratives that transcend place and time, and those which many migrants continue to live by in the deepest sense of the phrase.

Religious narratives provide means for migrants to actively engage their experiences. This takes place in ways that include identity negotiation, repeating religious histories of movement, reimaging or recreating sites of religious importance, self-identification with key narrative personas and emplacement in their own narrative trajectories, as well as other indirect means of instrumentalization.

NOTES

1. This chapter distinguishes between religiously freighted mobility, such as pilgrimage, and the role religion plays for migrants. While religious narratives deeply inform pilgrimage activities, often specifying sites around which pilgrimage patterns develop, the goal of this chapter is to explore the ways that religion functions in less established contexts of movement.
2. Clifford Geertz's conception of religion as such has been enormously influential and frequently overstated. He writes, '[Religion's] capacity to serve, for an individual or for a group, as a source of general, yet distinctive, conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them ... Religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to provide a framework of general ideas in terms of which a wide range of experiences—intellectual, emotional, moral—can be given meaningful form' (1973: 123).
3. Bourdieu, renowned as a practice theorist for his cultivation of the notion of *habitus*, describes the nature of this socially constructed collection of practices as, 'systems of durable, transportable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures' (1990: 53).
4. At the time of The Pew Center's 2012 report, Christians and Muslims constituted 76 percent of movers.
5. Following sociologist Christian Smith, I proceed with the understanding that religion is primarily a set of practices aimed at the access of and alignment with superhuman powers that can affect goods and help humans avoid ills (Smith 2017: 22). This aligns with Roger Stump's definition of religion as 'a compelling set of beliefs and practices whose truth is presupposed by faith and that ultimately relate to superhuman entities postulated by adherents to possess transcendent attributes or powers superior to those of ordinary mortals …Whatever form they take, these entities are considered by adherents to exert crucial influences, directly or indirectly, for good or for ill, within and beyond the realm of human affairs' (Stump 2008: 7).
6. I rely on a critical realist epistemological framework wherein the 'causal capacities' and 'ontogenic powers' of religion and migration are at the fore of the discussion (Vásquez and Knott 2014). In Smith's analysis, 'Religion works because humans attribute the causes of certain life events and experiences to the intervening influence of superhuman powers' (2017: 89).
7. See Hollenbach (2014) for a helpful introduction to different ways members of faith communities have functioned in such capacities.
8. In doing so, scholars have not dismissed Sundén's application of role theory to biblical texts but have simply expanded the theoretical grounds on which to apply it (Hamilton et al. 2013; Krause and Pargament 2018; Lundmark 2019).
9. Conceptions of ethics in terms of peripatetic motion are found in other religious traditions as well. For example, in Judaism, ethical prescriptions are identified as *halakha*, a term derived from the

Hebrew verb *hlk*, meaning 'to go, or walk'. In Christianity, salvation, and the ethical norms that adherents promote as emulations of the person of Jesus Christ, are described as 'the way'.

10. See also Stump (2008) who writes, 'During Muhammad's rule, *hijra* to Medina also became an obligation for the faithful, a means of expressing their commitment to Islam. Based on these precedents, Islamic jurists later interpreted *hijra* as the migration of adherents from *Dar al-Harb*, the "Realm of War" where non-Muslims ruled, to Dar al-Islam, the "Realm of Islam" where the principles of Islamic law prevailed' (68).

11. Take, for example, *sūrah* 3:159 (The House of *'Imrān*) in which one finds the counsel, '[P]lace your trust in *Allah*; surely *Allah* loves those who trust' (Cf. Baig 2017, 135–36). For a robust account of research on such matters among modern Syrian Refugees see (Kanal 2019a; 2019b; Kanal and Grzymała-Moszczyńska 2019).

12. Baig (2017) demonstrates that traditional ways of engaging religious narratives of divine provision are being reformed. As already mentioned, Sundén's approach to role-theory assumed readers of biblical texts to be in a dialogical relationship with God. The same conversational disposition between Allah and humans has generally not been common among Muslims. Unlike the dialogical nature of the Psalms or biblical depictions of Moses conversing directly with God, references in the Qur'an to humans speaking directly with God are few (cf. 38:257–60; 21:83–90) and typically are accounts of persons who have cried to *Allah* for assistance or relief rather than entering into discussion on the nature of reality, suffering, ethics, etc. (133–41).

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8. Gender and culture of migration

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Migration is a gendered process that operates within local, national, and transnational cultures of migration. Conceptually, gender encompasses the social construction of differences between women and men (gender roles and relations), as well as gender ideologies or the ideas and expectations that define men and women within particular social or cultural contexts (Brettell 2016). Viewing migration through a gendered lens emphasizes how gender roles and relations, as well as gender ideologies, impact and are impacted by geographical mobility in sending and receiving societies.

LOCALIZED CULTURES OF MIGRATION AND GENDERED FLOWS

Understanding cultures of migration highlights the historical and sociocultural dimensions of a sending community or region from which people emigrate. As Douglas Massey et al. (1993: 452–53) argue, the culture of migration describes how "migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people's behaviours, and values associated with migration become part of the community's values". In these communities, migration is perceived as an avenue, and often the sole avenue, for economic and social mobility. Migration can become a rite of passage; that is, something that young people must experience or participate in before reaching adulthood. This rite of passage is frequently gendered masculine, although sometimes it is gendered feminine.

Portugal, a country for which the emigrant (or *emigrante*) has stood as a symbol of national identity (Brettell 2003) for centuries, offers one example. There, the migration stream was historically male dominated. Young boys, particularly from the rural northern villages (as well as the Azores and Cabo Verde), grew up with the expectation that they would spend time abroad (generally Brazil, but also Spain, the United States (US), and recently northern Europe) to earn money to buy land or a house. Many young men emigrated while they were single, while others departed (or departed for a second time) after marriage. By contrast, the expectation for women, particularly married women, was that they would remain in their home villages, managing land and households in the absence of men. Some young men never returned and this in turn had an impact on the marriage market in northern Portugal. In the absence of men, some young women could not find a spouse. But they also sometimes had children out of wedlock. High rates of permanent "spinsterhood" and high rates of out-of-wedlock births were part of the culture of migration in this region of Portugal during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Brettell 1986). Only in the latter decades of the 20th century, when the Portuguese were migrating primarily to northern Europe (particularly France and Germany), the United States, and Canada, did the migratory flows become more gender-balanced with wives following husbands and young unmarried women emigrating to take jobs in domestic service.

A gendered culture of migration can be found around the world, including 19th and early 20th century Sicily (Reeder 2003) and contemporary Mexico (Broughton 2008; Cohen 2004;

Getrich 2019). Massey et al. (2006) demonstrate how culturally constructed gender relations (from "patriarchal" to "matrifocal") in five sending nations (Mexico, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico) generate distinct patterns of migration. In the more patriarchal societies, female outmigration is low by comparison with that of men while matrifocal countries show a higher ratio of female to male migration. The authors also show that in the more patriarchal cultural settings, female migration is influenced by the migration status of the partner or husband, by having relatives at destination points, and by holding legal documents. By contrast, in the more matrifocal cultures, it is a woman's migratory experience that is most important.

Heering et al. (2004) encountered similar outcomes in their Moroccan-based research. The authors found that in regions of Morocco where a culture of migration has emerged, men have strong emigration intentions. Migration, for these men, is considered to be "the only way to improve one's standard of living; … those who stay are losers, those who leave are winners" (p. 335). For women, in contrast, cultural trends have little effect; and instead familial networks drive migration. Three factors motivate Moroccan women. First, there is the "trailing wife", which dates back to the 1970s and which remains a dominant trope. Second, labour motivates as women seek work to earn money for their families. This is a more recent trend, smaller in size, but gaining in importance. The third motive is "escape". Migration offers a way to depart from traditional dependency and obedience to male kin. This form is the most recent and the smallest in size (p. 326). Heering et al. conclude by arguing for a "gender-specific approach to migration" and a framing of cultures of migration within a transnational context (pp. 334, 336).

While a good deal of research on gender and migration emphasizes labour mobility, there is also extensive migration that occurs in association with marriage and family formation (Brettell 2017; Constable 2005). Marriage-related mobility also needs to be understood in relation to local cultural contexts and practices. One form occurs in response to a shortage of rural brides—the case, for example, of Malagasy women who marry French men and move to live with them in the rural communities of France (Cole 2014) or of Filipina women who marry Japanese men living in rural areas (Faier 2007). A second form involves "spatial hypergamy" whereby a marriage to a migrant is desired because it results in enhanced social status for the bride or groom, and often an extended family. Examples of this "marrying-up" migration can be found in China (Oxfeld 2005), Vietnam (Thai 2005), and Pakistan (Charsley 2005). A third form involves arranged or semi-arranged marriages where first- and second-generation immigrants look to the homeland to find a spouse. Such practices are characteristic of a broad range of immigrant populations (Pande 2014; Selby 2010; Timmerman 2006). These unions enhance family honour and reinforce religious and cultural practices; they also illustrate the gendered and intergenerational power differentials within immigrant transnational families. It is important to emphasize that arranged transnational marriages can sometimes have adverse results, including honour-based violence that occurs when a second-generation daughter challenges traditional arranged marriage practices (Akpinar 2003; Korteweg 2012; Wikan 2008). Often cases of violence are the result of a conflict between host country values (which the children of immigrants have often adopted) and those of the sending country, values that are centred on traditional gender relations and ideologies.

A fourth form of marriage-related mobility is that mediated by marriage brokers; this includes the category of "mail-order brides" (Constable 2005; Jackson 2007; Nakamatsu 2003; Wang and Chang 2002). Zare and Mendoza (2012:366) view this practice as part of a global

capitalist industry that illustrates the "intersecting dynamics of gender inequality, sexism, racism and colonialism … that has intensified with the increase in cross-border interactions among migrating populations and their host communities". Gender ideologies and relations in the country of immigration can shape the demand for mail-order brides, sometimes in less than obvious ways (So 2006). As Kojima (2001: 204) observes, in Japan the mail-order bride system has developed in response to women's resistance to "conventional marriages based on traditions of oppressive domesticity". Mail-order brides, on the other hand, are often constructed as subservient to others and subjected to many forms of abuse (Narayan 1995).

CULTURES OF MIGRATION AND CHANGING GENDER RELATIONS

Migration alters the meaning and the practice of conjugal/gender relations within families and households, whether in the sending society, in the country of immigration, or in the transnational spaces in between. These changes are varied and specific to particular cultural contexts. Some of the best-documented changes are those that occur in the home or sending communities in the absence of male partners. Wives left behind may view their increased responsibilities as a burden because it has created more work and hence more stress (McKenzie and Menjívar 2011: 76–77). In their daily tasks—managing finances, supervising farm labor, overseeing home renovations, attending community meetings—they see themselves as "both a man and a woman" (Boehm 2008). Simultaneously, they develop greater independence and autonomy, something that is often buttressed by the remittances that their spouses send from abroad (see Pauli 2008 for rural Mexico; Rao 2012 for rural Bangladesh).

While some women remain behind, others sacrifice their roles as wives, leaving their husbands behind and migrating with their children. This is the case for some Asian families in the United States and elsewhere (Chee 2005; Tsong and Liu 2009). A variant of this gendered strategy of migration occurs when it is wives who work abroad as nurses or in domestic service, leaving their husbands in the sending community as the primary caregivers to children. Some men find this a challenge to their masculinity (Gamburd 2008; Hoang and Yeoh 2011). For example, Malayali husbands in the state of Kerala, in southwest India, are known as "waiting men". Either they bide their time until a visa is approved for them to migrate, or they remain behind with their children, living on their wives' remittances (Gallo 2006).

In many instances, what has emerged as part of a gendered culture of transnational migration are forms of long-distance parenting, often referred to as transnational motherhood or fatherhood (Carling et al. 2012; Horton 2009; Nicholson 2006; Pribilsky 2012). Transnational mothers often redefine what it means to be a good mother, juxtaposing "traditional ideas of physical and emotional nurturing with realities of nurturing from outside of their own domestic sphere, providing physical support that comes from remittances and emotional help through technological mediums such as the internet or over the phone" (Millman 2013: 77). Ecuadorian immigrant women working in Italy use the phrase "double living"—their physical bodies are in Italy, but their hearts and souls are in Ecuador (Boccagni 2012). These women have developed new cultural norms for what it means to be mothers in the transnational space between their homes of origin and their places of work. Instead of nurturing their children they are providing for them through the money they earn and what it can buy, whether goods and clothing, a new house, or an education. Fathers, on the other hand, are fulfilling, if they

are able to, the roles and responsibilities assigned to them by localized cultures of migration. To be a good husband and father is to be the breadwinner and often the breadwinner father is a migrant father (Cohen 2004; Dreby 2006; Pribilsky 2007). What is evident here is that parenting roles are being recalibrated by a transnational culture of migration that links places of origin with those of immigration.

Of equal importance are the changes that occur in gender roles and relations as migrants settle and must adapt to new constraints and opportunities in new social and cultural contexts. These changes vary depending on the immigrant population and the circumstances of settlement and employment. In their comparison of couples in the US and in Mexico, Barajas and Ramirez (2007) find that while Mexican women in the US acknowledge more equality in decision-making and greater familial authority than do women in Michoacán, Mexico, they also emphasize the double burden of combining waged work and household chores. The traditional division of labour within the household has not been altered by migration.

Many researchers have focused on conjugal tensions that emerge in the immigrant context, often resulting from a loss of self-worth among men who face precarious employment and hence cannot effectively realize their role as breadwinner. Ong (1996) describes Cambodian refugee wives who lose respect for husbands who are unable to make a living and who refuse to share in child-care at home. Abdi (2014) discusses Somalian men in Minnesota who are suspicious of the public assistance programs that are directed toward the support of their wives and children and that they view as undermining their domestic authority. Sometimes these transgressions of gender ideologies—when women are wage earners—increase the potential for domestic violence (Menjívar and Salcido 2002).

New forms of intimacy have also emerged among immigrant couples (Constable 2003; Faier 2007; Walsh 2009), resulting in a call to place greater emphasis on love and affect in analyses of decision-making and behaviour (Cole and Groes 2016; Mai and King 2009). Working with Mexican couples in the city of Atlanta, Georgia and in Jalisco and Michoacán, Mexico, Hirsch (2003) documents a generational shift from heterosexual relationships based on respect (*respeto*) to those based on trust (*confianza*). She describes the emergence of "companionate marriages" (that include sexual intimacy and intense psychological companionship) among migrant families in Atlanta and others in Mexico who follow the changes that their compatriots abroad adopt. Hirsch does argue that while a companionate marriage may be more emotionally satisfying for a woman, it is often fragile. "Equal access to intimate companionship," she asserts, "is not the same as equal access to power" (p. 156).

GENDERED LABOUR MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL CULTURE OF MIGRATION

In any consideration of migration as a gendered process, it is important to highlight the global political economy, the international division of labour (Nash and Fernández-Kelly 1984) and segmented labour markets. Indeed, many scholars attribute the increasing "feminization" of migration (Hofmann and Buckley 2013; Morrison et al. 2008; Zlotnick 2003) to structural changes in the economies of receiving countries and to the emergence, for example, of globalized care work.

Immigrant labour markets have always been gendered with distinct occupational niches for men and women—for example, the steel industry and the meat packing industry for Slavic

and Polish men, and domestic service for Irish and Swedish women in 19th century America. However, the growth of export-processing zones in the developing world that attract large pools of female internal migrants (ILO 1998) and the "global transfer of services associated with a wife's traditional role … from poor countries to rich ones" (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002: 4) have fundamentally transformed global cultures of migration and gendered divisions of labour.

Many migrant women in the United States work as live-in nannies or daily housekeepers (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001), as do Filipino women in Italy (Parreñas 2001) and Hong Kong (Constable 2007), and South and Southeast Asian women who migrate to the Middle East (Pande 2012, 2013). In fact, the scholarship on immigrant women in domestic service around the world points to new dimensions of the culture of international migration as it records situations of exploitation and abuse (National Domestic Worker Alliance 2012), as well as resistance that women are taking to counter and address abuse (Ford and Piper 2007).

Another labour recruitment program that is important to the gendered international culture of migration attracts nurses from the Caribbean, India, and the Philippines, to name just a few source countries, to work in the healthcare sectors of the developed world (George 2005; Kingma 2006). The international mobility of nurses is "big business" that employs individuals who train them, travel agents who manage their transport, and bankers who oversee the flow of remittances that these nurses send back to their families.

This particular migration stream can have varying impacts on gender hierarchies. Sometimes they are upended as these skilled professionals become the primary source of cash income for their families or the primary sponsor for the migration of other family members. On the other hand, these nurses also confront stigma and devaluation. As Margaret Walton-Roberts (2012: 189) observes, with reference to nurses from south India, "the mobility nurses experience has challenged … gender norms …. In response to these transgressions, the idea of the nurse as 'suspicious' figure gains salience and is used to challenge the class mobility female nurses may experience through the migration process."

Eldercare is another dimension of migratory and gendered global care work and one of the fastest growing sectors of the global service economy. This sector relies primarily on immigrant minority women (Lowell et al. 2010) and, like domestic service, it is a sector characterized by low wages, high turnover, and other forms of exploitation (Deguili 2007; Huang et al. 2012; Ibarra 2002). In a particularly interesting study of Christian and Jewish Russian immigrant men and women in the private homecare sector, Solari (2007) shows how culturally generative and mutable this employment sector is in its relationship to both gender and religion. One might expect, given gender stereotypes, that women would develop a more personal and familial relationship with those for whom they provide care while men would adopt a more professional and distant relationship. However, Solari (2007) argues that religion more than gender shapes these relationships. For example, some of the Christian men "actively renegotiated dominant notions of masculinity, arguing that paid care work is a Christian calling" (p. 187). This offered a counter-narrative to the idea that care work represents downward occupational mobility. By contrast, Solari observes, "Russian Orthodox discursive practices allowed men to reinterpret hegemonic notions of masculinity and see homecare work as manual work that follows in Jesus's footsteps" (2007: 208).

Solari's work reminds us that the international division of labour is historically associated with a culture of migration. It crosses borders and shapes employment opportunities. Immigrant men and women are often employed in dead-end occupations (Ramirez and Hondagneu-Sotelo

2009). Other sectors that employ immigrant men are farming and construction; these jobs are often dangerous and precarious, particularly when the migrant workers are undocumented and/ or working as day labourers. Walter et al. (2004: 1162) point to the "competition, insecurity and public embarrassment of tenuous survival on the streets" that generates anxiety and a sense that their gender identity is under assault. These authors also describe the formation of a hyper-male identity, as a response to this precarious and high-risk employment situation, as hard-working, tough, and courageous men of honour who despite all the challenges send money back and hence remain as the "arms" of the family.

Highly skilled immigrants and IT workers face their own gender challenges regarding the international division of labour (Boyd 2013). These challenges are grounded in sending country traditions, short-term contracts and constant relocation (Raghuram 2004; Varma and Rogers 2004: 5647). Many IT workers have entered the US on H1B visas that allow for three years of work with the possibility of renewal. Often these highly skilled immigrants are paid lower wages than their US-born co-workers and are denied opportunities for advancement; and if lucky, they may have the chance to apply for a green card, sponsor family, and be placed on a path to citizenship. Demonstrably, the US H1B program has spawned a global and gendered culture of IT worker migration that has a particular set of characteristics. Varma and Rogers (2004: 5647) describe it as follows:

> US companies favour IT workers from India because they offer a unique set of technical skills, [are] well-versed in English, do not demand higher wages, are willing to relocate, [are] not very demand-ing, and help companies to build or strengthen their business in India. Many body shopper recruiting agencies have emerged in India to facilitate the migration of skilled workers on H1B visas.

Additionally, if and when some of these workers gain legal status and a green card, they soon realize that they face a glass ceiling. The result is that many strike out on their own, founding their own companies (Varma and Rogers 2004).

The gendering of international migration also drives sex trafficking, which has become a multi-billion-dollar global business (Kempadoo 2016; McCabe and Manian 2010). Indeed, within the European Union, the most common job for undocumented migrant women after domestic service has become sex worker (Andrijasevic 2007; Breuil et al. 2010; Carling 2005). Heated debates circulate around whether adult individuals work in this industry by choice or through coercion and deception and there are certainly complex and culturally variant dynam-ics at play. For example, Busza (2004: 241) found, in research among Vietnamese sex workers in Cambodia, that while the women in this industry expressed a sense of shame about the work (it is "bad work"), they also appreciated the potential earnings. Rhacel Parreñas (2011) reports that Filipina hostesses in Japan see their work as a path out of poverty. It gives them financial independence and personal autonomy. They do not necessarily identify as being trafficked and hence Parreñas labels their work a form of "indentured mobility." And despite the sense of autonomy that these women develop, they encounter structural constraints to their migration and their work.

Eastern European migrant sex workers in Italy also see their work as an escape from low self-esteem, family abuse, and a life of poverty and unemployment. Writing about these women, Andrijasevic (2003: 262) is critical of some of the efforts to control trafficking because it creates a "supplementary migration system" run by third parties. She argues, forcefully, that the discourse on trafficking is gendered because it reproduces "stereotypical narratives of femininity and masculinity … of victimization and criminality" that undergird asymmetric

power relations and physical abuse (2003: 265). Similar criticisms, revealing gender biases, have been directed toward anti-trafficking legislation in the United States (Chapkis 2003). Gozdziak and Collett (2005) point out there are equally gender biases in research, with the bulk of it focused on women and girls and very little on the trafficking of men and boys.

THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF GENDERED CULTURES OF MIGRATION

While we tend to think that migration laws and policies are gender-neutral, in fact they are anything but (Brettell 2016). Policies shaped by the need for labour are different from those that focus on family reunification, and both types of policies are imbued with gender ideology about who is the worker and who is the dependant and what kind of work is appropriate for men or women. Indeed, it is the assumption of a woman's dependency that is the most blatant example of gender bias in immigration laws. This dependency can make women vulnerable to various forms of precarity, including domestic violence. For example, in the mixed-legal-status families in the United States a husband who has managed to legalize his position, but whose wife has entered illegally, can threaten not to sponsor her or to call immigration officials as a form of control.

Mixed-legal-status families are part of the culture of migration that has emerged in the United States during the last several decades (Dreby 2015; Rodriguez 2016), partly as a result of the increasing militarization of the US southern border (Rodriguez 2018). The children in these families often experience high degrees of fear and trauma (Getrich 2019). Indeed, many children are US-born citizens and entitled to services and programs, but their parents are often reluctant to seek out these services because of questions surrounding their legal status. This challenge can only be resolved through comprehensive immigration reform that addresses the legal uncertainties that these families confront. What has emerged in the United States is a "gendered racial removal program". This program targets men of colour who are considered expendable and deportable (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Hagan et al. (2008: 71), in their research on Salvadoran families, found that the majority of deportees were young and male. This is because "migrants are generally apprehended at locations where males dominate in number and are more visible to the official eye, such as ports of entry, prisons, labour pools, public streets and job sites". However, married men can also be apprehended and deported leaving their wives, whether legal or not, in the United States to raise their US-citizen children.

Similar gendered biases are present in the immigration policies of other major western receiving nations. Margaret Walton-Roberts (2004) argues that in Canada immigrant women who are sponsored by their husbands are particularly vulnerable. The system has exacerbated "their unequal status within the marriage, diminishe[d] their dignity and degree of independence, aggravate[d] existing socio-economic disadvantages and violate[d] their most basic human rights" (p. 270). While these gender inequities are under review, Canada's point system for admission results in labelling many migrant women as dependants regardless of their education or skills. In many EU countries marriage and family reunification have become the primary means by which female immigrants can legally enter. Here too women are often placed in the position of a non-working dependant. As such, they confront situations of vulnerability, particularly if a spouse dies, loses a job, or for some reason is deported. Further, in

a country like France increasingly restrictive immigrant policies have pushed large numbers of immigrants, including many women, to seek work *sans papiers* (without papers) and hence become more vulnerable (Raissiguier 2010).

Contemporary refugee and asylum laws also demonstrate gender biases (Calavita 2006). In the post-World War II period, as the UN formulated its refugee policy, the typical asylum seeker was framed as a male claiming persecution for his political actions and beliefs. Women were ignored and it was assumed they were not involved in public sphere politics and hence did not require asylum. Several decades later private sphere persecutions (for example gender mutilation or other forms of domestic violence) finally came into consideration. And yet, the gender biases remain—something that is quite apparent in the way that the United States has handled the asylum claims made by Central American women and children who have appeared at the US Southern border during the second decade of the 21st century. Indeed, in public discourse refugees are often imagined as young, male and a security threat (another gender bias); in fact, half of the individuals in any refugee flow tend to be women and children. As Salcido and Menjívar (2012: 363–364) observe, "the exclusion of gender-specific needs" in the 1980 US Refugee Act (itself based on the 1951 UN Convention) means that "once again the perspective and interpretation of a framework based on male experiences reproduce gendered hierarchies and serve to maintain a heteropatriarchal state".

Across the globe refugee women are not accorded the same protections provided to refugee men; they are more likely considered dependants and with a "derivative status that makes them vulnerable" in myriad ways (Valji et al. 2003: 61). It has taken some time for agencies and agents dealing with political asylees and refugees to realize that women and children may have special needs and face different risks including the sexual violence and intimidation that is associated with war and conflict (Chantler 2010). In South Africa, for example, the Refugee Act of 2008 includes gender-based harm as a seventh ground for asylum (Middleton 2010). However, in many places such claims are determined to be personal rather than political and hence insufficient grounds for an asylum claim and international protection (Freedman 2012).

Gender bias is also characteristic of debates about and laws pertaining to citizenship. In Western societies, the philosopher Alison Jaggar (2005: 92) argues, citizenship is "gendered masculine … the activities regarded as characteristics of citizens—fighting, governing, buying and selling property, and eventually working for wages—have all been viewed as masculine, as have been the social locations where these activities are undertaken". Historically in liberal democracies, a citizen was defined as a white male property-holding individual; a woman's citizenship as derivative (that is, related to the citizenship status of a spouse). Only when women acquired the right to vote did some of these laws change, including in the United States. Such laws had all kinds of implications for immigrant women but also for American-born women who married immigrant husbands. By the end of the 20th century, sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis (1997: 22) advocated for a formulation of citizenship as a "multi-tier concept" that is detached "from an exclusive relation to the state". This new conception of citizenship would encompass the state, civil society and the family, thus bringing gender more fully into the discussion.

CONCLUSION

Gender focuses our attention on the inequalities and power differentials between men and women as well as other markers of inequality and difference. In relation to the culture of migration, a gendered analysis highlights the double discrimination that women may experience not only as a migrant but also as a woman; the latter because patriarchal ideologies may travel with them and perhaps be exacerbated in the immigrant context. On the other hand, migration may also lead to new and more egalitarian gender relations within households. A gendered analytical lens highlights the experiences of emasculation and disempowerment that men may encounter as a result of their migration. Furthermore, gendered inequalities also serve the interests of global capitalism; a system that is constantly in need of docile and low-wage workers and of families willing to live with the precarity of undocumented status and the indignities and insecurities of the labour market in order to provide a better life for their children.

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9.   Return migration[1]
Julia Pauli

INTRODUCTION

During the last fifteen years, a comparative ethnography of return has taken shape. A substantial number of monographs and edited volumes now trace the lived realities of returning in the age of globalization and transnationalism. Detailed case studies describe Chinese (Achenbach 2017), Cypriot (Teerling 2014), Ethiopian (Kuschminder 2017), Greek (Christou and King 2014), Kazakh (Blum 2016), Kyrgyz (Sagynbekova 2016), Mexican (Rothstein 2016), Puerto Rican (Aranda 2007) and Somali (Galipo 2019) return migration, to name just a few. Edited volumes compare homecomings and return both globally (Hirsch and Miller 2011; Long and Oxfeld 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004) and regionally (Akesson and Baaz 2015a; Conway and Potter 2009; Tsuda 2009b; Tsuda and Song 2019b; Xiang et al. 2013).[2] Resonating with what interlocutor Eula Grant told anthropologist Carol Stack on her personal experiences of migrating and returning in North America more than two decades ago (1996), these works capture the ambivalences, challenges but also rewards of leaving, going and coming home: "You can go home. But you can't start from where you left. To fit in, you have to create another place in that place you left behind" (Stack 1996: 199).

This development is even more remarkable when compared to the relative scarcity of work on homecomings and returns until approximately the beginning of the 21st century. In the introduction to one of the first comparative volumes on the topic, Anders H. Stefansson remarks that "return movements across time and space have largely been ignored in anthropology and migration research" (Stefansson 2004: 3). Similarly, in 2000, one of the most influential return migration scholars, Russell King (2000: 7) observed, "return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration" (see also Brettell 2007: 56; Ghosh 2000: 1; King 2000; Percival 2013: 2). Why then is the study of return migration all of a sudden so widespread? Two recent dynamics seem especially relevant for understanding the increased interest in return migration. On the one hand, critical awareness of the political dimensions of return migration has grown. On the other hand, transnational approaches are increasingly expanding to include an interest in locally grounded livelihoods. I will elaborate on both dimensions in a bit more detail.

In all regions of the world, state policies frame human migration by enabling, encouraging, restricting, punishing and hindering movements. Major events like the so-called "European refugee crisis" have made this very visible. Akesson and Baaz highlight the link between state interest in migration and return: "In the discourse of European policy makers, the issue of return also reflects the management and control of migration" (Akesson and Baaz 2015b: 5; see also Cassarino 2004). New policies and programs worldwide aim to encourage migrants to leave their host and destination countries and return to their original communities. For African migrants in Europe, Akesson and Baaz observe that "there is a significant overlap between the latest surge of interest in return and efforts to remove unwanted immigrants from destination countries" (2015b: 5). Very often, these policies build on narratives of "develop-

ment", with returning migrants presented as agents of change. At the same time, countries of origin like Ghana and Senegal have designed policies to promote the return of highly skilled migrants (Akesson and Baaz 2015b: 1). Tsuda and Song (2019a) underscore the role played by Asian homeland governments in framing return migration. Countries like Vietnam perceive wealthy and well-educated migrants more and more as a resource that needs to be returned home (Tsuda and Song 2019a: 28). Consequently, the growing interest in return migration is also an expression of the heightened scholarly awareness of these state interests, policies and dynamics. Similar to Xiang's approach to return migration as "a policy subject, as an idea, and as a strategic moment when the intersection between nation-states and transnational mobility is particularly visible" (Xiang 2013: 3) many recently published case studies scrutinize the interplay between power and policies in questions of return.

Parallel to the increased academic interest in how state policies frame return migration, a productive critique of the currently dominant transnational paradigm has commenced. While acknowledging the importance of thinking beyond methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) and narratives of assimilation and migrant integration, the continuous relevance of the local in both "home" and "host" countries has sometimes been overlooked in transnational migration studies. Stefansson goes so far as to say that narratives of "carefree borderless belongings" and "cultural hybridity" have made any attempt to understand "going home" appear "antiprogressive, illogical, and illusory" (Stefansson 2004: 3). Migration does not automatically lead to a transnational lifestyle. Some migrants emphasize local over multiple or transnational forms of belonging (Dahinden 2009). Others, like the deportees Drotbohm (2016) met in Cape Verde, long for transnational lifestyles that are unavailable to them, only experiencing "frozen cosmopolitanism" in their attempts to hold on to their former mobility and self through forms of consumption. These, and other works of the evolving "ethnography of return migration" (Oxfeld and Long 2004) show that understanding practices and perceptions of return does not have to be essentializing. Quite the contrary, understanding return does not contrast but often complements transnational approaches (Horst 2007).

In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss definitions and categorizations of return migration. Next, I will scrutinize different reasons for return. This will be complemented by findings on generation, gender and social class of returnees. Finally, actual experiences of return will be examined. As the literature on return migration is by now quite extensive, my approach will only be exemplary. In the last section of my chapter I will explore some of the more general findings in light of my own ethnographic work on return migration and transnationalism in Mexico.

DEFINING RETURN

Most attempts to define return migration ponder on the at first sight straightforwardness of the term and the rising complexities when giving it a second thought. Unlike other concepts in migration research – transnationalism, hybridization – "return is a category that people themselves use, embellish, and understand" (Oxfeld and Long 2004: 3). This common, often taken for granted understanding of return certainly helps in the ethnographic endeavour. But, Tsuda asks, "what exactly does it mean to return?" (Tsuda 2019: 240). He differentiates three dimensions of return: spatial, temporal and social.

Return is movement in space, a going back to where one started. Yet, place of origin is a rather fluid category. Depending on specific migration trajectories it can mean various things. Place of origin can be a house, a village, an area, a nation state or a whole continent. The temporal dimension is equally challenging. Return is not only a spatial movement; it is also a "going back to a previous time in the past" (Tsuda 2019: 241). Images of the past are projected into future returns. But as Eula Grant warned, and as reported in Stack's *Call to Home*, "you can't start from where you left" (1996: 199). A return in time is unpending and nostalgic longings are very often impossible to satisfy (Stefansson 2004: 11–12). Finally, the social dimension of return touches upon "going back to something that one knows well" (Tsuda 2019: 243). Yet, what during the migratory absence is assumed as familiar and known might become unfamiliar and unknown upon return. The migrant and the place of origin have changed. Ethnographic studies throughout the world describe returnees' experiences of loss and irritation when coming home: "This anticipation of returning socially and ethnically familiar (and similar) country of origin is the fundamental reason why diasporic returns are often quite ambivalent and fraught with tension" (Tsuda 2019: 243).

Unsurprisingly then, some of the returns that had been intended as permanent become transient. After the return is before the return. The returnee returns again, away from the country of origin and back to the host country. Consequently, recent scholarship has moved away from previous definitions of return characterized by permanent settlement and the termination of migration (Gmelch 1980: 136) and towards more open-ended approaches: "there is no singular diasporic 'Return' with a capital R, but only multiple 'returns' in the plural" (Tsuda 2019: 239). The permanence of return is also a central way of categorizing return migration. Tsuda (2019: 239), for example, differentiates three kinds of returns: returns as one-time occurrences ending migration trajectories, returns as repeated occurrences, and returns as part of a continuing migratory process. Another typology classifying return migration based on time spent in the home country distinguishes between four types of return: occasional and short-term visits to see kin and friends, seasonal returns, temporary returns of a longer duration and with the intention to remigrate, and finally permanent returns including resettlement (King 2000). The most extreme kind of permanent return is probably the return upon death (Abu-Lughod 2011; Pauli and Bedorf 2018; Stefansson 2004: 3).

Categorizations of return migration and returning migrants are often based on two early publications. The typology suggested by Frank Bovenkerk (1974) in the 1970s was further developed by George Gmelch (1980) who distinguishes four categories: first, intended temporary migration with return; second, intended temporary migration without return; third, intended permanent migration with return; and fourth, intended permanent migration without return. This typology does not consider that intention might, and often does, change during the migration process (Kuschminder 2017: 7). Another set of typologies equally focuses on intentions and motivations, differentiating between voluntary and forced returns (Boehm 2016; Cassarino 2004). Yet, it might be difficult to decide when a return is voluntarily and without any pressure (Akesson and Baaz 2015b; Kuschminder 2017: 6). Tsuda and Song thus suggest that "this dichotomous distinction between forced versus voluntary returns is not always clear and should be conceptualized more as a continuum" (Tsuda and Song 2019a: 23; see also Vathi 2017).

Many authors of return migration do not work comparatively but try to understand and describe their specific case (Carling 2004). Their aim is not to build general theories of return migration but to "develop categorizations of returnees that suit their case study" (Kuschminder

2017: 8). Christou and King, for example, place their study of Greek second-generation return-ees within diaspora studies, labelling the group they study as "counter-diaspora" (Christou and King 2014). This label qualitatively distinguishes "counter-diasporic return" from "ethnic return migration" (Tsuda 2009b), "roots migration" (Wessendorf 2007) and "ancestral return" (Teerling 2014). Another classificatory approach attempts to understand return migration through the lens of success or failure (Cassarino 2004; Gmelch 1980; Lindstrom 2013; Olwig 2012).

Akesson and Baaz (2015b) warn against reinforcing too sedentary and essentialized notions of migration, identity and belonging when speaking about "return" and "returnees". They conceptualize return migration as "a partial return to a place where the migrant once lived" (Akesson and Baaz 2015b: 10). They especially emphasize the relationship between migrant/returness and "stayers". Relationships with "stayers", often kin, are a central motivation for migrants to return.

REASONS FOR RETURN

To order the multiple reasons for return migration a distinction between macro- and micro-oriented research might be helpful. More macro-oriented research emphasizes the role of the nation state in configuring and framing reasons for return. Research working on the micro and meso levels pays attention to how the individual, the household, the wider (kin) networks and the community perceive and influence return. Xiang (2013), as an example of a more macro-oriented approach, scrutinizes how the treatment of returnees by state policies and their representation in public media has grouped returnees into three groups. They have either returned because they are "victims" – refugees or victims of human trafficking; or they are "the desirable" – highly skilled or investors; or finally they are what Xiang calls "the ambiguous" – economically needed but socially undesired, unskilled and irregular migrants (Xiang 2013: 11). Governments might deliberately encourage what is being perceived as "desirable" returnees. For example, instead of recruiting migrant workers from China, a Japanese law in 1990 allowed and encouraged the return of Japanese-Brazilian migrants up to the third generation and including their spouses and children (Tsuda 2004). Vietnamese residing in the Global North were initially viewed as hostile and antagonistic by the Vietnamese government. This view has substantially changed. Now, the government actively facilitates the return of overseas Vietnamese, hoping to profit from their professional, technological and business expertise (Tsuda and Song 2019a: 27). Similar state policies have been described for the Caribbean (Conway and Potter 2009) and a few African countries (Akesson and Baaz 2015b).

More micro- and meso-level-oriented approaches towards return often emphasize the importance of notions of belonging to understand return (Bedorf 2018). Tsuda and Song (2019a: 24) stress that it is not "primordial attachment and an inherent sense of ethnic affinity to and longing for a country of origin" that motivates return. Instead, they highlight what they describe as instrumental and practical reasons.

Most migrants are confronted with racisms in their host countries. Gmelch (1980; 2004), for example, notes that Puerto Ricans leave the US because of discrimination and stigmatization. Similar negative experiences also motivate African migrants to leave Europe (Akesson and Baaz 2015a) or Mexicans to leave the US (Rothstein 2016). Gmelch (1980; 2004) further mentions economic difficulties and troubles to cope with cold climate as motives for Puerto

Ricans to return to Puerto Rico. Other reasons mentioned in the literature are homesickness and health problems while in the host country (Duncan 2014; Percival 2013). All of the above factors are related to the migrant's situation in the host country. Gmelch (1980; 2004) summarizes these motives as push factors and distinguishes them from pull factors relating to the country of origin.

Very significant pull factors concern the obligations and connections migrants have towards kin in the country of origin. Kin support each other within transnational spaces and upon return. Reynolds (2010) writes that British-born Jamaicans are motivated to return to Jamaica because they can expect help of elder relatives with childcare. Care networks and expectations of care also frame the wish of many migrants worldwide to return home upon retirement (Bedorf 2018; Coe 2016; Pauli and Bedorf 2018; Percival 2013). Such expectations can result in despair and frustration as Ferguson (1999) has vividly described for returning migrants in the Zambian Copperbelt. To prepare for their return upon retirement, migrants globally build houses in their country of origin (Aguilar 2009; Coe 2016; Cohen 2004; Dalakoglou 2010; Lopez 2015; Olwig 2012; Pauli 2008; Pauli and Bedorf 2018). Despite the many efforts and costs that go into migratory housebuilding and staying connected, many migrants who entertain the idea of return, never return. This form of imagination has been described as the "myth of return" (Anwar 1979). Another pull factor can be related to education. Research from Pakistan, Nigeria and Germany shows that some middle- and upper-class migrant parents send their children "back home" to provide them with a good education (Erdal et al. 2015; Kea in press; Knörr 2005). Class, along with gender and generation, thus crucially frame motivations for return.

GENDER, GENERATION AND SOCIAL CLASS

How gender, generation, social class and their intersections shape return migration is receiving more attention in recent years. Teerling (2014: 6) observes that "[to] what happens to gender relations upon the actual return, literature appears to be scarce". Nevertheless, some literature on gender and return indicates that often women are confronted with patriarchal gender norms and practices upon their return (Christou and King 2014: 248; Dahinden 2010; Pessar and Mahler 2003). Correspondingly, some female migrants want to stay in the host society or return to it because there they feel less restricted by patriarchal gender norms (Constable 2004: 109; Hirsch 1999). Additionally, migrant women tend to build long-term relations in the host society, making it less likely that they want to return. In case children are born in their host country, mothers prefer to stay close to their children and often do not want to return (Bedorf 2018). In contrast, men more frequently engage in transnational strategies such as political involvement in the community of origin, increasing the likelihood of return (Teerling 2014: 6). However, these tendencies intersect with class issues. For women with less economic means a return to the country of origin can be perceived as an advantage. There, funds might last longer. Wealthier women in contrast have more possibilities to take advantage of the opportunities the host country might offer (Teerling 2014).

The transnational dimension of social class is a relatively new topic in migration research (Coe and Pauli in press; Nieswand 2011; Van Hear 2014). Long-term research shows how dynamic class is being re-configured in transnational communities. While a substantial flow of migration is directed towards the so called "developed" countries, in the course of time,

countries of origin that were previously classified as "less developed" might change, offering attractive economic opportunities for returnees. A well-documented case is the return migration to the Caribbean, especially Barbados. Potter and Phillips' (2006a, b) work scrutinizes the intersection between class and generation upon return from the UK (see also Reynolds 2010). Since the migration of what they classify as the first generation of migrants in the 1950s and 1960s and the increased return to Barbados since the 1990s, Barbados has economically prospered. Potter and Phillips distinguish the "retirement return" of first-generation migrants from the return of second-generation migrants, often their children. After many years of absence, first-generation migrants tend to find it difficult to adjust upon return. Contrary to this, second-generation migrants do not come to Barbados for retirement but for business and employment. Potter and Phillips describe them as well-educated and belonging to the middle class.

A rather different experience of class and return migration is described by de Carvalho (2003) for Japanese-Brazilians returning to Japan (see also Tsuda 2004). While many Japanese-Brazilians belong to the middle class in Brazil, upon return to Japan they often find jobs as low-status factory workers. This experience of downward mobility upon return motivates many Japanese-Brazilians to return a second time, back to Brazil (de Carvalho 2003: 109). Interestingly, class status of different Japanese-Brazilian generations seems to not vary as much as in the Caribbean case described by Potter and Phillips (2006a, b). While many middle-aged and well-educated Barbadians returning to Barbados often climb the social ladder even further, both younger and older Japanese-Brazilians tend to lose their middle-class status upon return to Japan.

Like gender and social class, generation is a relatively new focus of return migration research. By now, a number of case studies (Christou and King 2014; Teerling 2014) and edited volumes (Conway and Potter 2009; King et al. 2014) have been published. Nevertheless, "past and ongoing research on migration concentrates almost exclusively on first-generation migrants" (Christou and King 2014: 8). Christou and King (2014: 15) emphasize that the return of the second generation is not a return in the statistical sense. Demographically speaking, it is an emigration to another country. Nevertheless, the second generation often feels a strong bond of ethnicity and kinship to their parental country of origin, often fostered by an "ideology of return" (2014: 15). It seems that the second generation is even more involved in transnational ties and practices of return if the parental country of origin is geographically close. This is the case for Mexican-Americans (2014: 14). The Greek-American and Greek-German second-generation returnees studied by Christou and King (2014) are very ambivalent about the meaning of home (see also Markowitz 2004). Their "counter-diasporic return" to Greece does not resolve these troubles in belonging. They hold some rather negative views of Greece but also do not want to return to Germany or the US (Christou and King 2014: 244). Consequently, questions of place-making in Greece are of central importance to them. Many of them do not return to the place their parents once left. Instead they settle in towns or cities that were not home to their parents. These experiences of return of second-generation returnees vary substantially from those of migrants returning to places where they once lived.

EXPERIENCING RETURN

Expectations and experiences of return seldom seem to match. Returning is a socially and emotionally challenging endeavour, fraught with ambivalences and frustrations (Christou and King 2014; Long and Oxfeld 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004; Teerling 2014; Tsuda 2009a). Not surprisingly then, questions of success and failure of return often shape returnees' experience. Much of the literature paints a rather dark picture, with some exceptions (Olwig 2012). However, one has to keep in mind that in-depth treatments of the actual experiences of return are still comparatively rare: "While there is an extensive literature on how African migrants contribute to 'development at home' through remittances, the experiences of African return migrants have received only scanty attention" (Akesson and Baaz 2015b: 2). While this is certainly true for African migrants, lived experiences of returning have been documented in other regions of the world in more detail, especially the Caribbean (Conway and Potter 2009; Gmelch 1980, 2004; Goulbourne et al. 2010; Horst 2007; Olwig 2012; Potter and Phillips 2006a, b; Reynolds 2010). Nevertheless, it is likely that more research on the lived realities of diverse groups of migrants will lead to a more nuanced picture of how return is experienced.

Expectations and experiences of return vary between those who return and those who stay. Many returnees are confronted with what can seem at times to be exaggerated demands from kin or neighbours. Remittances play a crucial role in framing these expectations. In many regions worldwide, remittances are a key economic element (Cohen 2011; Delpierre and Verheyden 2014; Sana and Massey 2005). Non-migrating kin folks often depend on the economic support of their migrating kin. Delpierre and Verheyden (2014) show that migrants who are confronted with larger wage risks in the host country are more likely to remit. Their investment into remittances is a practice of securing their future. This again increases the likelihood of their return. But it can also lead to a status paradox (Nieswand 2011). For Ghanaian migrants Nieswand (2011) shows that through migration status is often gained in the country of origin while at the same time status is lost or low in the receiving country of migration. The newly achieved status of migrants in their home community is very often expressed through forms of conspicuous consumption like extravagant house constructions or costly life cycle celebrations (Pauli in press). Consequently, those who stayed perceive the returnees as a "remittance bourgeoisie" (Smith 2006) or an "elite" (Pauli 2018). But upon their return not all migrants can live up to these expectations. For Barbados, Potter and Phillips (2006a, b) describe that some returnees felt that their kin perceived them as wealthier than they really are. This impression was not only built on the sending of remittances but also on the culture of generously giving presents upon short-term holiday visits. Discourses of differences between those who stayed and the returnees did not only concentrate on class issues. Returnees interviewed by Potter and Phillips (2006a, b) said that they were perceived as "mad". On the one hand, first-generation returnees had a rather high rate of mental illnesses (2006b: 592). On the other hand, middle-class and well-educated returnees of the second generation were viewed as too "English" in their behaviour. This "Englishness" was found in their assumed obsession with punctuality, their going out in the rain or their walking in the hot sun and not staying in the shade. Differences and expectations such as these are very challenging for returnees. Some returnees decide to not return to their place of origin but instead settle somewhere else, often cities or towns, in their country of origin (Çağlar 2002; Christou and King 2014).

Although most research emphasizes the difficulties of returning, a few studies also describe positive experiences. In his long-term research on Caribbean return migration, Gmelch (2004:

212) observes that the longer a returnee has stayed after return, the higher the chances that he or she is satisfied with the situation. Gmelch found that 53 percent of the Barbadian returnees said that their situation had been better before the return and in the host society when interviewed within the first year of their arrival to the island. Conflicts with kin and neighbours and difficulties to adapt to the local lifestyle led to their dissatisfaction. However, had a return lasted for longer than a year, only 17 percent were still dissatisfied. Thus, the longer the return lasted the higher the chances that the returnees experienced their return as positive. The importance of this kind of adaptation is probably also linked to the level of "preparedness" before the return. In his overview of different return migration theories Cassarino concludes that the level of "preparedness" of returnees strongly shapes how a return is experienced: "preparedness is far away from being a vague notion; it puts emphasis on the returnees' ability to gather tangible and intangible resources when return takes place autonomously" (2004: 275). In her study of highly skilled male migrants returning to Ghana, Kleist (2015) finds that the returnees managed to establish successful social and political positions for themselves after their return. Their preparedness related to their social class. Even in Ghana, they matched the image of returnees as "upper-class citizens" and "big men", making their experience of return a comparably positive one. Class thus does not only shape return motivations but also actual returns.

MEXICAN RETURNS

In the final part of the chapter, some of the more general findings described above will be briefly discussed for Mexican return migration. Although return migration is a central feature of the movement between Mexico and the US, "research on Mexico–US migration has neglected return migration" (Masferrer and Roberts 2012: 466; 2016). Compared to other regions of the world, especially the Caribbean, research on Mexican return migration is still in its infancy. I nevertheless focus on Mexico–US migration and return. Mobility between Mexico and the US defines one of the largest migration movements in the world. Additionally, my empirical work has been on Mexican migration, transnationalism and return (Pauli 2008, 2013; Pauli and Bedorf 2016, 2018) and I am most familiar with this region.

Lindstrom emphasizes that although migration from Mexico to the United States dates back to the 19th century, its current shape has to be linked to the Bracero guest worker program initiated by the United States in 1942 and maintained until 1964 (Lindstrom 2013: 177). During that time, a total of 4.6 million Mexicans received temporary work visas. Douglas Massey and his research group have documented in detail that the end of the Bracero program did not end migration (Massey et al. 1987, 2002). Rather, a system of circular migration evolved, including a "culture of migration" as Cohen (2004) has aptly called it. Before the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, mainly undocumented men migrated, staying for only a few years and then returning to Mexico. For millions of undocumented immigrants, the 1986 act provided an avenue into legalization, leading to more family reunification and settlement in the United States. At the same time, an increasingly severe border regime was established, making unauthorized crossing ever more difficult and dangerous. Recently, due to further militarization of the shared border and changes in Mexican and US economies and laws, the number of border crossings from Mexicans into the US is declining (Arenas et al. 2015), the number of deportations from the US to Mexico is substantially rising (Masferrer and Roberts 2012: 470) and the number of Mexicans entering on temporary work visas is also rising (Lindstrom

2013). Massey and his colleagues have argued that the militarization of the border and associated policies have created a bifurcated system (Massey et al. 2015). As re-entry into the US is much more dangerous than in the past, undocumented migrants in the US are now less likely to return to Mexico, while documented migrants are more likely to cross the border.

One often used typology to classify Mexican return migrants has been proposed by Durand (2006). He differentiates voluntary return from, on the one hand, "failed migration", meaning the inability to survive in the host country due to, for example, illness or unemployment, and, on the other hand, forced repatriation through deportation. When compared to the typologies mentioned above, this typology combines the differentiation into forced versus voluntary return (Cassarino 2004) and an evaluation of success and failure of return migration (Gmelch 1980). Deportations and forced repatriation have strongly increased during the last two decades (Boehm 2016; Masferrer and Roberts 2016). However, what Durand classifies as "voluntary return" is still the most common form of return migration to Mexico (Arenas et al. 2015). Nevertheless, Masferrer and Roberts caution that some survey data indicate that "return migration is becoming a forced decision, or at least unplanned or with no preparedness" (2012: 470). They relate their findings to Cassarino's (2004) concept of "preparedness", encouraging future research to work on a better understanding of what forced return means for returning migrants. The recent increase in deportations notwithstanding, much research stresses that voluntary returns continue to be part of a circular migration system with the transnational household as its base (Cohen 2004, 2011; Massey et al. 1987, 2002).

Similar to the more general findings discussed above, return migration also differs by gender, with women being less likely to return (Feliciano 2008; Rothstein 2016: 52). Those with homes, children, marriages or relationships in the US are also less likely to return (Massey et al. 2015). Many of them, nevertheless, hold on to the "myth of return" (Anwar 1979), often investing in house construction in their place of origin (Lopez 2010; Pauli 2008; Pauli and Bedorf 2018; Sandoval-Cervantes 2017). Housebuilding can be a continuous act of "doing kinship" (Pauli 2008, 2013). Through the planning and building of remittance houses the transnationally dispersed family stays connected. But remittance-related housebuilding has also substantially reconfigured gender and generational relations (Magazine and Ramírez Sánchez 2007; Pauli 2015; Pauli and Bedorf 2018; Ramírez 2008). Wives with absent husbands often have more freedom in their decision-making and movements. This enhanced agency questions and re-configures existing gender norms (González de la Rocha 1993; Pauli 2008). Younger couples with income and remittances challenge the rural gerontocracy. Today, younger couples involved in migration hardly ever live patrilocal. Instead and based on the *migradoláres* earned through migration they build their own conspicuous houses. Care obligations between the younger and the older generation have become negotiable. Inheritance as a central way to own a house in exchange for the care of the parental generation has lost its relevance. In sum, these migration-related practices have shaken the very foundation of the Mesoamerican Household System (Robichaux 1997). Consequently, returnees going back to rural Mexico are often confronted with ongoing struggles over questions of kinship, residence, care, normativity, obligation and support. This can substantially clash with fantasies of return held while away. Imaginations of an idle and peaceful return to the rural countryside can become the very opposite when experienced (Pauli 2015). These challenges of return are even more troublesome when returnees are physically or mentally ill. Research shows that some migrants return because of serious health problems (Arenas et al. 2015; Duncan 2014). In a large-scale survey research, Arenas et al. (2015) found that compared to those remaining

in the US the health of return migrants in Mexico is much worse. Their findings are based on self-reported measures of health and measures of mental health.

Questions of success and failure of return are thus complex and multidimensional. Social, political, normative, but also physical and psychic dimensions must be complemented with the so far little researched question "whether return migrants are able to successfully incorporate themselves into home country labor markets" (Lindstrom 2013: 178). Based on household survey data from 88 Mexican communities collected between 1987 and 2002 as part of the Princeton-based Mexican Migration Project, Lindstrom finds no effect of US working experiences on upward occupational mobility upon return to Mexico (Lindstrom 2013: 199). There is a high likelihood of investment into farmland and self-employment which is also an expression of the lack of employment opportunities for return migrants in Mexico. Overall, Lindstrom concludes that return of temporary migrants works best when there is complementarity between work done in the US and in Mexico. This is most often the case for farm workers.

I conclude with two substantial changes in return migration and illustrate them with my ongoing work in Mexico. While until recently most migrants went back to their place of origin, mainly small rural communities in the so-called sending states of the Center-West of Mexico, Masferrer and Roberts (2012, 2016) show that since approximately the first decade of the new millennium the geography and demography of Mexican return migration is changing. As shown in research from other regions of the world (Christou and King 2014), returnees do not necessarily return to their place of origin any more but often prefer economically more dynamic cities or metropolitan areas. Additionally, new groups of migrants outside of the long-term Mexican sending states are also migrating to the US: "Regions and places, such as the larger cities, that in the past had little international migration experience have now become major sources of migrants to the US" (Masferrer and Roberts 2012: 466). Masferrer and Roberts emphasize that the troubling increase in deportations and the rise in families of mixed documented status will result in new social and economic inequalities throughout Mexico. This warning is also connected to the second major change in Mexican return migration Masferrer and her colleagues describe. In the last ten years, alongside adult returnees, a very high number of more than half a million US-born minors have gone back to Mexico (Masferrer et al. 2019). Most of them are of primary school age, often living with their Mexican-born parents in Mexico. However, one-third of these children are separated from one or both parents, some of them residing with grandparents. The meaning and impact of these recent changes is substantial and calls for further research.

CONCLUSION

Returning is always beginning. Returns are special kinds of beginnings, permeated with memories, hopes, desires, anxieties and longings about what has been left. The emerging global ethnography of return follows the traces of the past in the re-making of home(s) and belongings upon return. It can build on a few long-term research sites where returns and return migration have been studied for decades, especially the Caribbean. The *longue durée* of returns that becomes visible in these long-term research sites has to be combined with comparative and theoretical approaches on return migration. Concepts like Cassarino's (2004) "preparedness" can be used to better understand different kinds of return and their consequences for returnees,

their kin and their communities. Cassarino emphasizes the varying degrees of "preparedness" of returnees. The concept can be extended, including those who have stayed. One might ask how prepared they are for living with return and returnees. Like the returnees they must create a new place in the old place.

State policies are crucial forces in shaping returns, leading to cruel and devastating practices of deportations and forced repatriations of those who are not wanted. At the same time, state policies can also enable and encourage returns of those who are wanted and perceived as valuable. Much more research is needed to comprehend how state policies interact with other dimensions of return, especially gender, generation and social class. Returning and returns, imagined or real, are central features of our time. A comparative understanding of this fundamental moment in most movements is now taking shape.

NOTES

2. A very helpful systematic bibliography of return migration has been compiled by the research group headed by Jørgen Carling from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (Carling et al. 2011).

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10. International migration, environment, and climate change dynamics
Michelle J. Moran-Taylor and Matthew J. Taylor

INTRODUCTION

The natural environment and human migration have been closely linked throughout history. Droughts, floods, and other changes in the natural environment have led to the movement of humans within and across borders. The environment–migration nexus has gained traction in recent decades as evidence of human-induced climate change increases and influences understanding about how such changes can lead to human migration. The growing impacts of climate change and increasing numbers of people moving around the world are a topic of profound significance.[1]

Indeed, in the 2019 IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)[2] report the authors state that:

> [C]hanges in climate can amplify environmentally-induced migration both within countries and across borders (medium confidence), reflecting multiple drivers of mobility and available adaptation measures (high confidence). Extreme weather and climate or slow-onset events may lead to increased displacement, disrupted food chains, threatened livelihoods (high confidence), and contribute to exacerbated stress for conflict (medium confidence).

One of the principal 2019 IPCC authors told the *New York Times* that "peoples' lives will be affected by a massive pressure for migration … People don't stay and die where they are. People migrate" (Flavelle 2019). The IPCC (2019) summary statement captures the burgeoning body of research on the environment–climate change–migration nexus. Specifically, several recent review papers (Okobata et al. 2014; Piguet et al. 2018; Berleman and Steinhyardt 2017) argue that both quantitative and qualitative analyses of migration show that climate change-related impacts on the environment are one of the multiple drivers of human mobility; highlighting how multiple dimensions shape the decision to migrate. Furthermore, they caution against singling out one factor like climate change to explain human migration trends (Bates-Eamer 2019; Jokisch et al. 2019).

Although climate change scholars are careful to stress that the environment and changes in the environment include only one of the multiple dimensions that can lead to population movements, increasingly the popular press links human-induced climate change and migration. These reports emphasize the role of climate change and obfuscate the complexity of migration decisions. Popular media outlets like the *New York Times*, the *New Yorker* and the *Guardian* carry headlines reading: "How Climate Change is Fueling the U.S. Border Crisis" (Blitzer 2019), "Central American Farmers Head to the U.S., Fleeing Climate Change" (Semple 2019), "People are Dying: How the Climate Crisis Has Sparked an Exodus to the U.S." (Lakhani 2019). This type of reporting represents the recent proliferation of popular media coverage and reveals how the media frames the environment and climate change–migration nexus. But,

more importantly, as some scholars observe, "media can tell people what to think about. At the same time, framing can have an effect on how people think about certain issues … Not only can framing have an impact on how an issue is perceived but on whether and how policy is made" (*Science Daily* 2019). While the Global North politicizes and views climate change as a security issue (Baldwin et al. 2014; Gemenne et al. 2014; Piguet et al. 2018), the Global South presents climate change as an international issue (Vu et al. 2019) due to its high risks, problematic resiliency, and greater vulnerability to hazards.

The increase in migration scholarship exploring how environmental factors and climate change can contribute to migration is paralleled by a steady up-tick in studies that document the outcomes of migration on the environment in migrants' places of origin (e.g., Robson et al. 2018; Jokisch et al. 2019; Radel et al. 2019). The environment in migrant sending communities can be transformed by both social remittances and economic remittances (Moran-Taylor and Taylor 2010). Furthermore, most of the literature examining migration-related impacts on the environment in sending regions is informed by empirical case studies. Because so many people around the world are on the move, this realm of study is as relevant as the research on how the environment shapes migration. These two sets of literature—the role of the environment and environmental change on migration, and in turn, how migration can shape the environment—form a growing body of work that extends well beyond 2,000 publications (see CliMig database).[3]

In this chapter, we examine the scholarship that looks at the environment and climate change–migration nexus from the perspective of migration driven by environmental change, and how migration and migrants impact the environment in sending regions, particularly in Latin America. To keep the scope of our analysis manageable, we confine our focus to international migration and rely mainly on research over the last two decades. First, we present a brief overview of the relationship between migration and environment literature. Then, we assess the research on environmental and climatic factors as drivers for human mobility due to fast-onset hazards (adverse events) and slow-onset hazards (environmental scarcities).[4] In the penultimate section of this chapter we pay attention to the effects of international migration on the environment in migrant sending regions in Latin America. Finally, we conclude with suggestions for future research.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE MIGRATION–ENVIRONMENT NEXUS

Migration scholarship is an interdisciplinary endeavor and several scholars have reviewed the general migration literature, expanding our understanding of migrant behavior trends and offering different theories to explain migration social processes (e.g., Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Massey et al. 1993; Basch et al. 1994; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Castles et al. 2013; Brettell and Hollifield 2015). Discussions about migration and the environment began as early as the 1880s with Ravenstein's classic migration work (1889). Focus on the migration–environment nexus slowed throughout much of the 20th century in favor of economic narratives (Piguet 2013). Debates surrounding climate change and the environment re-emerged in the second half of the 1980s, mainly led by international organizations like the United Nations, International Organization of Migration (IOM), and the IPCC (Piguet et al. 2018). The IOM, for instance, first published on migration and the environment in 1992. Bilsborrow (1992) highlighted the

linkages between migration and the environment and addressed population growth and land pressures—often involving internal migration and land intensification. By the early 2000s, debates about migration and environment resurfaced. Myers (2002) became an influential figure, arguing that up to 50 million environmental refugees were to be expected by 2010, and by the late 21st century, he projected that there could be as many as 200 million people fleeing due to extreme weather events.

Several recent insightful and comprehensive review papers reveal the connections between migration and the environment (e.g., Black et al. 2011; Piguet et al. 2011, 2018; Oliver-Smith 2012; Piguet 2013; Kaenzig and Piguet 2014; McLeman 2014; Obokata et al. 2014; Berleman and Steinhyardt 2017; Hunter et al. 2015; McLeman and Gemenne 2018; Jokisch et al. 2019; Radel et al. 2019). As Hunter et al. (2015) observe, research laying the groundwork and tracing the migration–environment nexus has been the work of geographers and anthropologists (e.g., Bilsborrow 1992; McGregor 1993; Kibreab 1997). Particularly, geographers have been at the vanguard of this research due to their orientation towards human–environment interactions. In turn, geographers have been instrumental in promulgating further studies, especially after 2010, when we see a dramatic spike in publications. Studies focusing on the migration–environment relationship have garnered much attention from other social science scholars in disciplines like sociology, demography, and political science. But, as a whole, the inter-disciplinary conversation that could lead to a more holistic and better understanding of the migration–environment linkages warrants more attention (Jokisch et al. 2019).

Despite the up-tick in research on the dynamics between migration and the environment, specifically the migration–climate change nexus, it is worth noting that some recent publications and funding come under a different guise. This is particularly true in the United States (U.S.). The Trump administration (2016–2020) has made climate change a polemic issue impinging on how climate change scholars frame their work and seek funds. For example, instead of using "climate change" in the titles, grants or scholarly publications with the labels "environmental change" or "extreme weather" have increased. This suggests that, even if research topics remain the same, the terms scientists deploy to depict them may have altered (NPR, November 2017). Other researchers who have employed the term climate change in their work have been pressured, censored, and forced out of their positions (Caffrey 2019). Despite climate change negation in some political arenas, scholars maintain that human-induced changes to the atmosphere are responsible for the global temperature and precipitation changes we are experiencing, and thus, these transformations have led to changes in frequency and intensity of flooding, hurricanes, tropical cyclones, droughts, and sea-level rise (SLR). The next section summarizes studies that elaborate on how such changes in climate and the environment fuel international migration.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The subject of climate change and international migration is often deemed a security issue[5] by developed countries who tend to view individuals escaping the consequences of environmentally induced migration as "environmental migrants or refugees" or as "climate refugees" (Myers 2002; Hartmann 2010). As the global climate becomes more erratic, people fleeing or considering relocation elsewhere as "climate change refugees" cannot request asylum. A person fleeing their homeland must comply with specific categories of persecution (i.e.,

religion, politics, ethnicity) outlined in the UN 1951 Refugee Convention—climate change is not one of these categories. It is not yet included because there is a great deal of controversy over the legal appropriateness of the label "climate refugee" (Veronis et al. 2018).

Understanding the role of the environment in migration dynamics means looking at how and why people are vulnerable to climate change and the different and various strategies employed to cope or adapt to such changes—migration is one of the multiple strategies that households in migrant sending regions use to adapt (Piguet et al. 2011; McLeman 2014). Here, we examine climate change and a number of the environmental changes projected to have the biggest impact on people, especially with regards to human migration: droughts and variable rainfall; hurricanes, tropical storms, torrential rains, and heavy flooding; and sea-level rise (SLR) (Kaenzig and Piguet 2014; IPCC 2019). Much research connecting drought to migration patterns (fueling both long- and short-term mobility) takes place in Africa and in Latin America—in the latter, the emphasis centers mainly on the U.S. and Mexico, while Central and South America and the Caribbean receive less scholarly attention. Although SLR will affect the whole globe, its impacts are experienced overwhelmingly in Oceania and the Pacific Islands, hence, more studies attend to SLR and migration in those regions. In general, regardless of whether the focus is on drought or SLR, most empirical studies focus on rural areas rather than urban places (Kaenzing and Piguet 2014; Hunter et al. 2015; Piguet et al. 2018; Veronis et al. 2018).

Case studies from the environment–climate change–migration nexus literature stress that migration outcomes are context-specific (Piguet et al. 2011; Kaenzig and Piguet 2014; Okobata et al. 2014). In other words, place matters, and it matters how and when people decide to migrate because of a variety of issues (e.g., mature social networks, household economic resources available, infrastructure, governance, non-profit assistance). Certainly, the nature of locality needs to be considered in every study. But also, as some academics argue, we must consider the emotional and subjective lived experiences of people—in other words, the emotional landscape of climate change migration (Parsons 2019). Current conceptualizations of the environment–climate change–migration nexus often overlook the subjective experience behind climate change; erratic climatic events do not happen in isolation of other political, economic, social, and cultural conditions. Examining peoples' lived experiences and their emotions of that impact (e.g., risk, fear, attachments to place) and how these relate to climate change offers an opportunity to understand how they may or may not influence mobility. While interest in "the emotional" has grown in the social sciences (see Lutz and White 1986) and in migration scholarship in general, few scholars consider the emotional and behavioral factors of climate change in their analyses (e.g., Gorman-Murray 2010), and when migration is added to this picture, even less so (see, however, Parsons 2019). One way that we can begin to more deeply understand the plight and subjectivities of people's lived experiences connected with climate change-related events is through ethnography or storytelling, or as some have recently put it, "storying climate change" (Crate 2019). Eliciting stories of how people grapple with environmental events and migration also helps us to convey in a more accessible fashion these issues to the wider public and provides another source of framing—besides the story we get from scholarly research and the media.

Droughts

In this section, we examine research on drought and migration. This subject has received the greatest attention in the emerging body of empirical case studies capturing environment and climate change dynamics in migration (Okobata et al. 2014; Piguet et al. 2018). Droughts can lead to severe consequences affecting more people than any other natural hazard due to their large scale and long-lasting nature. Droughts often lead to famines and to what Watts (1983) calls "silent violence." Watts' (1983) classic study bridges the environment and political economy and highlights how famines do not constitute a purely "natural" phenomenon. In the case of droughts and highly variable precipitation as a human migration driver, recent studies observe that environmental determinants may play a pivotal role in household-level decisions to migrate. As Cohen and Sirkeci write at the beginning of this volume, migration processes are intimately linked to the household as an adaptive unit where various social actors make decisions (Wilk 1991). Drought can lead to severe consequences, especially when it occurs in regions with populations already extremely vulnerable due to structural violence, neoliberal policies, and historical contingencies. In areas that experience crop loss and that count with no accessible crop insurance programs, like much of the developing world, households may respond to drought by sending a household member to work elsewhere and remit part of their earnings (Massey et al. 1993; Okobata et al. 2014; Hunter et al. 2015).

Most scholarship looking at the rainfall–migration nexus in the Western Hemisphere focuses on rural Mexico. Several recent studies correlate low or variable rainfall with U.S.-bound migration from Mexico (e.g., Feng et al. 2010; Hunter et al. 2013; Nawrotzki et al. 2013, 2016). Feng et al. (2010) observe that a 10 percent loss in crop production due to droughts fuels migration to the U.S. Hunter et al. (2013) and Nawrotski et al. (2013, 2016) also examine migration from rural Mexico to the U.S. and find that there is a correlation between drought and migration, but this correlation is stronger in the dry states of northern Mexico, especially in places with strong migration networks and a culture of migration.

As emphasized earlier, environmental changes like drought alone do not propel people to migrate. Social networks play a big role too on where, and if, migrants migrate—as do other economic, political, cultural, and social forces. And, for some time now, migration scholars have recognized the importance of social networks in migration processes (e.g., Massey and Espinosa 1997), how individuals forge connections and social fields across expanses of space and time (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994) and how communities develop a "culture of migration" (Cohen 2004; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). If a culture of migration is well developed, international migration, then, might be a critical coping mechanism to environmental changes like drought.

Hurricanes, Tropical Depressions, and Floods

Hurricanes, tropical depressions, and floods are examples of rapid-onset environmental events that may influence people's decisions to migrate. This is especially true in migrant sending regions that also face multiple structural political and economic barriers (e.g., poverty, debt, a fragile state or narco state, corruption, impunity, stripping away of state programs due to economic neoliberal policies). Thus, disentangling migration forcing variables in these scenarios often can be challenging.

A classic case highlighting environmentally induced migration is Haiti. Environmental disasters such as hurricanes, tropical depressions, and flooding due to environmental degradation have long affected Haiti (Alscher 2011). Almost all of its forests have disappeared. Haitians have left their island because of political oppression, but many have left because of the severity of their deteriorated environmental resources—soil, water, and trees that undergird their agricultural economy (Murray 1987; de Sherbinin 1996). Such physical, economic, and political conditions, when coupled with severe weather events like hurricanes, ultimately shape Haitians' decisions to migrate. A recent study highlighting the Haitian case captures how social inequality and environmental factors fuel international migration to Canada, where well-established communities of Haitians exist in Ottawa and Montreal (Mezdour et al. 2015). And, the IOM (2013) reveals that Brazil has become another new destination for Haitians.

In southern Mexico and parts of Central America, environmental changes that have contributed to international migration include hurricane Mitch in 1998, and hurricanes Stan and Wilma in 2005. These environmental disasters contributed to heightened ecological vulnerability and U.S.-bound migration (Alscher 2010). When fast-onset disasters like hurricanes, tropical storms, and flooding affect an area, like it did in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, this can lead to the development of "new" sending regions, especially as places develop a "culture of migration" (Moran-Taylor et al. n.d.). In another study, Wrathall (2012) found that following hurricane Mitch in Honduras the most economically disadvantaged households in Garífuna communities often decide to migrate internally or to send members to the U.S. Although Central America is considered one of the regions in Latin America most vulnerable to climatic and environmental change, a plethora of other reasons also drive many to leave their homes and migrate north. Additionally, what makes this region stand out is that it is considered one of the most violent and crime-ridden areas in the world with one of the highest homicide rates as well (excluding war zones), engendering insecurity, fear and a spike in asylum cases (Moran-Taylor 2020). So, when fast-onset phenomena like hurricanes impact migrant sending regions, these climatic events can aggravate the precarity that many vulnerable populations contend with in their everyday lives.

Sea Level Rise (SLR)

In contrast to fast-onset hazards like hurricanes and slow-onset phenomena like droughts and variable rainfall which are context-specific and can be temporary, scholars show that linkages between SLR and migration are more clear (Piguet et al. 2011). This is principally true for South Asia and the South Pacific atolls (Kaenzig and Piguet 2014) and many coastal and low-lying mega cities (McLeman 2018), which have experienced SLR over long periods of time. While scientists debate how much and how quickly the ocean's waters will rise, politicians and economists remain at odds over how to deal with the ramifications of flooding, erosion, and the poisoning of farmland by brine (*Economist*, August 17, 2019). A region projected to experience major population displacements due to drastic SLR are small island states in the Pacific. Atolls like Kiribati may be permanently submerged in a few more decades. In Latin America, however, there is less environmental damage due to SLR and no SLR-related migration is documented in the literature, although it is expected that SLR will have a greater impact along Latin America's Atlantic coast and the Caribbean (Kaenzig and Piguet 2014). Thus, in comparison to other environmental and climatic factors linking human migration, SLR studies focusing on Latin America remain limited (Piguet et al. 2011).

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT

In what follows we address the literature highlighting the impact of migration on the environment in Latin America; in particular we focus on remittances, natural resources, deforestation and forest recovery, and changing agricultural activities. The effects of migration on the environment vary. Just as scholars who study how the environment can influence migration, studies on how the environment is affected by migration reveals that the ramifications are location-specific and depend on the culture, economic, social, and politics of each place, including aspects like the culture of migration. Put simply, the consequences of migration on the environment are mediated by manifold context-specific factors and no generalized statements can elucidate how migration changes the environment.

International Migration, Remittances, and Environment

When exploring how migration and remittances—both social and economic—may affect the environment, past research points out how returnees and/or cash remittances can play a central role in migrants' places of origin. Remittances (i.e., the monies that migrants send back and that may take various forms) have become the economic bastions of many developing countries, often play a huge role in development, and often do more than "official" development programs and funds. The World Bank (2019) estimates that $529 billion flowed back as remittances to migrants' home countries during 2018—a global record. This figure, however, is only the traceable amount. Migrants often rely on informal transfers that are not included in the World Bank calculations. Remittances are not only money and tangible items, but also social remittances that can influence how people think about the environment and, consequently, make changes to it—directly and indirectly (Moran-Taylor and Taylor 2010).

The 1990s and 2000s saw an increase in studies documenting the consequences of migration on the environment in migrant sending regions. For example, Gray (2009) observes that emigration and cash remittances dramatically transform smallholder agriculturalists in rural Ecuadorian Andes due to declines in labor availability and income growth. In terms of maize production, he shows that it decreased with male emigration, slightly increased with cash remittances, and changed little because of female out-migration or internal cash remittances. Yarnall and Price (2010) illustrate how cash remittances shape the region of Valle Alto in Bolivia turning it into a "new rurality" and allow for land purchases, mechanization and cultivation of market crops.

Studies of international migration and natural resources in Guatemala show how direct links to the environment develop if migrants switch from firewood to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking (Moran-Taylor and Taylor 2010; Taylor et al. 2011) and how cash remittances can lead to both deforestation and afforestation within the same community as well as accumulation of land in the hands of migrants which migrant households may or may not employ for agriculture (Taylor et al. 2016). As emphasized, international migration outcomes depend on multiple factors at the national, regional, local, and household level. For instance, some migrant households abandon their land as their children gain higher levels of education and no longer want or need the hard work of agricultural labor (Taylor et al. 2016).

Existing research shows too that international migration and resultant economic and social remittances lead to deforestation or reforestation in migrants' sending communities depending

on a number of factors such as the types of investments migrant households generate, markets, policies, institutions, community governance (e.g., Bilsborrow 1992; Hecht et al. 2006; Kull et al. 2007; Robson and Klooster 2019). Bilsborrow (1992) highlights how return migrants in Ecuador can be linked to lower levels of deforestation. Kull et al. (2007) look at international migration and environmental issues in Costa Rica and Madagascar (two biodiversity hotspots), with a lens on tropical forest transitions and consider the role neoliberal reforms, tourism, migration, and international conservation agendas play in forest recovery. Additionally, Hecht et al. (2006) find in El Salvador that areas that receive high remittances correlate with areas of forest expansion. Focusing on rural Oaxaca, Mexico, Robson and Klooster (2019) examine new forest uses and conservation efforts and find that although out-migration can be challenging for community governance of forest resources, less participation in agricultural activities can allow for forests to potentially recover. Other Latin American studies exploring this topic show how international migration can lead to forest recovery (Hecht and Saatchi 2007; Schmook and Radel 2008).

International Migration and Agricultural Production

With respect to migration and agricultural production, several divergent perspectives and diverging outcomes emerge in the literature. One group of researchers underscores that migration leads to labor shortages and that remittances are not invested in productive agricultural ways (Durand et al. 1996; Binford 2003). Other studies identify how cash remittances are used for purchasing land, livestock, and increasing agricultural production (e.g., Taylor et al. 2006). Investments in agriculture occur, however, only after consumer demands are met, where political economic incentives are found, and in areas where environmental conditions are favorable (Durand and Massey 1992). Migrant households may purchase land for agriculture, resulting in inflation of land value, but this land may be slated for pasture or withdrawn from production rather than improved or cultivated on a regular basis (e.g., Taylor et al. 2006). Cohen and Rodriguez (2005), in a study of rural Oaxaca, Mexico, observe that nearly one quarter of cash remittances sent home is allocated to agriculture or farm-related areas. Economic remittances also lead to investments in coffee expansion in Guatemala, with support of local cooperatives and transnational producers' networks, as well as additional land purchases (Aguilar Støen 2012; Aguilar Støen et al. 2016).

Jokisch (2002) demonstrates the lack of impact that cash remittances have on cultivation practices in Ecuador. Agricultural production is a cultural and risk-averse activity, given the poor environment, low returns on cultivated crops, and a lack of irrigation, thus investment in cultivation is not a good option. Instead, migrants invest in a peri-urban real estate (Jokisch 2002). Gray and Bilsborrow (2014) also highlight that emigration from rural Ecuador has little impact on agricultural activities. And, in the central Bolivian Andes, out-migration results in locals growing biodiverse maize landraces versus losing biodiversity knowledge (Zimmerer 2014). Other studies illustrate how migration transforms land use, creating opportunities and challenges for indigenous environmental governance and conservation in Oaxaca, Mexico (e.g., Klooster 2013; Robson and Klooster 2019).

More recently, Radel et al. (2018) in their study focusing on northwestern Nicaragua, an area experiencing drier climatic conditions where small-scale farmers rely on rain-fed agriculture, find that out-migration among small-scale farmers does not function as adaptation to climate change nor does it reflect a failure to adapt. In another study, Carte et al. (2019)

examine Nicaraguan small-scale farmers' migration to neighboring El Salvador and Costa Rica for semi-subsistence agriculture and highlight that these farmers participate in international migration (temporary and repeat journeys) which helps them to live subsistence livelihoods and to moderate food insecurity.

Gender dimensions are discussed among some researchers looking at the environment–climate change–migration nexus, though very little work emphasizes this intersection (see, however, Gray 2009; Radel et al. 2010). Yet, in the migration scholarship in general, gender and migration has been well studied and documented (e.g., Donato et al. 2006). As past scholars observe, when looking at gender dynamics we gain more holistic insights into how gender norms, policies, and institutions interplay to configure international migration's causes and consequences. For sure, when we include gender in the environment–climate change–migration nexus, we end up with a different migration story. Some scholars, for example, attend to gender and cash remittances and how this promotes investments in agriculture, particularly maize cultivation (e.g., Gray 2009). Radel et al. (2010), embracing a transnational lens, interrogate the gendered nature of international migration and land management in the Yucatán, Mexico and in Vermont, USA. The authors observe that in migrant sending communities gender norms altered—from women typically being left out of the decision-making and management of agricultural fields to being actively involved when spouses migrate.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Yet another review on the environment–migration nexus? Even as we write, more reviews appear![6] Many of these reviews vary in focus and scope and account for inter-disciplinary perspectives. Also, scholarly research on this topic is changing fast and expanding considerably, as climate change studies are in the spotlight. Additionally, recent popular and political discourse about migrants has placed migration in the forefront of research agendas.

Here, then, we present some of our concluding remarks as a springboard for further thought and research on the environment–climate change–migration nexus. Recent work has stimulated debate, reaction, and reformulation and has led to multiple reviews of migration and the environment, especially from geographers, seeking to understand where we stand in this line of inquiry. A concern in this line of inquiry is that academics employ distinct research methodologies and tend to employ different definitions and/or social categories of migration (Black et al. 2011; Obokota et al. 2014; Piguet et al. 2018). In part, this happens due to the various disciplines now focusing on the interplay of migration and the environment. Much research drawing on quantitative data (e.g., census data, environmental data such as rainfall, average temperature, and/or soil quality information used in modelling data, datasets obtained from national household surveys or datasets generated from other research projects like the Mexican Migration Project) attempts to flesh out environmentally induced migration. Debates continue with regards to who is directly impacted and how the environment is affected due to climate change. Additionally, often when addressing the linkages between the environment–climate change–migration nexus, there is a lack of accountability of historical antecedents or past social inequalities of the localities studied which may contribute to making people more vulnerable to recent climate change and environmental issues and thus tip their decision to migrate.

Although it is easy to call for multi-disciplinary studies of the environment–migration nexus in attempts to gain holistic views of the relative roles of all the variables involved in the discussion to migrate, we must also exercise caution. As Anderson et al. (2019) observe, popular discourse and anecdotes from farmers point to changes in climate. Many areas of the Western Hemisphere, especially Central America, however, lack climate data of sufficient spatial and temporal resolution to explore climate–migration relationships. Novel explorations (e.g., Anderson et al. 2019) and new datasets are beginning to overcome the obstacles that lack of data present. It is only then, with reliable climate and environmental data, that natural and social scientists can begin to explore and gain deeper and broader understandings of the environment–climate change–migration nexus.

NOTES

1. The Global Internal Monitoring Displacement Database (IDMC n.d.) estimates that over 25 million people were displaced due to severe weather events in each year over the last decade. Available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data.
2. Created by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization.
3. The CliMig database focuses on migration, the environment, and climate change, compiled at the Institute of Geography of the University of Neuchatel, Switzerland. Additionally, it strictly includes academic literature (see Piguet et al. 2018).
4. Much research pays attention to internal migration because when fast-onset phenomena like flooding, torrential rains, cyclones and hurricanes affect a region, people usually make short distance moves within national boundaries (Black et al. 2011; Oliver-Smith 2012; McLeman 2014; Okobata et al. 2014).
5. In recent years, scholars have focused on the topic of "securitizing" when addressing the climate change–migration nexus (see, for example, Baldwin et al. 2014; Gemenne et al. 2014).
6. Veronis et al. (2018), in their environmental change and international migration review, counted 23 literature reviews published in the last two decades—from different disciplinary backgrounds, methodological assessments, and foci. As of this writing, then, there are 26 reviews associated with the migration–environment nexus and vice versa.

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11. Taste and displacement
Micah M. Trapp

SOUR MILK SKYSCRAPERS

Small parcels of sour milk, frozen solid, were incredibly satiating in the hot climate on the southern coast of Ghana but could be hard to find. Occasionally I would hear someone calling out "sour milk, sour milk!" or see someone carrying a cooler on their head, a pretty good sign that they were selling something frozen. My fondness for the creamy, sweet, and sour fermented drinks became known among my regular research participants at the Buduburam Liberian refugee camp and I received a tip that there was a woman who sold entire bottles of sour milk. One afternoon I made my way into a pink compound on the outskirts of the camp, near the Big Apple Guesthouse, to find the fabled bottles. As I stepped into the compound, I noticed a woman washing clothes under a small tree. I approached her and asked if anyone sold sour milk. Before she could even respond, we were met with playful taunts from a neighbour: "Ohhh, this is really IT for yooouu." "Resettlement has come, oh!" The man continued to spin a colourful narrative about how the woman washing clothes would soon be seeing skyscrapers. I'm certain my cheeks immediately flushed to match the pink of the compound walls and accompanying sunset. Grace confirmed that she sold sour milk and ushered me into her house.

As she pulled sour milk from a giant freezer, I glanced around the sitting room filled with upholstered furniture and engaged with the little kids jumping around and shyly smiling at me. It was hard for me to focus; my thoughts were consumed by the bitingly playful imagery of skyscrapers and the pronouncement of resettlement, all unfolding upon my arrival in the compound and nestled in the shadows of the Big Apple Guesthouse. My taste for sour milk had led me into a maze of metaphoric nesting and dissonance of place. In this piece I follow the narrative threads of sour milk in the Big Apple and the life cycle of refugee displacement to look more closely at how taste and place—as nature, landscape, and socio-political boundary—matter in constituting refugee identities, experiences, and aspirational futures.

Food, as a necessary and everyday practice, serves as a primary mechanism for generating and negotiating culture. Anthropologists approach the relationship between food and culture as one of the central means of constituting local, regional, and national identities; thereby linking people, place, and food in intimate relation. In the 21st century we are at once comfortable with high-speed mobility of people and things, while clinging to the idea of rootedness as natural, authentic, and valuable. Circulations of diverse foodways across the globe are celebrated and savoured, but also emerge as sites of "gastronomic racism" (Cavanaugh in Counihan 2018: 44). Indeed, concerns over the naturalization of inequality through relationship to land—more specifically, dirt (Douglas 1966)—and food have occupied the anthropological discipline for decades. How do some people and foods on the move become targets of discrimination and dehumanization?

I have argued that taste serves as a form of engagement in the refugee camp, enabling refugees to counter the dehumanizing experiences and expectations that coincide with

being displaced (Trapp 2016). In this chapter, I further my analysis by approaching taste as a micro-vitality, a communicative, thinking, and living being, expressive of and engaged in the pursuit of life-sustaining potential. I attach the prefix "micro" to reflect both the microscopic unfolding of taste underneath the surface of ordinary, everyday perception; as well as the microbial nature of tasting, a life process illustrated literally in the case of sour milk. Microbes generate and threaten life, a dual potentiality that is often in immediate play in the migratory lives of refugees.

Known through "embodied anthropology" (Holmes 2013) and close ethnographic analysis, taste has emerged in my work as a multispecies interlocutor, unfolding across the life cycle and landscape of displacement, from the Liberian homeland (though this is hardly a homogenous entity) and the Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana to the United States, once the colonizer and now preferred third country resettlement site. As a multispecies interlocutor, the micro-vitality of taste sparks and sustains dialogues and connections across space and time. Taste as memory, sensory action, and aspirational desire weaves place—as a natural, social, and political landscape and territory—with animals, people, and microbes. Approaching taste from the perspective of displacement enables us to rethink the connections between food, taste, people, and place as well as the moral messages and valuations we attach to certain people and places. While the disruptions of displacement allow us to see and know the vitality of taste, the generative potential of taste resides in all who taste. The micro-vitality of taste thus exposes the ordinariness of upheaval, emergence, and becoming.

ROOTED TASTES, FOOD ON THE MOVE

Anthropologists have engaged deeply with questions of food on the move, from the nutritional mechanics of how diets change to the social and cultural dimensions of identity, belonging, and loss that unfold through human migration. Humans maintain imaginative and sensory memories and ideas of good food that are linked to specific places and times. Contemporary multi-cultural food landscapes rely heavily on markers of authenticity to discern place-based qualities of migrant foods (Heldke 2008). However, studies of food and taste among displaced populations focus on the dual loss of meaning and place; for example, Elizabeth Dunn (2011) shows how Georgian refugees treat food rations in the refugee camp as "foods of sorrow," entirely void of meaning. In "Tasting of Displacement," Joan Goss (2018) also observes connections between taste and a loss of home through the indexical use of "fresh" among Latin American migrants in the United States: "[I]t's not the pleasure of taste that repairs the losses in these cases, it's the memory of the pleasure of tastes no longer available that reminds one of the loss of home" (205). "[B]iting into an old mango is tasting displacement" (201). When on the move, good taste remains at a distance, as something lost, remembered, and to be found again through connection to a homeland. This distanced taste reveals the ways in which we connect the goodness and value of food and taste to specific places and landscapes.

In the "global dialogue about taste," terroir features prominently as the conceptual framework for understanding the significance of place as expressive of the unique qualities of the earth, soil, sun, and land (Trubek 2008: 6 and 12). Terroir articulates and generates value from nature—the soil, sun, minerals, climate; and food is characterized as having a distinct taste as a result of these natural elements. Terroir evokes qualities of discernment, purity, rootedness, and belonging. The French concept initially used to describe wine production has expanded

across Europe and beyond to discern the unique tastes of olive oil, cheese, and maple syrup and has even inspired the concept of merroir to express the distinct tastes imparted by specific bodies of water. The literally and figuratively rich landscapes generating terroir—the wine groves of Loire, olive orchards of Tuscany, etc.—contrast sharply with the places of my research: seaside landscapes marred by conflict, contamination (sewage, machine guns, trash, lack of water), as well as displacement, and producing a more complicated environment for the production of food, taste, and value.

Monterescu (2017) articulates the "palatable characteristics of place," along the Palestinian–Israeli border, where he encounters "soil with political meaning, defendable boundaries and collective entitlement." "Terroir here bespeaks geopolitical history (between capitalism and communism) and a pollution-free biological diversity" (132). Terroir offers a way of thinking about taste emerging from people and places of conflict, displacement, and dispossession, but the gastronomical valence of producing wine still generates a kind of capital that remains remarkably absent at my field sites on the shores of West Africa. Using terroir in my research context furthers the connection between cuisine and empire (see Laudan 2013), but it is not on these grounds alone that I abandon the concept. Terroir and the tastes it creates do not account for the generative and aspirational potential of sour milk skyscrapers.

While microbes have certainly generated value in many contemporary food practices—raw, artisanal cheese, fermented kombuchas—the potential for microbial life in foods remains frightening in certain places and for certain people in ways that reflect on-going social inequalities. Refugees and refugee camps remain intimately associated with and unjustly exposed to such microbial dangers. I argue that the micro-vitality of taste illustrates the subtle ways in which taste emerges as a communicative, thinking, and living being, expressive of and engaged in the pursuit of life-sustaining potential. In doing so, I show how taste exposes, falls prey to, and protects from the visible and invisible risks and life-sustaining potentiality of displacement.

FROM SETTLEMENT IN LIBERIA TO LIBERIANS ON THE MOVE

In order to build my case for the micro-vitality of taste as it unfolds and lives across place and time to connect a refugee camp to New York skyscrapers, I offer brief historical accounts of transnational migration and the colonial relationship between the United States and what is now the nation-state of Liberia. Next, I present an overview of the recent series of civil wars in and displacement of refugees from Liberia.

From Colonization to Nation-State

The area of West Africa known as the "Grain Coast" is thought to have been populated by people migrating from the disintegration of the Malian empire. Spanish explorers first arrived in the West African region that is today's Liberia in the 13th century. In 1444, Portuguese traders were the first Europeans to raid and seize African slaves (H. Klein 1999: 103; M. Klein 2002: xiii). Other Europeans soon joined suit (Azikiwe 1934: 35; M. Klein 2002: xiii) and the first African slaves to North America arrived in Jamestown, Virginia in 1619 (M. Klein 2002: xiv). At the height of the slave trade to the United States, nearly 80,000 people were brought to the American colonies (H. Klein 1999: 57).

The American Colonization Society (ACS) was established in 1816 "to promote and execute a plan for colonizing (with their consent) the free people of colour, residing in our country, in Africa or other such other place as Congress shall deem most expedient" (American Colonization Society 1818). While colonization emerged through the guise of freedom, the policy of emancipation with deportation generated a notion of asylum as the "morally acceptable method of expatriation of free blacks" (Sawyer 1992: 19). Members of the ACS personally benefited from slavery and shared President Jefferson's rhetoric of free, but not equal: "When freed, [the slave] is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture" (Thomas Jefferson quoted in Sanneh 1999: 183).[1] Following great struggle, in 1821 the ACS attempted to sign a treaty for land in Grand Bassa (the eastern shore of contemporary Liberia) (Harris 1985: 28) and eventually seized land in Cape Mensurado (about 130 miles long, 40 miles wide) in exchange for $300 worth of goods (Sanneh 1999: 205).

Christened as Monrovia, after President Monroe, in 1822, the colony eventually became the Commonwealth of Liberia in 1839 (Akpan 1973: 218). In 1847, Liberia became an independent republic with Joseph Jenkins Roberts presiding as the first president of the independent nation. An educated, freeborn man from Norfolk, Virginia, Roberts travelled to Liberia with his mother, a former slave in 1829. The initial settlers—later called Americo-Liberians—were primarily middle class, free black men whose success in the United States was limited by pervasive racism (Moran 1990: 58). For these settlers, West Africa offered the potential of limitless opportunities, as the colony existed outside the restrictive confines of United States' (U.S.) racism. However, underneath the black settlers' rhetoric of freedom, internal domestic relations between the settlers and Africans were marked with social strife.

