

Aggregate Implications of Child-Related Transfers with Means Testing*

Darapheak Tin[†]

Australian National University

Chung Tran[‡]

Australian National University

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Abstract

Should government transfers to families with children be means-tested? We revisit this question and provide new insights from the unique Australian policy context, where means-testing is widely adopted to determine eligibility and benefits for child-related transfers. Using the Australian household survey data, HILDA (2001-2020), we document the significant role of these transfers and distinct life cycle patterns of female labor supply and earnings in Australia. We then build a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations model of single and married households to quantify the aggregate and redistributive implications of the current means-tested child-related transfer programs and alternative designs. Our findings reveal complex trade-offs among efficiency, overall welfare, and equity in designing an effective child-related transfer system. Specifically, we demonstrate the significant adverse effects of means-testing on work incentives and human capital development among women. A structural reform replacing the status quo means-tested system with a universal system improves efficiency and overall welfare, and garners majority support. However, the new regime increases tax burden and leads to unintended welfare consequences for single mothers—the intended beneficiaries—by reducing their lifetime take-home income and consumption. Adjusting the universal benefit rates does not resolve these inequities and may undermine government support for those in need. In contrast, incremental reforms to the current means-tested system, by relaxing the taper rate of the Child Care Subsidy (CCS) program, can enhance efficiency and achieve a fair distribution of welfare gains, albeit with modest aggregate improvements.

JEL: E62, H24, H31

Keywords: Child-Related Transfers; Means-Testing; Universal Transfers; Female Labor Supply; Welfare; Dynamic General Equilibrium

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[†]Research School of Economics, Australian National University, email: darapheak.tin@anu.edu.au

[‡]Research School of Economics, Australian National University, email: chung.tran@anu.edu.au

1 Introduction

Governments in advanced economies implement child benefit policies to support low-income families with dependent children, namely child-related transfers, but the structures of these policies vary significantly, leading to debates in academic research and policy making spheres. The transfers—including lump-sum cash transfers, child care subsidies, and child tax credits, just to name a few—are typically either universal or means-tested. In practice, the OECD countries generally adopt the means testing approach, though they may vary in terms of their definition of means, and auxiliary test instruments such as demographic and socioeconomic criteria.

Australia, in particular, has two major government transfer programs supporting households with dependent children, namely Family Tax Benefit (FTB) - direct lump-sum transfers; and Child Care Subsidy (CCS) - subsidies to the formal child care cost. Unlike many other OECD countries, Australia has a history of running a comprehensive means-tested transfer system with the following prominent features: (i) all child benefits are strictly means-tested using joint household income and demographic criteria including marital status, and number and age of children; (ii) no market work requirements for receiving lump-sum cash transfers; and (iii) no child tax credits for working parents.¹

Means testing is the central policy tool for delivering benefits to families in need (extensive margin) and controlling expenditure (intensive margin). However, it can potentially produce significant disincentives to work and save, leading to unintended efficiency and welfare losses. For these reasons, questions pertaining to how to improve existing child-related transfer systems and/or design a new optimal system have been a subject of macro and public finance literature. Previous studies (e.g., [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2020](#)) mainly focus on the economic impact of child-related transfers in the US policy settings. In this paper, we aim to contribute to that literature new insights from a study of the Australian policy design and reforms.²

To do so, we first provide empirical evidence on child-related transfers, female labor supply and earnings over the life cycle in Australia, utilizing data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey from 2001 to 2020. We emphasize three key empirical facts: (i) child-related transfers are important for low income parents; (ii) the labor supply profiles of mothers feature distinct patterns, such as the M-shaped full-time employment share, differentiating them from men and childless women; and (iii) significant earning discrepancies exist between mothers and non-mothers. To explain the economic mechanisms underlying these findings, we formulate a simple partial equilibrium model and demonstrate how integrating means testing into a child-related transfer program impacts labor supply decisions.

We next develop a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring overlapping generations of single and married households. These households face income and longevity risks, time and monetary costs of raising children, and unequal access to child-related transfers due to means testing. Our model includes household heterogeneity in several dimensions, including marital and parental status, number and age of children, asset holdings, education, human capital, and uninsurable individual income shocks. Married households make joint decisions about female workforce participation, consumption,

¹Australia has run a means-tested child-related transfer system since the introduction of the New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999. The UK introduced income test into its child-related benefit after the High Income Child Benefit Charge 2013. The United States used income test to phase out child tax credits for high income families in the American Rescue Plan Act 2021.

²Disincentives to work embedded in the current design of the Australian tax and transfer system have been highlighted in government policy review papers (e.g., [Treasury 2023](#) and [Treasury 2024](#)).

and savings throughout the life cycle. We discipline our benchmark model using macroeconomic aggregates and household microdata from Australia. The calibrated model serves as a laboratory for quantitatively assessing the benefits of the existing system and the effects of potential reforms on female labor supply, macro aggregates, and welfare gains or losses across different groups. We analyze these impacts by adjusting policy parameters related to child-related transfers and employing income tax as a government budget-balancing tool, while holding other policy and structural parameters at their initial steady-state values.

We begin by examining the benefits of the status quo child-related transfer system through three counterfactual policy experiments: (i) abolishing the Family Tax Benefit (FTB) program, (ii) abolishing the Child Care Subsidy (CCS), and (iii) eliminating both FTB and CCS. The first and third experiments show that removing these programs can generate output gains due to increased female workforce participation and human capital accumulation, albeit at a welfare and equity cost. For instance, the third experiment results in significant efficiency gains with a relatively small welfare loss. However, these changes adversely impact single mothers, who lack family insurance and face limited options for self-insuring against future earnings shocks due to the costs associated with child care.

The second experiment, eliminating the CCS alone, proves detrimental; it results in a lose-lose scenario. Without the CCS, there is a noticeable decrease in labor supply and human capital, while simultaneously expanding the FTB program. This expansion increases the tax burden, negating any tax relief from the removal of the CCS and leading to moderate welfare losses. Essentially, while the FTB serves a government insurance role in the absence of the CCS, its beneficial welfare effects are outweighed by the resulting lower disposable income for the average household.

Our findings highlight the classic trade-offs among efficiency, overall welfare, and equity inherent in our model. Overall, the negative welfare and equity impacts of removing one or both programs are predominant. Based on these results, we conclude that maintaining child-related transfers is socially desirable within our framework.

We then explore whether a universal program is a more effective mechanism for delivering child benefits in terms of aggregate efficiency, overall welfare, and the distribution of welfare changes across household groups. We propose a radical reform that involves abolishing all means-testing and making FTB (Family Tax Benefit) and CCS (Child Care Subsidy) universally available to all households with children, while keeping the benchmark benefit levels and the demographic criteria stated in program description and formulae in Appendix B. Our findings suggest that the baseline means-testing creates significant work disincentives as phase-out/taper rates raise the effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs). Specifically, the reform leads to improvements in both aggregate efficiency and overall welfare, and is favored by the majority of households, who experience welfare gains under the universal system. However, the welfare effects vary across groups for two main reasons. First, while the universal system eliminates some drawbacks of means-testing, it does not contain fiscal costs. The universalized FTB and CCS significantly increase public spending on these programs, necessitating much higher income taxes to balance the government budget. Second, the reform negatively affects the formation of human capital among female workers throughout their life cycles, leading to a reduction in their lifetime earnings as the loss of human capital accumulates over time. These two forces combine to reduce the welfare of single mothers—the intended beneficiaries. As child-related benefits rapidly decline and eventually cease as children age, these mothers face inadequate income replacements, ultimately experiencing welfare losses.

In our extension, we examine alternative designs of a universal child-related transfer system by varying the benefit payment rate. We find that deviating from the baseline payment rates neither addresses the issue of inequity nor achieves the program's aim of benefiting all parents. On one hand, scaling up the universal program entails a heavy tax burden, exacerbating financial strain on single mothers, as previously explained. On the other hand, reducing benefits alleviates this tax burden on single households but negatively impacts low-education married households. The latter group often faces family size and early parenthood challenges, which limit their ability to self-insure via work, and the model's credit constraint assumption prevents them from borrowing against future earnings. Consequently, low-income parents exhibit high marginal utilities of consumption early in life, underscoring the need for government transfers to ease their constraints and allow them to better smooth their life cycle consumption. A reduced universal payment fails to fulfill this role.

We also extend our analysis to include incremental reforms to the existing child-related transfer system, specifically examining changes to four policy variables: FTB and CCS payment rates, and their respective taper rates. Our findings reveal trade-offs between efficiency and welfare in most settings. A notable exception is when the CCS taper rates are relaxed (halved), which brings about efficiency gains and moderate improvements in welfare for all households. While this redesigned means-tested system improves efficiency and welfare without compromising equity, the aggregate welfare gain is relatively smaller, and married households, who constitute the majority, benefit less compared to what a universal system could offer. As a result, the baseline universal child-related transfer system would still garner more support if both policy options were presented.

Thus, our quantitative investigation, from a life cycle perspective, highlights the complexity of trade-offs among efficiency, overall welfare and equity in designing an effective child-related transfer system. While means-testing is indeed an important tool for delivering benefits to targeted groups, the universal system appears to be a more effective approach for enhancing overall efficiency and welfare.

Related literature. This paper is related to a strand of literature on female labor supply (e.g., see [Baker, Gruber and Milligan 2008](#); [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2012a](#); [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2012b\)](#); [Bick 2016](#); [Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln 2018](#)). [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2012a\)](#) and [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2012b\)](#), for instance, model the joint labor supply of married couples and explore the disincentive effect of joint-taxation in the US. [Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln 2018](#) study the implications of taxation on work hour differences between married men and women across 17 European countries and the US. Recent developments also focus on the joint benefits of social security (e.g., [Kaygusuz 2015](#); [Nishiyama 2019](#); [Borella, De Nardi and Yang 2020](#)) and child-related transfers in the US (e.g., [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2020](#)). Our paper contributes to this growing literature new insights from the Australian policy context, where income is taxed separately but child-related transfers are strictly means-tested based on joint family income. Different from [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2020\)](#), the means-tested transfer system in our model economy does not yield better welfare outcomes than a universal transfer system. Methodologically, we extend the model used by [Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura \(2020\)](#) to incorporate male and female earnings and mortality risks, and consider a broader range of counterfactual policy experiments.

This study also contributes to the literature on means-tested social insurance (e.g., [Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995](#); [Feldstein 1987](#); [Neumark and Powers 2000](#); [Tran and Woodland 2014](#); [Braun, Kopecky and Koreshkova 2017](#)). Their findings highlight that while means-testing can distort incentives to work and save, it can be useful for balancing the insurance and incentive trade-offs,

potentially improving overall welfare. We extend this literature and demonstrate similar mechanisms at work for government transfers to families with dependent children. Moreover, we show that even though a universal system is an overall improvement to the means-testing approach and is favored by the majority, it can still mask undesirable redistributive effects that undermine policy objectives.

Finally, our paper relates to the empirical literature on labor supply in Australia (e.g., see [Dorion and Kalb 2005](#); [Breunig et al. 2011](#); [Breunig, Gong and King 2012](#); [Gong and Breunig 2017](#); [Iskhakov and Keane 2021](#); [Herault and Kalb 2022](#)). Motivated by these micro/empirical findings, we build a structural macro model to study the implications for macroeconomic aggregates and welfare. Additionally, our work adds to the growing body of research on the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies in Australia, as seen in works by [Tran and Woodland 2014](#), [Kudrna, Tran and Woodland 2022](#), [Tran and Zakariyya 2022](#), and [Tin and Tran 2023](#).

The paper hereinafter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts. Section 3 discusses a simple theoretical model constructed for intuitions. Section 4 gives a full description of the dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 5 reports the internal and external calibration procedures, and the benchmark economy's performance. Section 6 discusses selected counterfactual experiments, and Section 7 provides an extended analysis, including incremental reforms. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix provides additional results and descriptive statistics, detailed information on the child-related transfer programs, and the algorithm to solve the model.

2 Child-related transfers and life cycle labor supply in Australia

In this section, we outline the institutional features of the two child-related transfer programs, alongside selected empirical life cycle labor supply facts based on the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey Restricted Release 20 (2001-2020) and the 2021 Child Care Package Evaluation by [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#).

2.1 Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and Child Care Subsidy (CCS) programs

Transfers directed towards families with dependent children, or child-related transfers, in Australia accounted for between 2-2.5 of GDP over the past decade. Two primary programs take center stage: the Family Tax Benefit (*FTB*) and the Child Care Subsidy (*CCS*), which together constitute 70% of the total child-related transfer expense. These programs are highly targeted with emphasis on supporting low-income, single-earner couple parents and single parents. The support is administered through a range of instruments, including strict means-testing of joint and secondary earner incomes, and adjustable payment rates and income-test thresholds that vary according to the number and age of dependent children.

The FTB consists of two parts. The FTB part A (FTB-A) assesses joint family income, with maximum and base payments per child increasing with the number of dependent children. The FTB part B (FTB-B) provides extra support to single parents and single-earner couple parents. It tests the primary earner's income to determine eligibility (extensive margin) and secondary earner's income to adjust payments and taper rates (intensive margin). The FTB-B benefit is paid per family, and similar to the FTB-A, families having younger children receive higher payments.³

³Appendix B gives a comprehensive breakdown of the two programs, including benefit calculation methods, qualification criteria, and how payment rates vary based on marital and parental statuses, the number and age of children,




Figure 1: **FTB-A recipients in 2018 by income (left panel) and wealth (right panel) deciles**

The FTB-A The proportion of households receiving the FTB-A (out of all households observed in the survey data) has fallen from 10% in 2001 to slightly over 5% in 2020, as shown in Figure B.3. This can be attributed, in part, to threshold-creep (inflation pushing incomes above the income-test threshold) and a falling birth rate.⁴ Despite the overall decline, the benefit remains concentrated among low-income families. The left panel of Figure 1 indicates that a sizeable fraction of households in the first six income deciles, up to 15 for the median households, received the FTB-A in 2018. Surprisingly, possibly due to the absence of assets test, relatively wealthy households also met the eligibility criteria from the benefit, as portrayed in the right panel.⁵ Nonetheless, Figure 8 on life cycle facts indicates that the share of FTB is inconsequential for those in the third income quintile.




Figure 2: **FTB-A payment rates per child: Base rate (left panel) and maximum rate (right panel)**

At the intensive margin, the FTB-A alone represents a significant sum of inflation-indexed trans-

and household income.

⁴The base thresholds for FTB-A, which determines the benefit phase-out zone, are not indexed to inflation. Throughout the latter half of the 2010s, thresholds for maximum and base payments hovered around \$50,000 and \$95,000 (current AUD), respectively. Within the same period, the taper rates stood at about 0.2 for maximum payments and 0.3 for base payments (see Figure B.1 and Figure B.2).

⁵Household wealth is defined as its net worth where net worth is total assets net of total debts. Total assets contain the following components: (i) financial assets (e.g., own and joint bank accounts, children's bank accounts, superannuation, cash investments, equity investments, trust funds, and life insurance), and non-financial assets (e.g., property assets, home asset, other property assets, business assets, collectibles, and vehicles). Total debts comprise credit card debt, joint credit cards, own credit cards, student debt (HECS), other personal debt, business debt, property debt, home debt, other property debt, and overdue household and bills.

fers. Despite the intricacy, both panels of Figure 2 illustrate that there have been minimal changes to the base and maximum statutory payment rates for children under 18 since 2004. Qualified families with a child aged 13-15 could receive up to \$7,000, while the maximum rate for children aged 12 or younger is slightly lower, still exceeding \$5,500. Given that payments are allocated per child, the average two-children family could receive up to \$14,000. Moreover, Figure B.3 in the Appendix shows that the benefits delivered to eligible families have been rising. The average FTB-A payout increased from \$8,000 to \$8,500 (2018 AUD) over the past decade. Additionally, because the scheme predominantly targets single-earner families, especially single parents, single parent households claimed higher benefits on average compared to couple parent households, as seen in Figure B.4.




Figure 3: **FTB-B payment rates per family by age of the youngest child in the family**

The FTB-B Figure 4 and Figure B.3 in the Appendix indicate that the majority of FTB-A households also claimed the FTB-B. Although the FTB-A is the larger of the two benefits, the FTB-B offers a non-trivial amount. As shown in Figure 3, the FTB-B payment remained steady at approximately \$4,500 (2018 AUD) for eligible families whose youngest child is under 5 years of age, and \$3,200 if their youngest child is between 5 and 18 years old.




Figure 4: **Fractions of FTB-B recipients (Left panel) and average FTB-B payment per family (right panel) by marital status**

Compared to the 2000s and the first half of 2010s, the fraction of partnered FTB-B households

dropped by nearly 50% by 2018 (see left panel Figure 4). This could be partially explained by factors similar to those affecting the FTB-A, such as fertility trends and threshold creep. For the FTB-B in particular, the recent drop in couple recipients can also be attributed to the \$150,000 (current AUD) income-test threshold for primary earners introduced in 2009, and the subsequent tightening in 2016 as the threshold decreased further to \$100,000. These stricter measures, which complemented the existing test on secondary earners, significantly reduced the claimant pool. However, because the primary earner's income test exclusively determines eligibility (controlling the extensive margin), it had no discernible effect on the payment rate. The right panel of Figure 4 demonstrates that in 2020, eligible single parents could still expect to receive over \$3,500 in 2018 AUD, while couple parents could expect just under \$3,000 — similar to the amount they would receive in 2005.

The CCS The CCS program is the core product of the ‘2018 Child Care Package reform’ that involved significant additional government expenditure. The CCS subsidizes the cost of formal child care services—including out-of-school hours care (OSHC) for children up to 13 years old—and is paid directly to service providers. Subsidy rates are determined through means testing based on family income. A distinctive feature of the CCS, setting it apart from the FTB, is the activity test on secondary earner’s work hours to adjust the income-test-based subsidy rate. Parents who work, or engage in recognized activities such as training or volunteering for 48 hours or more per fortnight can receive subsidies covering up to 85% of the formal child care costs. The income-test-based subsidy rate is adjusted down as work hours fall.

According to [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#), out of the 1,131,177 families recorded using child care in the 2018-19 financial year, a substantial 75—with family earnings below \$171,958—qualified for at least a 50% subsidy rate. This group comprised 96.9% of single-parent families and 70.1 of couple-parent families. The distribution of effective subsidy rates further underscores the program’s broad impact: approximately 32% of the families received a subsidy rate between 75-95%, 43% received between 50-75%, 18% received a rate under 50%, and a small remainder received no subsidy at all. These patterns indicate that the CCS program delivers benefits to the majority of child care users.




Figure 5: **Proportion of hours paid for that are unsubsidized by gross family income decile in 2018-19 financial year.**

Notes: This figure uses data from Table 31 in [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#). The lowest decile earned at most \$31,399. The top decile earned \$240,818 or more.

Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of unsubsidized child care hours, highlighting the program’s

expansive coverage. Excluding the top decile, a significant majority of families received fully subsidized child care. Case in point, between 50-55 of families situated around the median income received full subsidies. The prevalence of those with at least one hour of unsubsidized child care increases among families in the lower deciles, likely due to the work activity requirement, yet approximately 40% of families in the bottom decile still enjoyed full subsidies. Additionally, even among families with at least one unsubsidized child care hour, provided that they were not in the top income bracket (i.e., annual earnings above \$240,818), the average unsubsidized hours did not exceed 20% of their total child care hours.




Figure 6: Child Care Subsidy rates and Mean Benefits (Subsidies) by income decile.

Notes: This figure uses data from Table 61 in [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#). The lowest decile earned at most \$31,399. The top decile earned \$240,818 or more.

The above statistics suggest that a substantial proportion of families across a broad income range benefited from the CCS. One might suspect that high-income families received smaller subsidies due to the decreasing statutory rates with higher incomes. However, the distribution of the average benefits from Figure 6 suggests otherwise. It demonstrates the significance of the CCS benefits (in absolute magnitude) for recipients at all income levels.

The average annual benefits were well above \$7,000 for those at or below the median income, and for the lowest decile—those earning less than \$31,399—in particular, the benefits constitute at least 20% of their gross earnings. In the same figure, we observe that the subsidy rate exhibits a progressive trend, decreasing as income increases, yet high-income families (excluding the top income) still received notable benefits, approximately \$6,000. This substantial disbursement to better-off families may result from (i) the generous income-test thresholds, with a cut-out point above \$350,000 (more than the family income cut-off of \$240,818 to be in the tenth decile), and (ii) the activity test aiming at fostering workforce participation. In other words, families with higher income do receive a smaller hourly subsidy rate, but they can still receive substantial subsidies if the secondary earner works full-time.⁶ For the same reason, lower average benefits for the bottom-decile families than for their peers in the adjacent deciles may occur due to fewer work hours.

In summary, the FTB is a means-tested transfer with no labor market conditions, whereas the CCS

⁶According to [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#), families with an income in excess of \$186,958 face an annual cap of \$10,190 on the CCS per child. However, based on Table 28 in the report, only 1.7% of couple parents and 0.1% of single parents are estimated to have been affected by the cap. Among the affected couple parents, the vast majority are dual-earner families living in a capital city. Table 29 further shows that even when we consider the subset with income between \$186,958 (cap threshold) and \$351,247 (cut-out point of CCS), only 8.7% are impacted by the annual fee cap.




Figure 7: Proportion of children in child care by child age and FTB receipt.

Notes: This figure uses data from Figure 95 in [Bray et al. \(2021\)](#).

reduces formal child care costs for working parents. Furthermore, as evident in Figure 7 which shows child care usage by child age and FTB status, a significant portion of the FTB parents uses child care services. The usage profiles are roughly hump-shaped for both FTB and non-FTB recipients, with the greatest incidence of child care usage during the first 5 years post-birth. Single FTB parents, in particular, have the highest proportion of children in child care across all age groups. Since FTB and CCS benefits are not mutually exclusive, further investigation into their joint effects and potential reforms is warranted.

