

**It was harder to sniff Bluetooth  
through my mask during the  
pandemic...**

**Xeno Kovah**  
**OpenSecurityTraining2 &**  
**Dark Mentor LLC**



# About Me

- 75% of my time is spent making free (as in beer), open access, and *open source* (Creative Commons licensed) classes for a non-profit I started, **OpenSecurityTraining2 (ost2.fyi)**





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- 75% of my time is spent making free (as in beer), open access, and *open source* (CreativeCommons licensed) classes for a non-profit I started, **OpenSecurityTraining2 (ost2.fyi)**
- 25% of my time doing consulting and research for **Dark Mentor LLC**
  - The research is for fun, but is *also a trojan horse* to get me into conferences to tell you about OST2 ;)



DARK MENTOR





# **What I Want To Know:**

## **What Bluetooth Chip Is Inside Any Device**



DST2  
.FYI



DST2  
.FYI





DST2  
.FYI




 **TEXAS  
INSTRUMENTS**



 **BROADCOM<sup>®</sup>**



 **SILICON LABS**



?




# **Why I Want To Know It: So I Know If It's Vulnerable To A Firmware-Level Exploit**



DST2  
.FYI








DST2  
.FYI





DST2  
.FYI





ARMIS.<sup>®</sup>

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 TEXAS  
INSTRUMENTS

SEM

SECURE MOBILE NETWORKING

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OST2  
.FBI

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 SILICON LABS



# How Am I Going To Figure It Out?

- 1) Know That I Know Nothing 😊
- 2) Do A Bunch Of Naive BT Data Collection
- 3) Find Out What I Don't Know



# Hardware

By price & capability






# Hardware

## By price & capability

- Raspberry Pi Zero W (v1) - \$15
  - .5GB RAM, 1GHz single-core ARMv6 CPU (BCM2835) + BCM43143 WiFi/BT






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






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- BeagleBone Black Wireless - \$72 (when I got it. Now \$111 but out of stock)
  - .5GB RAM, 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 + TI WL1385
  - **Antenna connector!**








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
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
# Hardware

What collects more?



VS.

- Test 1: Pi Zero & Pi 4b in parallel
  - Pi0 = 113, Pi4b = 65 *named devices*



VS.

- Test 2: Pi 4b & Beagle Bone Black Wireless in parallel
  - Pi4b == BBBW == 422 *named devices*




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
## What collects




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
VS.



- Test 2: Pi 4b & Beagle Bone Black Wireless in parallel
  - Pi4b == BBBW == 422 *named devices*



# Run-time on Battery




Model	Runtime	RAM
rPi Zero W .5GB	90h 2m	.5 GB
BeagleBone Black W .5GB	55h 16m	.5GB
rPi 4B 1GB	21h 51m	1GB
rPi 4B 4GB	21h 21m	4GB

# Run-time on Battery



Runtime on nominal 14800mAh battery pack



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# Software Setup

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OR "Naïveté, thy name be Xeno" OR "I am dumb, and you can too!"

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  - Only made this around Feb 2023, captures incomplete data compared to bash scripts! I basically don't even use this anymore, so I didn't release it. Someday I will make it good enough to be my primary mechanism...



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
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
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HOW TO ENSURE YOUR CODE IS NEVER REUSED



HOW TO ENSURE YOUR CODE LIVES FOREVER

<https://xkcd.com/2730/>



# Background - *BT Device Address (BDADDR)*

BT Classic Addresses



# Background - BT Device Address (*BDADDR*)


## BT Classic Addresses





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
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BT Classic Addresses  
**00:1f:ff:5f:0d:5a**






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
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


00:1f:ff:5f:0d:5a  
(00:1f:ff): Respironics, Inc.