SEEDS OF STRIFE

Under the new Liberian Constitution, indigenous Africans were not permitted to be citizens and were unable to own land; but indigenous Africans could "pass" as settler elite, which posed risks to maintaining concentration of power among Americo-Liberians. Settler superiority was thus filtered through the concept of "civilization" and being "civilized" (Brown 1982; Fraenkel 1964; Liebenow 1969; Tonkin 1981; Moran 1990). While education (Moran 1990) and salary (Tonkin 1981) were prominent features of being "civilized,"—or kui, a Kru word meaning "western"—speaking English, lifestyle, dress (men wearing western suits, women wearing dresses), food habits, cleanliness and mannerisms also demarcated "civilized" status. Particularly as manifested in cleanliness—e.g. keeping one's yard swept, eating with utensils or keeping house—"civilized" status transposed social inequality into moral worth, such that "kui is a concept for aspirants, not achievers, who need not measure themselves in such terms" (Tonkin 1981: 321, 323) and attempts to naturalize the privilege of Americo-Liberians. The aspirational performance of "being civilized" is a key aspect for understanding the micro-vitality of taste.

The Americo-Liberian elite successfully maintained power for more than a century, until 1980, when President Tolbert was assassinated in coup by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe (Harris 1985: 75). Doe, a man without formal education from the Krahn ethnic group, pursued power in the name of the liberation of "country" people, and through the creation and exploitation of ethnic identities and constituencies in opposition to the Americo-Liberian elite identity (Ellis 1995: 177–178). On Christmas Eve 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, invaded the eastern part of Liberia, ultimately toppling the

Doe regime (Ellis 2007: 75). A lengthy and intermittent civil war unfolded from 1989 to 2003, resulting in more than 200,000 casualties, about 750,000 refugees and 1.2 million internally displaced people (U.S. Department of State 1998: 2). In a country with a pre-war population of approximately 3 million, the loss of life was tremendous and devastating.

REFUGEES IN GHANA

Following the outbreak of violence in Liberia, thousands of people fled to neighbouring countries including Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, and Ghana. The Ghana government opened the Buduburam Liberian refugee camp in response to the arrival of several large groups in September 1990. Located about 40 kilometres west of the Ghanaian capital of Accra, the Buduburam refugee camp became home to nearly 40,000 refugees by 2007. The population at the camp fluctuated over time; people arrived and departed from the camp with frequency as Liberians attempted to find better opportunities within and outside of the West African region. Some refugees tried to return to Liberia in the late 1990s and as the war seemed to dissipate, but when civil war erupted again in 2002 refugees once again fled to Buduburam.

When I spent three months at the Buduburam camp in 2005, the camp had long since shifted from a landscape of tent structures to mud brick houses covered with tin roofing and was host to a rather vibrant economy—partially supported by the arrival of financial remittances from family resettled to the United States and other wealthy nations. Spurred in part by the power of these remittances as well as the age-old power association of being connected to the United States, many refugees hoped to resettle in the United States. When I returned to the camp in December 2008, the conditions were very different. The economy of the camp reflected the global economic crisis. People pinched resources and were uncertain about what the future held. Many refugees had built homes and lives at the camp amidst the struggle of camp conditions. Limited livelihood options in Liberia meant that few wanted to return (or even go for the first time if they had been born at Buduburam), especially given the high cost of living in Monrovia and the prospect of being stigmatized for the time spent at Buduburam. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ghana government planned to close the camp and people were tense. The possible threat of losing refugee status loomed large; a cessation clause would revoke refugee status and mean that resettlement to a Western country and access to its resources and status would no longer be possible. The simultaneous hope for resettlement and anxiety about the closure of the camp settled over households like a deep fog and seeped into all aspects of my research, as registered in the opening narrative of sour milk skyscrapers. By the time of my departure from Buduburam in July 2009, the World Food Program had ceased operations at the camp; and in 2012 the UNHCR invoked a cessation clause, effectively revoking refugee status from all Liberians.

The Homeless Omelette, Taste as Method

My stomach growled as the scent of the fried okra sauce wafted up from the cook pot. The rising steam was visible in the unlit room, made even darker by a ceiling heavy with the weight of war. As Patrice stirred the sauce, she told me that she wanted to repair the ceiling. Patrice and I met in 2005 when she was living at the Buduburam Liberian refugee camp in Ghana. We reconnected in Monrovia, four years later, and she was filling me in about what it was like to live in Liberia again. As she dished up her okra sauce, she implored me to make

some of "my food" for her during my brief stay. "Maybe a homeless?" Patrice asked. Patrice explained that her neighbour makes a really delicious one with potatoes, but I had never heard of a "homeless." After some back and forth, I asked: "Do you mean an omelette?!" "Yes, yes. That is it. An omelette." Through our laughter, the juxtapositions quickly surfaced as the simple, well-travelled and esteemed dish confronted the weight of its displaced moniker: the "American" food with a French name being cooked in Monrovia, a place once settled by freed people "returned" from the United States.

Once I returned home to the United States, the homeless omelette appeared only as a small aside in my field notes. It was overshadowed—I was surprised to learn—by frequent, detailed accounts of the hot egg sandwiches slathered with mayonnaise that I would eat just before bedtime and at the insistence of my host in Monrovia. The egg sandwiches reflected the high standards of Liberian hospitality and how taking care of guests is a direct reflection of one's social standing. Nevertheless, preparing such decadent sandwiches nightly also posed an economic burden that I had to find ways to offset as a refusal to eat would be insulting. So rich and delicious, the sandwiches were unlike anything I had eaten in months, but what I found so striking was that I did not write about the taste of the sandwiches as much as I wrote about what the taste of the sandwiches did in and around me. The soft eggs lulled me into moments of rest and brief feelings of being at home; they softened my gaze and allowed me to look outwards and take more in: the people working along the beach, the sound of scraping rice from a cookpot, glass shards pressed into the top of a concrete wall as a security device. As a method, taste was vitalizing.

Anthropologists have shown how taste informs collective ways of knowing and being in the world. Marc Lalonde (1992) has argued that taste operates as a perception and form of consciousness to construct and filter meaning through the meal. Ramona Perez's (2014) ethnographic work in Mexico proposed a theory of taste, sabor, as a worldview that organizes space, kinship, and nurturing. In each case, taste—while embodied—is still located in and emerges primarily from the mind. I want to think about how taste moves in the material world, in the body, and between bodies and worlds.

In what follows I draw on a series of fieldwork encounters that took place during my 10 months at the Buduburam Liberian refugee camp in Ghana (2005 and 2008–2009) and a brief two-week trip to Monrovia, in 2009, to explore how taste exposes, falls prey to, and protects from the visible and invisible risks and life-sustaining potentiality of displacement. My understanding of the life cycle and landscape of displacement is also informed by my two years of work as a practitioner in two refugee resettlement agencies in the United States. My job duties put me in regular contact with refugees who had resettled in the United States and one position was specifically linked to food and nutrition programs.

SOMETHING FISHY AND BEACH BEANS: UNEARTHING COLONIAL ROOTS

The afternoon sun was hot. As I stepped over the short concrete wall into the courtyard surrounded by five houses, one of which I rented, my neighbours and landlords—Johnson and Rose—called out a friendly greeting. They were sitting in a small cluster of white plastic chairs and though it had been a long day and I was exhausted, I walked over to join in the conversation. They had just received a box of food from Liberia and were happy to respond to inquiries

about what they had received. Pulling out what looked like a diamond-encrusted piece of smoked, salted fish from the box, Johnson inhaled the smell of the treasured, double-imported fish (first to Liberia, then to Ghana) and much to my surprise, started laughing. Seeing my puzzled look, he explained that the fish was so delicious that it had caused many problems in Liberia. Johnson launched into telling a story.

Settlers in southeast Liberia first brought this fish to the Bassa people who lived there. In exchange, the Bassa people had given small pieces of land to the settlers, who kept bringing the fish. Over time the settlers had accumulated a vast swath of land. Warning me that the Bassa people would not find his accounting of events so funny, Johnson exclaimed, "you [Bassa] sold all that land for small fish?!"

Johnson's narrative presents the colonial encroachment of Liberia as a comic (and offensive, especially to the Bassa people) tale featuring the production and seduction of new tastes as a dubious, though otherwise successful strategy for the extraction of land and ultimate colonization. In this story, taste is alluring and compelling, it can summon and dispossess, if only in jest. But this vitality frames how we understand dispossession and displacement. Johnson's story unfolded from a contemporary place of exile, more than a century after the dispossessing taste of the fish. Arriving at the Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana, the smoked and salted fish becomes an interlocutor across time and place. I explain the enduring micro-vitality of the smoked fish through another ethnographic encounter.

On one particularly sunny and breezy afternoon, Mary burst from her front door with a bowl of beans and rice in her hands and shouted: "Blessing, you went to the beach to cook these beans today! They really fine, oh!" The moment shone with the pleasure that comes from being satiated. Blessing, Mary's neighbour, had shared the small, red-brown ration beans that she prepared early that morning. Blessing's generous seasoning of the beans and Mary's subsequent quip offer a deeper view of the relationship between taste and place. The preparation of the beans from inside the place of the refugee camp faced the material constraints of the quality of World Food Program provisions, including "dirty, black" salt, so when Mary tasted the deliciousness of the beans, she attributed the adept seasoning to a place outside of the refugee camp. However, the imagined place of the beach and the pure sea salt was not literally responsible for the taste; Blessing's figurative trip to the beach to season the beans signals the central role of movement and imagination in the relationship between taste and place.

By attributing the deliciousness of the beans to the beach, Mary draws attention to the ways in which food production and the potential of the seasoning are intimately linked to the landscapes and power. However, unlike the rooted goodness of terroir, movement played a central role in generating good taste. The micro-vitality of taste—its ability to compel consumption and to sustain human life, in this case—emerges from movement. Refugees do not remain solely subject to the abject conditions of displacement; they find ways to season generously and maintain vitality through movement. The salty sea emerges as a site of dispossession and vitalization, tracing and connecting a history of displacement and dispossession through colonization to contemporary conditions of displacement and exile into one narrative.

WATER: PURE, EMERGENCY, MINERAL

The saltiness of ground water at Buduburam ensured that access remained a fraught issue and contrasted starkly with Liberians' memories of the ample presence of clean, free water at home. The lack of water pumps meant that tanker trucks deposited water into private reservoirs at the camp. Entrepreneurial Ghanaians and Liberians able to invest in a reservoir would have water trucked in and sold it by the bucket. The quality of reservoir water was dubious at best and was typically reserved for bathing, washing clothes and cooking; and even then, those who could afford to do so (including myself) would add a splash of an antiseptic to the water before bathing. Those who could not afford reservoir water relied on well water or rainwater collection, both of which had serious contamination problems. In 2008, a U.S.-based non-profit organization successfully installed 16 running water pumps throughout the camp and sold water at a 50 percent lower cost. However, during my field research, there were frequent and persistent periods of water shortage. A water engineer who worked in a city in Northern Ghana described the water situation at Buduburam to me as "emergency water" given the resounding lack of infrastructural investment in providing a regular, safe water source to those who lived there. Buduburam had served as a refugee camp for nearly 20 years by that time and so her designation of "emergency water" was rather remarkable, though its alarmist quality certainly reflected the daily reality of those living at Buduburam.

For those who could afford it, drinking water—"pure water"—was consumed from packaged 500ml clear plastic sachets. However, a lack of regulation within the industry and the widespread presence of typhoid and other water-borne diseases often left refugees with a risky decision when choosing among a dizzying array of pure waters. My research participants preferred certain water brands but warned that you must ultimately evaluate the quality and potential risk of water sachets on your own. Through advice, trial, and error, I generally developed a taste for Life Water and Standard pure water, though I occasionally drank other brands such as God's Blessing or Love Me True. However, my preference for these waters was fluid (no pun intended) and could not be left to the mind and brand allegiance; taste was required. Pure water could taste of slightly stale dirt, hinting a vibrant and likely unwanted microbial life inside the sachet. Hot water sachets tasted like plastic that, if not detected initially through touch, would quickly register through smell, and most certainly as it travelled down the oesophagus (and even possibly back up).

Such sensory engagement was necessary practice and could enable the detection of unwanted microbes. Mercy, an elder and one of my regular research participants, explained that several years ago someone had purchased empty Standard water sachets and filled them with dirty water. Standard had a strong, positive reputation and many people regularly drank it; as a result, the scheme caused many people to become sick with typhoid. During a trip outside of the camp with Mercy, she taught me about the simultaneous importance of place and taste in discerning the quality of unknown pure water. In the hot sun she had resorted to drinking an unknown brand, but immediately knew from the taste that the water was not pure. The risk of the microbial-ridden water coincided with Mercy's experience of being out of place when outside of the Buduburam camp. Upon our return to the camp, she took an antibiotic in hopes of mitigating the microbial life she sensed in the water.

Being able to taste the nature of the water crucially informs consumption and reconfigures the relationship between body, mind, and nature. Wilk (2006) has argued that the branding and consumer choice in the bottled water industry, especially in the U.S., is not governed by

taste, but through images of nature and place. However, in the precarious place of the refugee camp, the taste of nature played a key role in discerning the purity of water. This is not to say that place and larger ideas of belonging did not factor in, but it was not the most salient factor of discernment. One of the most targeted and unsuccessful branding attempts took form in the wrapping of water in a Lonestar label, a nationalist cloak intended to appeal to Liberians in Ghana. The effort failed spectacularly; in the words of one woman who had tasted the water, it was "dirty and nasty." The place of home mattered little within the context of discerning safe water in the marginal environment of the camp. In this way, taste is not passively linked to a place; rather, its micro-vitality emerges through the human experience of tasting it.

The imagined place of resettlement also figured into the consumption and taste of water at Buduburam, but again in ways that reconfigure the role of taste as an interlocutor accounting for the experiences and potential that emerge from displacement. Consuming bottled water was associated with wealth and status and was typically reserved for "foreigners." Returnees—refugees who had been resettled to a third country and returned to visit Buduburam—shared "foreigners'" preference for bottled water, as one research participant explained: "you will see them walking around with their bottles of mineral water like kings or queens." This quote reflects the ways in which the taste for bottled water represented "a class culture turned into nature, that is, embodied" and "help[ed] to shape the class body" (Bourdieu 1984: 190).

However, it is not just the privileged status that accrues from the representational act of being seen holding or drinking from a bottle of water. Some research participants viewed the drinking of bottled water as a sign that someone was too weak to drink pure water. Seth Holmes (2013) describes the literal embodiment and inscription of difference as one way in which the farmworkers enact symbolic violence against themselves; they reproduce their position at the bottom of the social ladder by describing their bodies as tough enough to withstand the dangers of pesticides. Mercy's tasting of the water and collective disdain for those whose bodies required bottled water reveals the micro-vitality of taste. It was not only that they would be too weak to tolerate the microbial life contained within sachets, they did not have the capacity to taste and discern the potential risk of the water. Tasting water interprets and inscribes the social dimensions of human existences, evaluates the potential risk of biological contaminants, and ultimately serves as an interlocutor between the body, mind, and nature.

THE TASTE OF CHICKEN

At Buduburam, "country chickens" were those that roamed freely outside in the yard. The taste—and value—of country chicken came from its relationship to and movement on land, a form of production similar to "free-range" chickens in the contemporary industrialized food landscape. Whole country chickens could be purchased for about $5.00 USD during the time of my fieldwork, but the few people who ate "country chicken" raised them on their own. Even still, the cost of raising a country chicken was quite high and so people only ate "country chicken" on special occasions. Liberians living at Buduburam more frequently purchased previously frozen chicken that was sold at the market at the front of the camp. This chicken was much cheaper—three whole chicken wings typically cost $0.25 USD—and enabled Liberians to prepare sauces with multiple animal proteins, a preferred form of preparation for its ability to deliver both flavour and social status.

Land and place served as a mechanism for characterizing the production and quality of the chicken, but displacement quickly complicates the relationship. In her work with Latin Americans, Joan Goss (2018) writes: "One Mexican farmworker … spoke of the chickens bought in U.S. grocery stores as having a strange flavour and texture which he attributed to the time between when it was killed and when it was sold. 'Back home if you wanted to eat chicken for lunch, you got up early in the morning and grabbed a live one'" (202). Chickens, the categories used to describe their taste, and the people who eat chicken all enact the micro-vitality of taste; taste is not rooted but lives and is made through movement on land. "Country chicken" manages to evoke nostalgia for rural, subsistence life, while also marking a social status in relation to its opposite, "civilized," used to connote connection to lifestyles associated with Americo-Liberian colonial settlers. Arguably country chicken acquires and generates taste by moving freely on the land, a trait reflective of life without colonial encroachment.

By contrast, Mary, one of my neighbours at Buduburam, insisted that the chicken arrived in Perdue boxes frozen right off the industrialized food lines of "America." But unlike the usual ascription of privileged status to people and goods connected to the United States, she described the frozen chicken as tasteless, "toxic waste." Tasting chicken generated a tension between the "dirtiness" of the industrially produced chicken and the goodness of country chickens roaming the refugee camp; an inversion of how Liberian refugees tasted local water at Buduburam. While the "toxic waste" chicken travelled across vast stretches of land and water to arrive at the Buduburam camp, the hint of factory origins suggested a distinct lack of taste that posed a stark contrast with the social landscape where refugees vied, hoped, and prayed for the opportunity to resettle to the United States.

Toxic waste chicken is thus a striking example of the potential emerging from taste and displacement: It reminds us of the complex relationships between the powerful and powerless in the global landscape of human displacement. Importing toxic waste chicken into the refugee camp poses a remarkable question: What is the source and site of ruin? Tasting chicken tells us to attend not only to the landscapes of war and refuge, but also the industrialized food system. Further challenging global flows of food and value through the taste of chicken, when I worked at a resettlement agency in the United States, numerous refugees (from all parts of the African continent) would buy imported "African chicken" because it tasted far better than the cheap, factory-farmed chicken available widely in grocery stores.

Country chicken is full of microbes drawn from the land, while toxic waste chicken is pumped with chemicals aimed at destroying any possibility of microbial life. While the latter is purported to be the safe, assured way of sustaining human life, the destruction of microbial life in toxic waste chicken limited its vitalizing potential in those who consumed it. The superior taste of the country chicken, drawn from the chicken roaming on land, speaks of the freedom to which Liberian refugees aspired. Dirt on the move and people on the move are conflated and seen as sources of contamination. Country chickens and "African chickens" offer a narrative counter to terroir: The movement of microbes and dirt make good food. As a multispecies interlocutor, taste disrupts widespread valuation of free global flows of food and people—i.e. free trade and people who travel by choice—as morally superior and poses a critique of where microbial fears should be directed and placed: the industrialized food system.

BIG APPLE CULTURES, THE FUTURE OF TASTE ON THE MOVE

In "Shared Life," the introduction to a special issue on multispecies ethnography, Lestol and Taylor (2013: 184) complicate the relational dimensions of multispecies engagement in a way that is particularly productive for thinking about the relationship between taste and place for displaced people on the move.

> A major characteristic of all existence is the need to consume others in order to grow and then be consumed to help others grow. … The whole question is that of *knowing what consuming the other means*. We could suggest that this broaches the most intimate of what constitutes us as living beings. *To consider life in common is*, therefore, *to think not in terms of relationships with other living beings*, or even the closeness of humans with other living beings, but of *modes of consumption*, which constitute animal life in general and human life in particular. (Lestol and Taylor 2013, my emphasis)

Refugees frequently face "the question of knowing what consuming the other means." They flee to avoid being consumed by violence and poverty; they face hunger in the absence of an "other" to consume. In the context of displacement, taste—as a discerning mode of consumption—surfaces as a vitalizing, multispecies interlocutor. Taste lives in, links, and travels between human and non-human bodies; it can be carried across ecosystems and human biomes. Taste circulates social and political life by forming and regulating the boundaries of identity and belonging; taste commands and exploits value. But doing all of these things rests upon a multispecies engagement that often transpires at microscopic levels.

We do not necessarily think about what we are consuming when we taste a strawberry, for example. But Seth Holmes shows how consuming a strawberry means that you are also contributing to a structural violence that generates immense physical and emotional suffering for the Triqui labour migrant that picked the berry for a mere 14 cents per pound. The bodies of the berry pickers are porous sponges for the chemicals sprayed to protect an appealing, taste-inspiring appearance for the berry consumer. Despite the risks, migration across the U.S.–Mexico border still often presents as a life-saving potentiality (see Holmes 2013).

Treating taste as a micro-vitality has also allowed me to show how things—meaning, value, risk, potential—are not simply picked up, carried, and transformed passively from place to place; rather, taste emerges as a central way of engaging, shaping, and navigating displacement. The micro-vitality of taste reveals the resonance between the past and present of displacement, from the dispossessing salted fish to the impossibility of preparing delicious beans from inside the refugee camp, while the contrast between country and toxic waste chickens suggests the vitality of taste connects to future potentiality. I return to my opening narrative of sour milk to illustrate.

Grace did not have any bottles of sour milk frozen, so I bought several little plastic bags filled with sour milk, twisted, and tied. She "dashed" me one (gave a free one) and said she would put some bottles in the freezer for me, thereby setting up the relationship for a return customer. When we stepped out of the house, the neighbours were still speculating about resettlement. I went over to talk with them, to explain that I was a student without access to those who make resettlement decisions. As I had encountered in many of my conversations with Liberian refugees living at Buduburam, this technicality did not matter to the neighbours; my whiteness expressed American citizenship, wealth, power, privilege, and access to resettlement.

After listening to my lengthy informed consent script months earlier, one very kind and patient research participant advised me that she understood the technicalities, but that I could and should not ever destroy hope. It was all she had. The sobering admonishment resonates in this narrative of sour milk and skyscrapers and is instructive of the micro-vitality of taste. My proclamation that I could not resettle anyone may have been true, but seen through the micro-vitality of taste, my presence seemed full of potential.

My taste for sour milk was generative: I became a customer, and the woman dashed me an extra to ensure that I would come back. At Buduburam, proximity and relationships with those from outside, especially with privileged connections to the United States, generated all sorts of opportunity. Sour milk could compel me to become a return customer. Sour milk, as a living culture, could become the living culture that would carry Grace to the Big Apple. My narrative accounts of tasting across cycles of displacement reveal a full spectrum of possibilities: Taste is at once a matter of grave consequence—water must be tasted with full-bodied attention—and a humorous hope of skyscraping heights. Taste of place surfaces not as a matter of reterritorialization (Paxson 2008), of renewing and reclaiming landscape, but as constant negotiation, of being in tune with the world around, responding to its risks and potential. Nor is the taste of displacement consumed exclusively by loss. Refugees used taste in ways that confound widespread values of rooting in specific dirt.

Liberians certainly maintained strong connections to the Liberian homeland and regularly waxed nostalgic about the creaminess of palm butter that could only come from palm trees growing in the soil of their homeland, but these memories were met with more complicated enactments of taste and displacement. Moving across landscapes, through national borders and into lands where they did not belong, demanded a way of being that was no less real or valued. The micro-vitality of taste as an interlocuter challenges our static alignments between specific places and people as relationships tightly bound by either microbial-ridden dirt or lush, rich soil. In doing so, the micro-vitality of taste shows how our discernments about the value of food leak into the ways in which we think about the people and places that produce and consume these foods. My work seeks to dismantle the naturalized confluence of microbial dirt with displacement and the inevitability negative valuation of displaced people. Taste serves as a corrective and elaboration upon the narratives of loss that surround refugee foodways. The generative potential of the micro-vitality of taste resides in all who taste.

NOTE

1. Eleven of the initial 12 members of ACS were from the South and many owned slaves and were interested in and quelling the upsurge of slave revolts in the South (Beyan 1991: 3).

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PART II

NATIONAL PATTERNS

12. Migration policy making in the US
Philip Martin

This chapter focuses on research on migrant demographics, including the number of legal and unauthorized foreigners and their age structure, fertility and internal mobility, and how this is much more accepted by policy makers than research on the socio-economic impacts of migrants.

ADMISSIONISTS VERSUS RESTRICTIONISTS

Even when researchers reach consensus on the socio-economic impacts of migration, this consensus can be interpreted very differently by admissionists who favour more immigration and the legalization of unauthorized foreigners and restrictionists who oppose amnesty and want to reduce immigration. For example, the research consensus of a National Academy study conducted in the wake of California's enactment of Proposition 187 in 1994 was that the 15 million foreign-born workers in the US labour force in 1996 depressed average hourly earnings by 3 percent and led to a net expansion of US GDP of $8 billion. Admissionists touted the $8 billion net economic gain from immigration, while restrictionists emphasized that the then $8 trillion US economy was growing by 3 percent or $240 billion a year, making the net gain due to immigration equivalent to 12 days of US economic growth (*Migration News* 1997).

The effect of social science research on policy making is often muted because migration's major economic effects are (re)distributional, with migrants and owners of capital the major winners. Admissionists stress the income gains to individual migrants in the US, the minimal costs to US workers, and spillover benefits of immigration that range from preserving industries that hire immigrant workers to repopulating shrinking cities and to increasing diversity. Restrictionists highlight migration as a key reason, along with technology and trade, for depressing the wages of low-skilled workers, increasing inequality, and reducing social trust.

The number of immigrants more than quadrupled from 10 million in 1970 to over 45 million in 2020. As numbers rose, the debate over migration policy has come to be dominated by the most extreme admissionists and restrictionists. Social scientists are also tugged toward the no borders and no migrants extremes fostered by these interest groups by the funders who support and publicize their work. If current trends continue, migration could join abortion, guns, and other issues on which public opinion is polarized and research has limited impacts on policy making.

IMMIGRATION PATTERNS AND RESEARCH: 1970–2000

The US is a nation of immigrants whose motto *e pluribus unum*, from many, one, signals openness to newcomers.[1] The US had 42 million foreign-born residents in 2014, almost 20 percent of the world's international migrants. Over half were from Latin America and the Caribbean,

including 28 percent from Mexico.[2] Another quarter were from Asia, led by China, India and the Philippines. Almost half of foreign-born US residents are naturalized US citizens (Brown and Stepler 2016).

Immigration to the US occurred in four major waves, beginning with the largely British wave before admissions began to be recorded in 1820; a second wave dominated by Irish and German Catholics in the 1840s and 1850s; a third wave that included many southern and eastern Europeans between 1880 and 1914; and a fourth wave set in motion by 1965 laws that switched the priority for admission from the migrant's country of origin to US sponsors who request the admission of their relatives or employers who need workers. Waves suggest peaks and troughs, with troughs in the aftermath of the Civil War in the 1860s and World War I in 1914, followed by legislation in the 1920s that prevented a resumption of large-scale immigration from Europe (Martin and Midgley 2010).

The immigration wave launched by the 1965 legislation that gave the US a family unification immigration policy had largely unanticipated impacts. There was little research to counter the assertion of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who asserted that family unification would not change "the ethnic mix of this country" (Congressional Digest 1965; CIS 1995).

Kennedy was wrong. During the 1950s, 56 percent of the 2.5 million immigrants who arrived during the decade were from Europe; by the 1970s, fewer than 20 percent of 4.2 million immigrants who arrived during the decade were from Europe (DHS n.d., Immigration Yearbook, Table 2).[3] Chain migration, as when immigrants and naturalized US citizens sponsor their relatives for visas, was soon apparent. The US has one of the world's most expansive definitions of immediate family, including children under 21 and the parents of US citizens. US citizens may sponsor their adult children for immigrant visas as well as their adult brothers and sisters, resulting in decade-long waits for visas to become available. The US offers 50,000 "diversity immigrant visas" awarded by lottery to citizens of countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the US during the previous five years, creating new family networks to sponsor relatives for immigration.

There were 10 million foreign-born residents in 1970 when the fourth and current wave of immigration began. At the time, immigration research was dominated by historians who explained the integration of third-wave immigrants who arrived before 1914 and debated 1920s efforts to "Americanize" southern and eastern European newcomers. Researchers highlighted the factors most important for successful immigrant integration during the 1920s, including factories and unions, mobilization for war, public schools, and religious and ethnic organizations (Higham 1984).

Two immigration issues drew the attention of social scientists in the 1970s – farm workers and Asians. Between 1942 and 1964, the US government allowed farmers to employ 4.6 million Mexican guest workers under a series of bilateral Bracero agreements. Most Braceros returned year-after-year to fill seasonal farm jobs, but 1–2 million Mexicans gained experience working in US agriculture. Bracero admissions peaked in 1956, when 445,000 Braceros were 20 percent of US hired farm workers and fell to fewer than 200,000 after 1962 as the US government tightened enforcement of regulations aimed at protecting US and Bracero workers from farmers who underpaid wages.

The Bracero program was ended in 1964 as a form of "civil rights for Hispanics." Many Mexican-Americans moved to cities during the 1950s to avoid competing with Braceros in the fields.[4]

A combination of no Braceros, few unauthorized workers, and the charismatic leadership of Cesar Chavez allowed farm worker wages to increase rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. The United Farm Workers union won a 40 percent wage increase in its first table grape contract in 1966, and due to the absence of Bracero competition, represented most California table grape and lettuce workers by the early 1970s (Martin 2003).

Farm employers responded to the UFW by encouraging their largely legal Mexican-born supervisors to recruit friends and relatives still in Mexico to enter the US illegally. There were no penalties on employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers until 1986, so rural Mexicans who faced a choice of uncertain incomes in Mexico and a guaranteed job in US agriculture moved north. Illegal immigration from Mexico surged in the 1980s, especially after a short-lived oil-inspired Mexican government spending boom collapsed as the price of oil fell in the early 1980s. Cesar Chavez and the UFW protested that "illegal aliens" were undercutting union demands for higher wages and benefits, and asked that the federal government impose sanctions on employers who hired unauthorized workers, but Congress refused to act.

The Bracero program ended in part because a blue-ribbon committee appointed by the US Department of Labour concluded that Braceros depressed the wages of US farm workers. Clemens et al. (2017) assembled data on farm employment and wages before and after 1964, and concluded that average hourly earnings in states with more Braceros rose at the same pace after 1964 as in states that had few or no Braceros, suggesting that removing Braceros did not lead to wage spikes in states that could no longer employ Braceros.

Such a before and after comparison is misleading because the Bracero program was shrinking for a decade before it ended, so that comparing state-wide movements in farm worker earnings in labour markets where Braceros were less than 5 percent of farm workers is unlikely to measure Bracero wage effects accurately. As farm wages rose in the 1960s and 1970s, the demand for farm workers fell, demonstrating that reducing the supply of farm workers does more to accelerate labour-saving substitution and encourage farmers to switch to less labour-intensive crops than to draw US workers into the farm work force due to higher wages.

During the 1970s and 1980s, case studies showed how unauthorized workers replaced US citizens and legal immigrant farm workers. Farmers turned to contractors to obtain workers rather than hiring farm workers directly, spurring competition between several types of employers who competed with each other to obtain jobs for their crews. Some employers hired mostly legal workers, while others hired mostly unauthorized workers. This competition between employers was won by those who hired unauthorized workers, contributing to a rising share of unauthorized California crop workers, from less than 25 percent in the mid-1980s to 50 percent a decade later (Mines and Martin 1984).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was expected to reverse the rising tide of unauthorized farm workers because of federal sanctions on employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers. However, IRCA also allowed unauthorized foreigners who were in the US at least five years, or who worked in agriculture at least 90 days, to become legal immigrants.

IRCA legalized 2.7 million unauthorized foreigners, 85 percent Mexicans. Its repercussions were long lasting, teaching rural Mexicans how to use false documents to become immigrants under the farm worker amnesty program and to work in the US with false documents if they did not qualify (Martin 1994). IRCA enabled legal and unauthorized Mexicans to spread throughout the US, and to move from agriculture to construction, manufacturing and nonfarm services.

IRCA-related research asked how employers adjusted to employer sanctions and found that labour costs fell because of the upsurge in illegal migration (Martin 1994). The National Academies found that the earnings of newly legalized foreigners increased 10 to 15 percent, largely because legal status allowed previously unauthorized foreigners to find "better employers" (Smith and Edmonston 1997). Farm worker unions shrank due to increased illegal migration, internal union problems, and the rise of labour contractors and other intermediaries (Martin 2003).

Newcomers to the US typically earn less than similar US-born workers, but the earnings gap narrows over time. Chiswick (1978) examined various cohorts of immigrants, such as those arriving in the 1950s and 1960s, and concluded that these newcomers experienced rapid income gains, catching up to similar US-born workers within 13 years and then surpassing their US peers in income, suggesting that average US incomes could be raised via immigration.

Borjas (2016) re-examined the data on immigrant earnings mobility and concluded that "immigrant quality" as measured by earnings growth in the US was falling. Chiswick's data analysis was correct but reflected a unique and one-time event. Asians found it hard to immigrate until 1965, and those who arrived in the 1960s were especially talented. As immigration from Latin America surged in the 1970s, the initial earnings gap between newcomers and similar US-born workers widened, and immigrant earnings rose much slower. Immigrants who arrived in the five years before the 1960 census earned 10 percent less than US-born workers in 1960, while those who arrived between 1995 and 2000 earned 30 percent less in 2000 (Borjas 2016).

The legalization of 2.7 million mostly low-skilled Mexicans and the continued arrival of unauthorized foreigners raised questions about how low-skilled migrants affected similar US workers. Case studies in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that low-skilled newcomers, legal or illegal, displaced similar US workers and depressed their wages (GAO 1988). However, comparisons of cities with more and fewer immigrants, and studies that compared the wages and unemployment rates of US workers who were assumed to be like immigrants in a particular city, could not detect wage depression and displacement. Many researchers thus concluded that low-skilled migrants do not hurt similar US workers (Smith and Edmonston 1997).

The best-known study involved the "natural experiment" of 125,000 Cuban Marielito migrants who arrived in Miami between April and September 1980, increasing Miami's labour force by 7 percent. Card (1989) found that the unemployment rate of Blacks in Miami rose more slowly than in several comparison cities that did not receive Cuban migrants in the early 1980s, suggesting that employers created more jobs to absorb the Marielitos, whose presence benefited rather than hurt Blacks in Miami.

Borjas (2016) disagreed with this no-harm-and-perhaps-benefit conclusion of low-skilled migrants. He emphasized that, when another wave of Cubans tried to reach Florida in 1994, the US Coast Guard intercepted them and sent them to Guantanamo, a US naval base at the eastern end of Cuba. Even though few Cuban migrants arrived in the mainland US, the unemployment rate of Miami Blacks rose, while the rate in comparison cities fell, leading Borjas to conclude that natural experiments show only that there are many factors in addition to migration that affect the unemployment rate of Blacks and other US workers who are similar to the immigrants.

The Mariel controversy is a symbol of the debate over whether the arrival of low-skilled migrants hurts or helps similar US workers. Card's conclusions of no negative impacts bolstered so-called immigrant supply siders, who believe that migrants add to economic activity

and benefit themselves and other residents, analogous to supply-side economists who believe that tax cuts encourage additional work and benefit both those whose taxes go down and others via the multiplier effects of increased economic activities. Borjas, by contrast, believes that the demand curve for labour is downward sloping, so that adding to the supply of labour reduces wages, especially in the short run.

Leubsdorf (2017) reviewed the arguments over the 1980 Cuban boatlift and emphasized that the comparison group of US workers selected to check for migrant impacts affects the conclusions drawn. Analysts who use more inclusive groups of Americans to try to detect the impacts of migrants, such as women and teens still in school, are less likely to find negative effects of newcomers than studies that focus only on adults who did not finish high school. Borjas (2017) dismissed a suggestion that a change in the number of Blacks in the sample explains the reduced wages of similar Blacks, emphasizing that the wage of Blacks must be constructed rather than measured, meaning that analysts are estimating the effects of Marielitos on a constructed rather than a measured wage of US Blacks.

During the 1990s there were efforts to answer the question of whether immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive in tax-supported benefits. California Republican Governor Pete Wilson blamed the need to provide services to unauthorized foreigners for the state's budget deficit in the early 1990s, and won re-election in November 1994 as voters approved Proposition 187 by 59:41 to deny state benefits to unauthorized foreigners, including K-12 education to unauthorized children (*Migration News* 1994).

Most of Proposition 187 was declared unconstitutional, but suits demanding that the federal government reimburse states for the cost of providing services to unauthorized foreigners prompted studies of the fiscal impacts of immigrants. The Republican-controlled Congress, in response to Proposition 187, enacted several laws in 1996 to make it more difficult for low-income residents to sponsor their relatives for immigrant visas and denied federal welfare benefits to legal immigrants arriving after August 23, 1996. At a time when 11 percent of US residents were foreign-born, 45 percent of the estimated federal savings from the new welfare system were expected to come from denying benefits to immigrants until they had worked in the US at least 10 years or become naturalized US citizens after five years (*Migration News* 1996).

In response to Proposition 187 and the 1996 immigration laws, the Commission on Immigration Reform chaired by ex-Congresswoman Barbara Jordan (D-TX) sponsored the first National Academies study, which concluded that the US economy was $1 billion to $10 billion larger in 1996 than it would have been with no immigrants, with the best estimate that immigrants were responsible for a net $8 billion gain (Smith and Edmunds 1997). The $8 trillion US economy was growing by 2.5 percent a year. Admissionists stressed the $8 billion gain, while restrictionists emphasized that the net gain was equivalent to two weeks of economic growth.

The model for estimating the net economic gain from immigration assumed that adding immigrants to the labour force reduced average wages by 3 percent, from an assumed $13 an hour to the actual $12.60 in 1996. The lower wages of all workers expanded the economy and increased the returns to owners of capital, making them and the immigrants who moved to the US for higher wages and more opportunities the major beneficiaries of immigration.

Estimating the public finance effects of immigrants required more assumptions. The National Academies (2015) study calculated the net present value of the average immigrant in 1996 by assuming that the average earnings of immigrants will catch up to those of similar

US workers, and that the children and grandchildren of immigrants will have the same average earnings, taxes paid, and benefits received profiles as the children and grandchildren of native-born children (Smith and Edmondston 1997). The study further assumed that immigration did not raise the cost of public goods such as defence, and that persisting federal government budget deficits would force the government to raise taxes and reduce benefits rather than continue to borrow to provide benefits for aging residents, meaning that both young immigrants and young US-born workers would pay more in taxes and receive fewer benefits.

These assumptions generated two major findings. First, the average immigrant had a positive net present value (NPV) of $78,000, meaning that a typical immigrant was expected to pay $78,000 more in federal taxes than he or she would receive in federal benefits in 1996 dollars over their lifetimes and those of their children and grandchildren. The NPV of immigrants with more than a high school education was plus $198,000, while the NPV of immigrants with less than a high school education was minus $13,000, that is, even assuming that the children of low-educated immigrants have the same average earnings, taxes, and benefits as US-born children, low-skilled immigrants and their children impose a net cost on US taxpayers.

The study led to an obvious conclusion: to generate the maximum economic benefits from immigrants for US-born residents, the selection system should favour young and well-educated newcomers who are most likely to earn higher incomes, pay more in taxes, and consume fewer tax-supported benefits. This recommendation was rejected, as those favouring the current system, including advocates for particular migrant groups, churches, and immigration lawyers, argued that levels of immigration should be increased to accommodate more high-skilled foreigners rather than reduced by restricting family immigration to increasing skilled worker migration. Furthermore, many US employers preferred the current demand-oriented system under which they sponsor foreigners for immigrant visas, encouraging skilled foreigners to remain with a particular employer for years as guest workers in order to receive immigrant visas. By contrast, a Canadian style supply-oriented point-selection system would allow newcomers to move from one employer to another.

During the three decades from 1970 to 2000, the share of foreign-born residents in the US population doubled from 5 to 10 percent. The number of unauthorized foreigners, after dipping briefly with legalization in the late 1980s, more than doubled from 3.5 million in 1990 to 8.6 million in 2000. The effects of legal and unauthorized foreigners were debated. Most economists agreed with Card that, since they could not find the expected negative effects of low-skilled foreigners on similar US workers, there were few or no such effects. There was more consensus among demographers on the number of unauthorized foreigners and more agreement on the public finance impacts of immigration, since it was easy to visualize how migrants with higher levels of education and higher incomes would pay more in taxes and receive fewer welfare benefits.

IMMIGRATION PATTERNS AND RESEARCH: 2000–2020

The election of Presidents Vincente Fox in Mexico and George W. Bush in the US in 2000 was expected to usher in a new era in Mexico–US migration, marked by cooperation to reduce illegal migration and violence along the Mexico–US border, legalization of unauthorized foreigners in the US, and new guest worker programs. Indeed, just before the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks, Fox was in Washington DC urging Bush and Congress to enact immigration reforms that legalized unauthorized foreigners before the end of 2001 (*Migration News* 2001).

Instead, security took centre stage after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and several laws increased the monitoring of immigrants and visitors. As the US economy recovered from recession and illegal immigration rose in the run up to the 2008–09 recession, there were renewed calls to legalize unauthorized foreigners. However, there was deadlock in Congress between restrictionists who emphasized the need for enforcement to deter unauthorized foreigners, and admissionists who wanted to legalize unauthorized foreigners.

Economists were also deadlocked over the impacts of low-skilled foreign workers on similar US workers. Borjas published an influential article in 2003 that reinforced economic theory, which held that adding immigrant workers depressed wages or increased unemployment among similar US workers. These effects are hard to detect in cities with a large share of immigrant workers because US workers who compete with immigrants move away or do not move to immigrant cities.

Borjas argued that worker mobility means that immigrant impacts should be studied in the entire US labour market. To do that, Borjas divided foreign- and native-born workers into age and education cells, so that immigrant and US 25–30-year-old workers with less than a secondary school education were in one cell and 30–35-year-olds in another. Borjas (2003) estimated that wages for US-born workers in the young and less-educated cells were up to 10 percent lower due to the presence of immigrants. Foged and Peri (2015) disputed Borjas's conclusion. They argued that, if migrants and natives within each age and education cell are complements rather than substitutes as Borjas assumed, playing different labour market roles despite similarities in age and education, and if employers respond to the arrival of migrants by investing more to create jobs for them and US workers, then the presence of immigrants raises rather than lowers the wages of similar US workers.

The debate over the impacts of low-skilled migrants was mirrored in a similar debate over high-skilled migrants. The US created the H-1B program in 1990, when 20,000 temporary foreign workers with college degrees and fashion models were being admitted. The H-1B program made it easy for US employers to recruit and employ up to 65,000 college educated foreign workers a year. The expectation was that the number of H-1B visas would begin high and then fall over time as US colleges and universities ramped up training and Americans filled more of the expanding number of IT jobs.

The H-1B program expanded slowly, not reaching the 65,000 cap until 1997 (Martin 2012). At a time of low unemployment and in anticipation of the Y2K problem of computers not adjusting to the year 2000 properly, US employers persuaded Congress to raise the cap, to add 20,000 H-1B visas for foreigners who earned Master's degrees from US universities, and to exempt non-profit employers such as universities from the visa cap, which allowed over 200,000 H-1B workers a year to enter. Since each H-1B can stay up to six years, the US soon had over a million H-1B visa holders.

Researchers studied the impacts of H-1B workers and reached opposing conclusions. Some found that US employers preferred to hire H-1B workers because they were younger and cheaper than similar US workers. In an IT labour market where workers often moved from one firm to another, H-1B workers who wanted to be sponsored for an immigrant visa were "loyal" to a particular employer. Critics called H-1B workers high-tech Braceros, a reference to the discredited program that brought Mexican farm workers to the US under what are now seen as

exploitative circumstances and found that their presence reduced wages and the employment of US workers (Bound et al. 2017).

Other researchers stressed the positive spillover effects of highly skilled foreigners with H-1B visas on US innovation and employment (Peri et al. 2015). They found, inter alia, that cities with more H-1B foreigners generated more patents and experienced faster wage and job growth, findings that supported employers who wanted more H-1B visas (Nell and Sherk 2008). Some researchers echoed employers in arguing that it made no sense for US universities to educate foreigners in STEM-related fields and deny them an opportunity to stay in the US and work.

Employers resisted efforts to link more protections for US workers with an increase in the number of H-1B visas available, arguing that requiring employers to first try to recruit US workers would reduce their competitiveness. Instead, they persuaded DHS to allow foreign students who graduate from US universities with STEM degrees to remain in the US and work in jobs related to their degree for up to 30 months, so-called optional practical training or OPT, giving these foreign graduates time to find a US employer to offer them H-1B visas good for six years.[5]

By 2005, when Congress began to consider immigration reforms to deal with the 11 million unauthorized foreigners, most social science researchers agreed that any negative economic effects of low-skilled migrants on similar US workers were small, that high-skilled migrants had positive spillover economic effects, and that legalizing unauthorized foreigners would increase their mobility and wages as well as expand the US economy. However, restrictionists in the House of Representatives approved an enforcement-only bill in December 2005 to increase enforcement on the Mexico–US border, require all employers to use the internet-based E-Verify system to check the legal status of new hires, and to make illegal presence in the US a crime, perhaps hindering the ability of unauthorized foreigners to become legal immigrants in the future.

The House Republican enforcement-only bill was widely denounced for ignoring the benefits of migration; protests culminated in a May 1, 2006 "day without migrants" that involved many businesses closing for the day to highlight the contributions of migrant workers. The more admissionist Senate in May 2006 enacted a bipartisan three-pronged comprehensive immigration bill to increase enforcement to deter illegal migration, to legalize most unauthorized foreigners and put them on a path to US citizenship, and to create new guest worker programs for low-skilled workers. The restrictionist House refused to act, and a similar bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill failed in the Senate in 2007 but was approved in 2013 with the support of President Obama. However, the House again refused to act and there was no immigration reform.

During this decade of immigration reform debates, most social scientists supported the legalization of unauthorized workers and more guest workers. There was very little research on how employers, labour markets, and the economy might adjust to fewer foreign-born workers, since immigration reforms were expected to legalize current workers and admit more.

TRUMP AND MIGRATION

Donald Trump in 2015–16 campaigned on seven major issues, two of which involved migration. First, Trump wanted the US to build and Mexico to pay for a wall on the 2,000-mile

Mexico–US border. Second, Trump promised to deport the 11 million unauthorized foreigners in the US, beginning with those convicted of US crimes.

Candidate Trump launched his bid for the Republican presidential nomination in June 2015 by accusing unauthorized Mexicans of "bringing drugs. They are bringing crime. They're rapists … but some, I assume, are good people" (*Rural Migration News* 2015). There was an immediate negative reaction. Most pundits thought that Trump's inflammatory comments would doom his first campaign for elective office, especially with well-known senators and the brother of ex-President George W. Bush also seeking the nomination.

However, Trump won the most votes in state-by-state primaries and became the Republican candidate for president in July 2016 with a nationalist platform that centred on the slogan "Make America Great Again". After a short visit to Mexico, candidate Trump outlined a 10-point immigration plan on August 31, 2016 that began with a wall on the Mexican border and ended in ambiguity about what would happen to unauthorized foreigners in the US. He said "No citizenship. They'll pay back taxes … There's no amnesty, but we will work with them" (*Rural Migration News* 2016).

The National Academies released its second consensus report on the impacts of immigration in September 2016, just before the November 2016 elections (Blau and Mackie 2016). The report estimated that immigrants generated up to $54 billion in benefits for Americans in 2015, equivalent to 0.3 percent of US GDP of $17.5 trillion in 2015. This net benefit reflected a loss in wages to US workers of $494 billion and a gain in profits of $548 billion. The conclusion: "the immigration surplus stems from the increase in the return to capital that results from the increased supply of labour and the subsequent fall in wages", meaning that the arrival of immigrants depresses wages, expands the economy, and increases profits.

The National Academies 2016 report concluded that immigration bolsters "economic growth, innovation and entrepreneurship", and has "little to no" negative effects on US wages in the long term, largely because the models used to estimate immigration's impacts on the labour market assume that there will be no long-run impacts on wages.[6] The report highlighted the negative impacts of newcomers on previous immigrants and US-born workers with little education, including teenagers.

The report found slowing rates of wage convergence, meaning that newcomers to the US begin their American journeys at lower wages relative to their US peers than previous arrivals, and are slower to close this gap as they integrate into the US; what Borjas (2016) called declining immigrant quality. One reason for this widening earnings gap is that a higher share of newcomers to the US have low levels of education, and most are learning English slower than earlier arrivals.

Immigrants pay less in taxes than they consume in public services, and their US-born children do not close this gap because the federal government runs a deficit, meaning that all of the taxes paid by all US residents do not cover federal government expenditures. The impacts for state and local governments, which generally must have balanced budgets, are different. Immigrants pay less in state and local taxes than they consume in tax-supported services, while natives pay more in taxes than they consume in services. If the US-born children of immigrants fare as well as other US-born children, over 75 years, this immigrant fiscal deficit disappears at the federal level but persists at the state and local level.

The 2016 National Academies report, which was more pessimistic about spurring economic growth via immigration, was used selectively in the political debate (Edsall 2016).

Restrictionist-oriented think tanks such as the Centre for Immigration Studies welcomed the report, summarizing it as follows:

> Immigration is primarily a redistributive policy, transferring income from workers to owners of capital and from taxpayers to low-income immigrant families. The information in the new report will help Americans think about these tradeoffs in a constructive way. (Camarota 2016)

The American Immigration Lawyers Association, on the other hand, said that:

> the study found that immigrant workers expand the size of the U.S. economy by an estimated 11 percent each year, translating to $2 trillion in 2016 alone. In fact, the children of immigrants are the largest net fiscal contributors among any group, native or foreign-born, creating significant economic benefits for every American. (AILA 2016)

Neither candidate Clinton nor Trump responded to the National Academies report when it was released, but President Trump in January 2017 ordered DHS to redirect funds to plan for construction of a wall on the Mexico–US border and to beef up interior enforcement by adding 10,000 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to the current 10,000 to detect and remove unauthorized foreigners convicted of US crimes. Trump said that Mexico would pay for the wall, if necessary, with a 20 percent tax on Mexican imports.

Trump reinstated the so-called 287(g) program that allows federal immigration agents to train state and local police officers to detect unauthorized foreigners and to hold them for federal agents. Trump also expanded the definition of criminals who are the highest priorities for deportation to include those charged, and not necessarily convicted, of US crimes. Trump threatened to withhold federal grants from sanctuary cities that "willfully refuse" to cooperate with ICE, prompting California legislators to say they would nonetheless defy Trump and prohibit state and local police from cooperating with federal ICE agents.[7]

Trump sought to suspend the admission of refugees for 120 days, to block the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely, to reduce planned refugee resettlements in the US in FY17 from 110,000 to 50,000, and to ban entries for 90 days from seven countries: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Yemen.[8] This "Muslim ban" was blocked by the courts, leading to a revised order issued in March 2017 to block new entries from six countries. The US Supreme Court in June 2018 ruled that Trump has the authority to ban from the US arrivals from six countries: Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.

Trump's executive orders were condemned by admissionists and many researchers who emphasized that unauthorized Mexico–US migration had fallen to historic lows as Mexico completed its fertility transition and better education and more jobs kept more potential migrants at home. Most research concluded that migrants were less likely to commit crimes than similar US-born persons, and that efforts to detect and remove unauthorized foreigners are costly[9] and break up mixed families, those in which some members are unauthorized while others are US-born and thus US citizens. Finally, some researchers decried reducing refugee admissions, arguing that the US has long been a haven for those seeking refuge and that most refugees integrate successfully and are not terrorist threats.

Each house of Congress has an immigration subcommittee that conducts oversight hearings on migration-related issues that range from visa issuance to unauthorized migration to guest workers. Researchers are often invited to testify, although the majority party controls most of the witnesses who can testify, and most witnesses are employer or ethnic advocates. Private

foundations and the federal government support a wide range of migration research, most of which concludes that migrants and their children are integrating successfully, with few adverse and many positive effects on the US economy and society.

CONCLUSIONS

Social science research on migration is generally optimistic, concluding that immigrants help themselves by moving to the US and also enrich the US economy and society. There are several reasons for this optimism, including the fact that migrants expand the labour force and the economy. Economists find that migrants promote economic growth without hurting US workers significantly; sociologists find that most newcomers integrate successfully; and most political scientists celebrate the benefits of diversity rather than its potential to dissipate social capital and trust (Blau and Mackie 2016).

There are three major lessons from the US experience. First, as the number of immigrants rose, the focus of migration research shifted from history to contemporary migration. When immigration was at a low point in 1970, migration research was dominated by historians who examined how immigrants integrated into and changed US society many decades ago. By 1990, a new generation of non-historians focused on the impacts of contemporary migration. Many of these researchers were immigrants, including George Borjas (from Cuba), David Card (Canada), Alejandro Portes (Cuba), and Giovanni Peri (Italy).

Second, most government- and foundation-supported migration research concluded that immigration was beneficial for the migrants and the US economy and society, thus supporting calls to expand legal immigration and to legalize unauthorized foreigners. The Mexican Migration Project obtained work and migration histories from thousands of Mexicans who had been in the US and concluded that Mexico–US migration had mutually beneficial effects as Mexicans circulated between Mexican homes and US jobs. This "natural circulation" was interrupted when the US government stepped up border enforcement in the 1990s, "trapping" unauthorized Mexicans in the US (Massey et al. 2002).

The general theme of contemporary social science research is that immigrants generate more benefits than costs, and that these benefits could be increased if unauthorized foreigners were allowed to legalize their status so that they had more mobility in the US labour market and incentives to learn English. Researchers acknowledge the risk of segmented assimilation, as when frustrated immigrant children or the children of immigrants who identify with US minorities feel unable to get ahead, so they drop out of school and perhaps join gangs (Blau and Mackie 2016; Meissner et al. 2006).

Third, especially unauthorized migration has become increasingly contentious. The research and elite consensus agreed with the three-pronged comprehensive immigration reforms approved by the Senate in 2006 and 2013, namely, more enforcement, legalization for unauthorized foreigners, and new guest worker programs, and expected enactment of immigration reform after Hillary Clinton was elected president in 2016. In anticipation of Clinton's election, many of the major foundations that had been supporting migration research shifted their funding to organizations that would help unauthorized foreigners to legalize their status.

This means there has been relatively little research on the effects of Trump's more restrictionist policies. Some research suggests that employers are reacting as economic theory would

predict. As wages rise, employers are substituting capital for labour in industries from agriculture and care giving to construction and restaurants (Martin 2017).

For two centuries, economists have preached the virtues of freer trade, arguing that comparative advantage ensures that most people in trading countries are better off because the winners from trade win more than the losers lose, so that the winners can compensate the losers and still leave everyone better off. Free trade became the mantra of opinion leaders in both major political parties and all significant research institutions, even though most paid only lip service to the need to compensate the losers from freer trade. Opposition to freer trade came largely from unions that represented manufacturing workers; they argued that displaced manufacturing workers who were forced into service jobs had lower wages and fewer benefits, belying the promise that trade's winners would compensate the losers.

Climate change is another issue on which there is a difference between the research consensus and Trump's policies. Despite research agreement that the climate is warming due to human activities, there is disagreement over the appropriate policy response, or how much to sacrifice now to avoid worse adjustments in the future. Most researchers urge a significant investment now to minimize future adjustment costs. As with migration, the few researchers who disagree on the need for a carbon tax or other investments now to avoid future problems are considered out of the mainstream.

Americans are better educated than ever before, there is more scientific research than ever, but research-influenced policy prescriptions have become ever more contentious. One reason may be that better educated voters and politicians realize that research generally does not lead to truly definitive answers. Researchers who oversell their results, and the think tanks, media, and politicians that amplify research messages, may wind up reducing the credibility of all research on migration and other contentious issues.

NOTES

1. The original meaning of *e pluribus unum* was that one nation emerged from the 13 colonies, but the phrase has evolved to symbolize unity from diversity, or the ability of the US to integrate newcomers (S. Martin 2011).
2. There were 11.7 million Mexican-born residents in 2014, 4 million born in the Caribbean, 3.3 million born in Central America, and 2.8 million born in South America, that is, 21.8 million or 52 percent of all foreign-born residents were from Latin America.
3. Stocks changed slower than flows. In 1960, 85 percent of the 9.7 million foreign-born residents were from Europe or Canada; by 1980, their share dropped to 43 percent of 14 million (Brown and Stepler 2016).
4. The average employment of hired workers on US farms in the early 1960s was 2.5 million. http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1063.
5. www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-employment/stem-opt. Employers do not have to try to recruit US workers before hiring OPT graduates, and there are no special wages that must be paid to OPT employees.
6. "In the case of structural studies, when capital is assumed to be perfectly flexible, [average] wage effects on natives are zero, although this result is built in by theoretical assumptions" (Camarota 2016).
7. Two-thirds of the 2 million foreigners who were put in removal proceedings after being detected by Secure Communities enforcement had committed only misdemeanor crimes. The Priority Enforcement Program unveiled in November 2014 targeted foreigners convicted of felonies and gang members. Sanctuaries are states, counties, and cities that limit their cooperation with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency of the Department of Homeland Security. In

2015, there were four states, 326 counties, and 32 cities that had declared themselves to be sanctuaries for unauthorized foreigners (www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-cities
-trust-acts-and-community-policing-explained).
8. The US admitted 785,000 refugees since September 11, 2001, including a dozen who were arrested
    or removed from the US due to terrorism concern. Some 3.2 million refugees were admitted since
    1975, including 85,000 in FY16, of whom 72 percent were women and children. In FY16, 38,900
    Muslim and 37,500 Christian refugees were admitted.
9. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimated in 2016 that it costs $12,200 to identify and
    remove each unauthorized foreigner, a cost that could drop if state and local governments cooperated with ICE. See www.politico.com/story/2016/12/is-donald-trump-deportation-plan-impossible
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13. Migration of humans versus migration of cultures in the Middle East

Ayman Zohry

INTRODUCTION

With more than 50 percent expatriate population in the Arab/Persian Gulf countries, one shouldn't underestimate the impact of these expatriates on the culture of these sheikdoms. Likewise, Gulf states, supported by oil revenues, are looking to play a role in the Arab region and beyond. In the aftermath of the establishment of (Arab) states in the 1950s and 1960s,[1] these states pursued policies to extend their influence in the region by disseminating their culture and ideologies. Given their Islamic orientation, Gulf States spread the word of the Jihadist Wahabi sect of Islam since

the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. These efforts continue today in the post-Arab Spring period. This chapter focuses on the case of the Gulf states and mainly Egypt, exploring the cultural influence of migrants in Egypt and the Gulf states.

The focus on the Gulf countries, instead of the Middle East in general, is related to the complexity of the geographic and geopolitical definition of the Middle East and the fact that the so-called Middle East region includes different cultural patterns such as the North African and Egyptian culture, the Persian culture, the Levant culture, the culture of Iraq/Mesopotamia, and other cultures. A comparison of the Gulf countries and Egypt may be considered a salient example of a two-way cultural influence that can be attributed to the impact of migration.

This chapter is divided into four sections. An overview of migration in the Gulf states is provided in the following section. The third section is devoted to the phase of cultural absorption in the Gulf states, mainly, before 1974. The phase of cultural diffusion in the Gulf through migrants, as well as direct attempts to diffuse their culture through media, is explored in the subsequent section before concluding remarks.

MIGRATION IN THE GULF

Significant migration flows to the oil-rich Gulf states started in the 1970s. The percentage of foreigners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[2] populations has grown continuously over the last few decades. The population share of foreigners in the GCC increased slightly from 35.4 percent in 1990 to 36.6 percent in 2005. In 2010, the population share of foreigners reached 45.9 percent, and then continued to increase gradually until reaching 50.9 percent in 2017 (Table 13.1). The total number of migrants in the GCC countries increased from 8.2 million in 1990 to 20.5 million in 2000, and then increased again to 28.1 million in 2017. The share of migrants in the total population in 2017 ranged between 37.0 percent in Saudi Arabia to 88.4 percent in the UAE. In Bahrain and Oman, migrants constituted less than 50 percent of

the population in 2017, while migrants in Kuwait and Qatar constituted 75.5 percent and 65.2 percent respectively.

All the Gulf States discourage integration. Restrictions on family reunification resulted in limited opportunities for family-based migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. For example, the rule governing family reunions in the UAE, Article 31(D) of Ministerial Decision No. 360/1997, states that "family reunification may be granted to the wife of a sponsored foreigner if his monthly salary is 3,000 United Arab Emirates Dirham (Dh) or more and accommodation is provided by the employer, or if his monthly salary is Dh4,000 (excluding accommodation)". In fact, more than 50 percent of workers earn less than Dh3,000 per month (De Bel-Air 2015). In addition, the GCC countries regard migrants as contractual labour rather than migrants. The GCC countries are reshuffling their foreign labour regularly in order to avoid claims of naturalization (Bauböck 2011; Kinninmont 2013).

Table 13.1   *Total number of migrants (in millions) and their share in total population, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1990–2017*

Country	Migrants' share in total population						
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
Bahrain	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.7
	(34.9%)	(36.5%)	(36.0%)	(45.4%)	(53.0%)	(51.3%)	(48.4%)
Kuwait	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.9	3.1
	(51.2%)	(57.2%)	(55.0%)	(58.6%)	(62.4%)	(72.8%)	(75.5%)
Oman	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.8	2.1
	(16.8%)	(24.5%)	(27.5%)	(26.5%)	(26.8%)	(43.2%)	(44.7%)
Qatar	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.5	1.7	1.7
	(65.0%)	(70.4%)	(60.7%)	(74.7%)	(81.8%)	(68.0%)	(65.2%)
Saudi Arabia	5.0	5.1	5.3	6.5	8.4	10.8	12.2
	(30.6%)	(27.3%)	(25.3%)	(27.2%)	(30.7%)	(34.1%)	(37.0%)
UAE	1.3	1.8	2.4	3.3	7.3	8.0	8.3
	(70.2%)	(74.5%)	(77.6%)	(71.6%)	(88.5%)	(87.3%)	(88.4%)
GCC	**8.2**	**9.0**	**10.1**	**12.8**	**20.5**	**25.8**	**28.1**
	(35.4%)	**(34.4%)**	**(34.1%)**	**(36.6%)**	**(45.9%)**	**(49.0%)**	**(50.9%)**

Source: Calculated by the author from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017).

Despite policies that discourage naturalization and family reunification, and given the fact that migrants constitute a large percentage of the population, the GCC states cannot avoid the cultural and the social influence of the foreign nationals. Migrants in the GCC countries come from different cultural backgrounds. As shown in Table 13.2, the GCC countries host different nationalities. Three groups of sending countries can be identified: (1) migrants from the Indian subcontinent, (2) migrants from South East Asia, and (3) migrants from the Arab region. Migrants from the Indian subcontinent mainly come from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Indian migrants are nearly 9 million, representing about 32 percent of total migrants in the Gulf. Bangladeshi migrants rank second with 11 percent of total migrants, followed by Pakistani migrants that represent 10.9 percent of the total migrants. Migrants from the Indian subcontinent altogether represent 15 million; 53.5 percent of migrants in the Gulf.

*Table 13.2   Number and percentage of migrants in the GCC countries by nationality,
2017*

Country	Foreigners	%
India	8,904,781	31.6
Bangladesh	3,103,607	11.0
Pakistan	3,065,435	10.9
Egypt	2,479,365	8.8
Indonesia	*2,092,809*	*7.4*
Philippines	*1,561,510*	*5.5*
Yemen	1,015,337	3.6
Syria	829,712	2.9
Sri Lanka	*726,331*	*2.6*
Nepal	*665,441*	*2.4*
Sudan	656,875	2.3
Jordan	500,813	1.8
Other Countries	2,536,556	9.0
Total	**28,138,572**	**100.0**

Source: Calculated by the author from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017).

The second major group of migrants are from South and South East Asia and mainly four countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Migrants from these four countries represent about 18 percent of total migrants in the Gulf. While being substantially dependent on Arab migrants in the 1970s when Arabs constituted over 75 percent of migrants, the percentage of Arab migrants decreased sharply to below 25 percent in 2017.

THE PHASE OF CULTURAL ABSORPTION IN THE GULF

The history of the contemporary Gulf states' emergence is mainly linked to the rise of oil prices after the October 1973 war. The demand for immigrant labour dates back to the formation of the administrative and legislative systems in the 1950s and afterwards. The contribution of Egypt in setting up the administrative and legislative systems in the Gulf was vital. After its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1922, Egypt became a major force within the Arab region. Large-scale modernization efforts throughout the 19th century led to the formation of an educated elite-class in Egypt (Tsourapas 2018). The Gulf states had played no role in the early development of modern Arab culture.

Egypt has traditionally taken a leading role in fostering education in the region. Many Egyptian professionals travel to the Arab/Persian Gulf to contribute to the socioeconomic development of neighbouring countries. As Arab nationalism came to dominate Egypt after World War I, Egyptian high-skilled emigration became a political project focused primarily on education and development in the Arab region. The Egyptian government funded the construction of schools across the region and staffed them with qualified Egyptian teachers and administrators (Tsourapas 2018).

Egyptians were the dominant immigrant nationality in the Gulf states from the 1950s until the end of the 1980s. The influence of Egyptian teachers was not only felt around education, but also in shaping the modern identity of the people in the Gulf states. Egyptian universities at that time were accepting students from the Gulf states and offering them generous fellowships.

This resulted in many of the first rank leaders, members of the royal families, ministers, and public administrators being graduates of Egyptian educational institutes or at least having studied in schools with a majority of Egyptian teachers.

Some notable names included, for example, Ghazi Al Gosaibi, Minister of Industry and Electricity in Saudi Arabia (1976–1983), who earned his degree in law from Cairo University in 1961. Moreover, Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, the sovereign ruler of the Emirate of Sharjah and a member of the Federal Supreme Council of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), earned his degree in Agricultural Engineering from Cairo University in 1971. In addition, as an appreciation of the Egyptian educational contributions, former prince (Emir) of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, visited Cairo in November 2010 just to offer condolences to the family of his private teacher (mentor) Ahmed Mansour.

Arab countries gaining their independence have generally turned to Egypt for help in drafting their constitutions and law codes, staffing their law schools, and serving as judges and even as lawyers (Podeh and Winckler 2004). At the level of providing technical assistance in setting up legal systems in the Gulf, it is noticed that Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have written their constitutions generally based on a common model; the premises of which owe much to the principles embraced by the Egyptian constitution (Ballantyne 1986). Moreover, the Egyptian Civil Code was adopted by most Gulf countries (Harding 2017).

Despite the importance of the Egyptian contributions in setting up educational and legal systems in the Gulf states in the early formation of modern states in the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s, the main contribution and influence of Egypt and its soft power was cultural. Egypt has produced more than 90 percent of the Arab long and short movies in the last decade.[3] More than 3,000 movies were produced in Egypt. Such movies shaped the public appetite of the Arab-speaking population in the Middle East. Egypt has long dominated the Arab film industry; its movies are distributed and watched throughout the region.

Despite the recently emerging competition from the Syrian and dubbed Turkish productions, Egypt is still regarded as the most influential television industry in the Arab world, with television audiences across the region watching Egyptian-produced dramatic programmes, soap operas, musicals and comedy programmes, as well as the most popular evening talk shows – all transmitted in the Egyptian dialect (Youssef 2017).

THE PHASE OF CULTURAL DIFFUSION IN THE GULF[4]

Traditionally speaking, it is well established in migration literature that every migration stream has a counter migration stream (Lee 1966; United Nations 1970). Similarly, one can say that every cultural diffusion stream has a counter-cultural diffusion stream. In other words, migrants do not only transfer their culture and cultural practices to their areas of destination but also contribute to a counter-cultural stream from destination back to origin. States of destination also make for the diffusion of their cultures to gain more geopolitical power.

The Diffusion of Wahabism

In addition to the increasing oil revenues, two important events made for the counter diffusion of culture from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms[5]: the triumph of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 as well as the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in the same year. Despite the dictated legislative and constitutional rules spreading from Egypt, the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, base their legitimacy on Islam and the undocumented agreement between the ruling families and the theological families such as the Wahabi family in Saudi Arabia.

To justify their involvement in the war in Afghanistan and to defend themselves from the threatening neighbour Iran, the Gulf states tended to strengthen their legacy through the heavy involvement in Afghanistan to defeat the "perceived" atheist Soviet Union. In order to increase the support to *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan, and in order to tackle the demographic deficit,[6] Gulf sheikhdoms made efforts to spread the Jihadist Islam well beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Sadat, the president of Egypt, in order to defeat his rivals, particularly Egyptian socialists and communists, allowed Islamic Salafists[7] and the Muslim Brotherhood[8] to be active in the Egyptian universities and in society in general. This political choice was aligned with that of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sheikhdoms.

Associated with these macro-level political and economic changes in the Gulf after the 1974 oil price surge which made these poor countries affluent, Egypt witnessed a large labour movement to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The deeply religious and conservative outlook of the Gulf elite and the desire for political and cultural prominence in the region created a great demand for a contemporary and dynamic yet recognizable Islamic identity and a high tendency to spread wide the so-called Islamic thoughts (Rabbat 2014).

Cultural Diffusion Through Migrants

Migrants remit money, goods and commodities, as well as ideas and behaviours that affect sending countries, positively or negatively. These kinds of remittances are called "social remittances" which "are the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-communities" (Levitt 1998: 927). She further identifies three types of social remittances: normative structures (ideas, values, and beliefs), systems of practice (actions shaped by normative structures), and social capital (Levitt 1998). In the following section, I explore socio-cultural remittances and their impact on Egypt.

Socio-Cultural Remittances

One should not ignore the interaction between migration and globalization and the role that diaspora networks play in enhancing cross-border flows of goods, capital, and knowledge (Rapoport 2016). In remote villages in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt, one can notice the increasing number of satellite dishes attached to television sets that bring international channels to these households and influence their behaviour and perception of migration. In this section, I explore the impact of migration on selected aspects of the Egyptian society with particular focus on the dress code of Egyptians, their religious practice as well as the *Gulfanization* of the public sphere (Abdulla 2010).

Since most of Egyptian migrants heading to the Petro-Dollar countries in the Arabian Peninsula are males who leave their families behind, other family members take over migrants' responsibilities in the country of origin, such as agricultural work. The husbands' absence forces wives to manage alone which makes for woman empowerment (Brink 1991; Zohry 2002). In contrast, migration to the origin of Wahhabism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for example, affected the Egyptian society and reproduced a new version of social and theological behaviour. This behaviour might have increased the tendency to fatalism and fundamentalism, as well as the marginalization of women in society.

The Dress Code and Migration

The typical dress of Egyptian males in rural areas is the *Jellabiya*, which is a traditional Egyptian garment. It differs from the Arabian *Thobe* in that it has a wider cut, no collar (in some cases buttons) and longer, wider sleeves. In the case of farmers, these sleeves can be very wide. Jellabiya colours are often dark, and tan or striped fabrics are used. The Egyptian Jellabiya is made of cotton or linen; suitable for the hot and wet weather in Egypt and made of national materials. With the massive migration to the Gulf countries in the mid-1970s, Egyptians started to introduce the *Khaliji* – Arab Gulf Jellabiya – with them. The top of the Khaliji Jellabiya is almost the same as the Western classic shirts; with tight sleeves and a collar. This Jellabiya comes usually in a single colour: white. Moreover, this Jellabiya is made of polyester – usually 70 percent polyester and 30 percent cotton. The Khaliji Jellabiya became a prominent item in the baggage of the return migrants from the Gulf for their own use and also as a gift for family members, relatives and friends.

Despite the fact that this type of dress is not suitable for humid, dusty, and hot weather in Egypt, its use has become almost universal. Males, not only in rural areas but also in urban, replaced their traditional dress with this imported Jellabiya. In addition, Jellabiya replaced the Western Pajama in urban areas and became the main dress at home for males. The most important motive for males to shift from the traditional Egyptian Jellabiya to the Khaliji Jellabiya is the claimed connection between this Jellabiya and Islam. Since the white dress has a connection with Islam as the preferred colour, and since many Muslims wear the colour white when they attend Friday prayers, and given the fact that this dress comes from Saudi Arabia, the country in which the Muslim holy land is located, this imported dress acquired a religious legacy to replace the national Jellabiya.

When Egyptian males migrated to the Gulf countries they associated the white dress with the males they saw there, and they found that women in these destinations were wearing black and were fully covered. Because they didn't have strong contact with the society, Egyptian migrants regarded this dress as the standard and used it to complete the "black and white" picture.[9] This tendency was associated with the relief of pressure against Islamic movements at the time of Sadat after a long ban in the Nasser era. The Bedouin black robe replaced the traditional rural women's dress and extended to include all segments of the society. It is important to mention here that the Bedouin robe replaced the Western-styled women's dress in urban areas not only for religious reasons but sometimes due to economic reasons, since Bedouin robes are similar to each other and can be worn many times without the need for having many of them compared to the Western dress which assumes maintaining a set of different styles and colours for different occasions and to show high social status.

Muslims, but not Islam

"I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam" (Muhammad Abduh). This quote by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), an Egyptian jurist, religious scholar (Grand Mufti of Egypt) and liberal reformer, regarded as the founder of Islamic Modernism, who concluded his visit to Europe by this quote, explains it all; the return migration of males who spent years in Saudi Arabia brought with them a strict practice code of Islam mixed with the harsh Bedouin culture to a tolerant agricultural society (Zohry 2007). The result is an increase of religious practice and less tolerance. Moreover, theological leaders who follow the Wahabi thoughts after their migration to Saudi Arabia and their return to Egypt attracted a significant segment of people in Egypt. In addition, these theological leaders established their own TV channels and started to spread wide their strict thoughts among their followers. It is noticeable of course that the new theological leaders are not graduates of Al-Azhar University, and many of them didn't study Islam in specialized schools. In addition, they don't wear the Al-Azhar formal dress but they dress the same as the Wahabi theological people in Saudi Arabia (Zohry 2012).

With the ease of communications and the new media, these theological leaders became society stars; the same as cinema stars and football players. They managed to have thousands and millions of fans on social media. Their photos, despite the fact that they deny the legitimacy of photographing the human body, replaced the wallpapers of famous singers and movie stars on mobile phones and computer screens. In addition, quotes of their TV programmes became mobile phone ringtones.

This excessive dose of religious behaviour resulted in sectarian strife; not only between Muslims and Christians who had lived together for hundreds of years but also among Muslims themselves. Muslims were divided into sects according to their practice, not their beliefs. Now, Egyptian Muslims are divided into Salafi (almost Wahabis), Sufi, Sunni (mainly belonging to Al-Azhar), liberals and many other sects. After 200 years of the foundation of modern Egypt as a nation state, political discourse now seems to have shifted from equal citizenship rights to the foundation of a religious state.

Gulfanization of the Public Sphere

For a long time, Egypt has been well known for leading in the development of Arab culture. With more than 3,000 movies in about 100 years, radio and media production, literature, well-known singers, musicians and composers, Egyptian universities, and Egyptian teachers in Arab countries, Egypt managed to Egyptianize the Arab cultural sphere from the Arab/ Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. Because of these efforts and soft tools, Egyptian colloquial language is widely understood and highly appreciated all over the Arab region. Nowadays, and due to migration and return migration, a strange culture that comes from the Arab Peninsula started to compete with the long-standing culture of Egyptians; not only in arts but also in religion (Zohry 2006).

The sharp sounds of Saudi Quraan reciters managed to push away the traditional Egyptian Quraan reciters such as Abdelbasset Abdelsamad and Mohamed Refaat (*Al-Bawab News* 2015; Al-Shammaa 2015). Moreover, the music TV channels founded and paid for by Khaliji businessmen invaded the Egyptian media sphere. Not only the media, but also Egyptian cuisine has been affected by imported behaviour and Khaliji restaurants in Cairo became an

integral part of the food business in the capital of Egypt. Shopping malls and main shopping streets also became full of shops that sell the Khaliji Bedouin robes. Similarly, bestseller books in the last Cairo Book Fair in January 2016 were mostly religious books that come from publishing houses in Saudi Arabia and their affiliates in Cairo. Many of these books were all about strict Wahabi practices, mainly related to women, hijab, and niqab. The books currently available for sale in bookshops specialized in selling Islamic books are usually cheaper than the cost of the materials used to produce them, which means that they are subsidized possibly by the Gulf states or organizations (Shousha 2016).

Controlling Media and Artistic Content

The Gulf states started early to have control over the Egyptian artistic production as well as developing their own media outlets. Gulf states followed an array of tactics to control, modify, and re-disseminate artistic products of others. Some examples of these efforts are presented below.

Foundation of contests and festivals with overvalued prizes

In order to attract artists and intellectuals from Egypt and the Levant, Gulf states initiated contests and festivals under the auspices of the rulers and *emirs* of these sheikhdoms with exaggerated prizes and rewards. Examples of these prizes are the Qatari *Katara Prize for Arabic Novel*, the UAE *Sheikh Zayed Book Award*, and the Saudi *King Faisal International Prize* with the largest cash endowment of $200,000.

Foundation of cultural and scientific publications

Another strategy to strengthen the influence of the sheikhdoms of the Gulf was to disseminate luxurious publications with affordable prices, way below the cost of publication. The published works themselves usually belong to Egyptian, Lebanese, or Syrian authors. Translated international books were also published. An example of this type of cultural influence are the publications of the National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters (NCCAL) of the State of Kuwait.

Buying rights to broadcast other countries' media and artistic products

In an attempt to censor the contents of the Egyptian, Lebanese, and other countries' media and artistic products to be aligned with their perceived understanding of Islam, designated Gulf investors in media entered the field of media dissemination. In fact, they just disseminate the productions of others after censoring them (including cutting kissing and intimate scenes), removing content that is perceived as a violation of Islamic guidance according to the strict Wahabi thoughts in a way that distorts the original artistic products. An example of this are the satellite channels of Abdullah Kamel and his media network, Arab Radio and Television Network (ART) founded in 1993.

Developing own TV networks

In addition to controlling the dissemination of the media produced by other countries to other countries after censoring their content, Gulf sheikdoms started to launch their own news and entertainment channels such as Al-Jazeera (founded in 1996) owned by the Qatari government and the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) founded in 1991, owned by Saudi Prince

Al-Waleed bin Talal. The objectives of such initiatives are to control the media sphere in the Arab region. Due to their demographic deficit and their persistent dependence on others, these channels are managed and run by non-Gulf citizens. They are mainly run by highly skilled Arab/non-Gulf immigrants, mainly from Egypt and the Levant.

In addition, attempts to spread colloquial Gulf State dialects among the children of other Arab countries are made through the purchase of the rights to broadcast Arabic versions of Cartoon Network channels with famous cartoon series and movies dubbed in Arab Gulf dialect instead of the conventional Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian dialects. Arabic versions of such channels, Cartoon Network or National Geographic Abu Dhabi, are unscrambled channels open to all with no fees compared to the original channels in English which are distributed in the region for a fee.

CONCLUSION

In this study, I shed light on the Arab/Persian Gulf countries and their cultural interaction with their neighbours, mainly Egypt, as well as the interchangeability of cultures and cultural practices. The influence of Egyptian migrants and Egyptian government on the Gulf states in the era before oil production was also explored. The influence of the Gulf culture on Egyptian society after the oil price boom in 1974 was also discussed in this chapter. The topic of socio-cultural remittances is severely under-researched; researchers should devote more effort to study the impact of socio-cultural remittances on sending countries. More attention needs to be paid to the study of the impact of socio-cultural remittances which may play an important role, negative or positive, in reshaping societies. One must also note that financial remittances are often associated with socio-cultural remittances.

NOTES

1. Extended to the 1970s in the UAE.
2. GCC includes six states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
3. The Egyptian cinema industry started in Egypt in the 1930s.
4. This section is based largely on an earlier article that appeared in *Remittances Review* (Zohry 2017).
5. A sheikhdom is a geographical area or a society ruled by a tribal leader called a sheikh. Sheikhdoms exist almost exclusively within Arab countries, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sheikhdom 21.10.2019.
6. Demographic deficit, in the case of Gulf countries, is not the shortage in the working age population due to ageing as is the case in Europe, but the shortage in working age population due to the extending economic base that needs more labor force than the available national labor force.
7. Salafi jihadism or jihadist-Salafism is a transnational religious-political ideology based on a belief in "physical" jihadism and the Salafi movement of returning to what adherents believe to be true Sunni Islam (Jones 2014).
8. Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928. Al-Banna's teachings spread far beyond Egypt, influencing today various Islamist movements from charitable organizations to political parties.
9. The white dress for males and the black dress for females.

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14. A framework for understanding migration from Sub-Saharan Africa: transnational and global perspectives
Claude Sumata

1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization has accelerated the emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa, and in this chapter I define some of the important factors patterning movement and the growth of migration from this region. Poverty, economic inequality, political instability and armed conflicts constitute the main engines behind the migratory flows in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past decades. Economic decline fuelled by war and bad governance as well as the decision to avoid violence at the national level pushes African people abroad in search of better living conditions. Over the past years, many African migrants have shifted their main destinations from within the continent to Europe and the US as emphasized by many studies.

The phenomenon of risk-sharing is at the forefront of many studies analysing the process of migration and development in developing countries including African nations (Stark and Levhari 1982; Lucas and Stark 1985; Sumata 2002; Sumata and Cohen 2018). There is evidence that, in a globalizing world, international migration constitutes the main source of investment of capital and Western countries have become popular destinations as movers escape cycles of local poverty and political violence.

During the early 1990s, most of Africa's migrants moved internally and established themselves in other Sub-Saharan countries. This tendency has recently decreased. The portion of Sub-Saharan emigrants travelling to Europe has increased. The percentage of African movers travelling to Europe has risen from 11 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2017. During the same period, the share of African origin migrants who have travelled and settled in the United States rose from 2 percent to 6 percent. In fact, according to the UN, approximately 1.5 million Sub-Saharan immigrants were in the US by 2017.

This chapter develops a framework for understanding migration from Sub-Saharan Africa using transnational theory and a global perspective. Section 2 explores African migrant pathways, Section 3 summarizes empirical data on African mobility and trends among Sub-Saharan movers. In Section 4, the perspective of African migrants is briefly outlined; followed by conclusions in Section 5.

2. UNDERSTANDING MIGRANT' CULTURE: AFRICAN PATHWAYS

Risk sharing is an important motivator for African migration in the absence of insurance or intertemporal markets within the continent. In fact, international migration offers a shelter

against income as well uncertain income prospects when individuals are facing poverty and insecurity (Sumata 2002).

As highlighted by Sumata and Cohen (2018), migration provides a shelter against uncertain income prospects when financial markets fail or do not exist. In this context, labour migration tends to improve the economic welfare of the destination countries and at the same time alleviate unemployment in the sending nations providing remittances and time for skills training. Migration can also become a mechanism for income redistribution as migrant families build upon their remittances to invest in localized development.

Beyond the economic advantages of remittances, migrants benefit from political and legal protection that can often be absent in most African countries. In fact, I argue that social and political unrest, epidemics, religious intolerance and ethnic factionalism have also accelerated Sub-Saharan African migrants' extra-continental flow over the past decades as highlighted by many studies (Ake 2001; Hyden 2007; Giménez-Gómez et al. 2017).

In this context, migration to Western countries for many Africans is an opportunity to escape political deprivation, find steady employment and to build a normal life (Table 14.1). Congolese immigrants in Western countries in the 1980s belonged mainly to the 'middle class' as emphasized in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo migration (Sumata 2002). However, following the economic and political instabilities in the 1990s, 'both the rich and poor people have no choice but to seek political asylum' (Sumata 2002; Giménez-Gómez et al. 2017).

Table 14.1   Sub-Saharan Africa's economic migrants: top countries of origin

Country of origin	Number of migrants in 2017	International migrants as percentage of total population in 2017	Level of freedom	Human Development Index
Ethiopia	49,220	1.2	Not Free	174
Nigeria	17,487	0.6	Partly Free	152
Guinea	12,158	1	Partly Free	183
Ivory Cost	11,966	9	Partly Free	171
Gambia	7,711	9.8	Not Free	173
Mali	6,953	2.1	Partly Free	175
Sudan	5,852	33,000,000	Free	165
Senegal	5,786	13,000,000	1,070	162

3.   ANALYSING THE MOBILITY AND MIGRATION TRENDS OF THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN POPULATION

I argue that migration is a complex and highly diversified phenomenon that follows unique patterns across different countries. The recent experience of Sub-Saharan Africa shows the growing experience of international migration for their citizens and the pattern of emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa shows the increasing diversity of destination countries. During the 1980s, traditional destinations were former colonial countries including France, Portugal Belgium and the UK. Over recent decades, other countries in Europe and North America (Germany, USA, Canada) and Africa (South Africa, Nigeria) have played increasingly major roles. Despite this, many Sub-Saharan African migrants stay within the continent; some host countries, in particular South Africa and Nigeria, serve as springboards or gateways as migrants travel to other Western countries in a stepwise fashion (Adepoju 2003; Sumata 2014).

We note that the number of emigrants worldwide from all the Sub-Saharan nations increased globally by 31 percent between 2010 and 2017, reaching 25 million in 2017. This rate of increase is significantly higher than in the 1990s (1 percent) and the first decade of the 21st century (25 percent). According to the latest United Nations data, migrants from Sub-Saharan countries represent around eight of the ten fastest growing international migrant populations since 2010. In fact, as emphasized by a Pew Research Center analysis (2017), the number of emigrants from these Sub-Saharan nations has increased by at least 50 percent between 2010 and 2017, whereas the worldwide average accounts only for 17 percent during this period (Table 14.2).

Table 14.2   Sub-Saharan African countries in growth of emigrant populations worldwide, 2010–2017

Country of origin	Total number of emigrants worldwide in 2017	Growth of emigrants, 2010–2017 (percent)
South Sudan	1,750,000	334
Central African Republic	720,000	204
Sao Tome and Principe	80,000	167
Eritrea	610,000	119
Namibia	190,000	90
Rwanda	570,000	73
Botswana	80,000	70
Sudan	1,950,000	63
Burundi	440,000	55
All countries	257,720,000	17

Over the past decades, the pattern of the main destinations of African migrants has changed significantly as emphasized by the following. Over the early 1990s, most of Africa's migrants travelled within the continent and were established in other Sub-Saharan countries. This tendency has recently decreased, and even as African migrants tend to stay within Africa, Europe is increasingly the main destination for movers who seek to settle outside of their home community and nation. In fact, the colonial legacy and geographic ties between African and Europe are critical in comparison to the pull of other developed countries like the United States, Canada, Japan or Australia (Kohnert 2007; Aiyar et al. 2016; Flahaux and De Haas 2016).

The proportion of Sub-Saharan emigrants into Europe increased from 11 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2017. During the same period, the share of these migrants in the United States rose from 2 percent to 6 percent. Figures from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies analysis of the 2016 American Community Survey and decennial censuses show that the number of Sub-Sharan immigrants in the United States reached 1.8 million in 2016 whereas it was 130,000 in 1980 (Figure 14.1).

Figure 14.1   *The number of Sub-Saharan immigrants in the USA, 1980–2016*

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2017).

4.   AFRICAN MIGRATION PERSPECTIVES

The patterns of Sub-Saharan African migration have changed drastically over the past decades as emphasized by many studies. In this context, we need to extend our views to focus on both sending and destination areas within Africa and destinations in Europe and North America. Furthermore, expanding our approach to movers to include refugees and asylum seekers in addition to economic migrants will allow us the opportunity to more clearly define how status and citizenship influence outcomes in sending and destination communities.

While income gaps between sending and destination countries constitutes a strong force driving migration from Africa, human security factors are also powerful drivers of both regular and irregular migration trends. Beyond economic development in the Sub-Saharan African countries, understanding the value and meaning of human security – democracy, human rights, social stability and peace in the region – will greatly expand our ability to model migration outcomes in the continent (Giménez-Gómez et al. 2017).

The prevalence of war, violent conflicts, discrimination and crime are significant push factors that drive Sub-Saharan migration. And the increase in the government's autocracy in the countries of origin constitutes an important indicator of an increase in external migration flows. In contrast, democratization processes in the home countries tend to reduce migration flows.

Different patterns of movement have also appeared between African regions over the past decades. While the growing rates of migration in Western and Southern Africa are related to the demand for labour in the main economic hubs in the continent's regions, intra-African migration in Eastern Africa tends to be comparatively more broadly defined, as economic drivers, violent conflicts and political turmoil are all factors driving migration in the region (UNCTAD 2018).

5.   CONCLUSION

The motivations to migrate from Africa arise from many drivers including economic turmoil, especially high unemployment levels and unequal distribution of wealth; political instability and violent conflict; and natural disasters. Another point is the fact that wealthy African countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and the Maghreb play the role of springboard for international migration.

Economic decline fuelled by violence and poor governance pushes Africans abroad in search of better living conditions and to avoid insecurity at a national level. In fact, poverty, economic inequality, political instability and armed conflicts constitute the main engines driving the migratory flows in Sub-Saharan Africa.

There is evidence that migration from Africa remains primarily intra-African even as migrant flows to Europe. Under these circumstances, lack of employment opportunities on the continent is one of the main drivers increasing the propensity to migrate. In fact, labour migration seems to improve the economic welfare of the Sub-Saharan countries and immigration is expected to alleviate unemployment while providing inputs such as remittances and skills. Therefore, international migration acts as a mechanism for income redistribution and as a source for resources for families with migrants.

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15. International migration from India: an historical overview
Ruchi Singh

INTRODUCTION

Migration has been very common throughout India's history. India has been home to important resources across the globe since the 1930s (Hutton 1986; Khadria et al. 2008; McNeill 1984; Shirras 1931; Skeldon 2010) and its culture as well as its social history have been shaped by both international and internal migration (Bhagat 2010, 2015). In fact, Davis (1951) notes that between 1834 and 1937, 30 million Indians moved across borders with only about 24 million returning. Additionally, under the indentured labour system, 1.5 million Indian workers were sent to British colonies between 1834 and 1920.

Like other large, powerful countries, India has served as home for movers setting off for international destinations, others transit across its length and breadth, and the nation also attracts migrant workers from abroad. India is also an important destination for migrant remittances. The large inflows of funds through pocket transfers as well as more formal methods have been an important strategy to diversify risk and reduce credit constraints in rural households (Singh 2018b). In fact, remittances from the GCC countries constitute more than 50 per cent of total remittances received in India (Wadhwan 2018). In other words, migrant remittances have a huge economic and social impact on the nation (Singh 2018a; Woetzel et al. 2016).

Literature shows that Indian migration has been male dominated throughout much of its history (Tumbe 2014). The 2018 UN World migration report states that the Indian diaspora is the largest diaspora in the world, with over 15.6 million people living across borders. Roughly 90 per cent of Indian migrants work in the Gulf region and South East Asia and the majority of these migrants are semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

Informal workers make up nearly 90 per cent of the workforce in India (Wadhwan 2018). Hence, contract work and better wages are drivers to leave. Most of the theoretical underpinnings of migration analyses in India are founded in neo-classical theories and consider socio-economic and geographical forces as the major drivers of mobility. Nevertheless, migration is not an outcome of economic choice and/or geography. There are various other socio-political factors that drive mobility. In addition to socio-economic and geographical factors it is the result of conflict and insecurities "driven by difficulties, discomfort, disagreements, tensions, and conflicts at the origin, while migration decision and destination choices are moderated by individual characteristics, cultural and social capital as well as by the local, national, and international context" (Sirkeci et al. 2016: 1).

Major sending regions or states in India include Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Migration from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is mostly composed of semi-skilled and unskilled workers while Kerala and Tamil Nadu migrants are often skilled workers (Government of India 2010). Major sectors attracting Indian migrant labour are construction,

manufacturing and retail which account for 85 per cent of all migrant workers (Jayaram 2004; LLP, G.T.I. 2016).

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN MIGRATION

Out of about 258 million international immigrants in the world by 2017, 106 million were from Asia. About 17 million of that group are from India (United Nations 2018). Despite this large number of movers, proportionately, a very small percentage of India's 1.4 billion citizens are international migrants. Some argue that Indians are less mobile mainly due to the caste system, family networks and the burdens such networks place on members, as well as traditional values, lack of education and predominance of semi-feudal relations that tend to limit the influence of global systems locally (Davis 1951; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009).

Dobbs et al. (2012) claim that in STEM fields (i.e. of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) India and China are leading source countries of highly skilled workers. This has had an impact on the development of the IT industry in Bangalore. It has also led to an increase in the social and economic remittances from these highly skilled migrants over time (Dobbs et al. 2012).

First Wave Migration in India and British Colonial Rule

Mahmud (1997) examines the history of migration from India during the British era and highlights three distinct types of migrations: migrations as a product of colonial design, migrations as part of anti-colonial resistance and finally migrations as an outcome of the collapse of the colonial rule. The first type of Indian migration was organized around indentured labour. Indentured workers from colonial British territories were relocated to other parts of the Empire. The second type of Indian migration was propelled by notions of sovereignty and nationhood. The last type of Indian migration was characterized by compulsory exchanges between nations and the movement of workers around the division of India into two distinct different nation states (India and Pakistan).

Indian migration during British colonial rule was managed under two systems: the coolie system and the penal system. The coolie system was in common use in the early nineteenth century. Under this system, workers from Asia, and in particular migrant workers from India and China, were sent to colonies governed by Europeans to work on plantations, mines, railroads, canals and various other projects (Mahmud 1997).

The coolie system was a kind of slavery and workers were not paid for their efforts, rather they were forcibly relocated in what was a "wage-free system". For Indian migrants travelling during British rule, the coolie system included indentured labour at home and abroad, the Maistry system, the Kangany system and penal transportation.[1] Indentured labourers were sent to various British colonies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The rapid expansion of colonies and the parallel demand for labour in public works, such as roads, harbours offices and jails, drove recruitment and migration. For many, the alternative to joining in forced work, particularly for convicts, was the death penalty or long-term imprisonment.