2.2 Empirical life cycle facts




Figure 8: Age profiles of FTB share of gross household income for the first three quintiles by family market income in 2018

Fact 1: Child-related transfers are important income sources. As described in the preceding subsection, average FTB payments have remained largely unchanged over the past two decades. Accompanying this fact is Figure B.8 which shows hump-shaped life cycle profiles of average FTB payments as a share of gross total income, peaking during the child-bearing and rearing years, and being most significant for the bottom two quintiles. In fact, for recipients in their late 20s to early 40s from the first and second quintiles, the FTB benefit comprises approximately one-third and one-fifth

of their gross total income, respectively. For the poorest households in particular, the FTB at its peak makes up over 40% of their total income.




Figure 9: Age profiles of labor force participation by key demographics (gender and parenthood). **Left:** fathers (solid) and childless men (dashed). **Right:** mothers (solid) and childless women (dashed).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data, and the oldest cohort is cohort 12 aged 75-94.

Fact 2: Distinct age-profiles of labor supply of mothers. The presence of dependent children correlates with distinct life cycle profiles of labor force participation and full-time employment for both men and women.⁷ As demonstrated in Figure 9, fathers consistently show higher workforce participation than their childless counterparts throughout their life cycle. The puzzle, however, concerns the participation of women. For the first 20 years of their adult lives, mothers participate in the workforce at lower rates than childless women. Specifically, up to age 35, only about 70% of young mothers are in the labor force, while the participation rate for childless women starts around 80 and peaks above 85 around age 30. This difference creates a 10 percentage point (*pp*) disparity in participation between the two groups, widening in their early 30s and narrowing again as both groups enter their early 40s, at which point their participation rates converge and follow a similar trajectory thereafter.

Figure 10 indicates that the life cycle profiles of full-time employment shares exhibit similar patterns. The full-time share profiles of fathers and non-fathers mirror their labor force participation profiles, and the divergence between mothers and non-mothers is even more pronounced. Note that, although the full-time share profile of childless women remains below that of childless men, both follow a hump-shaped trajectory. Conversely, the profile of mothers sketches a distinct M-shaped pattern, with the largest difference between mothers and non-mothers occurring between age 35 and 40. During this period, nearly 80% of working non-mothers have full-time jobs, contrasting sharply with just 45% of working mothers. While the disparity narrows with age, it never completely closes. There is a gradual recovery but the proportion of working mothers in full-time employment never reaches 60%, and the gap between mothers and non-mothers remains at approximately 10*pp* by age 65. Given the

⁷our definition of a parent is an individual with at least one dependent child, aligning with the model's definition of parenthood. An alternative definition, considering parents as those who have had a child regardless of the child's dependency or co-residence status (as in Figure D.3), makes the labor force participation gap between fathers and non-fathers negligible and that between mothers and non-mothers even more pronounced.




Figure 10: **Age profiles of full-time share of employment by key demographics (gender and parenthood).** **Left:** fathers (solid) and childless men (dashed). **Right:** mothers (solid) and childless women (dashed).

relatively stable workforce participation profile of mothers, the recession that creates the distinct M-shaped full-time share profile must have been driven largely by a transition from full-time to part-time employment. This is further corroborated by the similar evolution of parent and non-parent life cycle profiles of work hours from Figure D.1 in the Appendix, which shows that unlike childless women, who average 35-40 work hours per week for most of their working lives, mothers seldom exceed a 35-hour average.




Figure 11: **Age profiles of normalized weekly earnings (against age-21 worker's average earnings) by key demographics (gender and parenthood).** **Left:** fathers (solid) and childless men (dashed). **Right:** mothers (solid) and childless women (dashed).

Fact 3: Large earnings discrepancies between mothers and non-mothers. Figure 11 reports the age-profiles of weekly earnings relative to the average earnings of a 21-year-old worker. Non-parents, regardless of gender, display comparable trajectories over their life cycles. Their earnings profiles peak higher and exhibit flatter tails than those of parents. Although childless women generally earn less than their male peers, especially in the midst of their working lives, the greatest difference is observed between mothers and non-mother groups. Considering their smaller labor force participation, reduced full-time share of employment, and limited work hours during their prime working years, it is perhaps unsurprising that by age 45, mothers' average weekly earnings amount to

only half those of non-mothers at same age.⁸

3 A simple partial equilibrium model

In this section, we formulate a simple theoretical model to highlight how the inclusion of work subsidy and means-tested transfers, the central features of the child-related programs, can affect a woman's labor supply, her household consumption, and the economic efficiency and welfare.

Consider a representative couple-parent household making a static decision on joint consumption (c) and female labor supply (n^f). The husband's labor supply (n^m) is perfectly inelastic. Labor is awarded at a unit wage rate, and both spouses pay a flat tax rate of τ . For tractability, we simplify the two child-related transfer schemes as follows. First, we abstract from means-testing for the Child Care Subsidy (CCS), and assume the CCS subsidizes the secondary earner's labor earnings at a rate s . That is, $CCS = sn^f$. Second, we assume the Family Tax Benefit (FTB) is a single-tier means-tested program that assesses family income $n^m + n^f$, has the maximum payout of $\bar{t}r$, income-test threshold \bar{y} , and taper rate ω . More specifically, the FTB transfers are based on the payment schedule $FTB = \text{MAX} \{ \text{MIN} \{ \bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y}), \bar{t}r \}, 0 \}$.

The household problem is $\max_{c, n^f} \{ u(c, 1 - n^f) \}$ s.t. $c = (1 - \tau)(n^m + n^f) + CCS + FTB$. Let $u(c, 1 - n^f)$ denote a well-behaved utility function of consumption c and female leisure $1 - n^f$ such that the following properties $u' > 0$, $u'' < 0$, $\lim_{x \rightarrow 0} u' = \infty$, $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} u' = 0$ hold true for all its argument $x \in \{c, 1 - n^f\}$.

The means testing creates non-linearity in the budget constraint. We consider the three cases corresponding to three benefit payment zone (1), (2) and (3) as in Figure 12.⁹

Case (1)-Full benefit. $n^m + n^f \leq \bar{y}$: Family income is less than the threshold \bar{y} and the household receives the maximum FTB transfer, $\bar{t}r$

$$\begin{aligned} c &= (1 - \tau)(n^m + n^f) + sn^f + \bar{t}r \\ MRS &= \frac{u'_c}{u'_{1-n^f}} = \frac{1}{(1 - \tau + s)} \end{aligned}$$

Case (2)-Partial benefit. $n^m + n^f > \bar{y}$ and $\bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y}) > 0$: Family income is in the phase-out zone and the household receives a partial FTB transfer, $\bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y})$

$$\begin{aligned} c &= (1 - \tau)(n^m + n^f) + sn^f + \bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y}) \\ MRS &= \frac{u'_c}{u'_{1-n^f}} = \frac{1}{(1 - \tau - \omega + s)} \end{aligned}$$

Case (3)-No benefit. $n^m + n^f > \bar{y}$ and $\bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y}) \leq 0$: Family income is above the

⁸Figure D.4 in the Appendix confirms that the depressed earnings profile of mothers observed here is independent of marital status.

⁹We abstract from considering the kink at \bar{y} and the cut-out point. Depending on the household's budget constraint and preference, the kink might lead to a high density of households having income just below \bar{y} to maintain eligibility for maximum transfer $\bar{t}r$ (i.e., bunching).




Figure 12: An example means-tested Family Tax Benefit (FTB) schedule

Notes: The slope of the benefit schedule between \bar{y} and the cut-out point is the taper rate, ω .

cut-out point and the household receives no FTB transfer

$$c = (1 - \tau)(n^m + n^f) + sn^f$$

$$MRS = \frac{u'_c}{u'_{1-n^f}} = \frac{1}{(1 - \tau + s)}$$

Where $MRS := MRS_{c,1-n^f}$ is the marginal rate of substitution of female leisure for consumption (i.e., the price of consumption relative to leisure).

There are some notable observations. First, the household's budget constraint and MRS , and thus the effect of means-tested transfers, vary with family income ($n^m + n^f$). Across the three cases, transfers can affect labor decisions through two channels: (i) the direct income effect (IE) via the budget constraint, and (ii) combined income effect and substitution effect (SE) arising from distortions to MRS . Specific elements such as the total tax burden $\tau(n^m + n^f)$, subsidy sn^f , and transfer $\bar{t}r$ in Case (1), as well as $\bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y})$ in Case (2), are IE s that directly enter the household budget constraint. When the household receives full transfer $\bar{t}r$ as in Case (1) or no transfer at all as in Case (3), only τ and s contribute to the $EMTR$, distorting decisions at the margin. In Case (2), where there is a partial means-tested transfer, the taper rate ω adds to the $EMTR$, behaving as a tax on the joint family income above \bar{y} .

Second, if the household income falls within the FTB's phase-out zone, the $EMTR$ change from $\tau - s$ to $\tau + \omega - s$. Depending the strength of the taper rate ω , it can partially or completely counteract the work incentive effect of the subsidy s . Therefore, understanding the interaction between policies is crucial for analyzing household behavior.

Third, the policy parameter $\bar{t}r$, \bar{y} and ω , and the husband's income n^m can affect the wife's incentive to work. The household will receive benefit if $\bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y}) > 0$. This condition can be re-written as $n^f < \frac{\bar{t}r}{\omega} + \bar{y} - n^m$, which defines the upper bound of the wife's income zone over which the FTB applies. The term $\frac{\bar{t}r}{\omega} + \bar{y}$ determines the statutory cutout point of the benefit. All

else constant, raising the payment rate $\bar{t}r$, lowering the taper rate ω , or increasing the test threshold \bar{y} expands the FTB's coverage. Moreover, because the transfer assesses joint income, the effective cutout point is also influenced by the male labor income n^m . If n^m is sufficiently large, the family income may either be in the phase-out zone as in Case (2) or entirely outside the FTB eligibility zone as in Case (3). In the former case, the wife's labor decision at the margin will face a higher $EMTR$ due to the taper rate ω , while in the latter, the FTB is irrelevant for her decision. In contrast, if n^m is such that $n^m + n^f < \bar{y}$ as in Case (1), then female labor decision at the margin is not affected by ω but is still affected by the positive IE from $\bar{t}r$.

The discussion thus far is concerned primarily with the general characteristics of child-related transfers and how they can influence the representative household's decision making. To see more clearly the efficiency and welfare impacts, consider Case (2) and suppose the household's preference is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function: $u(c, 1 - n^f) = c^\nu(1 - n^f)^{1-\nu}$, where ν denotes the taste-for-consumption parameter. The associated first-order conditions and budget constraint give us the following expressions for n^f and $ln(u)$.

$$n^f = \alpha - \underbrace{\frac{1-\nu}{1-EMTR}}_{(a) \text{ price distortion}} \left[\underbrace{(1-\tau)n^m + FTB}_{(b) \text{ direct positive IE}} \right], \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} ln(u) &= \nu ln(\nu) + (1-\nu) ln(1-\nu) - \overbrace{(1-\nu) ln(1-EMTR)}^{(c) \text{ price distortion on leisure}} \\ &\quad + ln \left[\underbrace{(1-EMTR)}_{(d) \text{ price distortion}} + \underbrace{(1-\tau)n^m + FTB}_{(e) \text{ direct positive IE}} \right], \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $EMTR = \tau + \omega - s$ and $FTB = \bar{t}r - \omega(n^m + n^f - \bar{y})$. Welfare is defined as the utility $u := u(c, 1 - n^f)$, and female labor supply n^f is used as a proxy for efficiency.

We identify two main channels that affect efficiency and welfare. The first channel involves the direct positive IE —the male net income $(1 - \tau)n^m$ and the transfer FTB —that reduces efficiency, n^f , as seen in term (b) of Equation 1 and increases welfare, $ln(u)$, as in term (e) of Equation 2.

The second channel stems from the price distortion by the $EMTR$, represented by term (a) in Equation 1, and term (c) and (e) in Equation 2. The $EMTR$ adversely impacts efficiency. However, its effect on welfare is ambiguous. On one hand, its SE is such that household substitutes away from consumption towards leisure. As a result, for $0 < EMTR < 1$, a higher $EMTR$ in term (c) contributes positively to welfare, and its effect is weighted by the household's taste for leisure $(1 - \nu)$. On the other hand, the $EMTR$'s negative IE , represented by term (d), diminishes both consumption and leisure, thereby reducing welfare.

This simple theoretical exercise highlights potential channels through which child-related transfers may influence household decisions, efficiency and welfare. It also points to the significance of the financing mechanism of transfers as it affects the tax burden. Because the tax rate, τ , is a part of the price distortion and the direct IE in Equation 1 and 2, a high τ could mitigate or negate the intended positive effects of child-related transfers. This warrants further quantitative exploration in a General Equilibrium (GE) environment, with τ as an endogenous policy variable to maintain the public budget balance. Additionally, since the benefits and tax burdens vary across the socioeconomic and

demographic landscape—with parents of dependent children receiving benefits, while non-parents and working seniors bear the tax burden—this calls for a Heterogeneous-Agent framework with life cycle features to fully account for the redistributional implications of the child-related transfer program.

Motivated by the empirical facts and the analytical insights above, we build a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents to explore the efficiency, welfare, and equity implications of potential reforms to child-related transfer. We encapsulate the non-linearities introduced by means-tested benefits and consider realistic policy counterfactuals by integrating the actual FTB and CCS plans into our model. The next section details the quantitative environment.

4 A dynamic general equilibrium model

We study a small open economy model populated by a continuum of overlapping generations households, a competitive firm with CRS technology, and a government who commits to balancing its budget every period. Time begins at $t = 0$ when the model economy is at initial steady state, and ends at $t = T$. One model period corresponds to one year.

4.1 Demographics

Every period t , a new cohort of households aged $j = 1$ (equivalent to the real age of 21) enters the economy. Each adult member of gender $i \in \{m, f\}$ in a household born at time t survives each subsequent period $t + j - 1$ with a time-invariant conditional probability $\psi_{j,i}$, and can live to a maximum age $J = 80$ (i.e., $\psi_{J+1,i} = 0$). Individuals begin working at $j = 1$ and retire at age $J_R = 45$. The initial total number of households at time $t = 0$ is normalized to one. The model population grows at a constant rate, n .

Family structure. There are three types of family assigned at birth to households: (i) married couple with children ($\lambda = 0$), (ii) single childless men ($\lambda = 1$) and (iii) single mothers ($\lambda = 2$). Married households comprise a husband and wife of identical age and education. The marital status over the life cycle depends solely on survival probabilities, meaning a married household will become single if one of the spouses dies. Single households remain single until death. The model does not allow for divorce, marriage, or re-marriage after the initial assignment. The transition probabilities for family structure ($\pi_{\lambda_{j+1}|\lambda_j}$) is given by

$\pi_{\lambda_{j+1} \lambda_j}$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 0$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 1$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 2$
$\lambda_j = 0$	$\psi_{j+1,m}\psi_{j+1,f}$	$\psi_{j+1,m}(1 - \psi_{j+1,f})$	$(1 - \psi_{j+1,m})\psi_{j+1,f}$
$\lambda_j = 1$	0	$\psi_{j+1,m}$	0
$\lambda_j = 2$	0	0	$\psi_{j+1,f}$

Table 1: Transition probabilities of family structure

Children. Motherhood is a definite stage of life for every woman in the model. Children are deterministic and exogenous as we abstract from fertility choice. They do not contribute to the utility of their parents nor to the broader economy once they reach adulthood. Households have full information regarding the timing of children’s arrival, associated non-pecuniary and pecuniary child care costs, the FTB benefits per child, the CCS rates per hour worked, and the human capital gains (or losses) if the mother works (or stays at home). For simplicity, childcare quality and costs

for a child aged j_c are exogenous and uniform across all households. There is no informal care. All households have the same number of children, $\bar{n}_c = 2$, and child spacing is identical, although the timing of births varies by educational level. The firstborn arrives earlier for low-education (θ_L) and later for high-education (θ_H) households. Thus, the k^{th} child is born to every household aged $j = b_{k,\theta}$ and is dependent until the age of 18 (from $j = b_{k,\theta}$ to $j = b_{k,\theta} + 17$). Afterwards, they leave home permanently, ending the parent-child link. With these simplifications, the number of children a household aged j type θ has is $nc_{j,\theta} = \sum_{k=1}^{\bar{n}_c} \mathbf{1}_{\{b_{k,\theta} \leq j \leq b_{k,\theta} + 17\}}$.¹⁰

4.2 Preferences

Household preference is represented by a time-separable expected utility function

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \beta^{j-1} \left(\prod_{s=1}^{j-1} \pi_{\lambda_{s+1}|\lambda_s}, \right) u(c_j, l_j^m, l_j^f, \theta, \lambda_j),$$

where β is the time discount factor, c is the joint consumption, l^m is the leisure time of male, l^f is the leisure time of female, θ is the education level, and λ is the household type. We suppress the age subscript j to ease notation. The periodic household utility function for each household type can be written as follows

$$\begin{aligned} u(c, l^m, l^f, \theta, \lambda = 0) &= \frac{\left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{0,\theta}} \right)^\nu (l^m)^{1-\nu} \right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} + \left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{0,\theta}} \right)^\nu (l^f)^{1-\nu} \right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}}, \\ u(c, l^m, \theta, \lambda = 1) &= \frac{\left[(c)^\nu (l^m)^{1-\nu} \right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}}, \\ u(c, l^f, \theta, \lambda = 2) &= \frac{\left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{2,\theta}} \right)^\nu (l^f)^{1-\nu} \right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}}, \end{aligned}$$

where ν is the taste for consumption, γ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and $\iota_{\lambda,\theta} = \sqrt{\mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1\}} + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} + nc_\theta}$ is the consumption equivalence scale.

4.3 Endowments

Married and single men. Men always work full-time until retirement and earn labor income $y_{j,\lambda}^m = wn_{j,\lambda}^m e_{j,\lambda}^m$ where w is market wages, and $n_{j,\lambda}^m$ and $e_{j,\lambda}^m$ are exogenous labor supply and earning ability, respectively. Their intensive margin of labor supply $n_{j,\lambda}^m = 1 - l_{j,\lambda}^m$ is set at the normalized average work hours over working age. The earning ability $e_{j,\lambda}^m$ can be decomposed into a deterministic component \bar{e}_j and a stochastic shock ϵ_j^m

$$e_{j,\lambda}^m = \bar{e}_j(\theta, h_{j,\lambda}^m) \times \epsilon_j^m,$$

¹⁰Note that, we assume children and population growth are detached. The resource allocated to a child's upbringing also does not contribute to the future labor force productivity. Children and child care are exogenous and deterministic life event for all couples and single women. Because fertility is exogenous, making children affect the household utility, aside from the indirect effect through time cost on leisure, is not a necessary feature.

where $\bar{e}_j(\theta, h_{j,\lambda}^m) = e^\theta h_{j,\lambda}^m$ is a non-linear function of education θ and male human capital, $h_{j,\lambda}^m$. The stochastic shock ϵ_j^m is a first-order auto-regressive process

$$\overbrace{\ln(\epsilon_j^m)}^{=\eta_j^m} = \rho \times \overbrace{\ln(\epsilon_{j-1}^m)}^{=\eta_{j-1}^m} + v_j^m, \quad (3)$$

with a persistence parameter ρ and a white-noise disturbance $v_j^m \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$.

Married and single women. In addition to the joint consumption/savings decision, households make labor participation decision for their female members, choosing among three discrete choices: (i) exiting the labor force ($\ell = 0$), (ii) working part time ($\ell = 1$), or (iii) full time ($\ell = 2$). If a woman participates in the labor force, she will commit to an exogenous work hour plan $n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f$ that varies by her age, family and employment types. These decisions are shaped by the need to balance various work-related trade-offs to maximize household utility. These trade-offs, as detailed below, affect female labor supply behavior, their susceptibility to the insurance and incentive effects of the transfer schemes, and ultimately, how they respond to reforms in the counterfactual economies.

Benefits of working. If a woman works, she (i) *earns an income calculated as* $y_{j,\lambda}^f = w n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f e_{j,\lambda}^f$, (ii) *accumulates human capital for the next period* ($h_{j+1,\lambda}^f$), and (iii) *obtains child care subsidy per child of* sr_j if she meets the CCS eligibility criteria as outlined in Section 5.5. Her earning ability is

$$e_{j,h}^f = \bar{e}_j(\theta, h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f) \times \epsilon_j^f,$$

where the deterministic part $\bar{e}_j(\theta, h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f)$ is determined by her education θ and human capital $h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f$. As her male counterparts, the stochastic component ϵ_j^f is governed by an auto-regressive process: $\ln(\epsilon_j^f) = \rho \times \ln(\epsilon_{j-1}^f) + v_j^f$, with persistence parameter ρ and a white-noise disturbance $v_j^f \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$.