# Background - BT Device Address (*BDADDR*)


## Bluetooth Address Types (Low Energy)





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
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
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
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
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
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## Bluetooth Address Types (Low Energy)






# Background - $BT D\epsilon$

Random Static Addresses can be used in one of two ways:

- It can be assigned and fixed for the lifetime of the device
  - It can be changed at bootup

However, it **cannot** be changed during runtime.


The format of Random Static Addresses looks like this:





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
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
## Bluetooth Address Types (Low Energy)





# Background - BT Device Address (BDADDR)

## Bluetooth Address Types (Low Energy)





A Resolvable Random Private address is made up of the following fields:

# Background - E

## Bluetooth Addr



(depends on re-randomization interval)


Resolvable Address



Non-Resolvable Address

Minimally Trackable (*in principle*)

(Possibly trackable using device-specific data (e.g. names))




*Random Private Resolvable Address format (little-endian format)*

- 0 and 1 are fixed in the most significant bits (MSB)
- The next 22 bits are randomly generated
- The prand constitutes of these most significant 24 bits
- The lower 24 bits represent a hash value which is generated using the prand and the IRK



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
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
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
## Bluetooth Address Types (Low Energy)





# Background - BT D

## Bluetooth Address -





# btmon

- If you see output like the below in this presentation, it was captured by the \*nix "btmon" tool, and/or output by it

```
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 37
  LE Advertising Report (0x02)
    Num reports: 1
    Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV_IND (0x00)
    Address type: Public (0x00)
    Address: FF:FF:EA:00:34:84 (OUI FF-FF-EA)
    Data length: 25
    Flags: 0x06
      LE General Discoverable Mode
      BR/EDR Not Supported
    Name (complete): Triones-FFFFEA003484
    RSSI: -83 dBm (0xad)
```



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RSSI: -83 dBm (0xad)



Congrats! Your car can now be tracked by its headlights!