The British colonies in Burma and the Malacca Straits, founded between 1753 and 1759, were largely dependent on Indian migrant labour (Bates 2003; Becker 1967). These labourers were typically recruited into indentured and slave-like systems as well. The abolition of slavery

in Britain in 1833 marked a turning point in the management of plantation sector labour. The British abolition of slavery was followed by the French (1848), Danish (1848) and the Dutch (1863). The loss of slaves by the colonies left a gap in plantation labour and especially in the production of sugar. To compensate for the dramatic decline in agricultural production that came with the loss of slaves after the abolition of the slavery system, many plantation owners employed indentured labourers from India.

In 1838, British Guyana was the first Caribbean territory to receive Indian indentured labourers (Audebert and Doraï 2010; Kondapi 1951; Raza and Habeeb 1976; Roberts and Byrne 1966; Vertovec 1995) followed by other parts of world including South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji, other colonies and European nations where Indian workers served British citizens (Brain 1985; Gerbeau 1986). Over the next century, more than 500,000 indentured labourers from India were sent to the Caribbean and beyond. Indian labourers, many of whom were rural agriculturalists, adjusted to plantation life, trading colonial rule for their traditional status and their roles as indentured workers in agricultural fields, where they were industrious, and respected the sanctity, contract and authority of plantation owners (Kale 1995).

Though theoretically these migrants were celebrated as representing better economic opportunities for Indian labourers, for most it was an exile into bondage as they moved from one form of poverty and servitude to another (Roberts and Byrne 1966). Crossing borders always posed many threats and challenges to emigrants, and Indian migrants were no different (Behera 2011; Sharma et al. 2015). Migrant labourers demanded better treatment and support as the nineteenth century came to an end. Neverthless, there were new sources of labour to be exploited; and as Indian labourers started resisting their indentured status they were replaced by immigrants from Chinese and other southeast Asian countries.

Second Wave Migration, Independence and Partition

Post-World War II, the majority of Indian migrants were destined for the growing industrial nations of Europe and North America (Bharadwaj and Fenske 2012; Ray 2013); with many relocating to the UK as they built upon the colonial links established by the British Empire (Campbell 2000). After independence and the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 many more migrants travelled to the UK following family and friendship networks.

Third Wave Migration

The third wave of emigration from India has been characterized by flows to the Gulf countries responding to the labour needs in the growing oil extraction business and related growth in the construction sector (Weiner 1978). Six GCC countries account for about 96 per cent of labour migration from India. With 2.8 million Indian arrivals in Saudi Arabia, it became the preferred destination in 2015 (LLP, G.T.I. 2016).

Large numbers of migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana and Rajasthan have travelled to the Gulf (nearly 370,000 emigration clearances in 2014). Many of these mostly unskilled migrant workers find jobs in the construction sector (in masonry, in carpentry and as assistant electricians among other positions) as well as service and retail sectors. Migrants from Kerala, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu accounted for over 240,000 migrants in 2014. Migrants from these states were semi-skilled and were mostly employed in healthcare sectors

(nurses) and retail. The literature shows that the majority of the migration from India to the Middle East originated from the southern state of Kerala (Zachariah et al. 2002).

Fourth Wave Migration and Contemporary Movement

The fourth and the most recent wave of migration from India was marked by a significant number of skilled workers and included IT professionals, health care workers, service sector workers and international students (Khadria 2001, 2006). Contemporary migrants differed from earlier, nineteenth-century migrants. Contemporary migrants hold different intentions and seek opportunities that were not available in the nineteenth century. Not only are these migrants driven by different opportunities, they are defined by different economic characteristics and seek unique and new destinations. Many migrants come from India's growing middle class, and are looking to expand their horizons by relocating to urban centres in Europe and the US. Migrants from the states of Maharashtra and Karnataka share strong backgrounds and training in IT work for example, and they seek destinations where they can build upon their backgrounds. On the other hand, migrations from Gujarat and Punjab are more often exploring business-related opportunities. Their entrepreneurship is more often oriented towards the US, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia (LLP, G.T.T. 2016).

The diverse and shifting destinations of contemporary Indian migrants is paralleled by the nation's changing role as a destination country. A significant number of people from South African countries and many Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan etc. (Behera 2011) are relocating to India in search of jobs as well as education. Significant numbers of business people and entrepreneurs from the industrialized countries of the West are also attracted to India, a country characterized by high growth rate and market potential and prospects of profitable businesses (Khadria et al. 2008).

A recent study shows that contemporary Indian migrants are relatively better educated (tertiary education) than the native population of many OECD countries. India has a huge share of tertiary emigrants in OECD countries, i.e. 2 million, followed by China (1.7 million) and the Philippines (1.4 million). Together these three countries account for one-fifth of total tertiary educated immigrants in OECD countries (Goldin et al. 2018). The OECD (2017) report also shows that every one in five highly educated migrants in the G20 countries was from India. India by far includes the largest population of the highly educated workforce among G20 countries. In fact, this number has almost doubled in the last decade (OECD 2017) and should be considered combined with India's ever growing diaspora and the many students migrating to the US for higher education (Khadria 2006; Ray 2013).

CONCLUSION

Findings show that India is a major country of origin in terms of the volume of outgoing migration. Remittances of migrants from various parts of the world play a very important and significant role in the growth and development of India. Remittances in terms of both monetary and social benefits have been altering the lives of many for years in the Indian subcontinent. Indian is a leading country in terms of receiving remittances. The current chapter has made an attempt to document an overview of international migration from India since British rule and beyond.

As noted, the history of Indian migration can be divided into several phases and follows the shifting demographic status of the country. The first wave highlights the history of Indian migration from the British era and contrasts with contemporary movers. Indentured labour was the major form of labour migration from India in the British era. The second wave of migration was to industrialized nations in the post-World War II period and the rise of a very different class of Indian mover as indentured labour declined. And while the majority of Indian migrants were destined for the United Kingdom as an outcome of colonial links, they were no longer moving as colonial subjects. Indian independence and the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan mark the third wave of migration. The diaspora continued to expand, as more Indian migrants were destined for construction and industrial labour in the Gulf countries. A large number of migrants from the state of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan migrated to these oil-extracting Gulf countries for work in construction sectors. Most recently, and in the fourth wave of migration from India, we can follow the migration of skilled workers and students towards developed nations. These migrants differ from previous migrants from the country as they are more skilled and have different objectives and migration intentions. Literature shows that the migrants of the current era are relatively better educated than the native populations of the destinations. Though migration is an age-old phenomenon, migration across borders from India is still dominated by the work-related migration of males. India has always been a leading supplier of workforce to the globe for many years. The historical background of migration patterns and trends in India shows that migration is not new in India, rather for many years people have been crossing borders with varied motives. Reasons for migration and types of migration have varied over time in the history of international migration in India. From indentured and slave labour in the British colony era to more recent migrations to the GCC countries and growing skilled migration, a huge impact on both sending and receiving countries has been observed. The contribution of overseas migrants is easily visible through remittances which marks India as the leading nation with the largest volume of remittances received. India is also the leading exporter of workforce.

NOTE

1. Mishra (2015) describes the recruitment of labour under the Maistry and Kangani systems as based upon informal kinship ties and debt. Kanganies or Maistries (headmen) mobilized and recruited labourers mostly belonging to their own caste or kinship groups. The Maistry system was specifically for Burma and the Kanganies system for Malaya and Ceylon. The major difference between the indentured labour system and the Kangani/Maistry systems is contracts in the latter were relatively more flexible and often did not include severe punitive provisions if they were violated, unlike the indentured labour system.

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16. Situations and challenges: survey on internal ethnic migrants in northwest Hubei in China[1]

Ying Hou and Shengyu Pei

BACKGROUND

China's migrant population has entered a period of adjustment in both size and growth at the national level according to the China's Migrant Population Development Report 2018 (National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China 2018: 3–4). Over the last several decades, the number of ethnic-minority migrants has increased from 0.31 million in 1982, to a high of 19.36 million in 2015.[2] At the same time, the share of the population that included migrants increased from 4.7 per cent to 7.9 per cent. The growth of ethnic minority migration is consistent with migration in the whole country, and reflects the movement of citizens from west to east. In addition to moves from west to east, minorities are establishing new destinations in the east-central regions of China. The Uyghur, for example, were present in 5.7 per cent of China's districts and counties in 1953; by the Sixth National Population Census of China (also referred to as the 2010 Chinese Census), Uyghur were a presence in more than 70 per cent of the nation's districts and counties (Gao et al. 2016; Gao and Wang 2018).

While economic development, government investment and prosperity in eastern urban centres attracted internal migrants, differences in urbanization, population density, language, geographical environment and climatic conditions combined with distance, costs of living and travel as well as education and skills to complicate these moves. Urban centres in ethnic autonomous regions in western China also benefited from internal migration as cities in Guangxi Province, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region, Yunnan Province and Guizhou Province became important destinations for ethnic minorities (Duan et al. 2017; Xiao 2016).

The "great migration tide" created by the moves of ethnic minorities was particularly complex in the northwest region of Hubei Province and included the cities of Xiangyang, Shiyan and Suizhou. First, there was the voluntary movement in these cities from rural communities in northwest China. Second, new minority settlement villages emerged in the province as water conservancy projects were organized by the state, driving natives to new locations. Third and finally, there is the migration brought about by the government's demolition and relocation of already urbanized ethnic minority communities. In these last two examples, most people are involuntary migrants. They are losing their native homes and communities to water conservancy projects (like the Three Gorges Project) and to renovation and rebuilding programmes. Understanding how ethnic migrants (and potential migrants as well as stay-at-homes) manage these and other challenges and respond to these changes can promote development for all and recast the status that the nation plays in managing migration outcomes. Therefore, it is of great significance to pay attention and identify the different situations and responses of ethnic minority migrants.

ETHNIC MIGRANTS FROM NORTHWEST CHINA

Adjacent to Henan, Shaanxi and Chongqing provinces, the northwest region of Hubei is an important transportation hub and an intermediate destination for ethnic minority migrants travelling to destinations located in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta regions. In comparison to northwest China, the economic development of Hubei's northwest region is advanced, although it cannot compete with eastern cities. In recent years, internal ethnic migrants moving into northwest Hubei include the Islamic minority Hui, Salar, Dongxiang, Uyghur and Kazakh.[3] The majority of these immigrants set up and run ramen restaurants, barbecue stalls, and ethnic souvenir shops that cater to co-ethnics and more generally the local growing middle class. While some immigrants arrive independently, the majority move into northwest Hubei following friends and family. The assistance of relatives, friends and fellow villagers is critical (see Lucas 2015; Vertovec 1999).

> **Case 1**: More than 20 years ago, Tursun, from Hotan in Xinjiang (official, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region or XUAR), came to Shiyan City to make a living; a nearly 3,000-kilometer trip from his hometown. He opened a Xinjiang restaurant and after several years' operation established a foothold in Shiyan City (Hubei Province) where he built upon family and friends to create a resilient social network. Tursun sought out fellow villagers, friends and co-ethnics to help him manage the business as his restaurant expanded. In fact, many fellow villagers and co-ethnics settled in Shiyan to join Tursun who used his connections to provide accommodation for them and help in finding work. Tursun supported his fellow villagers with opportunities to work in his restaurant; and as importantly, when there were conflicts with locals in Shiyan, whether work injuries or salary disputes, he would intervene. Tursun's efforts helped his fellow villagers settle disputes and resolve bad situations. In addition, after a dispute was resolved, Tursun would often be rewarded for his effort. He typically received small gifts from his fellow villagers, enhancing his status as an important member of both his sending and destination communities. As time passed and Tursun's experience in Shiyan increased he formed a village association with others from Hotan, his home community. Tursun sat at the centre of the new association. Tursun did not live in isolation from the larger Shiyan community and his connections reached far beyond other people from Xinjiang. In fact, Tursun married Zhu, from Henan province. Zhu is Han and speaks the Shiyan dialect of Mandarin as well as Uyghur. Her ability to communicate with both communities (Uyghur and Han) allowed Zhu to support her husband and coordinate the contradictions and disputes that often confronted Tursun. Her successes and her status are codified in her title, *Shiniang* (master's wife) and her efforts to support and assist her husband, and fellow villagers.

> **Case 2:** Ma was born in Hualong County, Qinghai Province. Hualong is south of Inner Mongolia and about 850 kilometres north of Shiyan city. Ma went to Shenzhen (near Hong Kong) to find a job at 18. He spent quite some time travelling throughout northeastern China, working in several different cities. In 2006, under the recommendation and help of his relatives and friends, Ma saved his earnings and went to Shiyan. In Shiyan, he invested in opening and operating a Qinghai ramen restaurant. As his business grew and his restaurant became more popular, his income steadily increased. In 2016, Ma was able to use

a part of his earning to support four brothers who joined him in running and expanding his restaurants in the city.

As these two cases show, though this migration is described as internal and following a rural to urban flow, the long distances between origin communities and destination communities can be hard for ethnic minority migrants who face new languages, traditions and more (and see Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). And while movers who settle in northwest Hubei are faced with strange and different living environments (in terms of both the natural and built environments), they can succeed. Migrants use their skills and their strengths to establish themselves, and with the support of their families, friends and co-ethnics, make a living, establish their own relationship and social networks and adapt to local society. In fact, the most obvious feature of northwest ethnic migrants who move into the east-central cities is their reliance on traditional kinship relations, ethnic ties and shared hometowns as well as building upon ethnic ties in everyday business (Zhang 2018).

The reality of these ethnic-minority migrants suggests that we must look beyond typically push–pull models of migration. Push–pull models ground migration decision making in the choices of individuals and for the improving living conditions, incomes and opportunities (see Massey et al. 1998 for a discussion and critique of push–pull models). And while ethnic-minority migrants from western China relocate to take advantage of opportunities and escape poor living conditions, low wages, a lack of jobs, and so forth, there are often many barriers at points of destination that can limit success and have little to do with the economics of the moment. Migrants respond to the mix of opportunities and challenges they face in central and eastern Chinese cities by adapting cultural traditions and building upon kinship and family ties to find housing and access resources including resources that will cover the costs of relocation. Migrants also build upon social networks with family, friends and co-ethnics while establishing new relationships with the local population. These ties, like those activated by both Tursun and Ma, create new bonds that allow individuals to succeed and to access better living conditions, higher salaries and so on.

Although ethnic-minority migrants from northwest China face great difficulties as they migrate and integrate in cities like Shiyan in Hubei, it is possible for them to gain a foothold. A migrant can follow a friend, relative or co-ethnic to a new destination city, enhancing their experience and creating a foundation upon which to build toward success. In the process, migrants build upon their language and communication skills and social capital as they negotiate new relationships while relying upon older connections and creating opportunities to integrate (Pan et al. 2018). Building upon the successes and experiences of "pioneers" facilitates settlement and mitigates some of the stresses that often accompany migrants on their journeys. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that regardless of the adaptive success ethnic-minority migrants achieve, challenges remain. Ethnic-minority migrants are often isolated in their new cities, particularly when they do not share language or traditions with the native population (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Furthermore, the social relationships between immigrants and city natives are often influenced by the tensions that characterize competing traditions, beliefs, practices and outcomes for all groups involved. In order to establish authority and show muscle, "pioneers" who succeeded in destination cities will sometimes use drastic means to deal with other migrants and the disputes that sometimes pit more recently arrived migrants against older arrivees and locals, confounding the integration process for all ethnic minorities in their new cities. Approaching and acknowledging these differences should

facilitate integration and mitigate some of the practical difficulties that ethnic minority immigrants often face as they travel from western China to central and eastern cities and provinces.

ETHNIC MINORITY MIGRANTS IN RESETTLEMENT VILLAGES

Northwest Hubei is home to the water source of the Central Route Project of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project (see Liu and Zheng 2002; Zhang 2009). In response to the project, and to guarantee water quality for receiving cities, several Hui communities were relocated, and their people resettled (for background on the Hui see Rong 2016). Despite the short distances that each community was moved, as well as the planning that went into minimizing ecological differences between destination and original locations, the Hui were faced with many changes that included the built environment, work and labour practices as well as lifestyle (Lu 2018). These challenges were difficult for the Hui and rebuilding was not easy.

> **Case 3:** Qingliangsi village, Xiangyang. In 2010, 536 migrants created through water conservancy programmes in Shiyan were resettled in Qingliangsi village – a community that was approximately 90 per cent Hui and Muslim. The new community included paved cement roads, residential housing, and a well-developed modern infrastructure that surpassed what was available in neighbouring villages. Nevertheless, the Hui faced several challenges. More than half of the relocated Hui migrants contracted their fields to others as their traditional mountain farming techniques were impractical to use. Furthermore, a long-term drought followed the resettlement and worsened farming conditions for Hui migrants. Finally, the environment did not support cattle and sheep breeding that was common to the Hui. The water shortage and shifts in living standards as well as traditions led to disputes between Hui migrants and neighbouring villagers. To solve the myriad problems that challenged the Hui immigrants, the local government built a collective farm to raise cattle and sheep. Nevertheless, many of the immigrants chose to return to their hometowns finding work around Shiyan and their former village and sometimes marrying into native families.

> **Case 4:** Wangtai village, Xiangyang. In the mid-1990s, 276 Hui immigrants settled in Xiangyang and have begun to participate in the construction of Wangtai village since 2007. In 2009, the provincial government listed Wangtai as the site for a pilot project focused on the protection and development of ethnic cultural villages. A professional cooperative of cattle farmers was established in Wangtai village and villagers established a joint relationship with enterprises seeking to invest in the area through state programming. The programme has matured and developed to become a key example of scientific industrialization supported by the state called "company + raising base + farmers". The implementation of the project has improved access to the external market and provincial economy for Wangtai village residents. In response, villagers are more confident in themselves as well as in their interactions with outsiders, including businessmen who typically purchase their beef. The frequency of interaction and the growing scope of communication between Wangtai villagers and outsiders have continued to increase and extend connections well beyond the villages. The situation of mutual assistance between the residents within the

village increased, simultaneously contradictions and disputes rarely occurred and serve as a critical example of the cultural foundation upon which new relationships and networks can be founded and used to generate development.

Shared and celebrated cultural traditions drive community renovations and construction in Wangtai village and limit the kinds of disputes that are more common in Qingliangsi. The cultural grounding of Wangtai projects fundamentally reshapes the image of the community, fosters community awareness, transforms community organization, improves community performance, and promotes more harmonious development (Tan 2006). The reconstruction of ethnic minorities water conservancy resettlement villages in northwest Hubei follows two pathways that facilitate engagement. First, the reconstruction of the social environment of the community determines the position of ethnic minority migrants in the social networks of the resettlement sites, including the relationship between the resettlement community and other communities, and the relationship between the resettlement community and the local society. Second, the recreation of the internal structure of the community to foster and achieve development goals, especially for ethnic minorities, can support their wellbeing as well as their cultural traditions.

   The timing of relocations and the involvement of ethnic minorities is difficult and can have a significant impact on the wellbeing and social life of migrants to new destinations, not to mention the effect it can have as they leave traditional homelands (Bao 2018). The goal of resettlement must be more than economic. It must include more than settlement. It is critical that it eases migrants' fears and provides a stable foundation upon which to celebrate traditions and foster additional growth. The resettlement of Qingliangsi was short, and the transplantation and embedding of the original community in its new home was not easy for anyone. Furthermore, the one-way nature of the process of embedding Qingliangsi in a new destination determined what would happen next as social relations between migrant villages and other villages developed. Integration and acceptance of new social relations by the Hui was not simple and there was little stability to be had. The resettlement of Wangtai village was quite different. It had a much longer history of resettlement and it had attracted the attention of the government and together they invested social resources in development. The investment of resources in the community led to the success of the migrants and their continued growth. The reputation and the development of community in recent years is significant and supports continued expansion. In sum, community reconstruction should focus on the cultural practices of the population and use those traditions to renew and engage with growth. It should coordinate resources, rather than a focus on purely economic factors, support all parties and realize the further development of the community.

ETHNIC MOVERS AND THE URBAN DEMOLITION OF COMMUNITY

Urban multi-ethnic communities in the northwest region of Hubei Province are mostly located in the old downtown of the city. After a long period of development and change, social relations within these communities have stabilized and are now embedded in the local social structure where they exist in the open, celebrated for all to see. Beef noodle restaurants and beef and mutton businesses sell Halal foods to the Muslim market. The minority communities

in the area are powerful symbols of local life and culture. However, the structures of most residential buildings in these communities date to the 1970s and 1980s. Mostly low bungalows, their layout is chaotic and the electrical grid is aging. Power lines are often exposed, and drainage facilities are failing. The struggle of local utilities is challenged by open air, street market trading that often produces sewage and garbage that cannot be easily dealt with. With the urbanization of northwest Hubei, demolition and relocation has become a necessary measure to solve the challenges to infrastructure. Nevertheless, renovation projects often destroy the open marketplaces and original spaces that have existed for a long time, and offer complicated opportunities built upon the ruins of the past (Zhao and Zhu 2018). While the outcomes of development are celebrated as "going upstairs" and improving life, original bungalows in the community are lost and replaced by buildings with dozens of floors.

Case 5: Youyijie is located in the centre of Xiangyang City, with a total of 821 Hui residents. It was demolished in 2012, and its citizens relocated. Construction on new homes began in 2014 and the first group of ethnic movers were relocated to new tower apartments in 2019. During the process, different ethnic movers (Hui and Han) confronted the government's relocating policy. Mr. Sai (Hui) said:

> My house was more than 100 square metres. According to the government's policy, I will get more than 115 square metres for free as return. But it is still smaller than the size of the new apartment; it means I have to borrow a lot of money to buy the rest size. I am aged and suffer from low back pain. I wanted to live on the first floor, but I couldn't apply for it. I was arranged to live on the sixth floor of the new building, which makes me very disappointed. In fact, we, the Hui people, did not get any special compensation in the process of demolition and relocation.

Mr. Hu (Han) added:

> I have applied for a low-rent apartment provided by the local government. That place is a bit far away from here, so I will not move back in the future. If we did not apply for the low-rent apartment and just rent a normal house, we would not get any compensation. Even if we all hold private houses, the policy is still different for the Han and Hui. There is a transition period for the demolition and relocation project, the compensation is only given to ethnic minorities, the Han people do not have this compensation privilege during this period.

The mosque's Imam and community staffs tried to make the "so-called privilege" held by Hui understandable, yet it was not clear what that meant. What is certain is that the "so-called privilege" refers to the psychological gap between Hui and Han in their perception of resettlement, rather than the substantive unfairness of resettlement methods.

Akhond Da said:

> The Hui people who temporarily moved out during the transition period of the demolition and relocation project get some money from me every month. It is a subsidy for buying halal food, coming

to the mosque for worship and study. Our mosque is very satisfied with the government's policy, and we don't need the subsidy and compensation from real estate developers.

And a community staffer added:

Because after the reconstruction of Youyijie community, it is impossible to slaughter cattle and sheep on the street directly. Therefore, a new slaughter spot has been built in the suburbs by the government and managed by our community. But the slaughter spot is a bit far, so we will apply for some transportation subsidy. The beef and mutton of our community can be seen as a famous local brand. We're not going to let the traditional food culture disappear, we try to retain it. Although the income of some restaurants will be reduced because of the demolition, two rows of houses will be temporarily built to allow them to run the beef noodles restaurants here through our negotiation, we definitely prioritize the residents from own community who moved out their house.

The new apartment buildings redefine community living space, the construction of new shops and new slaughterhouses recall the community's economic space and cultural beliefs. In this way, demolition and relocation "improved design" for this urban multi-ethnic community. It enhanced infrastructure, expanded public space (Chen 2018), and guaranteed further development. At the same time, the demolition fractured the community organization and, in the process, undermined the physical representations of local social relationships (Zhang and Xiong 2019). Under these circumstances, ethnic identity is the only remaining support for individuals. Complicating the situation, this has clouded the long-term value of ethnic identity as a sign of differences. At present, ethnic identity is often the main constraint limiting a community as it tries to remodel and reconstruct itself. In other words, change is keyed to cultural challenges rather than simply the economics of development as we build a socially integrated system that includes local governance around which all people can participate and share (Zheng and Xu 2019).

Following a model that acknowledges culture and ethnicity as well as the economics of development is important to creating a multi-ethnic and open city. First, such a system can celebrate local practices as witnessed in the Halal-based businesses selling beef and mutton and stocking local restaurants. Second, it celebrates local cultural practices in a way that is accessible to China's growing tourism market. Finally, it is a crucial step in recreating the spiritual home of the community to help the movers to adapt to the new "upstairs and downstairs" neighbourhood relationship model, and actively cultivate a new community identity.

DISCUSSION

Through the investigation of the current situations of ethnic minorities' migration in northwest Hubei we see that internal migration is a critical challenge to China's growth and development. While ethnic immigrations from Northwest China to central and eastern cities is an active cross-regional response to economic change and the growth of the nation, the response must be completed with the inclusion of cultural traditions to limit the collapse of social practices. The issue becomes even more critical in situations that force the moving of ethnic minorities in response to ecological crises and climate change. Migrants who must relocate involuntarily and in response to water conservancy programmes create challenges that question how best to reconstruct environments and the social relationship of the resettlement community and immigrants. The "going upstairs" of minority movers in urban demolition and relocation com-

munities is a combination of forced and voluntary mobility, and the main challenge is how to eliminate the negative impact of ethnic identity on community reconstruction.

To address the challenges that confront ethnic minority migrants it is necessary to create social conditions for the people of all ethnic groups to live, learn, work and enjoy together; to promote interaction, communication, and to support integration. The government should improve how it governs and manages ethnic affairs, improve people's livelihood, promote regional economic development and focus on the community support for the ethnic migrants to achieve shared development. From a social point of view, the common culture of all ethnic groups should be the basis upon which to build and to realize a more inclusive and universal symbiotic culture. From the perspective of community, programming that embraces cultural traditions, social relationships and networks and looks beyond external economic forces should be accelerated. Community is the common home of all ethnic groups; the development of the community depends on everyone, and the fruits are also shared by everyone. Each immigrant should enhance his or her destination and form a sense of belonging that celebrates transformations from "different" to "same", from "guest" to "host", and from "exclusive" to "sharing" without threat or xenophobic stereotyping (see Sanjek 2003).

In our cases, we find that "interpersonal trust networks" are critical among the internal ethnic migrants in China. These networks can (and should) play crucial roles in the accommodation and integration process of the ethnic-minority migrants. People rely on trust networks when they decide to migrate and they are critical to some religious communities, ethnic traders and kinship groups (Tilly 2007). Because of the differences in language and customs, Uyghur migrants[4] in Northwest Hubei weave their own trust networks by knotting themselves closely around the "pioneers" who succeeded in destination cities before moving and after settlement.

Charles Tilly (1976) argued that chain migration brings many more less educated, less skilled and less prosperous migrants to cities, and chain migration itself helps manufacture ethnicity and promotes social segregation that is likely to persist and to crystallize into genuine self-conscious ethnicity if the group is big enough and different enough from the rest of the population to build its own full round of institutions – such as churches, social clubs and eating places. In our cases, we find the locations that internal ethnic migrants choose for their stores and family businesses like ramen restaurants, barbecue stalls and ethnic souvenir shops support their integration, particularly around their host societies. These neighbourhoods can become "ghettos" and can be easy targets for nativists who argue ethnic minorities are "remaking the mainstream", and transforming "the 'looks' and the ethnic composition of the working classes without altering the basic social order" (Portes 2010). The relative isolation of ghettos tends to preserve and to intensify the intimacies and solidarity of the local and neighbourhood groups (Park et al. 1967). For policymakers, the problem posed by these ethnic-migrant neighbourhoods is how to engage and not simply remake the social mainstream (Barrera 1980; Bean and Stevens 2003; Wilson 1987; cited in Portes 2010).

In practice the Islamic Association, the Association for the Promotion of National Unity and Progress, the People's Mediation Committee for Ethnic Minorities, Xinjiang Workstations and other organizations conducted a set of policies to assist ethnic migrants in Xiangyang in the accommodation and integration process, and provide better services and better access to those services. First, these organizations have helped to solve practical difficulties for their community and cooperated with the "pioneers" in the ethnic migration group. They thus managed to integrate the interpersonal trust networks into the local municipal management system. Second, the programmes uphold the rights and interests of different ethnic groups in

accordance with the law. It is crucial to the community and local government in host societies to resolve disputes and conflicts and avoid intensifying contradictions under the principle of statute law, and referring to the customs and customary law of ethnic minorities. In our case, the government built a new halal slaughterhouse in the suburbs. The new location satisfied the dietary requirements of ethnic minorities, but also complied with the environmental protection requirements of the municipal administration. Third, each community, regardless of its history and identity, is promoted for integration and acceptance. In fact, the integration and acceptance in city communities cannot only concentrate on economic factors. Providing a stable foundation upon which to celebrate traditions and foster a sense of belonging is no less important than raising income.

Although there are differences in the causes, scope and challenges for internal migration, the key problems to be solved are how to view ethnicity, celebrate tradition and limit the focus on economics as relationships are constructed and development succeeds. The dilemma comes from the assumption that different ethnic groups are in binary opposition and that the only solution is a one-way track to integration. The examples of successful outcomes for internal migration point toward the theory of social mutual construction which holds that participation of multiple subjects can have a significant effect on actions as different social subjects strive for an optimal value and actively plan their efforts (Yang and Zheng 2010). The process of social mutual construction emphasizes the negotiation and cooperation of participants in order to build prosperity that is culturally grounded, socially engaged and that can be shared. From this perspective, the reconstruction of migrants' social relations is shaped, influenced and organized by the interaction among various ethnic members, social organizations, governments and other action subjects. The reconstruction of social relations of immigrants is the interaction among these various players, social organizations, governments and other subjects. It should be clear that different ethnic groups and societies can be symbiotic rather than antagonistic, and with time and support they can construct and coordinate their futures. This process is uncertain and unpredictable; nevertheless, the realization of shared development requires the consultation and cooperation of the whole society and the positive harmony between ethnic groups and society in order to construct the development prospect that can be shared together.

CONCLUSION

According to the situation in northwest Hubei, cultivating and expanding speciality industries are key to promoting the economy of ethnic minorities. However, to reach these goals demands more than an economic programme. Celebrating the region, its diversity – whether religious, or around ethnic traditions and food – can be an effective pathway to growth. Ethnic movers can be drivers of change, particularly with the support of the state and other players including local industry. Celebrating ethnicity can be a key link in the local growth, expansion and the organization of community. Promoting the ethnicity and ethnic communities in the local area and building multi-ethnic centres can become a model for the future if culture is celebrated and social networks are encouraged. On this basis we can realize the shared development of ethnic culture and regional culture and support internal migration to promote the relationship between different nationalities through the expression, dissemination and exchange of the key symbols of food.

NOTES

1. Acknowledgement: This work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (16CMZ029).
2. The share of ethnic-minority migrants in Hubei Province was 1.52 per cent in 2015, it had expanded to 3.98 per cent in 2017. The population of Uyghur migrants in 1982 was 70,000 and increased to 1.21 million in 2015 nationwide. The nearly 20 million ethnic-minority movers are part of nearly 247 million Chinese citizens who move in most years (National Health Commission 2018: 5–6 and 119).
3. No specific number of Muslims in China can be found from the official census, as it is not a statistical indicator in the China census. By the ethnic religious affiliation (in general, these ten ethnic minorities are often treated as Muslim groups in China, but in reality not all the members from these ethnic minorities are Muslim) and the 2010 China census, the number of Muslims in China was estimated at 23.14 million, comprising ten Muslim minorities (Hui, Uyghurs, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Bonan, Uzbek, Tatars, in descending order of total population) (National Bureau of Statistics 2010).
4. There are distinguishable features to the policymaker between Uyghur migrants and Hui migrants despite their appearance. The differences the policymaker sensed led to different political practices in different Minority Autonomous Regions in China, and these political practices make each Muslim group have a unique and complex relationship with the state (for more discussion on the Hui, Uyghurs and Muslim groups in China see Gladney 2003; Lams 2016; Shorey 2013). As mentioned in Note 3, there are ten Muslim groups in China; Hui is closer to the Han Chinese culture than other Muslim groups despite the religious factor. "In between the two groups of the Hui and the Uyghurs, there is a range of Muslim nationalities who are either closer to the Uyghurs in resisting Chinese culture (Uzbeks, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks) or closer to the Hui in accommodating it (Dongxiang and Bonan)" (Gladney 2003).

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17. Labour market integration of immigrants in Finland[1]

Elli Heikkilä and Nafisa Yeasmin

INTRODUCTION

As a Nordic welfare state that emphasises the full employment of its citizens, Finland has perceived the labour market integration of immigrants as the main avenue for their social inclusion into Finnish society (see Fangen and Paasche 2012; Ahmad 2015). The integration of immigrants into a host country is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon spreading into economic, political, social and cultural realms. Not all areas of integration are possible to measure, such as subjective feelings of integration or non-integration (Heikkilä and Lyytinen 2019).

Finland is home to a relatively small immigrant population, but it has been one of the fastest growing populations among the OECD countries (OECD 2018). The number of foreign-born persons in Finland rose from 64,922 in 1990 to 387,215 by the end of 2018. Most of the immigrants are settled in the larger urban centres in southern Finland, and 57 per cent of immigrants in Finland are from other European countries. The largest immigrant groups are from Russia and the former USSR, Estonia, Sweden, Iraq, Somalia, China and Thailand. According to a recent study, family reasons (54 per cent) are the key driver of immigration to Finland, followed by work-related motives (about 20 per cent), study-related motives (10 per cent) and asylum seeking (10 per cent) (Sutela and Larja 2015).

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse immigrant labour market integration and experiences in Finland. It concentrates on the employment of immigrants with respect to different background variables, such as primary activities, employment sector and occupational groups, gender and ethnic background. Comparisons are also made to the Finnish-origin population to account for variations in the economic sectors in which both immigrants and the Finnish-origin population are employed. This chapter also highlights factors that can affect immigrant economic integration or the lack of it. Thus, the specific case study of Lapland is presented and the economic opportunities and experiences of immigrants in the Lappish labour market are discussed. The role of the so-called meso level, i.e. the existing immigrant actors and networks that help recent immigrants find a job and advance in their career, is also dealt with in this chapter.

IMMIGRANT LABOUR IN THE LABOUR MARKET

International mobility can, on the individual level, be conceptualised as a type of investment in human capital. Individuals migrate to where they can be most productive according to their skills. Before they receive a higher income, which is tied to greater workforce productivity, they must commit to making certain investments, such as the material costs of

migration, the learning of a new language and culture, difficulties in adapting to new labour markets, and the psychological cost of cutting old ties and creating new ones (Chiswick, 1978; Massey et al. 1993). When their skills, mastery of the language and familiarity with the labour markets improve, immigrants' social status will likely improve, allowing them to take higher-productivity jobs (Chiswick 1978; Hämäläinen et al. 2005).

Nevertheless, the research shows that highly skilled immigrants can also experience substantial downward mobility and professional disqualification, which lands them in a job not corresponding to their level of education (Khattab et al. 2011; Kaas and Manger 2012; Sirkeci, Acik and Saunders 2014; Sirkeci et al. 2018), but also involving disadvantages or discrimination in other respects (Forsander 2002) and influenced by earlier experiences with employers and prevailing stereotypes (Heikkilä and Jaakkola 2000).

Time is a decisive factor in the process of integration (Heikkilä and Lyytinen 2019). Several studies in Finland provide evidence that after the first few years of living in a country, the differences in employment and unemployment between immigrants and the native population gradually decrease (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2008; Kangasniemi and Kauhanen 2013; Krutova, Lipiäinen and Koistinen 2016).

Sarvimäki (2017) has demonstrated a heterogeneity in employment rates between immigrants from the same origin areas arriving in Finland in different years. For example, immigrants from Iraq and Somalia arriving in the early 2000s have had a higher employment rate from 2008 onwards than their compatriots who arrived in the late 1990s. When comparing Iraqi men and native men and their employment rates, during their first full calendar year in Finland men from Iraq had a 70 per cent lower employment rate than Finnish-origin men of the same age. Over time, their employment grew faster than that of Finnish-origin men, but even after ten years in Finland the employment gap was still 48 per cent lower for Iraqi men. Immigrants are at a disadvantage because their language skills are limited and because employers (are biased against) undervalue their foreign qualifications (Forsander and Alitolppa-Niitamo 2000; Jaakkola 2000; OECD 2018).

According to a survey done by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2018), a quarter of respondents, i.e. African first- and second-generation immigrants in 12 EU Member States, reported that they felt racially discriminated against when looking for work in the five years before the survey. Eighty-two per cent of them felt that their skin colour or physical appearance was the main reason for such discrimination. The respondents also indicated that such factors as their accent or the way they speak the language of the host country had hindered their job search, as had, for example, their first or last name or their country of citizenship.

Both in Finland and in other industrialised countries, it is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population. The result is that the former often have much higher unemployment rates than the latter (Heikkilä 2017). Transferability of human capital depends on similarities and differences between origin and destination countries. Language skills, the education system and the cultural and social environment in the country of origin are all important in this respect (Tassinopoulos and Werner 1999). Migrants arriving in a new country lack country-specific human capital (work experience, language proficiency and recognition of their home country credentials) and social capital. This tends to result in higher risks of unemployment and lower occupational status and earnings as compared to native-born persons (Lens, Marx and Vujic 2018). The ability of immigrants to communicate with the local people is often considered the most important single factor that leads to social and economic

integration (Dustmann and van Soest 2002). In a prior study, Jaakkola (2000) observed that immigrants lacked a well-functioning recruitment network in Finland, which is also an obstacle to finding a suitable job (see also Könönen 2012).

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES IN THE FINNISH LABOUR MARKET

Our study found remarkable differences in the primary activities among the largest immigrant groups by country of citizenship in Finland in 2017 (Table 17.1). Over half of all Estonians were employed, followed by an employment rate of 40 per cent for those from Sweden, Vietnam, Thailand and China. Unemployment was highest among Iraqis, most of whom are refugees. Thais, Russians, Syrians, Somalis and Afghans had the next highest share of unemployed persons by the primary activities. Children made up around 40 per cent of all Syrians immigrants, whereas a quarter of all Afghans and Vietnamese immigrants were students.

Table 17.1   Primary activity of the largest top ten countries by citizenship in Finland in 2017

Citizenship	Employed	Unemployed	0–14 years old	Student	Pensioner	Others outside labour	Total abs	%
Estonia	51.4	8.0	18.5	6.2	4.4	11.5	51,539	100
Russia	29.4	16.2	12.2	12.5	12.2	17.6	29,183	100
Iraq	9.7	20.0	24.4	22.5	2.7	20.8	11,729	100
China	39.6	6.2	12.1	13.0	0.9	28.1	8,742	100
Sweden	40.9	8.4	6.2	3.7	26.1	14.7	8,018	100
Thailand	40.4	16.3	7.7	14.9	1.2	19.52	7,533	100
Somalia	9.2	15.7	26.8	21.3	2.6	24.5	6,677	100
Afghanistan	10.4	15.2	20.5	25.6	2.6	25.7	5,792	100
Vietnam	40.9	7.9	9.8	25.1	2.0	14.4	5,603	100
Syria	3.6	16.0	39.3	22.2	0.4	18.7	5,290	100
All foreign citizens	38.6	11.3	15.2	11.7	5.2	18.0	249,452	100
Finnish citizens	42.5	5.1	16.2	7.1	26.6	2.5	5,263,678	100

Source: Statistics Finland.

The Swedes had the highest share of retired people, many of whom could be persons who emigrated from Finland to Sweden especially during the 1960s and 1970s and after retirement had chosen to return to Finland as Swedish citizens. A remarkable number of immigrants were not trying to enter the labour market, including Chinese, Afghan and Somali women working as housewives.

The next statistical analysis of a primary activity consists of Coming of Age in Exile – Health and Socio-Economic Inequities in Young Refugees in the Nordic Welfare Societies, a CAGE project funded by NordForsk, with special longitudinal register-based data bought from Statistics Finland. It includes all persons born between 1971 and 1999 (first generation) with a refugee background or other migrant background and second-generation persons born in Finland to two refugee parents/other migrant parents and native-born comparative data. All persons were living in Finland in 2015. The subjects in the CAGE study moved to Finland as

children between 0 and 17 years of age, i.e. they have been socialised to two cultures – their parental culture of origin as well as the Finnish culture.

When looking at the primary activity of persons 25 years of age from different migrant backgrounds and native-born persons (Figure 17.1), Finns had the highest rates of employment, followed by second-generation refugees, especially males (78 per cent), but also women (68 per cent). However, the data does not reveal the sectors in which they were employed. The share of employed was also high for second-generation migrant women whose families were not refugees (66 per cent). The share of unemployed persons was highest among first-generation refugee men (21 per cent), while the share of others outside the labour force was most striking for first-generation refugee women (23 per cent). The share of students among those 25 years of age was highest among second-generation other migrant (non-refugee) men (20 per cent) and Finns (16 per cent for males and females).

Figure 17.1   Primary activity of persons 25 years of age according to migration background, comparative groups and gender (%; first generation born between 1971 and 1999 and second generation born between 1986 and 1999)

Source: CAGE project.

How does education affect the employment rate among highly educated, i.e. those with a bachelor's degree or equivalent up to a doctorate or equivalent degree (ISCED 6–8), at 30 years of age among those from different migrant backgrounds and native-born Finns? Figure 17.2 shows that the share of employed was much higher for highly educated 30-year-olds than for all 25-year-old persons (Figure 17.2). The highest shares were for Finnish women (73 per cent), first-generation refugee women (70 per cent) and other (non-refugee) first-generation

migrant women (68 per cent). Unemployment was very low in all groups. Many of the higher educated persons were still students, and they were pursuing further education in Finland. The highest shares were among men from different groups as compared to women. Very few of them were also outside the labour force. All told, higher education guarantees a better position in the Finnish labour markets, and it is an investment in human resources.

Figure 17.2   *Primary activity of highly educated persons (ISCED 6–8) at 30 years of age according to migration background, whether native-born Finns or migrants, and gender (%)*

Source: CAGE project.

EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP

There were a total of 89,897 employed foreign citizens in Finland in 2016. Their share of all employed persons was, however, only 4 per cent. The immigrant professions show some differences in terms of the jobs done by workers with a foreign origin and those done by Finnish-origin workers. All persons with at least one parent born in Finland are considered to be of Finnish background. Persons with parents or the only known parent having been born abroad are considered foreigners (Statistics Finland 2019).

   Foreign-origin men were most often employed as craft workers and related trade workers in 2016 (20 per cent). Likewise, the share of employed Finnish-origin men was also high (18 per cent). This occupational group includes, for example, building and related trade workers as well as metal, machinery and related trade workers. The percentages were almost the same for those employed as professionals (foreign men 16 per cent vs. Finnish men 19 per cent). This group includes science and engineering professionals, teachers and health-care professionals, such as medical doctors, and business and administrative workers. The greatest difference was

found in elementary occupations, i.e. a far higher percentage of foreign men worked in these jobs than did Finnish men: 14 per cent of foreign men compared to only 5 per cent of Finnish men in 2016. Elementary occupations consist of, for example, cleaners, helpers and labourers working in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport. The next highest difference was found among service and sales workers, jobs that also employ a much higher percentage of foreign men. Service and sales workers include, for example, personal care workers, such as health care assistants, sales workers and personal service workers, such as waiters. Finnish men were more often employed as technicians and associate professionals compared to foreign men (15 per cent vs. 7 per cent). This occupational group includes, for instance, business and administration associate professionals and health associate professionals, including nurses (Figure 17.3).

Figure 17.3   *Employed Finnish-origin men (n=1,060,789) and foreign-origin men (n=74,593) by occupational group in 2016*

Source: Statistics Finland.

When looking at female employment patterns, the share of those working as service and sales workers was highest, 29 per cent, for both foreign-origin and Finnish-origin women (Figure 17.4). This occupation clearly had a higher share of females than males. Finnish women more commonly worked as professionals, technicians and associate professionals than did foreign women. Foreign women were quite often employed in elementary occupations, and the share was much higher for them (22 per cent) than for Finnish women (7 per cent), and even higher than for foreign males. A strong male majority was seen among craft workers and related trade workers as well as among plant and machine operators and assemblers. Plant and machine

operators and assemblers include, for example, drivers and mobile plant operators and station-ary plant and machine operators.

It is interesting to note, however, that when looking at the total number of professionals and the total number of elementary occupations in absolute terms, the difference was small: 21,308 persons were working as professionals and 22,824 persons in elementary occupations in Finland in 2016. This means that Finland has wide range of occupations among employed persons in the primary and secondary sectors in the labour markets.

Figure 17.4   Employed Finnish-origin women (n=1,081,436) and foreign-origin women (n=58,860) by occupational group in 2016

Source: Statistics Finland.

The number of foreign-origin employed persons has increased in the period from 2010 to 2016 by 47 per cent (increase in absolute terms: 42,599 employed). The most remarkable increases have occurred in the numbers of cleaners and helpers (5,261 employed), building and related trade workers, excluding electricians (4,673), personal service workers (2,975) and personal care workers (2,963).

What was the Finnish labour market looking for with respect to German and Somali workers in Finland in 2016, with the former representing workers from a developed origin country and the latter workers from a developing origin country (Figure 17.5)? While nearly the same number of employed persons from Germany and Somalia were working in Finland in 2016, the division in terms of occupational groups was significant. The share of professionals was very high (43 per cent) among German-origin workers compared to Somali-origin workers (8 per cent). The next highest share of Germans were employed as technicians and associate

professionals. A quarter of Somalis were service and sales workers, while a fifth worked both in elementary occupations and as plant and machine operators and assemblers.

Figure 17.5   *Employed German-origin workers (n=2,076) and Somali-origin workers (n=2,527) by occupational group in 2016 (%)*

Source: Statistics Finland.

The study next analysed employed citizens from Finland's neighbouring countries, Russia and Estonia, with Finland having received a significant number of immigrants from both countries. The number of employed Russian citizens by occupational group and education in 2016 is presented in Figure 17.6. One-quarter of employed Russians had higher education, almost one-third had secondary education and 45 per cent had received a primary education, including those whose level of education was unknown. It is important to note that, for example, a higher educated person can be classified as having only a primary education if he/she does not have a certificate to prove his/her educational background.

   One-third of higher educated Russian were professionals (652 persons), which indicates matching in the labour market. There were no managers among Russians. The next largest number of employed persons worked as service and sales workers and technicians and associate professionals. What is striking is that higher educated persons were also working in elementary occupations (272 persons).

   Almost a quarter of employed Russians with a secondary education were working as craft and related trades workers and in the elementary occupations. They worked also as service and sales workers. When looking at those with a primary education, including education unknown, surprisingly many were working as professionals. This can mean, for example, that long working experience is valued and that persons have had to advance in their career slowly,

on a step-by-step basis. They can also have their own enterprise and act there as professionals, although their educational background is at the level of primary education. Elementary occupations and service and sales workers were the next most important occupation groups among employed Russian citizens with a primary education.

Figure 17.6   Number of employed Russian citizens by occupational group and education level (n=8,437) in 2016

Source: Statistics Finland.

What was the situation in the labour markets among employed Estonian citizens by occupational group and education in 2016 (Figure 17.7)? One in ten employed Estonians had higher education, almost one-quarter had a secondary education and two-thirds a primary education, including education unknown. One-third of higher educated persons worked as professionals and one-quarter worked as technicians and associated professionals, which means that, in total, 60 per cent of higher educated workers were in professions generally matching with their education level. One-quarter were service and sales workers. There were also signs that higher educated persons were working in the secondary labour market, i.e. in elementary occupations (163 persons).

Estonians with a secondary education were mostly employed as service and sales workers, as craft and related trades workers, and in elementary occupations. One-third of those who had a primary education, including education unknown, were working as craft and related trades workers and a quarter in elementary occupations. Also, plant and machine operators and assemblers were an important occupation group for employed Estonian citizens.

When looking at the CAGE project data on employed, highly educated refugees and other migrants who were 30 years of age compared to Finns, it is worth noting that most persons in all three categories worked as managers or professionals. The matching in the labour market was thus evident. There were, however, signs of mismatching, too, since some highly educated persons were working in the secondary sector. This situation applied to refugees, though with the share being slightly higher, and other migrants and Finns (Table 17.2).

Figure 17.7   *Number of employed Estonian citizens by occupational group and education level (n= 25,845) in 2016*

Source: Statistics Finland.

Table 17.2   *Employed highly educated persons (ISCED 6–8) at 30 years of age according to migration background and Finns by occupational group*

Occupation group	Refugees 1st gen. (n=291)	Other migrants 1st gen. (n=1,096)	Finns (n=3,414)
Managers	24.4	28.6	33.5
Professionals	33.0	27.6	26.7
Technicians and associate professionals	4.8	8.8	6.9
Clerical support workers	10.0	8.4	6.9
Service and sales workers	0.0	0.2	0.9
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	3.1	1.4	1.6
Craft and related trades workers	1.7	1.1	1.2
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	2.4	1.3	0.9
Elementary occupations	0.0	0.4	0.6
Armed forces	0.3	2.2	1.8

IMMIGRANT LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION AND EXPERIENCES IN LAPLAND

Data Description

We next analyse immigrants' experiences with the Lappish labour market in Finland using qualitative data from the Foreign Lounge (FOLO) project funded by the European Social Fund. The number of immigrants having been born abroad in Lapland is still quite small, constituting 4 per cent of the total population in 2018. Selective in-depth interviews with 50 immigrant job seekers comprise the main data for the Lapland case study. The interviewees had registered as job seekers at the local employment office. The target group received intensive support by the project team for 28 months. Essentially, immigrants received support according to their needs when searching and applying for a job and for career planning.

Specifically, the interviewees included 34 females and 16 males. Most of them were from the following ten countries: Myanmar, Thailand, Russia, China, Yemen, Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey. The age range of the interviewees was between 24 and 56 years old.

The interviewees had different educational backgrounds; some having degrees from vocational institutes from their country of origin and others having acquired a vocational degree from Lapland or other parts of Finland. Some were highly educated, holding a master's degree or equivalent from their country of origin. They were mostly refugees, job seekers within the EU and spouses of Finns and had lived in Lapland for two to ten years. Their level of work experience also differed quite dramatically.

Experiences of Immigrants in the Lappish Labour Market

Many different factors had led to employment and underemployment among immigrants in Lapland. The level of language skills or unclear demands and prejudice on the part of employers regarding an immigrant's Finnish language skills, as well as the lack of a social network combined with labour market discrimination, were the main factors that emerged as obstacles to finding a suitable job (Figure 17.8).

Almost all the interviewees agreed that they had faced similar obstacles and challenges when looking for a job, but still the barriers differed between women and men. Almost all men and women believed that language skills and the assumptions of employers about immigrants' low language skills were one of the main barriers. Both men and women had to struggle when navigating through the local labour market, as they lacked, for instance, proper continuous guidance for evaluating and assessing the needs for new knowledge about local systems or else frequently lacked the means for upskilling when planning their careers.

However, women faced some additional employment challenges, like the lack of social network, more than did men. Males at least had social networking opportunities within their own community more often than did women. Male immigrants had more flexibility and opportunities for socialisation, since female immigrants typically had much more responsibility for household chores and more cultural or religious challenges that hindered their socialisation process. To a large extent, females maintained a tight relationship with others who also belonged to their community and spoke their mother tongue, which may have hindered their assimilation process and which could be the reason for weak local language skills, since they

did not practise Finnish in their daily life because of low interaction with locals. Therefore, the effect of origin indeed differed for male and female job seekers.

Since it was easier for males to have a social network among their own community members, they also collected information from those members who had more experience with local labour markets. The interviewees also reported that they had encountered different attitudes of employers towards immigrant job seekers. Some of the women with a Muslim background had faced negative attitudes in some service sectors in the labour market. Otherwise, the male and female interviewees had had similar experiences in terms of the recognition of qualifications and other formal and informal barriers faced by immigrants.

According to the interviewees, some employers expected and required a considerable level of language proficiency, literacy in a similar field and digital skills, while others required language proficiency to pass through the initial steps of the job-hiring process, since employers did not rely on application forms and interviews. The prejudice of employers regarding immigrant job seekers' language skills is one of the most common barriers to gaining access to the labour market.

Figure 17.8   Obstacles to finding a suitable job faced by the interviewees.

The interviewees also reported having to struggle to navigate their way through the local labour market. Some of them lacked knowledge about where to search for jobs as well as adequate soft knowledge (e.g. a lack of information, lack of skills for self-help) about the best way to approach employers or seek advice. The interviewees reportedly had faced difficulties in presenting themselves in different cultural contexts, relying on different norms about the appropriate way to present their competences. They lacked knowledge about some workplace norms that are hidden in Finnish working culture and are different from their country of origin. Such issues also resulted in a lack of soft knowledge about how to communicate effectively,

reducing their opportunities for navigating their way through the local labour market. Some jobs require having access to a certain hidden network and it is difficult to obtain information about those jobs, meaning that finding such a job is highly dependent on having the right social network.

The informants had faced an inability to find a job that could match their educational background. Approximately 90 per cent of the interviewees had found it difficult to find a job that matched their educational background or previous occupation. They had also endured substantial wage disadvantages by being underemployed. The interviewees believed that they were overqualified for the jobs available to them in the Lappish labour market. Thus, the interviewees faced a shortcoming in qualitative matching. Some interviewees possessed occupational skills that were not well known in the local labour market, which in turn also caused mismatches. To a large extent, it created a lack of complete information about the potential workers' skills and employers' requirements.

According to the experiences of some of the immigrants, shared labour market characteristics between the host and source country had had a positive impact on them finding close job matches: the more similar the educational institutions, working culture and labour market characteristics, the greater the possibility of finding a job that closely matched their training. Conversely, the more distant the origin and destination countries, the more difficult it is to find a suitable match in the labour markets; many interviewees had acquired educational degrees from their country of origin or from the host country which did not describe well enough their occupational skills for local employers. After having previous professional experience or higher degrees, many immigrants had chosen another profession in the host country that did not match their past educational degree.

> I was a teacher, and now I have taken another degree for getting access to the local labour market. I had a university degree from my country of origin, and now I have also a vocational degree and am searching for a job, because it was clear to me that I cannot get any job as a teacher in Finland. Accreditation for my previous degree is a lengthy process; thus, I have completed this new vocational degree to get access to the labour market quickly. (M, 42, Asia, 2017)

> Finnish employers rely on informal or formal networks for recruiting employees. Many jobs could be available through the recommendation of members in these formal and informal networks. This is an obvious obstacle for many immigrant job seekers as they lack a social network in host cities in Lapland. (F, 50, Africa, 2017)

Most immigrants reported that maintaining a social relationship with other immigrants from their country of origin, immigrants from a similar culture and immigrants from other countries who had similar kinds of needs made it easier to communicate, even if they did not have a common language, because they had been exposed to similar types of situations and had similar understandings. However, a few of them had good connections with some local networks that had given the immigrant job seekers the opportunity to demonstrate their skills and knowledge to potential employers. Many of them also reported that they had even still encountered negative attitudes as the result of discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping, and so forth.

In terms of job satisfaction, we also found that many immigrants reported being satisfied with periodical work, while others did not even desire accepting seasonal job offers. Many of the respondents were depressed by being relegated to seasonal job availability. Six per cent of them had found a full-time job, while 38 per cent of them had found some hourly and temporary work, and the remaining 56 per cent had only found a part-time job, which was

basically seasonal work. Some who had found a full-time job were also, however, working on an hourly basis according to the demand, including those working as interpreters, translators, mother-tongue teachers and craft and trade workers. In those cases, they had just received a job contract for an indefinite period of time. Apart from those cases, some had found a full-time job in the construction sector. Mostly, though, part-time jobs on a temporary basis were available to immigrants, which mainly included odd jobs like cleaning; also, some part-time jobs were available for kitchen assistants, bakers, marketing traders, craft and trade workers, travel agency workers, workers in tourism or science professionals. Some persons were employed in companies in which their wage was subsidised by the government.

According to the experiences reported by most of the interviewees, it was difficult for them to gain access to the labour market, including presenting their competences in an appropriate manner. Some faced individual barriers as well; especially a number of the women interviewees coming from countries with low female participation in the workforce encountered many cultural difficulties and often lacked minimum work requirements, e.g. language and other soft skills.

Many of the interviewees believed that they needed continuous support in searching for a job, e.g. expert guidance, since it can be particularly difficult to resolve hassles related to finding a job or even the right opportunities. A stable path toward gaining access to the labour market can be hindered because of the transition between being employed and unemployed. Many interviewees agreed that they needed face-to-face services rather than digital services, since many different working paths to employment are available for job seekers, such as various forms of supplementary education or training.

While a few interviewees believed that self-motivation and the determination to work could support them in their career planning, most said they were dependent on outside guidance on how to effectively make use of local systems and demanded direct support in taking the initiative and solving problems.

CONCLUSION

Primary and secondary labour markets, in accordance with the Dual Labour Market Theory (Massey et al. 1993), exist in Finland. In the former, human capital is fully utilised, whereas this might not be the case with secondary labour markets, i.e. work and education do not always correspond. The foreign-origin men and women interviewed for this study possessed multiple forms of human capital and were employed in a wide variety of occupational groups, including work in the primary labour market as professionals. The occupational structure showed some gendered differentiation with respect to the labour market, as is the case also for Finnish-origin workers. It is striking that the share of foreign-origin workers in elementary occupations was much higher than for those of Finnish origin. Also, when comparing those with a German or Somali origin, the Germans were employed especially as professionals, but the Somalis more often worked in elementary occupations (see Malin 2018). Jaakkola (2000) refers in his research to winners and hard workers. Well-educated westerners invited from abroad are the winners, while the hard workers are those with little education and work experience; they are often refugees coming from developing countries.

Education and acquired human capital are essential for employment, and it can clearly be observed that good education guarantees employment. The CAGE analysis showed also

that highly educated refugees and other migrants were employed especially in the primary labour market as were the Finns as a reference group. Some persons, however, experienced mismatch, working in the secondary labour market and overeducated for their professions. This phenomenon is known as brain wasting (see OECD 2018). The same phenomenon was seen among Russian citizens, i.e. those from different educational groups, including highly educated persons, working in elementary occupations. Highly educated persons were also employed as professionals. Among Estonians, matching with the Finnish labour market was good for secondary and highly educated persons, and only a few worked in the secondary labour market. Estonians have often good Finnish language skills, which eases their entrance into a matching career.

In contemporary times, a straight line does not exist for entering working life for good after completing one's education. Instead, often there are phases of re-entering education, sometimes also moving from a state of unemployment back to the workplace. It is important to note that the dynamics of labour markets can be thus understood as 'transitions' between labour market statuses. However, the ambivalence of the term 'transition' is obvious, because it implies not only an advancing career, but also the 'transition' to unsatisfactory conditions of employment – downturns in careers, blocked statuses in the labour market, unemployment and social exclusion (Krutova, Lipiäinen and Koistinen 2016).

The Finnish labour markets are currently facing changes because those that make up the baby-boomer generation are retiring, and the population is ageing. Especially the health sector and other labour-intensive sectors will face a demand for more labour and there is already now a lack of labour in these sectors. At the same time, the education level in Finland is rising. Vacated jobs, many of which are in low-paid and low-status sectors, will not be attractive to the native-born population. It is a common belief that the number of immigrants in these sectors will increase. Otherwise, it would be difficult to find people for low-paid, low-status, heavy and monotonous jobs, i.e. the so-called 3D-jobs (dirty, dangerous, demeaning). Such sectors include, for example, agriculture, construction and service-sector jobs like cleaning. Immigrants are over-represented in the construction sector, in hotel and restaurant jobs, and in domestic service. So-called entry-level jobs, which introduce immigrants to the labour markets, are often within these sectors (e.g. Forsander 2002).

Planning a career is not an easy task for job seekers with an immigrant background in Lapland. Together with the interviewees, the career plan had been modified several times during the FOLO project. Many who had found a job at the beginning of the project for a short period of time through the project's support team also came back to the project again to seek support in searching for another job. Hence, the interviewees transitioned from employment to unemployment and back to employment in their working life. This obviously means that immigrant job seekers need support in their career planning until they find a more sustainable job opportunity. Immigrants often need to revise and change their plan for finding better opportunities in the local labour market. As the process progresses, the job seekers' knowledge of job opportunities, personal and professional networks, and the demands of various jobs also increases. Many of them found a job outside Lapland region and moved away from the region during the period of study. We observed that the immigrant interviewees needed a mentor and a gatekeeper who can provide them with the knowledge on how to gain access to the labour market, thereby boosting their confidence. They also needed peer supports.

On the other hand, the FOLO project tried to build a network between immigrant job seekers and employers, i.e. social capital, which would ease interactive discussions between these

two parties and increase opportunities to obtain more information about the labour market. So-called positive discrimination should also be considered in labour market integration of immigrants. Positive special treatment is a mode of action where the target group is supported by specific actions if they are in danger of becoming unequal without them. In this respect, positive discrimination is acceptable and, although different authorities and projects offer services to job seekers, immigrants, however, feel a continuous need to seek more guidance and make more of an effort to integrate into the Finnish labour markets.

NOTE

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PART III

TRACING MOBILITIES IN SPACE AND PLACE

18. Contextualizing religiosity and identity in the case of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe

Tolga Tezcan

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

We are living in a world in which 68 percent of the population recognizes religion as an important component of daily life (Diener, Tay and Myers 2011) and in which individuals and societies are often divided by their religious differences (Haidt 2012). Currently, very few topics could be discussed without addressing religion, and migration is certainly not one of them. It is well documented that religious involvement creates interpersonal attachments and social relations (Kirkpatrick 1997), enhances subjective well-being (Ellison 1991), fosters positive health outcomes (Seybold and Hill 2001), protects from social exclusion (Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman 2013), and offers personal networks, ties, and support (Ellison and George 1994). In addition to this, there seems to be a prevailing understanding that religion serves as a channel for identity formation on both individual and communal levels (Duderija 2007; Verkuyten 2007: 354).

The religiosity[1] of immigrants is among the main areas of increasing interest of social scientists and policy makers, not due to its aforementioned various functions and positive impacts in different spheres of immigrants' lives, but rather because it mirrors a constantly evolving social identity that is interwoven with cultural values and practices and may accordingly conflict with the mainstream culture in various ways. Such confrontation becomes more complicated when immigrants are protecting their religious practices or becoming more religious in their destination countries than they were before (Kurien 1998).

In the US context, religion has generally been characterized as a functional institution to address the various demands of immigrants by bridging their social needs, supporting their claims for inclusion, and providing a pathway into the mainstream (Hirschman 2004). Protection of religious diversity, as a constitutional value, is built on a distinctive facet of the American ideal that facilitates the incorporation of religious identities into the polity (Schuck 2003). In Western Europe, however, religion has been depicted as a source of problems and conflicts strengthened by immigrants' diverse forms of religious attachment (Foner and Alba 2008). Recent evidence supports this pattern: in the US, the religiosity of immigrants serves as a bridge for mainstream incorporation, whereas in Europe, it functions as a buffer against the hardships of integration (Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman 2013). Furthermore, it has long been observed that the socio-political context in Western European countries enables immigrants' religious and ethnic identities to feed, modify, and even amplify one another (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012).

Aside from the role that receiving countries play in immigrants' religious identities, how and whether immigrants become religiously different from their non-immigrant counterparts, or *dissimilation*, has also contributed to our understanding concerning the changes in religiosity, from the perspective of the country of origin (Yinger 1981; FitzGerald 2012; Guveli et al.

2016b). One benefit of adopting the dissimilation perspective is that it permits an examination of the degree to which changes in religiosity can be attributed to the receiving countries and the extent to which immigrants adopt and follow the processes of (de)secularization taking place in the sending countries.

Turks in Western Europe constitute the largest immigrant group. With approximately 5.5 million (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019) Turks settled throughout Europe, they have been among the pioneers in introducing Islam since the early 1960s (Guveli et al. 2016a). Furthermore, Turks are often and typically described as one of the least integrated among other immigrant populations (Witte 2018). There are many reasons why Turkish immigrants have been the subject of a high volume of scientific inquiry in investigations of religion and immigration in Western Europe, and nearly all of them reflect the idea that being Turkish and being Muslim overlap to a large degree as almost inseparable identities. However, 'why should we identify, for instance, Turkish immigrants in a country like the Netherlands as "Muslims" rather than as "Turks" or "of Turkish descent"?' (Waardenburg 2003: 33).

The goal of this review is to selectively examine and synthesize the scholarship in two interconnected debates: (1) decrease versus increase in immigrant religiosity, and (2) religion as a source of, versus a buffer against, discrimination. While the experiences of Muslim immigrants vary greatly from group to group and each immigrant group follows distinctive paths of its own, the focus of this chapter is specifically on Turkish Muslim immigrants. To simplify the discussion to some degree, this review centres on Sunni Turkish immigrants.

A large body of literature scrutinizing immigrant religiosity has drawn attention to the patterns by which immigrants gain access to the core institutions of the society, their position in education and in the labour market in particular, and the secularization hypothesis that predicts declined religiosity with integration (van Tubergen 2007; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Lubbers 2012; Beek and Fleischmann 2019). In this context, little doubt exists regarding the link interwoven between the religion of immigrant groups and the willingness of mainstream society to receive them, through which immigrants may face substantial ethno-religious penalties in integration (Connor and Koenig 2015: 199). This link, in particular, has appeared to be a considerable component of everyday public and policy debates in historically Christian and highly secularized Western European societies. Belonging to a different religion is equalized to a threat to some degree (González et al. 2008), and Muslim immigrants are both observed (Bisin et al. 2008) and perceived (Field 2007) to integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslim immigrants. Public debates thus intensively revolve around the extent to which Muslim immigrants in particular and Islam in general are compatible with European values (Larrabee and Lesser 2003; Thomson and Crul 2007; Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009).

Once having entered and settled in a new country, most immigrants face long-lasting everyday challenges within and across generations, involving difficulties in socio-cultural integration (Statham and Tillie 2016), language inadequacies (Bayram et al. 2009; Spörlein and Kristen 2019), constrained educational and economic opportunities (Wrench, Hassan and Qureshi 1999; Worbs 2006; Johnston et al. 2010) poor housing conditions and residential segregation (Sayari 1986; van Kempen 2005; Khattab et al. 2011), limited quality of and access to healthcare (Norredam, Nielsen and Krasnik 2010) and general dissatisfaction with life (Safi 2010). In this line of research, discrimination, as an endogenous factor, has justifiably appeared to be one of the central predictors of an immigrant's hindered life chances. While Islam has become the second largest religion in Western Europe and the region will continue

hosting Muslim populations that gradually grow to be larger and larger according to recent population projections (Hackett et al. 2019), anti-Muslim sentiments are also on the rise in several European countries (Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

Taken together, the migration scholarship on religiosity broadly evaluates whether migratory events lead to a decrease or increase in religiosity over time and/or generations, and what role religion plays in personal and communal life in receiving countries. On the one hand, integration is thought to provide a secularizing effect manifested in diminished salience of religion; on the other hand, religion itself may influence the integration outcomes due to discrimination appearing as an ethno-religious penalty (Kogan, Fong and Reitz 2019). Thus, immigrant religiosity may be fostered by discrimination and various disadvantages that immigrants face in their daily lives (McAndrew and Voas 2014). Accordingly, in this scholarship, the link between religiosity and integration is also typically accompanied with the level of discrimination shown by mainstream society and how religion serves as a buffer for coping with discrimination.

This discussion brings to the surface the bi-directional nature of discrimination and religion. Following a religion that differs from the majority is one of the catalysts driving discrimination (Poynting and Mason 2007; Kunst et al. 2012) and Muslims have been largely stigmatized in the Western world (Kunst, Sam and Ulleberg 2013) for their beliefs. Religion may also provide a positive and distinct collective identity, especially in identity-threatening circumstances (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2019). Once discrimination has developed based on religious origin, religious identification turns into a strategic response and reactively reinforces the social identity of the immigrants. Subsequently, religion, as a buffer, constitutes a coping mechanism, which encourages immigrants to identify and organize around it (Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman 2013; Maes, Stevens and Verkuyten 2014; Shah 2019).

The review is structured as follows. First, it provides the historical context of Turkish migration to Western European countries. Second, along with related theoretical background and empirical findings, it presents the two sets of debates: (1) decrease versus increase in religiosity, and (2) religion as a source of, versus a buffer against, discrimination. Finally, the last section summarizes the discussion and offers some concluding remarks.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TURKISH MIGRATION FLOWS: FROM TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT

Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing throughout the 1950s, most Western European countries experienced an increased need for labour as a result of fast-growing industries, which opened a door for the recruitment of workers from several Mediterranean countries (Castles 1986). Turkey was a latecomer in joining this post-war economic boom, but it quickly became the main supplier of workers in the early 1960s (Sayari 1986). The bilateral labour recruitment agreement between West Germany and Turkey, signed in 1961, served as a model for similar agreements in other Western European countries, such as agreements with Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium in 1964; with France in 1965; and with Sweden in 1967 (Abadan-Unat 2011).

Although these bilateral labour recruitment agreements were initially intended to create a temporary solution for the booming Western European economy by providing a limited period of time in which to work and restricting guest workers' rights (Martin 1991), from 1961

to 1973, 1.35 million Turkish citizens, including 900,000 workers and 450,000 dependants, migrated to Western European countries and settled (Gitmez 1983: 20–24). Following the energy crisis of October 1973, the subsequent global economic recession lowered the need for workers to fill low-skilled positions in the labour market (Sirkeci 2006). In 1973, first, Germany halted its recruitment, and most Western European countries followed by the second half of 1974 (Castles 2006; Akgunduz 2016). Turkish guest workers were expected to return to Turkey, but substantial migration continued due to family reunification (González-Ferrer 2007), while economic and political instabilities in Turkey incentivized many to stay (Castles 1986). This first migration wave, comprising guest workers and their families, represents the mass labour migrations. The second wave was initiated by refugees and asylum seekers after the military coup of 1980 in Turkey (Abadan-Unat 2011), armed clashes between the Turkish Army and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the tightening immigration regime in the major Western European countries (Sirkeci 2005; Sirkeci and Esipova 2013). The third and very recent wave is composed of highly educated immigrants (Yanasmayan 2016). As a result, approximately 5.5 million Turks live in Western Europe according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019).

DECREASE VERSUS INCREASE IN RELIGIOSITY

The intersection of religion and immigration has received considerable and long-lasting attention from both the public and academia with many themes of inquiry, one of which has asked whether there is a decrease or increase in immigrant religiosity upon resettlement. The secularization hypothesis, positing a decline of religious beliefs and practices (Casanova 2007), has been used to analyse the prediction that industrialization would preclude the efficacy of religion (Berger 1967) and that religiosity decreases with the level of modernization (Dobbelaere 2004; Guveli 2015). This hypothesis predicts an inverse relationship between integration and religiosity (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011). However, the theologizing hypothesis, suggested by Smith (1978), construing immigration itself as a theologizing experience that affects immigrants' religiosity positively to help them deal with obstacles, has also received some support (Yang and Ebaugh 2001; Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Hirschman 2004).

One of the critical arguments with respect to immigrant religiosity in the existing literature is whether immigration is disruptive especially in the initial period of migratory events, or a spiritually intense experience wherein immigrants turn to religion in response to the challenges of resettlement. The first argument concentrates on how secular options compete with religious activities (Stolz 2009) and the degree to which immigration alienates immigrants from religious practices (Massey and Higgins 2011). Finding a job and housing, learning a new language, and establishing new social networks may become larger priorities than the obligations of religion (Diehl and Koenig 2013), and the process of cultural adjustment to the new environment can make religious participation unmanageable (Connor 2010: 62). Furthermore, this short-term disruption in religious participation may be followed by a long-term pattern, with immigrants becoming less religious then they were before (Connor 2010). From the opposite perspective, religion may provide essential meaning and support facilitating the integration process, namely civic engagement (McAndrew and Voas 2014); refuge, respectability, and resources (Hirschman 2004); spiritual needs (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003); a feeling of belonging (Maliepaard and Schacht 2018); and a network in a new envi-

ronment (Guveli et al. 2016b). Furthermore, the challenges of immigration may be perceived as a part of a greater divine predestination, can be more easily tolerated in an unfamiliar environment (Berger 1967), and may make immigrants more religious than they were in their countries of origin (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003).

Numerous studies have focused on the variations in religiosity between Turkish immigrants, other immigrant groups, and native-born Europeans, which enables scholars to explore Turkish immigrants' religiosity in a comparative way. Due to the lack of longitudinal data, changing patterns of religiosity cannot be traced, and therefore, except for a few longitudinal works (Connor 2008; Diehl and Koenig 2013), studies generally take a qualitative approach with limited sample sizes or cross-sectional analyses that cannot be used for causal inferences.

Keeping in mind the methodological limitations, the relevant scholarship, in general, has sought to determine the extent to which Islam survives in host countries. For example, based on anthropological observations in Germany, Mandel (1990) argued that even if many immigrant Turks were already observant prior to their migration, the foreign and Christian context catalysed more active religious involvement. Furthermore, it was found that the religiosity of Turkish immigrants in Germany seemed stable across generations and that their religious commitments were less 'symbolic' (Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009), diverging from what Gans (1994) described as 'symbolic religiosity'.

When Turkish and Polish immigrants in Germany were compared in one study, it was found that although Turks experienced a decrease in religious practices in the initial period of immigration, an increasing length of stay and corresponding access to already established religious infrastructure strengthened their religiosity later (Diehl and Koenig 2013). The context of the Netherlands, however, displays some nuanced differences regarding the effect of length of stay on attendance at religious worship. Guveli and Platt (2011), who investigated Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese immigrants living in the Netherlands, demonstrated that Turks showed greater religious attendance despite the constant probability of religious attendance growing with duration of stay, which was thought to be determined by infrastructural religious resources. Similar evidence was revealed in research comparing second-generation Moroccan and Turkish Belgian Muslims: mosque attendance of the latter outweighed that of the former (Scheible and Fleischmann 2013). Another study connected the increased level of religiosity among recent Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands to the influence of social networks; in other words, observant Muslims prior to migration develop more co-ethnic relationships, which increases religiosity as an outcome of socialization in turn (Maliepaard and Schacht 2018). A high level of religious practice was also found to be associated with the number of co-ethnic mosques in municipalities in Belgium where Muslim Turkish and Moroccan immigrants reside (Smits, Ruiter and van Tubergen 2010).

If Turkish immigrants are broadly found to be different from native residents and other immigrant groups regarding their religiosity, a question arises about the extent to which Turkish immigrants are similarly religious compared with their non-immigrant counterparts in Turkey. In other words, does the religiosity of Turks settled in Europe differ from the practices of their compatriots who do not migrate? The theory of dissimilation, which has been offered to answer whether immigration is a secularizing or theologizing experience, indicates the process whereby intra-societal differences are protected, maintained, and subsequently renewed (Yinger 1981). In conjunction with growing academic interest in migration scholarship and critiques of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), the concept of dissimilation has been analytically renewed for the understanding of how

immigrants become different from those who stay behind (FitzGerald 2012). Dissimilation reinforces the cleavages between immigrants and the non-immigrants of the country of origin (Guveli et al. 2016b). It not only drives deviation from the migrant's society of origin but also leads to distinct ethno-national cultures in the countries receiving migration (Faist 2000).

The relevant question here is how Turkish immigrants differ from non-immigrants in Turkey with respect to religiosity. The most substantial attempt to draw such a comparison was made by Guveli (2015). Results revealed that individual religiosity, measured by the frequency of praying (*namaz*), is dramatically decreasing among Turks in Europe on the one hand, while on the other hand they do not show a difference in attending religious services or in self-rated religiosity. In a study conducted in both Belgium and Turkey, sampling adolescents aged 15–20, it was found that Turkish Belgians are the most religious and Belgians the least, with Turks located in between (Güngör, Bornstein and Phalet 2011). In parallel, a study utilizing both the World Values Survey and the European Values Study found that Muslim immigrants living in Western Europe are religiously similar to neither Islamic nor Western societies. Instead, they are located somewhere between the origin and destination countries (Norris and Inglehart 2012). Having said that, as this kind of investigation entails data collection in both home and host country, there are still very few studies on dissimilation in religiosity.

RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF, VERSUS A BUFFER AGAINST, DISCRIMINATION

Since the late 1990s, as a way of narrowing the concept of discrimination by focusing on a more specific case in order to highlight an emerging phenomenon, the notion of Islamophobia has been intensively used in public, policymaking, and research. 'Islamophobia' describes 'unfounded hostility towards Islam' (Runnymede Trust 1997), the 'fear or dread of Islam or Muslims' (Abbas 2004), and the 'rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes' (Stolz 2005), although there is no consensus on to the extent to which Islamophobia is different from xenophobia or racism (Allen 2010; Dekker and Van Der Noll 2012; Helbling 2012). What relative consensus exists states that Islamophobia has become one of the central issues in Western European societies, and Islamophobia cannot be understood without noting the anti-immigrant sentiments and migration penalty that are interwoven in the understanding of discrimination today. While the presence of Muslim communities in Europe is centuries old, what makes today's Europe different in terms of out-group attitudes is the establishment of Muslim communities through migration (Nielsen 1999).

Discrimination against Turkish immigrants in Western Europe has long attracted attention among social scientists, with a specific focus on social distance toward minorities and on perceived discrimination. A review of this specific literature necessitates the knowledge that, as a result of mainstream perceptions and in response to discrimination, ethnic identity is often conflated with religious identity, which becomes more important to the immigrants in the country of settlement than it was in their homeland (Ebaugh 2003). In this regard, the literature focusing on expressed social distance and perceived discrimination, which appear to be the prevalent methods for measurement purposes in understanding ethnic hierarchies, toward Turkish immigrants depicts the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012).

There is a large and growing body of research dedicated to identifying the social distance between Turkish immigrants and natives. In Germany, it was found to be that the social distance toward Turks is greater than the social distance toward European immigrants (Friedrichs 1998). In a study that sampled Dutch children aged 10–12, Turks were evaluated more negatively than other groups (Verkuyten and Kinket 2000). Hagendoom and Hraba (1987) found that the most social distance, as scored by ethnic Dutch secondary school and university students, was developed toward Turks among seven ethnic groups, which provides clues as to how ethnic hierarchies are formed (Hraba, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn 1989). Studies employing nationally representative samples also display similar results. For instance, Turks were once again found to be the least favourable group for the Dutch (Pettigrew et al. 1997). More recent studies shed light on this consistent negative reaction across Europe. Helbling 2010) found that the proportion of Swiss who preferred not to have Muslim neighbours, namely immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Arab countries, was 17.7 per cent in 1996 and climbed to 21.3 per cent in 2007. Of relevance here, anti-Muslim prejudice was found significantly higher than anti-immigrant prejudice across 30 European countries (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). While most of the research on discrimination focuses on the social distance expressed by natives, the other side of the story requires equal attention: how is this social distance mirrored in Turkish immigrants' perception of both in- and out-group boundaries, and more specifically, how has religiosity been reshaped and how does it contribute to their social identity? In attempts to reaffirm and restore the identity threatened by social distance, it is well documented that religion plays a 'buffer' role (Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman 2013; Maes, Stevens and Verkuyten 2014; Shah 2019), which will be discussed on two levels: first, the transformative effects of discrimination on social identity, and second, the benefits of religion on immigrants' lives vis-à-vis their social identity.

From a social identity perspective, negative beliefs about social groups exaggerate the differences between groups while minimizing them within groups (Tajfel 1970). On the one hand, the discrimination experienced by disadvantaged groups promotes a positive social identity in which the in-group norms are redefined as self-enhancement is achieved. On the other hand, the presence of an out-group provokes intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses (Tajfel and Turner 1979). In this line of argument, religious group identification, grounded in a belief system encompassing 'a distinctive sacred worldview and eternal group membership' (Ysseldyk, Matheson and Anisman 2010), inevitably lies at the very core of the formation of Turkish immigrants' social identity in Western Europe.

Religion is arguably one of the most essential identity-signifiers, providing solid ground for security and stability, and helping to denigrate the 'other' by conceptualizing them as weak (Kinnvall 2004). While this is partially the case because religion provides a frame of reference for ways of interpreting the world and deriving values (Hunsberger and Jackson 2005), it also represents a means of drawing group boundaries and facilitating in-group solidarity (Nielsen 1985). This point has been reflected in recent discussions on how Turkish immigrants perceive religion as a reaction to discrimination. Stemming from the increasing Islamization of the public image of Turkish immigrants and religious-based discrimination (Ramm 2010), some studies show that Turkish immigrants perceive Islam as a morally superior religion and an inseparable part of their identity (Holtz, Dahinden and Wagner 2010; Çelik 2018; Tezcan 2019b).

Perceived discrimination and social rejection not only enable immigrants to turn to religion as a coping mechanism (Aydin, Fischer and Frey 2010), but also pave the way for 'reactive

religiosity', derived from the notion of 'reactive ethnicity' (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), implying that the higher the level of perceived discrimination is, the more attachment to religion will be seen, especially among subsequent generations (Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Tezcan 2019a). In line with 'reactive religiosity' as a way of identity consolidation in response to discrimination or hostility, second-generation Turkish immigrants were found to attend mosques at higher levels over time (Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Lubbers 2012) and to increase their disidentification from the host society due to early attendance of Koran lessons (Güngör, Fleischmann and Phalet 2011). Furthermore, second-generation Turkish immigrants who perceived discrimination and high incompatibility between their ethno-religious community and host nation reported stronger Muslim group identification (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012). These findings tie in with recent research identifying religious vitality fostered by parental socialization of religion. As such, parental religious value transmission emerges as a decisive factor in the religiosity of second-generation Turkish immigrants (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011), who may develop higher susceptibility to religious discrimination, thereby reinforcing their religious identity (Phalet, Fleischmann and Stojčić 2012).

In connection with transformed social identities, religion as a buffer against adverse events constitutes one of the major puzzles from a secularization perspective. At the same time, several benefits of religion for immigrants in highly secularized societies are well documented in recent studies (Lechner and Leopold 2015; Ikram et al. 2016). This line of scholarship commonly utilizes the theory of religious coping, defined as a process of searching the 'sacred' to attain 'significance' (Pargament 1997: 32). Some studies have provided evidence of the positive impact of embeddedness in religious migrant communities, defined as groups of immigrants functioning within religious frames of reference (Breuer 2018). These communities help immigrants cope with series of obstacles by extending business networks (Warner 2005) or generating solidarity networks (Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Phalet 2015). Nevertheless, it should be added here that this kind of social support and communal comfort may come at a cost. Ethno-religious communities may provide some benefits, but they are also characterized and maintained by social control exerted on individual behaviours. For instance, these communities may put pressure on Turkish immigrants to maintain an ethno-religious lifestyle, leading them, perhaps not surprisingly, to identify more and more strongly with their religious group (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012). On the contrary, some Turkish immigrants in Germany are labelled as 'Germanized Turks' and are excluded from the in-group by other Turkish immigrants for not following ethno-religious social norms (Tezcan 2019b). In other words, deviating or distancing from the standards of these communities can bring about ostracism (Kaya 2009).

CONCLUSION

A wealth of literature on Muslims residing in Western Europe has proliferated over the last decades, coupled with increasingly available datasets for studying the issue. This chapter is not the first attempt to summarize the growing scholarship on the religiosity of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. Several excellent reviews exist with slightly different focuses (Buijs and Rath 2002; Duderija 2007; Foner and Alba 2008; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). This review, however, has sought to narrow the focus of this line of investigation by addressing the literature on Turkish immigrants in Western European countries. Considering the size

of these Turkish populations with long-lasting migration waves, their gradually established ethno-religious identity, the fact that local residents have tended to see Turkish immigrants as a cause of increasing economic and social problems, and finally that their religious practices have long been perceived as incompatible with European values, this review is timely.

In this respect, this review was intended to bring greater attention to two interconnected questions: whether Turkish immigrants have experienced a decrease or an increase in religiosity, and how religion turns into a source of discrimination or functions in the face of discrimination.

Current literature suggests that Turkish immigrants in Western Europe have maintained their religious involvement due to the essential resources that religion provides in less welcoming environments. While they seem to protect their religiosity in receiving countries, they simultaneously appear to gradually dissimilate from the religiosity level of the home country. In this way, they achieve a distinctive and unique religiosity. The rediscovery and reactivation of religion is both a personal and a communal undertaking (Waardenburg 2003). This pursuit of religious and spiritual resources may pose unique challenges when immigrants belong to a different religion than the majority. This is especially the case for Turkish immigrants, whose national and religious identities overlap to such a large degree that they have become almost inseparable. To this extent, religiosity has become a very European concern, with a growing Islamic presence in the face of increasing Christian secularism (Goldberg 2006), and religion has been perceived as an obstacle to integration (Van der Bracht, Van de Putte and Verhaeghe 2013). Given that migration introduces individuals with different religious belief systems and degrees of religiosity into a society, mutual reception and various exchanges could be expected to close the social distances among natives and immigrants. What is observed in Western Europe is different, however, where Turkish immigrants, much like other Muslim immigrant groups, employ religion in their quest for identity formation and as a coping strategy in response to discrimination.

The utilization of religion as a buffer implies an effective defensive mechanism that has gradually shaped a trajectory for migrants to move from being passive targets who are expected to gain similarity soon to being active agents who resist and utilize religion as a helpful tool in the process of identity formation. Religion may therefore be one of the main resources manifesting a protective effect in the face of public hostility. Nevertheless, considering the trend of religion being utilized as a means of intensifying group boundaries (Güngör, Fleischmann and Phalet 2011), and recognizing that most immigrants view religion as a facilitator of attachment to ethno-religious networks (Maliepaard and Phalet 2015), which reproduce and maintain their heritage-based values and traditions, conflict persists. It seems likely that it will continue to spread in the foreseeable future.

NOTE

1. Religiosity is one of the most difficult phenomena to measure with its multidimensional nature involving 'cognitive, emotional, motivational, and behavioral aspects' (Hackney and Sanders 2003: 45). Empirical research generally measures religiosity by questioning religious affiliation (i.e., 'What is your religious affiliation?') (Ringvee 2014), religious participation (i.e., 'How often do you attend religious services?') (van Tubergen 2006: 7), self-reported degree of religiosity (i.e., 'How religious are you?') (Aleksynska and Chiswick 2013: 592), or the importance of religion in one's life (i.e. 'How important is religion to you personally?') (Beek and Fleischmann 2019: 8), through which comparisons are made. In this review, religiosity is used as an umbrella term referring to any dimension of religious commitment unless otherwise stated.

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19. Transnational migration, racial economies, and the limitations to membership

Bernardo Ramirez Rios and Anthony Russell Jerry

INTRODUCTION

Globalism postulates that the mass movement of people, ideas, goods, and economies defy previous limitations of space and time, collapsing the globe into a single entity rather than discrete national or even regional economies and societies (Appadurai and Fox 1991; Gupta 1992; Kearney 1991; Schiller 1994). At the same time, globalization collapses hegemonic processes into discrete transnational sequences, representing localized responses and reactions. The use of "glocal" or "glocalization" describes the amassing of capital, social resistance, and political power and the relationship between urban spaces and more extensive "superurban" processes (Brenner 1998, 1999, 2000). In some cases, "globalization" is described as a powerful language that amassed as a principle lexicon (Williams 1983, 2001) and its continued use in describing the exchange between broader (global) and smaller (local) processes (Abdullah 1996; Livingston 2001; Thornton 2000). Models of transnational migration studies contain operations of multi-national, multi-regional, multi-political, and multi-social movements that span local and global sets of processes. This chapter focuses on transnational networks and regional methods of community building and highlights the collaborative nature of transnational and global operations of social movement, identity, and culture to contribute to the understanding and construction of transnational membership and belonging (Cooper and Stoler 1997; Mahler 2017; Smart 1999). Additionally, it highlights the limitations of transnational and global connections—both material and symbolic—with regards to tensions between local and global understandings of race, ethnicity, and indigeneity.

The current practical use of space for the majority of Oaxacan immigrant communities in Los Angeles is recreational and provides a sense of community that is representative of traditional forms, as well as the political histories surrounding exclusionary as well as collective membership/belonging in Oaxaca, Mexico. The politics of public space in Oaxaca and Southern California reflect the historical development and impact of the racial, class, and gendered structures that frame and often prohibit access to membership and political participation within these transnational spaces. The current practices and utilization of space by the various representatives of the "Oaxacan community" develop structures and work as mechanisms for grounding, or "rooting", different communities of Oaxacans within transnational spaces and networks that continue to develop in the flows of people and capital. Indigenous and Black communities of Oaxacans, while originating from similar physical geographies, are differently situated to access these transnational spaces depending upon the historical, political, and cultural "baggage" that each carry when crossing the borders and boundaries that define their world. It is the ability, or lack thereof, to put this "baggage" to work within the contours of transnational space that defines the possibility and processes of contemporary belonging for Black and indigenous immigrants within the contemporary global political and cultural terrain.

TRANSNATIONAL SPORT MIGRATION

Basketball is a team sport that emphasizes cooperation but highlights individual achievement. Cooperation is a crucial component of team sports and also a cultural characteristic of sociopolitical relationships throughout rural Mexico (Cohen 1999). During the early twentieth century, the government of Mexico popularized team sports for its potential to socialize men into the fold of an emerging national identity (Arbena 1991, 2002; Rios 2008). With the help of Catholic missionaries, the sport of basketball remains a cultural institution in the state of Oaxaca. Rural pueblos throughout the sierra region have transformed basketball into a sport that is cooperative in team play but also exemplifies the inherent indigenous values that celebrate community and local culture. The production of sporting culture in the sierra region of Oaxaca traverses the physical boundaries of Mexico/US migration. It establishes transnational social fields where basketball is used as an instrument to promote, enhance, and reestablish Oaxaqueño identity.

In Oaxaca's sierra region, basketball is a cultural institution that holds different meaning for the people, so their interpretation and use of the sport in the US expands its definition. Understanding basketball in the Oaxacan sense is a mirror of cultural and social understanding of life; as one player puts it, "it's the quintessential tie to our communities and people." The game of basketball is a social mechanism used to bring together members of a community. Although it is popular in the neighbouring states of Chiapas, Veracruz, and Guerrero, it is the sierra region of Oaxaca that serves as the basketball mecca (Rios 2019). While the Oaxacan communities continue to embrace the cooperative nature of the sport, specific tournaments provide a stage for individual accomplishments.

An annual tournament, named in honour of Benito Juarez (Mexico's nineteenth-century president—and an indigenous liberal voice for the democratic rule), is played in the sierra region and attracts regional, state, and international attention. The annual basketball tournament, Copa Benito Juárez, is held in the president's birthplace, San Pablo Guelatao. In the town, one can visit the small house where Juárez was born, a museum dedicated to his life and political accomplishments, and a sizeable monumental statue of Juárez resides in the town's central plaza. The tournament occurs over two consecutive weekends in March, and the final championship matches occur on his birthday, March 21st. The competition is significant to the sierra region, but it is also a monumental sporting event that crosses physical and cultural borders and migrated to the US. A live feed records all the final matches and is publicly available on various internet platforms. Also, there is a regional and international radio broadcast where sports personalities announce play-by-play games throughout the day. The migration of basketball—as an institution of cooperation and as a cultural practice—provides a cultural space where individual affiliation and communal validation are challenged. Especially during the two-weeks of the tournament, basketball becomes a producer of cultural membership because it draws players and spectators from abroad.

The historical migration of basketball follows players traveling between the US and Mexico (Arbena 2002). Through the practice and participation in basketball, the sport impacts Oaxacan culture in the US, which motivates some communities in the US to send family members to play in the annual tournament in Mexico. This is expensive and only players and community members with the financial means are able to travel for the tournaments. US-based players become symbols of individual, familial, and communal success, as players on the court as well as accomplished transnational movers. Oaxacan communities in the US follow the tournament

action on internet radio. The scenes are reminiscent of past eras when families gathered around the radio to listen.

Throughout several years of research (2007–2014), results show that Oaxaqueño youth based in the US had to confront community traditions and practices while they negotiated their place and role either as a US player who participates locally in Oaxacan basketball tournaments or as a player who temporarily migrates to Oaxaca to play in the Copa and represent "their" town in the sierra region. Two players, Juan and Jackie, live in the Los Angeles area and have both traveled to Oaxaca to play in the Copa. They have similar experiences with the sport of basketball, and although their love of the game is identical, it is their unique journey and relationship with this particular tournament that makes their experiences different. They have spent the majority of their lives in the US, and they connect to communal values shared by other Oaxaqueños. But it is the sport of basketball that provides them with a platform to negotiate these values. Their participation is more than a reflection of their bi-national existence; it is culture and basketball has become the mechanism for migration that allows young Oaxaqueños to participate in communal citizenship (Kleszynski and Ramirez 2011).

