Macroeconomic Theory Overlapping Generations (OLG) Households in General Equilibrium Framework

Darapheak Tin

Research School of Economics, Australian National University

Sample Teaching Slides II

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Environment

- Time is discrete.
- Closed economy with a representative competitive firm.
- ▶ Competitive market: Prices (w, r) are taken as given by households.
- Overlapping generations (OLG) of households:
 - \circ Each period, a new generation is born and lives for two periods (young \rightarrow old).
 - Young supply inelastic labour (one unit).
 - Old retire.

Household problem

A household earns wage income w in period 1, chooses (c_1, c_2) to maximize lifetime utility:

$$\max_{c_1, s, c_2} \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right\}$$

subject to

$$c_1 + s = w,$$

 $c_2 = (1 + r) s,$
 $c_1, c_2 > 0$

Firm and pricing

A representative firm with Cobb-Douglas technology. The firm's profit maximization problem is:

$$\max_{K,L} \{AK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha} - wN - qK\}$$

and the net interest rate is

$$r=q-\delta, \qquad \delta \in (0,1).$$

Baseline calibration (for simulations later)

Parameter		Value
Discount factor	β	0.98
Risk aversion	σ	2
TFP level	A	1
Capital share	α	0.33
Depreciation	δ	0.05

Firm Problem

Firm chooses (K, N) to maximize profit:

$$\max_{K,N} \Big\{ AK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha} - wN - qK \Big\}.$$

FOCs:

$$w = (1 - \alpha)AK^{\alpha}N^{-\alpha},$$

$$q = \alpha AK^{\alpha - 1}N^{1 - \alpha}.$$

Lagrangian Approach - Household Optimization (1/2)

Household problem:

$$L(c_1, c_2, \lambda) = \max_{c_1, c_2, \lambda} \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \lambda \left(w - c_1 - \frac{c_2}{1+r}\right) \right\}.$$

First-order conditions (FOCs):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial c_1} : & c_1^{-\sigma} - \lambda = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial c_2} : & \beta c_2^{-\sigma} - \frac{\lambda}{1+r} = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} : & w - c_1 - \frac{c_2}{1+r} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Combining:

$$c_1 = \lambda^{-rac{1}{\sigma}}, \qquad c_2 = \lambda^{-rac{1}{\sigma}} \left(rac{1}{Reta}
ight)^{-rac{1}{\sigma}}$$

where R = 1 + r.

Lagrangian Approach - Household Optimization (2/2)

Plugging into the budget constraint:

$$\lambda^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{w}{\left[1 + \frac{1}{R} \left(\frac{1}{R\beta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right]}.$$

Therefore, the optimal consumption-saving rule is

$$c_{1} = \frac{w}{\left[1 + \frac{1}{R}\left(\frac{1}{R\beta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right]}$$

$$s = w - c_{1}$$

Lagrangian Approach - Competitive Equilibrium

The CE is characterized by the following system of equations:

$$\lambda^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \frac{W}{\left[1 + \frac{1}{R} \left(\frac{1}{R\beta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right]},\tag{1}$$

$$c_1 = \lambda^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}},\tag{2}$$

$$c_2 = \lambda^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{1}{R\beta}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}},\tag{3}$$

$$s = w - c_1, \tag{4}$$

$$N=1, (5)$$

$$K = s, (6)$$

$$w = (1 - \alpha)AK^{\alpha}N^{-\alpha},\tag{7}$$

$$R = 1 + \alpha A K^{\alpha - 1} N^{1 - \alpha} - \delta, \tag{8}$$

$$Y = AK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha}. (9)$$

Exogenous variables: $\{\beta, \sigma, A, \alpha, \delta\}$.

Endogenous variables: $\{c_1, c_2, s, w, r, K, N, Y\}$.



Dynamic Programming Approach - Household (1/4)

We turn the household problem into a recursive problem. For the general case, we have:

$$V_t(a_t) = \max_{c_t, a_{t+1}} \left\{ \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta V_{t+1}(a_{t+1})
ight\}.$$

s.t.

$$c_t + \overbrace{a_{t+1}}^{=s_t} = \overbrace{y_t}^{=w_t} + Ra_t$$
 when young (working life) $c_t + a_{t+1} = Ra_t$ when old (retirement)

where a_t is asset holding (asset holding today a_t = savings from yesterday s_{t-1}). Key assumptions:

- ▶ Born with no asset: $a_1 = 0$
- ► Terminal conditions:

$$V_{T+1}(a_{T+1}) = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad V_T(a_T) = u(\underbrace{(1+r)a_T}_{C_T})$$

