

Intentional Weakening of Encryption: The Ethical Implications of Apple's Refusal to Create a "Backdoor"

Daniel Wong

Computer Science

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Abstract

In December of 2015, two attackers killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California. The attackers destroyed their personal phones but their work iPhones were recovered by the FBI. However, the iPhone required a 4 digit pin to unlock it. The FBI requested data from Apple through valid subpoenas and search warrants. Then, the FBI requested Apple to engineer a version of the iPhone's operating system that would allow it to disable security features once installed. Apple declined this request stating that in the wrong hands, this software can have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone's physical possession. Was it ethical for Apple to refuse the FBI's request to create a "backdoor" to all iPhones? [18]

The United States government urged Apple to comply with the order after being opposed. The FBI stated they would allow Apple to destroy the software once the FBI was able to unlock and remove security features of the attacker's iPhone. Critics argued that Apple and technology companies alike should be held to the same provisions which made cellular encryption weak enough to allow officials to "tap" phone conversations as seen with A5/1. Others argue in defense of Apple stating that the intentional weakening of encryption will lead to easy access of the encrypted data. After A5/1 was used to encrypt phone conversations, security researchers were able to attack and easily decrypt the conversations.

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1 FACTS

In December 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and another attacker killed 14 people and seriously injured 22 others. After the attackers died, the FBI was able to recover Farook's work phone. The FBI had the National Security Agency attempt to unlock the phone. However, after a limited amount of incorrect attempts, the phone would automatically delete all of its data. With the NSA's absence of knowledge required to unlock the phone, the FBI turned to Apple and issued valid warrants and subpoenas. Apple complied and gave all of the data and information available to them.[18]

The FBI needs Apple's help because the security settings on the iPhone lock may erase all of the phone's data if passwords are entered incorrectly too many times. The FBI requested Apple to engineer an operating system that could be installed onto the attacker's phone to disable critical safety features. This operating system would allow the FBI as many trials to break the 4 digit pin without compromising the phone's encrypted data. [?]

Apple refused the FBI's orders to create an operating system that would circumvent several important security features and to install the operating system on the iPhone recovered during the investigation of the San Bernardino case. Apple believes that building this operating system would create a backdoor and while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control. [18]

In Apple's letter to their customers, they explain that the "key" to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge." [18]

Apple and other technology companies alike believe that if Apple complied and created this "backdoor", it could set a very dangerous precedent.

2 QUESTION

Was it ethically justifiable for Apple to refuse the FBI's request to create an operating system that would allow the FBI to unlock the attacker's iPhone?

3 SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Whether or not Apple's refusal to create a "backdoor" to unlock the phone of the San Bernardino shooter was ethical, there are numerous important considerations on its impact to the information able to be retrieved on personal phones.

When considering the implications of Apple's refusal, there are many concerns about public safety and preventing terrorism. Manhattan district attorney, Cyrus Vance, Jr., says he has 175 iPhones, with potential evidence from serious crimes, including murder, that he wants Apple to aid in opening.[21] Former FBI director, James Comey puts it, "Technology has become a tool of choice for some very dangerous people. Unfortunately, the law has not kept pace with technology and this disconnect has created significant public safety problems we have long described as 'going dark.'" [?] Thus, many people consider Apple's refusal to create this "backdoor" to be unjustifiable as it allows dangerous people to protect the information stored on their phone. As Republican Senator Lindsey Graham puts it during the GOP Debate in 2016, "Any system that would allow a terrorist to communicate with somebody inside our country and we can't find out what they're saying, is stupid." [?]

On the contrary, many argue that if this "backdoor" was built, it could lead to huge privacy concerns for the general public. John Oliver explains, "If you penetrate a safe, you have only penetrated that safe. But, a code to open one phone could be modified to work on many more phones." [?] Apple's CEO Tim Cook comments, "No one, I believe, would want a master-key built

that would turn hundreds of millions of locks even if that key were in the possession of the person that you trust the most; that key can be stolen... The only way we know to get additional information is to write a piece of software that is the software equivalent of cancer.”[?] Thus, this order and compliance has many important implications regarding overall security of the public including their privacy and preventing terrorism.