The Copa Benito Juárez tournament pits pueblos throughout the sierra of Oaxaca against each other. The towns compete in a double-elimination tournament until one pueblo is considered the champion. Regulations define player eligibility and determine whether a player (local or US-based) can participate. The regulations stipulate that a player must play for their town. Players who are from the US but have parents, grandparents, or direct descendants from a town are eligible to participate regardless of their residence. The tournament organization issues identification cards for every player. These cards contain a picture of the player, his or her age, pueblo, number, and stamps or signatures of approval from coordinated local governments in collaboration with the tournament organization. Every game requires a team submit player cards. Coaches present the cards to the scores table where a referee and tournament official accept player eligibility before the match by signing the games scorebook. Each coach initials their approval. Once completed, the matches begin. If a player lacks proper and approved identification, they are ineligible to participate in any game.

For the transnational players from the US obtaining an eligibility card is a lengthy and politicized process that measures community connections. The cultural kinships that span international borders create a contested space for generations of players. For example, Juan's parents are from two towns in Oaxaca. Juan is technically eligible to play for either. However, players can only play for one pueblo, and the decision is final. Juan had to choose one of his parents' towns. The decision allowed Juan to explore the meaning of community membership and belonging. Sometimes the decision to play for a particular team is about potential success and talent. Other times, basketball becomes a form of expression.

Juan won his one and only Copa championship at age 13, playing for his mother's town of San Pedro Matajuillá (SPM). Now 24, he recalls the joy of winning and the experience of traveling to Oaxaca as well as returning as a champion to Los Angeles, California. The experience solidified his social and political status within the community and marked him as a community representative. More importantly, it allowed him to engage community membership in a way that would not be otherwise attainable.

Other players do not have the opportunity to play in Oaxaca. Instead, they use the Copa tournament in Los Angeles, California to establish agency and identity. La Copa Benito Juárez in Los Angeles is the biggest Oaxacan tournament in the US. It provides a platform for players

and communities to address the socio-political life of the broader Oaxacan community. Juan's teammate from SPM Los Angeles commented on their Copa win in the 2010 LA tournament:

> **Anthropologist:** Big victory, how do you feel?
> **Player:** I feel great; you know it is bragging rights for the rest of the year!
> **Anthropologist:** I know you didn't get a chance to play in Oaxaca, so how does it feel to win out here in LA?
> **Player:** Yea, I don't really get along with some of the guys out there, so that's why I didn't play, but you know it's cool, I got a cup here so I can't complain, I'm happy, and my family is happy for me.

The Copa was a different experience for Jackie. Her parents are from the same town, so she is eligible to play for only one team. It had been ten years since she visited her parents' hometown at the time of our 2013 interview. Jackie's family supported her decision to play. Her mother and younger sister traveled with her to Oaxaca. Jackie found the decision to play validating and it connected her to her home in Los Angeles as well as Oaxaca. It also allowed her to visit with her family, including her younger sister, who she did not know well. Jackie's grandmother was ill during her visit; and her mother used the trip as an opportunity for Jackie to spend time with her grandmother.

> **Anthropologist:** How do you feel about being back about being here? It's somewhat weird, no?
> **Jackie:** … I don't know… it's like too much (shakes head). But I'm just worried about playing good, so I still have the tournament, you know…

Basketball extends beyond the boundaries of the court. For Juan and Jackie, basketball is a way to connect to family and community through transnational spaces. Most young players from Sierra families use the sport as opportunity to visit their pueblos in Oaxaca; reinforcing bi-national community membership. The game provides players and communities a space to create identity, and it serves as a cultural practice that supports players as they negotiate their belonging emphasizing the transnational nature of the connections (Basch, Szanton Blanc and Schiller 2006; Cohen, Rios and Byars 2009; Fox 2005; Stephen 2007).

ROOTING THROUGH THE RUINS

While Oaxacan indigenous youth in Los Angeles use basketball as a way to establish transnational identities in the Sierra Norte, African descendants in the nearby Costa Chica region of Oaxaca and Guerrero are enmeshed in a process of cultural invention. They are being asked to highlight difference and prove membership within the multicultural schemes promoted by the state governments of Oaxaca and Guerrero, as well as the Mexican federal government. These schemes rely on a form of "hard multiculturalism" (Lehman 2013) that perceives ethnic and cultural difference as a set of incommensurable properties that should be valued and embraced by all citizens. This difference (cultural, ethnic, and arguably racial) is seen by the state and white mestizo citizenry to be based on a set of naturally occurring phenomena that obscure the more extensive web of connections that bind people together beyond the lines drawn by difference through a number of historical, social, and political processes. In the Americas, colonial institutions initially drew these lines of difference as they dealt with the day-to-day practical managing and disciplining of colonial subjects (Bhabha and Comaroff 2002; West

2002); lines that were no less important in the imagination of the modern state (Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002; Omi and Winant 1986) and continue to act as a barrier to the potential gains brought about by socio-political racial organizing.

Fetishized as real, cultural difference appears as natural as other forms of difference such as the biological distinction between the sexes, which therefore allows for the work that was once done by colonial institutions to continue. It also simplifies differences for the general population as well as lower-level institutions such as schools, youth programs, tourism and other leisure-oriented enterprises. Thinking about the ways in which the lines of difference are drawn, and how state and non-governmental organizations actively work to make difference "official," can expose and uncover the real webs of relations of which marginalized peoples are a part.

The United Nations' declaration of 2011 as the "International Year for People of African Descent" can be seen, in many ways, as the ideological backdrop for the recent political activities, among local Oaxacan NGOs and the Oaxacan state, regarding social, cultural, and political recognition of Mexico's Black population. Political action regarding this struggle has been ongoing for at least 20 years, as Father Glynn Jemmot began his local organization, Mexico Negro, in 1993. However, the states of Oaxaca and Guerrero stepped up their attentions and started putting serious resources into the recognition of African descendants in 2011. The UN (2011) states:

> Around 200 million people who identify themselves as being of African descent live in the Americas. Many millions more live in other parts of the world, outside of the African continent. In proclaiming this International Year, the international community is recognizing that people of African descent represent a distinct group whose human rights must be promoted and protected (UN 2001)

In this same year, the state governments of Oaxaca and Guerrero began to strategize how to include African descendants within the racial, ethnic, and cultural milieu of Mexico. This process of official recognition included the invention of formal definitions of Blackness. The process of defining and setting parameters brought some groups to the table and a negotiation between state government, local non-governmental organizations, and community members. It is within this forum, partly brought about by the UN declaration, that official forms of local difference were created in Oaxaca and Guerrero. The states borrowed from pre-existing methodologies developed for the inclusion of indigenous communities, highlighting the preferred strategy for recognizing difference and the colonial intuitions that the Mexican government has employed over several years. Built into the programs are issues that created tensions between local activists and state organizations, and forced local community members to think about their identities and the ways in which they understand history, culture and social development.

The Comision Nacional Para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas (CDI) was the federal arm that took on the development and implementation of the program that would be used to locate the Costa Chica's Black communities. In Oaxaca, the CDI was partnered with the Secretario de Asuntos Indigenas (SAI) to implement programming that would create the official state and federally recognized ethnic group of African descendants. With the help of the SAI, the CDI organized several consultations (*consultas*) to define the cultural and geographical parameters of the program and situate the communities. The first step engaged the general objective to "Reconocer mediante un proceso de consulta a las communidades de los pueblos afrodescendientes de Mexico y sus principals caracteristicas [To recognize, through a process

of consultation with the communities of African Descendant peoples of Mexico, their principle characteristics – authors' translation]."

The second step in this process was the *consultas* and programming to politically active representatives of the African descendant communities. At the first *consulta* meeting in Jamiltepec, Oaxaca, the plan was unveiled to the audience of about 40 individuals representing a number of towns and employees of the CDI and SAI. CDI representatives in Mexico City drafted the plan with the help of a local anthropologist. The government plan overlooked the racial baggage that is historically responsible for the development and defining of Blacks and the Black experience in Mexico. One such element was the approach to naming, which was a significant point of contention for all involved, and an outcome of the fact of the program's development without local consultation or collaboration. Instead, programming was imposed upon the Black communities through the lens of multiculturalism as defined by the federal government. Local community members were under the impression that the first meeting would be a "brainstorming activity," while the CDI believed they would present the plan for ratification. While the programmers realized they had misrepresented the coastal Black communities, there remained a lingering sense that the material was not going to change, as the "professionals" ultimately "knew better."

Federal recognition is a double-edged sword and can oftentimes be conceived of in a way that suits federal agendas over the grassroots agendas of local communities. A profound material impact of these agendas of recognition is that they solidify racial borders and boundaries. While these borders may be symbolic in the context of national and local identity, ultimately, they limit the possibility of physical migration/mobility. Therefore, once these borders are crossed, racialized bodies are seen to conspicuously exist within non-Black physical and ideological terrains of the broader nation state. The presentation of the CDI agenda to the Black communities was based on many pre-existing logics of government, multiculturalism, race, ethnicity, etc. However, it must be recognized that these logics are colonial holdovers that were themselves conceived of with well thought out and intentional effects on Black and Indigenous communities. In these ways, the racial logics and legacies of colonialism continue to haunt current political mobilizations and limit the possibility for physical mobility across the racialized geographies of the region.

Ann Stoler (2008) argues that invoking the notion of colonial or imperial legacies can be unproductive as it glosses over the real processes and sites that continue to frame the action and the experience of the present. She argues that "postcolonial scholarship has sometimes embraced a smug sense that the nature of colonial governance is a given and we can now effortlessly move on to the complexities and more subtle dispositions of the postcolonial present" (192). This smugness is dangerous as it allows our assumptions to colonize our work, as well as to enable us to build what may be false foundations of our knowledge and strategies to addressing colonial structures and their enduring effects on the present. You can see this in approaches to multicultural recognition taken on by states throughout Latin America (Andolina, Laurie and Radcliffe 2009; Asher 2009; Hale 2005; Lucero 2008; Postero 2007); and the project of recognition underway in the Costa Chica is a prime example.

Stoler's argument about the uncritical application of "colonial legacy" is an important one, as it asks social scientists interested in the persistent and perpetual reproduction of colonial formations to remain diligent in locating the particular spaces in which these formations are enacted. However, it is also essential to recognize the ways in which the notion of legacy can speak to the ideas of inheritance, heritage, or even birthright and positionality. This sense

of legacy speaks to the ways that experiences of the present may be based on a particular inheritance of citizenship (Shachar and Hirschl 2007). Recognizing the inherited nature of citizenship, that is the legacy, allows us to start at the present and trace to the historical moments in which an individual or community was not only shaped by particular imperial formations, but how these formations were also framed by a prevailing and persistent logic of value; what I define as a "racial economy." And how this persistent logic, once imposed upon racialized bodies, continues to frame possibilities for future generations. This can be one motivator for transnational mobility. However, for those connected to the Black Diaspora, the learning curve associated with the prevailing racial economy is steep, and complications adhering to a new racial logic can have serious negative impacts on individual and community well-being. This persistent logic of value can be seen to represent a racial economy in which the commensuration of race and social place/status takes place to determine the value of any racialized body within the larger social system. Once this process of commensuration has taken place it is up to a broad set of political and social institutions to maintain these values and to be sure that racialized subjects adhere to the racial economy. Legacy, then, asks us to question the varied inheritances that either empower or burden citizens as they continue to wade through the debris of the past.

The recognition of Blacks in the Costa Chica is an example of imperial formations that are not fixed, but are states of being that anchor subjectivity to imperial forms and use particular eras as a frame of reference for the possibilities of being and becoming. For African descendants in Mexico, and arguably the Americas more broadly, the possibilities of being and becoming are always framed by a persistent racial economy that interferes and acts along with imperial formations restricting possible outcomes and new subject formations. The key is to think about how this economy is maintained by institutions and regimes of power in subtle ways, even as new possibilities are created. If these possibilities are dependent upon an unspoken value system, then they will continue to reproduce themselves even in the face of attempts at real change. There is no other possibility. Racial economies can be seen as legacies and should be perceived as one of the "lasting tangibilities in which ruination operates" (Stoler 2008: 194).

While "notions like 'colonial legacy' and 'colonial vestige' are deceptive concepts that deflect analysis more than they clear the way" (Stoler 2008: 196), they may be a place to start as we have no choice but to work backward from the present in doing an archaeology of racism and the associated methodologies used to produce racial and cultural subjects as we investigate migration. A racial economy might also be perceived as a racial ontology (2008: 204). This ontology is challenging to address because we have become accustomed to addressing it through "repairing" the victims of colonial and imperial authority rather than addressing the debris itself. The act of crossing the border (in any number of physical and symbolic senses), and the myriad of inspections associated with any attempted crossing (Lugo 2008), explicitly bring these ontologies to light. Moreover, crossing borders into discordant socio-racial systems asks the subjects produced within these socio-racial systems to re-imagine the possibilities associated with their own being. For the indigenous communities a shared understanding of the values and histories of indigenous peoples, both internally and externally, allows for the development of transnational connections that root Oaxacan indigenous communities simultaneously in the US and Mexico. However, this is not the case for Black Mexicans, as their crossings require engagement with new valuations of racial Blackness as they become subjected to a new racial economy. That is to say that the physical process of crossing the border

renders Black Mexicans less recognizable as Mexicans within the historical development of racial and ethnic politics in the United States Southwest, a region that is quickly becoming politically and socially defined by a "Brown/White" dichotomy.

Recently, a political shift has taken place in the United States around ethnic and racial politics with regards to those who have found themselves within the confines of the US national borders as a consequence of the flows that define the US relationship to Latin America. This shift has focused on inclusive ways to address what appears to be a heteronormative monopoly on identity politics as represented by the historical development of the Chicano movement in the US Southwest. This shift has also required the development of new nomenclatures to address the impact of these flows on the current ethno-racial makeup of the region. The term "Latinx" has become the preferred term to discuss what is perceived to be a general pan-Latin Americanness. The term is also imagined to do away with the implications of hetero-normativity within the more gendered terms of "Latino" or "Latina." While this term does much to question the implicit political relations responsible for the development of the Chicano as the privileged minority within the region, the term does little to explode the "Brown/White" dichotomy on which this term relies.

Moreover, both the Chicanx and the Latinx, in the context of the United States (really the only context in which the terms make political sense), continue to implicitly reference the "non-Black." It is this relationship and the reinforcement of the Brown/White dichotomy that frames the social and political geography in which Black Mexicans find themselves when they arrive as immigrants to the United States. There is simply no place in the emerging political geography of the region for Blackness given the political ethno-racial space of Chicanx or Latinx. Furthermore, this political geography sets the limits for an experience of transnational being for Black Mexicans in the United States. Unlike the indigenous example mentioned above, Black Mexicans must explore new ways of being (in both the context of Mexican and Black) once embedded into the racial economy, and the associated racial geographies, of the US.

An example from Los Angeles, California, will elaborate my point. Several ethnic groceries and markets have been established within the area in response to the increasing number of Oaxacan migrants. At the 2009 Los Angeles *Guelaguetza Popular* (a cultural festival originating in the State of Oaxaca) sponsored by the Los Angeles-based organization ORO (*Organizacion Regional de Oaxaca*), many different ethnic-based commodities were available for consumption. In fact, a rather large booklet, *Guia Commercial–Los Angeles–Oaxaca*, was produced in order to highlight the numerous merchants in the area that catered to the growing Oaxacan population. This guide included everything from authentic Oaxacan cheeses (*queso Oaxaca* and *Quesillo*) to money wiring services. The *Guelaguetza*, named for a Zapotec term referencing reciprocity and hospitality, is an event that is organized as a way to highlight the many cultural and geographical regions within the state of Oaxaca. These cultural regions include *La Region de Valles Centrales* (Central Valleys), *La Region de La Sierra Norte* (Northern Highlands), *La Region de La Mixteca* (Mixtec Region), and *La Region de La Costa* (North-Western Coastal Region) to name a few. However, the Costa Chica, as a Black region, is ignored. While the *Guelaguetza* is a site of cultural transmission and transformation the event fits into a larger racial economy dictated by a contemporary form of multicultural politics where the broadcasting of indigenous identity is seen to create a particular type of social, cultural, and economic capital. The *Guelaguetza* does indeed bring the Los Angeles Oaxacan community together. However, by highlighting an active indigenous identity it serves as a sign to the broader region and state that an active indigenous population does exist and allows for

a specific type of bargaining power. This indigenous identity fits within a larger multicultural politic, that values indigeneity in different ways (Stephen 2007). Moreover, this "value" is shared within a transnational context, allowing for the reproduction and re-rooting of Oaxacan indigenous communities in Los Angeles, and more broadly, California; creating a symbolic space that some refer to as "Oaxacalifornia" (see Kearney 1991). It might also be argued that in this way, Oaxacan indigenous communities take their place within the geographic and political landscape of indigeneity within the US racial economy.

The *value* here should be understood in two senses. According to Smith, "the word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys" (Smith and Cannan 2000: 41). Therefore, value can mean both "use-value" and/or "exchange-value." As Graeber (2001: 14) notes, to understand the meaning of value one must understand its place in a larger system. To understand the way in which race becomes valuable within a larger system, we must also think about the process of commensuration. Commensuration is the comparison of different entities according to a common metric (Espeland and Stevens 1998: 313):

> [C]ommensuration is no mere technical process but a fundamental feature of social life. Commensuration as a practical task requires enormous organization and discipline, in a Foucauldian sense, that has become largely invisible to us. Commensuration is often so taken for granted that we forget the work it requires and the assumptions that surround its use … [I]t is symbolic, inherently interpretive, deeply political. (1998: 315)

The *Guelaguetza* shows that racial and ethnic groups can work within the confines of a racial economy to extract new value from race and ethnicity. The work and discipline at play within the process of commensuration are continually being done, allowing indigenous ethnic groups to extract new economic value by "transforming social networks and culture into value" (Elyachar 2005: 9). However, a historic racial economy may limit the ways that Blackness can be transformed and put to work. The Los Angeles *Guelaguetza* offers an example of the ways that Afro-Mexicans can get caught between two contemporary racial economies (Mexico and the US).

The coastal region of Oaxaca is racially and ethnically diverse and home to a large number of African descendants, several indigenous groups, mestizos, and Whites. The region is often referred to as a "Black" region within Mexico and is quickly becoming famous. The *Guelaguetza* Popular highlights the region simply as La Costa, both in the city of Oaxaca and in Los Angeles, California. The performances of the *Guelaguetza* are a good way to explore the limits for transforming Black value within a larger racial and ethnic hierarchy. The dances of the "Costa" are highlighted within the *Guelaguetza* as being culturally representative. One dance that is performed in the *Guelaguetza* festival in Oaxaca is the *Danza de Los Diablos*. Many Black communities in the coastal region practice this dance, and many residents describe it as representative of an African (even if only by way of the body) heritage. While the dance is often presented within the festival as representative of the coast and Blackness within the region, the physical representation of Blackness is often absent within the festival. Martin, a then-Los Angeles resident who has since returned to his Costa Chica community of Morelos, explains that a folkloric performance group of *Mestizos* from the town of Pinotepa Nacional, rather than Black performers, historically dance in the official state *Guelaguetza* celebration in Oaxaca City. While Blackness is symbolically represented as an ethnic element within the

national landscape, its physical representation is undervalued, if not ignored, as represented by a conspicuous absence. In this way, the *Guelaguetza* plays a double role, recognizing the history of Oaxaca and the historical presence of African descendants while simultaneously rendering the contemporary presence of Blacks invisible.

While Martin's physical appearance allows for his racial/ethnic identity to be more fluid than some, he does identify as "*negro*," as many of his family members would be perceived as Black or "*negro*" in both the US and Mexico. Martin is also a part of a dance group that practices the *Danza de Los Diablos* in Los Angeles, California. At the *Guelaguetza* Popular in Los Angeles, the Coastal region is also represented, complete with the familiar appropriation of Blackness. While Martin's group was not invited to perform the *Danza de Los Diablos* at the Los Angeles *Guelaguetza*, Blackness was symbolically present. Between dance performances, the folkloric groups perform skits that are supposed to be representative of the common cultural gendered exchanges that take place within the different regions. In one skit, a man tried to convince a potential lover that he was sexually potent and would be a good romantic partner. The woman responded by saying that the only thing his penis was good for was urinating. This "burn" was well received by the attending Oaxacan immigrants and the larger crowd. However, more interesting was the use of language within the skit. The young man referred to the young woman as "*prieta*" (dark one), and she referred to him as "*mi negro*" (my Black one). Some might argue that these terms have been adopted into common Mexican parlance and are regularly used by a majority of Mexicans. But, in the particular regional context within the *Guelaguetza*, these terms take on a conspicuous racial connotation. Blackness is represented at the *Guelaguetza* but in a way that serves the purposes of the indigenous community. All of the performers were of "indigenous" descent, and the performances of these indigenous bodies re-enforced the contemporary notion of Oaxaca as "the indigenous state" within Mexico and allowed the Oaxacan community in Los Angeles to exploit this perception.

Though Martin did not perform at the *Guelaguetza*, he keeps track of these cultural events. Martin is the secretary of a new organization created in the early 2000s by Oaxacans from the Costa Chica region of Mexico, by the name of *Organizacion Afro-Mexicana*. Individuals from the Costa Chica created the organization to provide support for those who had not migrated. The *Organizacion* had official 501(c)3 non-profit status and had remained a strictly a US organization. German Acevedo, the president of the organization, noted that they are attempting to provide their home communities with medical attention and resources that the government does not provide. The organization itself gives particular insight into the way in which groups negotiate a contemporary racial economy. In a conversation with German, I asked him why organize as Black? German responded that their original intent was not to organize around the idea of race but instead to organize around a regional identity. However, after several conversations the founders decided to name the organization *Organizacion Afro-Mexicana*. While not all of the members would identify as Afro-Mexican or "*negro*," the attempt to exploit a particular multicultural moment in which race/ethnicity is given a value and invokes a type of capital which required the strategic employment of essentialism. This strategy is a direct response to the success of indigenous organizing around ethnicity within Mexico during the past decades. The *Organización Afro-Mexicana* group and others like it demonstrate how the contemporary negative value of blackness within Mexico is being challenged and is now in the process of being re-imagined. The re-valuation of blackness could be a reason why Martin's group did not perform at the *Guelaguetza* in Los Angeles, California.

A transnational landscape allows for indigenous communities to position themselves within the context of indigeneity in both Mexico and the US. However, while the process of recognition for blackness in Mexico is underway, a space within the multicultural geographies of indigeneity, Mexicanness, and Chicanx/Latinx in the US has not developed. This means that while Blacks prefer a strategy of embracing the local and national within Mexico, they are forced to adopt a strategy of diaspora once located in the US. This has been exacerbated by the historical perception and development of Chicano and Black as two distinct racial groups in the United States. This has meant that Black Mexicans have to be re-rooted once they arrive in the United States, as blackness is re-routed within the new racial economy of the US, and specifically the Brown/White political/racial dichotomy of the US Southwest.

CONCLUSION

Oaxacan Zapotec communities in Los Angeles, as well as the broader California region, have been able to use sport as a mechanism for solidifying processes of belonging and membership. Sport becomes a powerful tool in helping to make sense of the transnational flows that have acted as a centrifugal force on communities within Oaxaca, pulling individuals in mass from a center and dispersing them throughout the California region. It is basketball, as a project of building community, that helps to put the pieces together again. Basketball allows the following generations of the first migrant pioneers to remain in touch with locations that might otherwise have been forgotten or at least allowed to exist within the marginal and symbolic space of cultural and ethnic origins. Furthermore, access to these communities through the development of transnational connections facilitated by sport goes beyond diaspora, as developments in both the point of origin and the receiving communities create a codependent relationship. Through this relationship, the development of one space has tangible impacts on the existence of the other.

In contrast, the issue of race creates real barriers to the participation of blackness in transnational Oaxacan communities. As they cross the many borders and boundaries (racial, political, national) which define transnational Oaxacan spaces, these communities are forced to engage with the ruins of race and the histories of exclusion that continue to define the Black Mexican experience at home and abroad. However, there is one constant as Black Mexicans cross from one racial economy to the next; Black and Mexican remain antonyms. This invariably limits the ways that Black Mexicans can exploit the benefits of the same transnational networks that support the development of healthy transnational indigenous Oaxacan communities. Instead, diaspora becomes the tool by which Black Mexicans are expected to make sense of belonging in Los Angeles, and the United States more broadly. In this context, Oaxaca may remain the point of origin; however, movement away from this origin necessitates a cultural and political re-rooting.

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20. Transnational migration and the lived experience of class across borders

Jennifer A. Cook

INTRODUCTION

As migrants cross geographic borders, they also cross borders between social, political, and economic systems. These crossings, though intangible, have significant ramifications for migrants' lived experiences. Much scholarship has focused on migrants' movements between systems of racial and gender inequality, and between legal systems. By comparison, relatively little scholarship has foregrounded migrants' movements between class systems. In this chapter, I outline a framework for understanding class in transnational migration, with the intent of creating a tool that might be useful to researchers in any migration context at multiple stages of research – from the development of initial research questions to data analysis and write-up. The chapter has four sections. First, I outline current uses of the class concept in social science, including some definitions and key conceptual components. Second, I engage in a brief review of the existing literature linking transnational migration and class. I centre ethnographically oriented anthropology and sociology of migration to capture the experiential dimensions of class. Third, I lay out a framework for analysis of class in transnational migration. Finally, I demonstrate how this framework can used by applying it to a case study of a transnational social network of Mexican migrant farmworkers.

DEFINING TERMS

The concept of class is used in a variety of ways in social sciences scholarship.[1] At its core is the understanding that class is a system of stratification based on social-economic statuses, which facilitates or inhibits certain opportunities depending on one's position in the system. Anthropologists use class to describe a "bundle of unstable, uneven, contradictory and antagonistic relational interdependencies" (Kalb 2015: 14) between people with different positions vis-à-vis each other and global capitalism.

As the class concept has evolved, many different definitions and uses have emerged. "Class" can be deployed as an analytical concept at a "macro" level, as in analyses of inequalities between populations of countries with distinct positions in global capitalism. Scholars have also created class-based rankings of countries to describe the relationship between the "third world" and the "first world," for example. As the GDP of some of these "third world" countries begins to rise, or as they develop large "middle class" populations, they might be reclassified as "middle-class countries" (Calle and Rubio 2012). Scholars have also described global "classes" that cross-cut national boundaries, like the global working class (Ferguson and McNally 2015), "the precariat" (Standing 2011), the global elite (Ong 1999), or a global class of manual labourers.

Class is also used at the meso level, to refer to economic stratification within societies. Scholars using this notion of class operationalize the concept using aggregate statistics on income and other economic and material resources. "Upper" classes have more resources, "lower" classes have fewer, and "middle classes" fall somewhere in between (Breen and Rottman 2014). In this area of research, there is much debate about which resources should count in the arithmetic used to identify class groups and where the lines should be drawn between them.

At the micro level, class can be used to refer to a kind of cultural identity, typically based on one's occupation or income level. In this sense, class is a "socially acquired culturally constructed component of a person's or group's overall identity, comparable to other dimensions of their identity such as their gender, ethnicity, 'race', nationality and so on" (Kearney 2004: 137). Like other cultural identities, class culture is related to membership in a group with some degree of consciousness of what the group's class status is. "Working-class culture" in the US is one example. Importantly, class cultures are socially constructed. They often have imprecise, shifting, or even contradictory boundaries and standards for inclusion/exclusion.

At the individual level, there are three key dimensions of the experience of class: *capital*, *statuses*, *and subjectivities*. The first dimension, *capital*, derives from Bourdieu's (1977) conceptualization of class which suggests that people have different degrees and types of resources that facilitate certain kinds of opportunities and disadvantages. Bourdieu describes four kinds of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic (see Table 20.1).

Table 20.1   Types of capital

Type	Definition	Examples
Economic	"[C]ommand of economic resources and assets" (Van Hear 2014: 104)	Cash, property, stocks and bonds, lines of credit, home ownership
Cultural	Also described as "informational" capital – a person's knowledge, education, skills	Ability to speak a second language; knowledge of literature or pop culture; medical or legal knowledge
Social	Resources derived from one's social connections to others; from one's social network	Having a wide network of work friends or colleagues that provide access to other kinds of resources and/or information
Symbolic	"[T]he form the different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1987a: 4) – a person's social status	For instance, prestige derived from one's good reputation, fame, or past accomplishments. Doctors have symbolic capital by virtue of their engagement in a highly valued profession

The possession of capital produces power for the individual, but different kinds of capital in different contexts produce different degrees of power (Van Hear 2014). Capital can also determine the capacity of a person to engage in activities that contribute to their well-being or social mobility (i.e. pursuing higher education). Social stratification is the result of the uneven distribution of capital in a population. Different kinds of capital can be unevenly distributed; for example, a person might have a lot of cultural capital but relatively little economic capital, or vice versa. Capital can be "accumulated, transferred, and converted" (Van Hear 2014: S104) – for instance, a person can transform certain kinds of cultural and social capital into economic capital.

Bourdieu's fourth category, symbolic capital, is analytically distinct from the first three. Economic, cultural, and social capital are concepts that refer to the possession of certain kinds

of resources, connections, and knowledge. Symbolic capital, in contrast, refers to the social prestige that is derived from other kinds of capital. When situated within a system of stratification, symbolic capital produces the second individual element of class that is critical to migration: a person's social *status*. "Social status" refers to one's location in a social-economic hierarchy. In different social contexts, different kinds of capital might be more or less relevant to the production of symbolic capital and social status.

The third element of class as it relates to individual experience is class subjectivity. Subjectivity refers to "actors' thoughts, sentiments and embodied sensibilities, and, especially, their sense of self and self-world relations" (Holland and Leander 2004: 127). Class subjectivity includes the way people think of themselves as belonging to particular class groups based on levels of education or social connectedness (Ortner 2006). It also includes one's class "habitus," described by Bourdieu as "the conceptual schemes and dispositions that guide and govern an individual's life strategies and tactics" (Spiegel 2005: 14), and which "engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions" (Bourdieu 1977: 81) of a person. In other words, as people grow up, they become accustomed to different ways of life, including food, styles of dress, greetings, and other practices. These practices are shaped by one's class background and may serve as markers of one's class position or identity. In turn, they shape virtually everything about a person's dispositions and behaviours (Bourdieu 1987b). Importantly, individuals may be totally cognizant, partially aware, or completely oblivious to the ways in which class habitus informs daily life. Nevertheless, it provides an unwritten but deeply ingrained script for how we interact with our world and how we think of ourselves and our place in the world.

CLASS SUBJECTIVITY IN IM/MIGRATION STUDIES

Class is deeply implicated in migration processes and their outcomes. Extensive scholarship has examined the economic impact of migration on sending communities (as in the "dependency vs. development" debate – Cohen 2001; de Haas 2012), and the ways in which social class influences whether and how people migrate (Van Hear 2014). There has been significant scholarly discussion about how migrants and their families use remittances, and the extent to which remittance incomes result in short-term or long-term improvements in the quality of life for those who stay in their home country (Binford 2003; Cohen 2004).

The subjective experience of class in transnational migration is relatively less well-examined. Im/migration studies scholars have examined how migrants perceive their movements between different legal regimes (as in studies of il/legality – De Genova 2002; Dreby 2010; Tuckett 2018; Willen 2007) and systems of racial stratification (Anderson 2005; Brettell 2007; De Genova 2018; Duany 2010; Marcelin 2005; Silverstein 2005; Winders 2008). But how do they experience mobility across class systems? How do migrants conceive of their class position in the context of movement between countries with distinct systems of stratification? How does migration transform migrants' class identities, subjectivities, and habitus? A small body of sociological and anthropological literature examines these questions (see, for example, Erel 2010; Guarnizo 1996; Kearney 2004; Kearney and Beserra 2004; Rouse 1992; Schmalzbauer 2008; Thai 2014; Van Hear 2014), but it is spread across a variety of global contexts, and scholars take a variety of approaches to answering these questions.

This literature shows that migration can transform class identity and subjectivity. Migrants encounter distinct cultural systems, have new experiences, and acquire new forms of capital (and lose others) as they move between their places of origin and new destinations. Class transformation in migration experiences is often linked to work and is highly context dependent. Im/migrants that come from rural or indigenous communities where reciprocity-based economic systems predominate may undergo a process of "proletarianization" (a shift from owning the means of production to engaging in wage labour), thus becoming "members of a transnational semiproletariat, caught chronically astride borders and class positions" (Rouse 1992: 45). Because im/migrants are often incorporated into low-wage, informal labour markets (due to racial discrimination, language and legal barriers, and the inability to use professional certifications from the home country), many experience downward mobility. One study found that unauthorized middle-class Zimbabwean migrants to the UK feel that informal work directly conflicts with their established middle-class identities. In this context, "informality in itself was an assault on status – on long-cultivated notions of respectability and traditions of public service" (McGregor 2008: 473). In response, some Zimbabweans reframe the experience of doing manual labour as a kind of "stepping stone" or "ladder" to better opportunities based on their relatively privileged backgrounds; "As long as doing servile work could be cast in terms of personal and professional uplift, or as a temporary break, even a learning experience, so it could be upheld positively as a means to self-advancement, greater knowledge, further qualifications" (476). By reframing their undesirable employment circumstances as a temporary phase that would produce opportunities for advancement, Zimbabweans discursively distance themselves from working-class and poor migrant identities. This research highlights the fact that im/migrants may deploy strategies to either amplify or counteract the effects of migration on class.

Im/migrants may also experience a more complex transformation referred to by some scholars as "contradictory class mobility" (Parreñas 2015: 118), in which their status rises in some ways but falls in others. For instance, highly educated Filipina migrants who engage in domestic work may undergo simultaneous downward and upward mobility. On the one hand, their employment in domestic work constitutes a decline in occupational status compared to their relatively high status in the Philippines. On the other hand, they gain in status because they earn considerably more than they would have had they stayed at home in the Philippines and become able to send cash remittances back home to support their families. In this case, it is a transnational frame of reference that produces contradictory class mobility – Filipinos don't need to return to the Philippines in order to evaluate their successes and failures based on the class systems they internalized pre-migration. In other contexts, contradictory class mobility becomes more salient during physical returns to the country of origin. Horton (2013) argues that Mexican migrant farmworkers engage in medical return migration in order to receive high-quality private care which is inaccessible to them in the US as un- or underinsured im/migrants with liminal legal statuses and low incomes. While Mexican migrant farmworkers seeking care in the US are seen as "denigrated recipients of entitlements" (424), those same migrants receive "red carpet" treatment by Mexican health care providers because they are seen as "valuable customers whose business must be courted and retained" (424). Through these medical returns, Mexican migrants experience a temporary "dual class transformation … from Medicaid recipients to cash-paying patients, and from poor rural peasants to a privileged elite" (418).

The existing literature on class subjectivity in transnational migration also shows that migration can alter notions of class in the sending context. Remittances may compound exist-

ing inequalities by creating both a "remittance bourgeoisie" (Smith 2006: 50) (those who live more comfortably due to increased incomes from migrant remittances) and a "transnational underclass" (50) (those who do not receive remittances). Migrants may engage in transnational remittance practices that position their non-migrant family members as participants in what are perceived to be more "modern" consumption economies, or to produce a sense of upward mobility. In his work with Ecuadorean migrants to New York, for instance, Pribilsky (2007) shows that some migrants opt to purchase and remit electrical appliances, including televisions and stoves, even though they cannot be used in their homes in Ecuador due to a lack of electricity. These appliances are symbolic remittances – rather than being a good that can actually be used, they are an indicator of the migrant's economic success. They also symbolize migrants' progress toward achieving a modern urban/cosmopolitan identity grounded in their participation in the consumption culture of New York City, New York.

Another way in which transnational migration can shift class dynamics in sending communities is through transformations of gender norms and family relationships (Menjívar et al. 2016). Pribilsky (2007) shows that men's migration resulted in a re-gendering of money management and consumption practices, whereby tasks that were traditionally carried out by women became men's responsibilities. Migrants began to associate money management with the successful performance of masculinity, and the gendered distribution of power was reworked as "men were forced to cede some of their decision-making power in order to see the productive use of their remittances … [and] husbands often became dependent on wives to manage finances" (266). Schmalzbauer (2008) suggests that transnational migration of Honduran men has resulted in what she titles "class bifurcation" (343) in families, through which migrants and non-migrant family members develop distinct class subjectivities and aspirations. These differences are particularly salient intergenerationally, as children grow up with dramatically different lifestyles and life chances compared to their parents. Indeed, many im/migrants evaluate their economic "progress" in relative and/or intergenerational terms – comparing what they have now to what they had pre-migration; comparing their achievements to those of other migrants; or comparing their lives to the lives of their parents or grandparents (Menjívar et al. 2016).

Overall, this literature makes important contributions to our understandings of class in migration, particularly in the experiences of poor and middle-class migrants, and in South–North migration contexts. Less well-examined are the experiences of upper-class and "skilled" migrants (including retirees, tourists, expats, and diplomats, for instance), and South–South and North–South migration contexts. Furthermore, much research on class in migration has focused on unidirectional economic/labour migration. There has been little examination of class dynamics in cyclical or stepwise migration patterns, in return migrations, and in the context of forced/refugee migration. In the section that follows, I draw on this literature to outline a conceptual framework that will facilitate more in-depth and broader-ranging research into class dynamics in transnational migration.

CLASS IN TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: A THREE-PART FRAMEWORK

Inquiry into class subjectivity in transnational migration should focus on three areas: migration contexts; migration arrangements; and intersecting factors.

Migration Contexts

An important first step in understanding class in transnational migration processes is eluci-
dating the contexts in which the migration takes place. Class systems are deeply influenced
by the history of a given place, including how national, regional, or local social stratification
systems develop over time, and the interplay between global and local dynamics. These
distinct systems impact how people living within them see themselves as people with class
positions and/or identities.

   A consideration of context includes both the sending and destination communities, in
the case of the prototypical two-country model of migration, but might also include one or
more transit countries, as well as additional destination countries in the case of "onward" or
"stepwise" migration, or even multiple simultaneous "destinations" in the case of families
spread out across multiple diasporic locations. Migrants are influenced by their positioning
within class systems of the sending community, as well as their positioning in the destination
context(s). At the most basic level, scholars might engage in a comparative exercise, asking
such questions as: How does the position of the migrant(s) in the sending community compare
to their position in the receiving community? What kind of experience does this produce for
migrants who have moved from one place to the other? Importantly, class status is influenced
not only by an economic position but also by other aspects of a migrant's identity, including
race and gender (this issue is discussed at length below).

   It is important to note that the class position and subjectivity of migrants can be influenced
by contextual factors at international, national, regional, state, and local levels. For instance,
a migrant with a relatively high status in the local context of the sending community might
be positioned quite low in the overall national context of the sending country. Similarly,
migrants with a relatively low class position in the national context of a destination country
might be regarded highly in the local context of the destination community, particularly in
their context of work. Because migrants are influenced by their local, micro context, as well as
the broader macro/national context of the places from which they originate and to which they
migrate, context must be considered at multiple scales in order to adequately examine class
experiences. Figure 20.1 visualizes the multi-scalar dimensions of class in distinct migration
contexts.

Origin	(Example)		Destination	(Example)
Local	low/med/**high**		Local	low/med/**high**
State	low/med/high		State	low/med/high
Regional	low/med/high		Regional	low/med/high
National	**low**/med/high		National	**low**/med/high
International	low/med/high		International	low/med/high

Figure 20.1   Visualizing multi-scalar dimensions of class

In the case of migration flows involving return, cyclical, transit, onward, or stepwise migration, the chart might be modified to consider these additional contexts. Scholars might also consider elements of the discursive context, or the ways in which class is portrayed in public conversation, media representation, and policy. Discourses of deservingness (Willen and Cook 2016) may shape migrants' class identities by framing certain status-linked occupations, styles of dress, or kinds of food as "good" or "bad," or "high" or "low" status. For instance, narratives that portray Mexican migrants as hard workers and economic breadwinners create a false standard to which migrants are expected to conform, and which can contribute to the naturalization of their status as racialized low-wage labourers (Gomberg-Muñoz 2011). Furthermore, policies which regulate im/migrants' access to government benefits and public services might also shape how im/migrants think of their class positioning. In the US, recently proposed changes to the "public charge" provision and health insurance requirements in the immigrant visa petition process have begun to impact im/migrants' utilization of public assistance. A recent report shows that undocumented immigrants are less likely to access services like emergency health care, free immunizations, and free and reduced-price school meals for children for fear of immigration-related repercussions (Wong, Cha and Villarreal-Garcia 2019). Similar observations can be made about policies and deservingness discourses in the country of origin, or in transit/stepwise migration contexts. These kinds of discursive contexts have important practical and material implications for migrants' access to resources, as well as implications for the lived experience of class in migration.

As mentioned above, most literature examining class in migration experiences focuses on "South–North" economic/labour migration flows, which typically involve migrants with a low- to mid-range status in their place of origin moving to a destination in which their status remains low (or drops), by virtue of their entrance into (often racialized) im/migrant labour markets. Less well-examined are the class-based experiences of other movers, like high-skilled immigrants, expatriates, retirees, or tourists. These are important areas of inquiry if we are to fully understand class dynamics in transnational migration.

Migration Arrangements

While migration is best understood as a fluid, dynamic process that often resists typology, a consideration of the "type" of migration in which populations are engaged can be useful for understanding class dynamics. Van Hear (2014: 108) provides a useful five-part typology which differentiates between "moving out" (departure/emigration from a sending community), "coming in" (arrival/entry to a destination community) "moving back" (return migration), "moving on" (onward migration), and, importantly, "staying put" (immobility/non-migration). "Coming and going" is also a useful category to add to this typology to account for cyclical migration patterns undertaken on a consistent but temporary basis (as in the case of seasonal farmworkers, for example). The directionality of migration among and between the sending, receiving, transit, return, and onward contexts can play an important role in understanding the class experiences of movers (and nonmovers). Researchers might also find it important to consider internal/domestic migration contexts compared to international migration contexts (particularly as migrants may engage in domestic rural-urban migration, for instance, prior to engaging in international migrations – Cohen and Rios 2016). Each of these types of migration involves distinct migration contexts and experiences, which are likely to intersect with class dynamics.

In terms of migration "type," another important distinction relevant to class is the degree to which migration is voluntary. Migrant flows might be voluntary at one point but involuntary at another and driven by both economic and humanitarian concerns to different degrees at different times in the life course. Without reifying categories like "forced" and "economic" migrant, it is important to consider the degree to which class identities and experience impact and are impacted by the amount of choice migrants have in determining their movements. Migration motivations are also relevant – labour migration, flight from violence or political persecution, and moves for family reunification may influence class dynamics in different ways.

We must also consider the "legality" of the migration process. Migrant flows might be authorized at one point but unauthorized at another. Migrants moving with and without authorization may have distinct class positioning and/or class-based experiences. It is also important to consider how liminal forms of legality might influence class dynamics for migrant populations – for instance, migrants with permission to reside in a destination country, but without permission to work. Furthermore, the impact of deportation on class dynamics must also be considered, as new return migrant "diasporas" in migrant sending countries are being created by mass deportations and voluntary return migration (Kanstroom 2012).

A final element is time. Migrants may be mobile multiple times throughout the course of their lives, and they may spend disparate amounts of time in different contexts. Their movements may be permanent or temporary (whether intentionally or accidentally). Timing of migration may intersect with class in a variety of ways. The age at which migration is carried out is influential – those who migrate later in life may be more deeply influenced by class dynamics in the sending community compared to those who migrate as children. Im/migrants who engage in temporary or cyclical migrations may find themselves in substandard employer-provided housing. Alternatively, employer-provided housing might be of a better quality than what an im/migrant would ordinarily be able to afford if s/he were to move on a more permanent basis. Im/migrants who move once and settle permanently may have an entirely different class experience, again dependent upon context. Scholars might also consider class dynamics across generations, including how interactions between immigrant parents and their children influence class dynamics in families.

Intersectionality, Class, and Migration

Class intersects with other aspects of im/migrant identities and experiences. Though it constitutes its own form of social stratification, class is inseparable from race, ethnicity, nationality, legality, immigrant generation, and gender – among other factors. This is particularly true when considering class in transnational im/migration, as domestic policies "make it likely that social class will overlap in patterned ways with national origin" due to preferential treatment for some groups (Menjívar et al. 2016: 55). The specific variables that intersect most strongly with class vary by context, and for each im/migrant group. For instance, in the US, class and race/nationality intersect in ways that tend to obscure the role and meaning of class (Menjívar et al. 2016). Mexicans are a highly racialized group that has become linked with both illegality and low socio-economic status, despite the heterogeneous realities of the ethnic Mexican population in the US. Salvadorans also experience a conflation of class and ethnic identity, as "reported experiences of discrimination and racism in the United States reinforce the sense of belonging to a subjugated class, even for middle-class migrants" (Baker-Cristales 2004:

26). In other contexts, gender, language, religion, and refugee status might be more salient intersecting factors.

CASE STUDY: CLASS AND "LEGAL" MIGRATION OF MEXICAN MIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN CONNECTICUT

In the following section I apply this framework to a transnational network of migrant farmworkers from rural Rio Seco,[2] Guanajuato, Mexico, who migrate to the US state of Connecticut to engage in seasonal agricultural work. Rio Secans find themselves in particularly complex class positions as they migrate between their rural hometown and the agricultural community where they work in Connecticut.

Rio Seco is a small, underdeveloped, rural municipality in the north-eastern corner of Guanajuato. Markers of status in Rio Seco reflect broader patterns in Mexico. Indigeneity, rurality, and "traditional" lifestyles are associated with low status, and light-skinned mestizo identities, urbanity, and "modernity" indicate higher status. At the local level, those with the highest social status are families with "old money" – those with prestigious lineage and inherited wealth. Merchants and migrants occupy a burgeoning local "middle class" (with considerable status variation within this category), while families without access to migration and little economic capital constitute "the poor."

Rio Secans trace their migration history to (at least) the Bracero program, and many Rio Secans have older male relatives who participated in the program. After the end of the Bracero program, Rio Secan men continued to migrate to the United States as undocumented workers. Remittances from Bracero workers and unauthorized migrants played a crucial role in many families' abilities to purchase land, build homes, and establish small businesses. But the overall impact of remittances has been tempered by the "illegal" status of many Rio Secan migrants. Like all unauthorized Mexicans, undocumented Rio Secans are relegated to low wage jobs with no benefits, and families of the undocumented often struggle to support their families despite the influx of remittances. Thus, migrants have historically maintained a contradictory class status position in the Rio Secan context – they have relatively more money than the local poor and non-migrants and are able to purchase many of the trappings of modern life that are otherwise inaccessible to other Rio Secans (i.e. cars, televisions, etc.). But their upward mobility is limited. Many unauthorized migrants are unable to afford higher education for their children, meaning that their children are likely to continue an intergenerational cycle of transnational labour migration when they come of age.

Some Rio Secans have achieved a different fate, through a key change in US immigration law. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provided an opportunity for many Mexicans to gain legal status. By virtue of their employment in California agriculture in the mid-1980s, many[3] Rio Secans were able to gain lawful permanent resident ("LPR") status through IRCA's "Special Agricultural Workers" provision (Kerwin 2010). After they obtained legal status, many Rio Secan LPRs opted to seek employment opportunities in other states due to poor working conditions and stagnant wages in California. They established network hubs in Omaha, Nebraska, San Antonio, Texas, and central Connecticut. Today, some 30 years after they gained legal status through IRCA, most Rio Secan LPRs maintain their seasonal migratory patterns, typically returning to Mexico yearly for several months in between the agricultural seasons.

Rio Secan LPRs experience intense contradictions in their class positioning as they move back and forth between Rio Seco and the United States. The influx of remittances from legal migration has had complex effects on the social hierarchy of their hometown. Rio Secan legal migrants tend to have greater access to financial resources than most other Rio Secans. They have achieved a degree of social prominence due to their relative material position, and they often invest their money in community events and visible markers of status, including cars, clothes, and cell phones. But at the same time, legal migrants do not gain in terms of occupational prestige or high educational achievement. As migrant agricultural labourers, they fall relatively low in the social hierarchy according to these measures. Thus, they occupy a contradictory class position in Rio Secan society – prestigious by some measures, and humble by others.

The children of this cohort of legal migrants face a similar paradox. They have access to a broader array of material goods as well as higher levels of education and professional training compared to children of the undocumented and non-migrants. With a few exceptions, children of Rio Secan LPRs tend to live in "nicer" homes with more "modern" amenities, including flush toilets, American-style indoor kitchens, one or more vehicles, entertainment systems, and even in-home internet access. Laura, the wife of a Rio Secan LPR, highlighted the difference between the lifestyles of her children and their cousins, whose father migrates without authorization.

> My daughters … they are accustomed to other *comodidades* (amenities)*. And their cousins, my nephews, well "they are still more behind you guys" [I tell them]. "You are accustomed to another life." Because they practically don't want for anything … My brothers, their families are still a little … well maybe it's because they are larger families. So they have even less. And our daughters are accustomed to other things.

She went on to explain that while her daughters have their own rooms and their own clothes, the cousins share everything and live, in her words, in a "cramped" space.

Many children of Rio Secan migrants have graduated from, currently attend, or plan to enrol in secondary and post-secondary education, in academic, professional, and technical programs. In this generation of adult children of LPRs, there are nurses, architects, administrative professionals, and others with advanced degrees. Such high levels of education place these youth in a higher social status category in the community, earning them positions of respect and influence. But there's a catch. Due to the lack of employment opportunities in Rio Seco, these highly educated youth often complete their training only to remain unemployed, underemployed, or severely underpaid. Furthermore, migrant earnings are typically higher than the meagre incomes professionals command when they do find employment.

Teodoro, a Rio Secan migrant who received legal status through his father, explained to me,

> One of [my friends] is a psychologist. And he says, "take me [to the US]!"… I told him, "you have your profession!" "No," he says, "the thing is that the salaries here, the truth is that it's not even enough for me to eat." "But you're a professional!" [I tell him] And the truth is they have been working for years. And they are professionals, they studied and everything, and they don't … well, they'd like to have what we have, or more … And other friends, I've chatted with, they tell me that they are uncomfortable because they look at us year after year, year after year we are going, and we do things, but they would like to have what, I don't know, what they can't have with their profession … they think that it's just a matter of going and coming back and bringing money … but I tell them it's not like that. You work all day as soon as you go, all day it's work.

Thus, in the context of Rio Seco, agricultural labourers like Teodoro appear to occupy a privileged position due to their ready access to cash. Highly educated non-migrant youth have few income-generating opportunities of their own and have little experience with the hard work required in migrant labour arrangements.

These differences also play out intergenerationally. Few children of LPRs experience the poverty in which many of their parents grew up. Their distinct styles of upbringing result in intergenerational differences in class subjectivity and habitus (paralleling what Schmalzbauer referred to as a "class bifurcation" (2008: 343) in Honduran transnational families). For instance, when the wife of one relatively well-off Rio Secan LPR decided to sell food at a street stand to make a little extra cash, her children were deeply embarrassed, and poked fun at her for participating in what they deemed to be an unnecessary and unbecoming activity for a family of their relatively elevated status.

These inter- and intra-familial tensions are exacerbated by differences in legal status among family and community members. Legal migration brings Rio Secan LPRs into frequent contact with unauthorized and non-migrant Rio Secans and their families, making the disparate material realities of these groups highly visible during LPRs' seasonal returns to Rio Seco. The ability to cross the border freely is seen as a great privilege, which in turn produces other kinds of privilege. Those with legal status are expected to perform self-conscious humility when discussing their legality with others who do not have access to legal migration. Rio Secan LPRs often state how "lucky" they are that they were able to "get papers." They also highlight the difficulties of migrant manual labour in order to emphasize that they have the same "humble" roots as the rest of the Rio Secan community.

Destination is another important factor in the class experiences of Rio Secan LPRs. As ethnic Mexicans, Rio Secans occupy a marginalized ethno-racial position in US society. Agricultural labour is devalued in the US, particularly when associated with temporary or seasonal migration. Rio Secans' marginality as racialized, low-wage, migrant farmworkers is made particularly obvious in the context of Aldenboro, the central Connecticut town where many Rio Secans work. Connecticut is the fourth wealthiest state in the United States, and Aldenboro's per capita income places it in the top 10 percent of Connecticut counties ranked by wealth (US Census Bureau 2014, 2017). Several million-dollar-plus mansions sit on hilltops overlooking Aldenboro farmland, some of which are visible from the farm-provided housing where Rio Secan workers live.

On the farms, many Rio Secans work alongside local Aldenboro teenagers, most of whom are white, engaging in farm work as a summer job during college breaks. Some long-time Rio Secan employees serve as supervisors for these local staff in contrast to findings in other states (Holmes 2013). Several Rio Secans have established long-term friendships with local teenagers, many of whom remind them of their own children who are studying to pursue professional careers back in Rio Seco. Unlike many farmworkers in the US, Rio Secans also interface directly with local populations, through their work during the farm's "Pick-Your-Own" operations (where locals come to pick fruit), and at farm stands and farmer's markets. Rio Secans encounter a wide range of Connecticut's population, from wealthy (often white) consumers to individuals using SNAP food assistance coupons to purchase discounted produce.

Despite the stark inequality between Rio Secans and local Aldenboro residents, Rio Secans have a relatively privileged position when compared to other Mexican im/migrants in Connecticut and farmworkers elsewhere in the US (Holmes 2013; Horton 2016). Connecticut has become an especially attractive destination for Rio Secan LPRs because the wages are

high compared to other states, employers provide extensive benefits to employees (including rent-free housing), and the nature of the work involves greater autonomy and relatively better working conditions. Rio Secans also indicate that they experience less racial discrimination than they do in other destinations.

Rio Secan LPRs' relatively more secure economic circumstances mean that they are often in the position to help others in Rio Seco, through providing employment in small businesses or in their homes, and through volunteer and charitable work. Several Rio Secan workers serve as hosts to their white Anglo employers on trips to visit Rio Seco (and, indeed, host me when I conduct fieldwork trips there). A group of Rio Secans work together to organize a municipality-wide raffle to benefit the church. The family of one Rio Secan LPR collects used toys for donation to underprivileged local children and gives small monetary donations to Central American migrants when they encounter them in a nearby transit city. In contrast, when they are in Connecticut, Rio Secans are positioned – often unwillingly – as the recipients of help. Many Rio Secans utilize free health care services provided through the volunteer-based farmworker health clinics run through the University of Connecticut Area Health Education Centre and Medical School, which describes Connecticut's farmworker population as "among the most economically disadvantaged and most medically vulnerable groups in the United States having little, if any, access to health care or medication."[4] But Rio Secans do not see themselves as people who need "charity." As "legal" migrants, many Rio Secans might be eligible for government benefits like SNAP, but government benefits are rarely utilized by Rio Secans who engage in seasonal labour migration. Given their transnational class positioning, Rio Secan seasonal migrants understand themselves as community leaders, valued workers, and self-sufficient economic providers who provide a high standard of living for their family members back home in Mexico.[5] The limited use of such benefits parallels findings in other studies, which show that migrants may only feel it is appropriate to use government supports (like food stamps) in particularly dire circumstances, or during periods of unemployment (Carney 2015).

This case study reveals several important aspects of class dynamics that might otherwise be overlooked. Attention to the local level sending and destination contexts of Rio Secan migration shows that certain factors produce complex and even contradictory class positioning for Mexican migrant farmworkers at home though they are otherwise rather uncomplicatedly positioned at the lowest rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy in the US. Specifically, Connecticut's small farming industry is a distinct "receiving context" from that which many Mexican migrant farmworkers encounter in other parts of the country – because wages are higher and working conditions are better. Nevertheless, they are still framed by local residents and outreach workers as the recipients of charity, a major contradiction to their position in the local context of Rio Seco where they provide support to others in the community.

This case study also reveals the significance of migration arrangements in understanding class in transactional migration. Because Rio Secan LPRs engage in cyclical temporary migration processes, they have a highly transnational frame of reference in terms of their class experiences. They are constantly moving back and forth between the sending and receiving contexts, resulting in a complex and contradictory process of class transformation. Finally, this case study highlights the importance of intersectionality in class analysis. The possession of legal status has enabled Rio Secan LPRs to achieve relatively higher levels of upward social mobility in the context of the sending community. It has facilitated higher incomes, more dignified work environments, and protection from deportability. But it does not fully insulate them from the class-inflected racialization experienced by Mexican migrant farmworkers in general.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have outlined a framework through which im/migration scholars might carry out more systematic examinations of class subjectivity in transnational migration and applied this framework to a case study from my own work with Mexican migrant farmworkers. In doing so, I demonstrate several key points that might guide further inquiry.

Migration can transform class subjectivity – in both sending and receiving contexts. Importantly, migrants may have a transnational frame of reference for their class status, which produces complex configurations of class position and social mobility, particularly across generations. Scholars interested in elucidating these complex dynamics should consider the contextual factors in both sending and destination communities, at multiple levels of analysis – from the local to the national. Migration arrangements are also important to consider, for the ways in which questions of choice, migrant motivations, and temporariness/permanence influence manifestations of class in im/migrant experiences. Finally, scholars of migration must consider the ways in which class intersects with other aspects of im/migrant identities, including race, nationality, legal status, and gender (among others), in order to produce distinct outcomes for different im/migrant groups in different contexts.

It is important for scholars to take a more systematic approach to analyzing class in diverse migration contexts because class dynamics are influential in migration decision-making processes. Class transformations can be a significant source of conflict and tension for transnational families and communities. Furthermore, migrants are not the only ones influenced by the class dynamics involved in their movements. Class is also implicated in vernacular notions of deservingness (Willen and Cook 2016), in political discourse, and in policymaking. Further research into how state policies both shape and respond to class in im/migrant experiences will advance our understanding of im/migrants' experiences of inclusion and exclusion.

NOTES

1. The concept of class is derived from Marxian economic theory, which posits that society is divided into two groups: the bourgeoisie (the ruling class), which controls the means of production (capital), and the "proletariat" (the working class), which sells its labour to the bourgeoisie in exchange for wages (for an excellent discussion of the intellectual history of the concept, see Carrier 2015).
2. All names of places and people in this chapter are pseudonyms used to protect the identity of research participants.
3. Rio Secans who could not prove they were working in US agriculture during the period of eligibility outlined by IRCA were unable to gain legal status, remaining "undocumented" migrants.
4. https://health.uconn.edu/connecticut-area-health-education-center-network/migrant-farm-worker -clinics/
5. Some Rio Secans who have opted to bring their families to the US utilize government support systems due to the high cost of living in the US.

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21. Student and retiree mobilities[1]

Liliana Azevedo, Silva Lässer and Katrin Sontag

WHY STUDENT AND RETIREE MIGRATION?

In political debates as well as in research, migration is still mostly discussed in terms of labour migration or refugee migration. Yet, during the last decades research on diverse motivations and ways in which people move has increased. This chapter deals with two such kinds of migration, student and retiree migration, that have emerged as subjects during the last decades (reflecting increasing numbers) and that exemplify that some of the general, traditional notions of migration are too simple. We explain commonalities in the approaches to both research fields in the first three sections and subsequently treat each topic in combination with a case study in the following sections. We argue that both fields, student as well as retiree migration, are heterogenous and have to be thought of in connection with other migratory movements. Our two field cases exemplify these connections and the need for more attention.

The migration of students and retirees calls into question the assumption that migration is a permanent move. Students and retirees may not have a permanent or long-term perspective on their moves. Students may go abroad for a limited time, sometimes just a few weeks or months, to complete a course or to earn a degree. Moreover, students may move on to other destinations as their careers develop and families are established (Brooks and Waters 2010; Findlay et al. 2012; Geddie 2013). Retirees may commute between two homes or places and maintain strong ties to multiple places. In fact, literature has largely focused on retirees who relocate seasonally, such as second homeowners or residential tourists (Janoschka and Haas 2014). More recently scholars also have pointed out permanent forms of later-life mobility and new geographies of international retirement migration (King et al. 2019).

Both types of migration also challenge common understandings of sedentary life as being the norm (Janoschka and Haas 2014). In fact, both retiree and student migration have been discussed as temporary or "liminal" spaces with regard to the distinct localities and the fact that they are often associated with transitional periods of life (Amit 2007; Croucher 2012; Oliver 2007).

Both groups exemplify that the complex motives that drive migration – as in other kinds of mobilities – do not only correspond to the classic push/pull framework. In fact, education, leisure, care, family ties, adventure, and other individual motivations exist simultaneously. And we know from anthropological debates how difficult and controversial the definitions of "groups" are in general because of the complexity and heterogeneity of individual differences. Official migration categories and bureaucratic channels are powerful, shaping migration, and the ways in which we think and talk about migration, but they may not match the emic self-ascriptions of migrants. Moreover, they do not cover all migrants, such as undocumented persons, and they are not flexible. It is possible to come to a country as a student and work part-time, to stay (or overstay a visa) for work, or to arrive as a spouse and become a student or an employee. There are also visa categories, such as the "Working-Holiday Visa", that seek to combine different aspects and reflect the overlaps between official categories (Amit 2007).

It is thus important and a challenge to pay attention to the legal context as part of the migration regime and as a particular culture of dealing with migration, while also putting individual perspectives in the foreground and reflecting on the impact of political categories from the outside and inside. Analyses are further complicated by fields of research that rely on defined concepts such as "refugees", "highly skilled", "students", or "retirees". Nevertheless, a rejection of such terms can be problematic, as it makes an analysis difficult and there is a risk of overlooking the differences that do exist in distinct contexts (Clifford 1997). In the following sections, we will outline some approaches that cross these categories, by taking micro, meso, and macro levels into account (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011).

PRIVILEGED MOVEMENTS? FROM THE "GLOBAL NORTH" TO THE "GLOBAL SOUTH" AND FROM THE "GLOBAL SOUTH" TO THE "GLOBAL NORTH"

Student as well as retiree migration is described as "privileged migration" (Amit 2017; Croucher 2012; Janoschka and Haas 2014; Waters and Brooks 2010). The movers are characterized as middle class (Amit 2007) and able to afford the costs of mobility and associated lifestyles. In the case of the students, they have the necessary resources to, generally speaking, move towards the Global North. In the case of the retirees, the opposite movement is observed: older people from countries of the Global North move to warmer countries where living expenses are lower. That is one part of the reasoning why Mediterranean countries became such a popular destination for North European retirees in the last decades. As with other definitions and numbers of migration, more local and shorter-range mobilities are also taking place (e.g. within countries or between neighbouring countries) – although these flows are often not documented or captured that well (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Hauvette 2010 for local, short-term student mobilities within Europe).

Yet, the term "privilege" must be deployed carefully. Some students are moving to improve their chances on the labour market or to try to gain residency, as Baas (2006) has shown for Indian students moving to Australia. In other instances, the decision to move abroad temporarily is based on hedonistic motivations or to "take a break" from everyday life (Amit 2011; Waters and Brooks 2010). Some retirees are moving to more affordable countries because they lack the means to afford health care in their home country and find themselves vulnerable (Green 2014). Nonetheless, these decisions and movements are embedded in local and global structures of power.

Especially in societies that have experienced migration in the past, it is, moreover, important to acknowledge that different kinds of migration are interwoven and may exist at the same time. Student and retiree migration are not necessarily one-time moves for the purposes of retirement or study by a middle-class first time migrant. Many people have already migrated during their life and are re-migrating or living multi-locally at retirement age or, in the case of students, had moved as refugees or as children with their parents before they entered university. In the US, the "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA) immigration policy grants access to education and the labour market to eligible undocumented migrants who entered the country as children (Abrego 2018). Thus, depending on the field, theoretical concepts that cut across official migration categories and instead point to common situations and

motivations can be useful, such as the analysis of transnational social fields in which people live and move back and forth, forced migration, or "privileged migration".

Other concepts have been used such as "aspirational movement" (Oliver 2007). Here the focus is on a person's aspirations for a "good life" (Benson and O'Reilly 2009) – not only economically, but often motivated by and through idealized narratives and the search for happiness, self-transformation, going "away" from home (Stein 2011), or taking a break from responsibilities or work at home (Croucher 2012). Such positive views of travel and its perceived transformative nature are deeply rooted in historic Western narratives dating to the tradition of the European "Grand Tour" among the upper classes in the 17th and 18th centuries (Amit 2017). These narratives have since been perpetuated and reshaped, by individuals as well as through capitalist motivations and actors. They serve, for example, as central motives in advertising strategies for international student and tourist agencies or are reflected in educational policies (Amit 2017; Janoschka and Haas 2014).

The term "lifestyle migration" (Benson and O'Reilly 2009) has similar connotations, although it is more likely to be used in the context of retirees than with students. This term is also based on the assumption that the decision to migrate is largely taken in relation to reaching a desired lifestyle or a specific personal goal (Croucher 2012). Similar and partially overlapping discourses can be found in the field of tourism studies, where "lifestyle travellers" are researched in connection with processes of identity-negotiation (Cohen 2011). A critical problem associated with "lifestyle migration" is the implication that other kinds of migration may not be motivated by personal aspirations and motives. As in the case of many forms of travel and tourism, these movements are often influenced by overarching narratives and the desire for "real" and "authentic" experiences (MacCannell 1976; Noy 2004). In reality, it can often be observed that life away from "home" takes place in a rather bounded and "liminal" space, influenced by the often temporary and uncertain nature of the stay. The establishment of such "bubbles" (Amit 2017; Fechtner 2007) or "enclaves" (Smith 1977; Cohen 2011, 2018) has been mentioned in the contexts of retiree and student migration. Existing definitions of "resident", "visitor", "tourist", and "local" are mingled and often need to be renegotiated in an increasingly transnational setting where movers exist somewhere between the permanent and the temporary.

The transnational perspective (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) is a useful theoretical framework to study retiree (Bolzman et al. 2017; Johner-Kobi and Gehrig 2017) and student mobilities and to understand how migrants maintain multi-local attachments and adopt transnational forms of living. Transnational grandparents, for example, use information and communication technologies (ICTs) to create virtual modes of co-presence (Nedelcu 2017). Besides, the very possibility of living transnationally can also drive the mobility decisions of retirees.

THE PREVALENCE OF THE NATION STATES' PERSPECTIVE AND THE NEED TO CHALLENGE IT

The issues mentioned so far have to do with a perspective of nation states. Education is a national business with regard to curricula, but also the recognition of degrees. Likewise, pension schemes and transferability of social benefits, health care systems, and tax regimes play an important role in retirees' decision to move abroad. National boundaries and migration regimes, as well as legal structures (welfare provisions, tax regimes, etc.), have to be consid-

ered in migration research, as they shape people's possibilities, in the form of citizenships and the possibilities they offer for mobility, or the limits created by international treaties and bilateral conventions. Yet, as has been argued for a long time, the scientific analysis sometimes follows this logic of methodological nationalism blindly (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Both in student and retiree migration, a focus on nationality and borders may not always be helpful, for example when focused on internal mobility, short-term mobility, or mobility within the European Union. Regions that have developed across national borders are another interesting case. The University of Basel in Switzerland is located close to the border with Germany. There are German students, who can study in their mother tongue (in German-speaking Switzerland) and live in Germany in the villages where they grew up. For these students going to Berlin would involve greater changes than crossing the national border to Switzerland.

Methodological nationalism also fails to account for the transnational lives of retirees, for example grandparents who move for care arrangements, like the "zero generation" (Wyss and Nedelcu 2018), or labour migrants, who move back and forth once retired instead of returning to their home country (Bolzman et al. 2006). Those social realities highlight the relevance of the "transnational aging" approach (Böcker and Hunter 2017; Horn and Schweppe 2017), a quite recent topic in academia, that challenges the "aging in place" framework in both migration studies and old age research, as well as in welfare systems.

In addition, there is an emphasis on the Global North in research, as methodological nationalism also entails that research funded by Western countries is mostly focused on Western countries. This means some phenomena are understudied, for example students who go from North to South or who move within the South (Riaño and Piguet 2016), but also the perspective of the local places from which students come or to which retirees move (Janoschka and Haas 2014).

STUDENT MOBILITY

International students are the migrant group with the fastest growth rate (Riaño and Piguet 2016). While there were 0.8 million international students in 1975, there were 4.1 million in 2013 (UNESCO 2015). The main host countries are US, UK, France, and Australia, while the main sending countries are China and India (King and Raghuram 2013). Degree mobility (people who move for a full degree programme) is differentiated from credit mobility for shorter academic stays (Riaño and Piguet 2016). However, much of the official documentation of international students refers to legal definitions that can differ from country to country and is usually based on underlying notions of national borders, visa procedures, and monetary transactions from an institutional perspective (Bista et al. 2018). In Canada, for example, people living abroad but studying at a Canadian institution (online or offline) are included in the definition. Between other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, there is no student visa required (Bista et al. 2018). In a publication by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office the definition of international students is based on students who possess a foreign university entrance qualification, even if they are Swiss (Fischer and Ortega 2015).

Two more groups that are important and have received less attention in research are students who come as refugees and encounter specific difficulties in accessing higher education – and are not included in the official numbers of international students. Students with migration

backgrounds, who did not come specifically to study and may even have attended high school locally, are also not counted. A study in Germany focused on the latter group together with the group of international students and found that both groups face challenges in similar areas, but in different ways (Morris-Lange 2017): students with migration backgrounds encounter language problems regarding academic German and international students also have difficulties with language in daily life. Secondly, there is a lack of preparation, for international students because they are used to a different education system and for students with migration backgrounds because the majority do not come from families with academic backgrounds. The study also mentions financial difficulties and difficulties with regard to social contacts for both groups (Morris-Lange 2017). Similarly, the OECD differentiates between international and foreign students, the former being non-resident students who moved specifically for their education and the latter being non-citizen students who had migrated previously and for unrelated reasons (OECD 2019). Finally, apart from the positive and aspirational narratives surrounding international students, those students who quit also deserve attention.

Visa limits and restraints are also important. Student visas stress the temporary nature of student migration and place the students in a liminal slot bounded by administrative barriers (Haas and Damelang 2010). In certain cases, for example the Schengen area, some lenience is granted for recent graduates to transform their status into a more permanent one within six months (Riaño and Piguet 2018). It is, however, closely supervised, difficult to attain and tied to the interests of the national economy. A recent study for Switzerland showed that it is difficult for foreign graduates to stay in order to find work, and to access relevant information (Riaño and Piguet 2018).

Moreover, the category of "student" itself has been criticized (King and Raghuram 2013). It does not do justice to the positionalities of individuals' lives. As King and Raghuram have argued "students are complex subjects who are much more than just students whose only function is life in higher education" (2013: 134). They refer to their roles in their families, their work, citizenship, or asylum situation.

Raghuram (2013), moreover, argues that students are not the only migrants of whom learning, skills, and knowledge are expected: "In fact, it is precisely by casting all migrants as students in some form that the requirements of the knowledge economy are to be met" (2013: 140). She proposes to theorize international student migration in terms of its specific spatiality regarding knowledge and knowledge institutions.

Studies have identified the importance of relationships in student migration processes (Brooks and Waters 2010; Geddie 2013). They have also specified that the mobility of students is often a result of them previously having experienced mobility throughout their biography and as part of their socialization. As Findlay et al. (2012) showed in their study of international students from the UK, a large percentage of the students were planning to have an international career after completing their university education. "It appears that a 'world-class' education for some is embedded in a mobility culture that attaches symbolic capital to the very performance of international living and that aspires to engage in international career trajectories" (2012: 128).

With regard to motives, Findlay et al. (2012) show that it is not only the wish to get into a top university that drives students, but also the symbolic capital of differentiating themselves through mobility and international studies. Other studies also mention the search for adventure, excitement, and a general aversion to what is perceived as the responsibility and routine of everyday life (Waters and Brooks 2010). Similarly, youth travel has been analysed

as a way of delaying the inevitability of "settling down" (Amit 2011; Waters and Brooks 2010) or entering an uncertain labour market (Hauvette 2010), a temporary space to experiment with different identities (Amit 2011; Bruner 1991; Stein 2011), or a way of pursuing personal transformation (Amit 2007; Noy 2004).

Such narratives are also perpetuated by the institutions involved (Hauvette 2010) with a focus on the desirability of transnational and cultural experiences and the potential for personal transformation (Amit 2017). The temporary and liminal nature of their stay comes with a certain freedom that allows for ways of repositioning the self and negotiating one's own position – especially since youth travel and student mobility often take place during transitional periods in early adulthood (Geisen 2010).

There is a privilege in possessing this kind of "mobility capital": as opposed to many other young migrants who tend to face social marginalization and demands of integration and assimilation, the narratives associated with international students are largely positive. Visiting students possess the comparative privilege of being able to enjoy the difference and perceive the temporary and liminal space of being "strangers" as adventurous, rather than hostile (Hauvette 2010). Skey (2013: 241) refers to this advantage as being able to "more effectively engage with difference on their own terms".

However, as argued before, there are differences in the situation and privilege among international students. Thus, other approaches and studies show how media representations are constructing "Asianness" of international students in New Zealand (Collins 2006) or analyse ethnicization and minoritization of foreign students in Dutch higher education (Leurs and Ponzanesi 2013).

EXAMPLE: REFUGEE STUDENTS

A group of international students who are not necessarily recognized as such and might not be part of the narrative of personal transformation, are students who arrive at a place as refugees. In Europe, this topic gained attention when a large number of refugees arrived in 2015 and 2016. In Germany, for example, there were 441,800 first-time asylum applicants in 2015 and 722,264 in 2016 (Eurostat 2018). A survey showed that in 2015, 17.8 per cent of them had visited a university before coming to Germany (completed and interrupted), and 20.4 per cent had a completed high school education (Rich 2016: 5). However, access to higher education for refugees is an issue worldwide, also in situations of refugee camps.

In Europe, local students started initiatives at many universities to welcome the newcomers and show them solidarity. They organized buddy programmes in which a local student teamed up with a refugee student to introduce him or her to life at the university. Also, language courses, preparatory courses, individual guidance, scholarships, and cultural programmes were set up. However, enrolment is not easy for the refugee students and they often find themselves in a trapped situation of multiple limitations and liminalities.

In 2017, we carried out a qualitative study about the situation at three universities in Switzerland, Germany, and France. We conducted 20 qualitative interviews with refugee students in preparation programmes, stakeholders from the universities, the cities, and volunteers, and carried out participant observation and a policy analysis (Sontag 2018, 2019; Sontag and Harder 2018). We found that refugee students encountered and still encounter difficulties that other students do not. For one, asylum decisions could take several years, leaving applicants

in a situation of extreme uncertainty if and how long they could stay, creating a situation of liminality and temporariness. However, there are other issues that have to do with the education system, the asylum system, and the social system or funding schemes. These are systems that have to interact and are sometimes not well in tune with each other. It is difficult for the students to gather information and understand how they work and if and how they can proceed with their studies. Students who have already been through difficulties and feel under pressure because they have lost time, talked about feelings of stress and despair.

In Germany and Switzerland, for example, asylum seekers are restricted to a specific region during the process of their asylum application. Students thus may not be able to move to a university or attend a preparatory college, or the cost of public transport can pose a burden. Another difficulty is the recognition of previous diplomas: In Switzerland, an expensive additional exam (ECUS) is required in the case of Syrian high school diplomas.

In comparison with other international students, asylum-seeking students have no time or means to prepare their moves or to gain information about the new educational system. They are not part of any programme and cannot organize language courses or credit recognition beforehand. Moreover, some have lost their social networks and savings through war or family separation.

Germany has chosen a remarkable national funding approach to support student refugees. In 2018, 166 projects at universities, universities of applied sciences, and preparation schools were funded with 6806 seats between 2016 and 2018 (Kanning n.d.). It is worth discussing how this kind of migration can be part of internationalization strategies of universities.

A central approach to theorize international student migration has been in terms of class reproduction and the accumulation of cultural and social capital (Findlay et al. 2012). In the case of refugee students, the opposite dynamic seems to happen. Social capital in the form of networks and cultural capital in the form of prior studies and degrees, but also necessary financial capital, can get lost in the move and a loss of skills takes place. This outcome is caused by war and persecution, but it also has to do with educational and asylum systems that take a long time or pose accumulating restrictions when it comes to converting cultural capital from other countries and accessing foreign university degrees. At this point, thus, it is important to take not only the category of students or potential students, but also official migration categories and policies on a macro level into account in order to understand the challenges and limits of student migration. It is easier to transfer and increase social and cultural capital through the channel of student migration with all due preparations than through the channel of asylum (see Sandoz 2018 for a discussion on migration channels).

MIGRATION AND MOBILITY AT RETIREMENT AGE

Retiree migrants are a heterogeneous group that partake in a wide range of mobility patterns. Here we mainly focus on two groups: people who migrate in later life and whose international retirement migration intersects with "lifestyle migration" and "amenity migration", and people who have a migration background, grow old in the receiving country and move again at the end of their working life. But retiree mobility can also represent older members of transnational families, either parents of adult migrants that were left behind and join under family reunification programmes, or grandparents who move to help to take care of grandchildren.

Moves can be on a permanent or on a seasonal basis (see, for example, the North American term "snowbirds", Hayes 2015).

UN DESA (2017) estimates that more than 11 per cent of the international migrants (30 million people) are above the age of 65. Yet, numbers and definitions are again not simple to obtain – as return retirement migrants, for example, often hold citizenship in the country to which they move later in life (country of origin) and are thus neither considered migrants nor tourists. However, people moving abroad after retirement and, generally speaking, to the Global South, make up a growing population (Innes 2008; Green 2014; King et al. 2000). This has led to the establishment of popular retirement destinations with two emblematic examples in the literature being the large British retiree communities in Spain (Gustafson 2001; Oliver 2008) or the rapidly growing American retiree communities in Northern Mexico (Migration Policy Institute 2006).

In many cases, Western retiree migrants possess a comparatively privileged passport that allows them to move rather freely on a global scale. Overall, international retirement migration is welcomed and understood as beneficial; sometimes it is even included in countries' official development plans, as observed in Malaysia (Green 2014). However, the official visa policies do also have significant impacts on the experienced everyday realities of older migrants. For example, some retiree migrants rely on temporary or tourist visas, which means they have to leave the country of residence regularly to renew their permit (Green 2014). Howard (2008) refers to this as an insecure residency status, which leaves the retirees more vulnerable to unforeseen changes in migration policies. A blurring of boundaries and overlapping of migrant, tourist, and resident categories can take place. Thus, while many international retiree migrants are much less limited by national borders than people with less mobility capital this does not mean that they live in a border-less world (Amit 2017; Fechtner 2007).

Many structural components contribute to the rising numbers of retirees moving abroad. Narratives surrounding age and ageing are changing towards more positive, freedom-oriented discourses. In this context, retirement is often viewed in opposition to work, routine, and everyday responsibilities. Discourses of "active aging", better health, and more wealth of older people also contribute to this trend (Oliver 2007). In addition, affordable transportation and accessible communication make mobility much more accessible for everyone, including retirees.

These predominantly Western narratives present starting points to better understand the effects that large-scale retirement migration from more to less affluent countries can have on the receiving societies and their socio-economic structures. One particular topic of interest concerns the increasingly large numbers of retirees moving into the Global South to take advantage of affordable health care. This "outsourcing" of health care can become institutionalized in retirement homes or facilities that target more or less permanent foreign residents (Ciafone 2017). Implicit power differences and questions of relative privilege become visible in such settings. An important question in this regard is how Western expectations shape the environments in long-term tourist and migrant destinations and are reinforced over time (Amit 2017). While obvious asymmetries are observed between the different nationalities, the term "privileged migration" also carries a risk of masking less visible socioeconomic inequalities as well as personal difficulties. Most retiree migrants are not so wealthy or privileged in their country of origin, but can rather be seen as middle class, and economic motivations are significant in the decision of moving abroad (Amit 2017; Bender et al. 2018). Similarly, the health care system at destination, the portability of health insurance, the transferability of pension

benefits, and the public discourse on what is often referred to as an "aging crisis" can all play a role in such a decision (Ciafone 2017). Other studies point out the role of economic and political actors in attracting retirees from northern countries, e.g. many real estate businesses target specifically that group of migrants, actively transforming the local urban landscapes (Torkington 2014). Several countries, like Portugal and Italy, have adopted special tax regimes for post-retirement migrants.

International retirement migration can create a state of liminality, both in its sense of a temporary spatiality and as it takes place in a life phase that is generally regarded as transitional. In this case the transition is taking place between working life, which is often closely tied to one's identity and perceived purpose in life, and the question of what to do next (Amit 2017). Liminality can also be connected to the period between the third and the fourth age, individual health status and autonomy. Therefore, moving internationally can be different for young-old (60–79) and old-old (80+) people: for many, retirement migration will not last until the end of life and some may return as they are becoming older and frailer, while others are unable to return (Ahmed and Hall 2016). As Oliver (2007) shows in her study of British retirees in Spain, this liminality allows for freedom and often requires people to reinvent themselves – and this can be a narrative and goal of going abroad: to renew one's life, find personal transformation or realize some personal project. While initial aspirations often include the longing for "authentic" local experiences, real life sometimes takes place in what is dubbed "bubbles" or "enclaves" of people in similar circumstances. Similarly, there exists an "openness" and freedom that is present in many shared narratives about travel and international experiences, while the lived experiences among many international retirement migrants paint a more individualized picture (Oliver 2007). In some instances, processes of identity-articulation also take place by rejecting and challenging established public narratives and ways of life, such as retired migrants consciously moving to less popular areas in central Portugal (Sardinha 2014) or so-called "dropouts" who are contesting capitalist narratives and the notion of linear life courses (Janoschka and Haas 2014). The moving of older people coming from Northern Europe to rural areas in Southern Europe can be discussed as "amenity-seeking retirement migration" (Williams et al. 2000) and might sometimes also be related to the desire of being socially valued and pursuing an economic activity (such as olive tree plantation or Airbnb, see King et al. 2019)

As in the case of students, retirees might also have had one or more experience(s) of migration earlier in their lives. This is the case for older migrants with expats' trajectories whose choice for residence location at retirement is guided by mental maps forged by biographical elements (Williams et al. 2000), and for labour migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin at the end of their working life, when they lose the core purpose of their migration. In that case, retirement migration can be understood as a re-migration process, as both places and individuals changed over time. This heterogeneity of retired migrants and of factors that motivate migration in later life as well as people's new location has to be considered by public authorities and policy makers, as those individual decisions have demographic, fiscal and health expenditure implications in both destination and origin countries.

EXAMPLE: POST-RETIREMENT MIGRANTS

Post-retirement migrants are a composite group that include people with above-average levels of income and middle-class people from the Global North as well as labour migrants (guest workers) going back to the South at the end of their working life, as mentioned above. Literature usually distinguishes those two groups using "lifestyle migration" or "international retirement migration" to describe the former and "return migration" to describe the latter. Yet, reality is not so rigid, and we can observe similarities in the aspirations and motivations of both groups.

To illustrate this point, we focus on Portugal, a Southern European country whose population has migrated on a large scale to other European countries for the last six decades. Portugal is also a receiving country with increasing European immigration in recent years. These increases are partly due to policies that grant attractive tax benefits to new residents, including tax exemptions for retirees, a measure that brings up conflictive dimensions, both on the national and international level. In the last two years, French and Italians are the two nationalities with the biggest rise among incoming migrants, and one-third of the French and one-fifth of the Italians are retirees.

Our research focused on Portuguese migration to Switzerland, a movement that became significant in the early 1980s and whose first generation, a low-skilled labour force, is now retiring. Qualitative interviews with those who return to their country of origin after retirement draw attention to a wide range of reasons for this decision: low pensions (due to low wages and partial contributory careers) that are not sufficient to live decently in the host country, language difficulties, property ownership in their country of origin, and sense of belonging, among others. We also conducted exploratory interviews with Swiss and French retirees in Portugal and found similar expectations and needs, despite completely different socioeconomic backgrounds. Retirement migrants – both nationals who return and Europeans who apply for residency – come in search of more affordable living standards, property ownership, good weather, and a destination not too far from their offspring, so they can visit each other from time to time. In short, they all look for a good or a better quality of life. On the other hand, both groups have similar worries. They worry about health care issues, about not being present in the daily life of their grandchildren, and lack of social networks.

Nonetheless, there are substantial differences too: due to unequal integration in the labour market foreign-born retirement migrants and return retirement migrants do not have the same pensions, even if they relocate from the same country. Return retirement migrants also do not have equal access to tax exemptions, as a consequence of an unequal targeting of fiscal policies, and therefore they do not feel appreciated in the same way. Returning retirees generally go back to houses they inherited, built or bought in their homeland. On the other hand, amenity-seeking international retirement migrants usually have no ties with a specific location. They buy a property in accordance with their personal fulfilment projects and aspirations, which might be in the city, close to the sea or in a rural area – and doing so, they are contributing to ongoing processes of gentrification in the country and the exponential increase in real estate in recent years, which gave them a strong visibility in the media. In contrast, return retirement migrants are nationals whose movements do not appear in national statistics and are therefore less visible. However, they make an important contribution to the local economy in rural areas that suffered disinvestment of the public sector in the austerity context of the last decade. Yet, although returning retirees' pensions were considered low in the host country,

they are considered quite high in the origin country and may create a condition of relative privilege between those re-migrants and other nationals and increase inequalities.

Usually post-retirement relocation implies circulation, among a variety of transnational practices in which older migrants engage. Financially better-off retirees can opt for a dual location residence and move seasonally between their domiciles. But even those who move on a permanent basis and choose to have a single residence in Portugal after retirement – both Portuguese returning migrants and Swiss nationals – keep moving to Switzerland for many reasons: to visit family, friends and former colleagues, to take part in celebrations, to help with childcare, to get health care in specific situations, etc. Consequently, retiree migrants develop "different forms of 'double presence' that allow them to stay connected to both of the countries" (Bolzman et al. 2017: 10).

Lastly, going back to the argument that migration is not necessarily a permanent move, but can rather include a sequence of short-/long-term movements across the life course, both literature (Giner-Monfort et al. 2016) and interviews indicate that issues linked to the ageing process (e.g. widowhood and loneliness, disabilities, need for social care) can make retiree migrants consider moving again. Those who returned at the end of their working life and have double citizenship admit they might move again to their previous country of residence if/when they will face special needs. Therefore, longitudinal approaches will be useful to better understand how age and life course events intersect regarding migration decisions.

CONCLUSION

Student and retiree mobility make visible the diversity of ways in which people move and support the argument that many more people are moving than it appears in official definitions and numbers of "migration" (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). Moreover, definitions and records of these kinds of mobility are not necessarily simple or consistent – or in line with self-ascriptions.

In both cases, movements can be temporary, transnational, or connected multi-locally. Binary understandings and dichotomies such as mobile/sedentary, home/away, resident/visitor, but also work/study/leisure, can blur. In both cases, liminality, transitional moves, transformative aspirations, the economic interests of both individuals and involved institutions, aspirations of a "better" life (be it better education, making their pension last longer, narratives of fun, adventure and getting away from work and responsibilities), but also aspects that may enforce or shape the mobility of both students and retirees have been pointed out.

We argued for an open understanding of the categories of mobile students and retirees in order to also make visible other moves that are an inherent part of today's global mobility. Reflections on what makes a "student" or a "retiree" are just as important as reflections on definitions of migration. In both cases, Western perspectives are strong in research. We must not forget that retirement and pension benefits are not universal rights yet, for example older people in the countries of the Global South or who moved as refugees are largely excluded here.

Student and retiree mobility must also be seen in the context of other current or historic forms of migration and mobility. We showed two such cases: students who came as refugees to central Europe and retirees who had come as guest workers and are living transnationally or returning to their sending country. In order to understand the meaning, chances and challenges of migration from an individual point of view on a micro level, as well as for institutions such as universities, social services, and health care systems, on a meso level, and national and

supra-national migration policies on a macro level, these forms of migration must be seen in connection. Other criteria of inequality such as citizenship, gender, ethnicity, social and cultural capital need to be further explored in both student and retiree migration.

NOTE

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22. Violence and resilience across borders

Nia C. Parson

INTRODUCTION

For many, attempts to migrate to a new country are motivated by violence as an issue of life versus death, an explicit attempt to stay alive in the face of the existential threat of intimate partner violence, gang violence, political violence, and the structural violence of poverty. Forms of violence pose threats to life and well-being, future possibilities and health[1] and are a key migration driver as recognized by the World Health Organization (2018). The related issues of what constitutes security and insecurity and the ways that various forms of violence disrupt security are central to considering migrants' health and well-being (Parson and Heckert 2014). Violence and health issues for migrants constitute ongoing processes, not past events that can be fully escaped or current events that can be left behind. Violence is caused by power dynamics that generate multi-scalar intimate, local, national and global inequalities, and forms of violence often interact synergistically, with one form begetting another. This is especially pressing in contexts of structural inequality and violence in new context(s) for migrants, wherein it is crucial to consider the various forms that violence takes and the ways that these forms entangle themselves to bring about harm. As Fassin and Rechtman (2009) argue in their work on globalization of trauma frameworks and refugee health, attention to the *aetiologies* of forms of suffering in these contexts is paramount.

The act of migration cannot fix the continuities in structural violence as it shifts from one form or location to another (cf. Tuggle et al. 2019). Therefore, we need to attend to the particularities of how structural violence is embodied and manifests in particular ways across contexts. To illustrate, I draw from anthropological literature on migration and health and in particular from my own research, which shows that gender-based intimate partner violence against women is a glue that connects various forms of violence, distress, disorder, struggle, endurance and resilience for Mexican immigrant women in the US.

I use this chapter to argue that more attention is needed to the *aetiologies of resilience* among migrants in the face of violence and their struggles to endure (cf. Jenkins 2015). Panter-Brick and colleagues (Eggerman and Panter-Brick 2010; Panter-Brick et al. 2009) have identified the social nature of resilience, which is a fundamentally intersubjective experience, not located only within individuals but shaped by their political, economic and cultural contexts (Ungar 2012). They highlight the capacities of individuals and communities to thrive in the face of adversity and note that agency plays a central role in resilience (Bonnano 2012). Building upon these ideas, I argue that identifying aetiologies of resilience demands attention to how forms of violence are perpetuated and become embodied.

STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE

Structural violence provides a crucial framework for understanding how violence operates within migrants' lives and affects health and is an important framework for understanding the health effects of historically entrenched poverty, inequality, racism, and sexism in various contexts throughout the world (Farmer 1992)[2] and often acts both as a fertile ground for other forms of violence and is enabled by them (Merry 2008). Anthropological literature on health experiences particularly among migrants reveals that structural violence is central to analysis of migrant health in various contexts (Castañeda et al. 2015; Holmes 2013). These contexts are shaped in many ways by the social, political, economic, cultural, and material realities and logics of late capitalism, marked by the global expansion of capitalist policies, ideologies, imagined futures, conditions of possibility and the structuring of inter-generational wealth and health (cf. Stoler 1985). Insofar as structures of violence are embedded in the everydayness of human lives, they can become normalized, naturalized and invisible habits of mind as well.

Along these lines, symbolic violence, a concept elaborated by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), describes the process of "misrecognition" whereby forms of violence become such a fundamental part of the everyday, the mundane, the "normal," that they are misrecognized as being just the way things are. Misrecognition describes a largely psychological process that enables dehumanization of subaltern populations and is then internalized by those dehumanized by it, and in this way insidiously seeps into various aspects of lived experience, almost as though with permission of those violated by it. Scheper-Hughes' (1992) concept of everyday violence similarly describes how structural violence can become so completely folded into ordinary life that people are forced to adapt and endure in ways that come to be unremarkable facets of everyday life.

Symbolic violence occurs when governments fail to recognize the extreme impacts of structural violence as a legally legitimate reason to seek asylum. This failure to recognize the symbolic and structural violence in asylum law becomes in and of itself yet another form of structural violence. For instance, Holmes' (2013) ethnography of border crossing by unauthorized Mexican migrant farmworkers to US fields reveals that the issue of migration while often framed in terms of individual "choice" is more often an outgrowth of global economic processes that lead movers to seek better circumstances for self and family. The conflation of decisions to flee an untenable economic situation with "choice" elides the structural complexities of migrants' decision-making and, in the case of Mexico, the impacts of international treaties such as NAFTA on rural agricultural economies. Yarris and Castañeda (2015) similarly point out that the discursive distinction between forced and economic migrants is problematic, in particular because of the implications it holds for ideas around "deservingness of care" and the effects of this on health. In fact, many forms of structural violence are not considered to be a reason for *forced* migration (Yarris and Castañeda 2015). In other words, naming violence and identifying where it fits in discourse on belonging, identity and social action emerges as a crucial issue in thinking about issues of migrant health and the stark distinctions around what constitutes violence in material and symbolic senses. Whether one is deemed worthy of being a "forced migrant" or being a "refugee" can have great consequences (Yarris and Castañeda 2015).

Merrill Singer's syndemic theory takes the focus on structural violence and health further. He originally conceptualized syndemic theory to capture synergistic interactions of diseases and other health issues and their consequences in social contexts of inequality (Baer et al.

2003; Singer et al. 2011). Singer and colleagues state that syndemics "are most likely to emerge under conditions of health inequality caused by poverty, stigmatisation, stress, or structural violence because of the role of these factors in disease clustering and exposure and in increased physical and behavioural vulnerability" (Singer et al. 2017: 941). Mendenhall and collaborators have revealed the role of syndemics among interpersonal violence, depression and diabetes in a population of Mexican immigrant women in a Chicago diabetes clinic (Mendenhall 2016, 2019; Mendenhall et al. 2017; Singer et al. 2017). There, Mendenhall and collaborators found high levels of interpersonal abuse and depression, which they show interact syndemically with diabetes in contexts of poverty, inequality and immigration.