Different from the male earning ability, however, the female earning ability $e_{j,\lambda}^f$ contains an endogenously evolving human capital component over her life cycle according to the law of motion

$$\log(h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f) = \log(h_{j-1,\lambda,\ell}^f) + (\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell} - \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell} \times (j-1)) \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_{j-1} \neq 0\}} - \delta_\ell (1 - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_{j-1} \neq 0\}}), \quad (4)$$

where the human capital from working, i.e., $\ell \neq 0$, is gained at a diminishing rate over age j and is determined by the coefficient $\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell} - \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell} \times (j-1)$. δ_ℓ is the depreciation rate of human capital when not working, i.e., $\ell = 0$.¹¹

Costs of working. Labor force participation is costly. If a woman works, she (i) *incurs a formal child care cost per child* κ_j , (ii) *loses a portion or all of the means-tested FTB transfers*, and (iii) *sacrifices leisure on top of incurring a fixed time cost* χ_p *if she works part-time and* χ_f *if she works full-time*. More precisely, at any age j , her labor choice (ℓ) and family type (λ) affects her available

¹¹Human capital gains, such as experience and new skill acquisition, typically manifest as increased returns to labor. In this context, the law of motion employed in our model is more akin to a learning-by-doing human capital accumulation process, rather than an on-the-job training framework. Unlike learning-by-doing, on-the-job training requires an agent to actively invest in enhancing human capital by dividing her work time between productive activities and training. A significant challenge with this setup involves identifying returns to productive time in the data, as these are not directly observable in reality.

leisure time $l_{j,\lambda}^f$ in the following sense

$$l_{j,\lambda}^f = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if staying at home } (\ell = 0) \\ 0 < 1 - n_{j,\lambda,\ell=1}^f - \chi_p < 1 & \text{if working part time } (\ell = 1) \\ 0 < 1 - n_{j,\lambda,\ell=2}^f - \chi_f < 1 & \text{if working full time } (\ell = 2). \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

where χ_p and χ_f are fixed time costs associated with full-time and part-time work, respectively (with or without children).¹²

The decision for women to engage in the labor market therefore hinges on the interplay between these costs and benefits, shaped by child care costs, the consumption insurance and work incentive effects of the FTB and the CCS, and other factors such as human capital potential and family insurance (i.e., partner's labor earnings). These dynamics will be discussed in our main quantitative analysis in Section 6.

4.4 Technology

There is a representative firm with labor-augmenting technology A_t and a Cobb-Douglas production function $Y_t = K_t^\alpha (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha}$ that transforms capital K_t and total labor services L_t into output Y_t . Technology A_t grows at a rate g_t . The firm pays capital income tax τ_t^k , and chooses capital and labor inputs to maximize its profit, taking as given the capital rental rate $q_t = r_w + \delta_t$ and the wage rate w_t , where r_w is the world interest rate and δ_t is the depreciation rate of capital. Suppressing the time subscript t , the firm's problem is

$$\max_{K_t, L_t} (1 - \tau^k)(Y - wAL) - qK, \quad (6)$$

The firm's first-order conditions are:

$$r_w = (1 - \tau^k)\alpha \frac{Y}{K} - \delta, \quad (7)$$

$$w = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y}{AL} \quad (8)$$

4.5 Fiscal policy

We model key features of the Australian fiscal system including an income tax system, two means-tested transfer programs for families with children, and a means-tested pension program for retirees.

Progressive income tax. The government levies tax on individual labor and capital earnings via a progressive income tax schedule.¹³ Having a progressive tax mechanism in the model makes it possible to capture the extra distortions (or, lack thereof) when tax interacts with the child-related transfers at different pre-government income levels. For instance, in a tax-free or low-tax earnings

¹²We assume the time cost is a penalty on the wife's leisure in a perfectly altruistic household. Evidence from multiple sources, including an [ABS report on barriers and incentives to labor force participation](#), suggests child care responsibilities are more heavily weighted on mothers.

¹³Australia runs a separate tax filing system which treats individual, and not household, as the basic unit for income tax purpose.

zone of a progressive scheme, the FTB taper rate's effects could be less consequential compared to its effects under a proportional scheme.




Figure 13: **Estimates of average taxes by quantiles over time using the parametric tax function 9.**

Notes: To obtain the estimates, normalize \tilde{y} in the equation 9 by y_Q which corresponds to income at the Q^{th} quantile of the pre-government income distribution. When $\tilde{y} = y_Q$, it is easy to show that $(1 - \zeta)$ is the tax liability for the Q^{th} quantile. For further explanation, see the Appendix's Subsection B.4.

The taxable income for an individual $i \in \{m, f\}$ at age j is $\tilde{y}_{j,\lambda}^i$ which comprises labor income $y_{j,\lambda}^i$, and capital income ra_j if single or a half of joint capital income $\frac{ra_j}{2}$ if married. We can express $\tilde{y}_{j,\lambda}^i$ as $\tilde{y}_{j,\lambda}^i = y_{j,\lambda}^i + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda=0\}} \frac{ra_j}{2} + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 0\}} ra_j$. We approximate the tax schedule using a parametric tax function following Feldstein 1969; Benabou 2000; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante 2017. Suppressing the family type λ subscript and gender i superscript, the individual income tax payment is given by

$$tax_j = \max \left\{ 0, \tilde{y}_j - \zeta \tilde{y}_j^{1-\tau} \right\}, \quad (9)$$

where tax_j denotes the tax payment, ζ is a scaling factor, and τ is the parameter that controls the progressivity of the tax scheme. On one extreme end, if τ approaches infinity, tax_j approaches \tilde{y}_j implying 100% of the taxable income is taxed. At one extreme, if τ approaches infinity, tax_j approaches \tilde{y}_j , implying 100% of the taxable income is taxed. At the other extreme, if $\tau = 0$, then $tax_j = (1 - \zeta)\tilde{y}_j$, making $(1 - \zeta)$ is a flat tax rate. As τ increases (decreases), the MTR and ATR increase (decrease) for a given income level. We impose a non-negative tax restriction to exclude all government transfers in the form of negative income tax.

The government runs means-tested transfer schemes to support eligible parents with children. There are two main programs: Family Tax Benefit (part A and part B) and Child Care Subsidy. Below are simplified versions of the actual programs. For further details, we refer the interested readers to Appendix B.

Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTB-A). The FTB-A is paid per dependent child. The claimable amount depends on household combined taxable income, age and number of dependent children. The key policy parameters that determine the levels, kinks, and slopes of the FTB-A schedule are: (i) maximum and base payments per child, i.e., tr_j^{A1} and tr_j^{A2} , (ii) joint income test thresholds for the maximum and base payments, i.e., \bar{y}_{max}^{tr} and \bar{y}_{base}^{tr} , and (iii) taper rates for the maximum and base payments, i.e., ω_{A1} and ω_{A2} . That is, the FTB-A benefit per child, tr_j^A , received by a household is

given by

$$tr_j^A = \begin{cases} tr_j^{A1} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_{max}^{tr} \\ \max \left\{ tr_j^{A2}, tr_j^{A1} - \omega_{A1} (y_{j,\lambda} - \bar{y}_{max}^{tr}) \right\} & \text{if } \bar{y}_{max}^{tr} < y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_{base}^{tr} \\ \max \left\{ 0, tr_j^{A2} - \omega_{A2} (y_{j,\lambda} - \bar{y}_{base}^{tr}) \right\} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} > \bar{y}_{base}^{tr}, \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

where $y_{j,\lambda} = \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} y_{j,\lambda}^m + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1, \ell \neq 0\}} y_{j,\lambda}^f + r_{aj}$ denotes the household combined income.

Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTB-B). The FTB-B is paid per household to offer additional support to single parents and single-earner partnered parents with limited means. Similar to the FTB-A, the FTB-B is a function of age and number of dependent children. However, the eligibility and amount claimable are determined by marital status and separate tests on primary earner's and secondary earner's taxable income. Important policy parameters that determine the levels, kinks and slopes of the FTB-B benefit schedule are: (i) two maximum payments for families with children below age 5 or between age 5 and 18, i.e., tr_j^{B1} and tr_j^{B2} ; (ii) separate income test thresholds on primary and secondary earners, i.e., \bar{y}_{pe}^{tr} and \bar{y}_{se}^{tr} ; and (iii) a taper rate based on the secondary earner's taxable income, i.e., ω_B . Let $y_{pe} = \max(y_{j,\lambda}^m, y_{j,\lambda}^f)$ and $y_{se} = \min(y_{j,\lambda}^m, y_{j,\lambda}^f)$ denote primary earner's and secondary earner's taxable income, respectively. The amount of FTB-B received by a household, tr_j^B , is then given by

$$tr_j^B = \begin{cases} \Upsilon_1 \times tr_j^{B1} + \Upsilon_2 \times tr_j^{B2} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq \bar{y}_{pe}^{tr} \text{ and } y_{se} \leq \bar{y}_{se}^{tr} \\ \Upsilon_1 \times \max \left\{ 0, tr_j^{B1} - \omega_B (y_{se} - \bar{y}_{se}^{tr}) \right\} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq \bar{y}_{pe}^{tr} \text{ and } y_{se} > \bar{y}_{se}^{tr} \\ + \Upsilon_2 \times \max \left\{ 0, tr_j^{B2} - \omega_B (y_{se} - \bar{y}_{se}^{tr}) \right\} & \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

where $\Upsilon_1 = \mathbf{1}_{\{nc_{[0,4],j} \geq 1\}}$ and $\Upsilon_2 = \mathbf{1}_{\{nc_{[0,4],j} = 0 \text{ and } nc_{[5,18],j} \geq 1\}}$ are indicator variables, $nc_{[a,b],j}$ is the number of dependent children in the age range $[a, b]$ for households aged j .

Child care subsidy (CCS). The government also runs a child care subsidy program (CCS) to support the cost of formal child care for children aged 13 or younger. The CCS payment has a joint household income test, and is dependent on the age and number of dependent children. In addition, the CCS is conditional on work.¹⁴ Key parameters determining eligibility and rate of subsidy per child include (i) joint income test thresholds; i.e., $\{\bar{y}_1^{sr}, \bar{y}_2^{sr}, \bar{y}_3^{sr}, \bar{y}_4^{sr}, \bar{y}_5^{sr}\}$; (ii) fortnightly work hour test thresholds; i.e., $\{0, 8, 16, 48\}$; and (iii) taper rates; i.e., $\{\omega_c^1, \omega_c^3\}$. The CCS rate per child, sr , at age j is given by

$$sr_j = \Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n_{j,\lambda}^m, n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f) \times \begin{cases} sr_1 & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_1^{sr} \\ \max \{sr_2, sr_1 - \omega_c^1\} & \text{if } \bar{y}_1^{sr} < y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}_2^{sr} \\ sr_2 & \text{if } \bar{y}_2^{sr} \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}_3^{sr} \\ \max \{sr_3, sr_2 - \omega_c^3\} & \text{if } \bar{y}_3^{sr} \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}_4^{sr} \\ sr_3 & \text{if } \bar{y}_4^{sr} \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}_5^{sr} \\ sr_4 & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \geq \bar{y}_5^{sr}, \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

¹⁴Work is a more restrictive term used for our purpose. In practice, the CCS tests hours of recognized activities which comprise, among others, paid work (including self-employed), unpaid work in a family business, paid or unpaid leave, volunteering, and job seeking activities.

where $y_{j,\lambda} = \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} y_{j,\lambda}^m + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1, \ell \neq 0\}} y_{j,\lambda}^f + r a_j$ is the joint income and ω_c^i is the taper rate. $\Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n_{j,\lambda}^m, n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f)$ is the adjustment factor to the statutory subsidy rate through a work hour test on individual work hours if single or on the lower of the two spouses' hours if married. Let $n_j^{min} = \min\{n_{j,\lambda}^m, n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f\}$ be the household's minimum work hour. The adjustment factor is given by

$$\Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n_{j,\lambda}^m, n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f) = 0.24_{\{y_{j,\lambda} \leq AU\$70,015 \text{ and } n_j^{min} \leq 8\}} + 0.36_{\{8 < n_j^{min} \leq 16\}} + 0.72_{\{16 < n_j^{min} \leq 48\}} + 1_{\{n_j^{min} > 48\}}.$$

Otherwise, $\Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n_{j,\lambda}^m, n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f) = 0$.

Age pension. Age pension is means-tested, using income and assets tests, and independent of the contribution history. The pension is available to households upon having reached the age threshold $j = J_P$. Let $\mathcal{P}^a(a_j)$ be the claimable pension benefit based on the assets test

$$\mathcal{P}^a(a_j) = \begin{cases} p^{\max} & \text{if } a_j \leq \bar{a}_1^P \\ \max\{0, p^{\max} - \omega_a(a_j - \bar{a}_1)\} & \text{if } a_j > \bar{a}_1^P, \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

where p^{\max} is the maximum pension payment, \bar{a}_1^P is the assets test threshold and ω_a is its corresponding taper rate. Let $\mathcal{P}^y(y_{j,\lambda})$ be the claimable amount according to the income test

$$\mathcal{P}^y(y_{j,\lambda}) = \begin{cases} p^{\max} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_1^p \\ \max\{0, p^{\max} - \omega_y(y_{j,\lambda} - \bar{y}_1^p)\} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} > \bar{y}_1^p, \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

where \bar{y}_1^p is the income test threshold and ω_y is the income test taper rate. The amount of pension benefit, pen_j , received by a household is determined by

$$pen_j = \begin{cases} \min\{\mathcal{P}^a(a_j), \mathcal{P}^y(y_{j,\lambda})\} & \text{if } j \geq J_P \text{ and } \lambda = 0 \\ \frac{2}{3} \min\{\mathcal{P}^a(a_j), \mathcal{P}^y(y_{j,\lambda})\} & \text{if } j \geq J_P \text{ and } \lambda = 1, 2 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (15)$$

Government budget. The government at time t collects taxes on consumption, company profit and household income (T_t^C, T_t^K, T_t^I), and issues bonds ($B_{t+1} - B_t$) to meet its debt obligation ($r_t B_t$) and its commitment to three spending programs: (i) the general government purchase, G_t ; (ii) the family and child support programs (FTB and CCS), Tr_t ; and the age pension, \mathcal{P}_t . The inter-temporal government budget is given by

$$T_t^C + T_t^K + T_t^I + (B_{t+1} - B_t) = G_t + Tr_t + \mathcal{P}_t + r_t B_t \quad (16)$$

4.6 Market structure

Markets are incomplete. Households cannot insure against idiosyncratic labor income and mortality risks by trading state contingent assets. They can hold one-period risk-free assets to insure against these risks. We assume agents are not allowed to borrow against future income, implying asset holdings

are non-negative.¹⁵

The model economy is a small open economy in which the rate of return to capital, and thus labor, are unchanged across steady states. The free flow of foreign capital ensures that the domestic interest rate is maintained at a constant world interest rate, r^w . The link between the rental price of capital and the world interest rate is given by $q = r^w + \delta$.

We also abstract from labor market frictions. There are no search for employment, and no adjustment cost when switching between part-time and full-time work.

4.7 The household problem

Households are heterogeneous in terms of age $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, J\}$, household type $\lambda \in \Lambda$ where $\Lambda = \{0, 1, 2\}$, education realized at birth $\theta \in \Theta$ where $\Theta = \{\theta_l, \theta_h\}$, female human capital $h_{j,\lambda}^f \in H$ where $H = [h_{min}, h_{max}] \subset \mathcal{R}^+$, asset holdings $a_j \in A$ where $A = [a_{min}, a_{max}] \subset \mathcal{R}^+$ and transitory shocks to male and female labor income, ϵ_j^m and $\epsilon_j^f \in S$ where $S \subset \mathcal{R}$.

Workers. Define $Z = \Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S \times S$ as the state space for each household aged $j < J_R$.¹⁶ Let $z_j = \{\lambda_j, a_j, h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f, \theta, \eta_j^m, \eta_j^f\} \in Z$ be the current period composite state variable and $z_+ = \{\lambda_{j+1}, a_{j+1}, h_{j+1,\lambda,\ell}^f, \theta, \eta_{j+1}^m, \eta_{j+1}^f\} \in Z$ be the next period composite state. For a given state combination at the beginning of age j , the household decides on joint consumption (c), female participation (ℓ), and next period joint assets (a_+) from a choice set $\mathcal{C} \equiv \{(c, \ell, a_+) \in \mathcal{R}^{++} \times \{0, 1, 2\} \times \mathcal{R}^+\}$ to maximize its expected lifetime utility according to

$$V(z) = \max_{c, \ell, a_+} \left\{ u(c, l^m, l^f, \theta, \lambda) + \beta \sum_{\Lambda} \int_{S^2} V(z_+) d\Pi(\lambda_+, \eta_+^m, \eta_+^f | \lambda, \eta^m, \eta^f) \right\} \quad (17)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} (1 + \tau^c)c + (a_+ - a) + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1, \ell \neq 0\}} n_{\lambda}^f \times CE_{\theta} &= y_{\lambda} + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1\}}(nc_{\theta} \times tr^A + tr^B) + beq - T_{\lambda} \\ c_j &> 0 \\ a_+ &\geq 0 \\ l^m &= 1 - n_{\lambda}^m \quad \text{if } \lambda \neq 2 \\ l^f &= 1 - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell \neq 0\}} n_{\lambda, \ell}^f - (\mathbf{1}_{\{\ell=1\}} \chi_p + \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell=2\}} \chi_f) \quad \text{if } \lambda \neq 1 \end{aligned}$$

We suppress the subscript j wherever appropriate to ease the notation. β is the time discount factor; $y_{\lambda} = \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} y_{\lambda}^m + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1, \ell \neq 0\}} y_{\lambda}^f + ra$ is the total household market income; $CE_{\theta} = w(1 - sr) \sum_{i=1}^{nc_{\theta}} \kappa_i$ is the net formal child care expense per hour; tr^A and tr^B are the FTB part A and B transfers; κ_i and sr_i are the hourly child care cost as a fraction of hourly wages and the CCS rate for the i^{th} child, respectively; τ^c is the consumption tax; and $T_{\lambda} = \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} tax^m + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1\}} tax^f$ is the household income tax payment where tax^i for $i \in \{m, f\}$ is calculated using the tax function 9. Bequest motives are not operative. Households are born with no wealth ($a_1 = 0$), and each alive working-age household

¹⁵Without a borrowing constraint, it would require a low EIS γ (or, high relative risk aversion parameter) for the model to generate a time path of consumption that is not too erratic. In the presence of borrowing constraint, however, young economic agents are prevented from borrowing excessively against their future income, and hence, the constraint allows a realistic consumption path in a model environment with γ within the standard value range of gamma.

¹⁶For computational purpose, the transitory shock space is discretized into a Markov process with 5 shock values and 5×5 transition probability matrix using the Rouwenhorst method.

at age j receives a uniform lump-sum transfer of accidental bequest, beq , from deceased households of the same period.

Retirees. Retirement at age J_R is mandatory. The education and transitory shock states becomes absorptive states. In addition, since children are no longer dependent by the time parents have reached their retirement, retirees are not eligible for the child-related transfers. Pension payout is not conditional on earning history but is conditional on household type, λ . An eligible single household receives only two-third of the maximum pension payment that a couple would receive. The state vector of a retired household at age $J_R \leq j \leq J$ is therefore simplified to $z^R = \{\lambda, a\} \in \{0, 1, 2\} \times \mathcal{R}^+$ and their choice set is $\mathcal{C}^R \equiv \{(c, a_+) \in \mathcal{R}^{++} \times \mathcal{R}^+\}$. Suppressing the j subscript, the retired household optimization problem reduces to

$$V(z_j^R) = \max_{c, a_+} \left\{ u(c, \lambda) + \beta \sum_{\Lambda} V(z_+^R) d\Pi(\lambda_+ | \lambda) \right\} \quad (18)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} (1 + \tau^c)c + (a_+ - a) &= ra + pen - T_\lambda \\ c &> 0 \\ a_+ \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad a_{J+1} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

where pen is the Age Pension described in equation 15.

4.8 Competitive equilibrium

The distribution of households. Let $\phi_t(z_j)$ and $\Phi_t(z_j)$ denote the population growth- and mortality-unadjusted stationary density and cumulative distribution of households aged j in time t , respectively.¹⁷ Given that households enter the economy with zero female human capital ($h_{\lambda, j=1}^f = 0$) and assets ($a_{j=1} = 0$), the initial distribution of newborns ($j = 1$) in every period t is determined by

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} d\Phi_t(\lambda, a, h, \theta, \eta^m, \eta^f) &= \int_{\Lambda \times \Theta \times S^2} d\Phi_t(\lambda, 0, 0, \theta, \eta^m, \eta^f) = 1, \quad \text{and} \\ \phi_t(\lambda, 0, 0, \theta, \eta^m, \eta^f) &= \prod_{x \in \{\lambda, \theta, \eta^m, \eta^f\}} \pi(x) \end{aligned}$$

We suppress subscripts and superscripts of the state variables wherever appropriate for brevity. $\pi(x)$ is the unconditional probability density of state $x \in \{\lambda, \theta, \eta^m, \eta^f\}$ for all $\lambda \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, $\theta \in \Theta$, and $\eta^m, \eta^f \in S$.

From age $j = 2$ onward, the population density $\phi_t(z)$ evolves according to the following law of motion

¹⁷Because population growth rate is a constant, and mortality is age-dependent but independent of the other state elements, adjustment for population growth and mortality is done when aggregating over cohorts.

$$\phi_{t+1}(z_+) = \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} \mathbf{1}_{\{a_+ = a_+(z, \Omega_t), h_+ = h_+(z, \Omega_t)\}} \times \pi(\lambda_+ | \lambda) \times \pi(\eta_+^m | \eta^m) \times \pi(\eta_+^f | \eta^f) d\Phi_t(z), \quad (19)$$

where Ω_t is a vector of behavioral, technology and policy parameters at time t , $\pi(\eta_+^i | \eta^i)$ is the probability of η_+^i conditional on η^i for $i \in \{m, f\}$, and $\pi(\lambda_+ | \lambda)$ is the transition probability of λ_+ given λ taken from Table 1. Assets and human capital are endogenous states that evolve continuously. The share of households on each of the next period (a^+, h^+) pairs is obtained through linear interpolations of a_+ and $\log(h_+)$ on the assets (A) and human capital (H) discretized domains, respectively.

