# DNS / DNSSEC / DANE / DPRIVE @ IETF 93 Hackathon

July 18-19
Prague, Czech
Republic




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
# **Answering 3 Questions**

- How can you be sure the information you get out of DNS is the same info the domain operator put in to DNS? (DNSSEC)
- How do you know you are using the correct TLS certificate? (DANE/DNSSEC)
- How can you protect the confidentiality of your DNS queries from surveillance? (DPRIVE)


**Attacking DNS** 



## The Global Chain of Trust



### The Two Parts of DNSSEC




#### DANE

- RFC 6698
- Adds TLS certificate (fingerprint or entire cert) as a DNS record – and signs that with DNSSEC
- Apps can then verify via DNSSEC that this is correct cert (or CA) to use
- Being used now between email servers, XMPP servers, plugins for browsers
- Concept expanded to S/MIME certs, OpenPGP

# DNS PRIVate Exchange (DPRIVE)

- Protecting the confidentiality of DNS queries
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dprive/ charter/
- Focused on communication between DNS clients (i.e. stub resolvers) and DNS iterative resolvers
- Solutions include sending DNS queries over TLS or DTLS

## Summary – What We Are Working On



**TRUST IN TLS - DANE** 

INTEGRITY – DNSSEC CONFIDENTIALITY - DPRIVE

### **IETF 93 Hackathon Ideas**

#### DNSSEC

- Stats and reliability testing improving tools to help gather data about roadblock avoidance.
- Tools to help ease / automate deployment
- Support for new algorithm types (ex. ECDSA) in tools/interfaces

#### DANE

- Portable tool for creating and adding DANE RR's to zones
- Measurement of DANE deployment
- Adding DANE support to different tools and interfaces

#### DPRIVE

- Explore mechanisms to authenticate server certificates used in DNS-over-TLS (Unbound, getdns)
- Enhancements to the implementation of DNS-over-TLS in Unbound e.g.
  - TCP connection re-use/TLS session resumption
  - Configuration options for TLS versions and supported cipher suites
  - Transport fallback if TLS/STARTTLS not available

## Join Us!

 Help us make DNS (and the Internet) more secure and private!

#### Champions:

- Dan York, Internet Society york@isoc.org
- Allison Mankin, Verisign Labs <u>amankin@verisign.com</u>
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