ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES

Education – Charter Schools Sample Teaching Slides III

WHO BENEFITS FROM KIPP?

Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, Pathak and Walters (2012)

Background: Charter schools vs. Traditional public schools

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- Can schools alone substantially reduce racial achievement gaps? Maybe they can. One potential solution is charter schools.
- KIPP (Knowledge is Power Program) is the largest charter management organization and targets low-income and minority students.
- As opposed to traditional public schools, KIPP schools
 - 1. are publicly funded but privately operated
 - 2. are subject to fewer rules and regulations, but are accountable for academic results
 - 3. subscribe to an approach called "No Excuses":
 - a) Focus on traditional math and reading skills
 - b) Long school day and year
 - c) Selective teacher hiring
 - d) Strict behaviour norms
 - e) Strong student work ethic

Background: KIPP Lynn vs. Lynn Public Schools (LPS)

- KIPP (Knowledge is Power Program) is the largest charter management organization and targets low-income and minority students.
- The study focuses on KIPP Academy Lynn (<u>KIPP Lynn</u>), the only KIPP school in New England, Massachusetts.
- The other publicly funded option for local residents is Lynn Public Schools (LPS).
- Most KIPP Lynn students live in Lynn and would otherwise attend LPS.

Background: KIPP Lynn vs. Lynn Public Schools (LPS)

• Similarities:

- 1. High proportion of non-white students who are also eligible for free or reducedpriced lunch
- 2. A fifth of the students in LPS and KIPP Lynn are categorized as **LEP** (Limited English Proficiency)
- 3. Another fifth are **SPED** (Special Education) students
- 4. Student-teacher ratios at around 14

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• Differences:

- 1. KIPP Lynn operates under the "No Excuses" approach
- 2. Reward 'paychecks' points for good work (spent on field trip and other perks)
- 3. Students, parents, and teachers sign a "Commitment to Excellence"
- 4. KIPP Lynn's teachers are NOT unionized, work long day, are younger and are expected to respond to students' phone calls in the evening

The Debate

Proponent of KIPP:

KIPP substantially improves academic performance of its students.

Opponent of KIPP:

- 1. Results achieved by students at KIPP are driven by selection bias.
- KIPP only benefits relatively high-achieving and motivated students but not the disadvantageous groups such as English language learners (LEP) and special education (SPED) students.

Angrist et al (2012) estimates the effect of **KIPP Lynn** on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) scores, a state-wide standardized Math and English language arts (ELA) test scores, of its students.

Why?

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Why?

To address the two main criticisms:

1. Results achieved by students in KIPP are driven by selection bias

State-wide regulations require all charter schools to use a lottery when oversubscribed.

From 2005 to 2008, admissions lotteries are used to develop a quasiexperimental research design.

Randomized lotteries help address the problem of selection bias.

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Why?

To address the two main criticisms:

2. KIPP only benefits relatively high-achieving and motivated students

While sharing many features with other KIPP schools across the US, KIPP Lynn enrols a high proportion of Hispanic, limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education (SPED) students.

This allows the study to estimate achievement gains for these students.

Angrist et al (2012) estimates the effect of **KIPP Lynn** on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) scores, a state-wide standardized Math and English language arts (ELA) test scores, of its students.

Note:

KIPP Lynn shares many features with other KIPP schools.

According to the authors:

"We might therefore expect similar gains and interactions to emerge from a larger sample of KIPP schools."

Are the findings externally valid?

The study focuses on one school and attributes the observed students' performance gains to the program features common to all KIPP schools.

• **Sample**: KIPP Lynn first-time applicants into 5th grade (Fall 2005 through 2008) (5th grade is KIPP's entry point)

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However, omit the following applicants:

- right applicants with siblings enrolled in KIPP (guaranteed entry),
- ➤ late applicants (missed the lotteries),
- >older applicants (entered late, if at all), and
- right students with missing demographic data when matched to the Student Information Management System (SIMS).