Aggregate variables. There are J number of generations living in every period t . Let the share of alive cohort j at time t be denoted by $\mu_{j,t}$ such that $\sum_{j=1}^J \mu_{j,t} = 1$. Taking into account the optimal decisions $\{c(z, \Omega_t), \ell(z, \Omega_t), a(z, \Omega_t)\}_{j=1}^J$ and the unit mass of households, aggregate variables for the model economy are equivalent to per capita variables. For an economy governed by a vector of parameters Ω_t in time t , the aggregate variables of consumption C_t , wealth A_t , female labor force participation rate LFP_t , and labor supply in efficiency unit for male LM_t and female LF_t in every period t are expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} C_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} c(z_j, \Omega_t) \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j) \\ A_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} a(z_j, \Omega_t) \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j) \\ LFP_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell(z_j, \Omega_t) \neq 0\}} \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j). \\ LM_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} h_{j,\lambda}^m e^{\theta + \eta^m} n_{j,\lambda}^m \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j) \\ LF_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell(z_j, \Omega_t) \neq 0\}} h_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f e^{\theta + \eta^f} n_{j,\lambda,\ell}^f \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j). \end{aligned}$$

The aggregate government variables are

$$\begin{aligned} T_t^C &= \tau_t^c C_t \\ T_t^K &= \tau_t^k (Y_t - w_t A_t L_t) \\ T_t^I &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} tax_j \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j). \\ Tr_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} (FTB_j + CCS_j) \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j) \\ \mathcal{P}_t &= \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} pen_j \mu_{j,t} d\Phi_t(z_j). \end{aligned}$$

where tax_j is the calculated using Equation 9, $FTB_j = tr_j^A \times nc_\theta + tr_j^B$ is the sum FTB-A of Equation 10 and FTB-B of Equation 11, $CCS_j = w_t \times sr_j \sum_{i=1}^{nc_{j,\theta}} \kappa_i$ is the total CCS with a subsidy rate sr_j from Equation 12, and $L_t = LM_t + LF_t$ is the total labor supply in efficiency unit.

Definition of competitive equilibrium. Given the household, firm and government policy parameters, the demographic structure, the world interest rate, a steady state equilibrium is such that

- (a) The collection of individual household decisions $\{c_j, \ell_j, a_{j+1}\}_{j=1}^J$ solves the household problem 17 and 18;
- (b) The firm chooses labor and capital inputs to solve its profit maximization problem 6;
- (c) The government periodic budget constraint 16 is satisfied;
- (d) The factor markets clear, $K_t^s = K_t^d = K_t$ and $L_t^s = L_t^d = L_t$, where

$$\begin{aligned} K_t^s &= A_t - B_{F,t} - B_t \\ L_t^s &= LM_t + LF_t; \end{aligned}$$

- (e) The goods market clears:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= C_t + I_t + G_t + NX_t \\ NX_t &= (1+n)(1+g)B_{F,t+1} - (1+r)B_{F,t} \\ B_{F,t} &= A_t - K_t - B_t \end{aligned}$$

where $I_t = (1+n)(1+g)K_{t+1} - (1-\delta)K_t$ is investment. NX_t is the trade account and $NX_t > 0$ denotes a trade account surplus.¹⁸

- (f) The lump-sum bequest is the total untapped end-of-period private wealth left by deceased agents in time t . Given the known survival probabilities, the total amount of bequest available at any time t can be accurately predicted. That is,

$$BQ_t = \sum_{j=1}^J \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} (1 - \psi_{j,\lambda})(1 + r_t) a(z_j, \Omega_t) d\Phi_t(z_j).$$

$\psi_{j,\lambda}$ is the conditional survival probability for each household type λ at age j .¹⁹ Bequest to each surviving household aged j at time t is determined by a general formula

$$beq_{j,t} = \left[\frac{b_{j,t}}{\sum_{j=1}^J b_{j,t} m_{j,t}} \right] BQ_t,$$

¹⁸See Appendix C for detailed explanation on $B_{F,t}$ and NX_t .

¹⁹For married households ($\lambda = 0$), $\psi_{j,0} = 1 - (1 - \psi_j^m)(1 - \psi_j^f)$ is the probability that both spouses survive and the household maintains its status quo marital status.

where $b_{j,t}$ is the share of bequest for each surviving household aged j at time t , and $m_{j,t}$ is the mass of households.²⁰ We assume bequest is uniformly distributed to each alive working-age household. Then, we can write $b_{j,t} = \frac{1}{JR-1}$ if $j < JR$ and $b_{j,t} = 0$ otherwise. The amount of bequest to a household aged j at time t is therefore

$$beq_{j,t} = \frac{BQ_t}{\sum_{j=1}^{JR-1} m_{j,t}}.$$

5 Calibration

We model our economy on a balanced growth path where consumption, investment and capital grow at a constant growth rate g of labor-augmented technology, whereas the time endowment for labor and leisure is fixed. The classes of parametric functions for preference and technology are chosen to reflect the observed macroeconomic facts and for comparability with the past research on related issues.

We calibrate the model to match the 2012-2018 key statistics of the Australian economy, a period of relative stability in macroeconomic indicators such as household consumption and asset growth. This period allows us to use policy parameters for the FTB and the CCS from 2018 after major changes to the FTB programs had been introduced. Externally calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2. They are obtained either from our estimates using the HILDA survey, estimates widely used in similar studies on Australia, or those from publicly available data provided by Australian governmental bodies - e.g., the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Department of Social Services (DSS) - or from international organizations, namely, the World Bank. The remaining micro and macro parameters are calibrated internally to match key model moments to a set of corresponding data moments. These parameters and their targets are in Table 3. In addition, we test our model performance by comparing a set of non-targeted data moments with their model counterparts. We find that our benchmark model does reasonably well in matching the selected empirical facts of the Australian economy. Results are shown in Table 4

5.1 Demographics

The model period is one year. Newborn households enter the model economy at age 21 ($j = 1$) as workers, retire at age 65 ($j = JR = 45$), and can live to the maximum age of 100 ($j = J = 80$).²¹ The time-invariant average conditional survival probabilities for males and females ($\psi_{j,m}$ and $\psi_{j,f}$) are computed from the 2001-2019 ABS Life Tables. The growth rate of newborn households is kept constant at $n = 1.6\%$, which is the average annual population growth rate in Australia between 2012-2018 (AIHW 2023). The share of newborn households by family type, $\pi(\lambda)$, is estimated from the HILDA survey. Married households comprise 70% of the newborns ($\pi(\lambda = 0) = 0.70$). The remaining

²⁰There are alternative methods one can choose to handle leftover wealth of the deceased. One way is to introduce annuity market. Households fully annuitize their savings by entering into a contract with financial intermediaries. There are also implementations such as introducing a parent-child link in the objective function of a household. However, this is computationally expensive as it requires an additional continuous state element to store the wealth of parents (necessary to determine the optimal savings paths for the children). This expansion of the state space with the already high dimensionality of our problem is not desirable. Nonetheless, as will be shown later, accidental bequest tends to be small and inconsequential to the outcome of our study, especially provided that our focus is on transfer policies to the low income and target demographics.

²¹We set productivity to zero from age J_R onward so that retirement is mandatory.

Parameter	Value	Target
<i>Demographics</i>		
Maximum lifespan	$J = 80$	Age 21-100
Mandatory retirement age	$J_R = 45$	Age Pension age 65
Population growth rate	$n = 1.6\%$	Average (ABS 2012-2018)
Survival probabilities	ψ_m, ψ_f	Australian Life Tables (ABS 2010-2019)
Measure of newborns by λ type	$\{\pi(\lambda_0), \pi(\lambda_1), \pi(\lambda_2)\} = \{0.70, 0.14, 0.16\}$	HILDA 2012-2018
<i>Technology</i>		
Labor augmenting technology growth	$g = 1.3\%$	Average per hour worked growth rate (World Bank 2012-2018)
Output share of capital	$\alpha = 0.4$	Output share of capital for Australia
Real interest rate	$r = 4\%$	Average (World Bank 2012-2019)
<i>Households</i>		
Relative risk aversion	$\sigma = 1/\gamma = 3$	Standard values 2.5-3.5
Male and female labor supply	n_λ^m, n_λ^f	Age-profiles of average labor hours for employees (HILDA)
Male human capital profile	h_λ^m	Age-profile of wages for men (HILDA)*
<i>Education</i>		
Education level	$\{\theta_L, \theta_H\} = \{0.745, 1.342\}$	College-High school wage ratio of 1.8**
Measure of households by θ type	$\{\pi(\theta_L), \pi(\theta_H)\} = \{0.7, 0.3\}$	College to high school ratio (ABS 2018)
<i>Fiscal policy</i>		
Income tax progressivity	$\tau = 0.2$	Tran and Zakariyya 2021***
Consumption tax	$\tau^c = 8\%$	$\tau_c \times \frac{C_0}{Y_0} = 4.5\%$; given $\frac{C_0}{Y_0} = 56.3\%$
Company profit tax	$\tau^k = 10.625\%$	$\tau^k \left(\frac{Y - WL}{Y} \right) = 4.5\%$; where $\frac{WL}{Y} = 1 - \alpha$
Government debt to GDP	$\frac{B}{Y} = 20\%$	Average (CEIC 2012-2018)
Government general purchase	$\frac{G}{Y} = 14\%$	Net of FTB, CCS and Age Pension (WDI and AIHW)
FTB, CCS and Pension parameters		HILDA tax-benefit model
<i>Others</i>		
Model income unit	1 model unit = \$24.02/hour $\times 24 \times 5 \times 52$	Average married men's hourly wage at age 21 (HILDA)*

Table 2: Externally calibrated parameters

Notes: (*) The age-profiles of median hourly wages for married and single men are obtained by regressing $\log(wage)$ on quadratic age terms and four dummies (gender, marital status, employment type and time). We then normalize all hourly wage estimates by the average hourly wage of male aged 21. All resources are generated endogenously in the model. All agents are endowed with base human capital of 1 at the start of lives, equivalent to AUD\$24.02/hour $\times 24 \times 5 \times 52$ before adjusted by work hours (heterogeneity comes from participation decision, hours, education and transitory shocks). (**) Our estimates based on HILDA suggests a wage premium for married men in the range of 1.7-1.8 over the 18 years period 2001-2018. (***) Given progressivity $\tau = 0.2$, we use the scale parameter ζ which controls the size of the tax system as an endogenous tax parameter to balance post-reform budgets.

Parameter	Value	Target
<i>Households</i>		
Discount factor	$\beta = 0.99$	Saving ratio 5%-8% (ABS 2013-2018)
Taste for consumption	$\nu = 0.375$	LFP rate 68-72% of working-age mothers (HILDA 2012-2018)
Fixed time cost of work	$\{\chi_f, \chi_p\} = \{0.1125, 0.0525\}$	Age profile of full-time employment share for mothers
<i>Female human capital</i>		
Depreciation rate	$\delta_h = 0.074$	Male-female wage gap at age 50*
Accumulation rate for:		
Married mother working full-time	$(\xi_{1,\lambda=0,\ell=1}, \xi_{2,\lambda=0,\ell=1}) = (0.0450, 0.00175)$	Married father's age-profile of full-time wages
Married mother working part-time	$(\xi_{1,\lambda=0,\ell=2}, \xi_{2,\lambda=0,\ell=2}) = (0.0350, 0.00135)$	Married father's age-profile of part-time wages
Single mother working full-time	$(\xi_{1,\lambda=2,\ell=1}, \xi_{2,\lambda=2,\ell=1}) = (0.0206, 0.00088)$	Single father's age-profile of full-time wages
Single mother working part-time	$(\xi_{1,\lambda=2,\ell=2}, \xi_{2,\lambda=2,\ell=2}) = (0.0179, 0.00060)$	Single father's age-profile of part-time wages**
<i>Technology</i>		
Capital depreciation rate	$\delta = 0.07172$	$\frac{K}{Y} = 3.2$ (ABS, 2012-2018)
<i>Transitory shocks</i>		
Persistence parameter	$\rho = 0.98$	Literature
Variance of shocks	$\sigma_v^2 = 0.0145$	Gini coefficient of male earnings at age 21, $GINI_{j=1,m} = 0.35$
<i>Fiscal policy</i>		
Maximum pension payment	$pen^{max} = 30\% \times Y$	Pension share of GDP, $\frac{P_t}{Y_t} = 3.2\%$ (ABS, 2012-2018)

Table 3: Internally calibrated parameters

Notes: (*) We chose age 50 to allow sufficient time for δ_h to take effect on female labor supply decisions. (**) We calibrate the female human capital accumulation and depreciation rates for a type $\{\lambda, \ell\}$ woman such that her age-profile of wages matches that of her male counterpart if she chooses to work without time off. The target male moment values (i.e., male age-profiles of wages) are HILDA estimates for each pair $\{\lambda, \ell\}$. Some additional adjustments (e.g., by discarding wage data near retirement age) are made to better fit the estimated male profiles since the data for some groups, such as single fathers, is noisy.

30% are single households, 53% of which are female, such that $\pi(\lambda = 1) = 0.14$ and $\pi(\lambda = 2) = 0.16$. Figure 14 reports shares of survivors by marital status over the life cycle.




Figure 14: Time-invariant shares of survivors by family type over the life-cycle.

5.2 Preferences

We calibrate the subjective discount factor $\beta = 0.99$ so that the household savings ratio stays between 5-8% as reported by ABS (2023), and set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (an inverse of relative risk aversion) to $\gamma = 1/3$ within the range of standard values commonly used in the literature.²² The taste for consumption relative to leisure, ν , is calibrated to 0.375 for the female labor force participation rate to stay within the range of 68-72%. The fixed time cost parameters of work, χ_f and χ_p , are calibrated to 0.1125 and 0.0525, respectively, so that the model generated mothers' full-time share of employment matches that in the data.

5.3 Endowments

Labor productivity. Every adult household member is subject to idiosyncratic transitory earnings shocks η^i for $i \in \{m, f\}$. Their shocks follow an identical AR1 process with auto-correlation coefficient, ρ , and variance of the innovation, σ_v^2 . We set $\rho = 0.98$ to stay within bound of the common values in the literature and calibrate σ_v to achieve a Gini index of 0.35 for the efficiency wage distribution of men aged 21. This configuration results in an efficiency wage Gini coefficient of 0.3766 (non-target) for the working age male population.²³ The Rouwenhorst method is employed to discretize the shock values into 5 grid points $\{0.29813, 0.546011, 1.83146, 3.35424\}$ with the following Markov transition probabilities²⁴

²² $\beta = 0.99$ results in the growth-adjusted time discount factor $\tilde{\beta} = \beta(1+g)^{\nu(1-\frac{1}{\gamma})} = 0.9807$ for the balanced-growth path steady state economy.

²³ σ_v is used to match the Gini index of the model male efficiency wage distribution with that of the data male earnings (instead of just wages) which include variations in work hours. The reason is that our exogenous male work hour profiles are normalized average values. There is no endogenous source of hour variation; therefore, we use the transitory fluctuation process - that drives the model male efficiency wages - to also capture the exogenous variation in hours for a more realistic model male earnings distribution.

²⁴The difference between Rouwenhorst and Tauchen methods of discretization is that the former does not require normality assumption of the shock distribution. Rouwenhorst matches exactly, by construction, the first and second conditional moments and, by the law of iterated expectations, also the unconditional moments of the continuous process, independently of the shock distribution. Nonetheless, this still presents a limitation since we are not capturing the

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0.9606 & 0.0388 & 0.0006 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.0097 & 0.9609 & 0.0291 & 0.0003 & 0 \\ 0.0001 & 0.0194 & 0.9610 & 0.0194 & 0.0001 \\ 0 & 0.0003 & 0.0291 & 0.9609 & 0.0097 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.0006 & 0.0388 & 0.9606 \end{bmatrix}$$

We assume two education types - low (θ_L) and high (θ_H) - realized at birth, representing those who have at most high school degree and those with bachelor's degree or higher qualifications, respectively. The earnings ability profile of an agent is scaled up or down by θ . We set $\theta_L = 0.745$ and $\theta_H = 1.342$ to achieve a college wage premium of 1.8 in the benchmark economy. The measures of low and high education households are $\pi(\theta_L) = 0.7$ and $\pi(\theta_H) = 0.3$ based on the college-high school ratio in the ABS (2018).

We abstract from men's labor supply decisions and women's intensive margin of labor supply decisions, and externally estimate their age-profiles of normalized average work hours (n_λ^m and $n_{\lambda,\ell}^f$) by gender, family type, and employment type. Men always work full-time and follow a pre-determined labor supply paths. Women can choose their labor supply along the extensive margin. Specifically, a household decides whether its female member ought to stay at home ($\ell = 0$), work part time ($\ell = 1$), or work full time ($\ell = 2$).²⁵ The average work hours are estimated from HILDA as shown in Figure 15.

We estimate the age-profiles of hourly wages for single and married males from the HILDA survey data (2001-2018) and use them as proxies for the male human capital age profiles, h_λ^m . Human capital of female workers, h_λ^f , is governed by the female labor market decisions and therefore evolves endogenously over the life cycle. The human capital gain parameters, $\{\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell}, \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell}\}$, are calibrated by household type (λ) and labor choice (ℓ) such that the life cycle paths of human capital of single and married women mimic those of their respective male counterparts should they choose to work without time off.²⁶

Children. Children are deterministic and exogenous. Provided that a plurality of parents (42%) in our sample data have two children, our model households are assumed to have only two children over

higher-order moments of shocks (e.g., third- and fourth-order moments) which tell a better story of the magnitude and probability of extreme shocks at the tailends of the earnings shock distribution.

²⁵Our estimates from HILDA demonstrate that male labor supply profiles remain virtually unchanged across selected demographics such as parental and marital status. We have also conducted several empirical exercises by running logistic regressions of workforce participation on lagged FTB benefits and demographic controls. Results indicate that the work disincentive effect is trivial for men. For fathers, in particular, a \$10,000 increase in the annual FTB transfer is associated with a 1*p.p.* decline in participation but the effect is statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level (p-value = 0.18). On the contrary, for mothers, the same increase in transfer magnitude is associated with a statistically significant drop in participation by 4.3*pp* (with participation predicted to be 72.68% if the FTB transfer is nil). On a similar note, [Doiron and Kalb \(2004\)](#) finds that the effects of child care cost increase on male labor supply is negligible. Empirical evidence thus far suggests highly inelastic male labor supply. Hence, for our abstract environment that puts a spotlight on women, this assumption is likely not a huge trade-off. In terms of female labor supply, one may argue that allowing work hour decision better captures the family insurance by married women (e.g., through work hour adjustment) in response to male earnings shocks. [Tin and Tran 2023](#) show that spousal labor supply response to primary earner's earnings shocks is weak. From another viewpoint, this behavior may also be driven by government insurance. It is possible that we would no longer see such passiveness from spouses once the child-related transfers are removed. For our current work, however, such complications are computationally demanding and lead to intractability.

²⁶Because female extensive labor supply decisions by marital status are the main interest in this study, it is necessary that we discipline their realized human capital trajectories from these choices by matching them to the corresponding male profiles from the data (under the assumption of assortative mating). We could in principle increase the quality of these matching exercises by further separating human capital age-profiles by education; however, this would generate many additional parameters and lead to noisy data moments due to limited sample size on certain demographics such as married households at early age and single households at older age.




Figure 15: **Labor supply over the life cycle.** **Left panel:** Age profiles of average work hours for married parents if employed. **Right panel:** Age profiles of average labor hours for single men and single mothers if employed. *Note: the difference between the two y-axes. The former ranges from 10 to 50 hours and the latter from 10 to 45 hours.*

their lifetime to reduce computational burden.²⁷ The heterogeneity pertaining to children is attached to the skill type θ in the form of arrival time of a child. [The longitudinal study of Australian children \(LSAC\) annual statistics report in 2017](#) shows that the largest share of first-time mothers within the 15-19 age range concentrates within the low education group (67.7%), and only around 10% of the 25-37 year-old first-time mothers are of low education. On the contrary, close to half of the first-time mothers in the latter group have achieved a bachelor’s degree or higher. We reflect this fact in the model by assigning the first child birth to type θ_L households aged 21 (i.e., $j = 1$, the youngest in the model economy) and type θ_H households aged 28. Then, for both low and high skilled households, the second child arrives exactly 3 years after the first born, at age 24 and 31, respectively.²⁸ For tractability and based on the observation that women constitute the majority (87.21) of lone parents in our sample, we assume only single women and married households in the model have children.²⁹

Child care cost. We abstract from informal child care and restrict the formal care service to have identical quality and price. That is, we assume a perfectly competitive market environment and do away with the complexity associated with regional child care cost variations and types of childcare services used. With a conservative estimate of \$12.5 per hour, the cost of child care is 52% of a 21-year-old male average hourly wages in the model. The total cost of formal child care for a household aged j is the sum of costs for all dependent children. We assume the child care cost, κ , declines once children have reached 6 years old (school age). More specifically, working mothers pay the full total cost of formal child care for a child aged 0-5 years old, and one-third of the cost afterwards under the assumption that public schools are free and parents only spend on out of school hours (OOSH) care

²⁷We estimate the share of parents with two children by first restricting the sample to older households (aged 50 and above). The resultant statistics thus reflect the number of children the households have over their life cycles. Our statistics show that there are 12% of parents with 1 child, 42% with two, 28% with three, and the rest with four or above. Hence, the average number of children in our model is not far off the actual figure.

²⁸AIHW (2023) shows that child spacing remains at around 3 years although the average age of mothers of first and second borns have risen from 27.9 and 31 years old in 2009 to 29.4 and 31.9 years old, respectively, in 2019.