# TellMeEverything.py

- If you see output like the below in this presentation, it's from my script I've released for analyzing log data

```
DeviceName: AP 000722ED 0E96AAC1000E09F2
In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)
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


Congrats! You can now be tracked by your diabetes-management device



# What About WiGLE?

- Good crowdsourcing infrastructure
- Originally for WiFi, Bluetooth support turned on by default in 2019
- I use the Android app on an old junk Pixel 3
- Missing most data we want for BT






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Seen Networks: 52,109  
 this month / last month with : 103 / 653

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
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Order of magnitude more BT than WiFi!

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Discovered + : 706187  
Seen : 764234






# What About WiGLE?

- Good crowdsourcing infrastructure
- Originally for WiFi, Bluetooth support turned on by default in 2019
- I use the Android app on an old junk Pixel 3
- Missing most data we want for BT



"Currently, the actual number of Bluetooth radios in use is four times higher than the number of Wi-Fi radios deployed." - Herfert & Mulliner, "Blueprinting" 2004






# **Begin - Anecdotes - Locations**




# Across the USA - Pandemic Cannonball Run!







# Across the USA - Pandemic Cannonball Run!






# USA - SF Bay Area






# Road Trip!

- Washington DC -> Savannah GA -> Orlando FL -> Key West FL -> Miami FL -> And Back to DC (by way of Cape Canaveral)





development purposes only

WEST  
VIRGINIA

Roanoke


VIRGINIA

Washington

For development  
Fairfax

Richmond


Norfolk





# USA - Disney World


- My data only, all BT, including those without names





# USA - Disney World


- My data only, only advertising a name
- One entry stands out as being very common: "DSNYMBLE"





# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE





# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE

## Star Wars: Galaxy's Edge – Frequently Asked Questions

**Q:** What is Bluetooth® Low Energy (BLE) and how is it used at the Walt Disney World Resort?

**A:** Bluetooth technology is a communication standard designed for short-range data exchange between devices. You may be familiar with it as it is commonly a feature in mobile phones, smart watches and even cars. BLE is a form of Bluetooth communication that requires only low power consumption, which is ideal for some kinds of device-to-device communication that only require small amounts of information to be sent or received.

Select locations throughout the Walt Disney World Resort (the "Resort") include BLE beacons, which are small radio transmitters. These BLE beacons may communicate with certain other Bluetooth-enabled devices, such as mobile phones or "smart" devices that have Bluetooth capability. The exchange of information is designed to allow you to enable certain interactive or personalized experiences and to improve the Guest experience.

Guests can visit the Resort without using BLE; however, certain features of the Resort experience are dependent upon BLE, including some personalized offerings. To participate using your Bluetooth-enabled mobile device, follow these 2 steps: (1) download the [My Disney Experience app](#) or the [Play Disney Parks app](#) (collectively the "Walt Disney World apps") to your mobile device, and (2) enable Bluetooth services using your device settings. Certain personalized experiences may also require that Guests be signed in to their Disney account on the app. For other BLE-enabled products, including, for example, Astromech Droid Units or Made with Magic Connected Ear Hats, the device will automatically enable the Bluetooth technology when the device is turned on.



# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE

**Q: What information does the Walt Disney World Resort collect through Bluetooth® Low Energy (BLE) and how is this information used?**

**A:** BLE beacons at locations within the Walt Disney World Resort (the "Resort") communicate with the [My Disney Experience app](#) or the [Play Disney Parks app](#) (collectively, "Walt Disney World apps") on your Bluetooth-enabled mobile device and certain other BLE-enabled devices or products, such as the Astromech Droid Units (collectively "your BLE-enabled devices") to trigger certain effects or experiences on your BLE-enabled devices.


In addition, your BLE-enabled devices may also broadcast data that, when received by our BLE beacons, may allow us to provide other interactive or personalized experiences. For example, when you use the Play Disney Parks app at [Star Wars: Galaxy's Edge](#), certain functions performed with the app may trigger physical effects in the land. Our BLE beacons may also receive data broadcast by your BLE-enabled devices to determine your relative position and enable certain personalized experiences.