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- ▶ late applicants (missed the lotteries),
- >older applicants (entered late, if at all), and
- right students with missing demographic data when matched to the Student Information Management System (SIMS).
- From 5^{th} to 8^{th} grade, these students were tested in math and ELA. Use their **normalized MCAS scores** (state-wide mean = 0, sd = 1) to proxy their academic performance

 Column (1), (2), and (3) report the 4th grade means of demographic characteristics and test scores.

• Column (4) reports the β_1 of:

$$row = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{1}_{\{winner\}} + e$$

Why?

If lottery is truly random, there should be no correlation between being a winner/loser and any of the observed characteristics or test scores.

• Column (5) adds all demographic controls to the regression above.

		Table 1: Desc	riptive Statistics ar Means	nd Covariate Balance	Dalamas	
d		Lynn Public 5th graders	KIPP Lynn 5th graders	KIPP Lynn lottery applicants	No controls	egressions Demographic controls
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Hispanie	0.418	0.565	0.538	-0.052	-
					(0.053)	
	Black	0.173	0.235	0.254	0.027	-
					(0.044)	
	White	0.296	0.168	0.182	-0.010	-
					(0.040)	
	Asian	0.108	0.021	0.022	0.026*	-
					(0.015)	
	Female	0.480	0.474	0.484	-0.010	-
					(0.054)	
	Free/reduced price lunch	0.770	0.842	0.825	-0.030	-
					(0.041)	
	Special Education	0.185	0.189	0.197	-0.013	-
					(0.042)	
	Limited English Proficiency	0.221	0.172	0.206	-0.075	-0.060
					(0.047)	(0.044)
	Baseline Math Score	-0.307	-0.336	-0.390	0.097	0.066
					(0.114)	(0.109)
	Baseline Verbal Score	-0.356	- 0.399	-0.438	0.054	0.028
					(0.118)	(0.109)
	Fourth Grade Applicant			0.768	0.056	0.068
					(0.046)	(0.047)
	F-value from joint test				0.820	0.998
	p-value from F-test				0.621	0.409

Some notable statistics:

1. KIPP Lynn admitted high proportion of Black and Hispanic applicants.

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- 2. 5^{th} graders in both LPS and KIPP Lynn, as well as the applicants to KIPP Lynn, score roughly $0.3 0.4\sigma$ below the state mean.

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- 3. KIPP Lynn lottery applicants look much like KIPP Lynn 5th graders (won and complied).

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	proportion of Black and	Hispanic	0.418	0.565	0.538	-0.052	-
	Hispanic applicants.	Black	0.173	0.235	0.254	(0.053) 0.027	-
2.	5 th graders in both LPS and KIPP Lynn, as well as the	White	0.296	0.168	0.182	(0.044) -0.010 (0.040)	-
	applicants to KIPP Lynn, score	Asian	0.108	0.021	0.022	0.026*	-
	roughly $0.3 - 0.4\sigma$ below the					(0.015)	
	state mean.	Female	0.480	0.474	0.484	-0.010	-
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4.	Characteristics cannot be					(0.047)	(0.044)
	predicted based on lottery	Baseline Math Score	-0.307	-0.336	-0.390	0.097	0.066
	outcome (i.e., lottery winners	Baseline Verbal Score	-0.356	-0.399	-0.438	(0.114) 0.054	(0.109) 0.028
		Baseline Verbal Score	-0.550	-0.399	-0.438	(0.118)	(0.109)
	were randomly selected from	Fourth Grade Applicant			0.768	0.056	0.068
	the pool of lottery applicants).					(0.046)	(0.047)
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Data and Empirical Framework: Attrition

Subject

Math

ELA

Another problem that could lead to selection bias is 'Attrition'.

- Is the attrition process random? Perhaps lottery losers are more likely to enrol in private school or leave state
 - → More likely to be missing from the MCAS state-wide test score data.
- Because we are comparing between treatment and control groups
 - → Unobserved elements in the control group can lead to biased results.

(0.031)

971

0.031

(0.032)

971

Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the outcome test score is non-missing on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies. The regression in column (2) includes dummies for outcome grade, year of baseline, application grade, and year of application interacted with a contemoraneous sibling applicant dummy. Column (3) adds demographic variables, and column (4) adds baseline test scores. The sample is restricted to cohorts for which we should observe follow-up scores and excludes applicants with sibling priority. Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.