²⁹The assumption that all households, except single male, have children is not far from the fertility rate in Australia which hovered around 1.8 per woman between 2012-2018. More precisely, since married and single female households comprise 86% of the population in our modeled economy, the fact that each of these households has 2 children implies that the average number of children per household is $0.86 \times 2 = 1.72$.

and other expenses such as extra curricular activities.³⁰

5.4 Technology

The production function is $Y = K^\alpha(AL)^{1-\alpha}$ where the capital output share is $\alpha = 0.4$. The labor augmenting technology A is set to 1 in the benchmark economy. Since the average annual GDP per hour worked growth rate in Australia is 1.3%, we set $g = 0.013$. Given α , the company profit tax rate $\tau^k = 10.625\%$, and the target capital-to-GDP ratio $K/Y = 3.2$, we use the firm's first-order conditions [7](#) to derive the capital depreciation rate $\delta = 0.07172$ in the initial steady state equilibrium.

5.5 Fiscal policy

Taxes. We set the progressivity parameter $\tau = 0.2$ (see [Tran and Zakariyya 2021](#)) and use the scale parameter ζ , which controls the total tax size given τ , as an endogenous budget balancing variable in all policy experiments. We set $\tau^c = 8\%$ to target the consumption tax share of GDP, $\frac{\tau^c C}{Y}$, of 4.5% given $\frac{C}{Y} = 56.3\%$ according to the ABS 2012-2018 data. We calibrate the company income tax rate to match the company income tax share of GDP, $\tau^k \left(\frac{Y - WL}{Y} \right) = 4.25\%$. Provided that $\frac{WL}{Y} = 1 - \alpha = 0.6$, we calculate τ^k to be 10.625%.

Family Tax Benefit and Child Care Subsidy. We use the policy parameters set by the Australian government in 2018 for the Family Tax Benefit part A and part B and the Child Care Subsidy programs, including base and maximum payment rates, income thresholds and taper rates.

Means-tested Age Pension. The Age Pension's income and assets test thresholds, and their respective taper rates are based on 2018 values. The maximum pension payout, p^{max} , is internally calibrated to be 30% of the average income Y to achieve a total pension share of GDP of 3.2% in the benchmark steady state economy.

General government expenditure and debt. We define the general government expenditure G as all government expenses other than the two child-related transfers (FTB and CCS) and the Age Pension that the model explicitly accounts for. The general expenditure in the benchmark is calculated to be 14% (total expenditure 18.5% of GDP - net of the estimated combined expenditure on the FTB, the CCS, and the Age Pension programs - 4.5% of GDP). Similarly, public debt B is set at 20% which is close to the average public debt share of GDP prior to the pandemic.

5.6 The benchmark economy

We assess our model performance by comparing between model and data moments.

Aggregate macro variables. We examine selected key target and non-target aggregate macroeconomic variables in the benchmark economy. Table [4](#) demonstrates that the benchmark model performs reasonably well in matching aggregate data moments.

³⁰OOSH services operate before school (6:30am-9am), after school (3pm-6pm), and during vacation period (7am-7pm). We drop the cost to 1/3 of the original cost to reflect the fact that children of school age spent less time in child care on average (only 40% between aged 6-8 participate in any form of child care and the rate declines to 20% by the age of 12). The cost after age 5 is assumed to also encapsulate other costs incurred by parents. See AIFS (2015) for further information on child care usage, and DSS (2005) for further information on the average cost of caring for a child. We use recent information for the hourly child care cost, and assume the costs of school-age children relative to

Moments	Benchmark economy	Data	Source
<i>Targeted</i>			
Capital, K/Y	3.2	3-3.3	ABS (2012-2018)
Savings, S/Y	4.7%	5-8%	ABS (2013-2018)
Mothers' labor participation, LFP	72.57%	68-72%	HILDA (2012-2018)*
Consumption tax, T^C/Y	4.23%	4.50%	APH Budget Review
Corporate profit tax, T^K/Y	4.25%	4.25%	APH Budget Review
Age Pension, P/Y	3.65%	3.20%	ABS (2012-2018)
Gini coefficient (male aged 21)	0.35	0.35	HILDA (2012-2018)
<i>Non-targeted</i>			
Consumption, C/Y	52.80%	54-58%	ABS (2012-2018)
Investment, I/Y	32.29%	24-28%	ABS (2013-2018)
Mothers' full-time share	50.32%	50%	HILDA (2012-2018)
Scale parameter, ζ	0.7417	0.7237	Tran and Zakariyya 2021
Income tax, T^I/Y	14.93%	11%	APH Budget Review
Tax revenue to output	28.36%	25%	ABS(2012-2018)
Child-related transfers (FTB + CCS)	1.7%	1.45%	ABS (2012-2018)

Table 4: Key macroeconomic variables: Model vs. Data moments

Notes: (*) Multiple sources agree on these ranges of participation rates for mothers. (**) We set 0.35 as the target for the Gini of wage distribution at birth ($j = 1$). As a result, the male wage distribution's Gini over the entire working age is 0.3766.




Figure 16: Lorenz curves of wage distributions. **Left panel:** Lorenz curves of the distributions of married male wages at age 21 and 22 (Gini = 0.35). **Right panel:** Lorenz curve of the wage distribution of working-age male population (Gini = 0.3766). Wages in the model account for human capital, education and transitory shocks over the life-cycle .

Life-cycle profiles of labor force participation and full-time share of employment. Age-based moments require the model agents to act in a way that closely resemble how the average economic agent with similar characteristics behaves at different stages in life. Thus, they serve as good additional metrics to gauge how our model economy performs against the data.

Figure 17 reports the age-profiles of labor force participation and full-time share of employment for mothers from the data and those generated by the benchmark model. Our model performs reasonably well in matching the two age-based data moments until approximately age 55, after which the model and data labor force participation rates begins to diverge. This can be attributed to two main assumptions made to ease computation: (i) exogenous work hour profiles and mandatory retirement, and (ii) exogenous children. First, the inability to adjust work hours when young and the mandatory retirement at age 65 imposed on economic agents in the model means more mothers have to work until retirement to offset the absence of labor earnings afterwards and to insure against longevity risk. Second, exogenous children, with births restricted to around the first 10 years of working age, could overstate the average labor supply path since older mothers are excluded from consideration.




Figure 17: **Model vs Data: Life-cycle profiles of labor supply of mothers.** **Left panel:** Life cycle profile of labor force participation. **Right panel:** Life cycle profiles of full-time share of employment.

6 Quantitative analysis

In this section, we use the calibrated model to assess whether child-related transfers are socially desirable, and if so, whether they should be means-tested or universal. In Section 6.1, we address the first question by considering three reforms to the status quo policies: (i) abolishing the FTB, (ii) abolishing the CCS, and (iii) abolishing both the FTB and the CCS. Next, in Section 6.2, we remove all means-testing rules and examine the aggregate (efficiency and welfare) and redistributive effects of universal child-related transfers. In our extension, detailed in Section 7, we explore alternative designs, including universal transfer system at different benefit rates and incremental reforms to the status quo means-tested system. Any discrepancies between the government’s consolidated tax revenue and expenditures are financed by adjusting the income tax rate.³¹

pre-school-age children remain unchanged since 2005.

³¹Ex-ante welfare changes are measured in consumption and leisure terms according to Hicksian Equivalent Variation (HEV) method. A welfare change for newborns from a policy reform can be expressed as

6.1 Assessing the status quo means-tested child-related transfers

We quantify the benefits of the current child-related transfer programs by considering three counterfactual policy experiments: (i) abolishing the FTB, (ii) abolishing the CCS, and (iii) abolishing both the FTB and the CCS.

	Abolishing one or both child-related transfer programs		
	[1] No FTB	[2] No CCS	[3] No FTB&CCS
CCS size, %	+49.80	–	–
FTB size, %	–	+10.89	–
Average tax rate, <i>pp</i>	+2.50	-0.70	+0.99
Fe. Lab. For. Part. (LFP), <i>pp</i>	+5.76	-10.00	+10.49
Fe. Full time (FT), <i>pp</i>	+9.21	-4.55	+20.38
Human cap. (H), %	+3.88	-4.83	+8.57
Consumption (C), %	+1.10	-3.26	+4.27
Output (Y), %	+1.38	-3.48	+3.86
Welfare (EV), %	-3.70	-1.00	-0.66**

Table 5: Aggregate effects of eliminating child-related transfer program(s)

Notes: Results are reported as changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

Abolishing the FTB or the CCS. The first and second columns of Table 5 present the aggregate efficiency and welfare consequences of abolishing the FTB (while retaining the CCS) and the CCS (while retaining the FTB), respectively. Eliminating the FTB removes the work disincentive effect associated with the program, leading to a 5.76 percentage point (*pp*) increase in female workforce participation, with an even stronger 9.21*pp* increase in full-time rates. This suggests a post-reform switch from part-time to full-time work by a sizeable portion of mothers. Overall, discontinuing the FTB program raises output by 1.38%, making it an attractive option from an efficiency perspective. However, this new regime also brings about an ex-ante welfare loss of 3.7% relative to the status quo, driven by the loss of leisure and insufficient government insurance in the new steady state for those in need. A society concerned with the long-run welfare of its newborns would oppose this reform.³²

The same society would likely be averse to eliminating the CCS. Without the subsidy to reduce formal child care costs and mitigate the FTB’s work disincentives, labor force participation falls by 10*pp*, with a 4.55*pp* drop in the full-time rate. The decreased labor supply can be attributed to (i) the CCS’s work activity test, which grants larger subsidies for full-time work, and (ii) the presence of the FTB, whose work disincentive effect becomes stronger without the CCS.³³

$$HEV = \left[\left(\frac{V(z_{j=1}, \Omega_{t=1})}{V(z_{j=1}, \Omega_{t=0})} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}} - 1 \right] \times 100,$$

where $\Omega_{t=0}$ and $\Omega_{t=1}$ denote the vector of behavioral, technology and policy parameters associated with the initial steady state (status quo) in time $t = 0$ and a reformed economy in $t = 1$, respectively. We use output as a proxy for aggregate efficiency. Therefore, output gains (or losses) are equivalent to efficiency gains (or losses).

³²Because behavioral responses in consumption and labor supply to benefit and tax changes are qualitatively similar across different settings of child-related transfers, we reserve detailed discussion of these responses for Subsection 6.2, 7.1, and 7.2.

³³Considering the shorter coverage of the subsidy (limited to children aged 13 or younger), the impact of reforming the CCS is most significant on younger mothers, especially single mothers whose family insurance (via partner’s income) is absent.

Furthermore, the general equilibrium effect via tax channel is small. Removing the CCS results in only a 0.70pp reduction in the average tax rate. This could stem from: (i) the targeted nature of child-related transfers via means-testing, which limits benchmark government spending, and (ii) the interplay between the two programs, where eliminating the CCS decreases labor supply and thus expands the FTB, negating the budget-saving effect.³⁴ Efficiency gains through this channel are therefore minimal. In total, output and welfare decrease by 3.48% and 1%, respectively, making the removal of the CCS a lose-lose reform.

From these experiments emerges a lesson of relevance to policy making: while both reforms cause welfare reductions and thus undesirable, removing the means-tested lump sum transfer (FTB) produces some efficiency gains in the form of higher labor supply, human capital, and output, whereas removing the means-tested subsidy (CCS) offers no such benefits.

Abolishing the FTB and the CCS. The total elimination of all child-related transfers in the third experiment removes both the positive and negative artificial incentive effects on labor supply. These forces combine to result in significant increases in female workforce participation by 10.49pp and full-time rate by 20.38pp, leading to an 8.57% increase in female human capital and a 3.86% increase in output. The efficiency gains more than double those observed from abolishing the FTB scheme alone.³⁵




Figure 18: **Labor supply and consumption changes by demographic due to removing all child-related transfers: Labor force participation (top-left), Work hours (bottom-left), Human capital (top-right), and Consumption (bottom-right).**

Notes: Figures are based on Table 12 and 13 in the Appendix. LFP and Work hours are reported as percentage point (pp) and percentage (%) changes relative to their respective values in the benchmark economy.

Figure 18 shows increases in female labor force participation and work hours over the life cycle, with stronger increases among younger mothers.³⁶ Because human capital gain rates are higher at early ages, this helps explain the substantial increase in human capital for women.

Furthermore, responses vary by demographic. Married women, particularly those in low-education

³⁴In a progressive tax context, rising income might push more people into higher tax brackets, passively raising the average tax rate.

³⁵Despite the reduced need to fund child-related transfers, the large increases in labor supply and output could lead to bracket creep, causing the slight 0.99% uptick in the average tax rate.

³⁶Because labor supply at the intensive margin is exogenous, work hour changes are necessarily a product of movement between full-time and part-time employment.

households, account for the largest share of the upward swing in labor supply. The presence of partner's earnings implies that this group is more likely to be situated in the phase-out zone of the FTB and the CCS due to joint income test, significantly raising their effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) in the benchmark economy. Conversely, the labor supply of single mothers is inelastic, for reasons discussed in Subsection 6.2. While we observe some increases in their work hours, suggesting movement towards full-time employment, they make little to no change in their participation decision.

The improved labor supply and human capital culminate in a 4.27% increase in aggregate consumption. However, there is a 0.66% welfare loss for newborn households, attributable partly to decreased leisure time, partly to the increased fluctuations of consumption growth over the life cycle (as illustrated in Figure 19), and partly to the significant welfare losses befalling single mothers, as depicted in Table 6.

	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	Single Men (H)	Single Men (L)	Single Women (H)	Single Women (L)
Welfare (%)	+1.35	-0.22	+0.02	+0.06	-4.03	-6.53

Table 6: **Welfare effects by demographic due to the elimination of all means-tested child-related transfers** (*H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

Notes: Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

The welfare loss for single mothers is also reflected in the fall of their lifetime consumption as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 18, demonstrating that for single mothers, increased labor earnings in the reformed regime fail to adequately replace the lost government assistance. Their dependence on child-related transfers arises primarily from the modeling of family structure and child care costs. In a setup without heterogeneity in family type, households with identical education and human capital levels would have the same family insurance and self-insurance capabilities. Differently, when incorporating family structure and children, single mothers, and to a lesser extent low-education married mothers, have limited family insurance compared to high-education couples. The credit constraint assumption further restricts their self-insurance via borrowing. Single mothers, like all mothers, also face difficulties self-insuring via work due to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary child penalties.³⁷ Since they do not have a partner and therefore lack family insurance, the elimination of child-related transfer programs exacerbates their vulnerabilities by taking away their last form of insurance, the child-related transfers.

Table 6 indicates that low-education couples also face a net loss. The efficiency effect in the form of higher labor earnings and consumption fails to offset the lost child-related transfers. This further implies that their reallocation of labor supply in the new regime is welfare deteriorating.

The factors aforementioned explain the sharp welfare reductions for single mothers. As seen in the final row of Table 13, welfare plummets by 4.03% for high-education single mothers and 6.53% for those with low education. In contrast, for married mothers with low education, the family insurance provided by their partner mitigates the loss, keeping it relatively small at 0.22%. Thus, despite the overall improvement in long-run welfare, aversion to inequality would likely lead society to oppose the complete removal of child-related transfer policies.

³⁷Without the CCS, the costs of formal child care substantially diminish their returns to labor. The fixed time cost of work also implies that their extra labor earnings come at a significant sacrifice of leisure.




Figure 19: **Coefficients of variation of log output and log consumption: Benchmark (black) vs FTB and CCS elimination reform (red).** Left panel: Life cycle profile of coefficient of variation of log output. Right panel: Life cycle profile of coefficient of variation of log consumption.

6.2 Universal child-related transfers

In this section, we examine whether child-related transfers should be means-tested or universal. To do this, we quantify the effects of a radical reform where the government provides universal child-related lump sum payments and work subsidies to families with dependent children. Specifically, we eliminate all the means-testing rules but retain the baseline payment and subsidy rates, as well as the demographic and other non-income related criteria of the transfers (e.g., conditions related the number and age of dependent children) described in Section B of the Appendix. We refer to this reform as the baseline universal child-related transfers.

Table 7 details the aggregate outcomes of this transition. Our results indicate that rendering the FTB and the CCS universally accessible improves overall efficiency and welfare. Remarkably, despite a 4.2pp increase in the average tax rate and the positive wealth effect of the universal transfers, the work incentive effect from removing means-testing remains dominant. This leads to increases in labor force participation and work hours among mothers, culminating in gains of 2.09% in female human capital and 0.11% in output. Additionally, ex-ante welfare increases by 0.85%.

Aggregate implications of universal FTB and CCS programs			
CCS size, %	+129.45	Hour, %	+6.71
FTB size, %	+281.40	Human cap. (H), %	+2.09
Average tax rate, pp	+4.20	Consumption (C), %	+0.04
Fe. Lab. Force Part. (LFP), pp	+2.64	Output (Y), %	+0.11
Fe. Full time (FT), pp	+4.39	Welfare (EV), %	+0.85

Table 7: **Aggregate effects of universalizing FTB and CCS.**

Notes: Results are reported as changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

On an aggregate level, the baseline universal child-related transfers outperform the status quo in all key metrics. However, these aggregate changes mask the heterogeneous effects on different family types, particularly in how the reform transfers welfare from single to married households as illustrated by the redistributive outcome in 8.

Married households emerge as clear winners of this reform, experiencing approximately 1.3% increases in welfare. On the contrary, all single households, including single mothers—the primary

targets of the transfers—are disadvantaged under the universal system. Single men are the most adversely affected, as they receive no benefits and now bear a higher tax burden. For single mothers, those with high education see a welfare decline of 0.69%, while their low-education counterparts experience a 0.51% decrease. Nonetheless, given that the winners (couples) represent 70% of the model’s population, the reform would likely secure the majority vote and be adopted if, as assumed in this analysis, social aversion to inequality is absent.

	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	Single Men (H)	Single Men (L)	Single Women (H)	Single Women (L)
Welfare (%)	+1.36	+1.34	-1.47	-1.20	-0.69	-0.51

Table 8: **Welfare changes by demographic due to universal child-related transfers** (*H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

Notes: Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

To better understand this redistributive outcome, we further investigate labor supply and consumption responses by demographic, as depicted in Figure 20 and 22, respectively.

The absence of means-testing under the universal framework ensures that mothers at all family income levels are eligible for maximum FTB transfers, eliminating wage distortions associated with the FTB income tests. Moreover, the universally accessible CCS program, by awarding maximum subsidies for working mothers, adds an extra layer of work incentive.

For married mothers, Figure 20 shows that the work incentive effect outweighs the disincentives stemming from the universal transfers (positive wealth effect) and the 4.2pp higher average tax rate to finance the new regime’s FTB and CCS—these inflate by 281.4% and 129.45%, respectively, compared to the benchmark economy. Because wage distortions under the status quo regime were strongest during child-rearing ages, universalizing child-related transfers results in the most pronounced increase in labor supply during the prime working age (age 20 to 40), especially for those with low education, when their human capital gain rates are at their highest. These boosts to labor earnings and human capital (Figure 21) enable couples to save more early in life for retirement and for insuring against earnings shocks, thus enhancing their wealth (bottom panel of Figure 22) and allowing married women in their 50s to increase their leisure. Improved self-insurance and allocation of labor supply over the life cycle ultimately contribute to significant increases in consumption throughout their lives. These factors help explain the welfare gains by couples, as evident in the first two columns of Table 8.

Conversely, Figure 20 shows that the labor supply of single mothers is highly inelastic, with only a minor fraction transitioning out of full-time employment. Several channels might account for the stark differences in responses between single and married mothers.

First, the availability and strength of family insurance against consumption fluctuations differ significantly. Single mothers, lacking a partner’s income, have lower family income on average. Since the FTB and CCS means test family income, single mothers are more likely to have already received maximum benefits in the pre-reform economy. In other words, they were less likely to be in the phase-out zones of child-related transfers and are therefore less influenced by the removal of means-testing rules. Second, lacking family insurance, single mothers have to rely on costly self-insurance to smooth consumption over their life cycle, with or without government assistance. As a result, they are also more likely to maintain their employment, regardless of policy changes. Third, the progressiveness of the tax system implies that the increased tax burden is felt most in higher-income brackets and is generally smaller for low-education single mothers. Fourth, our model restricts female labor supply




Figure 20: **Changes in female labor force participation (top) and work hours (bottom) due to universal child-related transfers.**

Notes: Figures are based on Table 14 in the Appendix. LFP and Work hours are reported as percentage point (pp) and percentage (%) changes relative to their respective values in the benchmark economy.




Figure 21: **Changes in female human capital due to universal child-related transfers.**

Notes: Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

decision to the extensive margin. This abstraction from work hour decisions might also help explain single women's unresponsiveness to reforms in our model.³⁸

Unable to adjust their participation, similar to their male counterparts, the main source of welfare loss for single mothers is the penalty on their take-home earnings due to the surge in the average tax rate.³⁹ This further demonstrates that for single mothers, the universal payments at the baseline level—limited to the period when their children are young and dependent—are insufficient to make up for the lost labor income. This group is compelled to maintain their pre-reform labor supply commitment while bearing the brunt of the increased tax burden. As reported in the top panel of Figure 22, their consumption over much of their life cycle declines, leading to welfare losses.

In summary, the baseline universal system, while seemingly affordable, still imposes a significant tax burden. Even though the additional taxes do not completely erode the efficiency gains, as reflected by the aggregate output and consumption increases in Table 7, they are substantial enough to reduce the welfare of single households, including single mothers whom the transfer programs are intended to support. Societies that prioritize the welfare of their worst-off members would likely reject this universal reform, even though it would be favored by the majority in a vote.

³⁸Note that, this is also partly a result of the small-open-economy setting. Perfect cross-border capital mobility maintains fixed factor prices. In a closed economy, the influx of labor into the market would put a downward pressure on wages and affect the reform's outcomes.

³⁹Single men's labor supply is exogenous, and the higher income tax rate simply deteriorates their lifetime consumption and wealth.