VIOLENCE IS EMBODIED

Violence encompasses both material and symbolic/psychological realms of human experience and thus demands a phenomenological, lived experience approach to understand how these forms of violence cause harm and what can engender resilience (Willen 2007, 2012). Attention to embodied experience is crucial especially for those whose experiences diverge from official political narratives, as migrants' often do, particularly when unauthorized, because as Williams notes (1977: 131), "Practical consciousness is almost always different from official consciousness, and this is what is actually being lived, and not only what it is thought is being lived." Perceived racism and discrimination, forms of structural and symbolic violence, have been shown to negatively affect health (Anderson 2013; Mullings 2006) and are both embedded in and perpetuate racial inequality (Mullings and Wali 2001). Instances of racism and discrimination in migrants' narratives show how forms of violence such as structural and symbolic violence work together to produce suffering and negative health outcomes.

For instance, De León's (2015) ethnographic work with migrants on the border between Mexico and the US illuminates the suffering and death that plague migrants' bodies and minds, pointing to the grim embodied reality produced by different forms of violence. He shows the effects of immigration policies on people's lives as they attempt to cross the border and survive, pointing to ways that structural violence is present both prior to, during and after the act of crossing.

In my research in Chile (Parson 2010), New Jersey (Parson et al. 2016) and Texas (Parson and Heckert 2014), immigrant women talked about the important roles racism and discrimination play for women migrants who suffer intimate partner violence in a new context and suggest that racism and discrimination perpetuate the entrapment of these immigrants within the bounds of their intimate relationships. Similarly, Alcalde's (2007) foundational work also revealed how racism was used as a tool of abuse in Peruvian women's intimate relationships and showed how internal migration from the Plains (*sierra*) to the city increased women's vulnerability around their intimate relationships. Antonia, a Peruvian immigrant woman I interviewed multiple times over several years in Santiago, Chile told me she faced similar insults from an abusive ex-partner in Peru, who said, in her words:

> Why have you come back? Didn't I throw you out? … [You] *serrana concha de tu madre* [your mother's cunt from the sierras]. Get moving. I am fed up with you! … Get out of here! Get out of here, you shit!

This insult was particularly geared towards Antonia's situation as a migrant from the sierras in the country, associated with being Indian, poor and "backwards" versus her abusive partner who was from the city (Parson 2010, 2013). Antonia tried to escape her abuser and the poverty that surrounded her by migrating to Chile, but her Chilean husband was no better, and he continued to abuse her verbally with racist remarks among other forms of abuse.

My research in Dallas, Texas is also illustrative of these themes. One woman in Dallas told us: "I wanted a restraining order, and they didn't want to give it to me. Another thing I took as racism because they didn't give me the restraining order because he is American and I'm Hispanic. I think because of that." Another woman echoed the perceived racism inherent in the inaction and delay of the police that many other women face in requesting legal protection from a violent partner:

> It doesn't make me feel good sometimes because there are very racist people, also because the police have some ways … I don't know how to say it. For example, when all of this started with my husband and I went to ask for a protection order, I told the woman that I had left [my house] and he had stayed in the house … It was my sister's [house], but it was like it was mine. She told me, "Then I'm not going to give you the protection order." One thinks like, "What is happening? You are the police!"

Discrimination in the workforce and by employers is both symbolic and material and it can directly contribute to the difficulties immigrant women face in escaping an abusive relationship at home and at work, especially in a new country where they may lack legal status or be unaware of the rights they have. Another woman in Dallas told us:

> I worked as a "Cleaner" … They discriminated against me there because I was Mexican. A "wetback" [*una mojada*] was what they called me, that I was a wetback [*una mojada*]. That I was worthless. That I came to take their jobs.

The overt racism she encountered and that she had to manage almost daily became too much to bear, and she finally left her job even though it paid well, and she liked her work.

Interactions of the symbolic violence of racism and structural violence emerged in Spanish-speaking immigrant women's narratives in Dallas when they brought up how they felt in the general context of the US. One put it this way:

> It's affected me in stores, when calling a taxi. In restaurants too.

When we asked her how this made her feel, she said,

> [L]et's say I felt devalued as a human being. Like they put a label of, "You are less than others."

Here, symbolic violence becomes structural violence since the symbolic violence of racism challenges her ability to provide for her material, everyday needs for food and transportation.

VIOLENCE TRAVELS

For migrants, the body bears the burden of violence (see Van der Kolk 2014), and crossing borders does not change this. Here, Veena Das' (2007) notion of *ordinary* violence offers a way to conceptualize how past violence is ongoing in the present, the ways that historical

events and processes are never completely over but live on and are embodied in human experiences and the vital structures that persist. For migrants, violence "travels" in multiple ways as do its health effects. It is useful to distinguish between violence that travels due to the embodiment of past experience and the forms of violence to which people are subject that are ongoing and/or novel in migration processes. There are many ways that intersecting forms of violence persist across borders, even as their forms shift and change, because of how violence becomes written into the human body and mind (Kirmayer et al. 2007; Van der Kolk 2014). Since forms of violence are embodied, they often interact syndemically to negatively influence health.

Wendy Vogt (2018) uses the term "embodied mobilities" to conceptualize migrants' experiences and embodiment of violence wrought by global processes, and her work poignantly illuminates how violence travels. In discussing people who suffer dismemberment on freight trains as they attempt to flee Central American countries and transit through Mexico to get to the US, Vogt notes, "These migrants' 'accidents' were anything but accidents; rather, they must be understood as the result of specific state and larger structural processes of inequality and violence" (Vogt 2018: 112). Vogt points out that migrants' health issues while in transit are usually less spectacularly horrifying than dismemberment by freight train—including UTIs, *nervios*, anxiety, gastrointestinal issues, emergent dental issues and lack of sleep.

Consider also Clementina's experience that she shared with us in a modified life history interview in Dallas. She decided to come to the US from Mexico after she split with her first husband who had abused her for 12 years and told us that she felt depressed and wanted to leave him. She first went to California, she said, to reunite with her sister who lives there and remained for a short time with her sister before continuing to Dallas. Shortly after arriving in Dallas, she met her current husband who also abused her until she left him eight months prior to our interview. He was of Mexican descent and born in Texas; she described how he used her immigration status and his citizenship as a source of control in their relationship. She told us:

> I experienced domestic violence in my country. I was sexually abused with my first son, by my boss at work … And then here with my husband and the beatings. He started not letting me go out, controlling my friendships, controlling my work and how I dressed. He didn't let me go out with my family.

When we asked whether her ideas about domestic violence had changed since arriving in the US, Marta offered:

> They have changed … But in the end, you fall into the same cycle. I tried to defend myself but went back to the same.

VIOLENCE TAKES GENDERED FORMS

Escaping everyday violence in the home is a common motivator to move, whether it occurs in the immediate family home or in the home community/country/region. Most of the 98 women we interviewed in Dallas described repeated patterns of violence in their narratives. We also found shared and repeated health effects and negative outcomes. Many women fled violence in their homes and communities to come to the US. Shared migration drivers included the structural violence of poverty, lack of jobs, and lack of educational opportunities in Mexico. The decision to cross the border was not made lightly. Many of the women we interviewed

indicated that they took seriously the risks that came with border crossing for women, and notably the risk of rape, in particular. In their narratives we heard women talk about some of the ways that structural, every day, ordinary and symbolic violence came together for them in their migration experiences.

We asked these women to reflect on attitudes around gendered expectations and domestic violence to understand and define the perceived differences they felt mattered in terms of their safety as women in Mexico versus the US. Though many of the women we interviewed said there is a more effective response to domestic violence in the US, others pointed out that the way domestic violence is handled in the US and Mexico is simply very different, neither better nor worse in the US versus Mexico. In the US, several women noted, people are more secretive about perpetrating domestic violence, and it is deemed unacceptable in the dominant cultural narrative, though it is still common. In Mexico, on the other hand, many of the women told us, domestic violence is perpetrated in the open and accepted as a part of everyday life. It is just a part of how life is, they said, pointing to such violence as symbolic, everyday and structural. Multiple times Marta talked about domestic violence as something that is a normal part of life in Mexico. And Julia told us,

> There's no protection. We don't have a voice. We don't have authority. We don't have words. We don't have anything.

Marta told us that the domestic violence she suffered was interlinked with her lifelong depression, which she also thought was just part of life.

> In Mexico, people don't get any sort of help for their distress … That's just life.

Other women talked about depression in similar ways. In Mexico, being depressed is "just life" while in the US it is seen as something to treat and change. Interestingly, Whitney Duncan (2018) reveals the shifting nature of views about depression among women in Oaxaca, Mexico, touched by migration of family and friends, in light of what she calls psy-globalization. Depression is correlated to intimate partner violence among immigrants in the US (Caetano and Cunradi 2003; Rodríguez et al. 2008) and among immigrant women in the US who have diabetes specifically (Mendenhall 2012, 2016; Mendenhall et al. 2017). This is but one example of the gendered nature of the health challenges that can arise for migrants.

In another interview, Clara narrated her experience of violence growing up in Mexico:

> The violence sometimes is in one's own house … My father was controlling. You don't go out. No boyfriend. We had to work. We had to give him money. I mean, that's like violence, like abuse. Always abuse after abuse. He said, "A woman doesn't need to go to school." My father didn't let us go to school. Women: no school. School was just for men. The woman, in the house.

Another said:

> Because they raise you like that … you think that you have to serve that person. They beat you, abuse you, are unfaithful. They yell. They keep you in your house, "You got married and you have to deal with it."

We also asked if and how the experiences of men and women differed around immigration to the US. Notably, many of the women thought that men had an easier time crossing the border. For instance, Gloria told us:

> I think it's easier for a man. The wages are better. They pay them better than the women. We women, we have to go through so many things. If we go to a restaurant, the male boss will always abuse. It's much more difficult for a woman than a man. It's much, much more difficult.

Men's Labour and Violence

Masculinities are often figured in terms of violent masculinities, but gendered violence is also about the victimization of men, who are targeted based on their gender as well. For example, men working in dangerous construction jobs with little to no access to funds for workers' compensation or other kinds of support, their lives become particularly dangerous. Nicholas Walter et al. (2004) use clinical ethnography to show how the painful lived experiences of Latino male day laborers' perceived inabilities to live up to idealized patriarchal gender expectations make them vulnerable to the economic vicissitudes that shape their abilities to gain employment. These men's bodies are configured as "disposable" in the matrix of late capitalism as defined by the state and private employers, but not to their families and in their intimate relationships. Of course, these men are not disposable. Rather, they are critical to the survival of the very system that perpetrates structural violence against them. Nevertheless, immigrant men are caught within a matrix that leaves little space to be an independent actor. On one hand, they must earn a living and provide for their families in a way that is stoic. On the other, they are mistreated, denigrated and abused at work. Maintaining their masculinity is difficult and the processes antithetical to the free expression of emotion and suffering. As Quesada and colleagues (2011) suggest, it is important to translate these realities into actual health policy/practice.

Labour market forces further effect immigrant women's experiences in Dallas. When we asked women to discuss what worried them the most, many brought up issues around finding work. In particular they mentioned issues that arose for them as undocumented individuals that were difficult and worrisome. For instance, Eva told us:

> Right now, what worries me is my work. I only work Saturdays and Sundays. I am looking for a Monday–Friday job, but they ask for papers, and work is very slow.

Eva laments the lack of possibilities for her to find a steady job during the work week, due to her lack of papers. Lara similarly told us:

> Sometimes I am totally stressed economically, and I think that I am not going to finish everything, and my head begins to hurt. I am totally stressed, and it begins to put me in a bad mood.

She attributes her extreme stress to her status as an undocumented person. Lara said:

> The anger with myself because I can't have a better job, I can't have a better income. Why? Because I am not legal in this country. I lack legal status.

Sara also told us about the difficulties she had finding a safe place for herself and her children, even with the help of the domestic violence agency where she sought help and where we met her. Sara said:

> I don't have anyone. I mean, I can always come here and everything. But, well, also I don't have papers, so they can't give me much help. So, they can't help me to get an apartment or anything because you have to have a Social Security number, so … I don't know what I am going to do.

Others talked about the fear of immigration raids at their work, another complicating factor that made it difficult for them to maintain jobs and a sense of safety.

VIOLENCE OF CARE

The process of providing care for migrants who have suffered various forms of violence can also emerge at times as another form of violence. In the US, anthropologists have noted how legal structures that are organized to help immigrant women who have suffered intimate partner violence can cause harm. Miriam Ticktin (2011) describes this phenomenon in her book *Casualties of Care*. She details the ways that immigrant women in France make themselves visible to the state in order to access some forms of care and find legal aid. She shows that the very institutions that promise care for migrants in France, whether health care or care for social ills and domestic violence, can be the agents of harm.

Seth Holmes (2013) argues that in addition to the embodied suffering and health problems engendered by migrant farm workers working long hours in the fields, they confront barriers to any type of health care. Many migrants whose status is precarious or undocumented put off going to the doctor out of the fear that they may be entrapped by immigration officials and imprisoned or deported. Many lack resources to access health care. In the case of Holmes' ethnography of Triqui (an indigenous group, from the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca) farm workers in the US, he shows how even when health care resources are ostensibly available, the "care" that migrants received is often ineffective, injurious or both, and almost always very expensive. At other times, immigrant workers will ask for aid, receive some help but quickly be returned to work regardless of their overall condition. While sometimes these errors in health and medical care were an outcome of linguistic barriers and the inability of Triqui workers to communicate with their superiors; other times it was due to a lack of care, or lack of interest in providing care. In response, Holmes argues for structural competency in health care for migrants, to attend to political, social, cultural and economic contexts, in order to address the structural violence that frames their lives and health. It is also necessary to pay further attention to resilience and the aetiologies of resilience among migrants who face often intersecting co-created forms of violence illuminated in this chapter.

CONCLUSIONS: RESILIENCE AND HEALTH POLICY

A wide range of violent circumstances demand attention in terms of migrant health. This chapter shows that context matters greatly, as do the embodied features of violence including how it travels across borders, bodies and minds, affecting health and wellbeing. Gender also matters; the power dynamics in relationships that are mediated by gendered expectations are of great importance in terms of women's health. The complex realities reflected in some of the stories in this chapter speak to the need for detailed attention to the dynamic global forces that produce violence and drive migration, sending people fleeing from various forms of violence: structural, economic, wartime, racialized, and gendered, to potentially encounter other forms of violence. Remedying entrenched and globalized inequalities seems a far-fetched fantasy, and it may well be; but it deserves real thought as forces conspire to drive migration and further build insecurities and inequalities among populations throughout our world. In the meantime, we need policy makers and concerned citizens who are attentive to the lived realities and complexities involved for people who are migrants and experience violence.

One of the ways we can promote health among migrants and others who have experienced violence is to focus on the capacity for human resilience in the face of great adversity (Fazel et al. 2012; Panter-Brick 2010, 2014; Panter-Brick and Eggerman 2012; Southwick et al. 2014). Fundamentally, human resilience is a social process; it is intersubjective. In order to address health-related issues for migrants surviving at the intersections of various kinds of violence, we need policies and practices that address their particular needs in ways that emphasize community and social interconnections crucial for resilience. This chapter echoes Catherine Panter-Brick and colleagues who call for research on resilience in terms of the social, political, economic and cultural contexts in which people engage to cope with life challenges (Eggerman and Panter-Brick 2010; Hobfoll et al. 2011; Panter-Brick 2010; Panter-Brick et al. 2009; Ungar 2012). Such research can help inform policy makers and others who have the power to dedicate funds to ameliorate human suffering by supporting resilience.

NOTES

1. In terms of health and migration, see Sargent and Larchanché (2011). They note that there is an emergent literature on structural violence, migration and health that attends to lived experience.
2. Structural violence was coined by Johan Galtung, a liberation theologist, and applied first by Paul Farmer (1992). There, Farmer reveals how the historical violence of colonialism and slavery in Haiti were central to the particular forms of suffering in Haiti in the 1980s and the blaming of Haitians for HIV/AIDS on the world stage.

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23. Development, migration, and the prospects of 'betterment'
Gregory Gullette

INTRODUCTION

The common refrain 'life is hard' reveals the fact that much of the world shares deep and profound problems. Whether one references the Spanish expression *la vida es dura*, or the Thai idiom *chiwit lumbaak* (or the slightly more dramatic *chiwit lumken*, recalling conditions of impoverishment), these colloquialisms capture life's hardships—rhythmic and recurring poverties, persistent difficulties of making ends meet, and lack of choice across important life decisions. Such a phrase translates the broader conditions of life (the good and bad of particular societies) into the personal. Seemingly neutral state structures and political-economic institutions take on significance as they are manifest in people's everyday experiences and provide structure that can limit agency. However, as opposed to resigning one's self to a life of suffering created through unjust structural arrangements, people envision a better life—one with equity, dignity, and fulfillment—and reorganize and strategize to realize their imagined pathways as migrants.

Importantly, the desire for an improved future is shared by people and the institutions around them. Individuals imagine and seek better lives, while governments and multilateral financial organizations establish targets and goals to reduce poverty and increase living standards. This desire for improvement and betterment has long shaped interactions between states, institutions, and civil societies; these intersections become evident when considering relations between migration and development. As detailed below, development as a political-economic project historically unfolded with specific interests in the nature and causes of human suffering, seeking to alleviate experiences of poverty and deprivation. Yet, after decades-long efforts and collaborative relationships between public and private sectors, development's aspirational goals for a better future remain unrealized. In fact, for some entangled within the development apparatus, conditions have worsened over time (e.g., Ferguson 2006, 2015; Scott 1998; World Bank 2017). A cursory read of the news underscores the simple fact that 'improvements' in life remain illusory for developmental specialists and those they seek to support. Scholars from fields such anthropology, geography, and sociology have demonstrated through rich, ethnographic accounts and broader statistical analysis that despite larger development interventions (and at times despite individualized strategies), people continue to confront deeply entrenched challenges that constrain possible futures.

This chapter considers the problematic and conflictual relationships that have emerged between individuals and 'development' as an institutional structure. Specifically, this chapter considers how people assuage development's negative effects through strategizing behaviors including migration. By focusing on how development interventions rely upon global capital penetration, this chapter reveals the ways in which market destabilization, land dispossession, natural resource extraction, among other things, disrupt economic, sociopolitical, and ecologi-

cal conditions. Such disruptions, in turn, offer incentives for new engagements with migration. As one's community or region experiences unwanted or unanticipated development effects, leaving the area (temporarily or permanently) may seem the best course of action, particularly if other mitigating strategies have been deployed and exhausted. As noted by scholars such as Black, Kniveton and Schmidt-Verkerk (2011) and Sassen (2016), out-migration from one's region or country is often a last resort.

Even as development's failures may motivate migrants to seek improved conditions elsewhere, scholars have considered whether (under certain circumstances) the economic and cultural products of migration may contribute to more just and sustainable forms of development that can more equitably integrate wider cross-sections of society. Can people's engagements with migration and associated sociocultural and economic benefits be effectively marshalled to engender popular forms of development? Might migration offer pathways toward developing a better future (variously defined based on culturally informed aspirations) both for migrants and origin communities? Therefore, the goal herein is to highlight the ways in which people demonstrate resilience to negative expressions of political and economic power in global development, while simultaneously exhibiting endurance as they improve their lives and the lives of those around them.

DEVELOPMENT: ASPIRATIONAL AND UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS

Over successive decades politico-economic development interventions have failed to address the problems of poverty, inequity, scarcity, and need. Fields across the social sciences have attempted to explain development's widespread failures, particularly as governments and institutions continue to invest in 'improvement' and 'betterment' schemes. According to Clammer (2012: 4) a fundamental shortcoming of development is that it has remained institutionally tied to economics, while ignoring theories and empirical studies in subjects such as ecology, cultural studies, or philosophy. The result is an institutionalized development that has trapped itself and become separated from the concrete, the subjective, and the sensuous experiences of human suffering (Clammer 2012: 5). In effect, development has relied upon technocratic and econometric modeling of human problems that ignores people's subjective interpretations of suffering. The result is development that works to the detriment of its intended beneficiaries, ignoring their wants, desires, or aspirations. In the attempt to understand the makings and deployment of development, researchers have attended to the ways in which the field has been constructed, shaped by academic legacies, and guided by governmental and professional interests and not the voices of those most affected.

Seminal works by Escobar (1995), Fairhead (2000), Ferguson (1994, 2006), Foucault (1991), and others have directly or indirectly questioned the motivations of development—drawing attention to its discursive constructions rooted in Western power—and deconstructing the foundational element of '"improvement", which emerged historically when the purpose of rule was recast in terms of a governmental rationality focused on the welfare of populations' (Li 2005: 384). Here Foucault's work is central, particularly his examination of the ways in which early European statecraft sought to effectively organize and optimize its citizenry. Beginning in the 18th century, states increasingly relied upon statistical modeling of populations, under the assumption that life could be manipulated and regulated for the benefit of all.

Repercussions were that states characterized people, simplified life, and employed a govern-mentality that aimed to reshape people and places into the desires of states and development institutions (see also Li's [2007] *The Will to Improve*). Situating development within such theoretical positions enables us to make sense of the ongoing and widespread failures of inter-vention. As noted by Olivier de Sardan (2005: 5) the discursive approach presents 'a narrative of Western hegemony bent on denying or destroying popular practices and knowledge', often avoiding the way life *actually* is in favor of what development planners *wish* life were like. Simplification and compression invariably introduce distortions and place any scheme for betterment at a disadvantage, as the scheme itself is mapped to a fiction.

Even when scholars argue that interventions managed by states or allied institutions may be beneficial, they do so with important qualifiers. For example, Attwood (2005: 2068) con-tends that macro-scalar interventions 'founded on industrial technologies have contributed to famine protection, food security, and human welfare in ways that were formerly unfeasible'. Analyzing the drought-prone western Deccan region of peninsular India, Attwood identifies the ways in which large-scale institutions have been essential for people's survival and abilities to circumvent regional ecological constraints via public and private canal irrigation systems. Yet, while advancing the benefits of macro-planning and resources (such as capital availability and organizational capacities to enact state-wide infrastructural initiatives), Attwood recognizes that to counteract inefficiencies and errors within top-down management future development efforts should proceed within 'participatory management' structures. This institutional arrangement recognizes the value of situated and contextualized knowledge and practice formed by local communities (see Scott's [1998] discussion of *mētis*).

Prioritizing the inclusion of local knowledges and desires into development has led researchers to more carefully consider the political outcomes when heterogeneous actors interact within the planning, implementation, and evaluative stages. Here researchers trace the connections and compositions of relationships, including the messy and conflicting effects that emerge during the unfolding of a development scheme. In participatory development where target beneficiaries take on planner roles, the interactions become the ethnographic site in a classic case study approach. That is, interactions between people become 'productive pathways into social reality, as means of deciphering concrete social situations, both in terms of actors' strategies and contextual constraints' (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 12). Researchers disentangle the relationships and social compositions that form and dissolve, as stakeholders articulate their desires and objectives, find new allies, and establish and renew alliances as they encounter obstacles. However, drawing from Escobar, such 'entangled social logic approaches' advanced by Olivier de Sardan (2005: 11–17) fail to adequately differentiate those with differing power, as well as to fully account for the cultural hegemony of Western development, which establishes itself as the arbiter of global development outcomes.

Still, critical theories and practical strategies such as participatory structures have improved development to a degree. As seen in the discussion of remittance investment (below), the process of democratizing development and integrating migrant populations and those remain-ing in origin communities into intervention planning and deployment have produced some positive, albeit limited, results. Yet, despite efforts to reformulate and restructure develop-ment, public and private schemes have long demonstrated negative effects. Early studies in political ecology and geography (see, for example, Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Wolf 1972) reveal the ways in which societal structures and political economies shape land resource and ecological degradation. Migration would allow people to

mediate socioecological stress by relocating to locations with more favorable conditions. If not explicit in earlier studies, implicit was the notion that the entry of development, and by association Western capitalism, would change political economic and socioecological conditions, leading to migration as a strategic response (for more recent engagements see Carte et al. 2019; Jokisch 2002; Radel et al. 2018).

Countries and regions targeted for development experience distortions of external capitalism through different means: the introduction of foreign-owned industries, a government's diminished autonomy due to loan requirements, capital growth through unsustainable resource extraction, reliance on environmentally damaging activities, or implementation of austerity measures. Negative outcomes may unfold as a series of rapid-onset effects (such as extensive structural adjustments, hyperinflation, or economic shocks), or more commonly as slow-moving outcomes that gradually undermine local political economic, sociocultural, or ecological conditions.[1] Such alterations within an origin community remain central in determining the volume and patterning of out-migration. According to the new economics of labor migration (NELM) 'the stickiness of migrant flows depends in large part on the institutional constraints in the origin setting and not on the absolute differences in conditions between origin and destination' (Curran, Meijer-Irons and Garip 2016: 120). Distortions and imbalances within origin countries take on greater significance within migration patterning.

Foreign instabilities and imbalances within global development—which is built in part upon exporting the structures of Western capitalism—become internalized within the weaker societies' structures (Portes 2016: 79). Decades of development that have pushed activities such as mining, plantation agriculture, and unregulated industrial productions have effectively reshaped and reconfigured much of the global South, resulting in people being expelled from their homes or placed into precarious socioeconomic or ecological conditions. Zoomers (2010: 430) notes that this 'foreignization of space' has profound implications for sustainable and equitable development and (as argued here) for the creation of new migrations as people respond to the political economic, sociocultural, and ecological constraints in the origin setting. Local forms of production and consumption become destabilized through foreign direct investment in offshore farming, in biofuels and non-food agricultural commodities, in tourist complexes and nature reserves, or in large-scale infrastructural initiatives. Processes of dispossession and political economic instabilities upend people's existence and result in adaptive responses (see Aha and Ayitey 2017; Hausermann et al. 2018).

DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION, OR MIGRATION AS DEVELOPMENT

The political economic and socioecological complications in interventionist schemes represent cumulative effects of misguided development policies that may create conditions incentivizing or requiring relocation. Here improvement schemes serve as an impetus to forced and voluntary movement. Yet, despite evidence of development's shortcomings, researchers and policy makers have (perhaps incongruously) advanced the notion that development, when structured and implemented appropriately, will narrow the gaps in differential levels of economic growth in the world economy. By reducing income gaps that exist between origin and destination countries—which traditionally follow global South to North migration patterns—people will

exhibit lower propensities to migrate to destinations such as Europe, the United States, or Canada to access more robust economic markets.

Two lines of thought dominate this consideration. First, using foundational theories on migration, such as neoclassical economics or NELM, researchers posit that improving socioeconomic conditions in the global South will reduce differences in income potentials that exist between origin and destination. After stabilizing economic conditions in origin countries, families and individuals would no longer need to pursue emigration as a risk-aversion strategy (that is, to send family members abroad for work in order to diversify microeconomies and increase household resilience to the economic shocks and instabilities characteristic of emergent or 'undeveloped' economies). In this model development has two primary objectives: to reduce the push factors and unstable markets that drive migration and to decrease the relative wealth differences that exist between 'developed' and 'undeveloped' countries. However, equilibrium theories of this type fail to adequately address how labor mobilities unfold in global economic systems. According to Portes (2016: 79) these models assume that migration 'occurs between two societies that are autonomous and internally integrated, but at different levels of economic development. The search for economic advantage then motivates workers in the poorer society to move to the richer one.' Migrants in such theoretical models logically respond to inequities that exist within global capitalism and countries' relative positions of wealth, as well as to unexpected downturns or instabilities within origin countries' markets.

A second line argues that migration may exist as a response to poorly implemented development schemes and as a component of human character (e.g., the historical percentage of global populations that live outside their country of birth has consistently averaged around 3 percent). Researchers have also examined the ways in which migration itself may positively shape all countries enmeshed in the global economic system. Certainly greater attention has focused on whether migrants laboring abroad positively affect home countries and communities through the transfer of sociocultural and economic remittances. However, in response to the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric globally—including in advanced democracies—researchers have examined the degree to which immigrant labor might also positively shape destination countries such as France, the United States, Australia, or Germany, thereby forcing a recognition of immigrants' contributions to host societies. As noted by Clemens (2017: 1):

> Migrants do not simply move to escape development failure; many use the opportunities that arise from development success to invest in migration. Migrants do not simply compete with others at their destination, but contribute to the complexity and division of labour that is the taproot of the wealth of nations … Migration shapes and is shaped by development, and migration is one channel by which economic actors reach their fullest potential … The next step is to understand migration … as a form of development itself.

Here research interests squarely sit on migration's change potential. That is, migration may improve living standards, qualities of life, socioeconomic insecurities, and cultural capacities for migrants in the destination and for families that receive remittances. Further, destination societies gain from immigrant labor productivity and diversification of labor markets (which underscore the illogicality of some countries' exclusionary and restrictive immigration policies). Given such potentials, research has attempted to understand if such positive outcomes can be scaled-up and help correct deeply engrained international inequalities.

REMITTANCES AND CHANGE POTENTIAL

Political discourse has historically framed migration as a problem needing a solution for the root-causes of movement. Researchers such as Bakewell (2007), Gullette (2014), Hairong (2008), Zhang (2001), and others have demonstrated the ways in which societies cast migrants as socio-politically destabilizing forces, instead viewing populations that are rooted in place and sedentary in nature more favorably. When combined with simplified and racist rhetoric that dehumanizes immigrant communities (see, for example, Alimahomed-Wilson 2018; Esses, Medianu and Lawson 2013; Gomberg-Muñoz 2016), crisis mentalities may form within destination societies, along with restrictive policies. Destination countries' resistance to accepting more immigrants and refugees underscores the perceived negative effects of global population movement and resettlement.

However, 'theories of global migration should not be based on the normative objective of finding ways of helping people to stay at home. Rather they should be based on the postulate that migration is a normal part of social relations' (Castles 2010: 1568). Societies should establish new kinds of regulation to maximize migration's benefits for all involved. For example, macroeconomic data reveal migration's positive attributes given that immigration tends to complement and raise native-born workers' productivity and salaries, with skilled immigrants having particularly positive fiscal impacts within the destination (CEA 2007, 2015).[2]

Interest in migration's positive effects have coalesced around a fuller examination of economic and social remittances. Commonly advanced arguments center on the ways in which transfers of wealth and sociocultural capital benefit receiving families, communities, and nations. Researchers posit that contemporary mobilities differ in important ways to historical migrations that often resulted in a discontinuation of social ties with the origin country. Permanent outmigration from a region, particularly when entire families leave an area, tends to depopulate communities. This reduces regional human and economic capital and diminishes the likelihood of sending remittances to or investing in origin communities.

Remittance patterns within cyclical migration experience different outcomes. Advances in transportation and telecommunications allow immigrants to maintain cross-border connections with family and friends. Along with enabling the flow of information to prospective migrants on ways to (regularly or irregularly) relocate to the destination country, maintaining social networks increases the propensity of immigrants to send a portion of their remunerations home. For example, migrants engaged within cyclical movements—spending a portion of time laboring abroad with either frequent trips back home or plans to return to the origin country—commonly invest their capital in the origin economy (see the edited volume by Sirkeci, Cohen and Ratha 2012). Such consumption and investment can create benefits for a region. Aggregate data indicate that remittances may expand regional economies, improve livelihoods, reduce vulnerabilities to economic and ecological collapses, and enlarge people's capacities to pursue home construction, business investment, schooling and educational access, consumptive purchasing, and other desirable development pursuits (e.g., Durand, Massey and Zeteno 1996; López-Córdova 2005; Yang 2008). Here remittances and social connectedness become firm pathways for people to obtain a better life and overcome inequities within the global (development) system.[3]

Of course, concerns exist that remittance flows might be a one-generation phenomenon as second-generation children acculturate to the next destination societies, and the socio-cultural connections to places and people important to their parents decline (Portes 2016:

83–84). Similarly, the degree to which parents maintain cross-border connections also influences generational differences in remittance behaviors. Should a family deepen social embeddedness within their destination and funnel economic resources to making ends meet within the new society, transnational relationships become more fragile. Additionally, should second-generation children grow up in poorer migrant families—excluded from the dominant host society due to institutionalized boundaries founded on domains of religion, race, language, or citizenship (see Alba 2005; Algan et al. 2010)—this increases the likelihood of constrained financial resources, which reduces second-generation children's capacities to remit. Yet, analyzing Mexican-American and Filipino-American families, Gutierrez (2018, 2020) argues that while second-generation cross-border ties demonstrate possibilities of weakening, first-generation migrant parents play significant mediating roles in strengthening connections between their children and origin communities. When parents maintain sociocultural and economic relationships with family and friends, this creates a transnational field and socialization effect on second-generation children that increases their propensities to remit.

PATTERNING AND EFFECTS OF SOCIOCULTURAL AND ECONOMIC REMITTANCES

Remittances and cyclical migration exhibit potentials to productively shape micro and macro socioeconomic conditions in origin countries. However, inconsistent findings suggest that additional variables influence propensities to remit and the volume of remittances. For example, while some studies have found that lower-skilled migrants tend to remit more and with greater frequency (e.g., Ford, Jampaklay and Chamratrithirong 2009; OECD 2007), other studies argue that high-skilled, highly educated migrants remit more as they experience greater earning potentials and lower financial constraints (e.g., Bollard et al. 2009; Osaki 2003).

In other instances, research has indicated that gender may influence remittance volume and frequency. Analyzing gendered expectations in households and concepts of filial piety, researchers have found that daughters face stronger expectations to contribute to family resources and smooth household expenses. For example, the complex economic responsibilities daughters face in Thai households result in more frequent and larger remittances (see, for example, Richter et al. 1997; Taylor 2005). Yet, Gullette's (2013: 136) ethnographic research among domestic migrants working in Bangkok finds that men remitted on average 1,564 Thai baht, whereas women remitted 1,104 baht. Given that men were more commonly married in that study (with wives and children remaining in origin communities) and given the gendered wage inequities present in the Thai economy, this might account for such differences. Similarly, Osaki (2003: 205) considers that migrants, regardless of gender, who have a spouse or children remaining at home remit greater amounts due to familial obligations. Understanding which variables exert greater influence on remittance frequency, volume, and use has implications for development potentialities and equalizing deep-rooted global inequalities. According to Castañeda (2012: e30):

> why migrants choose to send remittances, and how much, depends not only on the objective conditions determined by wages and the economic contexts, but also on subjective factors and social dynamics such as: whether or not one's spouse and children migrate, how many people in one's locality have left, and how migration has changed expectations regarding masculinity, identity, consumption and lifestyle, in many cases making remittance-sending itself a morally desirable act.

Remittances will unfold differently depending on contexts, actors, constraints, opportunities, motivations, and subjectivities. Researchers face the task of extrapolating their findings with a specific group of people in a particular place and time to other areas and people.

The best strategies reside in tracing the broad parameters of potentialities based on rich, ethnographic and culturally detailed studies—often relying upon complex variables such as class, status, social connectedness, or aspirations. Such research reveals the good and bad of economic transfers and the limitations produced through migrations and informs overall understanding of the myriad paths possible. The outcome of movement is, of course, not guaranteed and could limit origin countries' development potentials. For example, in addition to the loss of labor within sending regions (particularly if out-migration is largely permanent or migrants fail to return home to assist in labor-intensive family pursuits such as agriculture— see Gullette and Singto 2015), concerns exist that the loss of a country's professional class poses dangers to long-term growth and economic transformations. Deficient markets or limited professional opportunities may incentivize highly educated and skilled citizens to migrate elsewhere (read: the global North), thereby resulting in a 'brain drain' and further hampering a country's ability to retain its domestic talent. Such negative outcomes might be diminished through cyclical migration and the privileges of the professional migrant class to move with ease across borders. Even if they do not return home, continued embeddedness in their home country improves the likelihood that professional migrants will harness their capacities and capital to nurture developmental and educational improvements in origin countries by transferring economic resources as well as intangible sociocultural capital.

In these instances, remittances move beyond purely economic transfers and demonstrate 'social remittances'—the transnational transfer of values, ideas, knowledge, behavior, practices, or social capital between origin and destination societies (e.g., Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). And while lower-skilled migrants engage in social remitting behaviors, professional migrants' strategic position allows flexibilities and privileges in movement and cultural translation. Certainly, risk exists that these transfers may undermine local communities' standards or distract from pertinent local issues. For example, the flows of information and cultural practices from abroad might create unrealistic expectations on living standards or concepts of equity, which in the minds of receiving subjects are best corrected through further migration, thereby creating a perpetual flow of emigrants that depopulate regions and exacerbate tensions between unequal groups (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011: 1–3). However, as noted by Lacroix, Levitt and Vari-Lavoisier (2016: 2), whether researchers term the transfers of non-economic resources as 'intangible flows', 'political remittances', or 'democratic diffusion', global cultural circulation increasingly shapes local development processes. Introducing new ideas, transforming cultural beliefs, repositioning ideas and values in different contexts under different pressures, all produce outcomes that initiate *some* form of change. 'The translation of global norms into locally applicable and usable concepts empowers local activists and, hence, can contribute to [powerful change in economics, political representation, governmental transparency, or human rights]' (ibid.: 2). Social remittances can create the possibility for upending the status quo and correcting seemingly intractable inequities.

CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS: AN ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The scale and volume of remittances reveal capabilities to support widespread development endeavors, particularly in the global South. According to the United Nations (2019) approximately 11 percent of the global population receives remunerations earned by family or friends abroad. In 2018, this totaled $689 billion; the global South received $529 billion of these funds and approximately half were directed toward rural communities. Should historical growth patterns in remittances hold, migrants will transfer approximately $8.5 trillion by 2030. The potential impacts embedded within such figures are impressive. However, new and persistent challenges complicate the degree to which migration positively shapes development.

Development may distort political, economic, sociocultural, or ecological contexts and relationships. This may incentivize people to pursue migration as a way to mediate development's negative outcomes. Who then benefits from migration? At the micro-level immigrants certainly gain—not in all cases but in a sufficient amount to encourage others to pursue the journey (experiences of forced migration or development-induced displacement exist under different circumstances). When considering benefits at national and global scales the answer is less clear. Over the long term immigration positively impacts the majority of countries involved. Yet, in most cases it appears that the 'immigration surplus'—the increase in native residents' income due to immigration—disproportionately benefits destination societies, often in the global North (Sanderson 2016: 276, 288). Wealthier countries maintain such positions of power over the global South in various ways: patents in new technologies, coercive political-military force, robust economies that sustain international labor supply systems, and immigration policies focused on skill selection instead of complete cessation (Czaika and de Haas 2015: 34–39; Sanderson 2016: 277).

Given the ways in which migration benefits destination societies, the animus directed toward immigrant communities seems ill placed. Yet, researchers have detailed the rise and mainstreaming of anti-immigrant sentiment in advanced democracies and autocratic societies. Widespread exclusion or intolerance, combined with restrictive policies that criminalize irregular movement, limit immigrants' full participation in society. Immigrants find themselves in vulnerable positions—more likely to experience abuse, mistreatment, or devaluation—reducing their abilities to marshal economic resources to assist in individual improvements or regional development in origin countries. As noted by Bunnell, Gillen and Ho (2018: 46–48) the prospecting of elsewhere through migration reflects a spatial practice that seeks to better one's personal condition, while at the same time opening pathways to transfer such individualized accomplishments into broader contributions to the future of one's country. Given the capturing of immigration benefit by countries in the global North, researchers should increasingly advocate for policies that facilitate cross-border labor flows and decriminalize immigrants connected to irregular movements. These shifts will not only enable a legal and humane way for countries to gain from the immigrant classes' economic productivity, but such regularization of immigration offers ways to improve people's sense of security, justice, and freedom while laboring abroad. Here the objective is to link ethical and humanistic ideas within immigrant rights—focusing on solidarity, security, and self-determination—to development frameworks that advocate for people-centered approaches (see Clammer 2012). By carefully recognizing the interwoven elements of migration and development (as part of an integrated system), this will urge researchers and policy makers to simultaneously address

people's existential needs of fairness and dignity, while empowering them to follow pathways to imagined futures and life improvements.

Such freedom of movement may connect to and inform development that seeks to equitably integrate the intended beneficiaries in an immigrant's home community, creating space for their voice and agency to shape the development initiative. Ethnographic and long-term research has highlighted the aspirational elements of migration and the belief that such mobilities improve individuals' and families' circumstances. People's efforts to sustain and make durable transnational connections with family and friends, while at the same time participating in cyclical migration and remitting monies and social capital, reflect such beliefs. Yet, a persistent challenge in bridging migration and development is scaling-up the derived goods of mobilities. Though economic and social remittances may improve individual and family living standards, debate continues on whether remittances open the future for a collective sharing of migration benefits.

Certainly, limitations exist on the potentialities of remittances as a means to correct all inadequacies and disruptive effects within development. Land dispossession, environmental degradation, displacement, austerity measures, among other issues require profound structural adjustments within the logics of global capitalism, ideas on improvement, and coercive interventions. Despite such limitations, research has highlighted the economic and social capital embedded with a citizenry working abroad (highly skilled or not). Institutions and governments have sought to strengthen ties with emigrants by developing more robust infrastructure and opportunities in the hopes of incentivizing their return (particularly highly skilled and educated emigrants), which will improve the domestic socioeconomic capital available for national development projects. Even in situations where emigrants will unlikely return, economic and social remittances add needed capital to local or regional government development projects (many of which reflect participatory models that give greater autonomy and control to communities in shaping the project's focus and direction—see, for example, Fox and Bada 2008; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015).

While research on migration and development should consider the ways in which development's negative effects or unintended consequences might incentivize out-migration, researchers must also consider ways to capitalize on such mobilities. Viewing migration and development as mutually constitutive reveals its interrelated effects. Given immigration's potential to transform development and improve conditions in origin and destination societies, we need increased scrutiny of formal and informal processes that place immigrant communities at risk. Currently, the diminishment of capacity for individual *and* collective improvement extends in part from hostilities directed toward immigrant communities and their efforts to cope with a world where benefits and opportunities are unevenly distributed within a globally integrated economic system. Interlinking a more just and participatory development with a more inclusive and humane immigration system presents potentials for institutional structures to engage betterment in innovative ways.

NOTES

1. International development interventions may weaken domestic economies or gradually erode ecological conditions, which can facilitate a rapid-onset deterioration (for example, into extreme violence or warfare [see Murshed 2002]).
2. Not everyone in the destination society benefits equally from immigration. While aggregate figures show macroeconomic improvements such as a 5 percent national income increase within countries in the global North (Sanderson 2016), disentangling the data reveals that native lower-skilled workers experience wage depression. According to Borjas (2016),

   > [B]ecause a disproportionate percentage of immigrants have few skills, it is low-skilled American workers, including many blacks and Hispanics, who have suffered most from this wage dip … According to census data, immigrants admitted in the past two decades lacking a high school diploma have increased the size of the low-skilled workforce by roughly 25 percent. As a result, the earnings of this particularly vulnerable group dropped by between $800 and $1,500 each year.

3. Earlier schools of thought argued that remittances create economic dependencies among receiving families, as well as exacerbate socioeconomic differences between sending and non-sending households (e.g., Reichert 1981). Binford (2003: 323) notes that while

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24. The 'mobility turn': economic inequality in refugee livelihoods
Naohiko Omata

INTRODUCTION

Improvements in transportation facilities and communications technologies have resulted in a significant scale up of human mobility in the contemporary world. Mobility is a useful concept for understanding the dynamic, complex and fluid nature of day-to-day human movements beyond the conventional definition of migration offered by international organisations (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). The concept of mobility helps us to explore the experiences of movers and non-movers and to capture various patterns of movement between multiple locations in people's everyday lives (Hannam et al. 2006).

A burgeoning interest in mobility has developed over the past decade or so – often represented as a 'mobility paradigm' or 'mobility turn'. The mobility paradigm is now spreading into wider disciplines, not only placing new agendas on the table, but also questioning some of the fundamental sedentary assumptions made by the social sciences (Baas and Yeoh 2019; Brun 2001; Cresswell 2006; King and Christou 2011; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2000, 2007). The mobility turn has been particularly influential in migration research. It is not simply an assertion that the world is more mobile than ever. Rather, it seeks to highlight how complex mobility systems draw on the multiple fixities or 'moorings' that produce fluidity elsewhere (Baas and Yeoh 2019).

The concept of mobility has significant relevance to the livelihoods of migrants. Human mobility plays a crucial role in improving livelihood strategies for those living in sub-optimal conditions, where uncertainty and hardship dominate (de Haas 2010; Ellis and Harris 2004; Omata 2016; Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2016). Empirical work suggests that migration is often a deliberate decision to acquire a wider range of assets, to enhance access to labour markets, to diversify livelihoods and thereby reduce risks and vulnerability (de Haas 2010; Ellis and Harris 2004). As numerous researchers highlight, increased mobility due to advances in transportation systems and communication technologies has contributed to the emergence of mobile and multi-sited livelihood strategies based on extensive social networks (Creswell 2010; King and Christou 2011; Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2016).

Refugees are not outside this general trend. As communication technologies and transportation systems become increasingly available to displaced populations in developing countries, new patterns of mobility have emerged with significant implications for the refugee regime. In his seminal paper, Castles (2003) highlighted the interconnection between globalisation and forced migration:

> The distinction between forced migration and economic migration is becoming blurred as a result … This leads to the notion of the 'asylum–migration nexus': many migrants and asylum seekers have multiple reasons for mobility and it is impossible to completely separate economic and human rights motivations (Castles 2003: 17).

The blurred boundaries between forced and economic migration are complicated by indistinct reasons for flight and the fact that refugees have increasingly developed similar lifestyle characteristics to so-called economic migrants (see Behrends 2014; Betts et al. 2014, 2016; Horst 2006; Omata and Kaplan 2013).

While mobility has become an evocative keyword in the contemporary world, a number of scholars also highlight that mobility is a resource that not everyone can readily and equally access (Creswell 2012; Kaufmann et al. 2004; Morley 2002; Sheller and Urry 2006; Skeggs 2004). Hannam et al. (2006) warn of the problematic nature of the 'grand narrative' of mobility by describing the politically contested nature of many forms of (especially international) mobility, issues of unequal access to mobility amongst different social groups, and therefore the importance of immobility or 'moorings'. These scholarly observations on differentiated access to mobility, in turn, can be applied to forced migrants and imply that the role of mobility for refugees' economic livelihoods can also be differentiated amongst different groups of refugees.

To illustrate the complex nexus between mobility and livelihoods of refugees, this chapter will employ a case study from Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana. Data for this article is drawn from a series of fieldwork sessions conducted from 2008 to 2014 by the author. For privacy reasons, all names in this article are anonymised.

The chapter is divided into three additional sections. The next section surveys existing literature on mobility and livelihoods, with an emphasis on refugee contexts. Drawing on my empirical research, the section that follows explores how camp-based refugees in West Africa employed various types of movement in their livelihoods and reveal the different scales of mobility within this refugee population vis-à-vis their socio-economic background. The final section draws together implications from this research and concludes by illuminating the risks of over-emphasising refugees' mobility as a potential remedy for their economic hardship.

MOBILITY AND LIVELIHOODS AMONGST REFUGEES

Mobility Turn in Forced Migration

The relationship between refugees and mobility has often been characterised by a paradox, especially in the Global South. Freedom of movement is a fundamental human right and is central to the current framework of international refugee protection. Article 26 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention enshrines refugees' right to move freely within their host state. In reality, however, many refugee-hosting governments in developing countries have a policy of encampment: keeping refugees in segregated sites with very little freedom of movement (Horst and Nur 2016; Jacobsen 2005; Omata 2017). Even the UN Refugee Agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has not always advocated the free movement of refugees during exile. Historically, the UNHCR has treated irregular movement by refugees who seek socio-economic opportunities as problematic (Crisp and Dessalegne 2002); and the Agency has occasionally questioned the 'authenticity' of these mobile refugees, suggesting that they may be undeserving of international protection (Marfleet 2006).

Nevertheless, this sedentary perspective that is built upon a static state-centric view fails to understand the dynamic implications of space, places and movements embedded in the everyday lives of refugees. There is ample evidence showing that refugees' movements are not

simply one-off events that carry refugees from their country of origin to asylum. Their pre-war movements often continue even after displacement and a range of new patterns of mobility emerge during exile (see, for instance, Bakewell 2000; Castles and Miller 2009; Monsutti 2008; Stigter 2006). In the blurred boundaries between these two manifestations of migration, key defining characteristics of economic migrants are increasingly associated with the economic strategies of forced migrants, including multi-directional movement and multi-locality, coupled with transnational social networks. Gale (2006: 69) states:

> There is a clear pattern of multidirectional cross-border movements [amongst refugees] that indicates the ongoing, cyclical nature of migration … Refugees' livelihood strategies depend on these multidirectional moves and the social connections they sustain.

The last decade has seen a significant shift in thinking about refugees' mobility and migration in the global refugee regime. Increasing mobility amongst refugees is viewed as a means of facilitating enduring access to sustainable livelihoods and meaningful economic opportunities for refugee populations (Long and Crisp 2010; Scalettaris 2009). This drastic change can be attributed to the observation that in the modern period of globalisation, human mobility is growing in scale, scope and complexity, resulting in an inevitable and substantial increase in the total number of mobile refugees (Castles 2003; Crisp and Dessalegne 2002; Omata 2016).

Existing literature also presents several examples of refugees' mobile strategies for subsistence. Despite the presence of encampment policies, significant numbers of refugees move between designated camps, local villages, and cities in search of economic opportunities. The inadequacy of economic security in camp-based lives is frequently cited as the reasons for refugees' onward movements outside of camps (Jacobsen 2005; Long 2009). For instance, Hyndman (2000) points to the commuting habits of refugees between camps and cities on the Kenyan coast; in Utange camp, it was common for Somali female refugees to leave the camp in the morning, travel to Mombasa to purchase vegetables wholesale, sell them retail in the city markets, and then return to the camp again.

Additionally, some groups of refugees move back and forth between their country of asylum and the country of origin for their livelihood amongst other purposes. South Sudanese refugees in Uganda took advantage of lulls in conflict or periods of relative security to move across the international border; many were involved in cross-border trade and agricultural activity including animal husbandry between these two countries (Kaiser 2010). Certain refugees also take advantage of multi-directional 'transnational movement' (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011) in their commercial activities. For Somali refugees in East Africa, for example, mobility is one of the central strategies for securing a livelihood. With few restrictions on freedom of movement in Uganda, some Somali refugees have adopted extensive mobility practices and established lucrative trading businesses in the sub-region (Betts et al. 2016).

Policy Approaches Promoting Labour Mobility of Refugees

Given the growing recognition of the importance and pervasiveness of multi-directional movement amongst refugees, new approaches have been designed to improve labour mobility, and therefore create avenues for the development of sustainable livelihoods for refugees. The current UNHCR website[1] has a section titled 'Labour Mobility for Refugees', which explains:

> Many refugees flee to countries where they do not have access to agricultural land or the formal labour market … As a result, they may try to move to a state where better jobs appear to be available. In many cases, however, they lack the necessary passports, visas and work permits … Such situations would not arise if refugees, especially those with particular skills, could exercise freedom of movement, gain access to the required documents and work legally in other countries. Although not a solution in itself, labour mobility could assist refugees to locally integrate in the country where they are working or their country of first asylum. (UNHCR)

This mobility turn in the refugee policy arena is gaining popularity in some regions. In West Africa, the Free Movement Protocols agreed upon by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been promoted to provide refugee populations from ECOWAS states with greater mobility – and, ideally, increased livelihood security (Adepoju et al. 2007; Boulton 2009; Fresia 2014; Long 2009). ECOWAS is not a refugee-protecting body but a regional confederation of fifteen West African states founded to promote economic integration and trade activities across the region. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement adopted by ECOWAS stipulates the right of ECOWAS citizens to freely enter and establish themselves in all fifteen member countries, provided that they satisfy particular requirements. According to UNHCR, this sub-regional arrangement can strengthen refugees' livelihoods by facilitating their mobility, going so far as to provide a 'solution' for refugees' economic predicament in West Africa (Boulton 2009; UNHCR 2012).

Differentiated Access to Mobility

The recent focus on mobility in the field of forced migration evokes an image of refugees' movements being limitless, which, coupled with the use of modern technologies, could enable them to take advantage of socio-economic opportunities through an increasingly mobile lifestyle. However, existing studies indicate that there are groups of refugees who can and cannot access migration and mobility (Adey 2010; Castles and Miller 2009; Cresswell 2006, 2010; Massey et al. 2005).

   Kaufmann et al. (2004) perceive mobility as a form of capital that is inherently related to social and economic inequality and stratification. On a micro level the degree of mobility they can access differs, depending on the volume of resources which individuals or groups can invest. In particular, trans-border movement should be seen as an accumulation strategy undertaken by comparatively well-off groups that can afford substantial outlays by deploying their existing social and economic capital. Conversely, less well-off populations are not as readily able to participate in this form of migration given their lack of financial capital and social connections (Van Hear 2004, 2014). In the Human Development Report 2009, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) clearly states that the potential of mobility to improve the well-being of disadvantaged groups is limited because these people are less likely to move. The report highlights that mobility should not be considered a replacement for development support directed towards those in adverse situations (UNDP 2009: 18).

   Crucially, the above-cited studies alert refugee policymakers to the other side of the mobility discussion – immobility, which is perhaps a more common experience for refugees living in the Global South (Black and Collyer 2014). In spite of the increasing interest in refugees' mobility as a key livelihood strategy, few studies have addressed the interplay between their mobility, socio-economic conditions, and livelihoods. Following a brief discussion about the research context, the rest of this chapter will explore different patterns of mobility and mobile

livelihoods amongst the refugee population in Buduburam refugee camp and will demonstrate how the differentiated access to mobility is reflected in their economic backgrounds and strategies.

THE DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF MOBILITY FOR REFUGEE LIVELIHOODS: CASE STUDY FROM WEST AFRICA

Research Context: Liberian Refugees in Buduburam Camp

The Ghanaian government established the Buduburam refugee camp in 1990, a year after the Liberian civil war began, in response to the arrival of displaced Liberians in the country. Following the final ceasefire agreement of the war in 2003, UNHCR repeatedly urged refugees to repatriate to Liberia. Nevertheless, many residents in the camp remained in Ghana due to the precarious political and economic environment in Liberia.

After more than a decade in exile, refugees' living conditions had become increasingly challenging in Ghana. After the ceasefire, humanitarian aid to refugees was continuously reduced and almost entirely terminated by around 2010. Additionally, refugees faced continued barriers to engaging in economic activities outside the camp, such as xenophobia and an inability to communicate in local languages (Hampshire et al. 2008; Hardgrove 2009). Thus, except for a small subset of that population that received remittances, most Liberian refugees were reduced to bare subsistence inside and around the camp.

One of the few advantages that Liberian refugees in Buduburam had was the relative freedom of movement they were permitted. Unlike many refugee-receiving countries in Africa where refugees are confined to camps and are only allowed to move about with special permission, the Ghanaian government granted Buduburam refugees general freedom of movement. Although there was a local police station next to the camp entrance, police paid little attention to the refugees' entry to and exit from the settlement. The open-entry character of the Buduburam camp made it easy for residents to move back and forth between the camp and places outside the camp.

De Haan and Van Ufford (2002) point to this complex pattern of movement as a defining characteristic of West African livelihoods. A considerable number of refugees in Buduburam built their economic strategies through various mobility structures, with distinctive differences in destinations and the scale of their movements. During field research, I observed the following three primary patterns of refugees' mobility vis-à-vis their livelihoods: (1) between the camp and Accra, Ghana's capital; (2) between the camp and Liberia; and (3) between the camp and neighbouring countries in West Africa. These patterns are explained more fully below.

Mobile Livelihoods Between Buduburam Camp and Accra

Buduburam camp was conveniently located on a tarmac highway and within a relatively short drive from the Ghanaian capital. Some Liberian refugees took advantage of its proximity to the country's commercial hub. For example, many Liberian refugee women commuted daily between Buduburam and Accra to do hair-plaiting. Some Liberian refugees made connections with Liberian non-refugee communities in the capital and found employment opportunities as security guards and housekeepers in their shops and homes.

In line with the UNHCR's description of 'bustling Buduburam', there were a variety of economic activities in the camp, such as fast-food stands, DVD shops, barbers' shops, beauty salons and tailoring shops. Amongst these business activities, trading was by far the most common livelihood. For refugees engaged in trade, the relative proximity to Accra was a particular important advantage. They frequently travelled between the camp and the capital's markets to purchase goods to sell. The travel cost for a round trip between Buduburam and Accra was roughly 3 Ghana cedi (the Ghanaian local currency, hereafter GHS, equivalent to about 2 USD) at the time of this research.

Emmanuel was one of these refugee merchants. During an interview, he explained how he had constructed his business by capitalising on access to markets in Accra:

> In 2002, I began a water business in the camp. I knew that water was in huge demand because there were no water pumps in the camp at that point. I bought water from Accra and sold it by gallons [inside the camp]. This business went well until UNHCR set up water pipes and provided subsidised water. So I stopped that business in 2005. Then, I started a small shop in the camp selling everyday products. I went to markets in Accra twice a week to buy soap, candles, matches, canned food, notebooks, pencils, sugar, milk, tea, etc.

According to Emmanuel, his daily profit for his second business was between 5 and 10 GHS (about 3.5–7 USD) at the time of the interview. He told me that he used to make better profit, but as other refugees started to operate similar retail businesses, retail competition increased in his neighbourhood. Consequently, he had to reduce his prices, which curtailed his profit margin. Given the relatively lower entry threshold, a considerable number of refugees developed trading businesses that relied on movement between the camp and Accra.

Mobile Livelihoods Between Buduburam Camp and Liberia

A less common type of mobility-based livelihood amongst refugees involves those refugees who engaged in trans-border businesses between Buduburam and their country of origin, Liberia. This movement was facilitated by a shuttle bus service between Buduburam camp and Monrovia, Liberia's capital. This transport business was formally registered with the Ghanaian government and was jointly run by Ghanaian businessmen and Liberian refugees. At the time of my fieldwork, a one-way ticket cost 120 GHS (84 USD). According to the Liberian operator of this transport business, the majority of the passengers were Liberian refugee traders.

I interviewed over 20 refugees who participated in cross-border trade with Liberia. Amongst them were Marcus and his wife Anita, both in their 30s, who lived nearby during my fieldwork. Marcus had been living in the camp since 2002, and Anita was living in Liberia although she was formally registered as a refugee in Ghana. This split-family strategy between Ghana and Liberia was primarily used to facilitate their trading business. The following is an excerpt from my interview with Anita when she visited her husband in Buduburam:

> **Me:** Why do you live in Liberia?
> **Anita:** I have my shop in Monrovia [the capital of Liberia].
> **Me:** What are you selling?
> **Anita:** I sell second-hand clothing.
> **Me:** Where do you purchase the clothing?
> **Anita:** In Accra.
> **Me:** Why do you come to Ghana to purchase it?

Anita: Because Ghana has the best used-clothing markets in the sub-region. I can get good quality clothes at a cheaper price.

Me: How often do you come to Ghana?

Anita: At least four times a year. Sometimes, I ask Marcus to buy and carry some clothing when he comes to Liberia.

Anita had been carrying out this cross-border trading for four years. Later, I discovered that Marcus was also running a brokerage business between Ghana and Liberia, which mainly dealt with electrical appliances and construction materials. He also occasionally travelled between the camp and Liberia. In subsequent interviews, I came to realise that both Marcus and Anita were from active business families in Monrovia. Some of their immediate family members had stayed in Liberia throughout the civil war and their siblings had resumed their businesses in Liberia immediately after the 2003 ceasefire. Their second-hand clothing shop in Monrovia had, in fact, branched out from one of Anita's brothers' enterprises and had been given to her with financial and material support from her brother. As the example of Anita and Marcus implies, most of traders who travelled between Ghana and Liberia had similar patterns anchored in social networks and split-family arrangements across the two countries.

Mobile Livelihoods Between the Camp and Sub-Regional Countries

Some Liberian refugees in Buduburam were engaged in multi-directional movement and running large-scale trade across several West African countries. In general, these mobile merchants did not deal with everyday merchandise that was easily afforded in Ghanaian markets but handled particular types of goods. For instance, Patricia, a female refugee in her late 20s and a typical example of these mobile traders, had been selling both new and used cell phones in her shop inside Buduburam camp since 2006. She purchased these phones in Lagos, Nigeria at 25–50 per cent cheaper than she would have to pay in Ghana. She described her trade practice in the sub-region:

Me: How often do you go to Lagos?

Patricia: Every two weeks. Each time I normally buy 15 to 20 cell phones.

Me: How much do you pay for transportation for each trip?

Patricia: In total, I pay 120 to 150 GHS (84–115 USD) [for a round trip].

Me: At what price do you sell cell phones?

Patricia: It depends on the type. For example, the most popular type of used cell phone in my shop is sold at 50 GHS (35USD). I bought it at 35 GHS (25 USD) in Lagos.

Me: Why did you choose to sell cell phones?

Patricia: My older sister gave me this business. She used to live in the camp but she was resettled in the US in 2006. She taught me how to run this business and gave me her contacts with reliable suppliers in Lagos.

I interviewed Patricia a few times during the research period. In a later interview, when I asked her how she had obtained the initial financial capital to begin this business, she said that she had received approximately 1,000 USD from her relatives living in the US. She used the funds to purchase phones and build her shop. According to Patricia, she normally made about 150 USD profit every two weeks. Also, since 2008, she had expanded her cell phone business to Liberia, with assistance from her siblings who had already returned from Buduburam to Liberia. She used her smartphone to send emails and text messages across Buduburam, Nigeria, and Liberia to make purchases and to check her inventory.

I interviewed other refugees trading in the sub-region who dealt in various items, including jewellery and accessories from Benin, lace and textiles from Nigeria, and women's dresses from Togo. Through these conversations, I discovered that almost all of these merchants had access to international remittances and wider social networks, including trans-continental ties with the Global North. In most cases, they had secured their initial start-up capital through remittances from their relatives in part because refugees in Ghana were excluded from formal bank borrowing. These refugees usually had extensive personal connections that provided useful business information, thereby reducing initial transaction costs.

The trans-border traders in Buduburam mostly dealt in occasional-use goods and managed to retain sustainable profits. The high margin associated with trade was maintained by going direct to the source of the goods or commodities. Although this required a substantial degree of mobility, their privileged asset profile enabled them to afford long-distance travel across the sub-region to purchase items from wholesalers outside Ghana. Furthermore, given the cost necessary to set up such businesses, the number of refugees involved in sub-regional trade was limited; they could therefore establish effective monopolies over particular commodities and enjoy good margins.

Immobile Subsistence: Surviving Within the Camp

So far, I have presented three patterns of mobile livelihoods. This by no means suggests that all of the refugees in Buduburam camp were engaged in economic strategies that relied upon mobility as a livelihood asset. For the majority of the 'ordinary' camp residents, such mobility-based economic strategies were not readily accessible.

The most common livelihood in Buduburam was petty trading within the camp, especially selling drinking water, fruit (oranges and pineapples) and prepaid cell phone units. They sold these items to other residents by hawking inside the camp or setting up a 'table shop' on a busy street. The following excerpt from an interview with Mariana, one of the retail sellers of drinking water, illustrates her sedentary subsistence.

> **Me:** Where do you purchase [drinking] water?
> **Mariana:** I buy it from shops in the camp. These shop-owners buy water from Ghanaians living in Accra.
> **Me:** Where do you sell water?
> **Mariana:** I sell in front of my house [in the camp].
> **Me:** Who are your customers?
> **Mariana:** My [refugee] friends and neighbours.
> **Me:** How many customers do you receive and how much profit do you make per day?
> **Mariana:** If the weather is hot, I sell about 120 sacks [of water] and make about 3 GHS (2 USD) per day. But if it rains, I get fewer customers and make less profit. It is not easy to survive [with such small profit] …
> **Me:** Why don't you try a more lucrative business?
> **Mariana:** I don't have capital! I knew that selling water barely makes any money but what else can I do …

My conversation with Mariana reflects that this type of petty trade requires much less mobility. The drinking water which she sold was easily purchased from shops located either inside or around the camp. Her customers were predominantly other refugees residing in the immediate vicinity. In fact, Mariana had gone out of the camp only a few times in the past years. Also,

her trading business had very little to do with advanced communication technologies and the internet because both her suppliers and her customers were located within walking distance. Her subsistence was built on her limited personal contacts and movement within the camp and contrasted sharply with the sub-regional trading that was enabled by multi-directional mobility across West African countries. According to my research, the majority of camp residents, who have a similarly low socio-economic status, were mostly making a living by combining these more-sedentary economic activities for limited profit.

Impact of Sub-Regional Mobility Scheme for Refugee Livelihoods

UNHCR announced in January 2012 that refugee status for Liberian refugees would cease worldwide at the end of the June (six months later). The international community deemed the situation in Liberia to be greatly improved a decade after the ceasefire agreement and judged that the causes of displacement no longer existed. At the beginning of 2012, Liberian refugees living in Ghana were left with two options: either to repatriate with assistance from UNHCR by the end of June and before the invocation of the Cessation Clause or to remain in Ghana as migrants through an agreement that existed amongst the member countries of ECOWAS.

Since the late 2000s, UNHCR had focused on the latter option as an 'innovative solution' to the challenge posed by the long-term presence of refugees in West Africa. Staff members of UNHCR Ghana believed that increasing mobility options for refugees offered a means to ensure enduring access to sustainable livelihoods and meaningful employment opportunities by providing legal residency and better access to labour markets across ECOWAS countries.

Approximately 7,000 Liberian refugees remained in Ghana and continued living in exile under the new label of ECOWAS migrants at the end of June 2012. Even though the Ghanaian administration officially announced the closure of Buduburam camp in 2012, most of these former Liberian refugees continued living inside the camp area. In February 2014, almost two years after the cessation of their refugee status, Liberians remaining in Ghana were issued ECOWAS passports, which included a two-year work permit as well as a residence permit. The provision of this migrant status, however, has not brought meaningful changes in their daily lives.

Stephanie, a single mother with a school-age daughter, had been living hand-to-mouth by combining various means of subsistence, such as doing household jobs for other refugee families and receiving charitable assistance from other refugees and her church inside the camp. When asked how her life had changed since the provision of ECOWAS work and residence permit, she responded:

> [There has been] No change. We are living on help from other Liberians [inside the camp]. I wash their clothing and clean their house for [a little] cash or [a] portion of food. This is how we [have] survive[d] for a long time … I do not have any special skills. I cannot manage outside the camp.

Some Liberians unsuccessfully attempted to explore employment opportunities outside the camp area. Marshall, owner of a small shop in the camp, expressed his despair during this job search:

> I applied [for] two jobs at local supermarkets but I did not get [either] of them. I don't speak local [Ghanaian] languages. Discrimination from locals remains strong. Even if I have a work permit, I don't think I can get a job in Ghana.

Adam, a Ghanaian programme officer who had worked for NGOs in the camp for over a decade, questioned the viability of the sub-regional integration scheme:

> I was always sceptical about the feasibility of this ECOWAS option. UNHCR said that the work permit enables refugees to move to a place where they can find good jobs. But where can they find good jobs? Ghana does not have many employment opportunities and many locals are unemployed … The ECOWAS status might be useful for those with special qualifications such as doctors, nurses or computer experts. But how many Liberians have such technical skills?

In Ghana, former refugees who were not particularly suited to be able to take advantage of the ECOWAS integration scheme were left in exile to survive as 'economic migrants'.

IMPLICATIONS

Drawing from the case studies presented above, this section elicits implications of the nexus between refugees' mobility, socio-economic status, and livelihoods.

First, the research findings illuminate the clear linkage between refugees' scale of mobility and the amount of economic resources they can mobilise. As the examples in the article illustrate, most of the mobile merchants, especially those who employed multi-directional cross-border movement, were 'elites' endowed with privileged asset profiles as compared to the rest of the Buduburam residents. These findings correspond to the existing literature that the patterns and extent of mobility are shaped by the resources that people can mobilise, and those resources are, of course, largely determined by their social and economic background. In particular, trans-border and long-distance movement must be seen as an accumulation strategy undertaken by comparatively well-to-do groups who can afford the substantial outlays of migration by deploying their socio-economic capitals (Van Hear 2004, 2014).

Second, on the other hand, increasing mobility options does not necessarily improve socio-economic conditions for poorer refugees who either choose or are forced to engage in sedentary subsistence activities. While higher-profile mobile traders can be spotlighted as examples to illustrate refugees' resourcefulness, 'relative immobility' or 'forcibly immobilised' (Lubkemann 2008) more accurately reflect the realities of camp-based refugees with limited financial and social resources. Continually highlighting a handful of examples of 'model' refugee businesspeople can gloss over the geography of immobility and overshadow the plights of refugees that are struggling to survive inside the camp.

Third, establishing mobile economic strategies requires other livelihood assets in addition to mobility. As demonstrated above, the refugees who employed transnational livelihoods were also equipped with robust social and financial capital. Their ties with resourceful kinfolk often played a key role in providing useful information and business knowledge and supplying material assistance for constructing their dynamic trade businesses. While restricting freedom of movement generates serious negative consequences for refugees' economic activities (Jacobsen 2005; Kaiser 2007; Werker 2007), promoting refugee mobility alone does not necessarily ensure profitable livelihoods for all groups within a given population.

Finally, given these implications, the promotion of mobility as a solution for improving the economic standing of refugees in West Africa deserves scrutiny. The ECOWAS framework was employed to facilitate the movement of Liberian refugees remaining in Ghana after the enactment of the cessation clause to places where they could find better livelihood

opportunities. It is true that socio-economically better-off refugees might enjoy the benefits of the ECOWAS framework, including access to travel documents as an ECOWAS citizen. However, a majority of refugees living in the camp engage in means of subsistence built on the camp economy and do not depend on mobility to sustain their livelihoods. In addition, few refugees who lack resources could afford the cost of transportation to venture out of the camps and access external markets. It remains unlikely that the implementation of this sub-regional scheme will enable the majority of camp inhabitants to increase their mobility and develop sustainable livelihoods and access to wider economic opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Today, mobility is considered a constituent part of processes that advance progress, opportunity, and empowerment (Adey 2010; Cresswell 2006). Nevertheless, inflated expectations about the role of mobility can generate misleading impressions that everyone is able to take advantage of the resources that mobility can afford equally. As this chapter illustrates, there is clear evidence of socio-economic inequality in relation to the scale of movement and access to economic strategies and opportunities.

Similar findings are observed in other studies on refugees. According to Mason (2011), the level of mobility amongst Iraqi refugees varies significantly with their socio-economic position, leaving those with limited financial and social capital largely 'immobilised'. Sturridge's research (2011) on Somali and Afghan refugees demonstrates that mobility is useful only for those who have resources to employ it, whereas it is less relevant for those lacking sufficient capital to utilise it. She argues that policies centralised on the potential mobility play only a limited role in elevating the well-being of disadvantaged groups.

In addition to the model that ECOWAS developed, the mobility turn has been recognised in other refugee policy instruments. For instance, UNHCR's policy on Alternatives-to-Camps, which seeks to develop solutions outside of camps whenever possible, aims to strengthen refugees' livelihoods by promoting their mobility to increase access to labour markets where they can develop sustainable livelihoods and self-reliance (UNHCR 2014, 2018). While the policy itself should be welcomed as a means of providing more options to refugees in exile, as observed in the implementation of ECOWAS scheme, the degree to which refugees benefit from the policy differs significantly amongst different groups.

In the refugee policymaking arena, mobility should not be romanticised as a silver bullet that will invariably ensure the freedom and liberation of all refugees. Those living in adverse circumstances still need the support of humanitarian and state-based interventions.

NOTE

1.   UNHCR website, accessed 10 Oct 2020 available at https://www.unhcr.org/uk/labour-mobility-for -refugees.html?query=Labour%20Mobility%20for%20Refugees.

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25. Remittances and belonging: reading the social meaning of Peruvian migrants' money

Karsten Paerregaard

Classical migration theory examines migration as a population movement from people's places of origin toward new destinations. The focus of the theory is the push and pull forces that uproot people and drive them to migrate; the organization, the frequency and the routes of their migration; and the receiving context that shapes their adaptation, and settlement. The conceptualization of migration as a single movement from migrants' home communities, regions and countries to their new places of settlement reflects the modernization process that first Europe and later the rest of the world have experienced in the past 150 years; and that triggered the outmigration of millions of people from rural areas to urban centers where they hope to find work and achieve economic and social mobility. Even though many rural–urban and international migrants stay in contact with, and invest their savings in, houses and activities in their home communities and sometimes also return to their places of origin, classical migration theory takes little interest in these linkages, which it views as a reminiscence of the past or a temporary phenomenon and irrelevant to the migration process.

In the past three decades globalization has transformed the world by speeding up the circulation of people, things and ideas at a global level. In particular, the spread of modernity and modern life style and the introduction of new communication technologies have accelerated rural–urban migration in the developing countries and international migration from the Global South to the Global North, which supports the classic migration theory and its claim that population movements are a one-way flow of people from poor and underdeveloped toward rich and developed regions. But globalization also questions classic migration theory by reminding us that establishing new lives in foreign places and maintaining relations with the place of origin are not always exclusive options. In fact, rather than severing their ties to family and home communities, migration sometimes prompts people to strengthen them. Thus, under the label of "transnationalism", a growing number of scholars are studying how globalization enables migrants to forge social relations and engage in economic, political and cultural activities across national and international boundaries. Some scholars even argue that transnational engagements in the sending country may facilitate and encourage the process of assimilation in the receiving country. Rather than a one-way physical movement from the rural periphery towards the urban center, this transnational scholarship argues migration is a multi-tiered and complex process in which people move and adapt to new places while maintaining ties to their place of origin. As I shall discuss in this chapter, such engagements include migrants' economic support to the people they left behind through remittance sending (Åkesson 2011; Cohen 2011; Lindley 2009; Pribilsky 2004).

THE GRAMMAR OF REMITTANCES

In 2018 the world's 258 million migrants, representing 3 percent of its total population, remitted US$ 529 billion to developing countries, the second largest capital flow in the world after private investments (World Bank 2019; World Bank Group 2019). The magnitude of the global remittance flow reflects the hope that drives many migrants to make money in dollars, euros, yen or other hard currencies, but rather than seeking personal wealth it is the wellbeing of their relatives and communities that is the true leitmotiv of their adventurous travels. In other words, remittances are the means to attain loftier goals which, in the short run, are to support relatives in their home countries and, in the long run, are to prepare for either their own return or the reunification with their families in their new countries of settlement.

The aim of this chapter is to understand how Peruvian migrants use remittances to negotiate their role as household members in Peru and their relations with the relatives they have left behind. The chapter seeks to answer three questions. What drives Peruvian migrants to remit money to their relatives? How do migrants and their relatives use remittances to communicate? And how does remittance sending shape Peruvian migrants' sense of belonging to their families? My claim is that when remitting money to their relatives, migrants do not only make an important economic contribution to their households, they also validate their family membership and attachment to home. I call this use of remittances to express feelings of belonging *the grammar of remittances* by which I refer to the implicit communication remittance sending glosses over. To decode the grammar of remittances, I argue, we need to scrutinize remittance sending as a way that migrants affirm and their relatives endorse the relations of affection and solidarity that tie them together. Through three case studies of Peruvian migrants' remittance sending to their spouses in Peru, I explore remittances as a hidden script with an unspoken message from the sender to the receiver that only sees the light of the day when migrants and their relatives send letters and videos recordings to each other, or communicate on telephone, "WhatsApp" and other social media. The grammar of remittances is a long-distance language of symbolic acts and tacit communications that lend migrants and their families a sense of unity and mutual dependence across geographical and national borders. To document migrants' motivation to remit and to describe how they use the grammar of remittances to authenticate their feelings of belonging, I investigate how the commitments migrants make to support their relatives during their absence create bonds of trust and responsibility between remittance senders and recipients. Receivers often use these remittances as a barometer to read migrants' readiness to fulfill the commitments they have made and test their continuous loyalty to family and home.

Migration scholars who employ a transnational framework to study remittances remind us that these are "one part of a strong system of transnational connections that link people over distances and around diverse cultural practices" (Cohen 2011: 106). Such connections often take the form of an elaborated reciprocal system that is based on nostalgia and other sentiments of belonging that encourage migrants to remit money to their families while allowing the migrants' relatives to repay and recognize their support by showing them respect and concern for their wellbeing (Paerregaard 2015a). But remittance sending does not only reinforce relations of trust and care between their senders and receivers. It also serves as a mechanism of control that simultaneously enables migrants to hold their relatives to account for their use of their money and ensure the latter the former's continuous support. Several studies provide evidence of the intricate ways migrants and their relatives use the grammar of remittance sending

to both express sentiments of affection and belonging and negotiate relations of control, power and status (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2013). In their study of labor migration in a London hotel and hospital Batnitzky et al. found that remittances serve as "a social mechanism through which migrants are able to fulfill multiple obligations to families and places of origin, while also enhancing their own economic status and future" (2012: 140). In a similar vein, based on research of remittance behavior among Brazilian immigrants in North America, Goza and Ryabov report that "family obligation measures were the driving force behind remittance activity" in the US (2010: 179). In other words, the mechanism of reciprocity underpinning remittance sending is an opportunity for migrants to reassure their membership and role in their households as well as a means for the remittance receivers to hold migrants to account and highlight their own class distinction.

Migrant scholars have also documented how remittance sending reshapes relations of gender and generation in migrants' families. Pribilsky, who investigates how Ecuadorian men and women renegotiate their family roles in a migration context, highlights the subtle ways remittances change the power relation between wives and husbands. His research shows that the wives of migrants "worried that their husbands might be holding back remittances and not sending all they could" but that this drawback needs to be held up against the fact that "in their roles as remittance managers women often occupied better positions than non-migrant wives to demand portions of their husbands' earnings" (2004: 328–329). He also reports that "many women told me how their experiences as remittance managers made their husbands become better listeners and allowed themselves more room to disagree actively with their spouses" (ibid.: 329). Other studies conclude that even though labor migration and the remittances economies it generates offer non-migrants new room for maneuver, they also create worries. Thus, in their research on the meaning of migration among Honduran women whose husbands migrate to remit money home, McKenzie and Menjívar find that "many women came to associate the men's 'economic' migration with elevated levels of tension, even when they received money and gifts" (2011: 77). Similarly, Carling asserts that remittances can be a source of tension between family members and that "the migrant has an upper hand in having earned the money, but this could be overshadowed by other aspects of the relationship" (2008: 55). Carling argues that we need to scrutinize "how the sending of remittances shapes, and is shaped by, relations between senders and receivers" (ibid.). The transnational reciprocal system that drives remittance sending therefore serves as a mechanism to both affirm feelings of belonging and solidarity and negotiate relations of power and control, and is evident in the following case studies.

PERUVIAN MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES

From 1990 to 2009, Peru experienced a migration explosion (Paerregaard 2008, 2015a). In this period, the number of Peruvians who left their country of origin grew fivefold, rising from 46,596 in 1990 to 251,102 in 2009 when the emigration peaked (INEI 2019; INEI et al. 2013). As a result, a total of 3,089,123 Peruvians lived outside Peru in 2017 constituting 10 percent of Peru's population; a number considerably higher than estimated in previous estimates by Peru's national institute of statistics (INEI 2017: 15; Paerregaard 2015a). Peruvian migrants are scattered in several countries. In 2010 almost a third (31.4 percent) lived in the United States while somewhat smaller groups were found in Spain (15.4 percent), Argentina (14.3

percent), Italy (10.2 percent), Chile (9.5 percent), and Japan (4.1 percent) (INEI et al. 2013: 28). But it is not only its dispersal that makes Peruvian migration interesting; its social composition is also remarkable. Of every 100 Peruvians who emigrated in 2017, 53 were women and 47 men, which makes Peruvian migration noteworthy compared to other Latin American flows (INEI 2019: 19). Another important feature of Peruvian migration is its origin within Peru. Unlike Mexican migrants that predominantly come from rural areas, 92 percent of Peru's migrants were urban residents before they left the country (INEI and IOM 2010: 49). Finally, the economic class composition of Peruvian migration makes it peculiar: migrants come from all income groups in Peru. Of the total number of Peruvians who emigrated in 2017, 17.5 percent came from quintile A, 23 percent from quintile B, 29.3 percent from quintile C, 17.2 percent from quintile D, and 13.1 percent from quintile E; quintile A representing Peru's riches and quintile E Peru's poorest population sectors (INEI 2019: 26).

Peru's remittances were estimated to be US$ 3,250 million representing 1.4 percent of the country's GDP in 2018 (World Bank 2019). Peruvian migrants, however, do not share the burden of remitting equally: only 41.7 percent of Peru's migrants remit (INEI 2019: 35). Most of these remittances are sent from the United States. Thus in 2017 Peruvian migrants in this country sent home 28 percent of Peru's remittances. Migrants in Chile (17.6 percent), Argentina (14.3 percent), Spain (13.3 percent) and Italy (9 percent) remit less, while somewhat smaller amounts come from Japan (3 percent) (INEI 2019: 38). Remittances are not only unequally shouldered by migrants, they are also unequally distributed among the Peruvian population: only 3.8 percent of Peruvian households receive remittances (INEI and IOM 2008: 50). The distribution of remittances is even more unequal when considering that 4.7 percent reach households in rural areas while 95.3 percent end up in urban areas (INEI and IOM 2010: 92). Most of these remittances are used to cover the immediate needs of migrants' families (food, housing, monthly bills, and electrical devices) and make up 66.2 percent of their spending. The remaining part of the remittances are spent on education (21.4 percent), housing (4.8 percent), saving (3.2 percent), and other needs (INEI and IOM 2010: 100).

A closer look at Peru's remittance receivers reveals that these include family members of all ages (INEI and IOM 2010: 85). But while remittance receivers are diverse in generational terms, they are biased when it comes to gender. Even though women outnumber men by a single percent in 2010, 67.7 percent of Peru's remittance recipients were women and only 32 percent were men (INEI and IOM 2010: 91). The difference in the figures is striking, but we should be mindful that they do not correlate directly. Migrating does not always imply remitting, and the same migrants may remit to several persons and households. Yet, the figures do suggest two possible tendencies in Peruvian migration: women predominate in Peruvian migration and are the main remittance recipients.

To sum up, Peruvian migration is heterogeneous, which makes remittance sending and reception highly unequal. One reason why remittance senders contribute with very different amounts of money is that they are destined for different countries, with different jobs and different incomes. Moreover, while Peru's remittance receivers include a variety of age groups, two-thirds are women and only one-third are men, which suggests that not only migrant women but also migrant men prefer to remit to female relatives in Peru. From a scholarly point of view, Peruvian migration is also intriguing because remittance receivers encompass all income groups in Peru even though they are concentrated in the country's cities. Such geographical and social variations in remittance sending and remittance reception are of special

relevance for my three case studies that explore how migrants' motivation for remitting is shaped by their choice of destination, position in the household and ties to close relatives.

THE REMITTANCE COMMITMENT

Migrant remittances only reach a small percentage of Peruvian households and they make a small contribution to Peru's national economy. Nonetheless, remittances are critical to the household economy of the families that receive them, which is reflected in the way they are referred to by Peruvian migrants. Migrants often describe their remittance sending as a *compromiso* (commitment), a reference to the promises they make to their families before migrating to support them during their absence (Paerregaard 2015a). The term *compromiso* embodies the notion of migration as a family rather than a personal endeavor and evokes the idea of remittance sending as a commitment that migrants make to support their families at the cost of their own individual needs. Migrants' *compromisos* may have different aims: to pay back the loans their families took to finance their travel, sponsor the migration of other family members, pay for their families' daily costs of living and their monthly electricity and telephone bill, pay for the schooling and studies of their children, pay the medical and hospital bills of family members who fall ill, finance the construction of a new house, buy domestic appliances and electronic articles, or purchase a car. But as I show, migrants' *compromiso* glosses over more than a commitment to provide for their relatives' material needs and assure their social status. It is an important means to ratify the senders' belonging, affirm their role in the household and reassert their membership of the family they have left behind.

Another critical aspect of migrants' money is their symbolic value. For the relatives of migrants who come from urban areas and belong to Peru's middle classes, remittances are particularly important because they help them maintain their standard of living and reinforce class identities. Thus, remittances are not merely spent on daily needs but are indexed as symbols of status and power, read into a geographical hierarchy of migration destinations, and ranked according to migrant earnings and saving capacity. In this mapping, remittances from Japan, a country with high salaries, are considered more prestigious than remittances from Argentina and Chile, where salaries are low. The US, Spain and Italy, where salaries are lower than in Japan but higher than in Argentina and Chile, rank in the middle. Though in smaller numbers, migrants from rural areas also remit to their families and, more irregularly but in much larger amounts, to their communities. Most of these remittances are used to sponsor prestige-producing activities such as fiestas, although migrants also donate money for charity work and other philanthropic aims (Paerregaard 2010, 2017). In fact, quite a few migrants who lived in Peru's cities before emigrating were born in the country's rural highlands but moved to urban areas to find work. Many of these rural–urban migrants maintain the ties to their communities of origin although few plan to return (Paerregaard 1997). Once they embark on international migration, however, their primary point of reference in Peru is the city where their close relatives live and not their home community. Similarly, it is the family they have left behind in Peru's urban shantytowns rather than the population of their regions of origin who benefit from their remittances (Paerregaard 2015b).

In the following, I present three case studies that show how remittances serve as not only an important economic income for migrants' families but also as a means for migrants to communicate with their spouses, affirm their sense of belonging, and negotiate their family

roles. The cases suggest that in a situation of long physical separation remitting is the lifeline between migrants and their spouses who often view remittances as a key sign and the material proof that the relationship remains valid. Two of the cases are male migrants, one in Japan and the other in the US, while the third is a female migrant settled in Chile. And while the first belongs to Peru's urban middle class, the second comes from the urban working class and the third from the rural working class.

THE FAITHFUL *COMPROMISO*

Nilo and Magda enjoyed a comfortable life together until the 1990s. As the co-owners of a chain of footwear shops in Trujillo, Peru's third-largest city, Nilo could afford to buy a house in one of the city's middle-class neighborhoods and to maintain his family. Magda, on the other hand, took pride in taking care of the children and keeping the household. When I visited Magna in her home in Trujillo in 2005, she recalled:

> It was a very nice time when we were all together. There was money enough to do what we wanted.

This all changed in the early 1990s when Peru's economic crisis forced Nilo out of business and threatened the family's well-being. Not only did Nilo and Magda have to sell their house, but their oldest son had to interrupt his studies at the university. As there were no jobs to be found in Trujillo, Nilo decided to migrate.

Nilo traveled to Japan in 1992. He entered the country on a tourist visa which he overstayed after three months, becoming an unauthorized immigrant. Meanwhile Nilo found work in a factory which enabled him to support Magda. Of a monthly income of US$ 2,700 he remitted US$ 700 that covered her daily expenditures, including the groceries, house rent, bills, school fees and utilities for the children and, when possible, a woman to wash the family's clothes and a gardener to cut the lawn. Even though Nilo changed job several times he continued remitting the same amount of money every month to Magda until 2008 when she obtained a Japanese tourist visa and traveled to Japan where she was reunited with Nilo.

For 16 years Nilo's *compromiso* and remittances represented a visible sign of his dedication to his family and, in particular, his affection for Magda, who was able to maintain a middle-class life in Trujillo during his long absence. And although the separation affected Magda, she was painfully aware of the pivotal importance of Nilo's remittances for her standard of living in Peru. Before Magda left for Japan she said to me:

> This is not the way it should have been. Nilo and I should have been together and enjoyed our children and grandchildren. But thanks to Nilo I'm doing well. He is a good husband.

She also pointed out that many of her neighbors envied her not only because Nilo was working in Japan and made good money, but also because he was faithful. According to Magda, the neighbors received less money than her because their spouses were working in Spain, Italy or Argentina, and they lived with the constant anxiety that their husbands were having affairs with other women and therefore may have stopped remitting.

The case of Nilo and Magda suggests that remittances make up an important means of communication between migrants and their spouses. To the latter, in particular, remittances

are the tangible evidence of their husbands' or wives' continuous devotion. Thus, even though Nilo and Magda communicated by mail on a regular basis and on special occasions such as Christmas also by telephone, the monthly acts of sending and collecting money were the most effective way of confirming their love. But just as remittances constituted a tacit language that enabled Nilo and Magda to validate their marriage they fortified the family's power structure and improved its social status in Trujillo. During his long absence, Nilo's remittances enabled him to maintain the position as family breadwinner and household leader, a role Magda reaffirmed by crediting him for being a good and caring husband. On the other hand, Nilo's remittances allowed Magda to enjoy a middle-class lifestyle and make an important social distinction. By pointing out the geographical origin of Nilo's money Magda placed herself above her neighbors who were living from the money sent by their migrant spouses in other countries considered less attractive destinations. Remittances, in other words, are a powerful means of communication for migrants and their spouses to not only affirm their marriage vow but also reinforce their gender roles and class position.

THE STRENUOUS *COMPROMISO*

Aurora and Juan also come from Trujillo, where I have visited them in their home several times in the early 2000s. But, unlike Nilo and Magda, Aurora and Juan live in one of the city's many shantytowns in an environment of poverty and marginalization. Unlike better-off, middle-class Peruvians, who can afford to migrate to high salary countries such as Japan, Aurora and Juan belong to Peru's urban working classes that often lack support networks to help them migrate and the means to travel to far away destinations on their own. Many from this population sector therefore seek toward destinations such as Argentina and Chile that are easier and less expensive to access, but where they earn and remit less than in other places. While Argentina and Chile can be reached by bus for as little as US$ 200–300, salaries in the two countries are lower than in Spain, Italy and, particularly, Japan. Even so, remittances constitute an effective mechanism for migrants to have their say in family affairs during their absence, as the case of Aurora shows.

Aurora migrated to Argentina to work and remit money home to resolve her and Juan's economic problems in 1996. To finance the trip that cost US$ 500 Juan sold his car, which he used to make money as a taxi driver. In Buenos Aires, Aurora found a job as domestic servant for a local family making US$ 400 a month, but after three months she left the job and returned to Peru to attend to Juan who had fallen ill. As Aurora used most of her earnings in Argentina on traveling, and as Juan spent the US$ 350, she managed to save to buy a new car, the family's economic situation remained precarious. Hence Aurora decided to migrate again, this time to Chile. She financed her trip, which cost US$ 250, by taking a loan from a private moneylender in Trujillo, and in 1997 she entered Chile on a temporary travel visa that she later overstayed. Despite her illegal status, Aurora soon found work as a domestic for a local family that helped her obtain a stay permit in Chile. In 2005, Aurora told me:

> It was a good job and the family was kind. They even paid my trip back to visit my family in Trujillo. I hardly spent any money in Chile, so I sent most my salary home.

Aurora remained in Chile for six years, working as a domestic and caretaker for different Chilean families. Of a monthly salary of US\$ 300 Aurora remitted US\$ 200 to Juan and their daughters during the entire period.

Before Aurora went to Chile, Juan had promised that he would use her remittances to cover the family's daily expenses and pay for the construction of a new house of solid bricks. To provide proof that he was keeping his promise Juan recorded the construction work on video and sent Aurora the tapes. During her stay in Chile, Aurora also made several trips to Trujillo to make sure that her daughters were fine and to monitor the construction. And when Juan in 2003 informed Aurora that their home was finished, she quit her job in Santiago and returned to Peru. In 2004, she told me:

> During my years in Chile I was always concerned about the health of Juan and the children, and when my two oldest daughters got pregnant, I went home to assist them when they gave birth. Now I want to stay here to take care of my grandchildren, so I don't really want to go back to work in Chile anymore.

Although Peru's economy had improved significantly during Aurora's absence, and although her remittances had helped Juan and her daughters to stay afloat and finance the family's home, they were still in desperate need of money. Accompanied by her daughters and their husbands, Aurora therefore returned to Chile to work for several years remitting most of their earnings home to the family in Trujillo. To their frustration, the money was used to cover daily expenditures and, ironically, to pay back the debt that they took out to travel to Chile in the first place. But even though Aurora's remittances did little to improve the family's living standard they served as a tool to keep an eye on Juan's doings and stay informed about his and the children's health. As family remitter Aurora acted as both breadwinner and caretaker, which affirmed her own sense of belonging and reasserted the power she holds in the household.

THE BROKEN *COMPROMISO*

I first met Bernardo in Bakersfield, CA where he worked as a shepherd in the Californian desert and where he lived and worked with two other Peruvian men. During a previous period of fieldwork in Bernardo's home region in Peru's central highlands, I collected extensive second-hand information on the life and work of Peruvian shepherds in the US. However, visiting them *in situ* was a very different experience. In particular, I was stunned by the wretched living conditions they endured and the physical seclusion that prevented them from communicating with their relatives during their stay in the US. During my interviews with Bernardo and his work colleagues in 1998, they asserted that they appreciated the work as it allowed them to remit money to their families every month while saving for their future returns. However, Bernardo also told me that he suffered a lot. While working in the mountains, where life was solitary and the only means of transportation was by horse, he had to sleep in a tent even when it got cold and snowed. And to Bernardo's disappointment the ranch owner did little to make life easier for his employees.