Table 3: Attrition

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971

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0.855

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957

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958

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Data and Empirical Framework: Attrition

How to detect non-random attrition?

Answer the question:

"Are lottery results correlated with missing data over time?"

_	Differential Follow-up (winner - loser)					
Proportion of non-offered with MCAS scores	Basic controls	Demographics	Demographics and baseline scores			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
0.851	0.052*	0.041	0.044			

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Data and Empirical Framework: Attrition

How to detect non-random attrition?

Answer the question:

"Are lottery results correlated with missing data over time?"

Regression:

$$1_{\{score \neq missing\}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{1}_{\{winner\}} + controls + e$$

Result:

Probability of non-missing score is 85% for lottery losers.

Being a winner does NOT increase the probability, esp after accounting for controls.

Table 3: Attrition

		Differential Follow-up (winner - loser)							
	Proportion of non-offered with MCAS scores	Basic controls	Demographics	Demographics and baseline scores					
Subject	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
Math	0.851	0.052* (0.032) 971	0.041 (0.031) 971	0.044 (0.030) 957					
ELA	0.855	0.048 (0.031) 971	0.031 (0.032) 971	0.041 (0.031) 958					

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Estimating the causal effect of attending KIPP Lynn on test scores.

The Main equation:

$$y_{igt} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i + \rho s_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt}$$

where

- y_{igt} is the scores of student i tested in year t in grade g.
- s_{igt} is the years spent at KIPP Lynn as of the test date.
- ρ is the average treatment effect.
- α_t and β_a are year-of-test and grade-of-test effects.
- X_i is a vector of demographic controls.
- d_{ij} is three of the four KIPP Lynn application cohorts (j for cohort).

Estimating the causal effect of attending KIPP Lynn on test scores.

The First-Stage equation:

$$s_{igt} = \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_i \mu_i d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i + \pi Z_i + \eta_{igt}$$

where

- s_{igt} is the years spent at KIPP Lynn as of the test date.
- Z_i is the randomly assigned lottery offer dummy (an instrument).
- π is the first stage effect.
- λ_t and κ_q are year-of-test and grade-of-test effects.

We have

The Main equation:

$$y_{igt} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_{i} \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i + \rho s_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt} \quad (1)$$

The First-Stage equation:

$$s_{igt} = \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_i \mu_j d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i + \pi Z_i + \eta_{igt}$$
 (2)

To get ρ , we have to first construct the reduced form generated by this system of equations by substituting (2) into (1).

Substitute (2) into (1):

The reduced form:

$$y_{igt} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i$$

$$+ \rho \left(\lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i + \pi Z_i + \eta_{igt} \right) + \epsilon_{igt}$$

$$= \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i$$

$$+ \rho \left(\lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i \right) + \rho \pi Z_i + (\rho \eta_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt})$$

Substitute (2) into (1):

The reduced form:

$$y_{igt} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i$$

$$+ \rho \left(\lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i \right) + \rho \pi Z_i + (\rho \eta_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt})$$

Let $\tau = \rho \pi$ and name it the "reduced form effect".

Now, we estimate the first stage and the reduced form to get $\hat{\tau}$ and $\hat{\pi}$:

The first-stage equation:

$$s_{igt} = \lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_i \mu_i d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i + \pi Z_i + \eta_{igt}$$
 (2)

The reduced form:

$$y_{igt} = \alpha_t + \beta_g + \sum_j \delta_j d_{ij} + \gamma' X_i$$
$$+ \rho \left(\lambda_t + \kappa_g + \sum_j \mu_j d_{ij} + \Gamma' X_i \right) + \tau Z_i + \left(\rho \eta_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt} \right)$$

Since $\tau = \rho \pi$, the average treatment effect ρ can be derived: $\hat{\rho} = \frac{\hat{\tau}}{\hat{\pi}}$

First Stage estimates:

Lottery winners spent an average **1.2 years more at KIPP** than losers (robust).

