

B Experimental Instructions

Section B.1 presents instructions and the interface for the experiment. Analogously, Sections B.2 and B.3 present instructions and the interface for the social preferences (SVO) and risk preferences (BRET) elicitation tasks respectively.

B.1 Main Experiment

This section contains instructions for the Baseline and Intervention parts of the experiment. For the Baseline (Part 1), the rate of contagion is set at 65%. Note that the type of network and intervention do not feature in this part of instructions. For the Intervention (Part 2), we show instructions for the fine. Instructions for the nudge are similar, except that instead of explaining how the fine is implemented, participants are asked to watch a 3-minute video. The video can be accessed online at <https://youtu.be/tyf6EpSMGs>. The section concludes with Figure B1, which shows the decision and results interfaces from the main experiment.

Part 1: Instructions (page 1/6)

Welcome to this interactive experiment!

This experiment consists of two parts. You will be paid a **fixed reward of \$1** for completing all parts of the experiment. Additionally, you can earn points for your choices in Parts 1 and 2, which will be converted into \$ at the end of this experiment. There may also be a Bonus Task at the end of the experiment.

In Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment, you will **interact with a group of other real people recruited through MTurk**. Recall that you will never learn the identities of other people and no one will learn about your identity.

The expected duration of the experiment is **30-40 minutes** and your average expected total earnings will be **\$3-6 excluding the Bonus Task**. Note that you can earn less or more than this amount depending on your choices and the choices of others in your group.

At the beginning of Part 1 of the experiment, you will be randomly allocated to a **group of 5** and you will **remain in this group** for the duration of Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment. Note that you might have to wait while we are matching you with 4 other people, but we will compensate you for the time you wait.

Since this experiment is interactive, it is important that you **remain continuously attentive**, otherwise you may slow down others and may even be disqualified from the experiment.

In Part 1 of the experiment, you will be asked to play a game with the other members of your group. The instructions on the next 5 pages explain the rules of the game. You will receive more information about Part 2 after you complete Part 1.

All participants are given the **same** instructions. It is important that you read these instructions carefully. Note that there is no deception in this experiment.

Once you read the instructions, you will be required to pass a short understanding Quiz. **If you fail the Quiz, you will not be allowed to take part in the experiment and will not receive the fixed reward.**

To continue to the instructions, press the Next button below.

Part 1: Instructions (page 2/6)


In Part 1 of the experiment you are asked to play a game with the other members of your group. In what follows, you and the other members of your group are referred to as participants.

At the start of the game, you are presented with a diagram with 5 circles labeled by capital letters (P, E, C, M, Q) and lines between them.

Each circle represents a **position** – one for each participant. At the start of the game, each participant is **randomly allocated** to one of these positions in the diagram. Your position is the one colored in blue.

The lines between positions indicate the structure of interactions between participants in these positions. These lines **indicate which participants interact** with one another in the game.

An example is the diagram below. Here, you are in position M and directly interact with participants in positions P and E, but you do not interact directly with C and Q.



The next page of the instructions explains the choice you need to make in the game.

To continue to the next page, press the Next button below. To go to the previous page, press the Back button.

Part 1: Instructions (page 3/6)

In the game, you and the other participants face a **risk of getting infected with COVID-19** (commonly known as coronavirus).

The main symptoms of COVID-19 are shortness of breath, a high fever and a new, continuous cough. Most patients experience mild symptoms and recover in 1-2 weeks, but cases can progress to pneumonia and organ failure in the most vulnerable individuals.

After you learn your position in the diagram, you need to **choose whether to practice social distancing**. Below you can see what the buttons to make your choice look like.

Do you want to practice social distancing?

Yes

No

You have **20 seconds** to make your choice and the timer is displayed at the top of the interface throughout the experiment. If you do not make a choice within the allowed time, your choice is automatically recorded as a 'No'.