Bernardo was born in Corpacancha, a former hacienda and later peasant cooperative near the city of Huancayo in Peru's central highlands. In the early 1970s, two of Bernardo's brothers went to work as shepherds in the western US on three-year contracts brokered by the Western Ranchers Association, an agency that hires herders in Peru and other countries

to work for sheep ranchers in the US. Bernardo joined his brothers and traveled to the US in 1979, at the age of 17. His first work contract was on a ranch in Oregon, where the dense woods made shepherding and the life of a shepherd particularly hard. In 1983, Bernardo left on his second contract, which sent him to California to work for an American rancher, who turned out to be friendly. Upon his return to Peru in 1986, Bernardo spent his savings on a van, which he used to transport villagers between his home community and Huancayo. The van provided Bernardo with a steady income for some years, but in the late 1980s Peru's political crisis and battered economy made transportation an unprofitable business. In 1990 Bernardo was married and, as he had spent the savings of his first two work contracts in the US on maintaining the van, he decided to apply for yet another contract. In 1991, Bernardo started to work for a ranch owner in California and after a short return to Peru in 1994 he left on his fourth contract to work for the same employer. During Bernardo's absence his wife and their children lived off his remittances. Of his monthly income of US$ 700, Bernardo was able to remit US$ 300 to his wife and put another US$ 300 in the bank. Asked how he managed to make ends meet on the remaining US$ 100, he replied:

> Look, where I work there is nowhere to spend your money. My employer provides all the food we need, and I don't pay for accommodation, so I save almost all my earnings.

During an interview in 1998, Bernardo told me that he was planning to return to Peru for good to set up a new business when his contract expired. He said:

> I have worked in the US for almost twenty years and it's time to return. My children are getting older and I want to spend more time with them.

However, when I visited Huancayo in 2000, Bernardo was still in the US. His relatives told me that instead of returning, he had become an unauthorized immigrant and that he had stopped remitting money to his wife. They also said that Bernardo hoped to obtain work and stay permanently in the US after marrying a Mexican woman who is a legal resident. The many years of hard work and solitude had estranged him from his family and induced him to create a new life for himself in the US. And rather than writing a letter or calling, Bernardo used the grammar of remittances to inform his wife of the decision to break his *compromiso*. Just as Bernardo's wife read his monthly remittances as a proof of his fidelity, she knew their marriage was over once he stopped remitting.

DISCUSSION

Social class and economic status have played a pivotal role for the migration experience of Nilo, Aurora and Bernardo and their capacity to remit. In Peru's hierarchy of migration destinations and remittance-sending countries, Japan ranks highest and it allowed Nilo to support Magna with enough money to sustain her middle-class life in Trujillo. By contrast, Aurora's remittances from Chile helped her family to get by but not improve its economic situation, as Aurora had hoped when she began migrating. Even though salaries are lower in the US than in Japan, they are higher than in Chile, which allowed Bernardo to support his family in Peru's highlands and save money for the dream that made him migrate: to start a business upon his return. Notwithstanding the size of their remittances, however, Nilo, Aurora and Bernardo

all contributed significantly to their households. Most of their money has been spent on daily expenditures, conspicuous consumption or moneylenders but it has also worked to help their families accomplish more noble goals. Nilo's remittances allowed Magda to maintain her class status, Juan built a new house with Aurora's money, and although Bernardo never returned to Peru he managed to save money for a future business.

Remittances have also played a critical role as means of communication in all three cases. Labor migration implies long periods of physical separation of family members, and even though globalization and modern technologies offer migrants a range of new possibilities of communication, their contact with the families is often restrained by working conditions, time difference, access to the Internet, etc. Expressing their affection and concern for close relatives and affirming their membership of the families they have left behind are therefore hard-felt needs of many migrants for whom remittances constitute the most powerful and sometimes only way of certifying and symbolizing their commitments and affirming their feelings of belonging.

My data show that remittances serve as a language to not only attest relations of affection and solidarity but also negotiate power relations in migrants' households and review the ties that hold family members together. Thus, Nilo's remittances reasserted both his position as family provider and head of the household and Magda's status as a middle-class housewife in Trujillo. Aurora's remittances, on the other hand, empowered her as the family's care-taker as well as breadwinner. By the same token, Aurora used remittance sending to hold Juan accountable for his management of the family's economy. Bernardo's remittances also reinforced his status as head of household. But unlike Nilo's remittances that helped Magda maintain her class status until she was able to join her husband in Japan, and unlike Aurora's remittances that paid for the family's cost of living and the new house until she felt ready to return to Trujillo, Bernardo's remittances told a very different story – "I've met somebody else and I'm not coming home". In other words, the grammar of remittances is not only a tacit but also an open script that migrants may use to affirm as well as invalidate their feelings of belonging.

CONCLUSION

Migrant remittances have attracted the attention of international organizations and many governments in the Global South that view them as an untapped source of capital and that have designed policies to direct them into development projects, infrastructural constructions, private businesses and other activities (Agunías 2009; de Haas 2012; Ratha 2007). The three cases discussed in this chapter suggest that it a mistake to compare remittances with private investments, international trade and other global capital flows. Remittances are the savings hard working migrants send home to support their families and rather than following the logic of normal capital flows, they are tied to the remitter's sense of belonging. They also demonstrate that the remittance flow only lasts as long as migrants are separated from and remain loyal to their families. Once migrants are reunited with their relatives in the receiving country, as Nilo's case shows, or they return to their home country, as Aurora's case illustrates, or they

break their marriage and cut the ties with their family, as Bernardo's case demonstrates, the remittance flow stops.

Most remittance policies are shaped by a utilitarian mindset that reduces migrants' money to a mere economic good and neglects their social and cultural import. In a similar vein, they are informed by traditional thinking within migration theory that regards migration as a one-way population movement from the sending toward the receiving countries. Employing a transnational perspective, this chapter has examined the migration process as a multi-directional flow of people, things and ideas and scrutinized remittances as not only an economic contribution to migrants' families and home communities but also an important tool to communicate and express feelings of belonging. When designing policies to profit from migrants' money, policy makers would be wise to learn the grammar of remittances and read their hidden scripts.

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26. Highly skilled migrants and their networks
Amy Carattini

INTRODUCTION

> "I wanted to try something different"
> Professor Novak, Highly Skilled Migrant

> "I was moving from one place to another, never going to the same place. Getting bored is my problem"
> Professor Rossi, Highly Skilled Migrant

The analysis presented here of highly skilled migrants (HSMs) in the US is anchored in a cultural model of migration that reveals how human dynamics are embedded in global realities (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011: 17). Because HSMs are categorized by geographic location of birth when they enter the US, policy makers, state organizations, and other institutions that focus on country of origin often neglect the continued movement that stratifies HSMs' careers. Based on the accepted assumption that social and cultural forces at the macro and micro levels shape individual perceptions, choices and opportunities, the focus of this research is on career trajectories that traverse changing cultures, populations, and institutional contexts (Elder, 2003: 58). In other words, when historical times and places change, HSMs respond accordingly and adapt their lifestyles.

Migration can be theorized as a strategy to obtain something that HSMs are unable to access in their current geographic locations:

> I really took the next step in my academic ability. (HSM Professor Williams)

The decision to stay in a new location is often about finding satisfaction in both personal and professional lives. Like other migrants, HSMs grapple with finding routines and habits that unify the social, cultural and professional dimensions of their circumstances. After their initial settlement, what keeps this group rooted in a particular location is a continual reevaluation of the various driving forces they face, how satisfied they are and what the future might hold.

HSM Professor Novak states:

> I love my country; I love my city, and I love my people. But I live here, and this is my place.

One interpretation of his statement is that he feels the US is where he is able to function at the optimal level for his well-being. From this perspective, the social and cultural practices that make up individual networks (political, lifestyle and professional) are the units of analysis that contextualize the dynamics of glocalization – where global forces impact local landscapes and individual strategic responses (Sharma, 2009). In order to explore these networks, a life history approach is used to understand how HSM professors at a US university constructed their career paths from early educational experiences to selecting teaching and/or research

positions in their chosen field – both of which are connected to their subsequent/ongoing migration decisions.

By exploring the career trajectories of HSM professors in the US, these findings add to the notion that a culture of migration reveals a sense of belonging beyond what governments can categorize: "It provides the theoretical grounding to address how migrants construct places that are meaningful to them without obscuring the fact that locations are shared by many and contain multiple meanings" (Sprehn, 2015: SfAA Conference Presentation in Pittsburg, PA). While these cultural interactions often elide political constructions, they encompass important dynamics of the HSM experience.

BACKGROUND

Two interrelated conceptual frameworks dominated theoretical positioning for migration studies through the 1990s in anthropology: globalization and its counterpart, transnationalism. Distinguishing between these two frameworks helps to understand and differentiate between processes connected to how HSMs construct their social fields (transnationalism) and processes connected to how HSMs experience exchanges of power and economics (globalization).

In one sense, transnationalism can be understood as the experience of globalization at the intersection of at least two nation-states: the origin country and the destination country. Since globalization makes "borders" conceptually more diffuse through the social, economic, and political relationships that engage immigrants, transnationalism documents how people in birth countries link with settlement countries (Glick-Schiller, 2013: 26–27; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007: 130–131). By focusing on the perceived notion of locality, rather than the category of nation, this research shows how the international labor of HSMs illustrates the linkages that emerge with the rise of economic globalization.

Transnationalism assumes an inherent duality of identities (Vertovec, 2004: 974) and with this assumption comes a debate about the cultural boundedness of social fields embedded within global power structures (Glick-Schiller, 2018: 19–22). Put another way, acculturative practices are entangled with borders of nation-states and accompanying processes of citizenship – often viewed as an output or end-result (Freidenberg, 2016: 162–163). Some examples include dual citizenship, naturalization, and long-term permanent residency. Yet, these government-inspired categorical choices may not reflect the only ones available to HSMs, who often detail international social fields that span and operate in multiple national contexts.

Some social theorists have suggested that the relationship between place, people, and social and cultural relations may, in fact, be more fluid than otherwise thought (Clifford, 1999: 1–3; Hall, 1995: 6). Rather than focusing on the geographical anchorage of HSMs, these theorists emphasize their mobility: their movements, encounters, exchanges, and mixtures. This mobility takes many different forms: permanent or temporary migration, travel, tourism, transfer or exchange of capital, and so forth (Gustafson, 2001: 670). Since culture is communicated over time, HSMs "learn" new cultural norms through practices at institutional sites (work, school, shopping, etc.) that they experience in daily life and at specific localities (Freidenberg, 2016: 127). This view questions personal change with regards to political constructions of the idea of the nation-state held at different historical periods, and not necessarily based on consensus.

Using occupational geography this research captures how HSMs develop alternative scenarios as they confront what can be interpersonal ambivalent situations. This allows for doc-

umenting diverse ways in which HSMs construct their realities and the variables that impact these realities – navigating away from dualistic and generalized assumptions that immigrants themselves identify as being primarily from one locality versus another or being a naturalized citizen versus remaining a citizen of their birth country, or being an immigrant, a professor, or merely a human being. Rather the focus is on finding points of intersection within their new networks (Narayan, 1993: 673–676).

HSMs hold many social connections that are useful as incorporation strategies. In general, they report satisfaction with their occupational choices in comparison to other populations studied by migration scholars and often enter the US having adopted the traditional hallmarks of national assimilation (language, education, and occupation). Rather than embracing any one identity, thus forcing change into something else, they construct unique lifestyles based upon their background, training and the many locations in which they have lived and traveled.

IMMIGRANT IDEOLOGY

Most migration studies in anthropology have been conducted on immigrant or migrant groups in low-skilled sectors of the economy – often focusing on the structural aspects that shape incorporation, such as access to resources and labor market niches (Chavez, 2008: 58; Portes, 2003: 886). In the public domain discourse, certain immigrant groups are pathologized and perceived as damaging or threatening to the majority, understood as an *American mainstream* – forgetting the diversity of ideas and opinions about the US that exist within the country's own borders. This perspective allows for little reflection on the influence highly trained immigrants can have on the idea or conceptualization of the other and on how their necessary coexistence reveals national ethos.

In addition to social class differences, race and ethnicity pervade mainstream notions of immigrants, further excluding what HSMs represent (Goodman et al., 2012: 232–233). The research reported here allows for a critical look at other variables that influence diversity; for example, how individuals shaped by privilege interact with the world and how the world interacts with them (Pieterse et al., 2013: 381).

FACTORS TO CONSIDER

While research with migrants shows that factors such as group size, proximity to native born, and settlement experiences, to name a few, influence group cohesiveness, these experiences may not be shared by HSMs (Johns and Saks, 2004: 217–220). How do HSMs interact with other potentially different cultural traditions and occupational experiences (Caughey, 2006: 61–62)? Addressing these questions allows an opportunity to untangle how HSMs perceive incorporation as they blend into institutional categories and the notions of diversity that structure their experiences (Wei, 2008: 94). Factors that need exploring include professional visibility, social fields, and acculturation processes that influence incorporation from the point of view of the professional migrants themselves.

Factor 1: Visibility

Currently, the US government categorizes HSMs through their visa status, excluding those who have obtained permanent residency or are naturalized. This means that only a small percentage show up in the statistics produced by government institutions. The National Center for Education Statistics (2015–2017) shows HSM professors at degree-granting institutions in the United States comprise approximately 6 percent (45,222) of the total faculty population (807,109). The reality is that the number is much higher when naturalization and long-term residence status are considered. In fact, the number of institutionally visible HSM professors at the university where this research occurred changed from 3 percent (only visa status) to 34 percent (combining visa, permanent residency and naturalization statuses) when these statuses were combined (Carattini, 2015: 62–64).

   HSMs are a hidden population. Even if they are implicated in the global marketplace, they are not often understood as a culturally unique population (Schmidtke, 2013: 300). Further, within the university and other labour settings, they are generally "neither well defined nor available for enumeration" (Braunstein, 1993: 132). This leaves their contribution somewhat undetected as they are not all fully counted as being foreign-born in addition to being subsumed in other institutional categories relating to diversity and cultural minorities (Price et al., 2005: 570).

   As a professor of Asian background, HSM Professor Yu is documented in a positive way to help support the image of the University as a diverse place. She is a "professor of color," but when it comes to minority status and the accompanying university resources, she is not counted as Asian:

> We [Asian professors] are actually counted in a very unfair way. When they need to count more faculty of colour or students of colour, we are counted, but we are not considered a minority, whenever they have a special resource.

Most terminology used around HSMs and at the university where this research was conducted focus on the term *international* rather than its counterpart *foreign*. Special lectures highlight keynote speakers that are touted as *international* (Carattini, 2015: 40). Further, the advertising for such events emphasizes and reflects a purposeful decision, which shows a collective desire to move beyond birth country to that of something more encompassing and inclusive. Describing the intersection of education and policy, international development education specialist Stromquist (2007) highlights the term's importance when she argues that at the university level, "globalization is manifested by what is termed by insiders as 'internationalization,' a subtle response that not only affects academic programs, faculty, and students, but also creates new administrative structures and privileges" (81).

Factor 2: Social Fields

HSMs describe their engagement with the US as defined by a job and fit the parameters of a specific set of social and political processes accordingly (e.g. becoming a citizen and abiding by the country's laws). At the time of interview, HSM Professor Martinez considered himself a citizen of three countries and tended to view himself in terms of an international identity:

> [W]ould I have become a citizen of the US or of … [another country] if that wasn't convenient…? … I tend to see … nationality [as] … something that is more practical than anything else.

However, decisions about long-term stays change through time as HSMs better understand their own lifestyle preferences.

HSM Professor Angelo arrived in the US in the 1970s when a postdoctoral opportunity presented itself. Over time, he has become "*rooted*" in the US and enjoys "doing things for himself." He is uncertain that he would find the desire "to progress and discover" if he returned to his birth country:

> I've been back to … [my birth country] and there is a lot of beauty. People always rave over … [my birth country], but the mindset [there] … not just to live and to have beautiful surroundings … [I need the mindset] to progress, to discover.

HSM Professor Yu considered moving abroad in the 1990s when she realized that career options were limited in her birth country. She found she did not have access to the latest technology:

> The best [technology] is here in the US. I was also considering Japan. … The uncertainty was how I could fund my studies.

After completing a doctoral degree in the US, HSM Professor Yu gradually shifted her initial goal of return and thought instead of permanent stay. She was already a professional in her discipline:

> I would say that with or without a stage clearly labelled as post-doctoral study, there is a post-doctoral period where you have to learn to do the job, learn to establish yourself, learn to transition from that student mode to the professional.

In addition, HSM Professor Yu met someone from her birth country, married, and had two children – one who needed constant medical attention and who HSM Professor Yu perceived would not thrive as well if she were to return to her birth country.

HSM Professors Angelo's and Yu's narrated experiences show the relevance of finding and defining social fields that operate and support their long-term goals and daily lifestyles. And as these decisions are made, they in turn impact broader relationships, and establish larger, global social relations through new social networks they forge around their work.

HSM Professor Khatri illustrates this process as the geographic location of his work life became the place where he could accomplish his goals and become the kind of person he hoped to be. For ten years, he contemplated "packing up and leaving." After taking a sabbatical where he returned to his birth country, he found that where he "fit" and where he could "help" his birth country was here in the US:

> And what I found was that I … [could help my birth country] much better by building a good strong group here [in the US] than in going back there.

As career trajectories develop over time, members of this highly skilled workforce position themselves in reference and response to their social networks. They describe being part of larger, international networks and travelling for conferences, research, and career opportuni-

ties, the result being that they have several alternatives for movement – which are guided by their lives at the university.

HSM Professor Rodriguez describes his work on the built environment with an interdisciplinary team of scholars at Harvard University as well as with stakeholders in the region. He also talks about international exchange and how it has transformed the way he looks at what is possible in the architectural world and vice versa:

> In Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, they have been building these projects where they attach the slums with the city. So, they would have a cable cart, and they would build a library in the middle of the slum. That allows people to come to the city.

Based on this international exchange of ideas and observation, HSM Professor Rodriguez is able to examine more closely how his work influences aesthetics as well as a host of social, cultural, and economic factors.

Factor 3: Acculturative Processes

HSM professors did not always describe their acculturation as anchored in one nation-state. Most identified first as professionals and viewed their long-term stays in a specific locality as continually open for evaluation and re-evaluation: "It's like you forget your own country" (HSM Professor Hernandez). They didn't always feel altogether American, even if some had lived in the US for more than a decade:

> [M]y wife … was born in England … [and] grew up in Argentina. … In Argentina, she was like, La Inglesa, the English person. … [But] When we go back to Argentina, they say, "The Americans are here." So, I am sort of a nowhere person. (HSM Professor Garcia)

HSM Professor Chen described a sense of esteem and professional status associated with his experiences and from his colleagues:

> That is, the value is based on your research, is based on your merit, the merit of your international contribution rather than what color your skin is or what origin you come from.

This international contribution is also a vital component as expressed by HSM Professor Connor:

> I think of myself as a global citizen, and I'm just trying to contribute positively to the world. So that, I think, helps make it more comfortable.

At the time of interview, HSM Professor Angelo was 65 years old and he describes himself first and foremost as a "scientist." When applying for citizenship, he expresses that the career aspect of his identity is what he feels recommends him to the US as a permanent stakeholder. By contrast HSM Professor Agarwal notes his role as "grandfather" when he goes abroad:

> And the amazing thing is I go to parts of India where I don't know the language. I do not eat their food. I can't drink their water. But I love these children calling me "grandfather."

What these examples suggest is that instead of focusing only on how immigrants integrate into social categories, a shift in focus would be beneficial to understand how HSMs themselves conceptualize and organize difference and what kinds of cultural products appear (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011: 14; Levitt, 2011: 29–30). As the confluence of these factors shows, career trajectories develop through an interplay of personal and professional variables, and they create unique transnational social fields that often span multiple countries and contexts.

CAREER TRAJECTORIES AMONG PROFESSIONAL MIGRANTS

HSMs' experiences represent a more complex profile of migration than can be understood by simply noting ethnicity or birth country (Vertovec, 2007: 1025). Since their careers often span several locations, they create composite, social and cultural identities involving more variables. The theory of super-diversity has the potential to account for many of these variables – especially as HSMs describe locating their individual networks and evolving sense of social and cultural identities. Building upon Vertovec's approach (2007) to migrant complexity as it applies to HSMs here is used to account for these increasingly complex social formations that include a dynamic interplay of variables including: birth country, immigration niche, legal status, human capital, employment access, and locality, among others (1049).

While there are multiple identifications and axes of engagement that reach beyond ethnicity, these axes, by nature, are often invisible in the panoramic lens of society that looks more pointedly at birth country than factors such as international moves before coming to the US, age at arrival in the US, or settlements within the US. Vertovec argues these factors may be even more influential in the processes that govern how one adapts and responds to incorpora-

Table 26.1   Temporal and spatial variables collected in 48 interviews with HSM professors

Temporal and spatial variables
1.   Gender
2.   Rank
3.   Department
4.   College/School
5.   Year of Birth
6.   Country of Birth
7.   Locality of Childhood
8.   Type of Locality
9.   International Moves Before Coming to US
10.   Year of Arrival
11.   Age at Arrival
12.   First Settlement
13.   Entry Status
14.   Other Settlements within the US before Moving to Current Settlement
15.   Years in the US at Time of Interview
16.   Age at Time of Interview
17.   Multiple Citizenship(s)
18.   Marital Status
19.   Children
20.   Residence Status

tion experiences (2007: 1026). Following this super-diverse approach to document immigrant groups that can no longer be understood through one major unit of analysis, 20 different temporal and spatial variables were collected with each of the 48 HSM professors interviewed for this study (Table 26.1). These variables are then used to define transitions along career paths.

Among HSM professors, two major types of career trajectories emerge: (1) those who come to the US as graduate students or as post-doctoral fellows, and (2) those who come as already established professors or other kinds of professionals.

HSM professors who begin their stays as students are typically graduate students (81 percent) or in post-doctoral positions when they arrive in the US (Carattini, 2015: 136). This describes a population in the midst of establishing their professional identity while dealing with the social and economic adjustments of adulthood. In effect, they eventually become highly skilled immigrants after stays in the US. During their years of professional development, apprentice-like and mentoring relationships, these HSMs not only define new social networks and professional abilities but also intercultural competencies. HSM Professor Novak describes liking the fast-paced and busy lifestyle that he associates with his years in the US – a belief in production that motivates people:

> I came back to the US because once I guess you live in this country and kind of get used to the lifestyle and the way in which things are done … [the lifestyle pace is] too slow I guess [in some of the other places I have lived].

In the second career trajectory, HSMs who come to the US as established professionals often describe the process of choosing from career positions. They could have gone almost anywhere or stayed in their birth countries. This ability to choose suggests that they have amassed social and professional capital, beyond that of higher-level degrees or career experiences, which have yet to be recognized or measured. HSM Professor Bisset completed her PhD in her home country and then spent several years moving between her home country and the US as she studied and began her professional life. While she appreciates "the language, the routine, [and] years and years of daily life" that defined her childhood, she finds that the educational system in the US gave her the support she needed to change career directions:

> If you want to do something different [in the US], it will take some time, but you will be supported. In the end and you will achieve it. I think this is what makes this particular society or culture really different.

FINDINGS: SPHERES OF CONNECTION

Like other humans, HSMs search for attachment and a sense of fulfilment and belonging. As such, their connections are varied and multi-dimensional and change as circumstances change (Wimmer, 2009: 245). Even if national origins, socioeconomic status, contexts of reception in the US and social and financial resources play a role in attachment and belonging, incorporation experiences are diverse and cannot be theorized through the lens of any one major variable. Therefore, understanding HSMs and their experiences requires the identification of an "interplay of variables." Their incorporation experiences are rooted in their work lives, which in turn influence their spheres of connection to the US and elsewhere or, more specifically, the kinds of activities they engage in and the knowledge they amass and use. Political,

lifestyle, and professional intersections within these spheres, or within these new networks, then influence how this group expresses their agency to connect to the larger society – using their perceptions and the very labels which categorize them.

Political Spheres of Connection

HSMs describe citizenship as more practical and pragmatic than anything else. They describe varying degrees of connection to their birth countries, but of much more importance is their connection to their profession and their professional identity. Many HSMs from Asian countries (specifically India and China) describe the difficulty of maintaining their double citizenships or travelling without a visa to their birth countries, while HSM professors from European countries often describe the appeal of the European Union passport. In both examples, their beginning point (birth country) informs and stratifies HSM interactions and how other variables (e.g. international moves beyond the US, legal statuses here and elsewhere, employment access, and social ties located abroad, among others) play out.

As HSMs achieve their primary education and career aspirations, the reality of political incorporation becomes an important issue. This is especially apparent as they make the decision to extend their stays (and settle) in the US; however, this is not an indicator that they will align with a political party or that they will participate in national agendas. Often, settlement decisions revolve around work lives and long-term career issues. For the political to become more than pragmatic, it takes more points of intersection beyond their work lives, such as finding a US partner, starting a family and/or appreciating how they themselves have, over time, adopted US habits and practices. HSM Professor Rajan says:

> if people are badmouthing American policies, I feel far more defensive than if people are badmouthing … [my birth country's] policies. But there was a time when I remember it was the other way around.

HSM Professor De Vries was also surprised by this quiet transformation:

> While on sabbatical, I was visiting a professor in … [my birth country], and my wife also went there. And … we realized that we had become Americans. We did not fit anymore.

Migration scholars Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008: 2) argue that anthropological studies of immigration need to define frameworks that approach political incorporation beyond legal citizenship to encompass forms of participatory citizenship, addressing how immigrants acquire the civic and leadership skills that help them to move from peripheral positions to engage in US civil society. Research indicates that this engaged perspective is not always sought after or even present for HSMs, but there are experiences that foster this outlook more than others.

As HSMs have families or become invested in activities beyond work, these social aspects of their lives foster their interaction within their local communities, and those experiences may predict their desire to shift from a more pragmatic to a more politically engaged perspective over time. HSM professors indicate that they may find themselves joining the PTA because they are interested parents or organizing a local neighbourhood meeting to rally support for a proposed local ordinance. They might also use their research to address social concerns. HSM Professor Laurent, says,

> I love … [my hometown]. I always tell people I am not an American citizen, but I am … [from this small town]. Actually, I'm very involved. I was a member of the seventy-fifth anniversary committee. I prepared the symposium, and I am now on the planning board.

As opportunities occur, HSMs make changes that suit their lifestyle preferences. Most HSMs come to the US to enhance their professional careers – growing more connected to US society the longer they stay. HSM Professor Volkov found her profession to be integral in giving her the response from her colleagues that she desired. Since being in the US, she has experienced a difference in reception from male colleagues in her birth country:

> I go every year, and I'm treated better now since I'm an established US researcher. … And for a long time, I had to deal with this, "You're just a pretty little thing. Stand there. We're going to talk to the real scientists." … But I've been there long enough now that all the conflict is gone, and I think my publication record and my collaboration has convinced most people working there now that I'm a researcher to be reckoned with.

Lifestyle Spheres of Connection

The majority of HSMs come from white-collar social backgrounds, urban environments, and have complex family histories that include immigration (generational, circular, or multiple immigration experiences in the ascending generation). They seek to recreate their urban and white-collar world within the context of life in the US. Although he travels to his birth country a couple times a year and owns a house there, HSM Professor Rossi describes a world where place of residence becomes secondary to the intellectual and creative passions he pursues, such as designing and building boats:

> And then you realize that … you have recreated exactly what you had or I don't know how to explain … but they [both cities I inhabit in the US and in my birth country] look alike. So, in other words, my sailing clubs in … [both places] are the same thing – that the people here look a lot like the people there. That's probably not true, but I see them the same way. … So the places where I am, [they] become the same. … a seamless reality.

In addition, HSMs have preferences for urban and often East or West coast cities in the US. These urban landscapes often emphasize simultaneous social and cultural affiliations, identifications, and connections that nurture cosmopolitan sociabilities (Glick-Schiller et al., 2011: 399–401). As such, HSMs vary in their response to finding other people from their birth countries. While they enjoy the social diversity of interacting with others living abroad, most didn't necessarily seek out similar ethnic populations in order to feel comfortable with life in the US. It's not that ethnicity is unimportant; it's just not the dominating factor in connecting with others.

HSM Professor Farhad talks about his attachment to place:

> I feel for [my country] perhaps because of the memories that I have and because of the people that are suffering there. Sometimes I miss Berkeley more than I miss my hometown. … I think where you enjoy, where you can express yourself, that's where your home is.

This finding contrasts with ideas of diversity as they are often displayed and defined by the US Census. Even if social scientists are especially sensitive to the social construction of census categories, they too are used to the social categories at institutions including the university –

greatly influencing the way we see each other and ourselves, individually and as a community (Etzioni, 2002: 13). Missing are the many other forms of diversity that encompass migrant lives (education, occupation, childhood experiences, family histories with migration, etc.).

Sometimes these challenges have to do with unconscious assumptions that US-born make in their social interactions as HSM Professor Robinson describes with her experience of Americans and their sense of politeness, which she thinks often comes across as insincere:

> "Have a nice day" didn't mean have a nice day. "How are you?" was not a genuine question. I found this really jarring. I could not figure out why you couldn't just have a conversation with someone, and that people just weren't really interested in you; they said these things and they were meaningless.

HSM Professor Laurent finds that there are "two kinds of Americans," one who has "hardly gone out in the real world and doesn't speak any other languages" and then one who "goes all over the place and is totally cosmopolitan." Many HSMs find that they inhabit several different roles, and they often grapple to balance them through the lens of their cumulative international migration experiences. Like native-born, they are constructing a lifestyle that brings their lives into focus (social, cultural, emotional, and mental). HSM Professor Taylor describes the kind of balance he has found:

> I say things like "make sure whatever you're doing in college, whatever job you have is something that is stimulating you intellectually, something that is making you happy every day. If it's not doing those things consistently then get out of those things, make a change, do something different." And by implication I would say that if I applied that to my own life, I would still be sitting here talking to you because I'm generally happy most days. I generally find intellectual stimulation and passion in my work, so I'm a happy camper.

Because HSMs cross national borders, the way they create this balance is often more difficult to navigate as many travel for work and for satisfying social interactions – invigorating their careers and animating their social networks here, there, and other places. Sometimes this renders their interpersonal connections less satisfying as HSMs wait to see loved ones elsewhere or to interact on a level that is comfortable (Carattini, 2016: 30–31).

Professional Spheres of Connection

While HSMs describe the US as a place that has a reputation for excellence in higher education, it is not always their first choice, and is often one possibility among an array of choices. These choices are critical when evaluating the many circumstances that circumscribe their personal and professional lives and their ability to cross national borders to satisfy their needs. While HSMs anticipate what their initial experiences in the US might be like with regards to their training and future career plans, they describe their initial experiences with graduate school as full of unanticipated experiences with other people, with research agendas and projects, with institutional environments, and with surrounding regional identities.

HSM Professor Martinez notes that some of his greatest learning experiences came in conversations with other colleagues. Through these exchanges, he learns more about how he is viewed as a foreigner. The same university where he now holds a faculty position did not accept him as a PhD student. When asked how he perceives this experience, he replies that

it takes time and patience to translate foreign credentials, which does not always occur as it should:

> in all fairness, it is very difficult to evaluate foreign students. You see the applications, and you really don't have much information to judge them. So, "Who is this guy and where is he coming from…?" "We have never heard of the country" or something like that. That would be typical.

As these HSMs become part of their working world, new "structures of opportunity" become available to them that factor into their decisions whether to pursue a career in academia right away or come back to it later. Like native-born, who are also trained in the US, foreign-born HSMs decide to follow these "structures of opportunity." And, like native-born, they too differ in whether they decide to pursue a career either as a young adult or later in life after years of experiencing other types of career choices.

HSM Professor Kaminski talks about his interests in game theory that took him beyond disciplinary walls. He finds that while he could attach himself to several disciplines, he needs to find one to call his "home." Otherwise, he risks being isolated and without university resources:

> In this tribal world of academia, you have economists and you have sociologists and you have political scientists, and one tribe looks down on another tribe…. The borders are not penetrable really…. So, if you have multiple identities, then the end result is that no discipline really claims you.

HSM Professor Kaminski finds a way to embrace the porousness of intellectual boundaries vis-à-vis the constraints of a university organizational structure. Two important factors linking HSM career choices are: (1) developing a skill set that can be used in a variety of settings (e.g. medicine, human resources, government, industry, etc.), and (2), looking to use this skill set in a work environment that affords both intellectual stimulation and independence.

This finding indicates that there is a difference between those who choose the US in general and those who choose more specifically a distinct university and geographic location. The former group describes choices that are more limited in scope, e.g. not necessarily expressing that it would be so easy to return to their birth countries and find the career satisfaction they are seeking; while the latter group tends to describe a wider array of choices, e.g. having the ability to be more selective between a variety of places and institutions that would be a potential "fit" for their personal and professional lifestyles. As a result, they construct different kinds of mobile lifestyles with some choosing frequent travel between countries and others not as much.

CONCLUSION

Learning from HSMs questions the assumption that having skills and resources translates into seamless incorporation into a new nation. Rather, HSMs need to negotiate a complex world of power relationships (Horevitz, 2009: 754–755). A culture of migration is revealed through network connections that influence individual choices and that mark career trajectories. This research shows that immigrant incorporation strategies have more to do with institutional practices than with a putative idea of nation-state. HSMs are part of an institutional structure that has local and global dimensions – placing research connections in the context of larger structures associated with historical and political events as well as social and economic

interests. Stromquist (2007: 82–83) offers ideas about an institution's economic and political presence on the world market. Yet to be documented is how HSM professors are implicated in these processes.

Second, political administrations of nation-states often make visible the problems that HSMs face but that remain invisible to the public eye. Current legislation on the foreign-born in the US has focused predominantly on the undocumented – those in the US "illegally." As such, the focus tends towards policing US borders. And, a large portion of scholarly work has focused on disproving the notion that this group threatens US society (Glick-Schiller, 2010: 110–111). Often left out of this important policy and scholarly discussion is the diversity of the foreign-born population – regarding motives, intentions, experiences and contributions. However, these axes, by their nature, are often invisible in the panoramic lens of society and need the inside or emic perspective to be visible.

While migration scholars describe these nuances and complexities in understanding incorporation and acculturative practices, policy makers continue to create static categories of what it means to belong. In so doing, there is an ellipse between knowledge produced by migration scholars and the knowledge applied by policy makers. Put another way, power is enacted through policies but policies that have little relation to how HSMs are incorporated. The result is that while HSMs say that their social fields and attachments are much more complex, that they blend the personal and the occupational in any geographical location – much as the native-born do – their views are neglected by policy makers, state organizations, and educational institutions who categorize this population, among other things, by geographical location.

The problem becomes how to bring the knowledge produced by scholars and by the highly skilled as a group into the purview of the policy makers to create a dialogue between these two sources of knowledge production. The process of moving, of human mobility, is part of the human condition and has been so since the beginning of the human record. As such, there are many factors that describe and define a life. The process of immigrating, of incorporating into distinct nation-states, is relatively a new invention – about 250 years old (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003: 576–610) and refers to the apparatuses of the state (government, military, political parties, etc.) used to secure physical borders and manage them.

Most HSMs find some aspect of their moves to possess characteristics that they find favourable and beneficial to their career trajectories. More complex and varied are their comparisons concerning US culture and perceptions about US society. Because they must negotiate more than one social and cultural boundary, they often have a unique vantage point for presenting the strengths and weaknesses of their new environment. These perceptions need to be captured in a model that shows their perspectives along with those of the institutional and nation-state descriptions for what it means to belong.

An integrated immigration model helps us understand how this group anchors themselves in international space, finding their "place" in the world as one HSM professor so aptly stated. Perhaps the culture of migration, taken from this view, would not only be about them – what the migrants think of themselves – but also how other stakeholders – policy makers, institutions and government organizations – think about and make categories to define them (Freidenberg and Durand, 2016: 9). This would lead to a model that would help to understand immigration as it applies not just to the highly skilled but to other migrant populations as well.

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27. Precarity, migration and extractive labour in the Peruvian Amazon

Gordon Lewis Ulmer

INTRODUCTION

> "My parents died when I was four. I had no one else. I slept on the streets and worked on people's *chacras* (small farm plots), making about 3 *soles* (~$1) per day picking fruits and vegetables. But then a friend of mine told me about all the gold in Madre de Dios, so we came here! I had crazy ideas when I arrived … like buying an airplane. I was so young but it was believable to me because I was making five times more money panning gold than picking fruit, making around 15 *soles* (~$5 US) each day."
>
> Armando, former child gold miner

Armando never extracted enough gold to purchase an airplane. Instead, he panned gold for a year after he arrived in Madre de Dios, Peru from the Andean highland region of Cusco. A child at the time, he was in violation of labour laws (the minimum age requirement for mining work in Peru at that time was 16) and was picked up by the *Comisaría* (local authorities). He was taken to a "youth lodge" (a boarding school for the children of rural labourers and foster home for orphans), where he was fed, provided a bed, and sent to school in a nearby mining town. Extractive labour crews and land concessionaires recruited Armando and other children from the lodge to work weekends in gold mining and logging operations.

Armando is one among an estimated 40–50,000 Andean migrants who relocated from the Peruvian highlands to the Amazonian lowlands to work in gold mining. At the height of the resource boom in 2011, gold's price quadrupled and surpassed cocaine in value, seizing its place as Peru's most profitable illicit export. Since the boom, gold mining has become increasingly precarious work, not only in terms of contingent labour arrangements but also in terms of its effects on local communities, shifting legalities around extractive markets, and its relationship to other illicit activities.

Migration and precarity are ontological experiences (see Dudley, 2019; Millar, 2014; Neilson and Rossiter, 2005, 2008; Stewart, 2012). While scholarship on migrant precarity often invokes dichotomous terms such as legal/illegal, documented/undocumented, etc. to focus on the political subjectivity of migrants or their socioeconomic insecurity, I argue that internal migration in Peru confounds the binary framework typical to discussion and demands a more nuanced approach. My analysis situates migrant labour in the political economic realities of daily life while attending to the experiences of precarity that emerge around the devaluation of labour. In this chapter, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork conducted during multiple trips to Madre de Dios, Peru to illuminate the lived experience of migrant gold miners and the historical processes that influence their precarity.

This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I define precarity and its utility for understanding the experiences of internal migration in Andes-Amazonia Peru. I consider how precarity creates political vulnerability for internal migrants, the decline in patron–client relationships in gold mining, and the struggle to maintain security. Second, I evaluate the

term *unskilled labour* and consider how devalued work can provide a better framework for understanding the migrant experience. Third, I outline the history of labour precarity in Madre de Dios, Peru to understand patterns of movement of people amidst broader structural forces. Building on this historical analysis, I consider how infrastructural development has encouraged greater movement between Andes and Amazonia and opened new opportunities for households to "*florecer*" (flourish), which is symbolized by the completion of a migrant's home. Finally, I consider the legal risks that migrant labourers experience participating in an illicit economy to show how migration, precarity, and unskilled work converge around the politics of gold and other illicit activities.

CONCEPTUALIZING PRECARITY AND MIGRATION

Migration scholarship has recently highlighted the growing precarious conditions that many migrant labourers experience (Anderson, 2010; Bélanger and Tran Giang, 2013; Lewis et al., 2014; Schierup and Jørgensen, 2016). Dichotomies such as legal and illegal, documented and undocumented, can delineate different experiences; however, they can simultaneously obscure critical similarities. Some scholars have suggested that it is more useful to locate migrants on a continuum of precarity, legality, and formality capturing its "multi-dimensional and constructed" nature (Goldring, Berinstein and Bernhard, 2009: 240; also see Bélanger and Tran Giang, 2013). When migration and precarity are discussed in tandem it is often in reference to citizenship (e.g. Şenses, 2016). However, internal migration challenges formal categories while still attending to the political vulnerability of movers based on their subjectivity to the Peruvian State. For many internal migrants from the Peruvian Andes, moving is part of a broader diaspora associated with the aftermath of Peru's civil war and neoliberal reforms (Paerregaard, 1997). Although gold mining camps in Madre de Dios are composed of mostly Peruvian citizens, some who hailed from the highlands lack official documentation that is required for formal employment, such as a birth certificate or national identification number (see UNICEF, 2016). While Andean migrants in Peru may be "internal migrants," they are often viewed as outsiders when they arrive at Amazonian communities.

Scholars use precarity to reference perilous socioeconomic conditions related to the insecurity and irregularity produced by contingent labour in the postindustrial Northern Hemisphere (Bourdieu, 1998; Cangià, 2018; Standing, 2011). Precarity is a symptom of global capitalism, often-dubbed Post-Fordist neoliberalism, now approaching its fifth decade, and the shift towards temporary labour arrangements and flexible work regimes (Harvey, 1989: 150).

In Madre de Dios, the shift to contingent extractive labour corresponds to the 21st-century gold boom. Patron–client relations involving long-term work arrangements in mining operations have transformed into contingent labour arrangements in which miners frequently move between projects working 12–24hr shifts. One gold miner from the Andes described extractive activities before this major transformation:

> I worked in mining for 6 or 7 years, but back then it was artisanal. We only mined eight hours each day. We took siestas for an hour or two after lunch. We had crews of 15 people, so we did not have to work as many hours. We were only allowed to work eight hours each day—we were part of a syndicate. Now men get really sick from all the pollution and there are only four *obreros* who work 24 hours.

Older gold miners described working in large parties prior to the gold boom and as they began migrating seasonally to work in Madre de Dios during the 1980s and 1990s. The patron often provided food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. Today most of these basic needs are the responsibility of individual labourers.

Irregular and unstable work, previously a characteristic of low-skilled labour, has become a feature across different categories of work (Smith, 1997). Contingent, informal labour is a broad phenomenon that includes an estimated 78 percent of the "economically active people" across Peru working informally (RPP, 2016). It is not difficult to see how the socioeconomic conditions of contingent labour give rise to migration, as labourers relocate to seek work and wages. This, however, is primarily focused on the economic migrant, who represents just one of many types of internal movers. Migration might be better understood using a holistic model that pays attention to an individual's social role in the household and community, local traditions, geography, and the belief that migration will lead to greater well-being (Cohen, 2004).

Like migration, precarity is not simply a reflection of socioeconomic conditions or processes. Anthropological definitions of precarity have extended the term's meaning into new domains including political subjection (Lazzarato, 2004), ontological experience (Millar, 2014; Neilson and Rossiter, 2005, 2008; Stewart, 2012), and as a general condition of our present time (Tsing, 2015a). As Neilson and Rossiter (2008: 54) observe, precarity is only a new epoch "when set against a Fordist or Keynesian norm" (also see Boyer, 1986; Coriat, 1991; Lipietz, 1987). Precariousness, insecurity, and informality are not an exception to capitalism but rather its norm (Breman and van der Linden, 2014). On a global scale, this critique is best summarized in the words of Akua Britwum, a Ghanaian scholar, who said in response to an ILO presentation on precarious employment in 2011: "What you are calling precarious work sounds like what we in Ghana call—work" (Mosoeta, Stillerman and Tilly, 2016: 8).

Andean migrants who mine gold in Madre de Dios are not a monolithic social group. While some miners remain landless, lack housing, and struggle to meet basic daily needs, others have reinvested their earnings in agricultural land and productive assets or housing and have actualized some degree of social mobility and security. For example, Gustavvo, a *motorista* (boat pilot), migrated to Madre de Dios in the 1990s to mine gold. After several years of saving, he was able to reinvest his earnings to purchase a 15-metre *lancha* (launch or open motorboat), which he uses to generate income by transporting passengers and cargo up and downriver each month. Despite his success as an entrepreneurial boat pilot, Gustavvo still recognized the dearth of earning opportunities in the region and the broader structural problems that perpetuate precarity in Madre de Dios:

> They give us no other options. You look at the bulletin … where they advertise jobs and all you see are jobs for mining, logging, cooks for mining, cooks for logging, but where are the professional jobs for secretaries and other office jobs? There is nothing for us to do but mining, and yes, we want other options to survive! There is very little investment in anything here except highways … the electricity is bad, the lights, water … the government doesn't care about resolving these problems.

Gustavvo's testimony underscores how precarity is more than the lack of stable work. It is a general condition of underdevelopment and political marginalization (for comprehensive review, see Millar, 2017).

UNSKILLED OR DEVALUED LABOUR?

Most migrant workers worldwide are unskilled labourers (Martin, 2007). However, framing work in terms of unskilled labour only reveals part of the story for migrants in Madre de Dios. Workers do not lack skills, rather the skills they have are undervalued. Many migrant workers in Madre de Dios are multi-skilled and practise occupational multiplicity (Comitas, 1964). In fact, the migrants and miners I met are best thought of as "working-class renaissance men" (Elbein, 2015), as they move between jobs.

Like the term precarity, skilled labour also contains multiple meanings and requires some conceptual unpacking. Skilled labour is conceptualized as "a bundle of capabilities or require-ments that are attached to entities at the individual level of analysis; i.e., skills are possessed either by individual workers, or they are requirements of individual job roles" (Baba, 1991: 2). However, as Baba (1991) notes, ethnographers who have studied work have demonstrated that skill is better understood at a group level given that work activities are carried out by social groups rather than individual workers, and that skill often requires a "deep structure" of local knowledge linked together by informal social organization. Extractive labourers in Madre de Dios labour together in work parties that require a variety of technical capabilities derived from shared knowledge systems and transmitted through practice, with the household often a site of intergenerational transmission of labour knowledge (Ulmer, 2018).

Much of the work deemed "unskilled" labour, in fact, requires many capabilities and access to knowledge, which is not characterized by formal training or education. Hernández Romero (2012: 73) argues that the broad depiction of agricultural labour as unskilled obscures attention to the skills and abilities needed to perform agricultural tasks, to the process of acquiring them, and to "their impact in the life trajectories of those working in the fields". Similarly, depicting artisanal gold miners in Madre de Dios as "unskilled" labourers (many of whom also happen to have agrarian backgrounds) diminishes the ability to recognize the myriad capacities and requisite knowledge required to be successful and survive in the harsh conditions of the Amazonian lowlands.

During field research, I worked occasionally as a *tripulante* (boat crewman) while shadow-ing boat operators who transported passengers and supplies upriver. As a *tripulante*, I learned how to scan the surface of the river and gesture to the *motorista* to navigate away from driftwood that could damage the boat's outboard motor. This work can be quite dangerous, as boating accidents are common and large tree trunks and other organic debris pose hazards to navigation. In fact, the last rural labourer I interviewed in 2015 passed away in a boating accident two years later. Most gold miners, timber workers, and others I interviewed had experienced boating accidents.

Hunting and food preparation are other important skills for rural extractive labourers. Extractive labourers often spend several weeks or months in remote areas and supplement canned goods by hunting monkeys, javelins, agouti paca, and other wild game. Interviewees described various hunting methods, such as using fires to "smoke out" agouti pacas from their burrows, and food preparation techniques such as using salt and sunlight to make jerky from hunted game to extend the life of meat. However, hunting has become less important over the past decade following the rapid infrastructural development of the region.

Gold miners in Madre de Dios are often highly specialized technicians and there is a differ-ence between the unskilled *obrero* (labourer) and the specialized technician who can operate special machinery. As one miner stated,

There is too much competition now— you have to specialize to get work!

Gold miners with technical experience are in demand and, unlike *obreros*, miners who specialize in semi-mechanized operations keep a percentage of the gold they extract. They are referred to as "*traqueros*", "*gringeros*", "*carancheros*", "*pistoleros*" and "*torneros*", depending on their experience with different extractive machinery (e.g. the *traca, gringo, caranchera, chupadera*, etc.).

I first learned about the role of the unskilled *obrero* from Eduardo, a man who migrated from the Andean highlands to Madre de Dios in the 1980s. Eduardo was confronted with ever-growing health complications, including kidney problems and hypertension, which he attributed to a lifetime of earning low wages. We sat near the riverbank at one of his work sites in southeastern Peruvian Amazonia talking about his contingent labour employment as an artisanal gold miner. "*No soy minero, solo un obrero* [I'm not a miner, only a labourer]" he said in response to my query about why he is paid a wage rather than a shared percentage of gold profit.

Obreros perform numerous tasks such as hauling equipment, shovelling pebbles, pumping water, and cooking food for a fixed daily wage. Operators of various extractive sites sometimes hire labourers for a fixed wage instead of a percentage of extracted resource (e.g. gold, timber, or Brazil nuts). Such work is deemed unskilled, despite the experience and technical knowledge required to perform such work, and wages are normally low. However, working as an *obrero* guarantees Eduardo cash and mitigates the possibility of spending several unpaid days in the mines when no gold is found. To put it in the words of another miner, "*A veces trabajas por dos, tres semanas pero no encuentras ni mierda* [Sometimes you work for two or three weeks but you don't find shit]!" Gold miners often work for weeks without any luck but wage labour as an *obrero* means Eduardo can depend on the extra 300 *nuevos soles* (~$93 US) each month to complement other earning opportunities.

Another way to think about the concept of "skilled" labour is to consider how capitalist development takes advantage of pre-existing skills and abilities and "salvages" them, or brings them to the marketplace (Tsing, 2015b). For example, the informal employment of an *obrero* at a mining labour camp relies upon their upbringing in the Andes as a member of a household where basic construction skills were taught and technical knowledge was learned that enable *obreros* to perform a variety of tasks, such as assembling sluices for mining, building small tents for shelter, clearing trails, and so forth. Migration from the Andes to Amazon exemplifies that "unskilled" labourers are often multi-skilled and have gained useful knowledge through informal channels, all of which contribute to their successful relocation.

THE ROLE OF LABOUR MOBILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF *AN EXTRACTIVE ENCLAVE*

Populations across Peru since the Pre-Columbian period have "organized their livelihoods on the basis of the possibility of geographical mobility" (Takenaka, Paerregaard and Berg, 2010: 4). However, mobility- and migratory-based livelihoods in Madre de Dios have a particular history of precarity that originated when the region was transformed into an extractive enclave during the 19th-century Amazonian rubber boom. Understanding this history of precarity and migrant labour is paramount to understanding the present conditions and political eco-

nomic relations that continue to perpetuate insecurity and instability of many contemporary households.

In 1894, high quality *caucho* (rubber) was discovered in the region and *caucheros* (rubber barons) chartered an extractive economic system that laid the groundwork for the present (see Alexiades and Peluso, 2009; Reyna, 1942). Companies kidnapped and lured indigenous peoples from across Amazonia to tap rubber (see Varcárcel, 1993). This influx of imported coerced labour gave rise to the *ribereño* (mixed ancestry) society in Amazonia while European epidemics decimated indigenous Amazonian populations (Coomes, 1996; Naughton-Treves, 2004).

The rubber industry also attracted an intercontinental labour force to Madre de Dios. In addition to imported indigenous labour, Madre de Dios was also a destination for Japanese migrants as part of Peru's labour contract with Japan from 1899 to 1923. During the first two decades of the 20th century, Peru received some 20,000 Asian migrants or "coolies" (i.e. "unskilled" Asian labourer working abroad; see Goffe, 2014) to stimulate economic development in exports and industry (Blanchard, 1979). As Goffe (2014: 53) writes,

> The "coolie" remains, in many ways, an obscure historical figure—an undocumented figure—that haunts the colonial archive by its conspicuous absence. Between the continents, between the enslaved and the free, between Black and White, the "coolie," the late 19th, early 20th century Asian migrant labourer, a shadowy figure, occupies a liminal, unbound space.

At the request of the Inca rubber company, Morioka and the Meiji Colonization rubber companies brought around 500 Japanese migrants between 1905 and 1909 to tap rubber in the Tambopata region of Madre de Dios (Lausent-Hererra, 1987). Most who arrived at the region had worked on sugar and cotton plantations along the Pacific coast in Peru. However, with the falling price of rubber and consequent collapse of local farms, Japanese workers were released from their contracts and migrated to Brazil and Bolivia. Some remained in Madre de Dios and started local agricultural colonies, giving rise to one of Peru's largest Nikkei (Japanese-Peruvian) communities. Global rubber prices crashed after the British flooded the market with cheap rubber from plantations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka in what was arguably the first case of bio-piracy when Harry Wickham smuggled some 70,000 stolen rubber seeds from the Amazon to Southeast Asia. For this reason, rubber tapping was a short-lived extractive activity in Madre de Dios, though it left a lasting legacy socially, economically, and politically.

Although the rubber industry in Madre de Dios ended after the international price collapsed in 1912, its demise did not signify the end of extraction. Instead, extraction became a prototype emulated in the future. Since the collapse of rubber there has been a sequence of boom and bust economies around natural resources: furs and skins, mahogany and other timber, gold, hydrocarbon, and most recently, monocrops such as papaya and cacao. One of the consistent features across these booms is the influx of temporary migrant labour for the capture of natural resources.

Another pattern of precarity that has endured since the rubber boom era is debt bondage. Debt bondage is a mechanism that takes advantage of migrants' precarity by capitalizing on their pre-departure. In order to pay for the costs of migrating, migrants often borrow money at high interest rates. Bélanger (2014: 92) notes that credit may be an initial source of empowerment opportunity, but for many movers it can become a burden that "increases their precariousness and shapes their trajectories", which often leads to forced labour and coercion. Through the pernicious effects of debt bondage, migrants promise future wages to future

bosses to transport them from their communities in the Andes to work sites in the Amazon. There they effectively become sequestered in workplaces as their wages are gouged to pay debts amassed during their relocations (Ulmer, 2015).

Infrastructural development has played a critical role in opening up the region as an extractive enclave to migrant labour. As one miner described,

> It used to take a few weeks to travel here from *la sierra* [the highlands]—it was an expedition! Now it takes eight hours.

The construction of roadways in 1965 joined Andean and Amazonian regions of the country and enabled a logging boom in the north and gold mining to the south (Mosquera et al., 2009). During the years that followed, the Peruvian government offered blanket tax-exemption for individuals and companies to exploit gold in Madre de Dios. The state-run *Banco Minero* (Miner Bank) assisted in developing the region using grubstake loans to encourage gold exploration and by purchasing gold at prices that followed global market rates that rose until 1980 (Guillén-Marroquín, 1988). Migration in the region increased by over 40 percent during this period and coincided with record high gold prices that climbed precipitously in response to the oil crisis and floating international exchange rates when gold moved from a currency standard to a global tradable commodity.

The Transoceanic Highway, a multinational infrastructural development project, enabled migrant workers to access Madre de Dios from the neighbouring Andean departments of Cusco and Puno in as little as 8 to 12 hours (Southworth et al., 2011). The highway connects Brazilian and Peruvian traffic circuits and Atlantic and Pacific seaports and is part of the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). This multinational effort was designed to integrate resource rich areas in Amazonia such as the MAP frontier (an acronym for Madre de Dios in Peru, Acre in Brazil, and Pando in Bolivia) into greater chains of commerce and development plans (Southworth et al., 2011).

Highway development has contributed to land conflicts in the region, especially as the Transoceanic Highway enables opportunists greater access to remote properties. One landowner who has timber and gold concessions along the highway proclaimed, "The problem is *fantasmas* [phantasms]!" in reference to clandestine squatters who enter private land to extract resources. His complaint was a common refrain. Other landowners also described similar problems with *fantasmas* or "*colonos*" (colonists, or settlers) including an encounter that resulted in a machete fight to defend private lands from migrant settlers attempting to cultivate crops. Another landowner who had plans to cultivate papaya expressed concern that he would be held liable for illegal logging that was taking place on his parcels of land. Local residents often identified Andean migration, rather than the highway development, as the reason for these conflicts.

During an informal conversation, one resident from Madre de Dios complained that people from the Andes are "invaders" who bring their traditions to the Amazon. He argued,

> Why do they put their *toritos* on the houses? They are in the jungle, not *la sierra* [the highlands]!

and referred to the Andean practice of placing a pair of *toritos* (ceramic bulls) on a house's rooftop, a tradition from the Pucará area of the Cusco region in the Andean highlands.

However, the resident's complaint points to an important point about precarity and migration. The placing of a pair of *toritos* marks the finality of house construction. Before the house is finished, families tie flowers to rebar frames where additional floors have yet to be constructed. The bouquets are believed to bring growth, "*florecer*" (to blossom, or flourish). Once the second floor is finished, the household places the *toritos* on the rooftops.

> Then, it's *techado* [roofed, or enclosed, or complete],

added another resident. Some miners do not build their homes in Madre de Dios, but instead remit to their families in the Andes and elsewhere. One artisanal miner described how his compatriots reinvest in their home communities. He informed me,

> I have miner friends in Huapetue [a large mining site in Madre de Dios] who have homes in Lima, Cusco, Arequipa, and other places.

While precarity is a major dimension of the migrant experience, another side is the promise of growth, completion, security, and new opportunities and to rest at night in a home that is *techado*.

Some locals refer to Madre de Dios as a "colony" of Cusco, noting that most of the population are migrants or second generation from the bordering Andean departments of Cuzco and Puno. Former Peruvian president Belaúnde Terry (1994) invoked a mix of patrimonial and populist rhetoric to encourage a "colonization of Peru by the Peruvians". Internal migration between the Andean highlands and Amazonian lowlands in Peru requires consideration of the role of the state, which has received little attention in scholarship on mining (Hirst and Thompson, 1995: 409; also see Ballard and Banks, 2013). However, the nation-state is shaped by resource extraction (Shafer, 1994), and Peru provides a good example of this phenomenon and how it relates to migrant labour. What is referred to as the "new extraction" of Andes-Amazonia Peru entails a vision of the region as a vast opportunity for development in hydrocarbons and mining, an idea promoted by former Peruvian President Alan Garcia (see Bebbington, 2009). Factors that have created ideal global investment opportunities in Peru include growing global demand for hydrocarbons and minerals as well as the emerging economies of China and India in the Far East. The Andean nations of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia similarly approach the political ecology of extraction as an issue of patrimony, that resources belong to the nation, not to local or indigenous populations (Bebbington, 2009: 19).

PRECARITY AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES OF LABOUR

The precarity of migrants is in the context of broader national and global political economic structures (Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2018; Rigg and Oven, 2015). As Porst and Sakdapolrak (2018: 36) explain, a translocal perspective makes this possible in part because migrants are understood as:

> [E]mbedded at both the place of destination and the place of origin at the same time. Therefore the risk and vulnerability context at the place of origin of a migrant has an impact on their everyday life at the place of destination.

Andean migrants in the Peruvian Amazon face several everyday risks and vulnerabilities working as artisanal gold miners. Translocality helps to understand how precarity motivates migration as well as its outcome. During my fieldwork, there were over 200 military operations in Madre de Dios. I arrived at the field during a major labour strike in which riot police, armed troops, and thousands of miners occupied the streets of the region's capital city in Puerto Maldonado. Tensions escalated over new anti-mining decrees, which slowed work for several weeks.

After the strike, I travelled upriver to interview rural labourers and reunited with Juan Carlos—an Andean highlander. Juan Carlos was currently working as a *motorista* and as maintenance staff for an environmental organization that was developing an ecotourism business. One evening, he informed me that he planned to return to gold mining because he needed to earn more money than he was currently making (1,000 *nuevos soles* or ~$315 US per month). He had three children to support and his wife urged him to find better paying work elsewhere. I asked him, "How long would you need to mine gold to earn a month's salary in conservation?" He pulled out his cell phone and opened a calculator app. Text messages from his friends in La Pampa described extracting around 30 grams per a day. He would keep 25 percent of the gold and the machinery owner keeps the other 75 percent to pay operational expenses such as fuel, loan payment on the mining machinery, equipment transportation costs, and additional *obreros* for clearing beaches of vegetation to set up the operation. The quarter portion of an average 30-gram extraction is 7.5 grams of gold and is typically split between three miners. Juan Carlos calculated that he could keep 2–3 grams for himself, earning around S/350 (~$100 US) per day. He answered my query: "I only have to work for about one week, maybe less."

Combined with the declining price of gold and the escalation of military interdictions of mining operations in the region, the risks associated with mining are higher than ever. When I first met Juan Carlos, he had just left work in mining and decided to sign a 3-month contract with an environmental organization that runs an ecotourism venture on protected land. Extraction and conservation are complementary for Juan Carlos, who has shifted between gold mining and conservation for over a decade. This complementary relationship between extraction and conservation exemplifies how workers adapt to mixed economies and parallel paths of development and are unencumbered by distinctions like legal/illicit when it comes to work. Gold mining enables Juan Carlos and others to earn quick cash in between more reliable, formal, contractual jobs.

I observed Juan Carlos shift from mining to conservation for a 3-month contract, then return to mining for one month at the end of his contract. Later he returned to his *chacra* (family farm) to harvest crops for sale. Then he returned to conservation for another 3-month contract. After this contract ended, I ran into him in town and he was driving a mototaxi while looking for formal employment again. Several months after I had returned to the US, I saw online that he had found a job at *Gobierno Regional de Madre de Dios* (GOREMAD), the office of the regional government. After speaking with him online, I learned he returned to gold mining after his contract at GOREMAD, and then went to work again for a conservation organization. These shifts and moves reveal that contingency, low wages, and familial pressures coalesce to shape decisions about internal migration and about short-term work in extraction.

The agency of labourers and their capacity to seek earning opportunities is restricted; broader external forces influence decisions about labour choices. The declining price of gold combined with new laws that rendered informal mining illicit made it difficult for Juan Carlos

to assess whether the risks of returning to gold mining were worthwhile. Would he have to hide the expensive motor that powers the mining operation if police and marines arrive to fire-bomb the site? Would he be convicted and sent to prison if caught? These concerns support the definition of precarity as both "an ontological experience and social-economic condition" (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008: 55). Precarity is not merely defined by contingent labour, short-term contracts, or flexible labour pools of workers, but, in the case of Juan Carlos, also entails the realities and consequences of moving between low-wage and high-wage work, legal and illicit economies of labour, and the pressures of providing for a growing family in which kinship ties are strained by socioeconomic stressors.

Precarity is compounded by shifting legalities that render certain kinds of work illicit. During my fieldwork in Peru, the legal work status of most gold miners in Madre de Dios shifted from informal to illicit after a series of decrees targeted mining protocols, alluvial extraction, and fuel transportation. For example, gold miners in Madre de Dios were unable to file permits to formally work in extraction by the deadline in 2014, which shifted the status of thousands of miners in the region from "informal" to "illegal" and codified their labour as a criminal offense (thus provoking the major strike that occurred when I returned to conduct fieldwork in 2014). Working in extraction can be too risky or costly with ongoing military interdictions throughout the region.

This legal dimension of precarity underscores an important relationship between illegal or illicit activities and state power, a relatively understudied subject in the social sciences (Campbell and Heyman, 2015). Divisions and essentialist categories like legality and illegality are "simultaneously black and white, shades of gray" (Heyman, 1999: 11). Anthropological scholarship has questioned the dichotomous conceptualizations through ethnographies that blur the lines between licit and illicit worlds (Galemba, 2008; Heyman, 2013; Heyman and Smart, 1999; Millar, 2008, 2014; Veloso, 2012). Contingent labourers who migrate between highland and lowland regions and licit and illicit activities further challenge notions that these are divergent or contradictory worlds. From the perspective of migrant households, moving between informal/illicit/shadow economies in extraction and formal employment is part of an integrated strategy to adjust to the shifting risks of their precarious lives whether in the Andean highlands or Amazonian lowlands.

The legal ramifications of mining impact a significant portion of the population in Madre de Dios and beyond. The Peruvian government's national office of statistics and demographic information, INEI (*Instituto Nacional de Estatística e Informática*), reported that mining accounted for just under half of the region's GDP (42.7 percent), in 2015. Mining constituted its principle economic activity followed by commerce (11.7 percent), agriculture (6.4 percent), hunting and forestry (6.4 percent), construction (6.4 percent), manufacturing (5.2 percent), and several other sectors. In other words, the most prominent economic activity in Madre de Dios was illicit, which puts a significant portion of the labour force in legal uncertainty. Although gold mining accounts for just under half of the region's GDP, this percentage does not reflect the thousands of households in other parts of Peru that are also supported by gold mining in the region. In fact, during interviews with local residents of households with multiple generations of members from Madre de Dios, several individuals described gold mining as something that is done primarily by "people from the sierra" who take their earnings back to their respective communities instead of "investing in" or "developing" Madre de Dios. For them, gold mining essentially symbolizes an activity done by and for outsiders.

CONCLUSION

Precarity can be a motivation to migrate as well as the outcome of migration (Takenaka, Paerregaard and Berg, 2010: 4), meaning that sometimes movers end up confronting challenges to security in their destinations as a result of relocation even when similar conditions drove them to relocate in the first place. Some Andean migrants experience even greater insecurities when they arrive at Madre de Dios, especially those who participate in the illicit labour market around gold extraction. The simultaneous fears of illness or death (due to unsanitary/ dangerous working conditions; see Ulmer, 2015, 2020), legal retribution for the illicit status of their work, and sustained financial insecurity resulting from inconsistent and contingent labour opportunities highlight the broader conditions that exacerbate precarity following migration.

In this chapter, I drew from ethnographic fieldwork in Madre de Dios, Peru to illuminate the lived experience of migrant gold miners and the historical processes that influence their precarity. I argued that internal migration in Peru confounds the binary framework typical in migration discourse, which often invokes dichotomous terms such as legal/illegal, documented/undocumented, and focuses on formal political subjectivity. In contrast, internal migration demands an analysis that attends to nuanced experiences of internal migrants, which underscore how orphans, Quechua-speaking *campesinos* who lack national identification, and other precarious individuals who relocate often live like foreigners in their own country despite being Peruvian citizens.

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28. Refugees on the move: resettlement and onward migration in 'final' destination countries

Marnie Shaffer and Emma Stewart

Refugees present a unique challenge for academics conducting migration studies, for practitioners providing services, and for politicians developing policies to serve this population. Refugees are often depicted as a unitary category of movers who, because of their victimhood, lack autonomy and survive through the generosity of rich countries or any host in a location where refugees find themselves living (Cabot, 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; Johnson, 2011; Ongenaert and Joye, 2019; Zetter, 2007). Refugees are portrayed as a problem in need of a solution. Refugees are a global humanitarian obligation that many countries, in today's anti-immigration climate, do not want to be responsible for. Countries that accept refugees feel pinched by space and the resources required to absorb these populations. Many of these countries' leaders and citizens increasingly support distributing the burden of refugee resettlement more equitably among nation states, though there is little agreement over how many refugees this should include. Resettlement implies a permanent solution to a person's insecurity and to a refugee's mobility. The goal of resettlement is to stop movement in search of a secure home. Resettlement is supposed to demonstrate a host's investment in an individual as part of a country's duty to the global community and as a United Nations signatory, with the expectation that in return the individual will cease to move and instead invest in his or her adopted community.

Angst surrounding refugee resettlement, and migration generally, has proliferated with the rise of nationalism in recent years and continues to pose a significant threat to the lives and livelihoods of not only refugees but also of those already living in resettlement countries. Shifting attitudes toward refugees, especially those coming from Islamic countries, have reduced Western appetites for resettlement and other migration schemes that benefit individuals from poor or violence-torn societies. For example, the United States admitted nearly 85,000 refugees in fiscal year 2016, the final year of Barack Obama's presidency. Under the Trump administration's policy to ban migrants from countries with some of the world's greatest humanitarian needs, resettlement numbers have decreased. A total of 53,691 refugees were admitted to the US for resettlement during 2017 (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2019), Trump's first year in office, while 2019 was capped at no more than 30,000 individuals. To put this in a global context, there were just under 71 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide in 2018, nearly 26 million of whom were refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that 92,400 refugees were resettled to 25 countries in 2018. The US absorbed 22,900 of those individuals (UNHCR, 2019b). As current US policy tightens its reins and continues to limit new refugees entering the country, global resettlement numbers have plummeted. This decline has a profound impact on the lives of those already resettled in the US. Many refugees live without their spouses, children and the daily partnership as well as support of their loved ones who are unable to travel for reunification. These outcomes are

the direct result of policies that will continue to keep families separated. The US will admit up to 18,000 refugees during fiscal year 2020 (White House, 2019), which will only exacerbate the problem.

With the advent of the European Union (EU) 'refugee crisis' in 2015, member states were faced with the challenge of significant refugee flows seeking protection and settlement at the gates of Fortress Europe. Except for Germany, a country that accepted nearly one million refugees, the response across Europe was lukewarm at best and sometimes uncaringly aggressive, particularly among border states. The desire to control national borders and limit the number of immigrants and refugees entering the country also played an important role in the UK's decision to leave the EU. Indeed, parts of the UK Brexit campaign focused on the fear of 'others' and promoted an exclusionary politics of identity as a means to endorse separation from the EU. More recently, the resettlement of refugee populations continues to be politicized in the EU context. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has threatened to 'flood' Europe by opening the doors and sending 3.7 million refugees to the continent in response to EU member states critiquing Turkish military action in Syria. The politically charged issue of refugees and their resettlement plays into emotionally charged views of nationalism, racism, xenophobia, exceptionalism, culture, identity, economics, and the rising fear of globalization's impact.

Security, and its existence at multiple scales, is crucial to understanding these issues. Governments use 'security' as a justification for denying refugee resettlement, implying refugees are national security threats to societies and their presence may lead to violence. At the local level, refugees, like other migrants, are perceived as economic threats who 'steal' jobs from citizens and deplete the social resources that are provided by the state to its natural-born citizens. And within some communities, refugees increasingly are discussed as cultural threats, bringing rituals, practices, and belief systems with them that threaten the continuity of a host country's cultural core. The unfounded belief that refugees refuse to integrate into their adopted communities typically leads to host societies feeling threatened (Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013; Murray and Marx, 2013). Apprehension is tied to perceptions of social, cultural, environmental, and economic insecurity that citizens feel when refugees arrive at their doorstep. For example, the faces of neighbourhoods change as immigrant populations assert their presence by building their communities (Robinson, 2010), such as through the establishment of ethnic food stores, restaurants, or places of worship. Countries that host large numbers of refugees and migrants generally – especially those movers who are culturally dissimilar to their adopted home in significant ways – feel increasingly insecure about the presence of foreigners and the impact they will have on society.

Migration discourse often paints refugees with a broad brush, neglecting the critical importance of culture, context, and the nuances that shape human mobility. Decisions, even in forced migration, are influenced or determined by gender, age, health, religion, families, households, and other structural factors (Betts, 2013; FitzGerald and Arar, 2018). Luck, opportunity, economics, politics, and geography also play their part. Collectively, who moves, where they go, and how they get there are parts of an incredibly complex web of actors and circumstances working in tandem to shape migration outcomes. Refugees' willingness to move and reasons for migrating can be understood not only by these practical explanations, but also by the central role culture plays in conceptualizing movement and realizing resettlement. For example, Somalis generally attribute their propensity to move on their nomadic heritage, suggesting they emanate from a culture of migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011). Migration is

tied to identity; it is part and parcel of what it means to be a Somali. The spirit of migration was well-established long before the Somali state collapsed in 1991 and pushed millions of Somalis into the diaspora. This connection to migration continues to inspire mobility among those who left the country and resettled elsewhere decades ago.

Refugee movement is a fluid process that does not end after leaving home and the homeland. For most refugees, migration is a continuous process that takes individuals, families, and households to new destinations that may not have been part of a planned journey. Traversing the realities of smuggling routes and frustrated by strict (and often fluctuating) border controls and restrictions, the search for a new home can lead to years-long movement through countries or across continents, considering multiple options and strategizing various routes to reach new destinations. Refugees often draw on social or kinship networks to make decisions about where to go and how to access opportunities that facilitate movement. The act of moving is guided using networks and existing knowledge about migration journeys (Shaffer, Ferrato and Jinnah, 2018). Consequently, what are perceived as destination countries, such as those in Europe or the US where asylum cases are granted or refugee status has been obtained, sometimes do not lead to permanent resettlement.

This essay seeks to accomplish several goals. First, we present refugees as sharing their migration objectives with other categories of movers. Second, we discuss refugee migration trajectories and how movers determine and arrive at their planned destinations. Finally, we discuss the issue of permanence and what it means to be resettled in a final destination country and in order to challenge the sedentary bias inherent in refugee resettlement policies. To do so, we explore the issue of culture and migration through the lens of internal migration in developed (UK) and less developed contexts (South Africa). We integrate discussions of culture throughout the chapter and show that migration decisions are grounded in the family and engage households as well as communities. We consider not only the cultural context of ethnic movers and their motivations to move on or stay, but also the ways in which receiving societies – cities and neighbourhoods – perceive and act toward new, foreign residents. Everyday interactions with citizens greatly influence the desire to settle in a city and promote feelings of home, or they can push refugees into ethnic enclaves within a particular city or country.

REFUGEES AND OTHER MOVERS

Migration studies and migration discourse generally have long separated refugees from other types of movers, distinguishing the two based on assumptions about the degree of choice involved in the decision to move. Indeed, refugees have been excluded from general migration discourse since they were first recognized as a conceptually distinct social category at the end of World War II. Nevertheless, refugees are not unlike other types of migrants. Migration is about finding security and working toward the best interests of individuals and households. Moving in search of security, be it physical, social, or economic, compels people to make decisions about where they can go in search of opportunities. In this way, refugees are no different from others who migrate. Differences lie in the ability or perceived ability to feel or be secure. Forced migration is often used interchangeably with refugee migration, implying there are few or limited choices to be made, but several cases provide examples of people who use an opportunity such as violence to move and others – Syrians, for example – who do not.

Cultures of migration (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011) apply to refugees just as much as they do to economic migrants.

Like other migrants, refugees are situated in the wider socio-cultural context of the host society but are also embedded in complex social networks. For example, Somalis started moving to South Africa when Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994. Migration accelerated with the passage of the South Africa Refugee Rights Act of 1998. The Act granted asylum seekers entry into South Africa and the right to apply for refugee status. The different life experiences of movers – and perhaps even their motivations for moving – have had, over time, a profound effect on the Somalis living in South Africa. Somali refugees who fled their homes 25 years ago are distinguished from those who left East Africa five years ago. Those early movers are better integrated into South African society; they arrived before anti-immigrant sentiment inspired waves of xenophobic violence across the country; and they had access to and seized different economic opportunities. These differences often defined and granted early movers more powerful positions within their communities and broader social networks. More recent arrivals to South Africa carry the baggage of displacement and decades of violence in Somalia as well as a cultural restructuring of Somali identity that included a more conservative interpretation (and practice) of Islam. As clusters of Somali communities have grown in the country, so too has their visibility as foreigners and the perception that they are economic threats to citizens living in the cities and townships where Somali traders and entrepreneurs work.

For many movers, migration is an issue of security, and movement is tied largely to a search for new opportunities to innovate, participate, contribute, and develop themselves. In the case of Somalis, physical and/or economic insecurity led them to South Africa, and those same insecurities compelled many to continue their journeys elsewhere to places where they can feel safe from structural and xenophobic violence and free to explore economic opportunities. While circumstances shape refugee journeys, which we cover in the next section, culture and social connections play a key role in determining where and why refugees move in temporary settlement spaces or after arriving in final destination resettlement countries. Somali communities grew in South Africa through social networks and chain migration. Those who planned to stay temporarily may have decided to remain in the country and vice versa.

Like other migrants, refugees often depend on their ethnic communities for practical and emotional support while living in exile. For example, a growing number of refugees living in the UK were dispersed across the country on a no-choice basis after applying for asylum. The UK's dispersal policy was implemented in 2000 under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, a national policy aimed at spreading the 'burden' of housing asylum seekers across the country. Whether those individuals stayed in their dispersal locations or moved on once they received their refugee status is tied to several factors, including cultural traditions, ethnicities, and practical needs such as employment. In our ESRC-funded research, we found that Eritrean refugees are especially mobile as they tap into their social networks for assistance finding jobs. This is a common theme of most refugees who were dispersed to smaller cities but subsequently migrate away from those locations. The desire to move to a larger city (such as Manchester or London) due to the presence of social networks as well as employment opportunities was also observed among Iranians, who similarly appear to be relatively mobile (Stewart and Shaffer, 2015). It is not only the existence of ethnic communities that is important for attracting refugees as they relocate, but that the ethnic communities they seek play a key role in obtaining employment (Cheung and Phillimore, 2014; Stewart and Shaffer, 2015).

Refugees from countries such as Eritrea and Somalia tend to have lower levels of English proficiency and fewer qualifications on arrival to the UK and are more likely to need assistance in finding employment (Cebulla, Daniel and Zurawan, 2010). Moving onward is a primary way to access support provided by their ethnic communities. Members of those communities often help with securing jobs and providing the tools that lead to integration. Conversely, good English skills may decrease the tendency to migrate toward ethnic communities due to self-sufficiency, a factor which we will explore among Zimbabweans later. Overall, these patterns of movement are not dissimilar to chain migration flows that have been observed at the national scale and documented extensively within the field of migration studies. Key motivations for migrating, which include moving for employment opportunities, joining family members, and moving toward pre-existing ethnic communities, are findings that resonate with existing knowledge on immigrants' and ethnic minority populations' internal migration (Kritz and Nogle, 1994; Zavodny, 1999). The culture of migration observed among refugees is strong evidence for thinking about patterns of internal refugee flows alongside other types of migration.

MIGRATION TRAJECTORIES

Migration discourse among politicians and in the news generally would have us believe that all movers have clear, well-defined end points in mind when they begin their sojourns. While many migrants may have a planned route and an ideal destination as their goal, just as many movers are looking for security and a place – any place – that provides them with an opportunity to call it home. Sometimes the first stop on a migration journey is or becomes the destination; other times it is simply a place to pause before moving on. Sometimes a perceived destination changes, before or after it has been reached by a refugee (Shaffer, Ferrato and Jinnah, 2018). Cultural attitudes within receiving societies, in tandem with immigration policies, initial assistance from the host, and the socioeconomic climate, can alter perceptions of a (re)settlement destination and make it more or less appealing as a place to call home (Kibreab, 2004). Each of these components influence household outcomes, sociocultural arrangements, and onward migration and resettlement decisions. These same conditions may impel refugees to continue moving within or beyond a country's borders.

Conventional wisdom has it that refugees should move to a country neighbouring their homeland. Indeed, objections to refugee resettlement globally include questioning why individuals cannot simply go somewhere closer to home. The reality is that the majority of the world's refugees either are internally displaced or hosted in neighbouring, less developed countries. The UNHCR estimates that about 80 percent of refugees live in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. For example, the top refugee-hosting countries are currently Turkey (3.7 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.2 million), Sudan (1.1 million), and Germany (1.1 million) (UNHCR, 2019a). Except for Germany, the top refugee destinations are in less developed countries that are geographically proximate to refugee source countries. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the UNHCR 'spreads the burden' of resettlement to global destinations or why refugees seize opportunities to travel further afield. From a refugee resettlement standpoint, logistically and practically, it is not possible for a single or even multiple neighbouring countries to absorb and support thousands or millions of fleeing refugees crossing borders when a crisis warrants mass migration. There is a lack of social

and financial resources in most potential destination countries, including housing, food, jobs, support, hospitals, schools, and so on to manage high volumes of movers. While remaining in temporary accommodation in those countries may expedite resettlement elsewhere, many migrants will continue their journey independently in the hopes of finding a new home.

About one-quarter of the world's refugees are living in sub-Saharan Africa. Conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and other countries have led to internal displacement and refugee crises across the continent. Urban centres and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, as well as cities in South Africa (where there are no camps) and the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, have become destinations for refugees who are motivated to continue their journey or wish to wait for conflicts to be resolved so they can return to their home communities and rebuild their lives. Onward migration to Europe and North America is limited due to increasingly restrictive immigration policies, not to mention the exorbitant costs and logistical challenges associated with reaching those countries in the absence of legal trajectories. Moreover, individuals desperate to reach the shores of Europe face a perilous journey and often experience tragic consequences. For these reasons, many refugees stay close to home. Referring to the Somali example again, they and other refugee groups have been enticed by the relative ease of reaching South Africa and the promise of legal refugee status once they arrive – a contrast from other African countries that do not offer settlement or legal recognition to asylum seekers, leaving them vulnerable to detention. South Africa offers refugees critically important economic opportunities for business entrepreneurs hoping to earn enough profit to provide for their families locally and abroad, making the country irresistible to those weary of instability at home, limited opportunities in other parts of Africa, and desperate for legal status (Crush et al., 2017; Jinnah, 2010; Sadouni, 2009; Shaffer, 2018).

The degree of cultural (dis)similarity between refugees and their hosts is one significant factor influencing migration outcomes (Kibreab, 2004). Certainly, the cultural context of migration flows is crucial in shaping mobility patterns at the sub-national level. In the UK, refugees often experience their first encounters with racism in dispersal or temporary accommodation, shaping their perception of the cities and influencing onward migration decisions. In our research, we found that children and youths perpetrate racist behaviour in schools, parks, and toward residents in their neighbourhoods, which can influence onward migration decisions (Stewart and Shaffer, 2015). Racist behaviour is prevalent on local buses (from bus drivers and passengers), resulting in refugees feeling unwelcome. Three different Somali women living in Glasgow recounted how bus drivers were standoffish and often passed them by without stopping, despite their request to board the bus. The women also spoke of negative attitudes and the racist language used by fellow bus passengers toward them. While some refugees accept this as part of living in the UK, others do not feel welcome and act to move to neighbourhoods, or cities, that they perceive as more diverse and multi-cultural. In post 9/11 Britain, Muslim refugees face double discrimination as they live with the label 'refugee' as well as their religious identity. This tension drives refugees to situate themselves within their ethnic or religious communities or relocate to different cities in the country that they perceive are more diverse and hospitable. This also can lead to onward migration to other countries within the EU or further afield.

By contrast, other refugee groups have not felt isolated in resettlement due to cultural dissimilarities with their hosts. Zimbabweans in the UK have generally preferred to integrate in their dispersal locations and have not migrated toward other Zimbabweans. Zimbabweans tend

to be highly skilled, hold educational qualifications, and are fluent in English (Bloch, 2006), making them more independent and less reliant on existing ethnic communities. Interestingly, many view such independence from co-ethnic communities as an important step toward successful integration in UK society (Stewart and Shaffer, 2015). These outcomes can be explained by, and traced to, historical connections, education, English language, and previous knowledge of the UK. The legacy of colonialism has influenced recent refugee experiences in the country. With a lack of Zimbabwean communities and organizations, there is a tendency for refugees to view the challenges of adaptation as an individual rather than a collective responsibility. Additionally, many Zimbabweans entered the UK legally as visitors or students and later claimed asylum when they were unable to return home (Pasura, 2013). This means that many Zimbabweans live for a considerable time in the UK before claiming asylum and being dispersed following UK policy. Along with close ties to Britain through friends and relatives, this provides them with extensive knowledge about the UK system and locations around the country, perhaps leaving them better placed to make informed decisions about where to move.

RESETTLEMENT AND THE PERCEPTION OF PERMANENCE

It is assumed that refugees who are accepted for resettlement in a third country or who are granted asylum will see the security in having legalized, permanent status as synonymous with halting migration, ending the journey, and finding contentedness in a new home. But literature on mixed migration intentions and motivations of migrant and refugee groups would intuitively suggest the opposite. The reality for many refugees is a lack of permanence and the tendency to keep on moving either internally or internationally. Having been uprooted from 'home', for some movers there is a continual striving to settle and find a better home. This can be a long process involving years of movement and resettlement. In this section, therefore, we challenge the sedentary bias of settlement policies by shining a light on the culture of migration among refugee populations.

Many countries have implemented dispersal policies to control the resettlement of refugees within their borders. Several European countries have introduced these policies to 'spread the burden' of housing refugee populations such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Like the UK, these systems are primarily housing-led with less focus on long-term integration issues. Onward migration studies have identified key reasons for moving after dispersal, including employment gains, family reunification, and the desire to live within co-ethnic communities, although the importance of factors can vary for different nationality groups. The classic UK study of Vietnamese resettlement found that half of the dispersed refugees moved onward to London, Birmingham, and Manchester to join existing Vietnamese communities (Robinson and Hale, 1989). EU citizenship and freedom of movement also means refugees can choose to live and work in any European country, such as Somalis who have relocated to the UK after dispersal in the Netherlands (van Liempt, 2011). Likewise, as part of refugees' adjustment in new societies, resettled refugees in the US, Canada, and Australia have moved internally from rural and urban locations to gain social and emotional support, as well as for economic reasons (Harte, Childs and Hastings, 2011; Newbold, 2007; Simich, Beiser and Mawani, 2002).

Pre-existing ethnic communities provide new refugees with material, financial, and emotional assistance that is critical to long-term settlement. Refugees locate in ethnic clusters in order to provide mutual support and integration assistance. Being settled in locations with no pre-existing ethnic community can cause refugees to feel isolated, lonely, and vulnerable to racist abuse. Harassment often provides the impetus to onward migrate toward family members and ethnic communities (Robinson, Andersson and Musterd, 2003). For example, Somalis in the Netherlands have regrouped and moved to large Dutch cities as well as across Europe for employment, for educational opportunities, and to join existing communities of co-nationals (van Liempt, 2011). Resettled refugees in Canada also have been found to relocate and move toward ethnic communities to overcome a sense of isolation and language barriers. Secondary migration is prompted by a desire to reconstitute family and social support networks to ensure emotional and material stability (Simich, Beiser and Mawani, 2002), factors that are essential for integration.

'Integration' has become a buzzword for governments addressing the issues refugees face in their countries, such as making a life in a foreign land with markedly different social, cultural, and economic realities than their hosts. There is extensive debate over what is meant by integration (Castles et al., 2002), but in refugee studies key work has examined structural integration and acculturation, with Ager and Strang's (2008) seminal work identifying a conceptual framework for refugee integration. The challenge for refugees is in adapting to ideological and sometimes religious differences as well as in learning languages and navigating new ways of managing daily life. States increasingly perceive cultural dissimilarities as problematic, as something that requires a solution and not as diversity worthy of celebration (Dempster and Hargrave, 2017; Esses, Hamilton and Gaucher, 2017). We argue that integration is closely linked to mobility and helps to explain why some refugees migrate to pre-existing ethnic communities.

What does this mean for refugee resettlement and the permanence of a destination country? Migration is a fluid process and culture influences the ways in which individuals conceive, plan, and execute their journeys. Cultural knowledge can drive refugee strategies for building a life in resettlement spaces or moving on when realities fall short of expectations. Individuals lacking these tools often lean on their co-ethnic communities for support to survive in their new surroundings. Those who are equipped with assets that align them with their hosts may find it easier to settle in a new space. Perceptions that a receiving society has of ethnic groups may determine the treatment and services refugees receive from their hosts. These relationships are as varied as the individuals who experience them. Resettlement dreams may involve global locations, but in practice there are several moving parts that guide where individuals go, how they get there, and the interactions that result from those decisions. Culture may influence those experiences and drive individual refugees to feel content in their new home or to continue searching. It is a critically important piece to understanding insecurity, the nature of mobility, and the complexity of human relationships.

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29. Where is home? Navigating the complexities of refugee repatriation

Carrie Perkins

INTRODUCTION

Far removed from the breathless coverage of an emergent refugee crisis sit those who have waited in protracted refugee situations for years and sometimes even decades of their lives. Fading in and out of the public discourse with sporadic headlines urging readers to remember the victims of a forgotten civil war, they bide their time and contemplate the future. It's within these lengthy periods of time that return to a home country is both conceptualized and reimagined by those who were forced to flee. Often the problems that led to their flight are complex in ways that preclude a tidy resolution by way of one of UNHCR's packaged "durable solutions". Rather, resolution is messy and the realities of seeking refuge in a foreign country force many to rethink what repatriation actually means.

Repatriation is an abstract concept, one of political ideology that promises to reunite citizens with the state that betrayed them. In practice, simply returning to one's country of birth does nothing to "repatriate" the individual to a homeland that is often vastly different than the one they left. As Hammond (1999) has described, "Many returnees … do not see the object of repatriation as the 'rebuilding' or 'reconstruction' of their lives. Likewise, they often do not aspire to reclothe themselves in the culture of the past or to rejoin the community that they left" (p. 235). Rather, for many refugees who have forged new ties in their country of asylum or resettled to third countries, ideas of what constitutes a homeland are linked to the places that offer a sense of belonging. In this way, for repatriation to truly work as a resolution for a protracted refugee situation, multiple avenues of return have to exist that recognize and acknowledge the atrocities that surround these realities. Solutions must go beyond the linear trajectories towards a perceived homeland and include the multiple paths that may weave around or join with other routes, to create a circuitous, dynamic system.

In this chapter, I trace the emergence of voluntary repatriation as a globally accepted durable solution to protracted refugee situations and, as such, the preferred outcome of protracted displacement by the international refugee regime. Additionally, I discuss the inherent failings in framing repatriation as a natural solution to displacement and instead point to a more nuanced understanding of what it means to shed one's "refugeehood". Drawing on my fieldwork with Karen refugees living on the Thai–Myanmar border, I look at some of the specific barriers refugees face in voluntary repatriation while showing how return is especially challenging for those who have spent decades in exile.

THE EMERGENCE OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION

The goal of refugee protection is ultimately to find a long-term solution for displacement that allows refugees to live their lives free from persecution in peace and dignity. The universally accepted standard to achieve this goal has primarily focused on the protocol developed by UNHCR for resolving refugee situations. This protocol entails three primary options known as "durable solutions" which include: (1) integration into the country of first asylum, (2) third-country resettlement, and (3) voluntary repatriation. The enactment of durable solutions is often deeply complex and rooted in their own geo-political contexts and it is also worth noting that there have been recent efforts to combine the approaches outlined above, or to introduce labour migration as a fourth durable solution. However, voluntary repatriation is still often regarded as the hallmark signal of a conflict's conclusion as well as a significant phase of the post-conflict peace-building process (Black and Gent, 2006; Crisp, 2004). It is also generally seen as the most cost-effective, logistically efficient and logical conclusion to a mass displacement of people.

Voluntary repatriation efforts are supported by the fact that the right to return to one's country of origin has become accepted as a fundamental human right. This is explicitly stated in article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and notes that everyone has the right to "leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." While the Declaration is not legally binding, it has been influential in the shaping of national and international laws, treaties, and constitutions for more than 70 years. Most notably this influence can be seen in UNHCR's direct involvement with local refugee policy concerning return and implementation of voluntary repatriation programs such as those currently operating inside the nine camps along the Thai–Myanmar border.

The UNHCR's role in voluntary repatriation can be traced to its inception, when in December of 1949, the United Nations General Assembly established a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees. The *Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*[1] was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14th, 1950 and became effective as of January 1st, 1951. Among the duties assigned to UNHCR, the Statute outlined the conditions for return and called upon governments to cooperate by "assisting the High Commissioner in (her) efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees" (para. 1). The initial directives outlined in the Statute for UNHCR are significant in that they laid the groundwork for the guiding principles of future repatriation policy. These include the tenets that: (1) repatriation should always be voluntary; (2) UNHCR, governments and private organizations (NGOs) all have a joint role to play; and (3) voluntary repatriation should be both facilitated and promoted to ensure the safety and security of refugees.

Over the past several decades, UNHCR's role in voluntary repatriation has expanded significantly. Within their current mandate, a much more comprehensive effort has been made to ensure all stages of repatriation allow refugees to return in safety and dignity. UNHCR also plays a pivotal role in the coordination of states and other partners to promote and facilitate voluntary repatriation programs. In this regard they have adopted a more inclusive approach in hopes of bringing refugee voices to high-level policy discussions of status. For example, UNHCR has initiated several tripartite commissions that they describe as "useful mechanisms for the official recognition of refugee priorities and barriers to return, as well as ensuring refugee participation in planning and peace processes".[2] These have led to several signed

tripartite agreements between host country governments and UNHCR for the voluntary repatriation of refugees such as Nigerian refugees in Cameroon (2017), Sudanese refugees in Chad (2017) and Afghan refugees in Pakistan (2016).

While voluntary repatriation has indeed been the most common and preferred durable solution, it has not always been successful. Lubkemann (2008) has argued that return is neither natural nor a self-evident post-conflict outcome for refugees. Rather, he notes that prolonged wars dramatically alter the social, economic and political landscapes of the country refugees fled, essentially making the home they knew a very different place. Additionally, the new social and economic connections made over many years in exile can tie refugees to their areas of wartime resettlement and lead to reluctance or outright refusal to return.