Figure 22: **Changes in consumption (top) and wealth (bottom) due to universal child-related transfers.**
Notes: Figures are based on Table 15 in the Appendix. Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

7 Extensions

In this extension, we explore the aggregate, welfare, and distributional effects of other universal transfer schemes and incremental reforms to the status quo system.

7.1 Universal child-related transfers at different payment rates

Our previous analysis demonstrates how the adverse redistributive effect, primarily through the tax channel, can result in the universal system harming single mothers—the very group it aims to support—due to the excessive fiscal expansion. A potential remedy is to control the program expenditure by reducing the benefit rates. Therefore, in this section, we explore the effects of varying the generosity of the universal system by examining two contrasting scenarios: (i) a universal child-related transfer program with 50% smaller payment rates, and (ii) another with payment rates 50% larger relative to the baseline system discussed in Subsection 6.2.

	Universal child-related transfers varied by payment and subsidy rates		
	0.5×Baseline rates	Baseline rates	1.5×Baseline rates
CCS size, %	-15.45	+129.45	+207.27
FTB size, %	+132.56	+281.40	+430.23
Average tax rate, <i>pp</i>	+0.15	+4.20	+6.13
Fe. Lab. For. Part. (LFP), <i>pp</i>	+1.06	+2.64	+3.91
Fe. Full time (FT), <i>pp</i>	+0.23	+4.39	+6.29
Human cap. (H), %	+0.40	+2.09	+3.09
Consumption (C), %	-0.03	+0.04	+0.08
Output (Y), %	+0.16	+0.11	+0.11
Welfare (EV), %	+0.27	+0.85	+1.50

Table 9: **Aggregate efficiency and welfare effects of universal child-related transfers varied by size.**

Notes: Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the baseline economy. For ease of comparison, the middle column shows the aggregate changes associated with the universal scheme at the baseline rates from Subsection 6.2 again.

A key takeaway from Figure 17 is that adjusting the size of universal child-related transfers does not resolve the inequity issue. In fact, expanding the system, despite raising the overall efficiency and welfare as shown in Table 9, worsens the welfare loss for single mothers. On the other hand, shrinking

the system shifts the loss from single mothers to low-education couples. As for single male households, they lose in both scenarios due to the higher tax rates relative to the benchmark economy.

As illustrated in column 3 of Table 9, increasing the baseline universal FTB and CCS rates by 50% adds significant stress to the tax system. The average tax rate jumps by 6.13pp, about 2pp more than the increase under the baseline universal system. This elevated tax burden magnifies the negative effects on the life cycle consumption of single households. Single mothers thus do not perceive this increased generosity as a gift. Due to their lack of family insurance and the limited duration of the transfers, as discussed in the prior subsection, Figure 24 shows that single mothers make minimal changes to their labor supply decisions in the new universal regimes. The larger tax burden lowers their earned income and consumption during their working age (bottom panel of Figure 25), causing a welfare decline of 1.3% for high-education single mothers and 0.9% for those with low education.




Figure 23: Changes in welfare by demographic across different universal payment rates.

Notes: Figures are based on Table 17 in the Appendix. Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the benchmark economy.

In contrast, married households benefit more under the expanded scheme. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 24, they raise their labor supply further during their working age in exchange for higher consumption over the life cycle and increased leisure prior to retirement. Compared to the baseline universal system, the welfare gains increase by 0.2pp for high-education couples (from +1.4% to +1.6%) and double for low-education couples (from +1.3% to +2.6%).⁴⁰

Hence, these findings suggest that more generous universal systems can exacerbate inequity, but they might still receive majority support as they make larger welfare transfers from single households (a minority) to married households (a majority).

Conversely, halving the universal scheme's generosity, as shown in column 1 of Table 9, delivers smaller overall efficiency and welfare gains but eliminates the detrimental welfare impacts on single mothers observed under the baseline and expanded schemes. Despite the less generous payment rates, the net outcome for single mothers is positive, largely due to the accompanying smaller tax increase of 0.15pp that does not overshadow the benefits. Accordingly, the increased take-home income improves life cycle consumption trajectories for both low- and high-education single mothers, as demonstrated by the top panel of Figure 25, leading to small welfare gains of 0.1% for the former group and 0.4% for the latter. However, the distribution of welfare gains remains inequitable. Single men still lose from the higher tax rate, and now the welfare of low-education married households drops slightly by 0.02%.⁴¹ Given that low-education couples and single men constitute the majority, this reform is

⁴⁰Recall that universal transfers in our context comprise universal lump-sum transfers (modified FTB) and universal child care subsidies (modified CCS). This suggests that for couples, the work incentives driven by the combination of increased subsidies and lower EMTRs (due to the universalization of transfers) dominate the disincentives from higher lump-sum transfers and tax rate.

⁴¹

See Table 17 in the Appendix.

unlikely to pass.




Figure 24: **Changes in work hours across different universal payment rates:** $0.5 \times \text{baseline}$ (top), baseline (middle), $1.5 \times \text{baseline}$ (bottom).

Notes: Figures are based on Table 16 in the Appendix. LFP and Work hours are reported as percentage point (pp) and percentage (%) changes relative to their respective values in the benchmark economy.

Why do low-education couples lose? The lower average tax rate leads them to increase their labor supply, as shown by the higher participation and work hours in the right panel of Figure 24. These higher labor earnings translate into a consistent 3-4% increase in consumption for these households post age 30 (Figure 25). However, these gains, stretching over 70 years, cannot counterbalance their initial 0.7% consumption loss between age 21 and 30, resulting in a 0.02% net loss of welfare (Figure 23).

The profiles of consumption changes in Figure 25 help explain this puzzle. Comparing between the contracted (top panel), baseline (middle panel), and expanded (bottom panel) universal transfer regimes reveals that, relative to the first regime, the second and third bring about smaller consumption gains (not to mention longer work hours) for low-education couples after age 40. Nevertheless, the two larger systems still produce moderate welfare gains for these households. This suggests that (i) observed welfare changes for low-education couples are driven mainly by early-life consumption, (ii) their marginal utilities of consumption are high at a young age (due to the concavity of iso-elastic utility), and (iii) the lost benefits under the smaller universal system cannot be replaced by labor earnings.

Three assumptions contribute to this outcome. First, the assortative mating assumption results in low returns to the combined labor of young low-education couples. Second, early parenthood for low-education households reduces per capita consumption when individual human capital and therefore earnings ability are still limited.⁴² Additionally, having children introduces child care costs, further reducing the labor returns and hindering young low-education married mothers' ability to work and develop human capital. Third, the credit constraint assumption limits the ability of these households to self-insure via borrowing, making it extremely difficult to smooth consumption.

⁴²Human capital is set to 1 for all newborn households.

In short, young low-education couples face significant barriers to work and borrowing at a time when the arrival of children adversely impacts their per capita consumption. These challenges converge to depress their earnings and consumption early in their life cycle. With insufficient government insurance to relieve these constraints, as in the case of a downsized universal transfer system, the resultant loss of lifetime utility driven by the decline in early-life consumption cannot be compensated by mid- and late-life consumption gains from the lower tax burden.




Figure 25: Changes in consumption across different universal payment rates: $0.5 \times \text{baseline}$ (top), baseline (middle), $1.5 \times \text{baseline}$ (bottom).

Notes: Figures are based on Table 17 in the Appendix. Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the benchmark economy.

Discussion.

A key lesson emerges from the findings above. Within the confines of our model and analysis, universal child-related transfers that deviate from the baseline system neither address the inequitable redistribution problem associated with the latter nor achieve the policy goal of benefiting all low-income parents. On one hand, a smaller program alleviates the tax burden but provides insufficient government insurance for low-education married households. On the other hand, a larger universal program exacerbates the financial strain on single mothers due to the high tax rate it entails. This suggests that while child-related transfers can be welfare-enhancing for low-income parents, means-testing is required to ensure a net positive life cycle outcome.

7.2 Incremental reforms to the status quo means-tested transfer programs

Searching for efficiency and welfare improving reforms in a model featuring an extensive state space and intricate policy mechanisms is challenging, especially when considering changes to multiple means-testing parameters concurrently. However, by narrowing our scope to focus on several simple cases, we can derive some critical insights. Table 10 displays the efficiency and welfare outcomes from chosen incremental reforms, highlighting two notable observations.

Aggregate implications of incremental reforms								
	FTB payment rates		CCS subsidy rates		FTB taper rates		CCS taper rates	
	0.5 × tr	1.5 × tr	0.5 × sr	1.5 × sr	0.5 × ω^F	1.5 × ω^F	0.5 × ω^C	1.5 × ω^C
Tax rate, pp	-0.36	+0.19	-1.37	+0.69	+2.08	+3.34	-0.97	+1.28
Fe. LFP, pp	-5.65	+1.00	+1.13	-2.87	+1.69	-2.94	+0.17	-2.66
Fe. Hour, %	-10.89	+3.67	+3.28	-5.05	+1.13	-5.47	+1.00	-5.32
Fe. H. Cap, %	-4.95	+0.93	+0.92	-2.22	+0.76	-2.21	+0.22	-2.49
Cons. (C), %	-2.41	+1.03	-0.17	-1.09	+1.36	-1.55	+0.46	-2.06
Output (Y), %	-1.52	+2.20	+0.88	-1.08	+0.81	-1.67	+0.89	-1.42
Welfare (EV), %	-0.41	-0.02	-0.82	+0.28	-0.44	-1.41	+0.37	-0.61

Table 10: Aggregate efficiency and welfare effects of incremental reforms to means-test parameters

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy. Let tr denote the FTB payment rates, sr denote the CCS subsidy rates, ω^F denote the FTB taper rates, and ω^C denote the CCS taper rate (a reciprocal of the taper unit which is the amount of income increment by which the subsidy rate falls by 1pp). ϕ_p is a scaling factor that scales a particular policy parameter up or down by a certain factor. For example, $\phi_p \times tr^{FTB}$ when $\phi_p = 1.5$ means that the FTB payment rates are increased 1.5 times.

First, a glance at the bottom two rows, which detail output and welfare changes, reveals that most counterfactual regimes involve trade-offs between efficiency and welfare. Second, the reform that stands out is the relaxing of CCS taper rates, shown in the second-to-last column of Table 10, which improves both efficiency and welfare.

This policy generates a moderate overall welfare gain of 0.37%, compared to the 0.85% gain realized under the universal system of Subsection 6.2. Yet, unlike the universal system, which primarily transfers welfare to married households at the expense of singles, this reform spreads the welfare gains more evenly across different family types, as demonstrated in Table 11.

Couples (H)	Couples (L)	Single Men (H)	Single Men (L)	Single Women (H)	Single Women (L)	
Welfare (%)	+0.42	+0.40	+0.34	+0.24	+0.26	+0.18

Table 11: Welfare changes due to halving the CCS taper rates (H: High education and L: Low education).

Notes: Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

In addition to its lesser fiscal impact and thus a decrease in average tax rate by 0.97pp relative to the benchmark economy, easing the CCS taper rates enables larger subsidy rates to counteract the wage distortions caused by the FTB's taper rates. Single households benefit. For single women, Figure 26 suggests that while their workforce participation does not change, more increase their work hours by moving into full-time employment. For single men, they gain in terms of higher after-tax earnings. Ultimately, these factors explain the favorable changes in the life cycle consumption profiles of single households in Figure 27 and the higher welfare they experience.

Furthermore, unlike the case of downsizing universal child-related transfers, the government insurance provided by the FTB, which has proven to be important for young low-education couples, is not reduced under this reform. The presence of the FTB transfers, in conjunction with the decreased tax burden and higher subsidy, allows low-education married women to better re-allocate their labor supply over different phases of life, as shown in Figure 26. Those who choose to work, work more hours, especially from age 20 to 30 when the marginal utilities of consumption are at their highest. The changes work hours, arising from more full-time participation, are smaller but remain positive throughout their working age. However, some low-education married women aged 31-40 and 51+ do




Figure 26: Changes in labor force participation (top) and work hours (bottom) in response to the relaxation of CCS taper rates.

Notes: LFP and Work hours are reported as percentage point (pp) and percentage (%) changes relative to their respective values in the benchmark economy.

opt out of the labor force. For high-education couples, we observe increases in their labor supply during the entire working age. Consequently, based on Figure 27, these changes lead to increases in consumption over the life cycle of married households. Improved lifetime consumption and labor allocation, in turn, bring about welfare gains as depicted in Table 11.




Figure 27: Changes in consumption in response to the relaxation of CCS taper rates.

Notes: Figures are based on Table 18 in the Appendix. Results are reported as percentage changes relative to the benchmark economy.

By improving efficiency, overall welfare, and equity, the above reform meets all our set criteria; however, the model suggests that implementation might encounter roadblocks. Universalizing child-related transfers may still be preferred over incremental adjustments to the subsidy's taper rates. To see why, recall that high-education and low-education married households (who constitute the majority) experience welfare gains of 1.36% and 1.34%, respectively, under the universal regime, albeit at the expense of the single households (Figure 23). The incremental approach of lowering the CCS taper rates ensures a more balanced distribution of gains, but it only increases welfare for the average married households by approximately 0.4%. When put to a majority vote, the universal system would still likely secure the most support.

In summary, our findings underscore that larger aggregate welfare gains do not necessarily translate to increased equity, nor does a complete overhaul of the existing means-tested framework guarantee it. Specifically for Australia, universalizing the benchmark child-related transfers is not a Pareto improvement. A less radical reform, such as reducing the CCS taper rates, can potentially yield moderate aggregate gains and be more equitable. Nonetheless, whether it can garner majority support remains uncertain. Finally, a more exhaustive search over combinations of multiple policy adjustments might uncover more preferable alternatives, and we leave this issue for subsequent studies.

8 Conclusion

This paper aims to better understand whether transfers to households with children should be means-tested or universal, using the Australian policy settings of the two primary child-related means-tested transfer programs—Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and Child Care Subsidy (CCS). Our findings, based on a general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent overlapping generations model calibrated to Australia, reveal the costs and benefits of the status quo means-tested system. Means-testing appears to be an effective instrument to control the size of public funds dedicated to child benefit programs, lowering tax burdens and allowing targeted low-income households with dependent children to achieve lifetime gains. Despite these advantages, there can be significant work disincentives due to high effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) for parents, leading to overall efficiency and welfare losses.

In our model, a structural reform that replaces the means-tested system with a universal system could improve both efficiency and overall welfare, and is favored by the majority. However, such a reform leads to welfare losses for single mothers, the very group intended as beneficiaries. Varying the universal payment rates does not resolve its inequitable redistribution problem. A less generous universal scheme simply shifts the loss from single mothers to low-education married households. In an extended analysis, we show that a more incremental reform to the status quo system, such as reducing the CCS taper rates, could potentially offer a fairer distribution of welfare gains but might lack majority endorsement.

Our results carry important implications for public policy design and evaluation. First, it is crucial to account for family structure when quantitatively assessing the welfare benefits of child-related transfers. Second, a complete view of the life cycle impact is essential for understanding policy impacts and unveiling the underlying mechanisms behind welfare and redistribution effects. Third, simple incremental reforms can lead to more equitable welfare gains. Last but not least, the interactions between government transfer programs and general equilibrium effects matter for final policy outcomes. For example, in our model, abolishing one policy could lead to an expansion of a related policy, rather than alleviating the tax burden.

There are several key modeling assumptions, policy issues, and objectives that may be important for designing a more effective child-related transfer system, including the effects of such transfers on fertility, education, and marriage choices, as well as the interactions between progressive income taxes and means-tested transfers. We leave these issues for future research.

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Appendix

A Supplementary tables for main quantitative results and extensions

A.1 Current means-tested child-related transfers (FTB and CCS)

<i>Labor supply responses by mothers to the removal of FTB and CCS programs</i>											
LFP (pp)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	FT (pp)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
M (H)	+0.0454	+0.2091	+0.0777	+0.0177	+0.0012	M (H)	+0.1740	+0.4243	+0.2189	+0.0687	+0.0025
M (L)	+2.2350	+1.3731	+0.4436	+0.1798	+0.0290	M (L)	+2.7824	+2.5401	+1.0656	+0.6916	+0.0955
S (H)	0	0	0	0	0	S (H)	+0.0013	+0.0075	+0.0004	+0.0012	+0.0015
S (L)	0	0	0	+0.0002	+0.0008	S (L)	+0.0159	+0.0647	+0.0091	+0.0151	+0.0112
Hour (%)											
M (H)	+12.36	+48.96	+22.06	+7.64	+1.25						
M (L)	+83.20	+60.50	+20.12	+15.65	+8.80						
S (H)	+1.08	+10.98	+0.74	+2.07	+6.13						
S (L)	+2.57	+17.76	+2.89	+4.77	+9.28						

Table 12: **Labor supply responses by married (M) and single (S) female households to the elimination of all child-related transfer programs (H: high education, and L: low education).**

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

C (%)	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	Single Men (H)	Single Men (L)	Single Women (H)	Single Women (L)
Age 21-30	+8.12	+15.74	-0.11	-0.07	-7.74	-11.55
Age 31-40	+14.59	+14.83	-0.06	-0.06	-3.04	-6.88
Age 41-50	+9.65	+6.71	-0.03	-0.01	-4.20	-9.39
Age 51-60	+6.80	+6.59	+0.03	+0.07	-3.22	-8.03
Age 61-70	+6.24	+5.69	+1.12	+1.44	-1.32	-6.00
Age 71-80	+6.61	+4.10	+6.10	+6.36	+1.66	-3.09
Age 81-90	+5.48	+1.80	+9.83	+9.11	+2.13	-3.06
Welfare (%)	+1.35	-0.22	+0.02	+0.06	-4.03	-6.53

Table 13: **Consumption and welfare effects by demographic due to the elimination of all means-tested child-related transfers (H: High education and L: Low education).**

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

A.2 Universal child-related transfers

A.3 Other designs of universal child-related transfers

A.4 Incremental reforms: Relaxing the CCS taper rates

<i>Labor supply responses by mothers to universalized child-related transfers</i>											
LFP (pp)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	FT (pp)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
M (H)	+0.0390	+0.3347	+0.1323	+0.0126	-0.0161	M (H)	+0.4783	+1.0791	-0.0287	-0.0879	-0.0814
M (L)	+0.9228	+0.7844	+0.3895	+0.0542	-0.0153	M (L)	+2.3560	+0.4973	+0.3216	+0.0178	-0.0855
S (H)	0	0	0	-0.0003	-0.0004	S (H)	-0.0305	-0.0192	-0.0036	-0.0088	0
S (L)	0	0	-0.0001	-0.0005	+0.0009	S (L)	+0.0131	-0.0276	-0.0015	-0.0042	+0.0032
		Hour	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70				
		(%)									
		M (H)	+6.33	+21.87	+1.69	-1.25	-6.12				
		M (L)	+28.49	+9.42	+4.64	+0.60	-3.11				
		S (H)	-1.26	-1.40	-0.32	-0.89	-0.12				
		S (L)	+0.24	-0.88	-0.06	-0.20	+0.48				

Table 14: **Heterogeneous labor supply responses by married (M) and single (S) female households to universal child-related transfers** (*H*: high education, and *L*: low education).

