

CSEC-10/11 Admin

- 3 Lectures per week: Monday, Wednesday, Friday @ 10:00-10:50am
- 8 tutorials or labs: Weeks 3-10 (CSEC-10)
- 7 tutorials or labs: Weeks 4-10 (CSEC-11)



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CO CSEC-10



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Assessment

CSEC-10

- CW1 (formative)
 - Friday 13 October 12pm
- CW2 (12.5% of total)
 - Friday 3 November 12pm
- CW3 (12.5% of total)
 - Friday 24 November 12pm
- Final exam (75% of total)
 - December Exam Period

CSEC-11

- CW1 (15% of total)
 - Friday 3 November 12pm
- CW2 (15% of total)
 - Friday 24 November 12pm
- Final exam (70% of total)
 - December Exam Period

Textbook

Copyrighted Material
PEARSON NEW INTERNATIONAL EDITION
Introduction to Computer Security
Michael Goodrich Roberto Tamassia
First Edition



Where to find information

- Course Learn page
 - Schedule
 - Week 1-5 RAAC arrangements
 - Assignment, tutorial sheets, tutorial solutions
 - Lecture recordings
 - Online lecture links
 - Assignment submission links
 - Piazza (student discussions)
 - Office hours
 - Myrto: Wednesday's 11am-12pm IF5.27
 - Tariq: Friday's 11am-12pm IF4.04A


Course overview

- What are our goals in this course?
- What is trust?
- What is security?
- What is privacy?
- Who are the adversaries?
- Terminology
- Common defence methods

What are our goals in this course?

- To be able to identify **security, privacy, and trust issues** in various aspects of computing, such as:
 - Programs
 - Operating systems
 - Networks
 - Distributed systems
 - Internet applications
- The awareness of **how security, privacy, and trust can be achieved** in practice

The landscape



What do we want?




What do the we mean when we say...?

- Authentic
- Safe
- Common language/sense → (more) Formal language/models
 - Based on definitions
 - Properties of the system, the data, usage, and abilities of the participants
 - Wide-spread agreement (in some areas; still evolving)

Who is we?

- Ordinary citizen
- Whistle blower
- Corporate worker
- Dissident activist
- Secret agent

What is security?

- The main general properties are:
 - Confidentiality
 - Information access to only **authorized** entities
 - Integrity
 - The data is **untampered** and **uncorrupted**
 - Availability
 - Both the data and the system that provides **access** to it are there **when you need** them
 - Are these enough? What can still go wrong?
- 

Failure of Security: Apple Security Cert Validation Bug

- The bug occurs in code that is used to check the validity of the server's signature on a key used in an SSL/TLS connection.
- An active attacker (a “malfactor-in-the-middle”) could potentially exploit this aw to get a user to accept a counterfeit key that was chosen by the attacker.

```
static OSStatus
SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams,
                                uint8_t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen)
{
    OSStatus      err;
    ...

    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    ...


fail:
    SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
    SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
    return err;
}
```

What is trust?

- Generally, we trust when we have:
 - Assurance
 - The **means to know** that the system is secure
 - Reliability/Resilience
 - To **operate intact** in the face of natural disasters and human-launched attacks
 - Accountability
 - The **means to verify** that the system is operating as designed (i.e. securely)

NB: There is a difference between **trustworthy** and **trusted**

Failure of Trust: CA Domain Control Validation



Failure of Trust:

Operational security of digital certs

- Symantec has a track record of fumbling certificate issuance, once even wrongly issuing one for google.com
- Google chrome, among other browsers removes Symantec as a root CA
- Trustico (Symantec reseller) emails 23,000 private keys for certs they issued, thus invalidating them (how did they get them?)
- All 23,000 certs are revoked within 24 hours



Convenient insecurity

- Offer a service to generate public/private key pairs
- Do not delete the keys afterwards
- ???
- Profit

qSandbox.com [Home](#) [Blog](#) [Pricing](#) [Features / Benefits](#) [Tools](#) [Contact](#) [Sign up](#)

Tools > Free Online Private and Public Key Generator You are here: [Home](#) > [Tools](#) > [Free Online Private and Public Key Generator](#)

Generate online private and public key for ssh, putty, github, bitbucket

Save both of keys on your computer (text file, dropbox, evernote etc)!
The generated keys are random/unique and we can't restore a missing key. You will need to copy/set the public key on to the remote server/service.

If you're a logged in and a **paying (\$\$\$)** user you can save the keys temporarily in your account.

Private Key

Public Key

[Generate](#) [Generate & Download \(zip\)](#)

Saved keys

None

What is privacy?