The security, integrity and confidentiality of your information are extremely important to us. We have implemented technical, administrative and physical security measures that are designed to protect Guest information from unauthorized access, disclosure, use and modification. From time to time, we review our security procedures to consider appropriate new technology and methods. Please be aware that, despite our best efforts, no security measures are perfect or impenetrable.



# USA - Disney World


- Only DSNYMBLE
  - Everyone's WiGLE data, not just mine





# USA - Disney World


- Only DSNYMBLE
  - Everyone, not just me
  - Other parks





# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE
  - Everyone, not just me
  - Some use at resorts & buses?
  - Or do Magic Bands beacon?



Map Satellite


Google Maps

Keyboard shortcuts Map data ©2023 Google Terms of Use Report a map error



# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE
    - Everyone, not just me
    - Some use at resorts & buses?
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



# USA - Disney World

- Only DSNYMBLE
  - Everyone, not just me
  - Some use at resorts & buses?
  - Or do Magic Bands beacon?

*At first I was inclined to think "no", because otherwise there should be evenly-distributed data in all areas of the park.*

*But...*








# Or do Magic Bands beacon?



*At first I was inclined to think "no", because otherwise there should be evenly-distributed data in all areas of the park.*

*But...*





Satellite





# Netherlands

## The Hague



# Netherlands

## The Hague

- Hardwear.io 2021: Sniffer wouldn't boot :(



# Netherlands

## The Hague


- Hardwear.io 2021: Sniffer wouldn't boot :(
- Hardwear.io 2022: Minimal GPS from when I wandered around outside the hotel



# Netherlands

## The Hague

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




# Netherlands

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




# Netherlands

## The Hague

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- Hardwear.io 2022: Minimal GPS from when I wandered around outside the hotel
- First time I noticed Flippers...







# Netherlands

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





# Netherlands

## The Hague

- Hardwear.io 2021: Sniffer wouldn't boot :(
- Hardwear.io 2022: Minimal GPS from when I wandered around outside the hotel
- First time I noticed Flippers...
  - We'll come back to those later






# Las Vegas

## RingZer0 & DEF CON 2023



# Las Vegas


## RingZer0 & DEF CON





# Las Vegas


## RingZer0 & DEF CON





# Las Vegas

## RingZer0 & DEF CON





# Las Vegas

## RingZer0.Training 2023 @ Palms

- Saw 1347 unique *named* devices from Aug 5-8 at Palms casino
- Misc I noticed:
  - 7 Flippers
    - It's almost as if they're a secret signal that hackers are around ;)
    - How many do you think I'll find at RSA? ;)
  - 3 Glucose monitors (2 Dexcom, 1 Abbot)
  - One BT-enabled LG webOS TV per room in the good tower (not the tower I was staying in ;))



# Las Vegas

## RingZer0.Training 2023 @ Palms

- Regex: ^PayRange\$ but also ^BlueRadios[A-F0-9]{6}\$
  - Semantically: the [A-F0-9]{6} are the last 6 digits of the BDADDR
  - Device would advertise as PayRange but send back e.g. BlueRadios169B67 when asked what its name is. Some would also reply "BluKeyPayRange"



# Las Vegas

## RingZer0.Training 2023 @ Palms

- Regex: ^PayRange\$ but also ^BlueRadios[A-F0-9]{6}\$
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- Device would advertise as PayRange but send back e.g. BlueRadios169B67 when asked what its name is. Some would also reply "BluKeyPayRange"



Our latest 3rd generation BluKey is the most advanced mobile payment device in the world.

**BluKey for Vending**

~~\$179.00~~ \$49.95

Available options:


Product Assurance Plan - \$4.99 ▾

Clear selection

Total: \$54.94



# How It Works



67 when asked what

**uKey for  
ending**

~~\$00~~ \$49.95



ble options:

ict Assurance Plan - \$4.99

selection

\$54.94



# Las Vegas

## RingZer0.Training 2023 @ Palms

- Uses "BlueRadios, Inc." *bluetooth module* based on its (public) BDADDR and manufacturer-specific data
  - Which is actually just a Nordic NRF52840 chip