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

C (%)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Age 21-30	+4.56	+12.70	-4.12	-3.65	-3.64	-1.12
Age 31-40	+8.59	+6.18	-4.11	-3.90	-1.69	-2.65
Age 41-50	+3.82	+2.40	-4.08	-3.97	-0.96	-2.25
Age 51-60	+2.92	+2.30	-4.03	-3.97	-1.05	-2.30
Age 61-70	+3.02	+2.56	-3.35	-3.13	+0.15	-0.93
Age 71-80	+3.81	+2.54	-0.31	-0.44	+2.34	+1.03
Age 81-90	+3.53	+2.12	+1.96	+1.21	+3.08	+1.70
Welfare (%)	+1.36	+1.34	-1.47	-1.20	-0.69	-0.51

Table 15: **Heterogeneous household consumption and welfare responses to universal child-related transfers** (*M*: Married, *SM*: Single men, *SW*: Single women (Single mothers); *H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

<i>Labor supply responses by mothers</i>																
	0.5×Baseline rates				Baseline rates				1.5×Baseline rates							
	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60
LFP (pp)	-0.0935	+0.0634	+0.0397	-0.0149	+0.0390	+0.3347	+0.1323	+0.0126	+0.0379	+0.3452	+0.1266	+0.0019				
M (H)	+0.1662	+0.5453	+0.3592	+0.0440	+0.9228	+0.7844	+0.3895	+0.0542	+2.1401	+0.9600	+0.3522	+0.0051				
M (L)	0	0	0	-0.0004	0	0	0	-0.0003	0	0	0	-0.0004				
S (H)	0	0	-0.0002	-0.0018	0	0	-0.0001	-0.0005	0	0	-0.0001	-0.0002				
S (L)																
FT (pp)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60				
M (H)	+0.1906	+0.0613	-0.0649	-0.0746	+0.4783	+1.0791	-0.0287	-0.0879	+0.5678	+1.3883	-0.1174	-0.1880				
M (L)	-0.2479	+0.1150	+0.1595	+0.0119	+2.3560	+0.4973	+0.3216	+0.0178	+4.1052	+0.5985	+0.4306	+0.0131				
S (H)	+0.0035	+0.0365	-0.0034	-0.0078	-0.0305	-0.0192	-0.0036	-0.0088	-0.0318	-0.0301	-0.0038	-0.0091				
S (L)	+0.03	+0.0710	-0.0013	-0.0039	+0.0131	-0.0276	-0.0015	-0.0042	-0.0318	-0.1518	-0.0018	-0.0050				
HOURS (%)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60				
M (H)	+1.60	+1.88	-0.29	-1.51	+6.33	+21.87	+1.69	-1.25	+7.47	+26.81	+0.33	-3.12				
M (L)	-1.31	+4.78	+3.44	+0.48	+28.49	+9.42	+4.64	+0.60	+52.70	+11.41	+5.05	+0.14				
S (H)	+0.14	+2.66	-0.30	-0.79	-1.26	-1.40	-0.32	-0.89	-1.31	-2.20	-0.34	-0.91				
S (L)	+0.55	+2.27	-0.06	-0.25	+0.24	-0.88	-0.06	-0.20	-0.58	-4.86	-0.07	-0.22				

Table 16: **Heterogeneous labor supply responses by married (M) and single (S) female households to universal child-related transfers varied by transfer size (H: high education, and L: low education).**

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

<i>Consumption and welfare changes by household type</i>																		
C (%)	0.5×Baseline rates						Baseline rates						1.5×Baseline rates					
	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
21-30	+3.6	-0.7	-0.1	-0.1	+0.4	+0.8	+4.6	+12.7	-4.1	-3.7	-3.6	-1.1	+5.1	+21.4	-6.2	-5.6	-5.2	-3.8
31-40	+5.0	+3.5	-0.1	-0.1	+3.0	+1.5	+8.6	+6.2	-4.1	-3.9	-1.7	-2.7	+9.9	+9.2	-6.1	-5.9	-3.9	-5.0
41-50	+3.9	+3.5	-0.1	-0.1	+2.9	+1.2	+3.8	+2.4	-4.1	-4.0	-1.0	-2.3	+4.0	+3.3	-6.1	-5.9	-3.0	-4.0
51-60	+3.5	+3.7	-0.1	-0.1	+2.8	+1.2	+2.9	+2.3	-4.0	-4.0	-1.1	-2.3	+3.0	+3.1	-6.0	-5.9	-3.0	-4.1
61-70	+3.8	+4.1	+0.3	+0.3	+3.4	+1.8	+3.0	+2.6	-3.4	-3.1	+0.2	-0.9	+3.1	+3.3	-5.1	-4.7	-1.5	-2.1
71-80	+4.6	+3.8	+2.3	+2.0	+4.2	+2.8	+3.8	+2.5	-0.3	-0.4	+2.3	+1.0	+4.0	+3.3	-1.3	-0.9	+1.7	+0.9
81-90	+4.3	+3.1	+3.7	+2.8	+4.4	+2.9	+3.5	+2.1	+2.0	+1.2	+3.1	+1.7	+3.6	+2.7	+1.5	+1.4	+2.8	+2.0
Welfare (%)	+1.4	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	+0.4	+0.1	+1.4	+1.3	-1.5	-1.2	-0.7	-0.5	+1.6	+2.6	-2.2	-1.9	-1.3	-0.9

Table 17: **Heterogeneous household consumption and welfare responses to universal child-related transfers varied by transfer size (M: Married, SM: Single men, SW: Single women (Single mothers); H: High education and L: Low education).**

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

C (%)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Age 21-30	+1.59	+1.89	+0.98	+0.76	+0.95	+1.06
Age 31-40	+1.72	+1.25	+0.99	+0.86	+1.15	+0.77
Age 41-50	+1.48	+1.12	+1.01	+0.92	+1.02	+0.54
Age 51-60	+1.30	+1.13	+1.02	+0.96	+1.05	+0.60
Age 61-70	+1.22	+1.07	+1.05	+1.00	+1.17	+0.76
Age 71-80	+1.20	+0.99	+1.16	+1.03	+1.16	+0.87
Age 81-90	+1.15	+0.93	+1.19	+1.01	+1.13	+0.88
Welfare (%)	+0.42	+0.40	+0.34	+0.24	+0.26	+0.18

Table 18: **Heterogeneous household consumption and welfare responses to halving the CCS taper rates** (*M*: Married, *SM*: Single men, *SW*: Single women (Single mothers); *H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

Notes: Results are reported in terms of percentage changes relative to the levels in the benchmark economy.

		2001-05	2006-10	2011-15	2016-20*	Total
Income support payments	Pensions	51.74%	51.35%	57.67%	60.80%	55.79%
	Parenting payments	9.52%	6.58%	5.61%	4.63%	6.39%
	Allowances	14.80%	9.94%	10.62%	11.54%	11.59%
	Total	76.06%	67.87%	73.90%	76.98%	73.77%
Non-income support payments	Family payments	23.09%	24.96%	22.18%	18.02%	21.87%
	Bonus payments	0.00%	5.55%	1.31%	1.38%	2.07%
	Other non-income supports	0.59%	1.40%	2.51%	3.45%	2.10%
	Total	23.68%	31.91%	26.00%	22.85%	26.05%
Other public benefits NEI to classify		0.26%	0.22%	0.10%	0.18%	0.18%

Table B.1: **Components of Australian public transfers over time**

*The welfare and social security transfer accounts for roughly 30% of government revenue in the 2016-2020 period.

B Child-related transfer programs in Australia

The Australian tax and transfer system consists of progressives income taxes and highly targeted transfers. The core components of the Australian income tax system includes a progressive income tax schedule with statutory marginal tax rates, deductions, concessions, offsets and levies. The progressive tax schedule is applied to combined taxable income. Government transfers are often subject to complex rules of means testing with different benefit levels, income and asset thresholds, and taper rates. There are two main transfer programs to families with children: Family Tax Benefit (FTB) and Child Care Subsidy (CCS), both of which fall into the non-income support category. Family Tax Benefit has two parts as described below:

B.1 Family Tax Benefit part A (FTB-A)

B.1.1 Program description and formulae

The FTB-A program is a non-taxable transfer paid per child and the amount claimable depends on family's circumstances. In short, it is a function of combined household adjusted taxable income, annual private rent, and age and number of dependent children. Important parameters that determine the levels, kinks and slopes of the FTB-A benefit schedule are:

1. Statutory base and maximum payment rates per qualifying dependent child (i.e., FTB child),
2. Income test thresholds for the base and maximum payments,
3. Withdrawal or taper rates for the base and maximum payments, and
4. Supplements such as the Large Family Supplement (LFS), the Newborn Supplement (NBS), the Multiple Birth Allowance (MBA), the Rent Assistance (RA), and the Clean Energy Supplement (CES) that are added to the statutory base and maximum payment rates per child to derive the total base and maximum payments..

These parameters constitute the main structure of the FTB A program. Their values may vary from year to year. For our purpose, we adopt the 2018 FTB A parameters in the initial steady state equilibrium of the model economy.

We first calculate the per child total base payment, b_A , and the per child total maximum payment, m_A , of the FTB A benefit.

$$\begin{aligned}
 b_{A,j} = & LFS_j + NBS_j + MBA_j + CES_{A,base,j} \\
 & + n_{dep[0,17],j} \times FTBA_{base_1} \\
 & + n_{dep[18,24],j} \times FTBA_{base_2} \\
 & + \mathbf{1}_{\{school=1\}} n_{dep[18,19],j} \times FTBA_{base_3} \\
 & + \mathbf{1}_{\{school=0\}} n_{dep[18,21],j} \times FTBA_{base_4}
 \end{aligned} \tag{B.1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
m_{A,j} = & LFS_j + NBS_j + MBA_j + RA_j + CES_{A,max,j} \\
& + ndep_{[0,12],j} \times FTBA_{max_1} \\
& + ndep_{[13,15],j} \times FTBA_{max_2} \\
& + ndep_{[16,17],j} \times FTBA_{max_3} \\
& + ndep_{[18,24],j} \times FTBA_{max_4} \\
& + \mathbf{1}_{\{school=1\}} ndep_{[16,19],j} \times FTBA_{max_5} \\
& + \mathbf{1}_{\{school=0\}} ndep_{[16,17],j} \times FTBA_{max_6} \\
& + ndep_{[18,21],j} \times FTBA_{max_7}
\end{aligned} \tag{B.2}$$

Where $school$ is a binary variable for school attendance and $ndep_{[a,b],j}$ denotes the number of children in the age range $[a, b]$ of parents aged j . $FTBA_{base}$ and $FTBA_{max}$ are parameters corresponding to the statutory base and maximum per dependent child payment rates which vary over age of a child. In 2018, $FTBA_{base} = \{2, 266.65; 0; 2, 266.65; 0\}$ and $FTBA_{max} = \{5504.20; 6938.65; 0; 0; 6938.65; 0; 0\}$ stated in 2018 AU\$.

The income test thresholds for base and maximum payments, TH_{base} and TH_{max} , are

$$\begin{cases} TH_{max} = FTBA_{T_1} \\ TH_{base} = FTBA_{T_2} + (ndep_{[0,24],j} - 1) \times FTBA_{T_2A} \end{cases} \tag{B.3}$$

The maximum threshold is fixed while the base threshold expands at the rate of $FTBA_{T_2A}$ for every addition of a dependent child.

In 2018, the starting income test thresholds $FTBA_T = \{52,706; 94,316\}$, and the base payment income test threshold adjustment factor per additional qualifying child $FTBA_{T_2A} = 0$, all stated in 2018 AU\$.

We can then calculate the FTB A benefit.

$$FTBA_j^0(y_{\tau,hh}) = \begin{cases} m_{A,j} & \text{if } y_{\tau,hh} \leq TH_{max} \\ MAX\{b_{A,j}, m_{A,j} - FTBA_{w1}(y_{\tau,hh} - TH_{max})\} & \text{if } TH_{max} < y_{\tau,hh} \leq TH_{base} \\ MAX\{0, \\ & m_{A,j} - FTBA_{w1}(y_{\tau,hh} - TH_{max}) \\ & b_{A,j} - FTBA_{w2}(y_{\tau,hh} - TH_{base})\} & \text{if } y_{\tau,hh} > TH_{base} \end{cases} \tag{B.4}$$

Where the total household taxable income $y_{\tau,hh} = y_{\tau,h} + y_{\tau,w} + ra$ and $FTBA_w$ is the withdrawal rate. In 2018, $FTBA_w = \{0.20, 0.30\}$.

The statutory rates include extra supplement for low income households. In our calculation, this supplement is later deducted from the total benefit payment if a household does not meet the supplement's income test cutoff. The income test is conducted separately once the full benefit has been computed

$$FTBA_j(y_{\tau, hh}) = \begin{cases} MAX\{0, FTBA_j^0(y_{\tau, hh}) - FTBA_{AS} \times (ndep_{[0,12],j} \\ + ndep_{[13,15],j} + \mathbf{1}_{\{school=1\}}ndep_{[1619],j})\} & \text{if } y_{\tau, hh} > FTBA_{FT1} \\ FTBA_j^0(y_{\tau, hh}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.5})$$

Where in 2018, the annual FTB A supplement adjustment $FTBA_{AS} = 737.30$ and the supplement's income test threshold $FTBA_{FT1} = 80,000$ stated in 2018 AU\$.

Below are the formulae used to calculate the LFS, NBS, MBA, CES (for part A and part B), and RA in the model.

Large Family Supplement (LFS):

$$LFS_j = min\{FTBA_{S1} \times (ndep_{[0,24],j} - FTBA_{C1} + 1), 0\} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

Where $ndep_{[a,b],j}$ denotes the number of children in the age range $[a, b]$ of parents aged j , $FTBA_{S1}$ is the LFS amount per child, and $FTBA_{C1}$ is the number of dependent children a family must have to be eligible for the LFS for the first child to satisfy the cutoff $FTBA_{C1}$ and every additional child onward. In 2018, $FTBA_{C1} = 1$ and $FTBA_{S1} = 0$. **Newborn Supplement (NBS):**

$$NBS_j = \begin{cases} \mathbf{1}_{\{nb_j \geq 1, fc_j=1\}}FTBA_{NS1} \times nb_j + \mathbf{1}_{\{nb_j \geq 1, fc_j=0\}}FTBA_{NS2} \times nb_j & \text{if } ppl = 0 \\ \mathbf{1}_{\{nb_j \geq 2, fc_j=1\}}FTBA_{NS1} \times (nb_j - 1) + \mathbf{1}_{\{nb_j \geq 2, fc_j=0\}}FTBA_{NS2} \times (nb_j - 1) & \text{if } ppl = 1 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.7})$$

Where nb_j denotes the number of newborns to parents aged j , fc_j is a binary variable for first child, ppl is a binary variable for Paid Parental Leave (by default, we set $ppl = 0$), and $FTBA_{NS}$ is the amount of NBS per qualified child. In 2018, $FTBA_{NS} = \{2,158.89; 1,080.54\}$ stated in 2018 AU\$.

Multiple Birth Allowance (MBA):

$$MBA_j = \begin{cases} \mathbf{1}_{\{sa=3, jc \leq FTBA_{MAGE}\}}FTBA_{MBA1} + \mathbf{1}_{\{sa \geq 4, jc \leq FTBA_{MAGES}\}}FTBA_{MBA2} & \text{if } school = 1 \\ \mathbf{1}_{\{sa=3, jc \leq FTBA_{MAGE}\}}FTBA_{MBA1} + \mathbf{1}_{\{sa \geq 4, jc \leq FTBA_{MAGE}\}}FTBA_{MBA2} & \text{if } school = 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.8})$$

Where sa is the number of dependent children with the same age, $school$ is a binary variable for school attendance, jc is the age of children sharing birth date, and $FTBA_{MAGE}$ and $FTBA_{MAGES}$ are a child's age cutoffs to be eligible for the MBA if they attend and do not attend school, respectively. $FTBA_{MBA}$ is the MBA payment. For simplicity, we assume there can only be one instance of multiple births for each household.

In 2018, $FTBA_{MAGE} = 16$, $FTBA_{MAGES} = 18$, and $FTBA_{MBA} = \{4,044.20; 5,387.40\}$ stated in 2018 AU\$.

Clean Energy Supplement for the FTB part A (CES_A): The Clean Energy Supplement for the FTB part A (CES_A) is separated into base and maximum payments. We add the former to the base level and the latter to the maximum level of the FTB A benefit.

$$CES_{A,base,j} = ndep_{[0,17],j} \times FTBA_{CE1} + ndep_{[18,19]AS,j} \times FTBA_{CE1} \quad (B.9)$$

$$CES_{A,max,j} = ndep_{[0,12],j} \times FTBA_{CE2} + ndep_{[13,15],j} \times FTBA_{CE3} + ndep_{[16,19]AS,j} \times FTBA_{CE3} \quad (B.10)$$

where $ndep_{[a,b],j}$ denotes the number of children in the age range $[a, b]$ of parents aged j , $school$ is a binary variable for school attendance, $ndep_{[a,b]AS,j} = \mathbf{1}_{\{school=1\}} \times ndep_{[a,b],j}$, $FTBA_{CE}$ is the per child amount of the CES_A . In 2018, $FTBA_{CE} = \{36.50; 91.25; 116.80\}$ in 2018 AU\$.

Note that from 2018 onward, only households who had received the CES_A in the previous year were eligible for the supplement. In the baseline model, we assume this is true for all households.

Rent Assistance (RA): Rent assistance adds to the per child maximum payment of the FTB A and is available only to FTB A recipients who rent privately which we assume to hold true for all households in the benchmark model.

$$RA_j(rent) = \begin{cases} MAX\{MIN\{0.75(rent - rent_{min}), RA_{max}\}, 0\} & \text{if } FTBA_1 \geq FTBA_{min} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (B.11)$$

Where $rent$ is the annual rent, $rent_{min}$ is the minimum rent to qualify for the RA, RA_{max} is the cap on the RA benefit, $FTBA_1$ is the FTB A benefit excluding the RA, $FTBA_{min}$ is the minimum size of the FTB A for which a household must be qualified to be deemed eligible for the RA.

Before 2013, $FTBA_{min}$ is set to the base FTB A payment and $FTBA_{min} = 0$ thereafter. In 2018, expressed in 2018 AU\$

$$RA_{max} = \mathbf{1}_{\{ndep_{[0,24],j} \leq 2\}} 4,116.84 + \mathbf{1}_{\{ndep_{[0,24],j} \geq 3\}} 4,648.28$$

$$rent_{min} = \mathbf{1}_{\{single=1\}} 4,102.28 + \mathbf{1}_{\{couple=1\}} 6,071.52$$

B.1.2 FTB-A means-test parameters and related income statistics

B.2 Family Tax Benefit part B (FTB B)

B.2.1 Program description and formulae

The FTB B program is paid per family. Its objective is to give additional support to single parents and single-earner partnered parents with limited means. Similar to the FTB A, the FTB B is a function of age and number of dependent children, but differently, the eligibility and amount claimable are determined by separate tests on spouses' (i.e., primary earner's and secondary earner's) individual taxable income and marital status of the potential recipients. Important parameters that determine the levels, kinks and slopes of the FTB B benefit schedule are: (i) Maximum payment rate; (ii)




Figure B.1: FTB-A income test thresholds for maximum and base payment rates




Figure B.2: FTB-A taper/phase-out rates for maximum and base payments




Figure B.3: Fractions of FTB-A recipients and average FTB-A payment per family (2018 AUD) over time.




Figure B.4: Average FTB-A payment per family by marital status

Separate income test thresholds on primary and secondary earners; and (iii) Withdrawal or taper rates based on secondary earner's taxable income

Let $y_{pe} = \text{MAX}(y_{\tau,h}, y_{\tau,w})$ and $y_{se} = \text{MIN}(y_{\tau,h}, y_{\tau,w})$ denote the primary earner's and secondary earner's taxable income, respectively, and let $m_{B_i,j} = FTBB_{max_i} + CES_{B,j}$ be the maximum payment per family. Note that the structure of the FTB B changed in 2017. The FTB B formula prior to 2017 is thus different to that from 2017 forward. That is,

Before 2017

$$FTBB_j(y_{\tau,h}, y_{\tau,w}) = \begin{cases} cond_1 \times m_{B_1,j} + cond_2 \times m_{B_2,j} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq FTBB_{T_1} \text{ and } y_{se} \leq FTBB_{T_2} \\ cond_1 \times \text{MAX}\{0, m_{B_1,j} - FTBB_w(y_{se} - FTBB_{T_2})\} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq FTBB_{T_1} \text{ and } y_{se} > FTBB_{T_2} \\ + cond_2 \times \text{MAX}\{0, m_{B_2,j} - FTBB_w(y_{se} - FTBB_{T_2})\} & \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.12})$$

From 2017

$$FTBB_j(y_{\tau,h}, y_{\tau,w}) = \begin{cases} cond_1 \times m_{B_1,j} + cond_3 \times m_{B_2,j} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq FTBB_{T_1} \text{ and } y_{se} \leq FTBB_{T_2} \\ cond_1 \times \text{MAX}\{0, m_{B_1,j} - FTBB_w(y_{se} - FTBB_{T_2})\} & \text{if } y_{pe} \leq FTBB_{T_1} \text{ and } y_{se} > FTBB_{T_2} \\ + cond_3 \times \text{MAX}\{0, m_{B_2,j} - FTBB_w(y_{se} - FTBB_{T_2})\} & \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.13})$$

Where $cond_1 = 1_{\{ndep_{[0,4],j} \geq 1\}}$, $cond_2 = 1_{\{ndep_{[0,4],j}=0, (ndep_{[5,15],j} \geq 1 \text{ or } ndep_{[16,18]AS,j} \geq 1)\}}$ and $cond_3 = 1_{\{ndep_{[0,4],j}=0, ndep_{[5,12],j} \geq 1\}} + 1_{\{ndep_{[0,4],j}=0, ndep_{[5,12],j}=0, (ndep_{[13,15],j} \geq 1 \text{ or } ndep_{[16,18]AS,j} \geq 1), single=1\}}$

In 2018, the statutory maximum FTB B payment $FTBB_{max} = \{4,412.85; 3,190.10\}$, the income test thresholds $FTBB_T = \{100,000; 5,548\}$ in 2018 AU\$, and the withdrawal rate $FTBB_w = 0.20$.

Clean Energy Supplement for the FTB part B (CES_B): The Clean Energy Supplement for FTB part B (CES_B) adds to the statutory per family payment of the FTB B benefit.

$$CES_{B,j} = \begin{cases} FTBB_{CE_1} & \text{if } ndep_{[0,4],j} \geq 1 \\ FTBB_{CE_2} & \text{if } ndep_{[0,4],j} = 0 \text{ and } (ndep_{[5,15],j} \geq 1 \text{ or } ndep_{[16,18]_{AS},j} \geq 1) \\ 0 & \text{if } ndep_{[0,4],j} = 0 \text{ and } ndep_{[5,15],j} = 0 \text{ and } ndep_{[16,18]_{AS},j} = 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.14})$$

where $ndep_{[a,b],j}$ denotes the number of children in the age range $[a, b]$ of parents aged j , $school$ is a binary variable for school attendance, $ndep_{[a,b]_{AS},j} = \mathbf{1}_{\{school=1\}} \times ndep_{[a,b],j}$, $FTBB_{CE}$ is the per family amount of CES_B . In 2018, $FTBB_{CE} = \{73; 51.10\}$ in 2018 AU\$.

Note that from 2018 onward, only households who had received the CES_B in the previous year were eligible for the supplement. In the baseline model, we assume this is true for all households.

B.2.2 FTB-B means-test parameters and related statistics




Figure B.5: FTB-B thresholds over time on primary and secondary earners over time.




Figure B.6: FTB-B taper rates over time.




Figure B.7: **Fractions of FTB-B recipients and average FTB-B payment per family (2018 AUD) over time.**

B.3 Child Care Subsidy (CCS)

The Child Care Subsidy program aims at assisting households with the cost of caring for children aged 13 or younger who are not attending secondary school and is paid directly to approved child care service providers. Eligibility criteria include (i) a test on the combined family income (y_{hh}), (ii) the type of child care service, (iii) age of the dependent child, and (iv) hours of recognized activities (e.g., working, volunteering and job seeking) by parents (n_j^h, n_j^w). The rate of subsidy is also determined by parameters such as income thresholds, work hours, and taper unit (the size of income increment by which the subsidy rate falls by 1 percentage point). Given that the current model is silent on the type of child care and therefore child care fees, we assume the followings:

1. Identical child care service operating within a perfectly competitive framework,
2. No annual cap on hourly fee and on subsidy per child,⁴³
3. Households exhaust all the available hours of subsidized care.