NOTE:

The first-stage estimates are reduced by the fact that

- Some winners did not enrol in KIPP
- Some KIPP students left before finishing
- Some losers ended up in KIPP later

	Table 4: Lottery Results								
			all appl	icants		4th grade	applicants	Lynn public scho	ools at baseline
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)
		856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Reduced Form estimates:

- Compared to lottery losers, winners score:
 - \triangleright **0**. **4** σ higher in Math, and
 - > 0. 15σ higher in ELA (with demographic and baseline score controls)

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		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS		
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***		
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)		
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704		
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***		
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)		
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704		
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***		
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)		
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696		
	. .		0.400	0.450	0.470444	0.4000	0.420+++	0.0474	0.1.00+++		
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***		
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)		
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705		
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***		
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)		
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705		
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***		
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)		
		956	956	956	956	744	744	609	609		

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

2SLS estimates:

Recall

$$2SLS \ estimate(\rho) = \frac{Red.Form(\tau)}{First \ stage(\pi)}$$

How to interpret?

				Table 4:	Lottery Results				
			all appli	cants		4th grade	applicants	Lynn public schools at baseline	
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)
		856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

2SLS estimates:

Recall

$$2SLS \ estimate(\rho) = \frac{Red.Form(\tau)}{First \ stage(\pi)}$$

How to interpret?

Consider the first row:

→ We expect a winner to attend KIPP Lynn 1.222 years longer and score 0.431σ higher in math test.

This implies that math scores increase by about

$$\hat{\rho} = \frac{0.431\sigma}{1.222 \ years} = \mathbf{0.35}\sigma/year$$
 at KIPP Lynn.

Table 4:	Lottery	Kesul

	Table 4: Lottery Results									
			all appli	cants		4th grade	applicants	Lynn public scl	hools at baseline	
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	
Subject	Contro1s	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***	
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)	
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704	
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***	
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)	
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704	
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***	
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)	
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696	
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***	
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)	
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705	
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***	
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)	
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705	
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***	
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)	
		856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698	
Manager This	4-1-1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			TZTDD A T	T1		1:1 4- IZIDD I		

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

2SLS estimates:

• For ELA test, the effect is 0.12σ higher score for winners per year spent at KIPP Lynn (after adding all controls).

Table 4: Lottery Results											
		all applicants				4th grade applicants		Lynn public schools at baseline			
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS		
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***		
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)		
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704		
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***		
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)		
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704		
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***		
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)		
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696		
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***		
LLA	Dasic	(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)		
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705		
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***		
	Demographics	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)		
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705		
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***		
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)		
	Dascille Scores	856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698		

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

2SLS estimates:

- For ELA test, the effect is 0.12σ higher score for winners per year spent at KIPP Lynn (after adding all controls).
- Authors note that these effects are similar to results from a sample of charter schools in Boston in Abdulkadiroglu et al (2009).
- OLS estimates are close to the 2SLS estimates, which suggests that selection bias (due to compliance issue) is minor.

Table 4: Lottery Results									
		all applicants				4th grade applicants		Lynn public schools at baseline	
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)
		856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698
Notes: This		866 1.234*** (0.066) 856	866 0.149** (0.073) 856	866 0.120** (0.058) 856	866 0.172*** (0.031) 856	751 0.111* (0.059) 744	866 0.168*** (0.033) 744	705 0.132* (0.068) 698	705 0.182*** (0.036) 698

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Empirical Results

Addressing other concerns:

- 1. Older applicants are perhaps less likely than 4th grade applicants to have accepted an offer since they were required to repeat their current grade.
 - (5) and (6) suggest this is not a problem.
- 2. Students coming from outside of LPS have lower match rates from lottery data to SIMS data.
 - (7) and (8) suggest this is also not a concern.