After everyone in your group has made their social distancing choice, the computer randomly chooses **one and only one participant to contract COVID-19 directly**. If a participant does

not practice social distancing and is randomly picked by the computer then s/he gets infected for sure. In other words, **if you do not practice social distancing there is a 20% chance you get infected with COVID-19 directly.**

Social distancing gives you some level of protection against COVID-19. If you practice social distancing and you are the participant randomly chosen by the computer to be infected then the computer flips a fair coin. If the coin flip is Head you are infected with COVID-19. If the coin flip is Tail then you are not infected with COVID-19. In other words, **if you practice social distancing there is a 10% chance you get infected with COVID-19 directly.**

A participant who practices social distancing cannot pass COVID-19 to other participants and cannot be infected with COVID-19 by another participant.

On the other hand, an infected participant who does not practice social distancing may infect other participants through contagion. In particular, other participants who do not practice social distancing face a risk of getting infected because COVID-19 may spread through **interactions** between the participants.

The next page of the instructions explains how COVID-19 spreads through interactions between participants.


To continue to the next page, press the Next button below. To go to the previous page, press the Back button.

Part 1: Instructions (page 4/6)

A healthy participant who does not practice social distancing may get infected with COVID-19 through **contagion** by interacting with infected participants who do not practice social distancing. The probability a participant contracts COVID-19 through interaction with another participant is referred to as the **rate of contagiousness** of COVID-19.

Throughout Part 1 of the experiment the rate of contagiousness of COVID-19 is fixed at 65%.

Consider again the example diagram of interactions and, as an example, suppose that:



- You (participant M) do not practice social distancing.
- Participants in position E and Q practice social distancing, while participants in positions P and C do not.


In this example, suppose C is randomly picked by the computer to contract COVID-19 directly. First, C has chosen not to practice social distancing so s/he gets infected for sure. Moreover, C can pass COVID-19 to other participants because s/he does not practice social distancing.

Second, E and Q cannot get infected with COVID-19 through contagion because they practice social distancing.

Next, P may get infected through contagion because s/he does not practice social distancing and interacts with C. This can happen with probability 65% – the rate of contagiousness.

Finally, you may also become infected by contagion through your interaction with P. Specifically, there is a 65% probability you might get infected through your interaction with P if s/he becomes infected. However, if P remains healthy you will also remain healthy for the duration of the game.

It follows that in this example if 1) you do not practice social distancing, 2) E and Q practice social distancing whereas P and C do not, and 3) C contracts COVID-19 directly, then you may become infected with probability 42.25%. The diagram below shows how this percentage is computed.



Note that you will not be informed of the choices of other participants at any point during the experiment.

The next page of the instructions explains how you earn points in Part 1 of the experiment.

To continue to the next page, press the Next button below. To go to the previous page, press the Back button.

Part 1: Instructions (page 5/6)

At the end of the game you earn the following points depending on your social distancing choice and infection status:


- **100 points:** if you did not practice social distancing and did not get infected;
- **65 points:** if you practiced social distancing and did not get infected (100 points for being healthy minus 35 points cost of social distancing);
- **0 points:** if you did not practice social distancing and got infected;
- **-35 points:** if you practiced social distancing and got infected (0 points for being infected minus 35 points cost of social distancing).

Note that **if you fail to submit** your social distancing choice then you will receive a **penalty of 200 points**.

The information about the points you can earn, the rate of contagiousness of COVID-19, the structure of interactions between participants and your position are always displayed on the screen when you make your social distancing choice.

Below you can see an example of how this part of the interface looks like. The diagram of interactions is on the right, while the textual information on the left reminds you of the rate of contagiousness and the possible outcomes.


Rate of contagiousness	65%
Points:	
- not practiced distancing, healthy	100
- practiced distancing, healthy	65
- not practiced distancing, infected	0
- practiced distancing, infected	-35



At the end of the game, you are reminded of the structure of interactions between participants, your position within that structure, and your social distancing choice. You are also informed of your infection status and the number of points earned.

Below you can see an example of how this part of the interface looks like.

Your distancing choice	practiced distancing
Your infection status	healthy
Points earned	65



You have 15 seconds to review this information and the timer is always displayed at the top of the interface.