4 EXTERNAL ARGUMENTS

4.1 Encryption: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO)

In an influential piece by John Oliver, he argues that whatever happens in this case will have huge ramifications. “Because, the FBI ultimately wants Apple and the entire technology industry to have an encryption always be weak enough that the company can access customer’s data if law enforcement needs it.” [?].

4.2 Matt Blaze: A key under the doormat isn’t safe. Neither is an encryption backdoor.

Matt Blaze, an associate professor in the Computer Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania, “studies secure systems cryptography and the impact of technology on public policy.” In 1993, the “Clipper Chip” was invented by the NSA and was as a device that would encrypt consumer computer’s data but allow officials to access the data if needed. However, Matt Blaze was able to exploit the security flaws in the system. “Clipper’s failure starkly demonstrated that cryptographic backdoors must be understood first as a technical problem... Clipper failed not because the NSA was incompetent, but because designing a system with a backdoor

was - and still is - fundamentally in conflict with basic security principles.” [?]

4.3 Manhattan District Attorney: Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety

The Manhattan District Attorney’s office believes that Apple and technology companies alike are making encryption decisions based on their business interests rather than considering the public’s safety interests. “Without legislative action, these corporations will ‘continue’ to focus on customer and shareholder value,’ while government entities ‘will try to demonstrate the critical public safety price they (meaning we) pay for ‘warrant-proof’ platforms’.” [21]

5 HOW THE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING CODE OF ETHICS APPLIES

The IEEE/ACM Software Engineering Code of Ethics considers software engineers to be those who “contribute by direct participation ... to the analysis, specification, design, development, ... and testing of software systems.” [17] The operating system is the essential piece of software which interfaces between the user and hardware. “An operating system is a software which performs all the basic tasks like file management, (and) memory management” [?]

Thus, the employees at Apple whom are tasked with creating and maintaining critical safety features on the operating system are considered Software Engineers. These employees “shall adhere to the [Software Engineering] Code of Ethics and Professional Practice” [17] Software Engineers at Apple are the ones responsible for creating the operating system that fully encrypts and protects the data stored on iPhones from becoming breached. The IEEE/ACM Software Engineering Code of Ethics states that “Because of

their roles in developing software systems, software engineers have significant opportunities to do good or cause harm, to enable others to do good or cause harm.” [17] Is Apple instructing their software engineers to do good or cause harm?

6 ANALYSIS

6.1 Tenet 3.12: Respecting Privacy

Tenet 3.12 of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics requires software engineers to “Develop software ... that respect the privacy of those who will be affected by that software” [17]

6.1.1 Definitions

6.1.1.1 Respecting Privacy

To “respect” privacy is to protect the user’s data from being authorized by other individuals. [?]

6.1.1.2 Actual or Potential Danger

6.1.1.3 Affected by Software

Those who will be affected by the software are generally the users or persons whom have their information stored by that software. Thus, if the information stored by the software became available, it would be a breach of personal privacy of those people.

6.1.2 Domain Specific Rule

In the domain of software operating systems, tenet 3.12 requires Apple software engineers to “Develop software that incorporates significant security measures to protect their users’ information and data from being stolen.” In regards to this case, the operating system that Apple developed uses encryption to protect the information of their iPhone users.

6.1.3 Discussion

6.1.3.1 Potential Risks

Encryption is the essential way of protecting data from being accessed without consent. In the letter to customers from Apple, “Smartphones ... have become an essential part of our lives. People use them to store an incredible amount of personal information ... All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or permission.” [18] Apple engineers have a security system in place which encrypts the data on their phones. Thus, the information can not be accessed without entering the correct pin number to unlock the phone. In fact, Apple’s security is so strong, in Manhattan District Attorney’s office alone, 1445 out of 2000 total Apple iPhones obtained through court-ordered warrants are still locked. [21]

Apple argues that obliging with the FBI and creating an operating system to weaken the encryption only to be opened by certain individuals would never work. They believe that if this “backdoor” were to be built, then others will find ways to exploit and decrypt private information. “The government suggest this tool could only be used once ... Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge.” [18]

In the 1990s, the Clipper Chip was introduced by the National Security Agency. “Clipper Chip, could be used in computers and other devices that needed to encrypt data. But there was a catch: Clipper-encoded data would include a copy of the key used to decrypt it ... If Clipper-encrypted data were encountered during an investigation, the key could be taken out of escrow and the data decrypted.” [?] However, Matt Blaze, along with other security researchers were able to exploit the system. “Clipper failed not because the NSA was incompetent, but because designing a system with a backdoor was - and still is - fundamentally in conflict with basic security principles.” [?] Matt Blaze uses his knowl-

edge with this particular case to argue that creating the “backdoor” requested by the FBI would compromise the safety and integrity of the data. “There is overwhelming consensus in the technical community that even ostensibly ‘secure’ backdoors put the systems into which they are incorporated at increased risk of outside attack and compromise.” [?]