Dynamic Programming Approach - Household (2/4)

For our specific case where the households live for two period (young and old), the recursive formulation can be expressed as:

Period 1:
$$V_1(a_1) = \max_{c_1, a_2} \left\{ \frac{c_1^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta V_2(a_2) \right\}$$
 s.t. $c_1 + a_2 = y_1 + R \underbrace{a_1}_{=0}$

Period 2:
$$V_2(a_2) = \max_{c_2, a_3} \left\{ \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \underbrace{V_3(a_3)}_{=0} \right\}$$
 s.t. $c_2 + a_3 = \underbrace{v_2}_{=0} + Ra_2$

Assumptions: $a_1 = 0$ (born with no asset), $y_1 = w$, $y_2 = 0$, R = 1 + r, and life ends after two periods so $V_3(a_3) \equiv 0$.

We proceed to solve the household problem by *backward induction*: first period 2 (consume all), then period 1 (choose a_2).

Dynamic Programming Approach - Household (3/4)

The Bellman equation in period 2 is:

$$V_2(a_2) = \max_{c_2} \frac{c_2^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$
 s.t. $c_2 = (1+r)a_2$.

- No income in period 2 ($y_2 = 0$) and no savings in period 3 ($a_3 = 0$)
- ▶ Thus, optimal consumption $c_2 = (1+r)a_2$, and the value function is

$$V_2(a_2) = \frac{[(1+r)a_2]^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

Marginal value function:

$$\frac{\partial V_2(a_2)}{\partial a_2} = (1+r)^{1-\sigma}[a_2]^{-\sigma}$$

Dynamic Programming Approach - Household (4/4)

Given $V_2(a_2)$, Bellman equation in period 1 is:

$$V_1(a_1) = \max_{a_2} \left\{ \frac{(\overbrace{y_1 - a_2}^{c_1})^{1 - \sigma}}{1 - \sigma} + \beta \frac{\overbrace{[(1 + r)a_2]^{1 - \sigma}}^{V_2(a_2)}}{1 - \sigma} \right\}$$

Taking FOC wrt a_2 :

$$-(y_1-a_2)^{-\sigma}+\beta(1+r)^{1-\sigma}(a_2)^{-\sigma}=0.$$

Solving the FOC, the optimal plan is:

$$a_2 = \left[\frac{(\beta R)^{1/\sigma}}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\sigma}}\right] y_1$$

$$c_1 = y_1 - a_2$$

$$c_2 = Ra_2$$

where $R \equiv (1 + r)$.

Dynamic Programming Approach - CE

Competitive equilibrium characterized by:

$$\overbrace{a_2}^{=s_1} = \left[\frac{(\beta R)^{1/\sigma}}{R + (\beta R)^{1/\sigma}} \right] y_1,$$

$$c_1 = y_1 - a_2,$$

$$c_2 = Ra_2,$$

$$N = 1,$$

$$K = a_2,$$

$$w = (1 - \alpha)AK^{\alpha}N^{-\alpha},$$

$$R = 1 + \alpha AK^{\alpha - 1}N^{1 - \alpha} - \delta,$$

$$Y = AK^{\alpha}N^{1 - \alpha}.$$

Exogenous: $\{\beta, \sigma, A, \alpha, \delta\}$ Endogenous: $\{c_1, c_2, a_2, w, R, K, N, Y\}$

Solution Method 1: Fsolve

Fsolve - sol_GE_sys_residuals.m (1/2)

We stack all equilibrium conditions as residuals F(X) = 0 and use a nonlinear solver fsolve to find the unknowns X:

Unknowns:
$$X = [c_1, c_2, s, w, r, K, N, Y]^{\top}$$

Parameters: $\{\beta, \sigma, A, \alpha, \delta\}$

Residual system F(X) = 0:

$$F_{1}: \ \beta c_{2}^{-\sigma} - \frac{c_{1}^{-\sigma}}{1+r} = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Euler)}$$

$$F_{2}: \ c_{1} + \frac{c_{2}}{1+r} - w = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Budget)}$$

$$F_{3}: \ s + c_{1} - w = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Savings)}$$

$$F_{4}: \ w - (1-\alpha)AK^{\alpha}N^{-\alpha} = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Firm: wage)}$$

$$F_{5}: \ r - \alpha AK^{\alpha-1}N^{1-\alpha} + \delta = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Firm: interest)}$$

$$F_{6}: \ N - 1 = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Labour market)}$$

$$F_{7}: \ K - s = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Capital market)}$$

$$F_{8}: \ Y - AK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha} = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{(Production)}$$