- Concerns **individuals** and their **expectations** on how their data, behaviours, and interactions are recorded, utilized, and spread
- A useful definition: “Information self-determination”
 - A **person** gets to **control** information about **themselves**
 - Controls can include:
 - **Who** gets to **see** it
 - **Who** gets to **use** it
 - **What** they can **use** it for
 - **Who** they can **give** it to

Failure of Privacy: New York Taxi Database

- Database released for research
 - Taxi numbers and licence numbers pseudonymized
 - MD5 hash
 - Same input = Same result
- Taxi/Lic. numbers have structure
 - Results in reduced number of possible values
 - Brute force is feasible on 24 million numbers



Failure of Privacy: New York Taxi Database

Taxi #	Lic. #
3A3D444BB	01001EDFD
...	...
...	...
ADE034523	B0BB321AA

DATABASE

1. Enumerate all values with structures:
5X55, XX555, XXX555, 5XXXXXX, 5XXXXXXX
2. Hash all values above with MD5
3. Compare results with database on left

How could we have prevented this?

- Was the problem lack of education?
- Could some processes have helped?
- Were the problems obvious?
- Were the right stakeholders involved?

Who are the adversaries?

- All systems are vulnerable to all manner of threats
- Adversary types:
 - Nature
 - Script kiddies
 - Crackers/Hackers
 - Organised Crime
 - Governments
 - Terrorists
- Who should we worry about most? Can we ignore anyone?

Threat Modelling

- Who is the adversary (the system may protect against many types)?
- What are they allowed to do? Or, what can't we prevent them from doing?
 - The adversary need not be malicious, he could merely be curious
- What do we want to prevent the adversary from doing or learning?
 - What is the adversary's aim, or, when does he win?
- The set of threats we want to protect against given this (set of) adversaries
 - When do we win?
 - When does the adversary win?

Terminology

- **Assets**: Things we want to protect, like:
 - Hardware
 - Software
 - Information
- **Vulnerabilities**
 - Weaknesses in a system that may be **exploited**
 - Example: Public facing email server without spam protection

Terminology

- Threats

- Loss or damage to the system, its users, or operators
 - E.g. Proprietary source code being stolen and sold
- The six major categories of threats:
 - Interception
 - Interruption
 - Modification
 - Fabrication
 - Repudiation
 - Epistemic

Terminology

- **Attack**

- An action that exploits a vulnerability to carry out a threat
 - E.g. Hacking the company public facing email server to read emails to steal company trade-secrets

- **Controls**

- Mitigating or removing a vulnerability
- The control mitigates a vulnerability to prevent an attack and that defends against a threat
- No system is perfect: Control vulnerabilities when discovered

Security Principles (pp. 15-18)

- Economy of mechanism: easy to understand, verify, and maintain
- Fail-safe defaults: conservative permissions and functionality
- Complete mediation: every access should be checked (again)
- Open design: no security by obscurity
- Separation of privilege: cooperation required to act, no single point of failure
- Least privilege: programs and users on bare minimum of access
- Least common mechanism: minimize shared means of access to resources
- Psychological acceptability: well designed UI that are intuitive and clear
- Work factor: comparable effort for the value of the resource
- Compromise recording: record failures and breaches

Common defence methods

- There are 5 common defence patterns:

- Prevent
- Deter
- Deflect
- Detect
- Recover

NB: Not all attacks can be prevented!



- Best practice to employ some form of all to get “defence in depth”

Defence tools of the trade

- Protect assets that can be
 - Hardware, software, data (PII, social graph, confidential information, etc.)
- Many forms of control
 - Cryptography
 - Software controls
 - Hardware controls
 - Physical controls
 - Policies and procedures

Cryptography

- Protects the data, making it unreadable by anyone without keys
- Authenticating users with digital signatures
- Authenticating transactions with cryptographic protocols
- Ensures the integrity of data against unauthorized modification

Software controls

- Passwords
- Sandboxes
- Virus scanners
- Source code versioning systems
- Software Firewalls
- Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs)



Hardware controls

- Fingerprint readers
- Smart tokens
- Firewalls
- Intrusion detection systems




Physical controls

- Protecting against unauthorized physical access to hardware



- Locks



- Guards

- Off-site backups

- Not placing critical systems in natural disaster zones



Policies and procedures

- Non-technical means to protect against some type of attacks
- Disallow personal hotspot within work place
- Password rules
- Security training against social engineering attacks

Recap

- What is our goal in this course?
 - Identify security and privacy issues
 - Design systems that are more protective of security and privacy
- What is Security?
 - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authenticity
- What is Trust?
 - Assurance, Reliability/Resilience, Accountability
- What is Privacy?
 - Informational self-determination

Recap

- Who are the adversaries?
 - Threat modelling
 - Learn to think like an attacker
- Trade-offs
 - Security, Privacy, Performance, Cost
- Assets, vulnerabilities, threats, attacks and controls
 - You **control** a **vulnerability** to prevent an **attack** and block a **threat**
- Methods of defence
 - Cryptography, software controls, hardware controls, physical controls, policies and procedures