6.1.3.2 Respect of Privacy

The FBI is asking Apple to create a version of the iPhone operating system which would bypass critical security features to aid in recovering the encrypted data on the attacker’s phone. “Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation.” [18] The FBI is asking Apple to create a “key” that could unlock the specific iPhone. Apple states that it could be modified to open potentially every phone. Apple cites that it could set a dangerous precedent if they complied. “In the wrong hands, this software - which does not exist today - would have the potential to unluock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.” [18] The Manhattan District Attorney states that if Apple created this software “backdoor”, he would immediately ask Apple to aid his office in unlocking 175 iPhones. Thus, Apple’s refusal to the order is due to their concern for users’ privacy.

6.1.4 Conclusion

Tenet 3.12 of the Software Engineering Code Ethics requires software engineers to respect the privacy of those who will be affected by that software. As such, Apple’s operating system encrypts users’ information and protects it from becoming breached. As such, Apple was complying with Tenet 3.12. If Apple were to comply with the FBI and create an operating system to allow officials entry to encrypted iPhones, they would in direct conflict with Tenet 3.12. The domain specific rule, as derived from tenet

3.12 of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics, states that Apple should develop software that incorporates significant security measures to protect their users’ information and data from being stolen. Because Apple did not build the system requested by the FBI, this rule was satisfied.

6.2 Tenet 2.03: Knowledge and Consent

Tenet 2.03 of the SE Code of Ethics requires software engineers to “use the property of a client ... only in ways properly authorized, and with the client’s ... knowledge and consent” [17].

6.2.1 Definitions

6.2.1.1 Property

Digital content consists of “individual files such as images, photos, videos, and text files ... stored either on a device owned by an individual (locally), or on devices accessed via the Internet (in the cloud), often as part of a service offered by a third party and governed by a contract with the individual”, and digital content can be considered “intangible, personal property” [22]. User generated content is defined as “published information that an unpaid contributor has provided to a web site”, which can include “a photo, video, blog or discussion forum post, poll response or comment made through a social media web site” [16]. Because social media posts are user generated content, a form of digital content, and digital content is considered personal property, social media posts can be considered property. In the context of social media, “property” therefore includes “social media posts”.

6.2.1.2 Client

A client is “a customer or a person who uses services” [3]. A service “[supplies] public communication” [11]. Social media is defined as a form “of electronic communication... through which

users create online communities to share information” [12]. Because social media supplies public communication, it can be considered a service. Therefore, “clients” includes “users” of social media software.

6.2.1.3 Proper Authorization, Knowledge, and Consent

To authorize is to “give official permission for or approval to” [2], and consent is “permission for something to happen” [5]. Because authorization and consent are explicit actions, they cannot be properly given without adequate knowledge of the situation, and knowledge can be considered a necessary component of consent and authorization. Given the overlap between consent and authorization, and the necessity of knowledge in both, “proper authorization, knowledge, and consent” can be simplified to “official approval”.

6.2.2 Domain Specific Rule

In the domain of social media, tenet 2.03 requires software engineers to “use the social media posts of a user only in ways officially approved by the user.”

6.2.3 Discussion

As previously mentioned, Facebook researchers claimed that the “emotional contagion” study was conducted in accordance with Facebook’s Data Use Policy, which they cite as sufficient informed consent [?]. In order to justify this claim, the use of user posts in the experiment must be compared with the Data Use Policy, both of which will be examined in the following sections.

6.2.3.1 Use of Users’ Posts

In what ways did the Facebook researchers use the users’ posts?