Fsolve - sol_GE_sys_residuals.m (2/2)

```
function [c_1,c_2,s,w,r,K,N,Y] = sol_GE_sys_residuals(beta,sigma,A,alpha
    ,delta,X0);
options = optimset('Display', 'off'); % Turn off Display
function F = cFOCs_f(X) % define the function F with X
       % unpack input arguments
       c_1 = X(1); c_2 = X(2);
       s = X(3):
       w = X(4): r = X(5):
       K = X(6); N = X(7);
       Y = X(8);
       % system of equilibrium equations (residuals)
       F(1) = beta*c_2^(-sigma) - c_1^(-sigma)/(1+r);
       F(2) = c_1 + c_2/(1+r) - w;
       F(3) = s + c_1 - w;
       F(4) = w - (1-alpha)*A*K^alpha*N^(-alpha);
       F(5) = r - alpha*A*K^(alpha-1)*N^(1-alpha) + delta;
       F(6) = N - 1;
       F(7) = K - s;
       F(8) = Y - A*K^alpha*N^(1-alpha);
  end
end
```

Fsolve - sol_GE_Fsolve.m

```
% ---- MAIN SCRIPT ---- %
clear; close all; clc
% Parameters (one period = 30 years)
beta = 0.95^30;
sigma = 2;
A = 1:
alpha = 0.33;
delta = 1 - (1-0.05)^30;
% Initial guess for endo. vars: [c1 c2 s w r K N Y]
XO = [0.5, 0.5, 0.2, 0.8, 0.02, 0.2, 1.0, 1.0];
% Solve
[c_1, c_2, s, w, r, K, N, Y] = ...
sol_GE_sys_residuals(beta, sigma, A, alpha, delta, X0);
% Print results
disp('---- Results----- ');
disp(['Y =' num2str(Y)]);
disp(['K =' num2str(K)]);
disp(['N =' num2str(N)]);
disp(['R =' num2str((1+r)^(1/30))]); %annualised gross return
disp(['w =' num2str(w)]);
disp('-----');
```

Solution Method 2: Gauss-Seidel (G-S)

Gauss-Seidel Algorithm (Step-by-Step)

Objective: Instead of relying on fsolve to solve the entire system of CE conditions, we solve the model by iterating between household and firm decisions until capital converges.

- 1. **Initial guess:** Pick a starting value for capital $K^{(0)}$ and compute implied market prices: w and R.
- 2. **Household problem:** Given (w, R), solve for optimal savings s_1 (or equivalently asset holdings a_2).
- 3. **Update capital:** $K^{(i+1)} = s_1^{(i)}$ or $K^{(i+1)} = a_2^{(i)}$ and recompute market prices using the firm's FOCs based on the updated $K^{(i+1)}$.
- 4. Check convergence: Compare new and old capital levels:

$$\mathsf{Error} = \left| K^{(i+1)} - K^{(i)} \right|$$

5. **Stopping rule:** If error < tolerance (e.g., 10^{-3}), stop. Otherwise, return to step 2.

Intuition: The algorithm iteratively adjusts K until households' saving decisions are consistent with firms' capital demands (i.e., the goods and factor markets clear). □ ▶ ◆□ ▶ ◆□ ▶ ◆□ ▶ □□ ♥ ♀♀ 21/28

Gauss-Seidel - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr.m (1/4)

```
clear all: close all
tic
disp('----');
% Parameter values
beta = 0.95<sup>30</sup>; %0.9324<sup>30</sup>; % 0.9324
sigma = 2;
A = 1;
alpha = .33;
delta = 1 - (1-.05)^30;
% Initials
Kold = .01;
Nold = 1;
w = (1-alpha) * A * Kold^alpha * Nold^(-alpha);
      = 1 + alpha * A * Kold^(alpha-1) * Nold^(1-alpha) - delta;
% for iteration
error = 100;
errorv = 100:
iter = 0;
itermax = 50;
tol = .001:
update = .5;
```

Household - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr.m

Given w, R, the household chooses c_1 , c_2 , s_1 , using one of the three methods (user's choice):

- ▶ Method 0 (Lagrangian): Solve FOCs analytically.
- Method 1 (DP with FOC): Closed-form savings rule from Euler equation obtained through solving DP analytically.
- ▶ Method 2 (DP with Value Function): Discretise asset space, search for s_1 that maximises V_1 .