The child care subsidy function is

$$CCS(y_{\tau,hh}, n_j^h, n_j^w) = \Psi(y_{\tau,hh}, n_j^h, n_j^w) \times \begin{cases} CCS_{R_1} & \text{if } y_{\tau,hh} \leq TH_1 \\ MAX\{CCS_{R_2}, CCS_{R_1} - \omega_1\} & \text{if } TH_1 < y_{\tau,hh} < TH_2 \\ CCS_{R_2} & \text{if } TH_2 \leq y_{\tau,hh} < TH_3 \\ MAX\{CCS_{R_3}, CCS_{R_2} - \omega_3\} & \text{if } TH_3 \leq y_{\tau,hh} < TH_4 \\ CCS_{R_3} & \text{if } TH_4 \leq y_{\tau,hh} < TH_5 \\ CCS_{R_4} & \text{if } y_{\tau,hh} \geq TH_5 \end{cases} \quad (B.15)$$

Where $y_{\tau,hh} = y_h + y_w + ra$ and $\omega_i = \frac{y_{\tau,hh} - TH_i}{\text{taper unit}}$.

In 2018,

⁴³On 10 December 2021, the annual cap for all families who get CCS was removed. For further detail, see [the Australian department of education's announcement](#).

- Taper unit = AU\$3,000;
- Statutory subsidy rates, $CCS_R = \{0.85, 0.5, 0.2, 0\}$;
- Income test thresholds in 2018 AU\$, $TH = \{70,015; 175,015; 254,305; 344,305; 354,305\}$;
- Let $n_j^{min} = \min\{n_j^h, n_j^w\}$. The adjustment factor is

$$\Psi(y_{\tau,hh}, n_j^h, n_j^w) = 0.24_{\{y_{\tau,hh} \leq AU\$70,015, n_j^{min} \leq 8\}} + 0.36_{\{8 < n_j^{min} \leq 16\}} + 0.72_{\{16 < n_j^{min} \leq 48\}} + 1_{\{n_j^{min} > 48\}}$$

Otherwise, $\Psi(y_{\tau,hh}, n_j^h, n_j^w) = 0$.

B.4 More on the parametric tax function 9

We divide Y of 9 by the income level Y_Q associated with the Q^{th} quantile of interest.

$$T_{Y_Q} = T\left(\frac{Y}{Y_Q}\right) = \frac{Y}{Y_Q} - \zeta \left(\frac{Y}{Y_Q}\right)^{1-\tau}$$

When $Y = Y_Q$, this implies

$$T_{Y_Q} = 1 - \zeta \quad (\text{B.16})$$

The estimated $1 - \zeta$ is therefore the tax paid by households at the Q^{th} quantile of the income distribution.

B.5 Additional data and empirical facts

We use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey Restricted Release 20 (2001 – 2020). Began in 2001 and has since been conducted on an annual basis, HILDA is a nationally representative panel data of Australian households on a wide range of subjects pertaining to family and labor market dynamics. The survey collects information on respondents and their family members, including demographics, earnings and their sources, taxes and transfers, household and family identifiers, and a rich set of covariates.

We document aggregate and life-cycle facts on labor earnings, total income, government transfers, hourly wages, hours worked and labor force participation for individuals by gender, marital status and parental status. These serve as motivating factors and evidence to support our quantitative findings and subsequent discussion.

Fact 1: Child-related transfers are important sources of income for low income households. Table B.3 and Figure B.8 show that family transfer (most of which is child-related) is large and makes up more than half of the total public transfer for households in the bottom quintile. More importantly, the table suggests that the scheme is highly targeted, not just with respect to income level but also parenthood. Parents are able to claim substantial benefit, whereas non-parents of the same income bracket receive a trivial amount. Parents in the second, third and fourth quintile, for instance, receive approximately three-fourth of their public benefit as direct family transfer. Zooming

Primary Earner		N	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Age	Individual	5,064	41.62	40	11.42	25	64
	Family	5,064	-	-	-	-	-
Weekly hours	Individual	5,064	38.39	40	12.17	0	137
	Family	5,064	53.17	48	30.83	0	227
Weekly wages	Individual	5,064	1,602.68	1,407.68	994.18	0.00	13,106.03
	Family	5,064	2,366.64	2,135.80	1,479.03	0.00	15,752.48
Labor Income	Individual	5,064	85,855.68	75,723.73	56,891.76	0.00	970,817.13
	Family	5,064	129,099.10	114,556.42	85,839.93	0.00	1.13e+06
Market income	Individual	5,064	88,836.96	77,665.37	60,488.81	-42,502.38	970,817.13
	Family	5,064	139,555.66	121,949.19	102,986.36	-42,016.96	2.74e+06
Private transfer	Individual	5,064	446.73	0.00	3,197.68	0.00	132,911.66
	Family	5,064	809.84	0.00	5,273.85	0.00	168,922.17
Total income tax	Individual	5,064	20,926.39	15,641.81	23,154.97	-2,259.09	413,873.91
	Family	5,064	31,058.35	23,178.26	37,202.65	-7,960.70	1.16e+06
Public transfer	Individual	5,064	2,133.53	0.00	5,764.68	0.00	72,231.70
	Family	5,064	5,205.20	0.00	10,679.92	0.00	97,191.41

Table B.2: **Summary statistics of primary earners in financial year 2020.** The values of income, tax liabilities and transfers are expressed in 2018 AUD.

in and breaking down each group by gender and marital status for the first three quintiles, Table B.4 suggests that even among parents, the family transfer design places emphasis on marital status to account for equivalence scale of consumption (i.e., consumption economies of scale for larger size households). Among the recipients, single households get about as much benefit as married households do.

The annual family transfer benefits for parents are substantial up to the median quintile. One could argue that the disincentive effect extends to the middle income, though the magnitude of the effect might be small. What the statistics here imply is that an attempt to flatten the taper rates for the poor might cause leak the high participation tax rate problem further into the middle-income bracket.

		Age	Higher Education	Hours (Weekly)	Wage (Weekly)	Market Income (Annual)	Family transfer (Annual)	Total public transfer
1	Parent	37.04	53	25.06	431.39	8,065.76	16,046.15	29,628.35
	Non-parent	34.1	41	25.25	439.94	9,241.95	74.57	8,113.97
2	Parent	38.47	59	34.15	717.34	35,792.25	14,304.55	19,174.27
	Non-parent	37.76	52	35.53	786.26	38,842.94	69.61	2,309.72
3	Parent	39.16	65	37.31	981.51	53,330.45	7,588.87	9,119.27
	Non-parent	39.18	61	38.96	1,049.88	57,771.13	72.01	1,052.07
4	Parent	41.04	71	38.41	1,269.71	71,613.00	2,800.09	3,611.17
	Non-parent	39.5	66	40.48	1,220.94	69,634.42	72.65	585.03
5	Parent	43.81	83	40.67	1,893.70	130,694.33	492.86	956.73
	Non-parent	40.43	71	41.90	1,619.62	106,837.39	57.10	452.90

Table B.3: **Average 20-year statistics for parents and non-parents by family market income quintile.** All income and transfer values are stated in 2018 Australian dollar.

Fact 2: Distinct shapes of the life-cycle labor supply of mothers

			Age	Higher Educa- tion	Hours (Weekly)	Wage (Weekly)	Market Income (Annual)	Family transfer (Annual)	Total public transfer	
1	Parent	Female	Married	37.76	0.52	21.93	351.95	8,606.07	16,562.07	30,488.53
			Single	35.91	0.53	19.57	394.15	8,405.73	15,543.54	28,452.93
		Male	Married	37.67	0.53	35.78	549.33	7,131.24	16,822.63	31,531.71
			Single	42.35	0.65	25.38	377.37	8,391.72	13,723.69	25,218.91
	Non-parent	Female	Married	42.61	0.39	21.95	330.23	9,698.18	115.37	14,455.51
			Single	32.33	0.44	21.79	412.72	9,458.34	64.40	6,671.70
		Male	Married	41.28	0.47	31.44	439.17	8,269.99	110.10	12,362.00
			Single	31.36	0.37	27.99	500.43	9,154.35	62.90	6,505.85
2	Parent	Female	Married	37.86	0.57	24.50	511.58	22,245.91	13,634.21	18,460.58
			Single	40.06	0.64	30.23	757.21	39,957.50	13,510.48	18,351.28
		Male	Married	37.42	0.56	41.73	797.82	39,914.17	15,323.38	20,368.44
			Single	43.37	0.68	37.42	800.88	43,748.14	12,354.30	15,386.13
	Non-parent	Female	Married	41.28	0.50	28.77	598.87	27,740.26	104.54	5,312.39
			Single	37.92	0.58	34.30	835.51	41,945.45	53.59	1,266.48
		Male	Married	41.21	0.54	37.05	701.84	33,829.79	99.60	4,388.38
			Single	34.76	0.47	38.68	854.82	42,739.62	56.76	1,127.53
3	Parent	Female	Married	38.02	0.60	26.88	668.60	33,180.32	6,801.65	8,286.84
			Single	43.16	0.76	39.04	1,315.33	72,731.73	8,649.18	10,034.78
		Male	Married	39.14	0.66	44.55	1148.70	64,326.80	7,995.68	9,610.52
			Single	45.66	0.73	43.30	1,349.86	79,314.12	8,031.67	8,791.40
	Non-parent	Female	Married	39.53	0.59	32.96	804.86	42,424.30	96.00	1,552.06
			Single	39.82	0.72	38.91	1,213.76	67,857.61	44.65	579.33
		Male	Married	41.33	0.60	41.16	1,000.81	55,191.77	90.46	1,404.99
			Single	35.72	0.58	43.09	1,250.76	69,903.43	45.26	453.81

Table B.4: Average 20-year statistics by family market income quintile and key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood) for the bottom 3 quintiles. All income and transfer values are stated in 2018 Australian dollar.




Figure B.8: **Age profiles of income at different levels for parents in the bottom two quintiles of pre-government income.**

Notes: Pre-government income (black line) is a combined income from all market sources and private transfer before tax and public transfer. Post-tax income (blue line) is pre-government income net of tax and concessions. Post-FTB income (orange line) adds the FTB part A and part B to the post-tax income. Post-government income (a.k.a. post-fiscal or disposable income) is a sum of the post-FTB income and other public transfers received for the completed financial year preceding the date of HILDA survey interview.




Figure B.9: **Age profiles of full-time share of employment by key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood).** **Top left:** married fathers (solid) and married childless men (dashed). **Top right:** married mothers (solid) and married childless women (dashed). **Bottom left:** single fathers (solid) and single childless men (dashed). **Bottom right:** single mothers (solid) and single childless women (dashed).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life-cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data, and the oldest cohort is cohort 5 aged 55-74.




Figure B.10: Age profiles of work hours (if employed) by key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood). **Top left:** married fathers (solid) and married childless men (dashed). **Top right:** married mothers (solid) and married childless women (dashed). **Bottom left:** single fathers (solid) and single childless men (dashed). **Bottom right:** single mothers (solid) and single childless women (dashed).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life-cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data. The oldest cohort is cohort 6 (aged 50-69), except for the bottom-left panel in which the oldest is cohort 5 (aged 55-74).

Fact 3: There are big gaps in wages and earnings between parents and non-parents Based on Figure B.11, hourly wage measures of normalized returns to labor over life-cycle display striking resemblance across gender and marital status for non-parents. The main differences are between (i) parents and non-parents, and (ii) fathers and mothers (regardless of their marital status). Non-parents experience similar wage profiles whether they are single or married, male or female. The differences between parents and non-parents are however notable. Compared with parents, the average non-parents start with lower wages that increase rapidly to surpass parents by age 30 for a brief period and then proceed to decline at a greater rate. Among parents, hourly returns are significantly lower for mothers, especially if they are married. Fathers, on the other hand, have more stable life-cycle wage profiles that are generally the highest when compared with other groups. As in the cases of work hours and participation, the evidence suggests that parenthood is correlated either directly (e.g., childcare responsibilities) or indirectly (e.g., spousal earnings, child-related transfers, and demand side factors such as occupational choice and institutional structure, etc) with the wage differentials.

C Solution method and algorithm

We proceed in the following steps. First, we solve the model (a small economy with open capital market) for its initial balanced-growth path steady state equilibrium which is calibrated to the Australian economy's key micro and macro economic moments in the period 2012-2018 (a relatively stable period for these moment values). With the benchmark economy in place, we conduct sensitivity analysis and policy experiments by solving static problems for final steady state equilibria of hypothetical




Figure B.11: Age profiles of normalized wages (against age-21 worker's average wages) by key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood). **Top left:** married fathers (solid) and married childless men (dashed). **Top right:** married mothers (solid) and married childless women (dashed). **Bottom left:** single fathers (solid) and single childless men (dashed). **Bottom right:** single mothers (solid) and single childless women (dashed). Notes: Due to the lack of balanced panel data covering the entire lifespan of individual observations, the estimated wage figures are predicted values via a regression of log wages on quadratic age terms, gender, parenthood, marital status, the interactions between the selected demographics and age, and a year dummy.

alternative economic regimes. The algorithm is as follows:

1. Parameterize the model and discretize the asset space $a \in [a_{min}, a_{max}]$. The choice of grid points is such that
 - Number of grid points, $N_A = 70$;
 - $a_{min} = 0$ (No-borrowing constraint);
 - The grid nodes on $[a_{min}, a_{max}]$ are fairly dense on the left tail so households are not restricted by an all-or-nothing decision (i.e., unable to save early in the life cycle due to the lack of choices on the grid nodes for small asset levels);
 - a_{max} is sufficiently large so that: (i) household wealth accumulation is not artificially bound by a_{max} , and (ii) there is enough margin for upward adjustment induced by new policy regimes;
2. In a similar manner, discretize the human capital space $h_{\lambda,\ell}^f \in [h_{min,\lambda,\ell}^f, h_{max,\lambda,\ell}^f]$ for each λ and ℓ types such that
 - Number of grid nodes, $N_H = 25$;
 - $h_{min,\lambda,\ell}^f = 1$ for all λ and ℓ ⁴⁴
 - $h_{max,\lambda=0,\ell}^f = h_{max,\lambda=0,\ell}^m$ and $h_{max,\lambda=2,\ell}^f = h_{max,\lambda=1,\ell}^m$ for every ℓ ;

⁴⁴An alternative method is to set $h_{min,\lambda,\ell}^f = h_{min,\lambda,\ell}^m$. In plain English, we set the minimum earnings abilities of single and married female working in part-time or full-time jobs to match those of their male counterparts. This would be more realistic but could cause erratic labor supply responses to policies at the beginning, most likely owing to the fact that we have no job switching friction/cost. We are exploring different options in subsequent developments.

3. Guess the initial steady state values of endogenous aggregate macro variables K_0 and L_0 , endogenous government policy variables, and wage (w), taking $r = r^w$ where r^w is a given world interest rate;
4. Solve the representative firm problem's first-order conditions for market clearing factor prices;
5. Given the vector of the benchmark economy's macro and micro parameters (Ω_0), the parameters governing the stochastic processes of lifespan (ψ) and income (η_m, η_f), factor prices (w, r), and the government policy parameters, solve for the household problems for optimal decision rules on savings (a^+), joint consumption (c), female labor force participation (ℓ) and the value function of households by backward induction (from $j = J$ to $j = 1$) using *value function iteration* method;
6. Starting from a known distribution of newborns ($j = 1$), compute the measure of households across states by forward induction, using
 - the computed decision rules $\{a_j^+, c_j, \ell_j\}_{j=1}^J$;
 - the time-invariant survival probabilities $\{\psi\}_{j=1}^J$;
 - the Markov transition probabilities of the transitory earnings shocks η ;
 - the law of motion of female human capital from equation 4;

For determining the next period measure of households on the asset (a) and female human capital (h) grids, we employ a linear interpolation method on their next period values;

7. Accounting for the share of alive agents, sum across all state elements to get the aggregate levels of savings (A), consumption (C), female labor force participation (LFP), tax revenue, transfers, and others. Update L, K, I and Y via a convex updating process to ensure a stable convergence. Solve for endogenous government policy variables using the government budget balance equation.
8. Given the updated aggregate variables, calculate the goods market convergence criterion for a small open economy

$$Y - (C + I + G + NX) < \varepsilon$$

where

- the trade balance NX at time t is the difference between current and future government foreign debts. That is, $NX_t = (1+n)(1+g)B_{F,t+1} - (1+r)B_{F,t}$ and $B_{F,t} = A_t - K_t - B_t$ is the required foreign capital to clear the domestic capital market;
 - $NX < 0$ implies a capital account surplus or current account deficit (net inflow of foreign capital and thus an increase in the foreign indebtedness).⁴⁵
9. Return to step 3 until the goods market convergence criterion is satisfied.

⁴⁵ B_{LSRA} is the debt level of the Lump Sum Redistributive Authority whose sole purpose is to completely compensate (tax) the existing cohorts for their losses (gains) by using tax revenue from (compensating) the newborn cohorts for their gains (losses) due to the new policy regime in our policy experiment while maintaining a zero net present value of the LSRA's lifetime budget. Any net surplus in resource after the scheme is concluded can be regarded as an aggregate efficiency gain resulting from the policy experiment, and vice versa. For the current exercise, however, *LSRA* is silent and thus $B_{LSRA} = 0$.

Our steady-state analysis is capable of capturing the ex-ante welfare effect of a regime shift (i.e., effect on the future newborns). However, grasping the full impact of a policy change requires that one also investigates the welfare effect of the change on current generations (non-newborn) alive in the reform period. This requires that we consider the dynamics of the problem in-between steady states by solving for the transition path of the model economy as it moves from the initial steady state under the status quo to the final steady state equilibrium under the new regime. For a problem like ours with high dimensionality, this is a computationally monumental task. One might need to impose simplifying parametric forms on the social security schemes of interest, and/or shrink the state space by re-formulating certain aspects of the problem. For this study, only the steady state results are shown.

D Additional Tables and Figures

D.1 Tables

Financial year	Welfare (\$b)	Welfare-GDP (%)	Welfare-Revenue (%)
2010-11	140.19	8.43	34.04
2011-12	149.66	8.70	34.20
2012-13	153.24	8.89	33.62
2013-14	155.68	8.88	33.47
2014-15	165.13	9.41	35.15
2015-16	167.68	9.47	34.59
2016-17	165.76	8.95	33.02
2017-18	171.62	8.99	32
2018-19	174.24	8.80	31.18
2019-20	195.71	9.86	36.05

Table D.1: Welfare expenditure in Australia

Notes: \$ value is expressed in 2019–20 prices.

Source: *Welfare expenditure report by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare*.

Financial year	Families & Children	Old people	Disabled	Unemployed	Others
2009-10	2.51	3.33	1.87	0.48	0.40
2010-11	2.39	3.33	1.94	0.44	0.34
2011-12	2.33	3.43	1.98	0.44	0.52
2012-13	2.31	3.57	2.00	0.49	0.52
2013-14	2.26	3.47	2.02	0.55	0.57
2014-15	2.33	3.79	2.09	0.59	0.61
2015-16	2.32	3.86	2.08	0.60	0.62
2016-17	2.02	3.72	2.01	0.57	0.63
2017-18	1.94	3.67	2.18	0.56	0.65
2018-19	1.81	3.63	2.22	0.49	0.64
2019-20	1.92	3.85	2.53	0.93	0.62

Table D.2: Welfare expenditure to GDP (%) by target groups

Source: *Welfare expenditure report by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare*.

D.2 Figures




Figure D.1: Intensive margin: Age profiles of work hours (if employed) by key demographics (gender and parenthood). Left: fathers (solid) and childless men (dashed). Right: mothers (solid) and childless women (dashed).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life-cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data. The oldest cohort is cohort 4 (aged 60-79) on the left panel and cohort 5 (aged 55-74) on the right panel. We omit the very old cohorts due to data limitation.




Figure D.2: Intensive margin: Age profiles of work hours (if employed) by marital status and gender.
Left panel: married men (solid line) and married women (dashed line). **Right panel:** single men (solid line) and single women (dashed line).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life-cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data. The oldest cohort is cohort 4 (aged 60-79) on the left panel and cohort 5 (aged 55-74) on the right panel. We omit the very old cohorts due to data limitation.




Figure D.3: Extensive margin: Age profiles of labor force participation by key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood). **Top left:** married fathers (solid) and married childless men (dashed). **Top right:** married mothers (solid) and married childless women (dashed). **Bottom left:** single fathers (solid) and single childless men (dashed). **Bottom right:** single mothers (solid) and single childless women (dashed).

Notes: The age profiles stitch together 20-year snapshots of life-cycle for selected cohorts. The youngest cohort is cohort 12 aged 20-39 in the data, and the oldest cohort is cohort 12 aged 75-94.




Figure D.4: Age profiles of normalized weekly earnings (against age-21 worker's average earnings) by key demographics (gender, marital status and parenthood). **Top left:** married fathers (solid) and married childless men (dashed). **Top right:** married mothers (solid) and married childless women (dashed). **Bottom left:** single fathers (solid) and single childless men (dashed). **Bottom right:** single mothers (solid) and single childless women (dashed).

Notes: Due to the lack of balanced panel data covering the entire lifespan of individual observations, the estimated wage figures are predicted values via a regression of log weekly earnings on quadratic age terms, gender, parenthood, marital status, the interactions between the selected demographics and age, and a year dummy.