The “emotional contagion” paper states that user posts were analyzed by the “Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC2007)

word counting system” in order to determine whether they were positive or negative [?]. This data was then used to determine the posts’ likelihood of omission from the users’ news feeds according to the experimental condition they were assigned to. No new posts were added to the users’ news feeds; the experiment only involved post omission. Finally, the paper makes clear that all posts were still accessible via the poster’s personal “timeline”, and that no personal private messages were affected by the experiment [?].

To summarize, user posts were analyzed for emotional content and used in the experiment to skew the prevalence of positive or negative posts in participants’ news feeds.

6.2.3.2 What The Data Use Policy Authorized

What did Facebook users approve of by agreeing to Facebook’s Data Use Policy?

In May 2012, Facebook amended its Data Use Policy, adding a line stating that user data may be used “for internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, *research* and service improvement” [?]. Prior to this amendment, which was made *four months* after the “emotional contagion” experiment was conducted, there was no mention of research in the document.

A number of critics of the experiment refer to the updated Data Use Policy without stating that this line did not appear in the document when the experiment was conducted [?]. Thomas Leeper, in his analysis on the ethics of the experiment, argues that agreeing to the policy gives Facebook permission to use user data as long as it is “de-identified”, a statement he justifies with the following line from the policy: “we don’t share information we receive about you with others unless we have: received your permission; given you notice, such as by telling you about it in this policy; *or* removed your name and any other personally identifying information from it” [20]. While the data was analyzed in an anonymous fashion, Leeper’s defense leaps to

authorizing Facebook to “use [user] data however [it] want[s]” even though this line only authorizes sharing of anonymous data. While the previously mentioned line regarding research may have provided such authorization, the latter does not address usage outside of sharing anonymous data, and therefore does not constitute official approval of the experiment by users.

6.2.4 Other Means of Authorization

If the Data Use Policy did not provide official approval at the time of the study, was there some other way Facebook gained approval for the use of user posts in the experiment?

One way to gain approval for the experiment would be to request it directly from the participants. However, as discussed in section 6.1.3.2, Facebook did not provide explicit notification of participation in the experiment. Even if participants had been notified, though, such notification would only have been relevant to participants’ data. Because the experiment involved filtering posts from the participants’ friends, Facebook would have needed approval from non-participants as well. Because notification of the experiment was not provided to either the participants or their friends (see Section 6.1.3.2), Facebook could not have gotten approval for the experiment from them directly.

6.2.5 Conclusion

The researchers behind Facebook’s “emotional contagion” study used user data for the purposes of research and experimentation, and they cited Facebook’s Data Use Policy as informed consent. Though this document may have constituted official approval for the use of user posts in the experiment, provisions for use in research were not added until four months after the experiment was conducted; no mention of research was made in the document at the time the experiment was conducted. In addition, no notification of the experiment was provided to participants or other users whose posts were used for the purposes of

the experiment; the Data Use Policy was the only document through which Facebook attempted to gain approval for the use of user posts. Because this document did not mention research or experimentation at the time of the study, it did not sufficiently gain this approval. The experiment therefore used user data in ways not officially approved by the user, and was in violation of the domain specific rule derived above from tenet 2.03 of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics.

6.3 Tenet 2.05: Privacy

Tenet 2.05 of the SE Code of Ethics requires software engineers to “keep private any confidential information gained in their professional work, where such confidentiality is consistent with the public interest and consistent with the law” [17].

6.3.1 Definitions

6.3.1.1 Keeping Private

In the context of digital data, privacy “deals with the ability an ... individual has to determine what data in a computer system can be shared with third parties” [15]. More generally, privacy is “the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people” [8]. These definitions suggest that to “keep private” is to “maintain freedom from observation by other people”.

6.3.1.2 Confidential Information

Something that is “confidential” can also be considered “secret or private” [4]. Given the above definition of privacy, “confidential information” means information of which access to third parties is determined by the owner of the information. Because data is information [6], and data is the relevant information in social media, “confidential information” means “data that is intended to be accessed only with permission of the

owner”. As discussed in Section 6.2.1.1, the relevant data is a user’s social media posts, and the owner is the user who generated that data. Because Facebook’s privacy settings provide users with the opportunity to decide who has permission to see their posts [1], “data that is intended to be accessed only with the permission of the owner” includes social media posts. Therefore, “confidential information” includes “social media posts”.

