

Problem Set #7

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- (a) If u is linear, then the marginal utility is constant, so the agent maximizes utility by maximizing expected wealth. The agent's optimization problem, then, is

$$\max_a p(w + 2a) + (1 - p)(w - a) = \max_a a(1 - 3p) + w$$

Thus, expected wealth is maximized by choosing the maximum value of a if $p > \frac{1}{3}$ and by choosing the maximum value of w (i.e. $a = 0$) if $p < \frac{1}{3}$.

- (b) If the marginal utility of investing is strictly positive at $a = 0$, then the optimal level of investment is strictly positive. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial U(a)}{\partial a} &= 2pu'(w + 2a) - (1 - p)u'(w - a) \\ \frac{\partial U(a)}{\partial a} \Big|_{a=0} &= 2pu'(w) - (1 - p)u'(w) = 3pu'(w) - u'(w) = u'(w)(3p - 1)\end{aligned}$$

Where $u' > 0$ since u is strictly increasing, and $p > \frac{1}{3}$, so $U'(0) = u'(w)(3p - 1) > 0$.

- (c) Continuing from the last problem's calculation, the second derivative of the utility function is

$$\frac{\partial^2 U(a)}{\partial a^2} = 5pu''(w + 2a) + (1 - p)u''(w - a)$$

Where, by assumption, $u'' < 0$. Thus, $U'' < 0$, so $U(a)$ is strictly concave in a , and the FOC is necessary and sufficient for finding a^* .

- (d) When all wealth is invested, $u'(w - a) = u'(0)$ and $u'(w + 2a) = u'(3w)$. It would be optimal to invest all wealth if $U'(w) > 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial U(a)}{\partial a} &= 2pu'(3w) - (1 - p)u'(0) > 0 \\ 2pu'(3w) &> (1 - p)u'(0) \\ \frac{u'(3w)}{u'(0)} &> \frac{1 - p}{2p}\end{aligned}$$

If $u'(0) \rightarrow \infty$, then the left side of the inequality is zero. Since $p \leq 1$, it is not possible for the right side of the inequality to be negative. Thus, it cannot be optimal to invest all wealth. If $u'(0)$ is finite, then we can solve for \bar{p} , the probability level above which the agent will invest all of their wealth:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{u'(3w)}{u'(0)} &> \frac{1-p}{2p} \\ 2p \left(\frac{u'(3w)}{u'(0)} \right) &> 1-p \\ p \left(1 + 2 \left(\frac{u'(3w)}{u'(0)} \right) \right) &> 1 \\ \bar{p} &= \frac{1}{1 + 2 \left(\frac{u'(3w)}{u'(0)} \right)}\end{aligned}$$

If $p \geq \bar{p}$, then $U'(w) > 0$, so the agent will invest all of their wealth.

- (e) Given CARA utility, U becomes $U(a) = p(1 - e^{-c(w+2a)}) + (1-p)(1 - e^{-c(w-a)})$, where solving the FOC yields:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial U(a)}{\partial a} &= p(e^{-c(w+2a)})(-2c) + (1-p)(-e^{-c(w-a)})(c) = 0 \\ 2pce^{-c(w+2a)} &= (1-p)ce^{-c(w-a)} \\ e^{-c(w+2a)+c(w-a)} &= \frac{1-p}{2p} \\ c(w-a-w-2a) &= \log\left(\frac{1-p}{2p}\right) \\ a^* &= \frac{-1}{3c} \log\left(\frac{1-p}{2p}\right)\end{aligned}$$

Thus, optimal investment, a^* , does not depend on w .

- (f) Assume $A(x) = -\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$ is decreasing in x and recall that

$$\frac{\partial U(a)}{\partial a} = 2pu'(w+2a) - (1-p)u'(w-a)$$

Now, let $a^* = \operatorname{argmax} U(a)$ be a function of w such that $a^* = a(w)$ (for syntactical simplicity, assume that $a(w)$ always refers to the optimal value of a and that a , inside of any utility function or derivative thereof, is a function of w). Then, since $U'(a^*) = 0$, we can solve:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial}{\partial w} [2pu'(w+2a(w)) - (1-p)u'(w-a(w))] &= \frac{\partial}{\partial w}(0) \\ 2pu''(w+2a)(1+2a'(w)) - (1-p)u''(w-a)(1-a'(w)) &= 0\end{aligned}$$

$$2pu''(w+2a) + a'(w)4pu''(w+2a) - (1-p)u''(w-a) + a'(w)(1-p)u''(w-a) = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} a'(w)(4pu''(w+2a) + (1-p)u''(w-a)) &= (1-p)u''(w-a) - 2pu''(w+2a) \\ a'(w) &= \frac{(1-p)u''(w-a) - 2pu''(w+2a)}{4pu''(w+2a) + (1-p)u''(w-a)} \end{aligned}$$

$a'(w) > 0$ if the right side of the equality is greater than zero. Since $u'' < 0$, this is only true if:

$$\begin{aligned} 2pu''(w+2a) &> (1-p)u''(w-a) \\ \frac{u''(w+2a)}{u''(w-a)} &< \frac{1-p}{2p} \end{aligned}$$

Recall that, at a^* , $\frac{1-p}{2p} = \frac{u'(w+2a)}{u'(w-a)}$.¹ Thus, the condition for $a'(w) > 0$ is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u''(w+2a)}{u''(w-a)} &< \frac{u'(w+2a)}{u'(w-a)} \\ \frac{u''(w+2a)}{u'(w+2a)} &> \frac{u''(w-a)}{u'(w-a)} \end{aligned}$$

Where, by assumption, $-\frac{u''(x)}{u'(x)}$ is decreasing in x . Since $w+2a > w-a$, this inequality holds. Therefore, $\frac{\partial a^*}{\partial w} > 0$. Thus, if the agent is wealthier, they will invest more in the start-up regardless of $p \in (\frac{1}{3}, \bar{p})$.

¹This comes from solving the first order condition:

$$2pu'(w+2a) - (1-p)u'(w-a) = 0$$