Refuting repatriation as the most natural solution to displacement is further strengthened by literature that offers a critical analysis of existing systems of return. Of particular relevance to refugees who have spent decades in exile is research concerning how time and the protractedness of status relates to the conceptualizations of home. Hammond (1999) has pointed out how the discourse surrounding repatriation in humanitarian policy often uses terms such as "reintegration" and "rehabilitation". This discourse is problematic as the concept of "return" and "returnee" imply that by entering one's native country a person is returning to something familiar. She notes that the terms above are "riddled with value judgments that reflect a segmentary, sedentary idea of how people ought to live, what their relation to their homeland should be, and ultimately how they should go about constructing their lives once the period of exile ends" (p. 230). In essence, language that utilizes the "re" prefix communicates that refugees should somehow go backwards in time and resume life as it was before becoming a refugee. For many refugees born in exile, this is an impossible task. How can one repatriate to a country they have never seen? Along this same vein, Malkki (1995) has argued that assumptions of refugees often imply that they lose their national identity when they flee, but this way of thinking fails to consider refugees' capacity to develop new social identities and life strategies. For many refugees, their protractedness or refugeehood has come to define a key component of their lived experience. Their social identities have become inextricably linked to their lives in their country of refuge and the communities they have formed in exile. Repatriation assumes that the connection to one's homeland (or a parent's homeland) will supersede the bonds formed in exile, which is, quite clearly, not always the case.

RETHINKING REPATRIATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE KAREN ON THE THAI–MYANMAR BORDER

On a warm morning in October of 2016, a bus emblazoned with an IOM logo approached the border of Thailand and Myanmar to bring 71 refugees to Myanmar for the first official voluntary repatriation effort in over 30 years. Over the last three decades, as a result of a complex and brutal civil war, over 100,000 refugees from Myanmar's ethnic populations fled to Thailand. While some were eventually resettled to third countries such as the US, Canada and Australia, many remained in one of the nine camps established along the Thai–Myanmar border. The year directly following that first voluntary repatriation is where my research began. I wanted to know how those who had spent years and even decades as refugees in Thailand felt about the prospect of return. Would they in fact return "voluntarily", as the program assured? Or would the time they spent in exile, waiting in various states of uncertainty and limbo, affect

their willingness to re-enter Myanmar? If they would not return voluntarily, how would acts of resistance manifest themselves in the confines of a refugee camp? What would be the specific concerns with return as the prospect of a facilitated repatriation had finally moved from the abstract into reality? Embedded in these questions were the practical issues of land rights, security and equitable access to employment, education and health care. Equally important were more subjective concerns surrounding rebuilding trust, creating autonomy, and renegotiating identity after years spent in a state of "refugeehood".

During the latter half of 2017, I was living inside Mae La refugee camp near the border town of Mae Sot as a means to gather more intensive ethnographic data. At that time, Mae La camp was home to approximately 38,000 of the 98,000 Karen refugees who lived along the border for upwards of three decades. The main road towards Mae La weaves a path through alternating patches of farmland and dense jungle that is broken up by various checkpoints manned by armed Thai soldiers. After about an hour of driving north from Mae Sot, you began to catch glimpses of the camp from the road. I had visited Mae La camp once before during my preliminary fieldwork in 2015 and was always struck by its sheer vastness. For more than a mile along the main road you can see rows of tightly packed homes behind the tall fences topped with barbed wire. Upon my arrival at the camp, the truck I was riding in swerved onto a small dirt road riddled with the deep ruts and long gullies that resulted from the many years of vehicles used to navigate the muddy lanes during the relentless rainy season. As we bounced along at a slow pace, crossing a narrow makeshift bridge over a mostly dry creek bed below, I caught the first glimpse of Mae La that was not dominated by the packed housing visible from the main road. This section of camp offered some space to breathe for those living here. The thatch roofed homes and small shops were punctuated with small kitchen gardens and the occasional pigsty or chicken coop. The edges of the jungle, which were always hungry to regain their lost territory, inched around every corner, devouring footpaths with long green vines and tropical plants.

Over the next several months, I would get to know the camp and many of its residents well. Aside from the realities of life in the tropics, daily life in Mae La felt simultaneously familiar and strange. The normal flow of meals and chores mixed with the typical melodramas that played out amongst the students attending the camp high school. Teenagers chatted about Facebook and the latest YouTube video making the rounds while young mothers tended to toddlers and children chased each other through the schoolyard. Soccer games and Sunday religious services felt natural until placed against the backdrop of confinement. The constant presence of armed guards and a population interspersed with landmine victims and those with traumatic scars not visible to the human eye provided a sober reminder of the civil war that raged not so long ago near the camp's Western border. The monthly line-up to receive food rations offered another reminder of the other daily realities of camp life: that movement was restricted, working in Thailand illegal, and their status as a refugee would continue to dominate the discourse surrounding their future.

Throughout the course of my time in Mae La, I had many conversations about the prospect of repatriation. The notion of return is a point of contention for many Karen living along the Thai–Myanmar border. References to "Kawthoolei", the S'gaw Karen word for Karen State, invoke deep emotional connections to ancestral lands and dreams of independence. However, the physical space that Kawthoolei currently occupies within Myanmar is riddled with land mines, patrolled by the Burmese military and has little chance of achieving status as an independent nation. The collision of idealism and pragmatism has created a deep uncertainty

about when, how and why one might return. Further exacerbating the uncertainty surrounding repatriation for the Karen were recent cuts in humanitarian funding and declining international support for maintaining the camps along the Thai–Myanmar border. As such, refugees reported feeling pressured to return due to reductions in food rations and declining living standards in the camps. This was often seen as an unofficial agency strategy and a way to push people out.

At the conclusion of my fieldwork, I noted a clear majority of opinion amongst the Karen concerning the lack of a desire to repatriate into Myanmar anytime soon. This position was often reinforced by statements from the Karen National Union (KNU) and other ethnic-based organizations (EBOs) in the area. In addition to the influence held by the KNU, groups such as the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and the Karen Student Network Group (KSNG) also released formal positions pushing back against voluntary repatriation. Although Myanmar had made drastic changes over the last several years including a democratic election and a land-mark national ceasefire agreement, much more remained to be done in order to overcome the barriers that have prevented return for the past three decades.

Several reasons emerged for opposing voluntary repatriation, all of which were deeply inter-twined with the various motivations individuals had for fleeing in the first place. Many of the barriers identified by refugees in Mae La were similar to those that had circulated in the greater Karen community beginning around 2012. Outlets such as Karen News, Burma link, and the Karen Human Rights Group published interviews and articles that focused on the instability in Myanmar, the lack of available land and resources in Karen State and a general sense of unease with the Myanmar government.

In this way, a narrative of resistance developed within the community that synthesized the most common and pressing concerns of many displaced Karen. The construction of this overarching narrative was significant in that it allowed for "the innovation of multiple small stories, or voices, while still preserving the possibility of a stable community, making it pos-sible to construe resistance as a positive, continuous, recursive force of social reproduction" (Myrsiades, 1993). At times there was an inclination of informants to default to resistance narratives when questioned about repatriation, regardless of their personal experience. For example, some respondents who had been born in the camp or relocated at a very young age feared the military and argued it was a reason they would not return to Myanmar. This happened even though many refugees had never encountered a soldier. This was by no means an attempt to be deceitful, but rather the reproduction of a very real fear that had been passed along both culturally and generationally.

Among the most reported reasons for opposing repatriation among refugees in Mae La camp was a fear of the lack of security in one's home village and the presence of the Tatmadaw (Burmese military). Additionally, disputes over land rights and a lack of economic opportuni-ties or available space for building a home or farm were often noted. Many refugees described a general distrust of the Burmese government or a lack of KNU involvement in repatriation planning. All of these reported barriers spoke to conditions that would need to be met to ensure sustainable reintegration, which UNHCR defines as "a process which enables formerly dis-placed people and other members of their community to enjoy a progressively greater degree of physical, social, legal and material security" (UNHCR, 2012).

Through the communication of these barriers, refugees in Mae La clearly refuted the pillars of sustainable reintegration by focusing on specific areas of insecurity. For example, the pres-ence of the Burmese military creates physical insecurity whereas distrust in the government or a lack of control from local leaders such as the KNU creates a social and psychological

insecurity. Further, lack of identity paperwork or the right to own land breeds legal insecurity, while lack of economic resources or education causes material insecurity. While the importance of these barriers and their potential solutions cannot be overstated, their identification has been fairly widespread among academics and practitioners (Brees, 2010; Lang, 2001; Moretti, 2015; South, 2011). However, what has been less widespread is an analysis of the more obscure barriers that were preventing return along the Thai–Myanmar border.

A critical impediment to return was the fact that the population in Mae La camp was a mixture of long-time residents, people fleeing from war or environmental disasters, as well as those who were clearly economic migrants or others who would not meet the standards for international refugee protection. Thus, simply ending a civil war in Myanmar would not be enough motivation for many of the residents in Mae La to return to their country. This mixed population is related to the many push factors in Myanmar that have shifted over time and the fact that many of the refugees who experienced violence first-hand no longer reside in the camps, having already resettled to a third country. Conversely, some refugees who came to the camps more recently seeking economic or educational opportunities are now unable to return due to increased militarization or fighting in their home region. For example, the recent deployment of Tatmadaw troops in Karen State's Papun district over the rebuilding of a road resulted in fighting between the military and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which displaced some 2,000 locals.

From an historical perspective, at the height of the refugee influx to Thailand in 2005, the refugee population living within the camps on the Thai–Myanmar border peaked at approximately 150,000 people (TBC, 2018). That year also marked the beginning of several third country resettlement programs to countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada. A significant number of refugees were resettled by UNHCR, which reported 107,909 departures between 2005 and 2018. However, as of October 2018, the total verified refugee population remained at 97,395. The refugee camps seemed to be filling up almost as fast as they were being emptied by resettlement. The new arrivals altered the makeup of the camp in regards to motivations for leaving Myanmar. As explained to me by Saw Eh Paw, a camp leader and refugee who had lived in Mae La for nearly 20 years:

> The way I see it there are really three categories of people coming here as refugees. First are those people really affected by civil war, like me, and some other Karen people living in Karen territory. I say that because they (the Karen) are brutally persecuted and tortured by the Burmese military, it's like genocide. Everywhere there is land relocation, forced labor and portering. So it is very dangerous to live in Karen state. That's the first group, the ones very affected by the civil war that takes place in their territory so they cannot live on their land anymore. Their land was taken away by the government, who took everything away and destroyed it. The second group, are like farmers or people with no job and no economic security. The economy in Burma is not good and there is no education, so most of the parents are coming to refugee camp looking for a better life, especially for the parents looking for education for their children. The third one is people just purely looking for a chance or an opportunity. Or they think "oh if I come to a refugee camp, I can get opportunity to go to the 3rd country", that's how they think. There are so many groups of people who come like that. That's why the first group of the refugees, they went to resettle in third country, but the newcomers, keep on coming, based on the 3 reasons.

The distinctions described by Saw Eh Paw as to who is a refugee, economic migrant or purely an opportunist were characterizations echoed by both NGO staff and other refugees in the region. These informal assessments as to who was or was not an actual "refugee", as defined by the UN's

definition, seemed to indicate the supposed level of deservingness for an individual to receive international protection. It also precluded their ability to resettle to a third country.

The confusion surrounding official status can be traced back to the refusal of the Thai government to allow UNHCR to conduct standard refugee status determination (RSD) after January of 2004. Prior to 2004, the camp population was registered and considered similar to a typical prima facie status. Instead, the Thais introduced a camp-based government-led procedure to assess the status of "persons fleeing fighting" and "persons fleeing political persecution" through the provision of Provincial Admission Boards (PABs). The PABs ultimately failed at creating a comprehensive screening mechanism, and in 2005 UNHCR was allowed to resume registration, but only to register people who had already entered the camps prior to 2005. In the subsequent years, the government has failed to screen or register the majority of new arrivals, which the TBC (2018) estimates have left over a third of camp residents in a precarious legal status. While UNHCR and the RTG have been able to record individuals and families as residents of the camp, they have generally not granted the type of refugee status that would permit a third country resettlement or guarantee international protection.

It would be both difficult and time consuming to determine with complete certainty which camp residents fit the legal definition of a refugee. Rather, lines have become blurred, circumstances have changed and individual motivations for leaving Myanmar have varied considerably from one person to the next. Thus, the camp population in Mae La is a mixture of people fleeing persecution, looking for work, pursuing educational opportunities or seeking a better life, none of which are mutually exclusive.

An outcome of the camp's blended population is that creating a consensus among camp residents regarding the terms under which people would return to Myanmar becomes increasingly complex. It also creates a situation in which the conditions of return stipulated by camp representatives may exceed the standard of protections historically offered for refugees who voluntarily repatriate. For example, the position paper released by KSNG in June of 2017 contained 19 points to address before an agreement to repatriate could be made. However, the 19 points covered a broad range of topics, not all of which are internationally accepted as compulsory actions to be undertaken by the state in order to ensure refugee protection in return. For instance, one requirement stated that "refugee students have the right to continue their further studies in Thai universities as well as in Asia and all over the world", which is presented in a way that is untenable. Certainly, the denial of a student visa does not justify refugee protection, thus its inclusion, however well meaning, may actually impede negotiations. In this way, some of the most difficult barriers to overcome for a mixed population have to do with untangling what constitutes a human rights violation versus what may just be an unfavourable or unfair reality of life in Myanmar.

In the absence of explicit violence, issues of racism, discrimination and other structural inequalities do not typically justify international interventions or support claims of asylum. Nor does a lack of economic or educational opportunities in one's home country warrant refugee status protection. Thus, if refugees will not voluntarily repatriate unless stipulations are met concerning items not directly related to a well-founded fear of persecution, and Myanmar refuses to implement those demands, a stalemate may emerge that defines life on the border. As one woman explained to me during an interview,

> I can't go back to Burma because my husband died and now there is nothing for us there. We don't have any land or a home, so we must stay here so we can live.

What may eventually break the impasse is known as the "fundamental change of circumstances" clause of the UN Convention. The Refugee Convention states that refugee status may end in situations where "the circumstances in connection with which [a person] has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist", in which case the refugee could be repatriated to their country without their consent. What complicates this matter significantly is the lack of formal refugee status determination for residents in Mae La as well as Thailand's policy of deporting illegal migrants. However, if the situation in Myanmar in regards to the treatment of the Rohingya continues to deteriorate, it is unlikely the UN would deem Myanmar as having met the standards of a "fundamental change of circumstances" to justify repatriation on the Southeastern border. Nevertheless, the presence of a mixed population of refugees and migrants in Mae La creates a barrier in terms of overreach regarding conditions of return.

The second obstacle to repatriation was the lack of a mechanism for sustained and accurate information reporting for the residents of Mae La. When asked where one acquired information, most Mae La citizens responded that they heard news or rumours from a friend or relative. As one mother recalled,

> Sometimes my son will tell me what he heard on Facebook or at school. But I know what is going on here because my neighbour speaks to the camp leader.

However, there was a distinct lack of engagement with the local or international news which created a silo effect on the population, notwithstanding their unfettered access to the internet. To many residents in Mae La, Facebook *was* the internet, and its ability to spread inaccurate information quickly worked against more formal information campaigns from the government or international organizations. Without a clear picture of all available facts concerning the evolving peace process in Myanmar, Thailand's stance on legalizing migrant workers or the status of humanitarian funding for the camps, people relied heavily on their social networks to form opinions concerning repatriation. More often than not, the social networks amongst the Karen perpetuated the reported barriers to repatriation and rarely offered any nuanced debate surrounding negotiations, the reasons why funding was decreasing or how the community might leverage existing laws or policies to achieve common goals. Rather, rallying the population around the common themes of persecution and deservingness of humanitarian aid overshadowed any attempts at discourses aimed at practical solutions. In one conversation I had with a refugee in her late twenties, she noted,

> I remember being so surprised that we weren't the only refugees in the world. A Cambodian woman came to speak to us once at the school about her experience as a refugee, and I had never heard of these things before.

Or in another conversation with a refugee in his mid-twenties, he reported having no awareness concerning the recent crisis in Syria, the influx of refugees in the Middle East and Europe and its effect on international humanitarian funding. Although he had access to the internet via smartphone, this news had never breached his silo of the camp. Subsequently, he had no basis to understand why international funding had been decreasing in Southeast Asia noting,

> I don't know why they have forgotten about us. I think they just don't care about us Karen people anymore and don't want to give us any more money.

Closely related to this reliance on social networks to inform decision-making was the third barrier: an adoption of resistance narratives as a component of cultural and social identity. With a lack of the information required to form an independent opinion, people often align with the interests and perspectives of their social groups. In early social identity theory, it is argued that any perceived lack of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group (Hogg and Turner, 1987). In this manner, not only is participation in a resistance narrative key to maintaining one's social identity as a Karen refugee in exile, but openly accepting repatriation may be seen as delegitimizing the greater effort of the Karen community to advocate for a safe and dignified return. Additionally, the influence of Christianity on the Karen has often impacted cultural narratives of exile and persecution, sometimes going as far as linking the Karen fate to refugeehood. In this way, voluntarily repatriating disrupts a key component of one's cultural identity or oppression. In the confines of Mae La camp, these cultural identities of oppression and persecution are constructed and made visible in such a permanent way that their dismantling would require the creation of an entirely new identity.

One of the final barriers I observed was that the experience of living in a protracted refugee situation informed people's perception of the camp actually closing. As one man in his late fifties explained,

> Every couple years we hear this word "repatriation" and they say that Thailand will close the camps. But it never happens. So I don't pay much attention to these things.

Indeed, in the year since my fieldwork concluded, the situation in Myanmar has deteriorated and the optimism has faded from the announcements concerning UNHCR's voluntary repatriation program. While funding continues to decrease, it is becoming clear that a combined approach to implementing durable solutions must be undertaken.

Colson (2003) wrote that in the last several decades anthropologists have created an ethnographic base large enough that we ought to be able to generalize about likely consequences of forced uprooting and resettlement, while recognizing that human beings are creative and can come up with surprising, never before imagined, solutions. And indeed there is much literature that deals with many of the challenges faced by the Karen and the subsequent consequences for their persecution and protracted situation in exile. Furthermore, over the past three decades myriad solutions and their various components have been discussed ad nauseam by international actors, western academics and well-meaning policy analysts who possess no actual framework for implementation. Rather the stasis felt by the refugees trapped in Mae La is mirrored by the political inertia that precludes its solution. But this motionlessness is confined within the barbed wire fences of the camp while the rapidly changing world outside has begun to exert pressure on its existence. Many Karen are facing a future where there is not enough international funding to support their survival in camp but there is also not enough international pressure to enact the changes needed in Myanmar for a safe return. Further, the challenges involved in advocating for legal status in Thailand are riddled with the bureaucratic and geo-political landmines that could derail future positive economic outcomes in the borderlands. The solutions will ultimately have to come from those who have been disenfranchised and their willingness to negotiate, leverage and compromise on a way forward. A passive voice will need to be replaced with an active one and the long process of redefining the story of the Karen must begin.

MOVING TOWARDS A SOLUTION ON THE THAI–MYANMAR BORDER

It was during my third month living inside Mae La when my research assistant, Khu Htoo, and I arranged to visit the small care villa set up in camp that assisted the survivors of landmine accidents. On a sweltering August afternoon, we made our way over to the open-air building that operated as a dormitory for those who were disabled and had no means of family support. The care villa was situated atop a small hill, with open doors revealing a simple concrete floor and a row of beds on each side. A faded blue sign greeted us, which hung in front of two lines of laundry that neatly flanked the path between the beds. We were there to interview Saw Ehmoo, a 27-year-old former KNLA soldier who had lost his sight and both hands in a landmine accident eight years prior. The main room was quiet apart from the normal sounds drifting in from camp and the soft whirring of a small plastic fan in the corner.

We greeted Saw Ehmoo and moved into the open space at the front of the building where we proceeded to talk for the next hour and a half. As Saw Ehmoo told his story, I noted the quiet distinctions he made between "before" and "after" the accident that had so profoundly changed his life. He spoke about his time as a soldier with the KNLA and how it was the KNU that had arranged his transport to Mae La after the accident, noting it was the only place he could receive care. He explained that with little to do over the past several years he had become an avid radio listener of the BBC world service, picking up both Thai and Burmese broadcasts along the border. The inflection in his voice changed when he began to speak about cross-border politics or the government in Myanmar, becoming louder and more confident in tone. He offered a nuanced view on the efficacy of the ongoing National Ceasefire Agreement, lamenting the fact that the military still retained 25 percent of seats in parliament, effectively making it impossible to amend the constitution without their support. Speaking on the topic of reconciliation he argued,

> For the peace process to work, the military, not just the government, needs to meet with the ethnic groups. It was the military that came to our villages and burned our homes and killed our families. They need to show us that they want peace. It means nothing if only the government does this.

His comments recognized the importance of holding people accountable for their actions in order for a nation to heal. He reminded me of the Indonesian anti-communist purge of 1965–1966, when those who had committed genocide remained in power, while living side by side with the families of those they had murdered. In situations such as those, peace becomes superficial until there is an acknowledgment of what others have lost. Although this type of reckoning does not often come to pass, one example can be found in the case of post-apartheid South Africa. The first Truth and Reconciliation Commission allowed a country to bear witness to the human rights abuses perpetuated over four decades and laid the foundation for a full and free democracy in South Africa.

It struck me how valuable Saw Ehmoo's contribution to the peace process negotiations in Myanmar would be. Although still a young man, he had spent years thinking deeply about the conflict—about what he had lost, but also what the Karen had lost and how it might be regained. It was clear what Myanmar had lost. They had lost a generation whose potential had languished inside refugee camps instead of thriving in universities and cities and communities. When I inquired about the availability of prosthetic limbs to perhaps help regain any function-

ality, Saw Ehmoo noted that because of his blindness it had not been attempted. He reasoned that even if there were available prosthetics, he would not be able to fit them himself or have an opportunity to see a therapist. Instead he said,

> There are so many things I want for my life, but because of my physical body, the disability, I can never reach them.

Without a mechanism to receive official refugee status or a path to regularization in Thailand, he joins one of the most vulnerable populations in Mae La. It is this type of tragedy—the loss of potential and self-determination—that truly characterizes a protracted refugee situation. While solutions exist, it is the process of creating the political will to enact them that remains a challenge.

The goal of refugee protection is to ensure the human rights of individuals are met when their state has failed them. The notion of returning to one's country of origin after the bond between citizen and state has been so thoroughly broken is fraught with years of social, emotional and political turmoil. Hannah Arendt (1976) questioned in her reflections on totalitarianism how the universal rights of man could be upheld within the sovereignty of individual nation states. Those who work to resolve protracted refugee situations struggle with this question as ensuring adequate protection in return is often impossible without legal mechanisms of enforcement. Thus, the impetus to find new or alternative solutions for refugees who have spent decades in exile is growing as long-term encampment becomes more untenable.

I started this chapter by noting that in October of 2016, the first voluntary repatriation of 71 refugees was initiated from Nu Po and Tham Hin camps back into Myanmar. Subsequently, in May of 2018, 93 more refugees from the Mae La, Umpiem, Nu Po, Ban Mae Nai Soi and Ban Don Yang refugee camps also voluntarily repatriated. In February of 2019, 565 refugees who signed up for voluntary repatriation officially returned. In total, these returns account for less than 1 percent of the current population of refugees living along the Thai–Myanmar border.

We have started to see some alternative approaches emerge to resolving protracted refugee situations globally, and indeed models such as Kenya's Kalobeyei settlement offer glimpses of what a smarter more dignified methodology might entail. Additionally, rethinking the role of labour migration in the plight of the stateless may have substantial implications for not only eradicating the confinement of refugee camps, but also for demonstrating how neighbouring countries can help rebuild and lift up marginalized communities. For the Karen in Mae La camp, the road to repatriation must offer not only reconciliation, but also recognition of what they have lost. The restoration of rights must include a way to regain control of ancestral lands as well as opportunities to become self-sufficient, which also means the right to choose where to live and work. For many, true freedom is born in self-reliance and sustained return will be impossible without efforts that encourage it.

NOTES

1. UN General Assembly, *Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, 14 December 1950, A/RES/428(V), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0715c.html. Adopted at the 325th plenary meeting, 14 Dec. 1950. "Annex: Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees". In: Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its 5th session, Volume I, 19 September–15 December 1950. – A/1775. – 1951. – pp. 46–48. – (GAOR, 5th sess., Suppl. no. 20).
2. As stated in the 66th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Update on Voluntary Repatriation, Geneva, 21–24 June 2016.

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30. "They took a piece of my flesh": transnational motherhood and activism in Tlaxcala, Mexico
Ruth M. Hernández-Ríos

MECHANISMS OF TRANSNATIONAL MOTHERHOOD

The conceptualization of "transnational motherhood" changed scholarly conversations about transnational families two decades ago. Informed by an intersectional perspective (Hill Collins 1990; Crenshaw 1990), the pioneering work of Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) continues to impact thinking about how women manage and sustain their intersecting roles as migrants and mothers. Transnational mothers are mothers who live in a different nation-state than their children and engage with their children from afar through a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms are informed by gender norms and roles.

Gender constructs transnational motherhood and fatherhood as distinct social phenomena (Carling, Menjívar and Schmalzbauer 2012). Dominant gender norms inform parenting, including transnational motherhood, even though these mothers are physically separated from their children. Women who migrate and become breadwinners are expected to perform their traditional gender roles. For example, Parreñas's (2005) ground-breaking research on transnational Filipino families found that migrant mothers who leave their children under the care of their fathers are still expected to act as caretakers and nurturers, despite their new roles as breadwinners; a finding strongly echoed in subsequent research (see for example Abrego 2014).

How do transnational mothers parent across borders? Breadwinning and covering expenses for children in a sending home or community is among the most-cited mechanisms through which transnational mothers enact parenting. As Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila put it, "milk, shoes, and schooling—these are the currency of transnational motherhood" (1997: 562). As such, remittances ensure that children have access to education, better nutrition, and consumer goods like computers, clothes, and entertainment. Smith (2006) argues children in sending communities form part of the "remittance bourgeoisie", a social class created out of the culture of migration and remittance practices. However, although they have access to more resources, these children can lack the emotional stability that non-migrant parents offer (Dreby 2010). Thus, the remittances returned by migrant mothers are considered "double-edged". While they represent and symbolize a parents' love, they also justify their absence (Horton 2009). Although "gifts and remittances have become the currency of transnational love" (Horton 2009: 32), research continues to demonstrate that transnational mothers are held to dominant gender norms and are expected to perform emotional care work from a distance.

Performance of care work via communication is another much-discussed mechanism of transnational motherhood. On this topic, Nicholson writes, "here we see clearly the realignment—and not the relinquishing—of motherhood roles across transnational borders" (2006: 24). The migration of a mother into highly industrialized cities for work in the service sector provides a mover access to the technology that facilitates ongoing commu-

nication with their children back home (Uy-Tioco 2007). This ongoing connectivity has been named "transnational intensive mothering" and defined as an "emotionally absorbing, communication-intensive, and time-consuming practice" (Peng and Wong 2013: 498; see also Fresnoza-Flot 2009; Madianou and Miller 2012). However, it is important to note that communication patterns among transnational mothers and their children can differ. For example, Peng and Wong (2013) found that not all transnational mothers communicate equally or as often with their children. Even when these mothers share similar characteristics, patterns of engagement can be very different.   Their research introduced three forms of transnational mothering: intensive mothering whereby transnational mothers keep daily contact with their children, sometimes texting multiple times throughout the day; collaborative mothering that incorporates a caregiver in their absence; and finally, passive mothering, which prioritizes economic need over emotional intimacy.

Another common mechanism for transnational motherhood is that they engage collaboratively with other women to arrange the care of their children (Peng and Wong 2016). Accommodation for care work is most often discussed in connection with the mothers' roles, particularly their work in to ensure wellbeing and daily care. The shifting of care work, or, as Parreñas terms it, "international care-taking", often involves transferring demanding and socially devalued tasks to poorer and more vulnerable women (2005: 23–26). Other mothers (Schmalzbauer 2004), *mujeres de hogar* (housewives) (González de la Rocha 2006, as cited in Mummert 2010), and middle women (very often a grandmother; see Dreby 2010) are terms often used to describe child caretakers. While the transfer of caretaking from migrant to non-migrant can facilitate transnational family arrangements, researchers have also noted that the larger community can often resist the transfer of motherhood responsibilities (e.g. Parreñas 2005) and even sanction such behaviour (though see Åkesson, Carling and Drotbohm 2012 for examples of acceptance).

The mechanisms employed by transnational mothers are directly related to their roles as migrants and the labour they perform to sustain their families in sending households, ensuring financial stability and in some cases upward mobility. These acts are especially common among women who have dependent children under the age of eighteen. To better understand transnational parenting, the research presented here also considers how parents, particularly mothers, engage with adult children in the context of migration (Fomby 2005).

Transnational mothers reflect contemporary global migration patterns. However, research on transnational motherhood most often follows women moving from the Global South to the Global North and in particular migrant women as they settle in the Global North and the United States (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Dreby 2006, 2010; Abrego 2014), Europe (Fresnoza-Flot 2009; Boccagni 2012), and Canada (Bernhard, Landolt and Goldring 2005). In the United States, research on motherhood often focuses on the experiences of transnational women from Latin America, particularly Mexico and Central America (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Nicholson 2006; Abrego 2009; Schmalzbauer 2009; Dreby 2010). While this scholarship has advanced our understanding of transnational motherhood, it centres mostly on the experiences of mothers who are migrants and the challenges they face in their search for work and manage their status vis-à-vis their families as well as their sending and destination communities. This often overlooks the experiences of women in sending communities who are also transnational mothers and use different means, and their political activism, to establish transnational connections.

To understand how women in sending communities become transnational mothers, I ask the following questions: What resources or mechanisms do transnational mothers in sending communities draw on to mother from afar? How do transnational mothers' experiences of migration shape their activism? And, finally, what are the implications of mothers' activism in their transnational community and the broader Latinx immigrant rights movement in the United States?

METHODS AND DATA

Data for this study comes from semi-structured interviews and ethnographic fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2017 in Las Cruces, Tlaxcala, Mexico; New York City, New York; and Greenville, Connecticut, USA. All identifiable information, such as the geographical locations, name of participating institutions, and cultural productions, has been changed to protect participants' privacy and ensure confidentiality. In total, 69 interviews were conducted as part of a larger project on a transnational Mexican community spanning Las Cruces in Tlaxcala and Greenville in Connecticut. For this chapter, I draw on 26 interviews with transnational mothers, of whom seven were interviewed twice.

I learned of this group of transnational mothers during a theatre performance held at a university campus in Connecticut. There, a group of women who form part of the NGO called the Immigrant Family Support Network (IMFSH) performed an original play titled *La Casa Amarilla*. In the summer of 2011, I travelled to Las Cruces, the town where most of the women live, to conduct ethnographic research and life history interviews. My entry into Las Cruces was facilitated through a volunteer program run by the IMFSH that welcomed international student volunteers for community service and to help local women develop their professional skills (e.g. social justice advocacy). Recruitment of participants occurred during group meetings. Some women who were interested in participating in the study approached me, and other participants were recruited through snowball sampling methods. Interviews with transnational mothers, which took place in participants' homes, their local businesses, and at the NGO, ranged in length from seventeen minutes to four hours. All interviews were conducted in Spanish by the author, transcribed verbatim, and imported to MAXQDA coding software to systemize codes and analyse data.

In addition to in-depth interviews, I draw from hundreds of hours of multi-sited participant observation from 2011 through 2017. Observations took place at the NGO and in homes and the larger community in Mexico. During theatre tours in the United States, observations took place in community spaces such as auditoriums and universities. In Mexico and the United States, I was often invited to homes for meals as well as celebrations such as weddings or religious activities. Participating in these events enabled me to develop trust and rapport with participants over time.

My entry into the transnational Mexican community in the United States developed more organically. My identity as a Chicana and daughter of working-class Mexican immigrants drives my commitment to research that is reflexive and focused on social justice. As a result, I worked with the organization on various transnational social justice projects, including the 2016 theatre tour referenced here. My role as a coordinator during this tour facilitated my access to Mexican communities in the United States. After transnational mothers introduced

me to their sons and daughters as their "coordinator", I was admitted into the private lives of Mexican immigrants in Connecticut and New York.

As a Chicana feminist ethnographer, I am reflexive about my positionality and my dual identity as an insider and outsider. As a child migrant, and a member of a transnational family, my personal history of migration allowed me to connect emotionally with my participants on issues of family disintegration and the privilege of citizenship. During fieldwork in Mexico, I was often prompted by transnational mothers to visit my great-grandmother in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Over time, their stories and their commitment to family pushed me to further develop ties with my extended family in Guadalajara.

BACKGROUND

Tlaxcala, located in east-central Mexico, is the smallest state in the Republic. Its history of out-migration is long and characterized by three main movements: internal migration to nearby cities (e.g. Mexico City, Puebla); participation in seasonal migration programs; and migration to the United States. From 1942 to 1964, men from Tlaxcala participated in the Bracero Program. Similarly, and more notably, Tlaxcala is the second most important state in Mexico that provides labourers for Canada's season agricultural work (Guillén and González Romo 2008). Academics in Mexico have conducted important studies that situate Tlaxcala as an active state in the history of US–Mexico migration, as well as documenting the experience and consequences of this migration on communities, families, and individuals (Guillén and González Romo 2008; López Pozos 2010; Garrido 2015; González Romo and Sánchez Torres 2015). Today, the top five states receiving migrants from Tlaxcala are California (27.1 percent), New York (17.1 percent), Illinois (8.0 percent), Texas (7.9 percent), and Connecticut (7.2 percent) (*Yearbook of Migration and Remittances Mexico* 2016; Appendix A contains information regarding the primary destinations of family members of the mothers interviewed).

Tlaxcala is considered a "*postnáuhua* zone" (López Pozos 2010), that is, a community that has lost its indigenous language but continues to practise indigenous organizational customs and other cultural characteristics (Mulhare 2003: 74–76, cited in López Pozos 2010). In Tlaxcala, 2.74 percent of inhabitants over the age of three speak an indigenous language. The most common indigenous languages are Nahuatl (83.4 percent) and Totonaco (6.3 percent) (INEGI 2016). Additionally, 25.2 percent identify as indigenous. In Las Cruces, 14.63 percent of the population three years or older speak an indigenous language, and 67.59 percent consider themselves indigenous, more than double the national average (INEGI 2015).

The formation of the NGO resulted from a community project initiated by Mexican anthropology students from a local university who were interested in participatory action research in an indigenous community. In 2002–2003, young women from the community who participated as children and adolescents in the initial years of the program appropriated the project and invited their mothers and other local women to participate. The women's participation contributed to the project's transnational mission and focus on migration issues. At the forefront of their troubles was the issue of family disintegration. Members of the organization who were working in the US – young women and men from the community with visas – began to work with grassroots organizations and academic institutions in Greenville to solidify a transnational activist network. Today this network is comprised of grassroots organizations, cultural and educational institutions, and a Sister City program that continues to sponsor

cultural exchanges. A major focus of their work has been to counteract the negative effects of migration in this community. In particular, the organization works with migrants' mothers and wives living in Las Cruces on two social issues: the loss of indigenous language and customs that stem from the colonial period and that have accelerated because of migration, and the rupture of family ties and disintegration of families that result from migration. The program was institutionalized in 2007 with the construction of a building funded by a Spanish NGO. The program was then formally named "Immigrant Family Support House" (IMFSH).

Most participants in the organization are transnational mothers of adult migrants living in the United States. In response to their shared experience, the NGO developed a program called "Families United", which draws on transnational family ties and activist networks to organize cultural events in the US. Informed by the concerns of transnational mothers, the program produces social justice performances that bring attention to systemic inequalities related to US–Mexico migration, particularly issues of family disintegration and the loss of Nahuatl culture. By working to support cultural traditions, the organization facilitates legal travel for transnational mothers, a program that relies on support from transnational family networks as well as networks with grassroots organizations, academic institutions, and other community programs in the US. These institutions write "letters of invitation" for the NGO that are included in an artist portfolio that the organization uses for visa application procedures. Thus, it is their recognition as actors, not mothers, that grants these women entrance into the United States through the B1/B2 visa program. To date, the organization has made four trips (2008, 2011, 2012, and 2016), of which three were organized as theatre tours. The following sections examine how the women's identities as transnational mothers are foundational to the theatre plays and their political development as activists committed to social justice.

PERFORMING TRANSNATIONAL MOTHERHOOD

The mothers' transnational engagement began in 2009 when the NGO worked to organize a series of cultural festivals in New York and Connecticut. As a result of this work, ten mothers (living in Mexico) were granted visas to travel to the United States and perform "El carnival", a pre-Hispanic indigenous ceremonial dance. The organization's success in obtaining visas for the women contributed to an increase in participation; by 2010 the number of women—a majority mothers—engaged in the organization had increased from ten to fifty. Eager to see their children, the women worked for two years on a cultural project that facilitated their travel to the US. To justify why a large group of women needed to travel to the US, the organization created a social justice theatre program and developed plays informed by the mothers' lived experiences of migration and of return.

Activism facilitates their roles as transnational mothers in two important ways. First, through theatre these mothers transmit social justice messages concerning the welfare of their children and the community to a wider US audience that includes various segments of American society. Second, through theatre they travel to the United States and have time to see and care for their children. Thus, as research on Filipina transnational mothers in Canada (Tungohan 2013) has shown, transnational mothers use the stage to contest inequalities affecting their families and community, perform care and elaborate their status as "good" mothers.

The plays, while fictional, are informed by the mothers' lived experiences of transnational motherhood, family disintegration, and activism. For example, in their most famous play, *La*

Casa Amarilla, women's own experiences of transnational motherhood emotionally infuses their acting. In the turning point of this play, Guadalupe, a young *campesina*, informs her mother, Juana, that she is migrating to the United States. Alarmed at the sudden news, Juana turns to her daughter and desperately urges her not to go. Performing alongside the mother and daughter, several women tell the audience about the dangers that await Guadalupe at the US–Mexico border. The scene ends on a sombre note that features each transnational mother telling the story of her family's migration. The phrase "the day my family member left" is repeated by each mother, creatively communicating a community's narrative of migration. As Guadalupe grabs a backpack, a symbol of the migrant journey, her mother sorrowfully states, "the day my family member left, I was worried about her".

The rest of the play focuses on Juana's experience as a transnational mother. To combat the sadness and sorrow she feels after her daughter's migration, Juana becomes a leader who organizes transnational mothers in her community. This narrative closely resembles the activism of the performers. In one of the most powerful scenes of the play, the stage is transformed into a press conference. Like the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Taylor 1997, 2001; Arditti 1999; Bejerano 2002),[1] the women line up on stage, each holding a picture of her "missing" child. One by one the mothers deliver their testimonies. With tears in their eyes, the transnational mothers appeal to the audience:

> **Witness 1:** Good afternoon. My name is Sonia. My son Henry is very hardworking and is very talented at making wooden furniture. Unfortunately, he couldn't find enough work to live by here and when he found some, it was too far away. He had to sleep where he worked and, in the end, they didn't pay him what they had promised. Two years ago, he left home to look for his two brothers in California, where they said that he would be able to earn what he needed for his family, working construction. We haven't heard from him in two years. I'm sure that he's over there somewhere. I know it. Mothers know these things. But he is disappeared and, with him gone these past two years, I've lost a piece of my life. A year and a half ago they found his ID in the desert and weeks later they found some pants and told me that they were his. But that doesn't matter to me. They could have found a body like his and send it to me and it wouldn't matter, because I wouldn't be burying my son. My son is lost and I with him.

In the scene, Witness 1 draws on the women's shared experience of transnational motherhood and loss to emotionally appeal to the audience. To advocate for their children, the mothers ask the audience to work in solidarity with them, protesting against the human rights violations that migrants experience along the US–Mexico border. In doing so, the women capitalize on their roles as transnational mothers, using motherhood as a political tool.

Women's experiences as transnational mothers emotionally infuse their performances, enhancing their activism. Because theatre is a mechanism that facilitates legal travel to the US, the women can appeal to audience members and share the inequalities their children face as migrants. When defending their children's rights, mothers advocate for the welfare of all migrant families, empowering themselves and becoming protectors of the larger migrant community.

CONCLUSION

Many women from Las Cruces have become involved in activist efforts that address US–Mexico migration as a result of their children's migration. As transnational mothers living in a sending community, they use their activism to maintain and, in some cases, reestablish ties with their adult children living in the northeastern United States. Their activism takes shape through art-based social justice methods, such as theatre and ceremonial indigenous dance. Their participation is strategic and cathartic. They defy borders and enter the US legally despite strict immigration laws; actions unavailable to most transnational mothers as actors. On stage, their identities as transnational mothers infuse their performances, helping them express their pain regarding family disintegration. Thus, their performances are not just theatrical, they form part of the repertoire of activist tactics available for fighting for their children's rights and, more broadly, the Latinx migrant community in the United States. Their performances are well received in the US, where, through audiences' participation in Q&A sessions, members of their transnational community and the broader Latinx migrant community strengthen the plays' messages and reinforce the urgent need for immigration reform.

This research calls attention to two under-considered factors in the literature on transnational families, particularly transnational motherhood. First, by analysing the experiences of women in sending communities, it expands the concept of transnational mothers to include the experiences of mothers in sending communities whose children migrate. Second, the focus on the mothers' use of social justice theatre contributes to the limited research on migrant transnational mothers' use of activism as a method for enacting transnational motherhood (Flores-González and Gomberg-Muñoz 2013; Tungohan 2013). By examining activism as a mechanism for transnational motherhood, this study builds on the rich and diverse literature on activist mothering. In Mexico, where this research took place, the women of IMFSH join others committed to social justice, including reform of US–Mexico migration, as a priority that requires immediate attention.

IMFSH is not the only organization using cultural performances as a means of family reunification. In 2014, this model was duplicated by the founders of IMFSH in four other migrant-sending communities in the states of Oaxaca, Puebla, Guerrero, and Mexico City. In Puebla, where there is a high rate of out-migration to New York City, this model has enabled members of transnational families in the Puebla–NYC network to reunite and for the state to create programs like "Programa Raices", a family reunification program for migrant families. To participate in this state program the migrant (son or daughter in the US) must be active in a grassroots organization and have a parent who is sixty years or older who has not resided in the United States as an undocumented migrant or previously applied for a US visa (Consulado General de México Nueva York 2016). The future of such programs, as well as the right to legal family reunification, will depend on US–Mexico relations and the fate of immigration reform.

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NOTE

1. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo is a movement of women who advocated for their disappeared children during Argentina's Dirty War (1976–1983). Las Madres used pictures of their children to demand that the state acknowledge the violence committed during this period.

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31. Virtual village: Zapotec migrants in the digital era

Roberto J. González

For more than a century, the people of Talea de Castro, a Zapotec village in a mountainous region of Oaxaca, Mexico called the Rincón, have sought to improve communication. Its inhabitants eagerly accepted telegraph service at the turn of the twentieth century. It was among the first villages in the area to cultivate coffee as a cash crop. Dozens of Talean men went to work in the United States as *braceros* in the 1940s; and in the 1950s, village leaders successfully lobbied the Mexican government to build a road connecting their pueblo to Oaxaca City.[1]

This pattern has continued and in the early 1990s, Taleans lobbied successfully to have Telmex, Mexico's telephone monopoly, provide service to the community. In 2013, the pueblo drew international attention by creating its own cellular phone network, without support from telecommunications companies or the Mexican government. Today, the Internet and smart phones are a part of daily life for most villagers (for more information, see González 2018).

Talea's progressive outlook encouraged high rates of emigration domestically and internationally. Hundreds of *paisanos* who were born and raised in Talea, a town of approximately 2400 residents, now live in Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, Atlanta, and many other cities and towns scattered across the United States. Hundreds more live in Oaxaca City, Mexico City, Guadalajara, Tijuana, and other Mexican urban centres.

Geographic distance has not dissolved these migrants' bonds to their beloved hometown. In the late twentieth century, Taleans formed community-based associations to support each other, and to support those who remained in their natal homes. By coordinating fiestas, basketball tournaments, band concerts, and other events, migrant associations helped migrants connect with their indigenous identities while raising funds for their sending community (see for example Cohen 1999; Hirabayashi 1993).

Recently, another phenomenon has transformed Talea. Since the early 2010s, migrants who have left the village have used social media to stay connected with people living in Talea, and with Taleans living in other parts of the world. In less than a decade, social media has become an essential part of life particularly for those Taleans living abroad.

LIFE VIRTUALLY

My experiences in Talea began 25 years ago with research among *campesino* farmers in 1994. I was interested in learning how agricultural practices and knowledge changed in response to the North American Free Trade Agreement (see González 2001). I never would have imagined that one day I would be able to keep in touch with Taleans by calling them on mobile phones, sending emails, or following social media sites.

A growing number of Taleans spend parts of their lives online. Most are city dwellers (*urbanos*) who have migrated out of the region, but there are also resident Taleans, including a few young *campesinos*. Studying virtual worlds is crucial to research that documents the realities of technological change (Boellstorff 2008: 4). The arrival of the Internet service, cell phones, and now smart phones in Talea has ushered in a brave new world of possibilities.

When limited Internet service began in Talea in the late 1990s, a virtual version of the village began to take shape. Today, you might say that there are two distinct Taleas: there is a physical village located amidst the mountains and cloud forests of northern Oaxaca, Mexico; and there is a *virtual* village located in the ethereal domain of the World Wide Web. Even before the advent of smart phones, Taleans were using the Internet for their own ends, sharing and displaying communal celebrations, cultural events, and performances. Today virtual Talea exists on Facebook pages, YouTube videos, Instagram accounts, Flickr photo albums, WhatsApp posts, and other platforms and apps.

The virtual village is etheric, and its inhabitants are a widely dispersed and heterogenous group. They include those born in Talea but who now reside far away; those who have never visited Talea but have an ancestral connection to it; one-time visitors to the village or others who have an interest in following events there; and those who are residents of Talea.

My introduction to the virtual village was serendipitous. Several days after I gave a lecture about doing fieldwork in Talea, a student informed me that she had seen a YouTube video featuring Talea's version of the "*Danza de los Aztecas*," one of a dozen or so plays performed by young villagers during Talea's festival seasons. These historical plays, which are sometimes described as a form of street theatre, typically depict the triumph of Spanish Catholicism over Islam, represented by the Moors, and Mesoamerican religions, represented by the Aztecs. *Danzas* were imposed by Spanish friars in the 1500s but have endured in the Americas for nearly five centuries. Throughout Mesoamerica, the *danzas* represent an important part of indigenous identity.[2] I was intrigued by the possibility that Talea's *danzas* might be available online and asked the student to email me a link to the YouTube video.

I clicked on the link and was transported through space and time—to the past. The video was captivating: it provided a front-row seat to a choreographed dance in which a dozen Aztec warriors, played by Talean adolescents, bound, skip, and pirouette as the village's brass band plays an intricately metered, repetitive melody (see Figure 31.1).

The video ended, and I scanned the webpage for information: the clip had been viewed more than 2500 times. It was posted by someone whose surname is that of a prominent Talean merchant family. I spent hours that afternoon binging YouTube videos featuring *danzas* from Zapotec villages throughout the Rincón. Then I found out more about the person who posted the video by searching for him online. A quick search revealed he was a young man and the son of a local merchant. Now probably in his early 30s, he works in Oaxaca City as an electrical engineer and produced the video during a 2015 visit to Talea.

These experiences suggest two questions. If a growing number of Taleans are avid users of the Internet and social media, then how are they using these powerful technologies? And, what are some of the ways that virtual Talea differs from actual Talea? I probed social media sites—mostly Facebook pages and YouTube channels—to find people who live (or once lived) in Talea, to learn more about how they use these media for connecting with each other and with the outside world. My objective was to explore what this technology means for different groups of villagers. For example, do resident Taleans use the technology in ways that are

Figure 31.1   *Talean dancers participating in* Danza de los Aztecas

fundamentally different from the ways in which non-resident Taleans—that is, emigrants—use it? Do men and women, or *campesinos* and merchants, use social media in distinct ways?

I don't want to imply that Taleans or Rinconeros or Zapotecs have craftily outsmarted these technologies or the people who designed them. My point is not to argue that "they are not fooled, not crushed, not homogenized," much less to convince readers that "they are creatively appropriating or reinterpreting what is being thrown at them in ways that its authors would never have anticipated" (Graeber 2004: 99). Such arguments are disturbingly similar to those espoused by tech industry executives who claim that when people in "developing" societies are given the ability to freely use Facebook, or WhatsApp, or Instagram, their lives necessarily improve, or that they use them primarily to resist authoritarianism. Reality is more complex, for even as these tools allow people in places like Talea to create and circulate culturally valuable representations and productions, they also render them vulnerable to algorithmic modes of manipulation and governance. Even as Taleans have used these technologies to resist the state, the information they are sharing online—their digital footprints—become data points to be bought and sold to advertisers.

FIELDWORK IN A BLUE-BORDERED WORLD

My preliminary journeys across Facebook's blue-bordered two-dimensional world were clumsy efforts to locate Taleans whom I had befriended earlier. I began by searching for those *campesinos* whom I had accompanied into the fields, and after several failed attempts I decided to work with their grown children. After combing through my field notes, I compiled a list of names of people who would now be in their late teens or early 20s and within days I had tracked down hundreds of people who had listed Talea as their hometown.

Most Taleans' Facebook posts contain the kind of material that most social media users have come to expect: status updates, inspirational quotes, baby photos, memes, crude jokes, cute videos, political rants, food photos, and of course ubiquitous selfies; and it quickly became

apparent that Talea's most avid Facebook users are the native sons and daughters living and working in the US, in places like Grandview, Washington; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; Madison, Wisconsin; Gainesville Mills, Georgia; and most of all Greater Los Angeles (including Anaheim and other parts of Orange County). Assuming that their self-reported locations are accurate, one can map migration settlement patterns using Facebook profiles as a source of data. Many Taleans who reside in Tijuana or other parts of Baja California, the west coast state of Jalisco, Mexico City and surrounding areas, and Oaxaca City also regularly post "status updates" and other materials to Facebook. Presumably *urbanos* have more reliable Internet access than those living in rural areas—which may itself be a contributing factor to migration out of the countryside. A smaller number of resident Taleans, probably about a hundred or so, have Facebook accounts but typically do not post materials as often as their urban counterparts. They are more likely to respond to posts created by non-resident Taleans who live in cities. Many resident Taleans who have accounts have never posted anything other than a profile photo. I was struck by the fact that many users, particularly those who claim to reside in Talea, have profile photos portraying things that are emblematic of the village: a statue of Talea's patron saint, San Miguel Arcángel; the church tower; a branch laden with coffee beans; a panoramic photo of the municipal palace. It also became clear that few Taleans had enabled Facebook's privacy settings—photos, posts, and videos were typically available to anyone with a Facebook account.

Facebook information was often confusing, though I was able to collect basic information about Taleans' lives: for example, where they lived, where they had travelled, if and when they were married, when they had become parents or grandparents, and (for migrants living outside the village) when they had last visited Talea. I was surprised by posts that revealed a person's values, preferences, or political opinions; typically Taleans tended to be subdued about such things; and for each image I thought a user might want to keep private, I found other materials that were remarkable in historical, anthropological, or aesthetic terms: a photo of a 1950s wedding reception; an image of a grandmother holding her granddaughter who lives with her mother in Los Angeles and many others.

Before delving into examples that illustrate some of the ways in which Taleans are using social media, it is important to remember that the technology is not culture neutral. As a rule, when new technologies are introduced into a society, they become embedded within pre-existing cultural frameworks and value systems. David Edwards, in a book on sacrifice and suicide bombing in Afghanistan, notes that Facebook, which was created by privileged young men in a Harvard University dorm room, is a platform with many culturally constructed assumptions and concepts. The notion of publicly displaying one's face would hardly be considered controversial among the majority of US citizens, but in Afghanistan, where the face is synonymous with reputation, Facebook has been central to redefining its cultural significance. Among those who are online enthusiasts of the Taliban—"Talifans"—the most commonly displayed faces on Facebook were those of young men, soon to be martyred as suicide bombers (Edwards 2017: 185–192).

Another culture-bound assumption is the idea of "friends." In the US, there tends to be a general sense that "friends" are good to have, and that on Facebook, the more "friends" the better. Yet Facebook has transformed the responsibilities of friends in the US, and in other societies as well. Edwards writes:

[W]e must consider how much more dramatic and far-reaching might be the implications of Facebook when transplanted to other cultures, which have their own established friendship ideals and sometimes conflicting expectations related to other social matrices, most importantly kinship and religion. (Ibid.: 192–198)

NEGOTIATING IDENTITY AND BELONGING

Talea's four-day January fiesta attracts thousands of visitors. Resident villagers noted that the fiesta had evolved into a celebration for Talean migrants returning to visit relatives and friends. Julio Baltazar was among those people—he and all but one of his siblings have lived in Mexico City for most of their lives.

Baltazar's post to Facebook captures the complicated role digital media plays for migrants. His status update includes a photo portraying a *campesino* sitting down at a small table, wearing a loose-fitting yellow polo shirt and a dark blue baseball cap. The older man has a bowl of refried beans and a cup of coffee. In his prominently veined hands, he delicately holds a piece of tortilla. A bowl of tomatoes and chilies are on the table, along with a bag of dry black beans, several gourds and a bottle of cooking oil. His back is propped up against a neatly made adobe wall. The man has a sombre expression. The caption is simple: "In the farmhouse that is four hours' walk [from Talea] enjoying some delicious refried beans on Tuesday, January 23, my brother Beto."

The post was remarkable to me for another reason: it was followed by many comments, apparently written by close family members (particularly siblings living in Mexico City), nearly all of whom expressed nostalgia for Xaca and Talea. A total of 37 comments and "replies" followed Julio Baltazar's status update—too many to include here—but a sample of them will illustrate how some migrants negotiate identity and a sense of belonging by means of social media:

> **Tencha Baltazar [Julio's sister]:** What a beautiful photo Julio, thank you for sharing.
> **Juana Baltazar [Julio's sister]:** All of us siblings should go, it would be fantastic and with our children too so that those who haven't been there can get to know it.
>
> **Carolina González [Julio's sister-in-law, Rogelio's wife]:** Mmmmm, if I go tell them that I went to leave tortillas for my father-in-law, may he rest in peace, [when I went to Xaca] he served me boiling coffee for the heat and I felt as fresh as lettuce, ha ha.
> **Eva Gomez [relationship unclear]:** Pop, at least bring us a few tortillas ha ha.
> **Lao Salinas [relationship unclear—cousin?]:** When I go [to Talea] invite me to the farmhouse, relative.
>
> **Yadira Baltazar [Julio's sister]:** Brother, that is in Xaca right? So many beautiful memories. My heart beat faster, I shed tears. You're so lucky to be there. Enjoy it. Take lots of photos and share them please.
> **Tencha Baltazar [Julio's sister]:** Yadi, when we go I'm really looking forward to remembering beautiful times that we spent there.
> **Yadira Baltazar [Julio's sister]:** Let's go! And eat beans with ice cream beans ha ha [from the pacay tree].

Veronica Castillo [family friend]: Yadira, I remember well when you went with your mami.
Yadira Baltazar [Julio's sister]: Yes Vero!! There I spent a big part of my childhood!! Oh and how could one forget when we went for a whole week to pick your grandma's coffee!! Samy and Leti would go too. Do you remember????
Veronica Castillo [family friend]: Yeeees, beautiful memories when "Flatface" would go all the way to loma yagcua for bread, I can't image who he wanted to impress ha ha.

Comments on the post express a sense of nostalgia for an idyllic past, one that presumably still exists in Xaca for outsiders. There is also an expressed desire for the children living outside of the village to know Talea.

Ironically, in the 1990s, Beto bitterly complained to a group of close friends about the fact that of all of his siblings he was the one who worked the land. He was a melancholy man and something of a black sheep in his family. His brother Rogelio had finished high school and secured an office job in Talea, but only rarely went to the fields. He acknowledged that he had gotten into trouble as a young man traveling through the country (and had spent time in a northern Mexico jail). It was not entirely clear to me why Beto returned and stayed in Talea. It is possible that his parents expected him to settle there, perhaps because he never married, or perhaps because he didn't finish junior high, or perhaps because as the oldest son he was expected to work the land. Was Beto even aware of his photo and how it aided his siblings as they waxed nostalgic about their childhoods?

PUEBLO PRIDE

Many Facebook posts were created to transmit or reinforce a sense of civic pride among other Taleans and the posts by Abel Santillano, a man who is now about 40 years old who lives in Mexico state, are a good example of how this works.

Although most of his Facebook posts included photos of his wife and child, Abel returned to Talea four years ago for the annual fiesta in honour of San Miguel Arcangel, and posted several photos of women preparing *comidas típicas* (typical foods), *atole de cacao* (a corn-based chocolate drink), *yht gu* (bean tamales wrapped in banana leaf), and other delicacies. The caption for one of his status updates reads as follows: "The dough for bean tamales. Women working—in the rehearsal hall of the BUP [Banda Unión y Progreso]" (Figure 31.2).

The responses from Abel's Facebook "friends" demonstrate how social media facilitates communication among Taleans living in different cities across North America. Here I include the location of those commenting on the photo:

Adrian Chavez [Inglewood, CA]: Thank you for sharing the photos … I just saw my dear mom.
Abel Santillano: Sure thing, bro, thanks for visiting my profile, later I'll upload more.

Guillermina Mendoza [Tijuana, Baja California]: I WANT BEAN TAMALES MMMMMMM HOW DELICIOUS.
Luis Luna [Xalapa, Veracruz]: BEAN TAMALES HOW DELICIOUS.
María Alaniz [Oaxaca City, Oaxaca]: My ex-mother in law is a total sweetheart.

Another set of entries posted by Abel express enthusiasm about Talea's community cell phone network. During the summer of 2013, Abel posted a photo of a newspaper resting on his lap. The newspaper headline reads, "They created their own cell network" and includes

Figure 31.2   *Four women making tamales in preparation for a fiesta in Talea*

Source: Photo courtesy of Andrés Pérez Gerónimo.

a page-long story with photos of Taleans using mobile phones. Abel posted the following caption, which garnered more than 50 "likes":

> As I was getting my shoes shined, I borrowed a newspaper ... and oh, what a surprise ... I found this.

In a series of other Facebook posts, Abel posted photos of a TV news program reporting on the village's autonomous cell phone network. The news report appeared on the Televisa network, which dominates Mexico's pay TV market. He and others were beaming with Talean pride, even from hundreds of miles away.

As in the previous example from the Baltazar family, Abel's social media posts, and the subsequent comments from urban Taleans, illustrate a deep felt longing for the sights, smells, and flavours of the pueblo—and a sense of pride in its enduring *campesino* culture. Ironically, those who are nostalgic tend to be years or even generations removed from farming work. Yet they express pride in that heritage.

There are probably a hundred or so Taleans who live in the actual village with Facebook accounts, but few of them regularly post photos or other materials online. Although not many use the platform as a vehicle for eloquently expressing their innermost convictions, there are a few exceptions, like Kendra Rodríguez. Her Facebook page includes posts in which she openly discusses her political activities and ideology and nuanced ideas that are critical of the government. For example, she posted this message on March 8, along with a photo in which she is posing before the Zapatista army's "Office of Women for Dignity" in the Chiapas town of Oventic:

> On this day when we commemorate International Women's Day, I express my greetings and admiration for all those women, anonymous or not, visible or invisible, from all latitudes of the entire world. To those who have made a path for new generations, those who have passed on their knowledges,

those who have encouraged us to keep growing. Because the role of women in society offers an array of functions: friend, companion, mother, worker, professional, educator, housewife, artist, athlete; and now more than ever, present and future protagonist among the people of the earth. There is still a long path ahead, because the gender divide is still great, but accompanying one another, together in sorority we will continue advancing … Thank you to all … I send you an embrace from the beating heart of the Sierra Juárez.

In another post, Rodríguez includes the following comment, accompanied by an article published in one of Mexico's most popular daily newspapers:

> Once more, decisions are being made without informing the principal [coffee] producers, with the [economic] crisis and need that exist in the coffee sector of our state—not only Nestlé wants to take advantage of this, but also Starbucks, which is beginning to advance on the Sierra Norte, to try to hoard coffee and to impose its genetically modified coffee varieties that are of poor quality.[3]

Kendra's comments simultaneously express indignation at the misdeeds of global corporations, pride in the superb varieties of locally grown coffee, and a sense that the sierra must be protected from the abuses of powerful interests.

While Kendra used Facebook to voice her political dissatisfaction, most Taleans use Facebook to communicate posts that are short, mundane and don't do much more than express a feeling to "friends"— nostalgia, surprise, alarm, frustration, irony, pride, or affection. As psychologist Sherry Turkle (2012) notes, social media and text messaging can often be summarized by the notion: "I share, therefore I am."

What Taleans post on social media is not always filled with social significance; rather, a great deal is horseplay, *puro relajo*—good fun. Many Taleans prided themselves on their keen sense of humour, and even the most reserved villagers enjoyed telling jokes or playing pranks once I got to know them better.

Talean humour often translates well on social media. Take, for example, this Facebook post, uploaded without any written commentary by a merchant's son who is now in his late 40s (see Figure 31.3). He is the tallest person in the photo (on the far-right side, wearing number 11), and was often called *guero* by his friends and relatives because of his fair complexion and light brown hair. The photo depicts Talea's basketball team posing uncomfortably with a domesticated young buck after winning second place in a local tournament in the early 1990s. Several of the teenagers are awkwardly holding plastic bags containing large tacos, given to them by the organizers of the fiesta. The comments speak for themselves:

Adnan Miguel: What place did the team come in, guero? Poor Wil [see fourth player from the right, wearing a jersey with the number 6], that dude was really chubby, no? Haha!
Federico Botero: Second place in an epic final against Jaltianguis, a double match, there you'll see one of the old men that you can't outrun now, dude haha.
Adnan Miguel: But now you don't even want to play, dude.
Noe Calderon: Couldn't you all leave the tacos to the side? ha ha ha ha, cool picture, there's one to remember, congratulations!!!!

Bune Yadun: Friends if I'm not mistaken it was in San Bartolomé yatony [Yatoni], help me remember!
Federico Botero: It was in Talea in January 93, if I'm not mistaken, but that deer was given to us for winning first place in Yatoni the year before.
Bune Yadun: Great times, it's been a long while, hasn't it?
Elias Villarreal: Number 4 and number 11, all beans … ha ha ha.

Oscar Luna Botero: Damn you, guero, you're just making fun of our loincloths, dude.

Leti Gomez: Great photo, puro muchachón [pure strong young men]! Those are really athlete's legs!

Figure 31.3   Talea's basketball team after a tournament in the early 1990s

Source: Photo courtesy of Octavio Bautista and Daniel Bautista.

The comments serve to reinforce a shared bond between those who experienced the triumphs of Talea's team, but they also express side-splitting humour and a subtle sense of longing for the past. In this case (as in the case of the tamales photo posted by Abel), those commenting are scattered across Mexico and the United States. They are separated by distance and connected through media.

It is impossible to draw any grand conclusions from the ways in which Taleans use Facebook, other than the fact that those who live in the physical village tend to use it more sparingly than those who have resettled outside of it, and it is quite rare for campesinos to use the medium. Furthermore, the photos posted to Facebook preserve memories and document nostalgia rather than fomenting change.

CULTURAL PRODUCTION

As it exists in YouTube, videos that document virtual Talea can be organized into roughly five themes, most of which are associated with the village's annual fiestas. In order of popularity, these are *danzas*, musical performances (particularly by the village's philharmonic brass bands), *calendas*, fireworks and basketball tournaments. Another category, *la vida cotidiana*—scenes from everyday life – includes the preparation of regional foods, agricultural work, and Talea's picturesque surroundings. Most of the time it is relatively easy to confirm the identity of the person who posted the video (the "content creator") by comparing his or her name with another social media account.

Like Facebook, YouTube distorts the village, since so many posts portray extraordinary moments. As Octavio Paz famously noted in *The Labyrinth of Solitude*, "The fiesta is by nature sacred, literally or figuratively, and above all it is the advent of the unusual. It is governed by its own special rules, that set it even apart from other days." The fiesta "all occurs in an enchanted world: time is transformed to a mythical past or a total present" (Paz 1989[1950]). From another perspective, YouTube provides a window into events that are hyperrealistic. In many cases, the viewer finds himself or herself right in the middle of the action. These are almost never staged productions—they are eye-level recordings of culturally significant events.

Analysing videos of basketball tournaments can provide insight into life in the Rincón and beyond. For nearly a century, basketball has been the most popular sport in indigenous communities throughout the state of Oaxaca. Most villages have a basketball court located in the town centre or plaza, and Talea is no exception: its court is located directly in front of the municipal palace.[4] An essential part of fiestas throughout the state are tournaments between teams that represent different villages. Both men's and women's teams are organized. Winning teams receive prizes that may include cash, oxen, deer or other valuable animals. The biggest tournament of all is the Copa Benito Juárez, held in the village of Guelatao—up to 200 teams compete. Tournament finals often attract an audience of hundreds—women and men, young and old are equally drawn to the sport. During the 1990s, the Sierra Zapotec village of Macuiltianguis constructed a state-of-the-art indoor stadium at a cost of more than US $500,000. The *torneos de básquet* provide an outlet for villagers to compete with each other in a way that allows them to express civic pride, discipline, and camaraderie within the framework of indigenous values.

Outsiders often find it perplexing that basketball, rather than soccer, is so popular in Oaxaca, and the historical reasons for this are not entirely clear.[5] There are several theories about how basketball, which originated in the northeastern US during the 1890s, arrived in rural Oaxaca: some claim that schoolteachers brought the game with them when the first public school opened in the 1930s; others think that miners brought the game to the region early in the twentieth century; still others credit President Lázaro Cárdenas for promoting the construction of basketball courts. Oaxacan basketball is now a global phenomenon: many indigenous villages, including Talea, have corresponding teams in Los Angeles which participate in the Copa Oaxaca, a tournament that has taken place every summer for more than two decades. Some of these matches have been posted on YouTube—spanning the borderless ether of the Internet.

YouTube videos of basketball games sometimes reveal tensions that go beyond sport. For example, in the Cajonos Zapotec village of Santo Domingo Yojovi, a 2018 fiesta tournament culminated in a final match between Talea and the neighbouring village of Tabaa. As I watched the video, there was a palpable sense of excitement and emotion among the athletes—and the audience. An announcer gives a tense play-by-play account of the 30-minute game. Even the weather adds to the drama: in the background, looming overhead just above the nearby church, are leaden storm clouds. At one point, a referee calls a foul as two players shove each other, struggling over control of the ball. Men in the audience jump up and shout in frustration—and then play resumes. In the end, players from the two teams congratulate each other.

A video of a basketball game between rival villages is also a commentary on decades-old tensions as well as a celebratory document of the fiesta. And most Rincón adults will recognize the deeper significance of the video as it documents ongoing territorial conflicts between villages (Dennis 1987) over disputed lands. But perhaps the most important aspect of YouTube

videos of Oaxacan basketball tournaments is that they provide a new way to broadcast a contemporary transnational formation, linking people across space and time.

Professionally produced videos can become critical resources for villagers who have migrated and settled in new destinations. For example, VideoRey (a local production company in Oaxaca City) does brisk business with people living in rural Oaxaca; nevertheless, it is clear that its target audience includes indigenous Oaxacans who have migrated to the United States. Among the company's cleverest advertising slogans is *no les mande mole, mándeles un videorey de su fiesta* ("don't send them *mole*, send them a VideoRey of their fiesta"). The tagline plays on a decades-old practice in which rural Oaxacans hire local drivers to ship dried *mole*, *chintezle* (chili paste), *panela* (unrefined brown sugar), *chapulines* (toasted grasshoppers) and other delicacies to the US–Mexico border.

Companies are not the only entities that create YouTube videos set in Talea. Tomasa Cruz, a native of Talea who resides in Mexico City, has been a remarkably prolific producer and returns to Talea frequently. Cruz, who is a middle-aged woman, began posting videos on YouTube in June 2012. Since then her videos have been viewed more than 1.8 million times. She specializes in producing high-resolution videos featuring public performances by Talea's municipal band and highlights from Talea's largest fiestas, but she has also produced many other works, some of which were made in other Zapotec villages. Although it is difficult to calculate a precise figure, García's work has probably earned her somewhere between US $3600 and $5400—comparable to 1000 days of work at Mexico City's official minimum wage.

Although I was intrigued by García's most popular posts (half of her top 10 were filmed in Talea), the video that most captured my imagination was a 12-minute video filmed in the early morning hours of November 2, 2017 in her home. It depicts the *recorrido de los bhni hué*, a Day of the Dead ritual in which a group of men sing cantos in honour of departed souls. The video begins with six *bhni hué* entering the main room, which has a large, intricately decorated altar adorned with fruit, food, candles, and a large photo of García's deceased parents. Then the men methodically sing cantos. What made the images especially compelling to me was the fact that two of the *bhni hué* were men who had become close friends of mine in the 1990s.

Finally, I should describe a remarkable YouTube video, *Linda Taleanita* (Lovely Talean Woman), a slick music video featuring approximately 40 young musicians of the municipal band Alma Taleana, who range in age from about eight to eighteen (see Figure 31.4). They are dressed in clothing that would have been popular in Talea a century ago. Boys sport spotless ivory-colored *calzones* (loose-fitting pants and shirts made of coarse cotton), black broad-brimmed wool hats, and *huaraches* from the Cajonos pueblo of Yalalag, which are still commonly worn by many Talean campesinos. Girls don *huipiles* (embroidered cotton blouses), long pastel-coloured skirts, and black *rebozos* (shawls) wrapped around their heads. Dramatic clips of Talea's cobblestone streets, majestic church, and municipal palace are interwoven with close up shots of the protagonist—a beautifully poised teenage girl expertly picking coffee and patting out tortillas. The song also features a gifted singer, a mid-40s Talean man known locally as *el gran Pavarotti* because of his operatic voice.

Linda Taleanita encapsulates the ways in which technology can transmit a complex set of symbols laden with cultural meaning, to different audiences simultaneously. For resident Taleans, particularly for village youth, the video is documentary evidence of the vibrant village traditions that have survived into the twenty-first century—music, clothing, religion, the countryside. For Talea's *urbanos*, the production is a reminder of the pueblo's grandeur

and enduring beauty, but it is also an alluring invitation—the food, the scenery, and the music beckon migrants to return the village, to revisit their indigenous heritage.

Figure 31.4   *Talea's municipal band, circa 2018*

Source: Photo courtesy of Ulises Canseco Peña/Banda Municipal de Villa Talea de Castro.

DISCUSSION

For millions of Latin American migrants who have left rural pueblos like Talea to live and work in urban areas, technology in general and social media in particular can play a vital role in maintaining cultural values, even as new forms of digital communication transform the ways in which people interact with one another. If we consider the case of Zapotec migrants in the US, the virtual village represents a new kind of transnational community (Kearney 1995), one which relies upon smart phones and the Internet as essential tools for cultural connectivity over space and time.

Trying to make sense of the virtual village highlights some of the contradictions of new digital communications technologies. These potent tools provide a seemingly indestructible medium for documenting, curating, and distributing images, sounds, and sentiments that are culturally anchored and socially valued. Anthropologist Mary Good, who has studied the impact of Facebook among Polynesian youth, suggests that "the introduction of Facebook does not become a Western technology behemoth ruthlessly steamrolling across a passive new territory of eager users … adopting new media and incorporating it into their lives is a process, and sometimes facilitates the maintenance of more long-standing traditions" (quoted in Grossman 2014). In virtual Talea, a comparable process is unfolding in which virtual villagers are able to celebrate communal life, a shared sense of aesthetics, and individual opinions and attitudes among peers.

At the same time, when it comes to social media, Taleans have joined the ranks of billions of other users around the world who, in exchange for apparently free access to platforms and

apps, are subjected to the same forms of algorithmic processes that have enabled Facebook, Google, and Amazon to become the world's most powerful advertising firms. Like you, and me, and about half of the planet's population, Taleans—or more precisely, the data they generate along with the rest of us—*are* the product.

Historically, Taleans sought to maintain their autonomy in the face of powerful institutions that tried to impose coercive, repressive power from the top down: the Spanish colonial administrators, the army of the Second French Empire during the 1860s, and the post-revolutionary Mexican government. Today, control is more capillary, and power more pernicious. Social networks often feel good because they are unquestionably *connective*. As Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms are "giving shape to people's sense of self," we should not forget that they are also "producing certain forms of dependency and subjective bonds to authority … [while] enabling rather than simply opposing agency" (Walker 2012). The interactive nature of social media—and the Internet more broadly—seductively draws in users as they skip from one post, page, or site to another, often losing track of time, space, and perspective.

Several questions loom large about the long-term consequences of Talea's newest technology: to what extent will the people of the pueblo become dependent on their new technologies for social interaction? Will face-to-face communication in the Rincón eventually give way to face-to-screen communication—as has happened in so many other parts of the world? To what extent will users experience the kinds of behavioural addiction surrounding these irresistible new technologies in the US, Europe, East Asia and other regions? And how might the cell phone network make villages more susceptible to forms of digital surveillance and algorithmic modes of governance that have become normalized in so many countries?

In 1980, an influential Talean who had served in nearly every elected position in the village, had this to say about new technology: "We've all become comfort lovers … [but] what can be bad about new things is not knowing how to use them properly. I'm not against progress, I'm for it. But I think there must be a balance" (quoted in Nader and González 2013). Finding that balance in the midst of a digital revolution will likely be among the biggest challenges confronting Talea in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. Talea has an unusual history among Rincón *pueblos*. Most importantly, it was founded after the arrival of the Spaniards (see Chance 1989: 77; and see Nader 1964).
2. For a broader discussion of *danzas* in Mesoamerican see Cohen (1993) and Harris (2000).
3. Genetically modified coffee doesn't exist but what she probably means here is replacing *cafe arabe* with one of the hybrids or sun coffee.
4. Villagers often found it odd that an American man as "tall" as me (5 feet, 8 inches) would be such a poor basketball player. Although most Talean men were shorter than me, many of them were remarkably talented basketball players and spent a great deal of time honing their skills.
5. Some sierra villages have constructed full-sized indoor basketball courts at a cost of hundreds of thousands of US dollars. There is a growing literature on Oaxacan basketball. See for example Ramírez Rios (2019) and Quinones and Mittelstaedt (2000). US-based photojournalist Jorge Santiago (2017), who is a native of the Sierra Zapotec village of Guelatao, has produced *Identity at Play*, a compelling photo series highlighting basketball in the northern sierra. Oaxacan youth basketball has received global media attention over the past decade due to the remarkable talent of a team of indigenous Triqui boys who won an international youth basketball tournament, the Barcelona Cup.

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32. Interconnectivities: mobility, food and place
Paulette K. Schuster

"Every time I go home, I bring back my salsita. I can't be without it."
Sharon, a Mexican Jew living in Rishon Lezion, Israel, 2007

Going home and bringing back food is common among immigrants. This type of food remittances is often bidirectional (Bailey 2017). Migrants' sense of belonging is fundamentally related to the food they bring from home and the memories and nostalgia it generates.

Food is a central theme for migrants. Ask most anyone and they will tell you that they miss certain foods and they miss sharing those foods. People talk about foods they can't live without, which dishes and ingredients they yearn for and which they choose to bring back in suitcases along with the rest of their luggage (Schuster 2015a). They talk about what and how they cook with local ingredients, how they find and recreate "tastes" and "smells" of home, and what local cuisines they hate. For migrants, food is a powerful symbolic representation of home, community and a way of life left behind or placed on the sidelines.

Food and human mobility are universals that are connected throughout history (Gabaccia 2012). People move for a variety of reasons and in the process, they transport foods from one location to another. Why has the circulation of food become commonplace across geographical and cultural borders? Why does the act of migration so often include procuring and reproducing the tastes of "home"? This chapter considers migration and food as well as the important role food plays for migrants vis-à-vis their relationship to both home communities and destinations. Alongside the movement of people and food within and across national borders, we see an increasing trend in the adoption of new ways of eating, cooking, producing and accessing foods in sending communities including new destinations. Migrants' and stay-at-homes use food to mediate their sojourns and their responses to the sojourns of others. In other words, those who travel and those who stay behind also participate in the cultural production and consumption of food. Their culinary habits and practices are critical to identity. In many destinations, migrants inadvertently influence and change local gastronomy as they introduce new dishes, new ways of eating and new uses for native foods such as a Chimichanga, Nachos, Peking Duck, Lettuce Wraps, Kogi Taco/Burrito and Chicken Tikka Masala.

Food and mobility are perhaps the most prominent and obvious aspects of globalization according to both Appadurai (1996) and Smith (1990). This is particularly evident when we explore the effects of globalization on production cooking and eating (Poulain 2017). As the world becomes more globalized and connected, it has become easier than ever to access cuisines from different cultures and to adapt and combine them anew and often as fusions of different traditions. Migrants bring with them different cultural norms, food and eating practices (Bailey 2017). They place great importance on food and eating practices, forge distribution networks and form virtual communities all while negotiating their belonging.

Bailey (2017) examines the linkages between food, belonging and commensality among other themes taking examples from the suitcases of Indian migrants that are often filled with spices and snacks, curry leaves, chili powder, dried meat and Kerala rice. These once

hard-to-find foodstuffs are now readily available in niche ethnic stores and even in local supermarkets. "Food prepared by family which could be preserved over a longer period of time helped participants to conjure a sense of home" (Bailey 2017: 54). A sense of home is vested with a sense of place which is infused with smells and tastes.

Food becomes a symbolic object that triggers nostalgia and anchors migrants to a new locality and reality. Ganor (2019) uses household objects to narrate the lived experiences of German-speaking Jews who fled Nazi persecution. She focuses on the refugees' relationship to the objects that populated these spaces, paying particular attention to the objects that were carried into displacement from the lost home and homeland. Similarly, the food that migrants choose to carry becomes a traveling object that tells a story. "Household objects had the capacity to mirror various facets of life in displacement back [to] the people who experienced it" (2019: 8).

This chapter illustrates and explores food cultures and practices in the contexts of mobility and migration. Specifically, it explores the ways that the forces of globalization influence migration and mobility and impact cooking, commensality, culinary models, food production and consumption. Taking the discussion one step further, it explores the relationship of food to place, nationalism, ethnicity, identity; and highlights the interplay between these forces. The first section discusses migration and the role that food plays in culture and commensality. The second section explores eating, taste and power. The third section notes upon the use of space and role of place in the study of food and its place as a frame of reference for eating. The last section presents several conclusions aimed at shedding light on the importance of the analysis of food and mobility in the study of migration and the rise of ethnic restaurants.

FOOD AND MOBILITY

Mobility refers to the spatial cross-border relocation, regardless of duration of stay. This term encompasses internal and international (outward and inward migrations), rural and modern, national and transnational, as well as short- and long-term. The intrinsic value of migration is its relationship to rootedness and uprootedness that are framed within a global geopolitical context that emphasizes placement and displacement (Massey 1999). Food plays an important role in anchoring these binaries and in the creation of transnational social spaces.

Food permeates daily life from the mundane to the celebratory. Food carries culinary traditions that are deeply embedded in everyday practices. We may associate childhood memories with food and a nostalgia for family and place. We crave these nostalgic and comfort foods and turn to them in times of crisis, sickness, stress or anxiety. Cooking comfort foods functions as a coping mechanism for homesickness and reconnects the migrant with the past (and place) they have left. Traditional recipes are passed down from one generation to the next, from parents to children, creating continuity and expressing cultural identity. Food is everywhere we look, from the corner shop to high-end restaurants. We see food as part of our visual culture in books, billboards, on TV, magazines, posters and in supermarkets.

Immigrants bring their food memories and foodstuffs to their new destinations. Cooking traditional food is a way of safeguarding and preserving culture and creates powerful transnational symbols of belonging, ethnicity, identity and origins. In order to continue cooking traditional dishes and also to showcase them, many immigrants will open their own restaurants. In these establishments, the food evolves. Not all the necessary ingredients may be available

to make traditional dishes, and adaptations take place. As such, the taste and flavors of home are transformed.

Immigrants not only sell to their compatriots, they also sell to locals. They alter their original dishes to cater to a new and wider audience with distinct tastes, palates and preferences. These "altered dishes" are endowed with flavors that reimagine home and identity (Lallani 2017: 4).

Food takes on importance as individuals abandon their home countries and become part of a diaspora. Once they are separated from their mother culture, they become nostalgic for the smells and tastes they left behind. Food is often one of the last vestiges of home. While adaptation can begin by abandoning dress; food is often the last thing and the hardest to relinquish. Food is a daily reminder of the past and a foundation for the future. At each meal, people have the opportunity to connect to their memories, families, origins and communities. Eating, sharing food, talking about food, taking photos of food, uploading photos of food on social media channels, looking at other people's photos of food – these actions are all distinct ways that food brings people together. Cuisine is shaped by local tastes. Eating local home-grown or locally cultivated ingredients becomes part of the fiber of society.

Mobility is an inclusive, dynamic process. It is fluid and covers all types of moves regardless of their drivers (Amelina and Vasilache 2014; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). Food plays an important role in creating a sense of belonging and transcends the space between sending community and destination. Commensality is a central force in the multi-dimensional exchange that occurs around migration. Migrants recall memories of traditional dishes associated with holidays and rituals, from the Mexican Rosca de Reyes (round festive sweet bread) to the roasted Thanksgiving turkey. These dishes are infused and embedded with family stories.

The relationship between food and migration is more than a cultural exchange between members of the society of origin and the receiving society. Migrants acquire traditions of their new adopted home, as well as bring new foods and traditions that are often adopted by the receiving society. Commensality with co-ethnics or co-nationals led to a greater sense of community and established affective bonds. Within these social fields, the exchanges of food, eating practices, recipes, cooking tips and stories create a sense of belonging and presence where transnational lines are blurred.

Food facilitates social mobility. For migrants, food becomes a complex multidimensional thing that includes a considerable number of components (Westoff, Bressler and Sagi 1960). Migration, particularly transnational migration, is not a one way journey. It involves a revolving door between country of origin and the adopted country and food travels through this door (see Grieshop 2006). Transnationalism is defined by improved technology, ease of travel and the movement of goods, foods and people across myriad boundaries. Migrants are nestled in multi-sited and multi-layered transnational social fields that affect those who move, those that return and those who choose to stay behind (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1003). Within these social fields, food has become one important area that is reflected in public and private places, such as restaurants, stores, bars, pubs and within homes.

TRILOGY: EATING, TASTES AND POWER

The discussion of food and migration includes eating, taste and power. People eat different food but also eat in different ways depending on their lived experiences. The physical displacement from the country of origin forces the migrant to decide or negotiate what he/she

must eat depending on what is locally available in the country of destination. Narratives of food and eating articulate an awareness of the migrant's own distinct palate, memory and other sensory experiences. Eating in the transnational spaces changes as the migrant acculturates and articulates a sense of belonging to a place. The food that we eat is determined by a host of complex networks of cultural, social, economic, and political factors (Fieldhouse 1998). Food in general and individual ingredients play a significant role in understanding the self (Narayan 1995), differentiating between "us" and "them" and in shaping intergroup dynamics and relationships (Lusin 2013).

The habitus, a central theme in Bourdieu's theory, can be understood in this case as the perceptions and habits that shape people's attitudes and beliefs towards the social world, and provides guidance as to how to act correctly inside the social fields. Generative principles of practice forms, which are responsible for the characterizations of life, are structured by the social world and shaped through social practice. Habitus "are structured structures, generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices – what the worker eats, and especially the way he eats it" (Bourdieu 1996: 17). In order words, what we eat is determined by our attitudes based on our cultural and social practices and defined by the social strata consumers occupy. The fields are the spaces of social practice, a structured frame for social action. Each field, including the field of food, has its unique rules and reference points. Consumers and the food that is consumed are constantly changing and being negotiated, as are the relations, networks and institutions surrounding production, distribution, and consumption.

The conceptualization of return migration as part of the transnational migration process which is tied to the dynamic paradigm of mobility in dialogue (Parella et al. 2019) is part of the new research being done on transnationalism (Cohen and Schuster 2019a). When migrants return home, there is sometimes conflict between the food habits they have acquired and their original tastes. This highlights the way food and eating is contested by migrants at points of origin as well as points of destination. These clashes signal changing attitudes and capture how food, culture and history are interlinked. Every family has a story to tell through food, either via festive holiday meals or mundane everyday fare. Mealtimes are also studied as "cultural sites for socializing children into commensality, communicative expectations, and the symbolic, moral, and sentimental meanings of food and eating" (Ochs and Shohet 2006: 35).

Food transnationalism is distinct from other forms of globalization that typically concentrate on economic processes (Held and McGrew, 2007 as cited in Ozkul 2012), or on the effects of a particular global product over specific locations (Appadurai 2001). Food is a global product that highlights the dichotomy between "the global" and "local", and how diasporas and identities are created (see Clifford 1994; Vertovec 2004). Food connects us in problematic ways. The same multinational food corporations are found in every city, yet these corporations have introduced foodstuffs and cuisines that otherwise would never have left their places of origin. Chinese, Mexican, and Italian cuisines are certainly not only limited to China, Mexico or Italy; and were introduced at both a local and a national level.

Food is global and exists in both public and private spheres. As people move so does their food, their eating habits and their traditions. Food is a vehicle for transporting identity; it is central to our sense of who we are (Fischler 1988) and is a rich cultural symbol and marker of identity. Siniscalchi and Harper (2019) show how food becomes a marker of identity and response to social exclusion, and how food values become tools for transforming power dynamics at the local level and beyond. Through the comparison of food-centered movements across Europe, Altoé and de Azevedo (2018) describe how these forms of mobilization express

ideologies and economic and political objectives, all while the migrant endures a process of identity construction (both preserving his/her former cultural/ethnic identity and re-creating a new identity in the destination country). In doing so, the role of food practices and the influence of food culture are considered (Altoé and de Azevedo 2018).

Immigrants are often overwhelmed with their new surroundings and cultures. They turn to national cuisines as a melancholic/nostalgic way to capture a lost home, childhood and often to find solace in its familiar and comforting smells and tastes. The idea of "comfort food" stems from such an act of remembering (Spence 2017). In these cases, food provides a needed outlet. The comfort foods we choose demarcate who we are, where we came from, and what we experienced in our journey. Thus, for example, comfort food can translate into a rich bowl of chicken soup with matzah balls and dumplings or fried chicken on top of waffles with gravy. Such food choices are uniquely personal and meaningful at an individual and cultural level.

Culinary/food tourism has gained momentum as a result of the mixture of the migrants' national food with local cuisines. These food fusions attract locals and tourists alike. Mixing national food (Ichijo, Johannes and Ranta 2019) with local cuisines has produced unique emblemic dishes as exemplified with pizza and kebab in Rome, shwarma and jalapeños in Israel, Arab style tacos in Mexico, Portuguese custards in Macau and so forth. Cooking is a way of communicating. People sitting around the table talk about the pleasures of eating, joys and drudgery of cooking, exchange recipes, share reflections and anecdotes on everything and anything gastronomical (Brillat-Savarin 2011). A place that feels like home. In this case, does cooking become an act of imaging, performing or defiance to the host culture? In such commensality, eating is treated as a social phenomenon (Gronow and Holm 2019). National foods have become symbolic with specific connotations, located in a very specific place and country (Ichijo, Johannes and Ranta 2019). Migrants strongly identify with these home/national foods and try to replicate them in their destination/adopted countries in order to recreate a lost home and imbue a sense of continuity to their offspring.

Ichijo, Johannes and Ranta (2019) explore the role of migrant and ethnic food, cuisines and ingredients in society as a means of interrogating the concept of the nation-state and how the nation-state is changing in response to globalization. Bosco, Joassart-Marcelli and O'Neal (2017) analyze the food environment of young people's everyday mobilities and encounters with food and how they navigate contradictions between food norms and modalities across different places such as home, school, and neighborhood (and see Cohen and Schuster 2019b).

Migrants often have ambivalent engagements with local food landscapes and with what, how, and where they eat. The outcomes are critical to understanding the dynamic food environment in which they navigate and the relationship they have with their own journeys. Migrants' daily engagements/interactions with their food environments reveal how food and eating practices are structured by social networks/relations/family, as well as the physical and material constraints that can combine with geography to limit connections. Migrants actively contest and re-create the formation of national culinary identities (Ichijo, Johannes and Ranta 2019). Migrants often carry and ask others to deliver foodstuffs they cannot find locally. Often, these are products that fit in suitcases and can easily be transported across the borders. They bring products from home in their attempts to articulate and reinforce their national identity. The spatial flow of these foodstuffs creates a powerful link between home and destination country.

Scholarly discussions of ethnic food have tended to focus on the attitudes and eating patterns of consumers, rather than the creators and producers of such dishes. Ray (2016) explores

the culinary world from the perspective of the ethnic restaurateur; and examines the lived experiences, work, memories, and aspirations of immigrants working in the food industry in New York City. He notes how migrants settle in new places and create a taste of home and at the same time influence native food cultures through daily interactions (and see Carroll and Fahy 2015). Congregating and settling in cultural enclaves creates a "global hierarchy of taste" and captures ethnic differences in the construction of opinions about food, but also culture in general (Ray 2016). The global hierarchy of cultural taste is constructed on capital flows rather than in any inherent virtues tacit in culture. Migrants display their social lives in public spaces such as restaurants, cafes and grocery shops, especially when they are family or home-grown enterprises.

Whether migrants practice commensality while enjoying their national food or cooking for their families, they involve and invoke social networks (Portes 1997). They may invest in a family-owned or -run restaurant or food enterprise. "Migrants are embedded in networks stretching across multiple states and […] migrants' identities and cultural production reflect their multiple locations" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1006). As immigrants sample other cuisines they turn their attention to questions of authenticity and appropriation (Ariel 2012; Ray 2016) which contributes to the understanding and appreciation of other culinary traditions that are reaped with national experiences.

Gronow and Holm (2019) concentrate on the mundane and ordinary food and eating practices of the everyday as they are linked to changes in modern society. They also focus on the changes in traditional eating habits, family meals, regular meal patterns, gendering of food practices and signs of increasing informality around meals. Others focus on everyday food practices (Bailey 2017; Bosco, Joassart-Marcelli and O'Neal 2017), as they relate to migrants' cultural practices or their food choices in a wider context. Vester (2015) explores the role culinary texts/writings and practices play in the making of cultural identities and social hierarchies in the United States as forces to produce social order and as points of cultural resistance against hegemonic norms and ideas of nationalism, gender, and sexuality.

Siniscalchi and Harper (2019) focus on the transformation of values brought by individuals and groups in relation to food. These food values are expressed in daily life and livelihoods through specific practices of production, exchange, and consumption. Supermarkets exemplify this process as their shelves offer cross-sections of ethnic food and are good indicators of local flavors. They display a diverse array of products based on the region's traditional cuisines as well as those that are influenced by immigrants. Wandering the aisles of a typical grocery store in a new location can provide an insightful vignette into its roots and customs: "functioning as a social-scientific example, a fictional mise-en-scène, a symbol of cultural degradation, a journalistic scene, an architectural case study, and an artworld spectacle" (Alworth 2010: 321).

Ethnic food shops are spaces where consumption practices and patterns of immigrants' economies come alive daily. They show how consumption is shaped by the shifting attitudes and demands as well as the experiences, likes and dislikes of shoppers (Parzer and Astleithner 2018). The shop is a place where migrants can find a taste of origins as well as their new home; in other words, the ethnic shop is a translational space where belonging is managed (Mankekar 2002).

The role of the ethnic food shop, like food itself, is central to understanding power relations. Who eats, who cooks and how food is accessed (sold, shared and presented) influence relationships, and shape mobilities – including gender mobilities (see discussions in Butler 1990; Petö 2007; Riley and Dodson 2016).

CONFIGURATIONS AND SHIFTING NOTIONS OF PLACE AND FOOD

Place works as a frame of reference for eating. Close relationships between food discourses and a sense of home and belonging are formed in spatial terms. For movers, place is nostalgic, for non-movers place (at least the places migrants go) can be aspirational. Place is also where value is confirmed. Lemon's (2019) work on taco trucks in Columbus captures this point as he writes about the ways in which the taco truck Los Potosinos engages with the community and creates a bridge between Latinos and African-Americans.

When the movement of people and the flow of food come together, they become the "self-imagining as an everyday social project" (Appadurai 1996: 4). In doing so, the meanings of place, space, community, home and nation shift. The mobility of people, capital and food changes through the individual's construction of a "sense of place" (Massey 1995) which is critical in the configuration of space and in identity construction. It is through food that migrants make sense of their environment. As they depart from the familiar and familial spaces and arrive at the unknown and uncharted places food becomes an anchor of home. Thus, space becomes a symbolic representation of something left behind and food links migrants to that place. As a result, the notion of space changes and incorporates a unique reference to food.

The role of food in the formation of imagined communities (Anderson 1983) is central in the relationship between the home and destination and often helps form a unifying space that joins periphery, global, local, urban and rural. The stability that comes from food is critical when people are mobile and displaced. As migrants move from their places of origin to new destinations they engage, visualize and idealize through food. Studying the imagination of spaces and places in the specific context of migration and food captures one important avenue to how movers "do" transnationalism. Food serves as a means for social interactions and relations in the spaces and places where it is consumed, produced, replicated and distributed (stores, restaurants, bars, street food sellers, markets). Furthermore, through commensality, food becomes an important vehicle for creating, strengthening and cementing social relations (Kerner, Chou and Warmind 2015).