6.3.1.3 Professional Work

Something that is “professional” “relat[es] to a job that requires special education, training, or skill” [9]. Because “a software engineer is a licensed professional engineer” [13], “work done in a software engineering job” can be considered “professional work”. Because the Facebook researchers are software engineers (see Section 4), the “emotional contagion experiment” is the relevant professional work.

6.3.1.4 Public Interest

“Public interest”, though a nebulous concept, is defined as “the welfare or well-being of the general public” [10]. Without getting into too much detail, “public interest” is “the welfare of the general public”.

6.3.2 Domain Specific Rule

In the domain of social media research, tenet 2.05 requires software engineers to “maintain freedom from observation by other people any social media posts gathered during the ‘emotional contagion’ experiment, where such confidentiality is consistent with the welfare of the general public and consistent with the law”.

6.3.3 Discussion

6.3.3.1 What Was Gathered During the Experiment?

As mentioned in Section 6.2.3.1, social media posts were gathered for the 689,003 users who

were involved in the experiment. These posts include those made by the participant users, but also users they are connected to whose posts were filtered by the news feed algorithm. This amounted to a total of roughly 3 million posts [?].

6.3.3.2 Who Observed the Data?

Also mentioned in Section 6.2.3.1, the “emotional contagion” paper states that posts were analyzed by the “Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC2007) word counting system” for the presence of positive or negative content, and that “no text was seen by the researchers” [?]. As mentioned in 6.1.3.2, James Grimmelman agrees that “automated data processing is a meaningful way of avoiding privacy harms to research subjects” in spite of his criticism of the study [19]. Because the users’ posts were analyzed by software and not seen by people, the researchers did “maintain freedom from observation by other people” with regards to social media posts.

6.3.3.3 Welfare of the General Public and the Law

If the researchers complied with the domain specific rule in maintaining the privacy of user data, are there any reasons why this was not consistent with the public good or the law?

Experimental psychology is defined as “the branch of psychology dealing with the study of *emotional... activity... in humans... by means of experimental methods*” [7]. Because the “emotional contagion” experiment studied emotional activity, it can be considered a psychological experiment. The American Psychological Association has a code of ethics that addresses disclosure of confidential information. The APA Ethical Standard 4.05 justifies the disclosure of confidential information when permitted or mandated by law, or for valid purposes such as protection of “the client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm” [14]. This standard also states that “the

legal duty [of disclosure] is based upon a clinical assessment”.

Would observation of the user data have protected anybody from harm? The users’ posts were only analyzed for the purposes of finding positive or negative content, and the analysis was only used to tag posts as positive or negative for omission from the news feed. Because of this, researchers could not have been able to determine whether posts demonstrated a risk of harm to anybody. Furthermore, as the data was not assessed by the researchers, there could not have been any legal duty to disclose information.

6.3.4 Conclusion

The Facebook researchers who conducted the “emotional contagion” experiment gathered roughly 3 million social media posts for the purposes of the experiment. The domain specific rule derived above from tenet 2.05 of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics mandates protection of this data from being observed by other people unless justified by the interests of the public good or the law. Because the data was analyzed by software without being seen by people, it was successfully protected from observation. Furthermore, because the posts were not assessed, no legitimate risk of harm could have been found to justify the disclosure of the data as consistent with the welfare of the general public or the law. Therefore, the experiment was conducted in compliance with the domain specific rule, and tenet 2.05 from which it was derived.

known to the participants according to tenet 1.04. Because participation in the study was not made known to the participants, they could not have been aware of these risks. In addition, this lack of notification shows that the participants could not have given official approval for the use of their data in the experiment, as required by tenet 2.03. Though Facebook claims the Data Use Policy is sufficient for gathering this approval, the document did not mention research until four months after the study, and therefore could not have gathered official approval at the time of the experiment. Finally, because the posts were analyzed by software and were not seen by the researchers, the privacy of confidential information (users’ posts) was maintained in accordance with tenet 2.05. As no assessment was made of the data, there could not have been justification for disclosure according to the welfare of the general public or the law.

6.4 Conclusions of Analysis

To summarize the conclusions of the prior analysis, the “emotional contagion” experiment conducted by Facebook researchers was in violation of tenets 1.04 and 2.03 of the Software Engineering Code of Ethics, but was in compliance with tenet 2.05. The researchers had sufficient evidence for potential risks of anxiety to participants, and were required to make those risks

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