The next page of the instructions explains how points are converted into your earnings in \$.

To continue to the next page, press the Next button below. To go to the previous page, press the Back button.

Part 1: Instructions (page 6/6)

Part 1 of the experiment has **20 separate games** as described in these instructions. **The choice you make in one game has no effect on other games.**

The only variation between games is the random reassignment of the positions of all the participants (including you) in the diagram of interactions. The participants assigned to your group, the structure of interactions between positions, the probability of contracting COVID-19 directly, the rate of contagiousness of COVID-19 and the number of points earned depending on social distancing choice and infection status remain unchanged.

At the end of each game, you can review the history of your choices and outcomes for the last 5 games. The table below shows an example of how your history after 9 games might look like.

Your History

Game	Position	Distancing Choice	Infection Status	Points Earned
9	Q	practiced distancing	healthy	65
8	E	practiced distancing	healthy	65
7	P	not practiced distancing	healthy	100
6	M	practiced distancing	infected	-35
5	C	not practiced distancing	infected	0

It is important that you make a choice in every game. If you fail to make a choice for **3 consecutive games**, you will be **disqualified from the experiment**. In this case, you will not receive any payment for this experiment.

At the end of this experiment, the computer randomly picks **4 out of 20 games** to determine your earnings for Part 1 of the experiment.

The points are converted to \$ at a rate of 115 points per \$1.

Suppose that you earn 260 points in the 4 randomly drawn games. Then, your total earnings for Part 1 are \$2.26.

To continue to the short Quiz, press the Next button below. To go to the previous page of the instructions, press the Back button.

Part 2: Instructions

You have completed Part 1 of the experiment and will now proceed to Part 2.

Below are the instructions for Part 2 of the experiment. It is important that you read these instructions carefully.

This part of the experiment also has 20 games, and you are assigned to the same group of 5 people as in Part 1. The structure of interactions between participants, the probability of contracting COVID-19 directly and the rate of contagiousness of COVID-19 are the same as in Part 1.

The single difference from Part 1 is that in Part 2 of the experiment you will receive a fine of 15 points in any game in which you do not practice social distancing.

Hence, in Part 2 of the experiment the points you earn at the end of the game are:

- **85 points:** if you did not practice social distancing and did not get infected (100 points for being healthy minus 15 points fine);
- **65 points:** if you practiced social distancing and did not get infected (100 points for being healthy minus 35 points cost of social distancing);
- **-15 points:** if you did not practice social distancing and got infected (0 points for being infected minus 15 points fine);

- **-35 points:** if you practiced social distancing and got infected (0 points for being infected minus 35 points cost of social distancing).

Note that if you fail to submit your social distancing choice then you will receive a penalty of 200 points.

Your earnings for Part 2 are computed in the same way as in Part 1. At the end of this experiment, the computer randomly picks 4 out of 20 games to determine your earnings for Part 2 of the experiment.

As in Part 1, the points are converted to \$ at a rate of **115 points per \$1**.

Suppose that you earn 300 points in the 4 randomly drawn games. Then, your total earnings for Part 2 are \$2.61.

Before you can start Part 2 of the experiment, you must answer a **Quiz question on the instructions above**. If you fail to answer the question correctly, you will not be able to continue to Part 2 of the experiment.

To continue to the short Quiz, press the Next button below.

The experiment: Interface

Figure B1 shows the decision and results interface from the main experiment. We focus on game 5 of the Intervention part of the experiment, where the rate of contagion is set at 65%, the network is the star, and fine is the intervention. In this game, our example participant is assigned to position P. She decides to practice social distancing, and does not get infected.

B.2 Social Value Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure

This section contains instructions from and interface of the Social Value Orientation (SVO) task which participants complete as part of the recruitment survey.

SVO: Instructions

You have answered the qualifying questions correctly and are now in the Bonus Task.

In this Bonus Task you will be making a series of decisions about allocating money between you and another anonymous Turker (hereafter, Other). All of your decisions will be completely confidential.