```
For bdaddr = ec:fe:7e:16:5d:f1:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (ec:fe:7e): BlueRadios, Inc  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: PayRange  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random  
            NamePrint: match found for ^PayRange$:  
            This was found in an event of type 19 which co  
  
    No UUID16s found.  
  
    No transmit power found.  
  
    No Appearance data found.  
  
    Manufacturer-specific Data:  
        Device Company ID: 0x0085 BlueRadios, Inc ) -
```



# Las



# RingZ

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## BT5.0 Low Energy Single Mode Class 1 SoC Module

### **nBlue™ BR-LE5.0-S1A (nRF52840)**


- Uses main

- Wh

For bdaddr = ec:fe:  
Company Name: Blue Radios  
No BTC Ext: No  
DeviceName: Blue Radios BT5.0 S1A  
IPI: 1  
TID: 1  
No UUID16: No  
No transm: No  
No Appearance: No  
Manufacturer: Blue Radios  
De

- **AT HOME. AT WORK. ON THE ROAD. USING BT5.0 LOW ENERGY WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY MEANS TOTAL FREEDOM FROM THE CONSTRAINTS AND CLUTTER OF WIRES IN YOUR LIFE.**

- FCC, IC, CE, RoHS, and BT5.0 Certified ISM 2.4GHz module supporting BT5.0 high speed mode, long range mode and advertising extensions. Can also support BT5.0 Mesh, 802.15.4 for Thread and Zigbee, ANT or proprietary 2.4Ghz.
- Utilizes the Nordic nRF52840 SoC. 64Mhz ARM® Cortex™ M4F 32-bit processor with FPU, 1MB Flash, 256K RAM, built in DC-DC converter and ARM CryptoCell cryptographic accelerator.
- Programmable output power from -40dBm to +8dBm for short to long range applications.
- Over 1000 meter line of site distance with integrated antenna. External antenna can be connected to RF\_OUT pad or through optional u.FL connector (requires moving RF path resistor).
- Can be externally controlled via simple ASCII AT commands over UART, USB and BT5.0, or programmed with custom applications embedded in the module.





# Las



# RingZ

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## BT5.0 Low Energy Single Mode Class 1 SoC Module

### *n*Blue™ BR-LE5.0-S1A (nRF52840)


- Uses main

- Wh

For bdaddr = ec:fe:  
Company Name: Blue Radios  
No BTC Ext: No  
DeviceName: Blue Radios BT5.0 S1A  
IPI: 1  
TID: 1  
No UUID16: No  
No transm: No  
No Appearance: No  
Manufacturer: Blue Radios  
De

- **AT HOME. AT WORK. ON THE ROAD. USING BT5.0 LOW ENERGY WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY MEANS TOTAL FREEDOM FROM THE CONSTRAINTS AND CLUTTER OF WIRES IN YOUR LIFE.**

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# Mini-Takeaway



## Chip identification

- Identification of a BT module-maker can give you a *set* of possible chips that they use in their modules
  - And which chip a device is using, is one of the things I want to know!



# Las Vegas

## DEF CON 2023

- I can't tell you how many unique named devices I saw, because I was also explicitly walking all around nearby casinos every morning to collect more data



# Las Vegas

## DEF CON 2023

- When walking around, I would often have basic BT scanning phone apps open, so that if I saw anything with an interesting new name I hadn't seen before, I could stop and give my scanner an opportunity to potentially collect more data about it
- When I wandered into the Wynn casino area, all of a sudden my phone app lit up with all sorts of ^IGT Card Reader\$ entries!



# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- When walking around I would leave my phone open, so that if I saw something interesting before, I could stop and take a picture or collect more data as I walked.
- When I wandered into the convention center, my phone lit up with all sorts of notifications from various companies.

7:58      5G

< Back      Peripheral      Clone

## IGT Card Reader

UUID: ED5A634B-1779-445B-371C-9930F746721B

Disconnected. Data is Stale.

ADVERTISEMENT DATA [Hide](#)

Yes  
Device Is Connectable

IGT Card Reader  
Local Name

129  
kCBAdvDataRxPrimaryPHY

0  
kCBAdvDataRxSecondaryPHY

{  
Service Data



-72  
Tx Power Level

DST2.FYI

# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- When walking around I would leave my phone apps open, so that if I saw something interesting before, I could stop and take a look later to collect more data.
- When I wandered around, I would leave my phone app open, so that if I saw something interesting before, I could stop and take a look later to collect more data.

## Device Information

Manufacturer Name String >

IGT

Model Number String >

PAN1026

System ID >

{length = 8, bytes = 0x0102030405010203}

Hardware Revision String >

TC35661\_501\_ROM

UUID: E079C6A0-AA8B-11E3-

A903-0002A5D5C51B

0xB38312C0-AA89-11E3-9CEF-0002A5D5C51B >

Properties: Read Write Indicate



Peripherals



Virtual Devices



Log



Learn



Settings



# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- So what's IGT?
- ~~Gaming~~ Gambling machine hardware maker!



[Home](#) / [Shop by Part](#) / [Electronics, Electromechanical and Mechanical](#) / [IC,BLUETOOTH MODULE,INC ANT,BLE,CLASSIC](#)