Eating ethnic food in the public sphere consolidates forms of cultural and social capital and incorporates many aspects related to mobility, immigration, diversity and otherness. The city of Portland, Oregon serves as an example where migrants and locals are connected through street foods. The local city council designated specific empty spaces to sell ethnic food in order to provide a unique and varied gastronomic experience to consumers and create viable employment opportunities for immigrants (Borrelli 2018). In doing so, new modes of social interaction and relations were created that introduced local and migrant and established a foundation for integration. Food then becomes a great tool for uniting people across cultures as it demystifies difference.

As in the Portland case, food trucks filled a needed niche and became cultural sites for ethnic food distribution. As Lemon (2019) contends, foodways were traditionally slow processes of social integration which quickly became ways to sell a city as a multicultural site. Mexican food trucks changed the landscapes of many US cities. Furthermore, "food is a 'cultural object': a socially, meaningful expression, visible and tangible and, most of all, food 'tells a story'" (Materassi 2016: 184). Mexicans in Israel and European Jews in Mexico use the taco to tell their stories of immigration. Mexicans in Israel employ their story of tacos to connect to their homeland while European Jews use it to integrate into their adopted country

(Schuster 2015b; 2019). Lebanese and Syrians in Mexico appropriated the taco and made it their own, eating a local version with Middle Eastern spices and cuts of meat and calling it Taco Árabe (Schuster 2012, 2015a). This appropriation is also a way of changing the local gastronomic scene and emphasizing new pathways to cultural exchange.

The practice of food consumption and the ensuing social interactions between migrant and local play an important role in integrating communities, giving new meaning to places, and creating opportunities that are influenced and shaped by local idiosyncrasies and culture. Each physical and cultural location created contributes to the development of new forms of eating that are evolving and changing for all involved. The food we choose to make, eat and share is influenced by and is a function of the experiences we derive from other cultures. Nevertheless, ultimately people tend to eat dishes that are meaningful to them.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter is to explore the importance and meaning of food and food practices in the contexts of mobility and migration. Constructing a narrative around food, but based in the trajectories of people, I capture the important role food and eating play in creating identity for movers and spaces for migrants and locals to interact. Food is consumed in non-national spaces and in fixed local places. The migrants' consumption and use of cultural foodstuffs, products and commodities associated with their country of origin introduce the stranger and contribute to a new sense of self for all involved. This kind of consumption, which creates a belonging, can also be read as a response to a "fear of contamination" (Fischler 1979).

Eating operates to link practicality, emotion and ethnic identification with the demands of biology. The process moves beyond the private domain of the kitchen and into the public as seen in ethnic restaurants. An examination of public food consumption venues reveals how such places create collective spaces of belonging, loyalty and identification. Different national foods and gastronomies are defined in fixed terms by the immigrants themselves. If they remain loyal and attached to the culinary habits of their home country of origin, they maintain a strong link and continuity but in doing so they place in jeopardy their acculturation into their adopted country. As I have argued, this divergence is not necessarily reflected in the development of new spaces where movers and locals share their culinary practices forming ethnic and fusion dishes.

Food has become something more than the geographical and cultural context in which it is produced, prepared and consumed. It is a poignant symbol and a marker of identity as a focal point for meeting and integrating. Within a globalized and transnational environment, where people cross cultures and geographic boundaries the relationship between food, culture and belonging is heightened. Varied reasons may drive migrants and define migration, but food and culinary practices anchor and mediate outcomes. Looking to the future of migration research, the study of food will continue to develop. Food from home, cooking practices, food sharing and family relationships are all one. The practices of cooking and sensorial experiences surrounding them demonstrate the place and space that they occupy and the importance they hold.

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PART IV

HEALTH AND MOBILITY

33. Doing good or doing harm? The interrelations between migration, well-being, and mental health

Natalia Zotova

The broad notion of migration entails the movement of a person or a group of persons across an international border or within a state and encompasses any movement of people regardless of its length, composition, or causes (IOM 2019). Limited economic opportunities, poverty, conflict, wars, and aspirations to better lives drive large population movements across the globe. Migration is a stressful event and while it creates opportunities migration can also bring challenges including stress that negatively affect the well-being of those who move and stay behind. Well-being relates to a range of physical, psychological, and socio-economic characteristics. Psychological well-being includes the balance between positive and negative feelings, the person's self-perceived functioning in important areas such as relationships, self-esteem, purpose and meaning, optimism, and positive thinking (Diener, Wirtz and Tov 2010: 247). Mental health, an essential part of overall health, includes our emotional, psychological, and social well-being (CDC 2019). The World Health Organization defines mental health as "a state of well-being in which every individual realizes his or her potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and can make a contribution to her or his community" (2014).

BIOLOGY, STRUCTURE, AND CULTURE INTERTWINED

The combination of opportunities and challenges brought by migration can produce different outcomes for one's physical and psychological well-being embedded in the biological response to the stress process. Human beings, similar to other living organisms, need to maintain internal stability in the face of changing environments. An ability to keep this relatively stable equilibrium is called homeostasis. Stress entails the effects of anything that seriously threatens homeostasis, and conditions or events perceived as threats to an organism are known as stressors (Schneiderman, Ironson and Siegel 2005: 607). Individual responses to physical and psychosocial stressors are rooted in the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and hypothalamopituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. Exposure to stressors stimulates HPA and increases cortisol secretion which enables bodies to respond to actual or perceived threats. An adaptive hormonal mechanism shields us during the acute phase of stress, yet cortisol produces widespread metabolic effects on organ systems when organisms are subject to chronic stress. Prolonged stress responses cause dysregulation of the HPA axis and can damage the body's systems and organs in a process known as allostatic load (Geronimus et al. 2010: 20–21). Allostatic load accumulates over time and informs susceptibility to infectious disease, early onset of chronic diseases, functional limitations and mood disorders (Bound et al. 2015: 2168).

Migration has a disruptive effect on homeostasis as individuals respond and adapt to new physical and socio-cultural environments (Tuggle, Cohen and Crews 2018). In destination countries, discrimination and xenophobia, migration policies and laws, socio-economic constraints as well as social isolation and the lack of support are essential stressors that affect the immigrants' general and mental health (Bermejo et al. 2010; Bursztein Lipsicas et al. 2011; Castañeda 2009; Castañeda et al. 2015; Grove and Zwi 2006; Shishehgar et al. 2015). Poor working and living conditions, the lack of control and perceived insecurity are also among the range of psychosocial stressors that negatively influence individuals' well-being. The health outcomes of migration are founded in the relations of biology, structure, and culture, and we need to draw from interdisciplinary approaches to better understand how stress and social conditions affect the well-being and mental health of the global movers.

Research on migrants' health in destination countries has documented foreign-born general health advantages compared to the native-born population coined as the *healthy immigrant effect*. Migrants are likely to live longer lives, have fewer chronic conditions and lower infant mortality rates, and are less likely to die from cardiovascular disease and cancer compared to the native-born populations (Frank et al. 2019; Kennedy et al. 2015; National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine 2015). Better health among immigrants can be attributed to a set of factors, including health selection,[1] higher physical activity and a different diet in countries of origin. We can identify immigrants' better health advantages when compared to native-born populations across large nationally representative datasets. However, general health advantages erode over time spent in destination countries and across generations due to exposure to multiple stressors and the resulting accumulation of allostatic load.

General health advantages are also distributed unequally across different diseases and ethnic groups including mental health issues. An exposure to socio-economic and psychological stressors in destination countries can inform mental disorders among immigrant populations including higher rates of psychosis and common mental disorders such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Harper 2016; Mendelhall 2012; Rousseau and Frounfelker 2019). Mixed findings on common mental disorders among immigrant populations notwithstanding, cultural and institutional factors such as mental illness stigma, mistrust and institutional barriers to health care can inform observed variations between different ethnic and racial groups (Bhugra and Gupta 2010: 5). Medical anthropologists have introduced the notions of structural violence and structural vulnerability that are useful for understanding how broader socio-economic and political factors affect migrants' well-being and mental health. Farmer et al. (2006) define structural violence as a way of describing social arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm's way. The arrangements are *structural* because they are embedded in the political and economic organization of the social world; and they are *violent* because they cause injury to people (typically, not those responsible for perpetuating such inequalities). Structural violence is manifest in social structures and defined by poverty, racism, and gender inequalities that produce unequal access to power and socially structured patterns of disease across population groups including mental illness (Galtung 1969, 1990; Quesada, Hart and Bourgois 2011).

Quesada, Hart and Bourgois critique the widely accepted concept of violence and argue that it invokes materialist forces that perpetuate oppression. They propose a more neutral term, "vulnerability", "to extend the economic, material and political insights of structural violence to encompass more explicitly (and to project to a wider audience) not only politico-economic but also cultural and idiosyncratic sources of physical and psychodynamic distress" (2011:

339). Individuals' vulnerability is produced by their location in a hierarchical social order, power relationships, and their effects. This conceptualization includes personal attributes of individuals such as appearance, affect, cognitive status along with cultural values and institutional structures (Leatherman 2005).

Structural vulnerability places individuals and population groups at a health disadvantage through embodied effects of economic, social, gender and racial inequalities (Farmer 2009; Rhodes et al. 2012). Perceptions from outside of phenotype, language proficiency as well as ethnic identity and religious affiliation enhance migrants' mental health vulnerability because experiences of ethnoracial harassment and discrimination intensify migration stress (Agadjanian, Menjívar and Zotova 2017; Bermejo et al. 2010; Bursztein Lipsicas et al. 2011; Castañeda et al. 2015; Delara 2016; Martin 2015). Prejudice and institutionalized racism inform widespread racialization practices, harassment, and microaggressions toward non-white immigrants in Western countries. The growing nationalist sentiments in many countries of the Global North inform popular and media discourses that often represent immigrants as a threat to economic and cultural integrity and/or as criminals. Grove and Zwi argue that as refugees, asylum seekers and unauthorized migrants are defined as separate and disconnected from the host communities, this othering discourse has the potential to affect health for individuals and communities (2006: 1931).

Migration and public health scholarship have long emphasized the interrelations of migration and racism (Agadjanian, Menjívar and Zotova 2017; Armenta 2017; Bhugra and Gupta 2010; Erel, Murji and Nahaboo 2016; Schnirelman and Malakhov 2007; Thomas 2013). Immigrants can belong to privileged groups in their home countries that possess economic, cultural, and social capital necessary for migration. Hailing from the places with a different set of social hierarchies, immigrants are unprepared for the powerful social pressures in destination countries that force individuals into the racial categories and assign them inferior status based on their real or imaginary characteristics. Systemic racial inequalities are reproduced over time and define racial stereotypes and the range of associated perceptions and emotions. The latter is widely accepted and essential to maintaining the subordination of the people of color including migrants (Ballinas 2017; O'Brien 2008). The symbolic boundaries between ethnic and racial groups are reproduced through daily encounters of immigrants with authorities, health care providers, and native-born populations, to name a few. Experiences of racialization and harassment shape identity and perceived belonging among the first and second generation of immigrants (Ballinas 2017; Creese 2018).

Settling in new destinations, immigrants suffer from the loss of their language and support system in home countries and miss their families, friends, and familiar culture. Grieving for these emotional, cultural, and structural losses, known as cultural bereavement, can be viewed as a healthy adaptive reaction to migration. Yet, if the symptoms last long enough or cause significant impairment, the immigrants may need psychiatric interventions (Bhugra and Gupta 2010: 3). The negative feelings associated with cultural bereavement, perceived discrimination, and socio-economic and legal insecurities that immigrants are subject to increase mental health risks. Migration scholarship has long focused on declining socio-economic status among the first-generation migrants. Ethnoracial harassment that accompanies the loss of status reinforces marginality among immigrants and affects their mental health (Rivera, Forquer and Rangel 2010; Sue 2010). Being a visible minority is associated with depressive symptoms due to social isolation and perceived discrimination (George et al. 2015; Mechakra-Tahiri, Zunzunegui and Seguin 2007; Rousseau et al. 2011; Whitley and Kirmayer 2008).

COPING AND THE CULTURAL MODELS OF MENTAL HEALTH

Navigating structural constraints that undermine psychological well-being and mental health in destination countries, migrants draw from their cultural background, which defines their stress responses and coping (Dressler 1996, 2011; Kuo 2014; Tuggle, Cohen and Crews 2018). Culture informs the ways that individuals and communities relate to mental distress and shapes their help-seeking behaviours (Dressler 2011; Jenkins 2015; Kohrt et al. 2014; Spradley and Phillips 1972). Culture defines the role of family, kin, religion, and social networks, which for migrants become organizational principles of support systems that allow for better adaptations to the new environment (Kornienko et al. 2018; Menjívar 2002; Ryan 2011; Zotova 2018). Social support and other types of resources within families and social networks often have a therapeutic effect, as they moderate stress and contribute to greater well-being among migrants and non-migrants alike (Kornienko et al. 2018; Leahy and Crews 2012; Tuggle, Cohen and Crews 2018). Yet, the relations between social networks and mental health are controversial in destination countries. Reciprocal help is expected and appreciated in many immigrant communities, but social ties become fragmented due to adverse experiences; and a failure to receive support undermines migrants' emotional well-being as they feel lonely and abandoned by their extended family and kin (Menjívar 2000).

Religion can shelter migrants from hardships and contribute to better mental health by providing meaning, hope, and perceived belonging and participation in networks of mutual support, groups, and organizations (Da Silva 2017; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Foner and Alba 2008; Hirschman 2004; Min 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Sanchez et al. 2012). The moderating role of religion conceptualized as a religious coping framework is well-established for Christian populations (Fabricatore et al. 2004; Pargament et al. 1997). However, research on Muslim religious coping among migrants in Western countries points to conflicting evidence on the role of religion as a buffer of stress (Adam and Ward 2016; Ghaffari and Çiftçi 2010). Faith gives hope to migrants who seek spiritual support and guidance in times of hardships. Although prayers and mosque attendance can provide comfort and foster perceived belonging to a broader group, Islamic religious affiliation can increase stress and lead to common mental disorders such as anxiety and depression through negative stereotyping, social isolation, and discrimination (Ghaffari and Çiftçi 2010; Rippy and Newman 2006).

Analytical attention to the ways immigrants develop ethnographic accounts of their psychological conditions can provide important insights into their mental health (Sue 2010). Culture shapes expressions of mental distress as immigrants struggle for recognition and belonging and reconstruct their identities and self-esteem in new environments. Growing scholarship in medical anthropology and global mental health identifies cultural idioms of mental distress among Latin American, South Asian, and African populations. These cultural idioms – also known as cultural models of mental health – are shared linguistic connotations used to speak about one's troubled emotional and mental health conditions, for instance, suffering from the "nerves" or "thinking too much" among Latinos and other ethnic groups (Kohrt et al. 2014; Mendelhall, Yarris and Kohrt 2016; Yarris 2011). However, cultural concepts of mental health among immigrant populations have not yet received comparable attention.

Immigrants who originate from developing nations bring to destination countries their cultural attitudes and often little knowledge concerning their psychological conditions. A large number of people worldwide have family, kin, and community members who have behavioural or mental disorders, yet low mental health literacy – the knowledge of and positive beliefs

about mental disorders and their treatment – prevents them from recognizing the symptoms and seeking appropriate help. Mental health literacy tends to be higher in European and North American cultures, compared to non-Western cultures across Asia and Africa (Altweck et al. 2015). Research among South Asian immigrant communities has shown that they are likely to relate to depressive symptoms as "self-indulgence", are unable to label the illness, and only seek mental health care services when they associate their altered state of functioning with their physical well-being (Bhugra, Craig and Bhui 2010; McClelland, Khanam and Furnham 2014). Similar to other Asian immigrant groups, Central Asian immigrants seek health care for urgent conditions, pregnancy, and childbirth, yet they do not view their well-being and mental health as health issues worth visiting the doctors for (Gilliam et al. 1989; King and Dudina 2019).

The inability to define experienced psychological difficulties intersects with public causal beliefs about depression as laziness or a weakness of character. The internalized notions of personal failures are hard to manage especially when significant others perpetuate the cycle of blaming the sufferers for their mental conditions. Research has noted an association between blaming the mentally ill individual and increasing the social distance from those who have mental health illness (Dietrich et al. 2004; McClelland, Khanam and Furnham 2014). Interpersonal relationships are an important resource for immigrants who value quality time spent with friends and family and appreciate their emotional and other kinds of support. Mental illness stigma is powerful among many immigrant groups who share cultural attitudes to mental illness prevalent in their home countries. Immigrants are not willing to endanger their emerging social connections by recognizing and disclosing experienced mental distress (Molchanova 2014).

Gender is also important for internalized attitudes towards one's mental health: culturally defined understandings of masculinity and gender roles that assign immigrant men from traditional backgrounds more power in social hierarchies can prevent them from speaking about their well-being. Men are unwilling to recognize their psychological difficulties and mental distress because "men are supposed to cope with problems themselves – when you fail to do so that is considered weakness", in the words of Central Asian Muslim immigrant men. Unwilling to upset their families and due to perceived shame and stigma, immigrants often choose not to disclose their mental health concerns to anyone, or favour a lay referral system, turning to a family member for help (Furnham and Malik 1994). Yet, family and friends share cultural models of mental health, and while significant others manage similar socio-economic hardships, they can fail to provide adequate emotional support or suggest that the sufferers see health care providers.

Research among immigrants in Western countries has shown that immigrant minority groups rarely seek professional help and are also less likely to utilize voluntary specialty mental health services (McClelland, Khanam and Furnham 2014; Ying and Miller 1992). Limited economic resources and the lack of medical insurance, legal precarity along with low language proficiency and negative attitudes to foreign-born patients circumvent immigrants' opportunities to seek and receive quality mental care. When seeking health care providers for their general health concerns, immigrants do not feel confident that they can understand the doctors' explanations, discuss the treatment options, and receive quality care. Structural and institutional barriers make mental health care mostly unavailable for recent immigrants which can worsen pre-migration mental conditions and inform the new post-migration issues.

DOING GOOD OR DOING HARM TO MENTAL HEALTH?

Migration is a dynamic circular process. Those who settle in destination countries, as well as return migrants and non-migrating families in the communities of origin, respond to physical and psychological challenges associated with migration in different ways. The interdependencies between migration, well-being, and mental health among return migrants and stay-behind family members have received less attention compared to research among immigrants in Western countries. Migration helps to secure livelihood and manage powerful constraints that limit social mobility in the countries of origin particularly structural unemployment, poverty, corruption, and nepotism (Zotova and Cohen 2019). Beyond an ability to cover the daily needs of families, migration helps to generate capital for homeownership, micro-economic investments, education of children and siblings, and rituals (Cohen, Jones and Conway 2005; Danzer et al. 2014; Zotova and Cohen 2019). The participation in rituals has a high cultural value and helps to maintain social connections in local communities and to demonstrate one's migration success, wealth, and status (Cleuziou 2013; Cohen 2011; Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Ilkhamov 2013; Kikuta 2016; Reeves 2013).

The cultural outcomes of migration contribute to well-being and mental health in many ways. Perceived migration success contributes to satisfaction with life and the sense of fulfilment while accumulated wealth translates into an elevated social status which is a well-established predictor of health (Marmot 2004). Higher socioeconomic status (SES) has a strong association with longer lives, better health, and less burden of disease and disabilities (Dalstra et al. 2005; Mackenbach, Cavelaars and Kunst 1997; Minkler, Fuller-Thomson and Guralnik 2006). Subjective social status, also important for health, refers to one's perception of their position in the social hierarchy and includes objective economic measures (SES) along with non-economic criteria such as prestige (Demakakos et al. 2008; Jackman and Jackman 1973; Singh-Manoux, Adler and Marmot 2003). Subjective status is shown to relate to self-rated health and mental health over and above objective SES markers (Franzini and Fernandez-Esquer 2006; Operario, Adler and Williams 2004; Singh-Manoux, Marmot and Adler 2005).

Migration can provide individuals with a path towards a more fulfilling future and a recognized position in society (Åkesson 2004; Carling 2001; Langevang 2008). Migration has a generative potential for individuals and families as migrants celebrate new skills, increased capacity to provide for their families as well as perceived self-efficacy and agency. Cross-national scholarship links migration, masculinity, and status, and argues that migration allows men to reproduce gender attitudes, which positively affects their psychological well-being (Ali 2007; Choi 2018; Kandel and Massey 2002; Lambert 2002; Osella and Osella 2000; Prothmann 2018; Reeves 2013). Migration empowers women who celebrate their skills, knowledge, and income that provides them with more control over their lives (Bastia 2013; Castellani and Martín-Díaz 2019; Encinas-Franco et al. 2015; Oishi 2005; Segura and Facio 2008; Wolf 1992; Zentgraf 2002). Enhancing women's agency, migration helps both migrating and non-migrating women to contest and renegotiate traditional gender roles. Women who stay behind also enjoy increased decision-making power as the heads of the households, greater mobility, and fewer social restrictions (Castellani and Martín-Díaz 2019; Cleuziou 2017; Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016; Erdal and Pawlak 2018; Kikuta 2016; Sinha, Jha and Negi 2012; Ullah 2017).

These positive effects notwithstanding, migration can negatively affect well-being and mental health. Settlement in the country of destination, either temporary or permanent, exposes migrants to social, economic, and legal stressors. Chronic stress produced by adverse experiences and numerous determinants of health – the "conditions in the places where people live, learn, work, and play" (CDC 2018) – impacts individuals' well-being, increasing the risk of mental health disorders and influencing their ability to manage their mental health and access health care (Bhugra and Gupta 2010; Braveman and Gottlieb 2014; CDC 2019; Harper 2016; Link and Phelan 1995). In opposition to the U-curve model of cultural adjustment among migrants who walk through the "honeymoon stage" when individuals are excited about all new experiences, "culture shock" with accompanying frustration and feeling down, and eventual mastery of the new culture, migration is a non-unidirectional longitudinal process that involves much more than becoming familiar with a new culture and accepting its values and behavioural patterns (Black and Mendelhall 1991; Demes and Geeraert 2015; Oberg 1960). Well-being and mental health among immigrants are not likely to align with the U-curve pattern of cultural adjustment that posits that over five years the new arrivals are well accepted and integrated into the new society.

Systemic oppression and the gap between aspirations for better lives and lived realities negatively affect the mental health of immigrants, a pattern that can be replicated across generations (Mendelhall 2012). Forced migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons can have a high prevalence of PTSD and other common mental disorders as survivors of wars, violence, and other extreme conditions (Bhugra and Gupta 2010: 3; Kuznetsova et al. 2019). Return migrants, most likely due to health selectivity and limited opportunities in home countries, have worse mental health than their peers who stay in destination countries. Non-migrating women who stay behind have increased risks of mental diseases as they suffer from poverty, prolonged separation with spouses, and are subject to gender inequalities and power hierarchies (Pirova et al. 2018; Reeves 2013; Rodriguez 2008). Many low-resource countries and regions across the globe do not have enough health care providers and resources necessary to address mental health conditions among migrants and non-migrating individuals alike (WHO 2014). Limited resources and legal precarity, mental illness stigma, and perceived negative attitudes in health care settings also prevent immigrants from seeking help in destination countries and the providers often lack the cultural competency to effectively treat the mental health conditions of their migrant patients (Rousseau and Frounfelker 2019).

MODELLING THE WELL-BEING AMONG IMMIGRANTS: STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND ASPIRATIONS

Mental health and well-being are interrelated. Mental health, by the definition of the World Health Organization, is recognized as a state of well-being when individuals can cope with the stresses of life, work productively, contribute to their communities, and realize their full potential. Well-being means equilibrium between positive and negative thoughts and includes self-esteem, optimism, and perceived meaning and purpose. Yet we can hardly view migration as the normal stresses of life that individuals can cope with as they maintain homeostasis in familiar environments. Migration is an overwhelming experience that disrupts social connections, endangers external and internal resources, and locates individuals within racialized social hierarchies in destination countries, which often assign an inferior status to immigrants.

The compound effect of these negative outcomes of migration can make us wonder whether well-being and good mental health are possible among immigrants?

Broader factors that affect the health and well-being of vulnerable population groups including immigrants are often represented through the lens of structural vulnerability. Structural vulnerability defines the location of immigrants in a hierarchical social order through their physical and cultural attributes and the influence of institutional structures (Farmer 2009; Leatherman 2005; Quesada, Hart and Bourgois 2011; Rhodes et al. 2012). The influence of economic, social, gender and racial inequalities informs perceptions of immigrants from outside based on their phenotype, language, religion, and other characteristics. Negative stereotyping informs the discourse of othering and discrimination that along with perceived social isolation and limited access to health care services enhance immigrants' risks of poor mental health (Bermejo et al. 2010; Bursztein Lipsicas et al. 2011; Gerritsen et al. 2006; Shishehgar et al. 2015).

In Figure 33.1, the left part of the diagram represents an adaptation of the structural vulnerability framework widely used in medical anthropology and public health for understanding how social structures affect individuals' health and well-being. Immigration laws and the enforcement of migration policies, the structure of the labour markets along with the public and media discourses of migration, are among the broader environmental characteristics that define immigrants' positioning in destination countries. Legal precarity widespread among many immigrant groups and institutional barriers to socio-economic mobility create insecurities that prevent immigrants from the realization of their potential. Systemic oppression developed along the lines of social inequalities can inform chronic stress and the biological mechanism of stress responses negatively affects immigrants' general health and mental health.

Figure 33.1   *The dynamic model of immigrants' well-being: structure, culture, and aspirations*

The structural vulnerability framework is well-established and useful, yet it uses the top-down approach to individuals' health. This does not allow for modelling immigrants' agency, culture, and aspirations for better lives that help them adapt to the new environments and cope with hardships (Hart 2016). Migration is known to involve the transformations of subjectivity and temporality as the global movers plan and execute their trips and adjust their legal, occupational, and social status upon settlement in destination countries (Carling and Collins 2018; Collins 2018). Immigrants manage their biological and psychological stress responses as they navigate adversity and structural barriers to their desired status. They simultaneously draw on their aspirations – culturally constructed visions of the future – to seek new opportunities and relate to their migration experiences. Immigrants look into the past to assess their accomplishments expressed in their successful migration stories. Reflecting on their motives and aspirations that help them redesign their lives in new places, immigrants continue to hope for better futures. Their aspirations can be embedded in the culture and values of both origin and destination countries, such as aspirations to professional development, education, family, and housing, to name a few.

Aspirations and hope are essential for well-being and mental health because they provide immigrants with the motivation to work towards the realization of their potential and support positive thinking. The lens of structural vulnerability can skew our vision of immigrants and lead to the essentialization of minority population groups. Analytical attention to aspirations helps us to move beyond vulnerability frameworks to better understand how immigrants cope, adapt and progress toward greater well-being over time. The reciprocal relationships between aspirations and well-being are shaped by subjectivity and culture. Aspirations are essential parts of immigrants' culturally constructed mind maps that include their visions of the future supported by precedent. The capacity to aspire and hope for better lives for themselves and their families provides migrants with the resources to navigate structural constraints and gives them strength and motivation. Modelling the dynamic interdependencies between biology, structure, and culture can help us walk away from the representations of migrants as vulnerable subjects and define future pathways for research on migration, well-being, and mental health.

NOTE

1.   Health selection framework posits that younger, healthier, and more able individuals are more likely to migrate.

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34. Experiences of sociocultural reproduction among migrant women in the Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana

Jemima Nomunume Baada

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the effects of migration on the reproduction of inequalities among migrant women in rural receiving societies of Ghana. As the effects of climate change worsen, regions which are dependent on environmental resources for their livelihoods are expected to shoulder a disproportionate burden of these negative effects, which could lead to more internally displaced persons (Afifi et al., 2016). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is currently undergoing severe stress to its smallholder livelihoods, as many people in the region rely on subsistence farming for food and income. Studies show that continued trends of climate variability will result in lower agricultural yields and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in the region (Wossen and Berger, 2015). In order to cope with these threats to farming livelihoods, many agrarian populations in SSA resort to migration (Afifi et al., 2016). However, despite the utility of migration in mitigating poverty and food insecurity among smallholders, the process of migration could potentially cause more deprivation and vulnerability among mobile populations.

The Upper West Region (UWR), located in northern Ghana, is one such region which has witnessed the increasing outmigration of people in response to worsening environmental conditions and low agricultural productivity in the region. These intensified migrations are partly linked to the region's high rates of poverty and political neglect rooted in colonial and neo-colonial policies. During colonisation, UWR was left out of development initiatives, as it lacked trade goods which were of interest to the British (Songsore, 1979). The region had therefore served as a labour reserve to stock the mines and plantations located in southern Ghana. After colonisation, UWR was still neglected in development processes as a way of maintaining labour supply to southern regions. Thus, while people were not forcibly recruited as labour anymore, many residents of UWR, particularly young men, felt compelled to relocate to southern Ghana as it was the locus of educational and economic opportunities (Songsore and Denkabe, 1995). These migrations intensified in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to declining environmental conditions, but also as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a bid to stabilise the country, as it was undergoing economic distress due to extensive borrowing and spending. A major requirement of the SAP was the removal of subsidies, including agricultural subsidies for smallholder farmers (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000). This has affected residents of UWR, as subsistence farming is the mainstay of the region. These processes further necessitate that residents migrate out of the region for better lives.

Although north–south migrations in Ghana have been occurring for close to a century now, recent migrations are different in several ways. First, many more migrants are moving to

rural areas of the middle belt of the country (including the Brong-Ahafo Region [BAR][1]) for farming, as compared to earlier migrations which were to urban, mining and plantation sites (Kuuire et al., 2013). Second, previously seasonal migrations have been assuming a permanent pattern (Kuuire et al., 2016). Third, the permanent nature of recent migrations has led to the movement of more women and entire families, as opposed to the earlier migrations dominated by solo movement of young men (Baada, Baruah and Luginaah, 2019). These changing migration trends have implications for the survival of agrarian communities (Schraven and Rademacher-Schulz, 2016).

Despite these changing dynamics, the implications of these emerging migrations on social and cultural (sociocultural) reproduction, particularly among women in rural migration destinations, remain understudied. Few studies have examined the effects of migration on the reproduction of inequalities among female migrants in destination regions. Most research continues to focus on either the care aspect of reproduction among women in migrant communities, or on the reproduction of economic deprivation among static minority populations (Sampson and Sharkey, 2008; Locke, Seeley and Rao, 2013). Studies on women and migration in Ghana continue to focus on the experiences of migrants in urban destination areas and/or non-migrants in sending regions (Awumbila, Owusu and Teye, 2014; Atuoye et al., 2017). Despite a few studies having been conducted among agrarian migrants in rural destination areas (see Abdul-Korah, 2006; Kuuire et al., 2016), these have mostly focused on migrants' agricultural and food security experiences examined from male perspectives. This neglects the experiences of migrant women in rural destination areas of Ghana, particularly regarding the effects of migration on their experiences of sociocultural reproduction.

It is, however, important to study the effects of migration on sociocultural reproduction from the perspectives of female migrants in receiving societies for two reasons. First, women are central to reproduction within Ghanaian societies, hence the (permanent) outmigration of women from UWR may have implications for societal continuity in both origin and destination areas. Moreover, reproduction remains a communal effort among many Ghanaian communities. Yet, relocating to new areas in southern Ghana implies that migrant women might be cut off from communal support. This study therefore explores the experiences of sociocultural reproduction among migrant women in rural destination areas of Ghana. Reproduction as used in this chapter refers to the daily and generational material and symbolic processes needed to progenerate humans over time (Kofman, 2012), with a focus on the cultural and social elements of this reproduction.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CAPITAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL REPRODUCTION

I draw from the Bourdieusian theories of the forms of capital (Bourdieu, 2011) and cultural and social reproduction (Bourdieu, 2018), to explain the experiences of migrant women in BAR regarding reproduction in a rural migration context. Bourdieu refers to cultural reproduction as the transmission of culture conserved and inherited from the past, from one generation to another (Bourdieu, 2018). Social reproduction refers to the structures, institutions and activities that transmit social inequalities across generations (Doob, 2016; Bourdieu, 2018). Cultural and social reproduction (sociocultural reproduction) are greatly dependent on capital which Bourdieu (2011) describes as the accrued materialised and/or embodied labour which enables

actors to secure resources. Accordingly, capital is accumulated over time and consequently yields profits, which in turn reproduces this capital in a similar or expanded form.

Bourdieu classifies capital into economic, cultural and social capital. Scholars such as Doob (2016) add that human capital is central and interconnected to the other forms of capital. According to Bourdieu (2011), economic capital is directly exchangeable into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights. Cultural capital may be institutionalised within educational qualifications, and social capital consists of the social obligations and networks available to a person, which may be institutionalised in the forms of titles of nobility or a family's social positioning. Both cultural and social capital are convertible into economic capital under the right circumstances.

Bourdieu (2011) adds that cultural capital exists in three forms: embodied, objectified and institutionalised states. According to him, in its embodied state, the accumulation of cultural capital, or culture, is dependent on embodiment and transmission, both of which require human capital, and an extensive investment of time, labour and economic resources to execute. Cultural capital encompasses cultural goods such as books, paintings, pottery, among others, which are transmitted in material form and which can also be transferred into economic capital. The forms of capital therefore depend on, and are reinforced by, one another. Thus, economic capital plays a vital role in an individual's/community's ability to access cultural capital (knowledge, skills and shared beliefs/outlook) while cultural capital is also important in building human and social capital, and consequently availing a person to better economic, social and cultural resources. The social reproduction theory therefore argues that stratification and the resulting social inequalities are passed down from one generation to another based on the capital made available by a person's habitus (Bourdieu, 2011, 2018; Doob, 2016).

In the context of agrarian migration from UWR to BAR in Ghana, the theory of social reproduction is helpful in highlighting: first, the predisposition of individuals/communities in the migration origin to relocate to BAR for better livelihoods; second, the settlement patterns of agrarian migrants in receiving societies; third, the resources (e.g. land) available to migrants based on their settlement patterns and social networks; and fourth, how all of these factors in turn affect migrants' reproduction outcomes in BAR. For instance, due to fragile environmental conditions and extreme poverty in UWR, most residents live below the poverty line, which translates into low economic capital for them. This low economic capital informs the decision to migrate to rural farming areas of the migration destination (Kuuire et al., 2016). Relocating from their home region also means that migrants' access to social networks (social and human capital) must be renegotiated in settlement regions (Awumbila, Teye and Yaro, 2016). Consequently, the decision to settle in rural farming areas affects migrants' access to cultural capital such as educational opportunities, and the capacity of migrant families to transmit both embodied and materialised culture to their children (Moskal, 2016). All of these ultimately influence experiences of reproduction among agrarian migrants in BAR.

THE STUDY CONTEXT

The UWR is the poorest region in Ghana with poverty rates of up to 96 percent in some communities (Kuuire et al., 2013). The major ethnic groups in the region are the Dagaaba, Sissaala and Waala. It is estimated that up to 72 percent of the active population are into farming and agriculture related activities (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). Major food crops cultivated in

the area include millet, corn and groundnuts. The region has the Guinea-savannah vegetation: mainly grassland interspersed with drought-resistant trees. It experiences one rainfall season a year, which previously spanned April to September. However, rainfall patterns in the region in recent years have become unpredictable, sometimes beginning as late as June and ending as early as August (Rademacher-Schulz, Schraven and Mahama, 2014). As a result of these emerging rainfall dynamics together with declining soil fertility, agriculture as a means of livelihood has become unsustainable. The prevailing high poverty incidence and absence of other viable economic activities in the region push residents to adopt migration as a coping strategy. Available evidence based on census data and anecdotal evidence shows BAR as the most popular destination of choice among migrants from UWR due to its fertile lands, biannual rainfall season and relative proximity to UWR (Kuuire et al., 2016).

The BAR is one of three regions with two ecological zones; the Guinea-savannah and the semi-deciduous rainforest. The region experiences two annual rainfall seasons receiving up to 1400 litres per square metre in a year (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012; Owusu and Waylen, 2013). It has comparatively more fertile lands, making agriculture in the region more productive than in UWR. An estimated 66.4 percent of the active population is engaged in agriculture. Major food crops grown in the region include yam, cassava, plantain, corn, rice and tomatoes. In addition to this, cash crops such as coffee, tobacco, cocoa and cashew are produced in the area. Women in BAR also engage in the trade of farm produce in the many popular food markets in the region, particularly the Techiman market.

The region is inhabited by the Bono ethnic group who speak Bono-Twi and practise a matrilineal kinship system, juxtaposed with UWR which practises the patrilineal system. The number of UWR migrants in BAR is pegged at 23 percent (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). However, anecdotal evidence from discussions with key informants puts the figure at above 60 percent in rural farming communities, in the northern parts of the region. Although BAR has a poverty headcount of 28.6 percent, there are in-region disparities, with districts like Kintampo South – which is a migrant hub – recording up to 78.3 percent (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015).

Due to poverty and an inability to secure lands for farming in urban areas, most migrants from UWR prefer to settle in remote rural areas of BAR, which has relatively cheap and more arable land. The details of land tenure arrangements among migrants in BAR tend to be complex and depend on several factors including household income, land size, crops to be farmed and the length of period the land will be cultivated. These factors are, however, situated with broader cultural practices of land rent which some scholars describe as exploitative (Sward, 2017). For instance, studies show that due to migrants' poor socioeconomic status, most of them are only able to afford less fertile lands which are cheaper, or must rely on the goodwill of traditional leaders in destination areas for temporary land parcels (Kuusaana, 2017; Baada, Baruah and Luginaah, 2019). Although migrants enter settlement communities using existing social networks, migrant settlement patterns in these rural locations tend to be dispersed which inhibits communal bonding. Moreover, although most cultures in UWR practise the extended family system, many migrants in rural BAR relocate as a nuclear family which further reduces their household and community capital.

DATA AND METHODS

Study Design and Data Collection

I used a qualitative approach to explore the experiences of migrant women in BAR regarding sociocultural reproduction. A qualitative approach was chosen as the research sought to elicit depth and meaning. A qualitative approach was also selected as it facilitates the use of more than one method (Hay, 2000; Guba and Lincoln, 2004). Respondents were recruited using purposive sampling in six communities of three districts in BAR. The communities include: Dwenewoho and Alata Line in the Nkoranza North District; Kokuma and Beposo in the Kintampo South District; and Tanokrom and Gyebiri in the Techiman North District (see Figure 34.1). These districts were chosen due to their high migrant population and proximity to one another.

Figure 34.1   Map of Ghana showing study districts and communities

Source: Karen VanKerkoerle, Cartographic Specialist, Department of Geography, Western University.

I conducted 30 in-depth interviews (IDIs) and five focus group discussions (FGDs) with migrant women. Discussions centred around women's reasons for migrating and their experiences of carrying out their everyday activities related to reproduction, in the migration destination. Participants were aged 18–80, and while many were married or in common-law unions, a few were widowed or single. Interviews were conducted in either the homes of participants or in private, accessible places based on the preference of participants. All interviews were conducted in English, Dagaare, Sissaali and Twi, the main dialects spoken in the research area. In-depth interviews lasted between 15 and 45 minutes, whereas FGDs lasted 1 hour 15 minutes on average. Interviews were audio recorded and written or verbal consent was obtained from all participants.

Interviews were transcribed directly into the English language from local dialects and analysed with the help of QSR software for qualitative analysis: NVivo. Transcripts were fed

into NVivo and coded line by line in order to extract emerging themes for analysis based on research questions and theoretical constructs. To ensure rigour, transcripts were re-read while listening to audio recordings, in order not to distort meaning (Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Crang, 2005). Results were complemented with notes from a field research journal I kept during data collection. In the analysis of material and interpretation the themes are elucidated with direct quotes from interviews. These quotes are presented with pseudonyms, and anonymised modes of data collection and participants' ages.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Migrant women in BAR expressed concern regarding limited support and care for children; the absence of parental figures to maintain social control; generational culture loss due to migrant families' inability to transmit cultural education, values and skills; and the loss of economic capital, particularly land, due to migrants' outsider status in receiving communities.

Limited Support and Care for Children

A major theme that emerged during interviews with migrant women was the challenge of caring for children in BAR. The women complained that settling in BAR was not friendly for nurturing their children as compared to UWR. They attributed this to inadequate social support and the busy nature of farm activities in BAR. Migrant women noted that back in their region of origin, there was always someone to help care for children right from pregnancy into adulthood. In the early stages of childbirth/care, this support included asking other female friends or relatives to help with housework while they attended antenatal care; having family and friends bring baskets of gifts such as detergents, baby clothes and even food, when a woman delivered; and getting elderly women from the community to bathe newborn babies and treat women's childbirth sores until they were strong enough to take over. In addition to helping women with early reproductive services/childcare, these kinds of support also helped cushion mothers financially. Migrant women complained that all these forms of support were, however, missing in their new environment:

> Back home, sometimes you don't even learn to bathe a child until your second or third birth … Besides, even if you didn't have any money, you were not worried because you knew that as for *dawadawa*[2] and soap, your baby would get some. Here in BAR, as your due date draws near, you begin to stress. (Angelina, IDI, 29)

Migrant women added that this support continued even after the postpartum/infancy period. For instance, many women agreed that it was easy to secure babysitting services in UWR due to trust among community members and the system of reciprocity that communities in UWR practise. This, however, was also missing in the migration destination due to their outsider status and poor social networks:

> If I had to go to the farm or travel, I could easily ask my neighbours to come and watch my kids while I go, or take the children to my uncle's house for the period I was going to be away. (Faanye, IDI, 48)

Another participant in an FGD adds:

> What did I have to worry about? Nothing. Because if I had to travel, I knew that my children would have other fathers and mothers within the household to care for them. But over here I am all alone. Everywhere I go I have to take them along with me. (FGD 3)

Migrant women's narratives speak of the communal parenting characteristic of many communities in UWR, and the benefits of this system for women. This communal parenting is fostered by the extended family system that most families in the region practise. Even in situations where family members live in separate compounds, it is still possible to count on their support in caring for children. Relocating to BAR, however, disrupts these dynamics, as most migrants relocate as a nuclear family. Thus, with the exception of those who had been in BAR for several years and had built their own extended families, migrants found child nurturing in BAR challenging. These narratives emphasise the interconnectedness and importance of economic, social and cultural capital in reproduction (Bourdieu, 2011). They also highlight the fact that although reproductive roles are a major reason for women's decisions to migrate to BAR, these roles end up being in tension with reproduction itself in the migration destination (Locke, Seeley and Rao, 2013).

The Absence of Parental Figures and Declining Social Control

Another prominent theme that emerged from discussions with migrant women was the effect of changing family structures, and new farm/housework schedules due to migration, on child upbringing in BAR. Women spoke about the fact that raising good children was dependent on instilling shared values in them from an early stage. Achieving this, however, required constant monitoring and engagement with children, which their busy schedules could not afford them. Participants describe their experiences:

> When I wake up, I have to sweep the compound, fetch water from the borehole, cook and join my husband on the farm. I come home at night and repeat the cycle. I'm too busy to keep an eye on them the way that I should, and that's not good. Because if they're misbehaving, how will I know and teach them? (Ziem, IDI, 41)

> In UWR, there was always someone watching over our children. If some adults were away farming, others will be at home. It was easy to know what our children were up to, and to correct them when necessary. But over here, we're all busy so it's really difficult to follow our children's development. (FGD 1)

Furthermore, among many cultures in UWR, male figures are ascribed the role of maintaining order within the household, hence it is common for women to refer disciplinary issues to the men in the family. Migrant women nevertheless lamented the declining involvement of male parental figures in raising children in destination regions:

> It's even worse because their father, who should be the disciplinarian, is away on the farm all the time. From dawn till night. He comes home tired and goes straight to bed. So even if there's an issue that he needs to address, it is repeatedly postponed until he forgets. (Ziem, IDI, 41)

A participant from an FGD echoes this sentiment:

> We all know that it is the man's job to teach the children. As women, we care for the family and the men teach the children. But now there are no fathers to perform their roles. The old men didn't migrate here with us and the young men are too busy trying to sustain the families. So, it's different. But now there's no one watching them and the children are turning to bad behaviours. (FGD 5)

These accounts by migrant women support Bourdieu's (2011) assertion that effectively transmitting cultural capital within the family unit is contingent not only on the kind of cultural capital available, but also on the amount of usable time at the disposal of family members, particularly mothers' free time. These findings nonetheless depart from Bourdieu's, as they emphasise the key roles that men also play in sociocultural reproduction, in UWR culture. The concerns raised by migrant women about the absence of male figures to maintain social control went beyond the limits of the household, to include communal social upbringing and the subsequent transmission of culture from one generation to the other.

Eroding Cultural Capital and Generational Culture Loss

Many migrant women complained that relocating to BAR had not only adversely affected their stock of social support and networks but was also taking a toll on their ability to nurture generational culture, which has dire consequences for their cultural capital. This challenge of building cultural capital was attributed to two reasons. First is the absence of people who possess adequate knowledge of UWR culture to teach it to younger generations, and second is the busy schedules of migrants in BAR as mentioned earlier. The cultural materials that women discussed included both embodied and objectified forms as outlined by Bourdieu (2011). Examples are language (everyday language and more sophisticated uses such as proverbs), arts (music, poetry, dance and dirge performance), and skills/trades (e.g. brewing *pito*,[3] making beancakes, manufacturing xylophones and designing smocks). Women added that these shortfalls had many negative effects on migrant families in BAR, and especially on their children. The quote below speaks to the difficulties of raising children to speak their mother tongue:

> They struggle to speak Dagaare. It is Twi that they're fluent in. I tried teaching it to them, but how much time do they spend with me? Most of the time they're with friends or at school and they only speak Twi there. (Kaunsob, IDI, 49)

As language serves as a bonding tool among many communities in UWR, and indeed Ghanaian society in general, migrant children's inability to communicate in their mother tongues implied that they were missing an impact aspect of their community identity/life. Moreover, children's inability to speak the local dialects consequently affected their ability to learn some of the arts cherished by their ethnic groups:

> It's sad. They don't know how to sing Sissaali songs, perform our local dances or cry at funerals. So, when we go home (UWR) for events like that, they just stand there and watch you. And the village people are usually displeased. They blame us for not raising the children well. (Humu, IDI, 52)

These language and arts deficiencies further translated into migrant children missing out on the learning of cultural skills/crafts which are considered important aspects of UWR culture.

Migrant women added that in addition to losing out on their embodied culture and a sense of identity, migrant children's inability to engage in some of these skills/crafts could also have negative consequences on migrant children's future livelihoods:

> We grew up knowing how to brew *pito* and make bean cakes. The men too would learn to make smocks and xylophones. So, we did not have to depend solely on farming for our upkeep. We knew that even if the rains were bad, we could trade these things for income. Over here, farming is the only thing that we do. We spend all our time farming so we can't teach our children these things. And there's no one else to teach them. If one day they can no longer farm, what happens to them? (FGD 2)

According to Bourdieu (2011), to build social capital, it is important that every group elects delegates who direct, speak and negotiate on behalf of the group. At the most elementary (family) institutions within rural Ghana, these representatives include the household heads (mostly male), and the elderly or most senior members of the family. As the accounts of migrant women reveal, the absence of these 'delegates' markedly affects their social capital and ability to transmit cultural capital in receiving societies. Migrant women explained that amid these challenges, their children – especially the adolescents – sometimes felt alienated to both cultures of UWR and BAR, which led to loneliness and frustration. Sometimes, these frustrations escalated into waywardness and deviant behaviour among migrant children. Women believed that the situation would have been different had they remained in UWR, as the feelings of not belonging would not develop among children. Some participants' experiences are described in the quotes below:

> Down here, they know that they're different from their peers. When they go home (UWR) too, they can't speak the language and the elderly chastise them for it, so they don't like going home … They sometimes feel alone. (FGD 4)

This alienation experienced by children sometimes led to feelings of distress, which pushed migrant children into substance use:

> My youngest son smoked weed till we lost him. My husband died when he was just a little boy and I was always busy trying to get by-day.[4] If we'd been back home, his uncles and other relatives would have pumped some sense into him. This wouldn't have happened. (Connie, IDI, 60)

The experiences of migrant women emphasise the fact that both physical and socialisation processes play vital roles in reproduction and should therefore be accorded the same importance (Kofman, 2012). Interestingly, most migrant women reported that they were more worried about the effects of culture loss on their sons than daughters. They attributed this to the fact that, traditionally, among cultures in UWR, women married out into new families, while men married their wives into their own families. Thus, females' language, arts and cultural skills might become obsolete if they married into a different ethnic group than their own. On the other hand, if men married women from different ethnic groups, it was expected that these men – with the help of delegates/extended family members – would teach their new wives the culture of their community. Subsequently, these wives would then pass their newly acquired knowledge onto their own children. As migrant women feared that this tradition was being eroded, a common phrase among them was, 'our sons are getting lost', in reference to the fact that their sons did not know enough about the culture to become custodians and transmitters of it. In addition to highlighting the unequal gendered expectations and concerns ascribed to

different sexes, these findings also buttress Bourdieu's (2011) arguments that the transmission of cultural wealth to upcoming generations is the purview of the privileged in society, as effectively doing so requires time, status and economic resources, which people of lower socioeconomic status usually lack.

Social Reproduction and Worsening Inequalities

Finally, migrant women linked their challenges of raising children in BAR (due to poor cultural and social capital) to further economic marginalisation in the migration destination. Economic marginalisation as used here refers to migrants' inability to participate effectively in economic systems (farming, *pito* brewing and trading) in the migration destination due to their limited social capital, and the resulting economic inequalities that stem from this economic relegation (Kanbur, 2008; Baada, Baruah and Luginaah, 2019). According to participants, their main reason for migrating out of UWR was to secure better lives for their children. Many women, however, dreaded that what they were gaining in better farm yields, improved food security, and slightly better educational outcomes (in the short term), they were going to pay for in long-term economic marginalisation. Ayo speaks to this:

> We migrated here because they said the rains and lands were better. We thought we could get better lives for our children. But apart from the farming, which is even becoming disappointing too, and the schools, which they (children) have to walk long distances to attend, almost everything else is worse. And now, we don't have lands here and we won't have lands if we go back home. We were poor in UWR and we are poorer here. (Nomu, IDI, 37)

Another migrant woman discusses at length the cultural meanings and economic importance of land among the Dagaaba, and the implications of being landless on migrant families, particularly for male members:

> As for my daughters, they can't inherit land anyway. But my sons are the problem. You see land is not just about the earth, it is a place to call your own, a home for your spirit and a place for your ancestors to reside. Why do you think we pour libation on land? It's because it is sacred. If you please the land, it will bless you in return. And you can farm, eat, send your children to school, and provide them with a place to lay their heads. But we're landless. My sons, where will they take their children to? How will he keep the family going? If they have no where to call home, are they not lost? (Jane, IDI, 65)

These findings speak to the growing vulnerability of migrant communities in a rapidly evolving environmental and geopolitical context. Given that the main form of land ownership in rural Ghana is through customary allodial means/inheritance (Kansanga and Luginaah, 2019), migrants' outsider status implies that they are excluded from this form of land ownership in the migration destination. Yet, their poor socioeconomic backgrounds also hinder their ability to secure usufructuary/land lease rights. Hence, as the quotes above elaborate, land is a significant source of cultural, social and economic capital, and the inability of landless populations (such as migrants) to secure these forms of capital not only has dire consequences for daily livelihoods, but also generational continuity. Migrant women's quotes also emphasise the exacerbation of gendered inequalities resulting from social reproduction. Numerous studies have highlighted the inequalities in land rights access between women and men in global south regions (Basu, 1999; Baada, Baruah and Luginaah, 2019). These findings further

demonstrate that, as inequalities widen, the already vulnerable may end up more marginalised in destinations.

CONCLUSION

Experiences of sociocultural reproduction among migrant women from UWR in rural areas of BAR, Ghana revealed concerns among women regarding limited support in childcare; the absence of parental figures to maintain social control; generational culture loss; and the loss of resources, particularly land, due to migration. A number of issues to emphasise are: first, that care labour – and the availability of resources to undertake this care – is determined by factors such as gender, socioeconomic and migrant status (Kofman, 2012). Migrant women's economic marginalisation in UWR necessitates that they relocate to rural BAR for better lives for themselves and their children. Yet, they end up facing numerous childcare challenges in destination regions due to their economic marginalisation. Although women continue to play central roles in reproduction in UWR cultures, men also play important yet overlooked roles.

Second, the findings highlight the fact that the production of goods and services, and the production of life, are interconnected processes (Locke, Seeley and Rao, 2013), both of which are intricately linked to everyday social reproduction. Thus, in the case of migrant women, their economic marginalisation means that they must work harder to make ends meet, but doing so ultimately has negative outcomes on their ability to nurture household and community cultural capital. Consequently, the inability of migrants to develop and utilise cultural capital negatively affects migrants' sense of identity, with ensuing psychosocial problems. It also thwarts the potential of developing this cultural capital into economic capital, subsequently reinforcing the cycle of marginalisation (Bourdieu, 2011, 2018).

Third and importantly, these findings reveal that patterns of inequalities successively reproduce stratification by mirroring, reinforcing and exacerbating the inequalities on which these stratifications/vulnerabilities are built (Kofman, 2012; Bourdieu, 2018). As asserted by Bourdieu (2011), the more the formal transmission of capital is avoided or inhibited, the more the development of the social system is determined by the impacts of the covert circulation of this (cultural) capital. Despite the role of cultural capital in access to resources as evidenced by these study findings, its role is often disregarded, perhaps due to the masked nature of its acquisition and transfer. Thus, the experiences of reproduction among migrant women in rural BAR reiterate that the allocation of different forms of capital tends to reflect the social world, the social locations of actors in this world (Bourdieu, 2011), and the ways in which purportedly unrelated factors such as ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status and geopolitical elements continue to encourage capitalist undercurrents of dispossession (Ferguson, 2008). This is especially worrying given increasing globalisation and a rapidly deteriorating climate, which will propel migrations among already vulnerable populations, globally. Nevertheless, as vulnerable groups such as agrarian migrants scramble for scarce resources, the plight of already marginalised groups such as women (migrant daughters) worsen, as their needs are further relegated to the periphery.

NOTES

1. This region was renamed the Bono Region in 2019.
2. *Dawadawa* refers to fermented dried seeds of the African locust bean with a very high protein content.
3. Pito is a beer made from fermented millet, corn or sorghum, which is popular among people from northern Ghana.
4. 'By-day' is jargon for leasing out one's labour for daily farm wages.

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35. Migration, stress, and physiological dysregulation
Alexandra C. Tuggle and Douglas E. Crews

INTRODUCTION

Culture, a Prime Influence on Human Mobility and Physiological Responses

Migration is a dynamic cultural, mental, behavioural, and physiological process and a disruptive life event. Migration may be a response to local stressors, but it also elicits physiological responses that can affect the current and long-term health and well-being of migrants.

The final decision to migrate is complex and not made lightly. Often, migration is driven by insecurity, either in the individual's household, their sending community, or broader economic, political, and social patterns and changes (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Crews et al. 2019). Stressors, uncertainty, and social conflict continue to plague migrants as they travel to their new, but perhaps not final, destinations, react to unanticipated challenges during their sojourns, and settle into a new society.

The insecurity and uncertainty associated with migration produce unique stressors with profound implications for the health of migrants. Insecurity may not always act as a main driver of migration (see Cohen and Sirkeci 2011: 97). However, migration can generate cognitive dissonance between expectations and actual circumstances; this generates uncertainty regarding how to protect one's mental, social, and physical well-being (see Peters and McEwen 2015). Such cognitive uncertainty elicits a physiological stress response (allostasis). When chronically activated, allostasis can damage internal regulatory systems and result in poor health outcomes later in life (Peters et al. 2017). Chronic exposure to migration-associated stressors may result in physiological dysregulation – an allostatic load wherein immune, metabolic, cardiovascular, and neuroendocrine systems accumulate stressors and age-related damage (McEwen 1998). Cumulative wear and tear on these systems (allostatic load) is significantly associated with future and current chronic disease, declines in cognitive and physical performance, and mortality across multiple samples from different populations (Crews et al. 2012; Gruenewald et al. 2012; Karlamangla et al. 2002, 2006; Kusano et al. 2016; Seeman et al. 2001; Theall et al. 2012).

The human stress response is related to individual perceptions. Personality traits act as filters through which individuals interpret challenges to be more or less stressful. Behavioural attributes also allow individuals to cope differentially with stressful experiences (e.g. smoking/alcohol use, anxiety, overeating, exercise), whether more or less successfully (McEwen and Stellar 1993). Anticipation of a stressor also may trigger a stress response whether or not the actual perceived stressor occurs. Whether or not a perceived or anticipated stress occurs, the cost of mounting a stress response contributes to physiological wear and tear on internal regulatory systems (Ice and James 2012; McEwen 1998). In fact, previous lifetime experiences

can influence anticipation of certain stressors leading to adjustments before the stressor is experienced (Sterling and Eyer 1988).

Perceived stress and its outcomes vary between individuals and rely on a myriad of factors from age, sex, education, and socioeconomic status, to the environment of growth and development, genetic variation, living conditions, and cultural norms. Stressors perceived by migrants reflect both individual and cultural influences. Migrants are not only individuals but also members of families, households, and communities, expressing genders, ethnicity, and religious variation, and perceptions are influenced by these sociocultural structures (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011, 2016). Migrants' perceptions of insecurity and their resulting decisions are constrained and shaped by sociocultural factors and thus closely coupled to the culture of migration within which physiological responses to stressors are embedded.

Migration and Settlement: Physiological Responses and Allostatic Load

We know stress is damaging to the body, but how and where exactly does this damage occur? To begin, the human stress response represents a broadly conserved mammalian and vertebrate adaptive trait that provides organisms essential reactions to environmental stressors to limit somatic damage (Stearns 1992). Sterling and Eyer (1988) originally defined this physiological response system as allostasis, highlighting the dynamic nature of this internal regulatory system in response to constantly fluctuating environmental and social conditions and needed activity levels. When a stressor is perceived, the hypothalamus releases hormones that activate multiple physiological systems in preparation for actions to limit damage and preserve stability (McEwen 1998; McEwen and Stellar 1993; Peters et al. 2017). The stressors that activate human stress response are physical, social, environmental, and mental. Examples include physical exertion, infectious pathogens, and social settings. Those that may particularly affect migrants include abuse, malnutrition, hunger, thirst, heat exposure, lack of proper shelter, conflict, and uncertainty (including anxiety and fear) (see Crews et al. 2019; McEwen and Stellar 1993).

The stress response

The mammalian and human stress response is adaptive in the short term and comprises a complex interaction of the central nervous system (CNS) with peripheral adaptive responses (Charmandari et al. 2005). Once perceived, stressors activate the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis (HPA) as the hypothalamus releases specific modulating/releasing factors to the pituitary and activates four neuroendocrine axes directly involved in the stress response: the HPA or adrenal cortical axis, somatotropic axis, thyroid axis, and posterior pituitary axis (see Everly and Lating 2013). Upon first sensing a stressor, the hypothalamus releases corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) to the anterior pituitary, stimulating release of adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) into circulation. Once in circulation, ACTH induces the adrenal cortex to release glucocorticoids (cortisol and corticosterone), androgens (testosterone), and mineralocorticoids (aldosterone and deoxycorticosterone) into circulation (Charmandari et al. 2005; Everly and Lating 2013). As pleiotropic hormones, glucocorticoids (primarily cortisol in humans) induce numerous aspects of the stress response: gluconeogenesis (increased glucose production), immunosuppression, lipolysis, blood pressure, appetite suppression, urea production, and increased susceptibility to potentially harmful conditions and outcomes (e.g. gastric irritation, atherosclerotic processes, and exacerbation of herpes viruses). Although important

as regulators of stress response, circulating glucocorticoids also function to limit their somatic exposures through negative feedback that limits CRH and ACTH release, terminating the stress response and minimizing somatic damage (Charmandari et al. 2005).

Mineralocorticoids increase absorption of sodium and chloride and decrease their excretion in saliva and sweat, promoting fluid retention, while aldosterone may increase liver glycogen deposits. Chronic activation of mineralocorticoid secretion has been linked to conditions such as high blood pressure and Cushing's syndrome in humans (Everly and Lating 2013). Androgens, including testosterone, are released during stress response but their effects largely are unknown (Edes and Crews 2017).

When provoked by a stressor, the hypothalamus also activates the sympathetic–adrenal–medullary (SAM) axis by signalling the release of catecholamines (epinephrine and norepinephrine). Commonly known as the "fight or flight" response, the SAM axis was originally described by Cannon (1932) as a system that actively mobilizes the body systems to deal with a threat. Stimulation of the SAM axis induces increased blood pressure, heart rate, blood supply to the brain, circulating triglycerides and cholesterol, stimulates skeletal muscle, and decreases blood flow to the kidneys, skin, and gastrointestinal system. This process may also increase risks for hypertension, thrombosis, arrhythmias, and myocardial infarction (Everly and Lating 2013; Ice and James 2012).

Although essential to provide dynamic short-term adaptability and flexibility allostasis, the human stress response comes with a cost. When chronically activated, allostasis may result in cumulative damage to internal regulatory systems, including the immune, cardiovascular, metabolic, and neuroendocrine systems. Chronic activation also can lead to reduced allostatic responsiveness, hyper responsiveness, or even loss of response – any of which may lead to somatic damage, or an allostatic load. When a challenge to allostasis occurs, a stressor is perceived and primary mediators of the stress response are activated including neuroendocrine and immune responses. Secondary mediators of the stress response include the metabolic, cardiovascular, and inflammatory responses. As one's allostatic load increases, it may lead to deterioration of the body's regulatory systems, and manifest as disease, lower cognitive functions and physical performance, challenges to well-being, and mortality (Figure 35.1) (McEwen 1998, 2004; Seeman et al. 1997).

Stressors

What constitutes a stressor for an individual depends on multiple factors including familial history, conditions of growth and development, current lived experiences, health, age, sex, social support, marital status, and multiple personal factors. One's perceptions of stressors and subsequent decisions are shaped significantly by local and regional political and economic factors, but perhaps more so by cultural beliefs, social practices, traditions, and personal agency. Thus, self-perceptions of potential stressors represent a dynamic and continually evolving relationship (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Wilk 1997). Overall, a stressor may be defined as any social, environmental, or mental construct that induces a stress response, while stress is a mental/physiological state of agitation/allostatic activity.

Chronic stressors experienced during critical periods of growth and development are particularly influential on adult physiology, stress response, and potentially impact health, morbidity, and mortality. Consequently, one's social environment during infancy, childhood, and adolescence shapes somas, adult physiology, and resilience. Research suggests stress acts on developmental trajectories as early as *in utero* and may be influenced by the experiences of

multiple previous generations of ancestors (Barker 2012; Kuzawa 2005). The stress response evolved to help maintain somatic integrity of an organism adapting to stressful environments by increasing their chances of survival and reproductive success. Because they may modify lifetime stress response physiology, stressors experienced during growth and development have a more significant influence on allostatic load than those experienced during adulthood (Danese and McEwen 2012) (Figure 35.1).

Figure 35.1   Model of allostatic load and its outcomes for health and health disparities

Source: Adapted from Beckie 2012; Edes and Crews 2017.

Migration and stressors

Among migrants, health intertwines with stressors experienced before (i.e. economic insecurity, regional violence), during (i.e. harassment from law enforcement, dangerous journeys, malnutrition, violence), and following (i.e. acculturative stressors, downward mobility, separation from family) travel to a new environment. Stressors are both transitory and chronic (Table 35.1), and all may initiate an allostatic response, contribute to somatic wear-and-tear, dysregulate innate adaptive regulatory systems, and adversely influence health. Often, migrants are exposed to poor living conditions in their home countries prior to migrating, during, and following settlement. In addition, degree of separation from family and the pres-

ence of local support systems at their place of origin are important factors in how migrants respond to stressors before, during, and following their sojourns.

Table 35.1   Potential transitory and chronic stressors experienced by migrants at each stage of migration: pre-migration, during migration, and during settlement

Pre-migration	During migration	Post-migration/settlement
Regional conflict/violence	Law enforcement	Discrimination
Economic insecurity	Dangerous journeys	Downward mobility
Uncertainty	Uncertainty	Uncertainty
Infectious pathogens	Environmental exposure	Job insecurity
Unhygienic conditions	Thirst/hunger	Food insecurity
	Lack of shelter	Social isolation
		Family separation
		Acculturation
		Difficulty accessing health care

In addition to social support, the ability to support oneself in a new setting may contribute to physiological stress. While highly skilled migrants may experience upward mobility, most unskilled migrants, refugees, forced migrants, and asylum seekers tend to experience downward mobility at their final destination (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Regardless of skill, migrants with limited language proficiency or accented speech, visual differences from the host country, or lacking legal status are often economically disadvantaged (Agadjanian et al. 2017; Liebert 2019). When migrants experience downward mobility upon settlement, it relates to systems of power at both their places of origin and destination (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011).

Social and economic inequality are found across sociocultural settings. Migrants lacking family and friends at points of destination often experience not only social isolation, but also downward mobility coupled with discrimination. Discrimination and marginalization are powerful stressors shaping migrant health and well-being, as they heighten chronic stress and increase allostatic load (Gravlee 2009; Gruenewald et al. 2012; Pascoe and Richman 2009). Across samples of migrants and minorities discrimination is associated significantly with higher allostatic load (Brody et al. 2014; Geronimus et al. 2006; Gruenewald et al. 2012; Kaestner et al. 2009; McClure et al. 2015; Peek et al. 2010; Rodriquez et al. 2019; Tuggle et al. 2018).

Bioethnography as an Avenue for New Research on Migrants

Across different fields, research has approached migrant health from numerous directions. However, the complexity of observed associations has presented a challenge for researchers to disentangle. Many, including those recording and examining narratives, ethnographies, and demographic data, consider sociocultural aspects as driving factors for migration. Others have focused on biological and physiological ramifications of migration, settlement, and subsequent acculturation. To understand how culture, biology, and physiological responses affect migrants in ways that are only sometimes synchronized, we develop a "bioethnographic" approach. Our approach combines ethnographic methods: narratives, observations, interviews and self-reports of health, well-being, and discrimination, with assessments of biomarkers of physiological dysregulation and health. These data are then combined to explore how migra-

tion and health outcomes are related. This methodology is designed to contribute new insights into how culture, biology, and physiology interact in marginalized groups, capture the complexity of mobility stressors, and explore multiple intricacies confronting today's migrants.

The bioethnographic approach is founded on research with migrants and non-migrants at points of origin and destination. Like the processes of migration and settlement, stressors associated with each vary widely, including social (often expressed in a group's narratives and experiences of discrimination, loss, and family), environmental (e.g., temperature, climate, resource availability), physical (defined by diet, workload, activity level, and somatic indicators of stress), and physiological (systemic stress responses).

Narratives are qualitative and subjective retellings of experiences that serve as a lens through which migrants perceive their experiences that also may support healthy mental and physical outcomes. Constructing narratives of experiences is a natural human practice that allows individuals to organize, process, and structure their thoughts and feelings, and in turn gain control over those experiences (Pennebaker and Seagal 1999). Research has shown that framing stressful or emotional events as narratives has distinct effects on mental and physical health, even impacting the immune system including helper T-cell growth (n = 50) (Pennebaker et al. 1988) and Epstein-Barr virus antibody response among American university undergraduates (n = 57) (Esterling et al. 1994).

Self-reported health and well-being likewise are personalized sociocultural constructs that reflect somatic health, lifeways, expectations, and how individuals evaluate their health and well-being relative to others. Self-reports of health differ from narratives in that their assessments require individuals to interpret and make personal appraisals of their perceived mental and physiological states, previous illnesses, physicians' reports, and clinical experiences. Self-reports of health and narratives provide information on personal sociocultural responses to factors across multiple domains. However, they also have a high probability for bias that is often rooted in variable cultural and linguistic perceptions of health across individuals (Kandula et al. 2007; Pennebaker and Seagal 1999; Todorova et al. 2013).

Allostatic load and bioethnography

Allostatic load indices (ALIs) have a distinct advantage when the variable of interest is current health. ALIs are relatively unbiased in assessing physiological dysregulation secondary to chronic stressor exposures (McEwen 1998, 2004). Allostatic load indices combine a series of biomarkers representing multiple internal regulatory systems (e.g. the immune, cardiovascular, metabolic, and neuroendocrine systems) into a single composite measure reflecting measurable physiological dysregulation (Seeman et al. 1997). In the original 10 biomarker index developed by Seeman and colleagues (1997), biomarkers include both primary mediators of allostasis (e.g. epinephrine, norepinephrine, cortisol, and dehydroepiandrosterone-sulphate (DHEA-S)) and secondary mediators (e.g. systolic/diastolic blood pressure, low density lipoprotein (LDL), high density lipoprotein (HDL) to total cholesterol ratio, waist–hip ratio, and glycated haemoglobin). Today, multiple variations on which biomarkers are included in ALIs have been reported, including some without primary mediators (Geronimus et al. 2006; see Beckie 2012; and Edes and Crews 2017 for a recent review). Traditional approaches to health and stress often rely on single biomarkers analysed using linear models with dependent variables including proposed stress-related health outcomes. Such approaches do not capture the full complexity and interactive nature of stressors, stress response, and the corresponding physiological dysregulation that ensues. ALIs offer a multisystem view of current dysregula-

tion, and thus a more complete picture of how stressors and senescent biology affect health over the life span.

When combined, such multiple data types assessing different, but overlapping, domains of the human experience reflect a person's current sense of self. A partial understanding of what migrants experience can be quantified by defining a set of interrelated domains and factors contributing to individual adaptation and adaptability. The narratives informants share, measured biomarkers of health, and self-reports of health and well-being can be parallel and show a strong association; however, there is no reason we should expect a significant association. And, when independently examined, narratives and self-reports may fail to capture the physiological stressors and physiological responses individuals and their families experience (Tuggle et al. 2018).

REVIEW

Previous Research on Migrants, Stressors, and Health Outcomes: Unhealthy Assimilation, the Healthy Immigrant Effect, and Acculturation

Numerous approaches exist for disentangling the effects of stressors on migrant health. Typically, relationships between health and acculturative variables thought to correlate with stress and discrimination, such as language abilities, social support, and successful/unsuccessful adoption of cultural traits, habits, and ideals of the destination community have been addressed. In the United States, many migrants tend to show a health advantage over their US-born counterparts; an advantage that declines with time spent in the US often referred to as the "healthy immigrant effect" (Finch et al. 2009). This observation is often hypothesized to represent positive selection for pre-migration health. In other words, only the healthiest will migrate (Antecol and Bedard 2006; Cho et al. 2004; Lara et al. 2005). Deterioration of health with time then is attributed to "unhealthy assimilation", wherein immigrants adopt unhealthy behaviours including decreased physical activity, worsening diet (Antecol and Bedard 2006), or increased smoking, drinking, and drug use (Blake et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2002). Integration into the mainstream culture of the destination country, therefore, is pinpointed as the underlying mechanism for negative impacts on migrant health. Methodologically, these factors are measured by acculturation scales, of which more than thirty exist for Latin American migrants (Castañeda 2010). Often, these scales rely on proxies of more complex concepts for ease of assessment due to language proficiency, nativity, and length of residence (Fox et al. 2017).

While theoretically acculturation has been shown to affect health (Berry 1998; Chun et al. 2003; Organista et al. 2003), inconsistencies in findings have undermined the utility of these models and resulted in critiques of their underlying assumptions (see Fox et al. 2017 for a review). One criticism is that acculturation models can be over-generalized and are unable to capture the full variation within a heterogenous population (Fox et al. 2017; Salant and Lauderdale 2003). Cultural models are only useful if they accurately represent the worldviews, habits, ideals, and behaviours of the people in question (Dressler et al. 2005). Worldwide, migrants do not represent a homogenous group, thus group-specific acculturation models are necessary to make meaningful causal inferences. However, samples from diverse populations using different acculturation scales limit comparability of results from different

research groups. In a review of acculturation and health in Asian immigrant populations in English-speaking countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), Salant and Lauderdale (2003) observed a disjuncture in the literature on assessments of acculturation, and the relationship between acculturation and health. They report that physical health assessments were generally drawn from sociology and behavioural epidemiology, while mental health assessments largely drew from psychology. In sum, Salant and Lauderdale concluded acculturation research in Asian immigrant populations failed to explain how different cultural domains and non-behavioural factors such as cultural beliefs interact with and affect perceived and assessed health. In most recent reports, these domains were analysed separately, belying the essential interconnectedness of mental and physical health in overall well-being.

The goal of acculturation research is to explain group trends and determine if shared experiences result in the same health outcomes and disparities. In migrant health research, acculturation models have addressed mostly the healthy immigrant effect, with inconsistent results. Often, acculturation models are used in tandem with self-reported health to assess the relationships between health and acculturative measures. While self-reported health is a good indicator of future morbidity and mortality (Idler and Benyamini 1997), it is potentially biased also. For example, in a sample of 1357 Puerto Rican migrants residing in Boston, Todorova and colleagues (2013) tested the relationships between elements of self-rated health, acculturation, and health disparities. They observed positive self-rated health was associated with higher acculturation and social integration, and negative self-rated health was associated with lower physical and psychological health. However, they also found significant nuance in these relationships. Those with poorer health were more likely to understate their perceived health issues, which ultimately may conceal health disparities between less and more acculturated groups.

In studies of Asian migrants to the United States, multiple inconsistencies arise when connecting acculturation with self-rated health. Among a sample of Chinese immigrants in the US (n = 253), longer US residency was associated with better self-rated health and fewer emergency room visits (Chou et al. 2010). In contrast, in a large nationally representative sample of first-generation Asian immigrants in the US (n = 22,804) higher acculturation was associated with poorer self-rated health (Acevedo-Garcia et al. 2010). In this same study, black and Hispanic first-generation immigrants were more likely to rate their health as poor when compared to third-generation immigrants. These data suggest acculturation did not have similar effects on self-rated health across ethnic groups.

Previous Research on Migrants, Stressors, and Health Outcomes: Incorporating Biomarkers of Allostatic Load

While extensive research has examined relationships of stressors and stress among migrants, only recently have assessments of allostatic load been incorporated into research designs to measure stress-related physiological dysregulation (Arévalo et al. 2014; Bingham et al. 2016; Kaestner et al. 2009; McClure et al. 2015; Peek et al. 2010). While acculturative measures are correlated with self-perceived stress, biomarkers reveal physiological pathways connecting acculturative stressors with health outcomes. Self-reported measures of health may correlate significantly with acculturative variables, but they cannot determine causal pathways to health outcomes as do biomarkers. Self-reported health also does not assess changes to physiology

a respondent has not yet observed, but may result in poor future health outcomes, a condition ALIs are designed to assess.

Incorporating biomarkers in migrant health research methodologies will aid in unravelling the effects of related stressors on physiological dysregulation. In the first study of its kind, Kaestner and colleagues (2009) tested the "unhealthy assimilation" and "healthy immigrant" effects in a sample of Mexican migrants residing in the US using biomarkers of allostatic load. They found Mexican migrants to the US generally are healthier on arrival than their US-born Mexican American counterparts, while their health declined with time spent in the US. The authors also report evidence that the highest allostatic load occurs among migrants ages 45–60 residing in the US for 20 or more years. They suggest this may be partially attributed to a "salmon bias", or return migration of migrants to their homes. Controls were included for health behaviours and medical care use, suggesting "unhealthy assimilation" alone does not explain the observed decline in health.

Peek and colleagues (2010) examined the influence of acculturation on health disparities among a sample of Mexican immigrants (n = 181), US-born Mexican Americans (n = 544), African Americans (n = 150), and white Americans (n = 535) using a 12-biomarker allostatic load index. The authors noted a pattern in their results consistent with the healthy immigrant effect wherein Mexican immigrants had lower allostatic load overall compared to all other groups. However, while length of residence (less than or more than 10 years) in the United States was the strongest predicting factor of higher allostatic load in Mexican migrants, allostatic load was not related to other acculturation measures such as English language use, preservation of cultural practices and traditions, and social integration. Mexican migrants had lower biological risk profiles than white Americans even when controlling for socioeconomic status. In contrast, Crimmins and colleagues (2007), examining a large nationally representative sample drawn from the National Health Examination and Nutrition Survey (NHANES), found foreign-born Hispanic migrants had similar biological risk profiles as white Americans, but US-born Mexican Americans still had higher biological risk.

Some researchers use smaller regional samples incorporating biomarkers of allostatic load to detect local patterns in migrant health and stress that may be masked by larger nationally representative samples such as NHANES. In a sample of African migrants residing in the metropolitan Washington, DC area (n = 238), Bingham and colleagues (2016) used a 10-biomarker allostatic load index to assess relationships between physiological dysregulation and age at migration, length of residence, reason for migration, and development of unhealthy assimilation behaviours such as smoking, alcoholism, and decreased physical activity. Developing unhealthy assimilation behaviours was unlikely, which the authors attributed to participants' strongly retaining their African self-identification and adhering to their natal country's traditions and habits. They reported both longer length of residence in the US and older age at migration were factors predicting higher allostatic load. Family reunification was identified as the most powerful predictor of lower allostatic load, suggesting social networks and familial support are significant buffers to stressors.

McClure and colleagues (2015) present an interesting examination of regional variation in the relationships between culture, stress, and physiology. In a sample of 126 Mexican migrant farmworkers residing in two communities in Oregon, one majority white, English-speaking community and one Mexican immigrant enclave, the authors assessed relationships between social support, acculturation, and psychosocial stressors using a 6-biomarker allostatic load index. Overall, their results support the healthy immigrant effect, as in this sample aggregate

experiences of residing in the US were associated with higher allostatic load. Yet, they found considerable variation within these relationships. In both locations, migrant groups exhibited higher allostatic load overall. However, low family support, commonly associated with higher allostatic load in Mexican migrant populations, only predicted higher allostatic load in women residing in the white-majority community. In fact, women with low family support were eight times more likely to have higher allostatic load than women with high family support in this community. In the Mexican immigrant community, there were no significant predictors of women's allostatic load. This relationship did not exist for men in either community. This research suggests that migrant communities may offer significant social buffering against the stressors associated with US residence. Additionally, it suggests women may be more susceptible to social isolation, especially within white-majority communities, which may affect their health in negative ways.

Models and Techniques to Assess Successful Migration or Ill Health

Acculturation models, self-rated health, and the healthy immigrant hypothesis have often been used to guide models for assessing migrants' success or health. Razum and Twardella (2002) propose a conceptual model of migration as health transition, rather than a healthy migrant effect. This model explains the lower mortality in immigrant populations compared to native-born populations, specifically for migrants moving from economically less-developed to more-developed areas despite experiencing typical socioeconomic disadvantages and downward mobility. In this model, migrants experience a rapid health transition wherein their health challenges and mortality risks shift from the more immediate threat of infectious diseases and maternal/child mortality, to chronic diseases through time. Razum and Twardella (2002) attribute health among migrants to improvement of environmental conditions, including hygiene, clean water, and access to health care, as well as responses to new challenges including smoking, drinking, poorer nutrition, and decreased physical activity.

Spallek and colleagues (2011, 2014, 2016) incorporate a life course epidemiology approach into migrant health research that takes into account stressor exposure during critical periods (e.g. *in utero* or during childhood development), duration of stressors, and temporal interactions of exposures to stressors. This approach considers stressors occurring across the life course, including before, during, and after migration, and their differential effects due to timing.

Stressors experienced during critical periods pre-migration can have profound effects on the way the body reacts to stress and also implications for subsequent physiological dysregulation and poor health outcomes later in life. These stressors represent exposures that native-born members of migrants' destination communities have not experienced, and thus are essential when considering variable health outcomes between groups. Such stressors may include environmental, social, political, and economic factors acting in the sending community, such as infectious agents, hygienic conditions, access to water, war, natural disaster, political unrest, and poor working conditions, among others. For example, Spallek and colleagues (2014) note the cases of Turkish women migrants residing in Sweden (Azerkan et al. 2008; Beiki et al. 2009) and the Netherlands (Visser and van Leeuwen 2007) who experience lower rates of gynaecological cancers possibly due to lower exposure rates to human papilloma virus than in Turkey. Other migrants coming from areas where infection with *Helicobacter pylori* is common may experience higher risk of stomach cancer later in life (Spallek et al. 2008).

The period spanning the process of migration itself can be varied and can sometimes include stays in interim destinations. However, this period generally involves a significant amount of uncertainty and possible discrimination. The settlement period is also quite variable between migrants and their respective destination communities, and can include a range of acculturative stressors, discrimination, and downward mobility. However, it can also provide access to resources, community reciprocity, and support (White 1997).

While the healthy immigrant effect hypothesis and other migrant health theories are based on findings that migrants often show a health advantage compared to native-born counterparts and is commonly thought to reflect positive selection for pre-migration health, baseline health in migrant-sending communities is typically unknown. Recently, some researchers have called for a closer look into non-migrants and return migrants in sending communities to better explain migrants' health outcomes in comparison with those of native-born individuals in their destination communities. A control or comparison group is essential to most scientific research, and the United Nations (2007) suggests the ideal research design to determine consequences of migration is a longitudinal study that follows migrants from pre-migration through settlement. This type of complex research design is cost-restrictive and difficult to implement, but Rodriguez-Lainz and Castañeda (2004) suggest that while native populations in destination countries provide adequate comparison groups for health inequity research, those examining self-selection and determinants of migration should assess non-migrants, return migrants, and their households in sending communities. This approach is still quite rare in migration research. In a study of 244 potential migrants from Russia to Finland, Jasinskaja-Lahti and Yijälä (2011) examined how different "pre-acculturative" stressors related to expectations of the destination society, including expected discrimination and expected length and difficulty of the adaptation period. They found one-quarter of all potential migrants experienced severe stress dependent on their expectations of settlement demands and their prior knowledge of the culture, language, and immigration-related troubles. This research suggests there is a significant amount of stressor exposure directly related to migration occurring long before migrants actually move to their destination countries.

Ullmann and colleagues (2011) assessed health disparities between male adult non-migrants and returned migrants (n = 2121) in Mexico and found some evidence of health-based selection based on self-reported health indicators. While returned migrants reported higher rates of obesity, smoking behaviours, cardiovascular issues, and psychiatric disorders, there was no difference between non-migrants and returned migrants in terms of hypertension or diabetes. Although their results provide modest support for migrant self-selection, it is likely that self-reported measures of health could be evaluated differently by non-migrants and returned migrants. Arenas and colleagues (2015) also evaluated returned migrants in Mexico (n = 518) using self-reported health variables. They found both the measures of change in health since migrating to the US and perceived health relative to others of a similar age and the same sex supported health-based selection. Although this study did not provide data related to specific health conditions, it adds to the growing evidence that Mexican migrants who experience poor health in the United States are likely to return to their home country. Whether poorer health among returned migrants is simply a result of the stressors experienced during migration and settlement, migrants returning due to health problems, or both, is unclear and will require future research.

BIOETHNOGRAPHIC MODEL

As the stress response occurs across multiple integrated neurophysiological systems, it has both protective and damaging effects. Due to its interactive nature, assessing cumulative damage incurred over a lifetime by intermittent or chronic activation of allostasis requires a holistic approach. Allostatic load indices are integrated biomarker constructs of physiological dysregulation across the soma. They also provide a glimpse into future stress-related pathophysiology. While ALIs assess physiological health by dysregulation, they do not detail the complex array of interacting sociocultural, political, economic, genetic, historical, or individual factors influencing migrants' health. Mixed-methods approaches to migrant health research, uniting quantitative and qualitative methods, are now generally recommended, although there is no "gold standard" (Rodriguez-Lainz and Castañeda 2014). Combining clinical biomarker assessments of health with qualitative data from ethnographic methods, including narratives, self-reports of health, and social interactions, better inform the migrants' experiences. They also aid in anticipating responses to migration's outcomes in sending and destination communities.

We propose a bioethnographic model (Figure 35.2) integrating the aspects of migrant health discussed throughout this chapter. The narratives that migrants tell about their experiences, the social interactions they describe and self-report, the way they perceive their own health, and their clinically assessed health describe interrelated and interacting domains (see Figure 35.2). They also are filters through which people manage a diverse range of situations, stressors, and self-images. Migrant narratives are variable and fluctuating sociocultural responses used to process their circumstances, and thus also colour perceptions of their own health and future (Figure 35.2). For example, discrimination stems from how migrants are perceived by other members of their settlement community. It is influenced by existing personal factors such as age, sex, language aptitude, and phenotypic appearance (Figure 35.2). Discrimination affects migrants' self-perceived health and their physiological health through the embodiment of social inequality, downward mobility, and restricted access to health care and other resources (Crooks 1995; Gravlee 2009; Schell and Denham 2003).

Discrimination is based on pre-existing traits such as age, sex, appearance, and language use that are not generally alterable. Consequently, individual traits influencing discrimination begin our model as they affect all later domains. Together, these predisposing traits and discrimination influence self-reports of health as does medically reported physiological health, and all three influence each migrant's narrative. Narratives themselves also moderate allostatic load as perceived stressors influence our worldview and our responses (Pennebaker and Seagal 1999). Narratives serve to conceptualize experiences, in turn moderating allostatic responses to stressors and affecting physiological function (Peters et al. 2017). A dashed double arrow here signifies the recursive relationship between narratives and allostatic load, and the interactive nature of perceptions, responses, and physiological health. In addition, social support likely influences perceptions of health, narratives, settlement success, adherence to traditional practices, and allostatic load (Figure 35.2).

Figure 35.2   Allostatic load model incorporating self-reports of health, clinically assessed health, discrimination, and personal narratives with demographic factors as pre-existing states

Note: dashed lines indicate recursive relationships.

Like narratives, clinical reports of health influence self-reported health although in unpredictable ways. Because self-reported health is situational and entrenched in perceptions beyond health, it is not a valid proxy for physiological health. Clinical reports of health, self-reports of health, social settings, and narratives are tangled in a complex and dynamic interactive system regulating individual allostatic load and influencing current and future morbidity and mortality. In our model, successful migration and settlement reflect adaptive, time-dependent responses to the ever-changing environments in which migrants find themselves embedded. Settlement success abroad also can be moderated by a migrant's adherence to their home country's traditional practices (Figure 35.2). Adherence to traditional practices can combat unhealthy assimilation behaviours and contribute to supportive reciprocity within migrant communities (Bingham et al. 2016; White 1997). Migrants also can co-opt aspects of the local culture in their settlement communities within a framework of traditional cultural practices to increase their social mobility (Paerregaard 2014). Narratives, self-reports of health, ethnographic interviews, and clinical reports of health represent interacting domains of human experience, but each provides a unique data set to view the processes and outcomes of migration. Ascertaining how these domains interact as individuals respond to the stressors of migration will provide a better understanding of how migrants construct their lives and maintain their social and physiological balance, while confronting a myriad of social, ideological, and physiological stressors.

In sum, migration is a complex cultural and physiological process involving social, behavioural, dietary, and physiological interactions. Migration and the stressors involved with it are managed through the narratives people construct and relate to perceptions of their own health and well-being, any experienced discrimination, and their physical abilities. To capture the sociocultural as well as biological realities of migration, we developed a mixed-methods bioethnographic approach depending on informants' narratives and self-assessments of health while evaluating associated physiological biomarkers to determine individual allostatic load. Relationships between these domains may not always be obvious or statistically significant, but all contribute to and are indicative of individuals' dynamic responses to their migration.

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DEFINING RETURN
Most attempts to define return migration ponder on the at first sight straightforwardness of
the term and the rising complexities when giving it a second thought. Unlike other concepts
in migration research – transnationalism, hybridization – "return is a category that people
themselves use, embellish, and understand" (Oxfeld and Long 2004: 3). This common, often
taken for granted understanding of return certainly helps in the ethnographic endeavour. But,
Tsuda asks, "what exactly does it mean to return?" (Tsuda 2019: 240). He differentiates three
dimensions of return: spatial, temporal and social.

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Return is movement in space, a going back to where one started. Yet, place of origin is
a rather fluid category. Depending on specific migration trajectories it can mean various
things. Place of origin can be a house, a village, an area, a nation state or a whole continent.

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The temporal dimension is equally challenging. Return is not only a spatial movement; it is
also a "going back to a previous time in the past" (Tsuda 2019: 241). Images of the past are
projected into future returns. But as Eula Grant warned, and as reported in Stack's Call to
Home, "you can't start from where you left" (1996: 199). A return in time is unattainable and
nostalgic longings are very often impossible to satisfy (Stefansson 2004: 11–12).

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Finally,
the social dimension of return touches upon "going back to something that one knows well"
(Tsuda 2019: 243). Yet, what during the migratory absence is assumed as familiar and known
might become unfamiliar and unknown upon return. The migrant and the place of origin have
changed. Ethnographic studies throughout the world describe returnees' experiences of loss
and irritation when coming home: "This anticipation of return to a socially and ethnically
familiar (and similar) country of origin is the fundamental reason why diasporic returns are
often quite ambivalent and fraught with tension" (Tsuda 2019: 243).

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Not surprisingly then, some of the returns that had been intended as
permanent become tran-sient. After the return is before the return. The
returnee returns again, away from the country
of origin and back to the host country. Consequently, recent scholarship
has moved away from
previous definitions of return characterized by permanent settlement and
the termination of
migration (Gmelch 1980: 136) and towards more open-ended approaches:
"there is no singular
diasporic 'Return' with a capital R, but only multiple 'returns' in the plural"
(Tsuda 2019:
239).

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The permanence of return is also a central way of categorizing return
migration. Tsuda
(2019: 239), for example, differentiates three kinds of returns: returns as
one-time occurrences
ending migration trajectories, returns as repeated occurrences, and returns
as part of a contin-uing migratory process. Another typology classifying
return migration based on time spent in
the home country distinguishes between four types of return: occasional
and short-term visits
to see kin and friends, seasonal returns, temporary returns of a longer
duration and with the
intention to remigrate, and finally permanent returns including resettlement
(King 2000).

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vietnam

Vietnamese residing in the Global
North were initially viewed as hostile and antagonistic by the Vietnamese government. This
view has substantially changed. Now, the government actively facilitates
the return of over-seas Vietnamese, hoping to profit from their professional,
technological and business expertise
(Tsuda and Song 2019a: 27).

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return as instrumental and practical rather than ethnic affinity

Tsuda and Song (2019a: 24) stress that it is not "primordial attachment and
an inherent sense of ethnic affinity to and longing for a country of origin"
that motivates return. Instead, they highlight what they describe as
instrumental and practical reasons.

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racism and discrimination in host country

Most migrants are confronted with racisms in their host countries. Gmelch (1980; 2004), for example, notes that Puerto Ricans leave the US because of discrimination and stigmatization. Similar negative experiences also motivate African migrants to leave Europe (Akesson and Baaz 2015a) or Mexicans to leave the US (Rothstein 2016). Gmelch (1980; 2004) further mentions economic difficulties and troubles to cope with cold climate as motives for Puerto

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desire to return, but don't return. "myth of return"

many migrants who entertain the idea of return, never return. This form of imagination has been described as the "myth of return" (Anwar 1979).

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gender norms.

Nevertheless, some literature on gender and return indicates that often
women are confronted with patriarchal gender norms and practices upon
their return (Christou and King 2014: 248; Dahinden 2010; Pessar and
Mahler 2003). Correspondingly,

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2nd gen in barbados

After many years of absence, first-generation migrants tend to find it
difficult to adjust upon return. Contrary to this, second-generation migrants
do not come to Barbados for retirement but for business and employment.
Potter and Phillips describe them as well-educated and belonging to the
middle class.

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Christou and King (2014: 15) emphasize that the return of the second
generation is not a return in the statistical sense. Demographically speak-
ing, it is an emigration to another country. Nevertheless, the second
generation often feels a strong bond of ethnicity and kinship to their
parental country of origin, often fostered by an "ideology of return" (2014:
15).

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demands from kin (remittances)

Many returnees are confronted with what can seem at times to be exaggerated demands from kin or neighbours. Remittances play a crucial role in framing these expectations. In many regions worldwide, remittances are a key economic element (Cohen 2011; Delpierre and Verheyden 2014; Sana and Massey 2005). Non-migrating kin folks often depend on the economic support of their migrating kin.

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2nd gen not settling in their family's cities, towns.

On the other hand, middle-class and well-educated returnees of the second generation were viewed as too "English" in their behaviour. This "Englishness" was found in their assumed obsession with punctuality, their going out in the rain or their walking in the hot sun and not staying in the shade. Differences and expectations such as these are very challenging for returnees. Some returnees decide to not return to their place of origin but instead settle somewhere else, often cities or towns, in their country of origin (Çağlar 2002; Christou and King 2014).

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preparedness and ICTs

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Back in Ghana, they matched the image of returnees as "upper-class citizens" and "big men", making their experience of return a compa- rably positive one. Class thus does not only shape return motivations but also actual returns.
MEXICAN

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returnees prefer more dynamic metropolian areas

As shown in research from other regions of the world (Christou and King 2014), returnees do not necessarily return to their place of origin any more but often prefer economically more dynamic cities or metropolitan areas.

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