Gauss-Seidel - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr.m (2/4)

```
while (iter<itermax)&&(error>tol)
    % [1.] Solving the household problem (3 different methods)
    I_DP = 2:
    lambda_sig=w/(1+(1/R)*(1/(R*beta))^(-1/sigma));
       c_1 = lambda_sig; c_2 = lambda_sig*(1/(R*beta))^(-1/sigma);
       s_1 = w - c_1;
    elseif I_DP==1 % Dynamic programming using FOCs
       s_1 = (R*beta)^(1/sigma)/(R+(R*beta)^(1/sigma))*w; % a_2 = s_1
       c_1 = w - s_1; c_2 = R*s_1;
    elseif I_DP==2 % Dynamic programming method using value function
       % Asset space (a2 = s1), step size = w/100
       s1v = [0:w/100:2*w]; \% coarser grid
      %s1v = [0:w/1000:2*w]; % finer grid
      V2v = (R*s1v).^(1-sigma)/(1-sigma); % Value over the asset space
       c1v = w - s1v; % possible choices for consumption 1
      % find value function for V1
      V1v = (c1v>0).*c1v.^(1-sigma)/(1-sigma) + (c1v<=0).*(-10^10) +
           beta*V2v:
      % find the max value of the value function and optimal saving
       [val,pos] = max(V1v);
       s_1 = s1v(pos); % optimal saving/asset
       c_1 = w - s_1; c_2 = R*s_1;
    end
```

Gauss-Seidel - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr.m (3/4)

```
% [.2] Clearing the labor and capital markets
    N = 1; % inelastic labor
    Knew = s_1; % capital
    % Use onvex updating rule for capital for stabilty
    K
          = update*Kold + (1-update)*Knew;
    % [.3] Using the firm's FOCs to pin down factor prices
          = (1-alpha)*A*K^alpha*N^(-alpha);
          = alpha*A*K^(alpha-1)*N^(1-alpha);
    % Interest rate
    r = q - delta;
    R = 1 + r;
    % Output
    Y = A*K^(alpha)*N^(1-alpha);
    % [.4] the convergence condition and updates for next interation
    error = 100*abs(K - Kold)/Kold; % error in percentage
    errorv = [errorv error];
    Kold = K;
    iter = iter+1:
end
```

Gauss-Seidel - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr.m (4/4)

```
disp('--- Results-----');
disp(['Y =' num2str(Y)]);
disp(['K =' num2str(K)]);
disp(['N =' num2str(N)]);
disp(['R =' num2str(R^(1/30))]); % annualised
disp(['w =' num2str(w]));
disp(['error=' num2str(error)]);
disp('-----');
```

G–S - Analytical vs. DP (Numerical) Household Sol. (1/2)

	(i) Analytical	(ii) DP, step size $=\frac{w}{100}$	(iii) DP, step size $=\frac{w}{1000}$
Y	0.40049	0.39807	0.40062
K	0.062477	0.061342	0.062540
N	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000
R	1.02860	1.02900	1.02860
W	0.26833	0.26671	0.26842
error	0.00086253	0.00076821	0.00079105
Runtime (s)	0.039171	0.042734	0.051140

- ► (i) Household problem solved analytically (I_DP==0/1)
- ▶ (ii) and (iii) solved by value search on discretized asset grid (I_DP==2)
- ightharpoonup (i) is nice, but many problems have no closed-form solution ightarrow use (i)/(ii)
- All runs use the same Gauss-Seidel relaxation, tolerance, and production parameters

G–S - Analytical vs. DP (Numerical) Household Sol. (2/2)

Level differences are small but systematic:

- ▶ DP with coarser grid (ii) produces slightly lower K and Y relative to analytical (i).
- Finer grid (iii) brings DP back in line with analytical: K and Y essentially match (differences at $< 10^{-4}$).

Prices and wages move accordingly:

- With lower K in (ii), the wage w is a bit lower and R a touch higher (marginal products respond to capital).
- ▶ In (iii), w and R revert to analytical values.

Runtime:

Runtime rises modestly with grid refinement.

Note

Intuition: Coarser grids tend to lead low-asset households to *under-save* due to fewer saving choices. This biases K and Y downward.

Trade-off: Finer grids improve accuracy but increase computational burden (slower).

Solution: A potential solution is using one-uniform grid



Supplementary Material

Motivation: Why Non-Uniform Grids?

