Implementing Privileged Access Workstation - part 1


michaelfirsov.wordpress.com/implementing-privileged-access-workstation-part-1


October 25, 2018

In this blog post I'd like to share the results of my Privileged Access Workstation (PAW) implementation – this implementation will be based on this MS document. Although I didn't follow MS guide in its enterity (because my network cannot be divided to so many tiers as MS prescribes), the main steps of the paw configuration will be illustrated along with the results to which these steps lead.

Phase 1

The first step in the PAW configuration is creating the corresponding AD infrastructure: I'm not planning to use MS's scripts which create all required OUs and groups and will create only those ones which I think will be sufficient for the PAW deployment. The upper-level OU to host the paw devices and users is ADMIN:






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
As you see the Tier0 accounts which will be allowed to log onto the PAW (which is placed into Devices OU) are Enterprise Admin (*EntAdmin*) and built-in *Administrator*.

Two groups must be created to separate access to PAW: PAWMaintenance group (with the single member PAW Maintenance – *pawm* which was created beforehand) will be used only for the paw maintenance while the other – PAWUsers will contain the Tier0 user accounts –*Administrator* and Enterprise Admin(*EntAdmin*).




Next a couple of GPOs must be created and linked to the Admin\Tier0\Accounts and Admin\Tier0\Devices OUs.


1) **PAWConfiguration-Computer** gpo will configure the paw device and thus must be linked to the Devices OU:




The primary goal of the **PAWConfiguration-Computer** gpo is to protect a paw device by different ways.


a) Local Administrators group membership should be as follows:






on paw devices only built-in local *Administrator* account and the domain PAW
Maintenance user account (*pawm* in this case) should be the members of the local
Administrators group – all other members must be deleted.
All other privileged groups must always be empty:







Here's where the first discrepancy between MS's documentation and the practice can be seen: MS says the Hyper-V Administrators group should be among the groups with empty membership but this group can't be added here – it just does not exist in the drop-down group list:



b) the next gpo setting will define which accounts are permitted to log on to the PAW:





Here I'd like to draw your attention once again to which account will have and which will have not the right to log on locally to the paw.

These users/groups will have the right to log on:

- i) TestENTERPRISE\PAWUsers TestENTERPRISE\Administrator and TestENTERPRISE\EntAdmin
- ii) Members of the LOCAL Administrators group on the PAW device
- as you remember the membership of the local Administrators group on paw devices is configured by the respective gpo setting which states that only the LOCAL Administrator and the TestENTERPRISE\pawm user accounts can be the members of the local Administrators group so in this case it means the local built-in Administrator (PAW\Administrator) and TestENTERPRISE\pawm user account WILL have the right to log on to PAW locally and


these users/groups will NOT have the right to log on locally:

- i) any other LOCAL user account which was added to the local Administrators group
- ii) any other domain user account(s)

Once we have the paw configured, the *Allow to log on locally* user right will be the first setting to test.


One more thing to note here: Tier0 accounts (*TestENTERPRISE\Administrator* and *TestENTERPRISE\EntAdmin*) will NOT be the members of the local (PAW) Administrators group – this will be the second thing to check.

iii) MS offers to download the <u>pawfirewallupdate.wfw</u> file to configure the PAW's firewall in the most restrictive way:







Here's the list of the inbound rules:




As I'm not going to use IPv6 I reduced the number of the enabled rules once again to rule out the IPv6-related rules:




The list of the outboud rules after applying the .wfw file:





- of course IPv6 rules can be disabled here as well but given that my paw is not going to produce any IPv6 packets I won't do it now.
- iv) the last gpo setting to configure is the Automatic Updates: the updates for the paw should be auto-aproved and installed daily:







These are the all settings that should have been configured for the **PAWConfiguration-Computer gpo**. As a final step here I'd like to take the gpo backup:












2) **PAWConfiguration-User** gpo will configure the tier0 user accounts – it must be linked to the Accounts OU:









The **PAWConfiguration-User** gpo prevents tier0 users accounts from browsing Internet by enabling proxy and setting it to the non-existing ip – 127.0.0.1. If some user should have access to the Internet from this workstation we can create the special group – for example, CloudAdministrators as per MS's documentation – and prevent Internet browsing for all groups except CloudAdministrators:

i) Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings – ProxyEnable








The key path mentioned above:

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings

This setting must be applied to any account except CloudAdmins:










ii) i) Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings – ProxyServer


Preferences \(\rightarrow\) Extended \(\rightarrow\) Standard


Registry














iii) and no one (except CloudeAdmins) should have the ability to overwrite the settings configured above (that would be the third test):


User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Internet Explorer







Backup GPO:











Aside from these two GPOs, at least one more GPO should be created – **RestrictWorkstationLogon** GPO. According to MS it must restrict tier0 accounts from logging onto users' workstations.


I won't create the **RestrictServerLogon** GPO as decribed in the MS's article because I'm not going to administer different servers with different accounts in the TestENTERPRISE network – if you're planning to deploy a paw in the production network and want to maximize its security level then the **RestrictServerLogon** GPO should be created and linked to the Tier1-Servers OU to which according to MS all other servers must be moved. In fact the **Restrict Server Logon** GPO is the same as the **RestrictWorkstationLogon** GPO – you just link it to another OU. However, for testing purposes I will link RestrictWorkstationLogon to the OU with server computer accounts to show how the whole paw infrastructure should look like.

So let's create the **RestrictWorkstationLogon** GPO and link it to the OU which contains domain's client computer accounts – in my domain it is the COMPANY\COMPUTERS\Clients OU:




i) Deny Log on as a batch job for the following groups:







Attention! MS's article states that we must add "DOMAIN\Administrators" group (TestENTERPRISE\Administrators) to this policy setting — but I failed to do it: if I type the TestENTERPRISE\Administrators and press OK I get the following error:




- if I search for the Administrators group IN THE TestNTERPRISE domain I see that it is the LOCAL Administrators group which gets added to the gpo once I click OK:



In fact many other groups (Server Operators, Backup Operators...) are being added in the same way: you search for them in the domain but after adding they look as the local groups: the problem is that for these particular groups the goal is to add exactly these LOCAL groups and only one group – DOMAIN\Administrators – must be added as the domain group and I don't know how to do it... I've asked this question on github.com but as of this writing no answers have been published yet there so in this situation I see only two possible "workarounds": 1) simply to omit DOMAIN\Administrators from this and in the next gpo setting (*Deny log on as a service*) or 2) add the local Administrators group to the list – the latter can (and I think will) lead to negative consequences because a) some services may need to be running under administrative user accounts and/or a scheduled task may require administrative credentials (as was discussed on github). Let's try the second option and see how it will work. Here's the final list of groups:



ii) Deny log on as a service




There's no more settings to configure in the **RestrictWorkstationLogon GPO** – let's now see whether the requested goal has been achieved. MS documentation states:

"7. **Restrict Administrators from logging onto lower tier hosts**. In this section, we will configure group policies to prevent privileged administrative accounts from logging onto lower tier hosts."


Obviously this goal can not be met by configuring (even with the LOCAL Administrators group added!) only the *Deny log on as a batch job* and *Deny log on as a service* policy settings: it is the *Deny log on localy* policy setting that really controls who can or can not log onto workstations! I'm definitely going to have to take the additional step:

I advise to add only domain accounts on the tab below as these are domain accounts that must be protected – NOT the local ones!!!


iii) Deny log on locally



As you see it's not possible to configure *Deny log on locally* policy setting the same way as the previous two settings so I'm left with the other option (the first option discussed earlier) – to omit local Administrators group from the group list:



Here're the all configured policy settings:



In the <u>next part</u> we'll see how the newly installed privileged access workstation work using such custom configuration.