IC, BLUETOOTH MODULE,  
INC ANT, BLE, CLASSIC

[LOGIN TO VIEW PRICE ➔](#)



Nominally the "IGT  
Card Reader"





### IGT AVP FAMILY 20 SSD AND BOOTS FOR 3.0, 19 Games.

3 watched In the last 24 hours

Condition: Used

Price: US \$600.00

\$28.81 for 24 months with  
PayPal Credit\*


Buy It Now

Add to cart

Make offer

Add to watchlist

Best Offer:





# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- So what's IGT?
- ~~Gaming~~ Gaming machine hardware maker!




Resort Wallet works by:

- Leveraging branding (player downloads property branded casino app)
- Leveraging phone biometrics through app sign in authentication (face ID, pin, fingerprint ID)
- Multiple methods (player funds wallet)
- Ubiquitous (player taps bluetooth sensor)
- Icons, symbols, text (players presses transfer)
- Funds are transferred

# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- So what's IGT?
- Gambling Gami

Players add funds to an EGM by tapping a button on their mobile phone enabling funds to be deposited directly to the EGM, reducing or eliminating the need to carry cash or wait in line at an ATM. Operators experience reduced overhead due to ticket or cash related issues, such as a ticket printer jam or lack of ticket stock. In addition, operators have less overhead related to cash and ticket handling.






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UUID: ED5A634B-1779-445B-371C

Disconnected. Data is Stale.

## ADVERTISEMENT DATA

Yes

Device Is Connectable

IGT Card Reader

Local Name

129

kCBAdvDataRxPrimaryPHY

0

kCBAdvDataRxSecondaryPHY

{

Service Data

E079C6A0-AA8B-11E3-A903-0002A5D5C5...en

Service UUIDs

713458723.6085089

kCBAdvDataTimestamp


-72

Tx Power Level

Resort Wallet works by:

- Leveraging branding (player downloads property branded casino app)
- Leveraging phone biometrics through app sign in authentication (face ID, pin, fingerprint ID)
- Multiple methods (player funds wallet)
- Ubiquitous (player taps bluetooth sensor)
- Icons, symbols, text (players presses transfer)
- Funds are transferred

Players add funds to an EGM by tapping a button on their mobile phone enabling funds to be deposited directly to the EGM, reducing or eliminating the need to carry cash or wait in line at an ATM. Operators experience reduced overhead due to ticket or cash related issues, such as a ticket printer jam or lack of ticket stock. In addition, operators have less overhead related to cash and ticket handling.



# IGT Card Reader

UUID: ED5A634B-1779-445B-371C

Disconnected. Data is Stale.

## ADVERTISEMENT DATA

Yes

Device Is Connectable

IGT Card Reader

Local Name

129

kCBAdvDataRxPrimaryPHY

0

kCBAdvDataRxSecondaryPHY

{

Service Data

E079C6A0-AA8B-11E3-A903-0002A5D5C5...en

Service UUIDs

713458723.6085089

kCBAdvDataTimestamp


-72

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kCBAdvDataRxPrimaryPHY

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{

Service Data

E079C6A0-AA8B-11E3-A903-0002A5D5C5...en

Service UUIDs

713458723.6085089

kCBAdvDataTimestamp


-72

Tx Power Level

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# Las Vegas

## DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides Wynn are there "IGT Card Reader" devices advertising?

* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f5:ca	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f5:df	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f5:e0	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f5:fd	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:42	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:4c	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:5f	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:6d	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:70	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BT
00:13:43:42:f6:bd	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:d4	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f6:f3	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f7:9b	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f7:b3	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01
* LE	IGT Card Reader QoS: 0	type: BLE
00:13:43:42:f7:fa	?	2001-12-31 - 2001-01-01






# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides

advertising?






# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides


advertising?





# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides




dvertising?



# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides




dvertising?



# Las Vegas DEF CON 2023

- Where else besides



Remember, that's just where WiGLE users had a GPS signal! Which is uncommon in the middle of mega-casinos!



# Las Vegas

## DEF CON 2023


- Are they supposed to be advertising or are they misconfigured?
- \\_(`)\_/



# South Korea - All





# S





# S




IST 2  
FYI



# South Korea - Seoul

- Yes, I ran around Gangnam with the sniffer...






# South Korea - Seoul

## Scooters

- Regex: ^KICKGOING\$
- Not just a country-specific, but city-specific devices!