There is a total of 6 decisions to make which are independent of each other. For each decision, you are asked to pick the distribution of money between yourself and Other that you prefer, all values are stated in cents. After you have made your decision, select the resulting distribution of money by clicking on the button below your choice. As you will see, your choices will influence both the amount of money you receive as well as the amount of money the Other receives.

There are no right or wrong answers, this is all about personal preferences.

Every time 50 Turkers complete the task, we will randomly pick two of them and pay them for the Bonus Task as follows. We will pick one of the 6 decisions, and randomly implement the decision of one of the two chosen Turkers.

For example, suppose we randomly chose Turkers X and Y out of those 50 Turkers, and that we further randomly chose to implement decision 3 of Turker Y. Suppose that in decision 3 Turker Y allocated 150 cents to themselves, and 140 cents to Other. Therefore, Turkers X and Y will be paid 140 and 150 cents respectively.

SVO: Interface

Figure B2 presents part of the interface of the SVO task. We focus on one of the six decisions. In this example, a participant decided to allocate 288 cents to self and 188 cents to other.

B.3 Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET)

This section contains instructions from and interface of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) which participants complete after the main experiment.

BRET: Instructions

Thank you very much for taking part in the experiment!

You are now in the Bonus Task in which you have an opportunity to earn an extra payment.

On the next page, you will see 100 boxes. As soon as you start the task by pressing the ‘**Start**’ button, one box is collected per second starting from the top left corner. Once collected, the box is marked by a tick symbol.

For each box collected, you earn 2 cents.

One of the 100 boxes contains a **bomb** that destroys all of your earnings. **You do not know where the bomb is located.** You only know that the bomb can be in any box with equal probability.

Your task is to choose when to stop collecting the boxes and open those you have collected. You stop collecting boxes by pressing ‘**Stop**’ at any time. After that you open the boxes you have collected by pressing the ‘**Open**’ button. Note that once you press ‘**Stop**’ you cannot restart collecting boxes.

A dollar or a bomb symbol will be shown on each of the boxes you have collected.

If the bomb symbol does not appear, that means that you have **not collected the box with the bomb**. In this case, you **earn the amount accumulated by the boxes you have collected**.

If the bomb symbol appears, that means that you **have collected the box with the bomb**. In this case, you **earn zero** for the Bonus Task.

To proceed to the Bonus Task, press the button below.

BRET: Interface

Figure B3 presents the interface of the BRET. Figure B3a shows an example of the interface after a participant has stopped collecting boxes. We can see that she opened 56 boxes. Figure B3b shows the interface after she opened the boxes. We can see that the bomb is among the 56 collected boxes. Consequently, in this example the participant earns zero for the BRET.


Part 2 Game 5 of 20: Your Social Distancing Decision

Time left to complete this page: 0:10

Rate of contagiousness 65%

Points:

- not practiced distancing, fine, healthy 85
- practiced distancing, healthy 65
- not practiced distancing, fine, infected -15
- practiced distancing, infected -35



Do you want to practice social distancing?

Yes

No


By pressing one of the buttons you will submit your decision.

(a) Decision interface

Part 2 Game 5 of 20: Your Results

Time left to complete this page: 0:05

Your distancing choice practiced distancing
 Your infection status healthy
 Points earned 65



To proceed to the next game, press the button below.

Next

Your History

Game	Position	Distancing Choice	Infection Status	Points Earned
5	P	practiced distancing	healthy	65
4	C	practiced distancing	healthy	65
3	P	not practiced distancing	infected	-15
2	C	not practiced distancing	healthy	85
1	C	practiced distancing	healthy	65

(b) Results interface

Figure B1: Game 5 of the Intervention: interface






Figure B2: Social Value Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure: Decision interface



No. of boxes collected: 56
No. of boxes remaining: 44

Start Stop Open

(a) Decision interface



No. of boxes collected: 56
No. of boxes remaining: 44

Go to Results

(b) Results interface

Figure B3: Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) interface