					ottery Results					
			all appli	icants		4th grade	4th grade applicants		Lynn public schools at baseline	
		First Stage	Reduced Form	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Math	Basic	1.222***	0.431***	0.353***	0.304***	0.368***	0.272***	0.342***	0.308***	
		(0.063)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.109)	(0.054)	
		865	865	865	865	752	752	704	704	
	Demographics	1.232***	0.392***	0.318***	0.316***	0.356***	0.302***	0.309***	0.336***	
		(0.065)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.046)	
		865	865	865	865	752	865	704	704	
	Demographics &	1.228***	0.425***	0.346***	0.317***	0.336***	0.319***	0.341***	0.346***	
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.038)	
		856	856	856	856	746	746	696	696	
ELA	Basic	1.223***	0.183	0.150	0.170***	0.188*	0.138***	0.217*	0.168***	
		(0.063)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.057)	
		866	866	866	866	751	751	705	705	
	Demographics	1.235***	0.118	0.095	0.172***	0.152*	0.164***	0.150	0.180***	
		(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.080)	(0.043)	(0.092)	(0.047)	
		866	866	866	866	751	866	705	705	
	Demographics &	1.234***	0.149**	0.120**	0.172***	0.111*	0.168***	0.132*	0.182***	
	Baseline Scores	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.036)	
		856	856	856	856	744	744	698	698	

Notes: This table reports the coefficients from regressions of test scores on years spent at KIPP Academy Lynn. The sample uses students who applied to KIPP Lynn between 2005 and 2008. It is restricted to students with baseline demographic characteristics and excludes applicants with sibling priority. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies. All regressions also include year of test dummies, year of application dummies interacted with a contemporaneous sibling applicant dummy, and grade of application dummies. Some regressions add demographic controls, which include dummies for female, black, hispanic, asian, other race, special education, limited english proficiency, free/reduced price lunch, and a female*minority interaction. Columns (1)-(3) report the first stage, reduced from, and 2SLS coefficients from instrumenting years in KIPP Lynn using the lottery win/loss dummy. Column (4) reports the coefficients from OLS regressions of test scores on years in KIPP Lynn and controls. Columns (5) and (6) report 2SLS and OLS results using only students that applied to KIPP Lynn in the year after finishing 4th grade. Columns (7) and (8) report 2SLS and OLS results using only students that indicated Lynn Public School attendance prior to the lottery on their KIPP Lynn applications. Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.


^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Empirical Results: by cohort and grade over time

Does the KIPP Lynn effect increase over time?



A. Math Reduced Form



B. ELA Reduced Form


Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of test scores on the lottery offer dummy interacted with dummies for grade of test*application year. Basic and demographic controls are included.

Empirical Results: by cohort and grade over time


Does the KIPP Lynn effect increase over time?

Plot reduced form estimates by cohort and grade for models with demographic controls.

- The top panel suggests a cumulative effect for math score.
- The bottom figure shows less consistent results due to smaller pooled estimates for ELA. Effects are smaller and take longer to emerge.
- Note that in 8th grade (for the first cohort admitted into KIPP Lynn), the effect is negative (but insignificant).



A. Math Reduced Form



B. ELA Reduced Form

Notes: This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of test scores on the lottery offer dummy interacted with dummies for grade of test*application year. Basic and demographic controls are included.

Empirical Results: by subgroups

KIPP Lynn effect on the disadvantageous groups:

Table 5: I	Lottery Resul	lts in Su	bsample
------------	---------------	-----------	---------

		LEP	Non-LEP	SPED	Non-SPED	Hispanic	Non-hispanic
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	Basic	0.700***	0.208**	0.484**	0.298***	0.413***	0.247
		(0.182)	(0.101)	(0.207)	(0.092)	(0.118)	(0.150)
		132	733	175	690	462	403
	Demographics	0.628***	0.254***	0.527**	0.271***	0.302***	0.358**
		(0.197)	(0.093)	(0.215)	(0.087)	(0.106)	(0.152)
		132	733	175	690	462	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.451***	0.312***	0.441***	0.325***	0.346***	0.331***
	Scores	(0.155)	(0.056)	(0.146)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.076)
		131	725	174	682	457	399
ELA	Basic	0.457**	-0.016	0.346	0.077	0.217*	0.004
		(0.203)	(0.095)	(0.216)	(0.087)	(0.117)	(0.157)
		131	735	176	690	463	403
	Demographics	0.416**	0.019	0.220	0.038	0.068	0.119
		(0.183)	(0.084)	(0.216)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.150)
		131	735	176	690	463	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.384***	0.051	0.298*	0.049	0.121	0.086
	Scores	(0.140)	(0.062)	(0.162)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.099)
	1	130	726	174	682	457	399