```
Company Name by IEEE OUI (10:52:1c): Espressif Inc.  
No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
DeviceName: KICKGOING  
In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```






# South Korea - Seoul

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Company Name by IEEE OUI (10:52:1c): Espressif Inc.  
No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
DeviceName: KICKGOING  
In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```






# South Korea - Seoul

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DeviceName: KICKGOING  
In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```





# Mini-Takeaway

## Chip identification



- Sometimes devices which are using BT Classic, or BLE Public BDADDRs have an OUI which is from a *chip-maker*
- This can give a pretty strong signal of which chip a device is using
  - And which chip a device is using, is one of the things I want to know!



# KFTC BANKPOS

## Point of Sale terminal

- Regex: ^KFTC BANKPOSS\$
- "Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute (Korean: 금융결제원, KFTC) is a non-profit organization which manages several inter-bank payment systems in South Korea."
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/  
Korea\\_Financial\\_Telecommunications\\_%26\\_Clearings\\_Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea_Financial_Telecommunications_%26_Clearings_Institute)



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Korea\\_Financial\\_Telecommunications\\_%26\\_Clearings\\_Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea_Financial_Telecommunications_%26_Clearings_Institute)



# KFTC BANKPOS

## Point of Sale terminal

```
For bdaddr = 04:32:f4:18:2e:d8:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (04:32:f4): Partron  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: KFTC BANKPOS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    No UUID16s found.  
  
    No transmit power found.  
  
    No Appearance data found.  
  
    Manufacturer-specific Data:  
        Device Company ID: 0x004c (Apple, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!  
            Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0x4c00 (No Match)  
        Raw Data: 0215585cde931b0142cc9a1325009bedc65e00010002c5  
        Apple iBeacon:  
            UUID128: 585cde93-1b01-42cc-9a13-25009bedc65e  
            Major ID: 0001  
            Minor ID: 0002  
            RSSI at 1 meter: -59dBm  
            In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_mf_specific), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
            This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV_IND)
```



# KFTC BANKPOS


## Point of Sale terminal

```
For bdaddr = 04:32:f4:18:48:d7:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (04:32:f4): Partron  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    No Names found.  
  
    No UUID16s found.  
  
    No transmit power found.  
  
    No Appearance data found.  
  
    Manufacturer-specific Data:  
        Device Company ID: 0x004c (Apple, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!  
        Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0x4c00 (No Match)  
        Raw Data: 0215585cde931b0142cc9a1325009bedc65e00010002c5  
        Apple iBeacon:  
            UUID128: 585cde93-1b01-42cc-9a13-25009bedc65e  
            Major ID: 0001  
            Minor ID: 0002  
            RSSI at 1 meter: -59dBm  
            In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_mf_specific), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
            This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV_IND)
```




# Background

## Passive Scanning




## Active Scanning






# Background

## Passive Scanning




## Active Scanning



Sometimes the name will be here


# Background

## Passive Scanning



Sometimes the name will be here

## Active Scanning



Other times you need to ask for it,  
and it comes back in the SCAN\_RSP



# Mini-Takeaway




## Model identification

- Parsing iBeacons to extract the UUID128 within can be useful for identifying *unnamed devices* that are with high probability the same model as other devices where the name has been found



# **South Korea - Daejeon**

- Regex: ^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}S






# South Korea - Daejeon

## KAIST

- Regex: `^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}\$`





# South Korea - Daejeon

## KAIST

- Regex: ^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}\\$



Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd

No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.

DeviceName: IVT-125F

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)


This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)

No UUID16s found.

Transmit Power: 8dB

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)

This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)





# South Korea - Daejeon

## KAIST

- Regex: ^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}\\$



Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd

No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.

DeviceName: IVT-125F


In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)



No UUID16s found.

Transmit Power: 8dB

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)





# South Korea - Daejeon

## KAIST

- Regex: ^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}\\$



Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd

No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.