Uniform grids: $a_i = a_{\min} + i \times \Delta a$ (for i = 0, 1, ..., n - 1) use equal spacing. Simple but inefficient when:

- ► The value or policy function is highly curved near constraints/endpoints (e.g. borrowing limit).
- ightharpoonup Optimal savings of low-asset agents can be tiny so coarse uniform grids may not offer this option, forcing them to consume everything (to avoid c=0).

Solution: use non-uniform grids that place more points where accuracy matters (and fewer where it does not), improving accuracy without increasing number of grid points (computational cost).

We consider two discretization methods:

- 1. **Left-dense grid:** dense near a_{min} (borrowing constraint).
- 2. Chebyshev-Lobatto grid: dense near both a_{min} and a_{max} (Not applicable here).

Left-Dense (Power-Transformed) Grid (1/2)

Formula:

$$grid(t) = a_{min} + (a_{max} - a_{min}) t^p, \quad t \in [0, 1], \ p > 1$$

Code:

Intuition:

- 1. Start with a uniform grid $t = [0, \frac{1}{n-1}, ..., 1]$.
- 2. Apply a nonlinear stretch $t \mapsto t^p$.
- 3. Since $f(t) = t^p$ is convex for p > 1, points dense near a_{min} and sparse near a_{max} .

Left-Dense (Power-Transformed) Grid (2/2)

Numerical illustration:

t	t^1 (linear)	t ²	t ³
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.25	0.25	0.06	0.02
0.50	0.50	0.25	0.13
0.75	0.75	0.56	0.42
1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Parameter choice and effects:

p	Spacing pattern	Typical use
$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ > 1 \\ 0$	uniform dense near a _{min} dense near a _{max}	baseline (equal spacing) capture curvature near borrowing bound capture behaviour at high wealth

Chebyshev-Lobatto Grid (1/2)

Goal: Create dense grid near both ends $[a_{min}, a_{max}]$.

Formula:

$$\xi_j = \cos\left(\pi \cdot \frac{j}{n-1}\right), \quad j = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$$

$$a_j = \frac{a_{\min} + a_{\max}}{2} + \frac{a_{\max} - a_{\min}}{2} \, \xi_j.$$

Code:

Chebyshev-Lobatto Grid (2/2)

Let n = 5 and interval [0, 10].

Step 1: equally spaced angles

$$\theta_j = j\frac{\pi}{4}, \quad j = 0, \dots, 4.$$

Step 2: take cosines

$$\xi = [1, 0.707, 0, -0.707, -1].$$

Step 3: map to [0, 10]

$$a = 5 + 5\xi = [10, 8.535, 5, 1.465, 0].$$

Step 4: sort ascending \Rightarrow [0, 1.465, 5, 8.535, 10].

Observation: short gaps near 0 and 10, wide gaps in the middle.

Why cosine creates endpoint clustering?

Cosine basics:

$$x = \cos(\theta), \quad \theta \in [0, \pi]$$

gives $x \in [-1, 1]$.

If we take equal angular steps in θ from $\theta_i = \{0, \frac{1}{n-1}\pi, \cdots, \frac{j-1}{n-1}\pi, \pi\}$, the corresponding x's are **not equally spaced**. In fact, $x(\theta_i)$ will be dense near both endpoints -1 and 1 and sparse around the centre.

Consider derivative:

$$\frac{dx}{d\theta} = -\sin\theta$$

- Near $\theta = 0$ or π , $\sin \theta \approx 0 \Rightarrow x$ changes slowly, causing points to crowd near ± 1 .
- ▶ In the middle $(\theta \approx \pi/2)$, $\sin \theta = 1$, causing x to change quickly and therefore points spaced wider.

Gauss-Seidel - sol_GE_GaussSeideil_DP_Lagr_v1.m

```
while (iter<itermax)&&(error>tol)
   . . .
   elseif I_DP==2 % Dynamic programming method using value function
           % DIFFERENT DISCRETIZATION METHODS
           % [a.] Uniform
           %s1v = make_grid('uniform', 0, 2*w, 201);
           %s1v = make_grid('uniform', 0, 2*w, 2001);
           % [b.] Growing grid (left dense)
           s1v = make_grid('left_dense', 0, 2*w, 201);
           %s1v = make_grid('left_dense', 0, 2*w, 2001);
           % [c.] Chebyshev (dense near both endpoints)
           % (Not suitable for this problem)
           %s1v = make_grid('cheb', 0, 2*w, 201);
           V2v = (R*s1v).^(1-sigma)/(1-sigma);
        end
```