Notes: This table reports results analogous to the 2SLS estimates in Table 4. The reported coefficients are 2SLS estimates in subsets of the lottery sample. The sample for each regression is restricted to individuals who were classified as limited english proficient (LEP), special education (SPED), or Hispanic at baseline in columns (1), (3) and (5), compared to those who were not in columns (2), (4) and (6), respectively. The LEP estimation sample includes 79 students, while the non-LEP sample includes 319. The SPED estimation sample includes 78 students, while the non-SPED sample includes 320. The Hispanic estimation sample includes 220 students, while the non-Hispanic sample includes 178. Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Empirical Results: by subgroups

KIPP Lynn effect on the disadvantageous groups:

• Relative to Non-LEP, LEP students gain more in math score per year at KIPP Lynn.

The same can be said for the SPED vs Non-SPED comparison.

Table 5: Lottery Results in Subsamples

		LEP	Non-LEP	SPED	Non-SPED	Hispanic	Non-hispanic
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)	 (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	Basic	0.700***	0.208**	0.484**	0.298***	0.413***	0.247
		(0.182)	(0.101)	(0.207)	(0.092)	(0.118)	(0.150)
		132	733	175	690	462	403
	Demographics	0.628***	0.254***	0.527**	0.271***	0.302***	0.358**
		(0.197)	(0.093)	(0.215)	(0.087)	(0.106)	(0.152)
		132	733	175	690	462	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.451***	0.312***	0.441***	0.325***	0.346***	0.331***
	Scores	(0.155)	(0.056)	(0.146)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.076)
		131	725	174	682	457	399
ELA	Basic	0.457**	-0.016	0.346	0.077	0.217*	0.004
		(0.203)	(0.095)	(0.216)	(0.087)	(0.117)	(0.157)
		131	735	176	690	463	403
	Demographics	0.416**	0.019	0.220	0.038	0.068	0.119
		(0.183)	(0.084)	(0.216)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.150)
		131	735	176	690	463	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.384***	0.051	0.298*	0.049	0.121	0.086
	Scores	(0.140)	(0.062)	(0.162)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.099)
		130	726	174	682	457	399

Notes: This table reports results analogous to the 2SLS estimates in Table 4. The reported coefficients are 2SLS estimates in subsets of the lottery sample. The sample for each regression is restricted to individuals who were classified as limited english proficient (LEP), special education (SPED), or Hispanic at baseline in columns (1), (3) and (5), compared to those who were not in columns (2), (4) and (6), respectively. The LEP estimation sample includes 79 students, while the non-LEP sample includes 319. The SPED estimation sample includes 78 students, while the non-SPED sample includes 320. The Hispanic estimation sample includes 220 students, while the non-Hispanic sample includes 178. Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.

^{*} significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Empirical Results: by subgroups

KIPP Lynn effect on the disadvantageous groups:

Relative to Non-LEP,
 LEP students gain more in math
 score per year at KIPP Lynn.

The same can be said for the SPED vs Non-SPED comparison.

• The ELA score gains come almost entirely from the LEP.

Table 5: Lottery Results in Subsamples

			-					
	_	LEP	Non-LEP		SPED	Non-SPED	Hispanic	Non-hispanic
Subject	Controls	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Math	Basic	0.700***	0.208**		0.484**	0.298***	0.413***	0.247
		(0.182)	(0.101)		(0.207)	(0.092)	(0.118)	(0.150)
		132	733		175	690	462	403
	Demographics	0.628***	0.254***		0.527**	0.271***	0.302***	0.358**
		(0.197)	(0.093)		(0.215)	(0.087)	(0.106)	(0.152)
		132	733		175	690	462	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.451***	0.312***		0.441***	0.325***	0.346***	0.331***
	Scores	(0.155)	(0.056)		(0.146)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.076)
		131	725		174	682	457	399
				•				
ELA	Basic	0.457**	-0.016		0.346	0.077	0.217*	0.004
		(0.203)	(0.095)		(0.216)	(0.087)	(0.117)	(0.157)
		131	735		176	690	463	403
	Demographics	0.416**	0.019		0.220	0.038	0.068	0.119
		(0.183)	(0.084)		(0.216)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.150)
		131	735		176	690	463	403
	Demographics and Baseline	0.384***	0.051		0.298*	0.049	0.121	0.086
	Scores	(0.140)	(0.062)		(0.162)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.099)
		130	726		174	682	457	399
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Empirical Results: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect

Rothstein (2004, p. 82) writes: "They select from the top of the ability distribution those lower-class children with innate intelligence, well-motivated parents, or their own personal drives, and give these children educations they can use to succeed in life."

Table 6: Baseline Test Score Interactions

	Baseline	Scores	Demographics + Scores		
	Main effect	Interaction	Main effect	Interaction	
Subject	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Math	0.362***	-0.087**	0.367***	-0.106***	
	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.041)	
	85	6	85	6	
ELA	0.128**	-0.147***	0.139**	-0.157***	
	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.045)	
	85	6	85	6	

Notes: This table reports results analogous to the 2SLS estimates in Table 4, but specifications now include an interaction of baseline test score with years at KIPP Academy Lynn. These regressions use the KIPP Lynn offer dummy and offer*baseline score as instruments for years in KIPP Lynn and the interaction term. A main effect of baseline test score is also included in all regressions. Baseline scores are mean-zero in the estimation sample so that the main effects of years in KIPP Lynn are at the mean. Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.

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Table 6 adds an interaction between baseline (4th grade) scores and years at KIPP Lynn.

$$y_{igt} = \cdots + \rho s_{igt} + \omega s_{igt} \times base \ score_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt}$$

If KIPP Lynn raises achievement more for weaker students, we expect $\omega < 0$.

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	85	6	850	5	
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Empirical Results: School Switching

Perhaps the gains are driven by high rates of exit from KIPP.

That is, only good students stay.

How to test?

Table 8:	School	Switching	Regression
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	Tuote c. S.	Differential Follow-up (winner - loser)						
	Mean for non-offered students	Basic controls	Demographics	Demographics and baseline scores				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
	0.504	-0.278***	-0.291***	-0.294***				
Any switch		(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)				
		419	419	412				
641 41	0.855	-0.495***	-0.503***	-0.509***				
6th grade school is different from 5th		(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)				
different from 5th		294	294	291				
A	0.081	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004				
Any switch excluding 5th		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)				
to 6th transition		419	419	412				

Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if a student switched schools on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the KIPP Academy Lynn lottery. The dependent variable in the first row is one if a student ever moves from one observed school to another from 4th to 8th grade, either within a school year or between school years. The dependent variable in the second row is one if a student switches schools between 5th and 6th grade; only observations where both schools are observed are used. The dependent variables in the the third row is 1 if a student switches schools at any time besides the transition from 5th to 6th grade. The regressions in column (2) include dummies for outcome grade, year of baseline, application grade, and application year interacted with a contemporaneous sibling applicant dummy. Column (3) adds demographic variables, and column (4) adds baseline Math and ELA scores. The sample is restricted to cohorts for which we should observe follow-up test scores and excludes applicants with sibling priority. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

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How to test?

Regression:

$$1_{\{switch\ school\}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{1}_{\{winner\}} + controls + e$$

Table 8: School Switching Regressions

	_	Differe	ential Follow-up (winner	r - loser)
	Mean for non-offered students	Basic controls	Demographics	Demographics and baseline scores
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	0.504	-0.278***	-0.291***	-0.294***
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Taking into account the fact that LPS students switch from elementary to middle school when transiting from 5th to 6th grade,

we see NO difference in switching between winners and losers.

Table 8: School Switching Regressions

		Differe	ential Follow-up (winner	- loser)
	Mean for non-offered students	Basic controls	Demographics	Demographics and baseline scores
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	0.504	-0.278***	-0.291***	-0.294***
Any switch		(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
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