DeviceName: IVT-125F

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)




No UUID16s found.

Transmit Power: 8dB



In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)





# South Korea - Daejeon

## KAIST

- Regex: ^IVT-[A-F0-9]{4}\\$



Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd



No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.



DeviceName: IVT-125F


In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)


No UUID16s found.




Transmit Power: 8dB

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 0 (Public)  
This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)




**BCM-L101-A**




v4.1/CSR1010  
17 X 12 X 2


**BCM-L102-A**

v4.1 / CSR1012  
18.7 X 10 X 2.3

**BCM-L101-A**

v4.1 / CSR1010  
17 X 12 X 2





```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2


BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63



BCM-LN200-AS

v5.2 / nRF52810



```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2


BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63



BCM-LN200-AS

v5.2 / nRF52810



```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2


BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63



BCM-LN200-AS

v5.2 / nRF52810



```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2


BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63



BCM-LN200-AS

v5.2 / nRF52810



```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2

BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63



BCM-LN200-AS

v5.2 / nRF52810





```
For bdaddr = 74:f0:7d:12:74:a9:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (74:f0:7d): BnCOM Co.,Ltd  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: BCM-LN300-AS  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```

BCM-LA100-AS

Ver5.0 / Airoha AB1611  
11 X 16 X 2.5

BCM-L101

v4.1 / CSR1010  
12 X 12 X 2

BCM-LN100-AS

v5.2 / nRF52832  
5 x 11 x 1.63

BCM-LN200-AS


v5.2 / nRF52810

---

FCC ID: 2APDI-BCM-LN300-AS

Main Board Front







N52805  
CAAAB0  
2143AA



# Mini-Takeaway

## Chip identification



- FCC "Internal Photos" pictures can be used to identify chips for devices *in some cases*
  - And which chip a device is using, is one of the things I want to know!



# **End - Anecdotes - Locations**



# **Begin - Anecdotes - Devices**



# Teslas



- "Random static" BDADDR (that has never changed on my Model 3)
- Non-randomized advertised name
  - Regex:  $^S[0-9a-f]\{16\}C\$$  e.g. S83952932d49bc8aeC
  - Semantically: the  $[0-9a-f]\{16\}$  is *part of the SHA hash of the VIN*
    - [https://trifinite.org/Downloads/20220916\\_tempa\\_presentation\\_sec-t\\_public.pdf](https://trifinite.org/Downloads/20220916_tempa_presentation_sec-t_public.pdf)
  - <https://teslaradar.com/> to crowdsource Tesla tracking
    - But don't use that, use WiGLE instead!





DARK MENTOR




Synacktiv ✅  
@Synacktiv

...

IST2  
.FYI

# Teslas

After having finished their exploit in an hotel room, @\_p0ly\_ and @vdehors successfully compromised the Tesla Model 3 infotainment through bluetooth and elevated their privileges to root! Combined with the previous entry, this could have been a full chain to take over the car!





DARK MENTOR



Synacktiv ✅  
@Synacktiv


...

IST2  
.FYI

# Teslas

After having finished their exploit in an hotel room, @ p0ly and @vdehors successfully compromised the Tesla Model 3 infotainment through bluetooth and elevated their privileges to root!

Combined with the previous entry, this could have been a full chain to take over the car!





# Lexus

## Tencent Keen Security Lab: Experimental Security Assessment on Lexus Cars

by Tencent Keen Security Lab



Since 2017, Lexus has equipped several models (including Lexus NX, LS and ES series) with a new generation infotainment, which is also known as AVN (Audio, Visual and Navigation) unit. Compared to some Intelligent connected infotainment units, like Tesla IVI and BMW ConnectedDrive system, the new Lexus AVN unit seems to be a bit more traditional. From a security perspective, it may highly reduce the possibility of being attacked by potential cybersecurity issues. But a new system is always introducing new security risks. After conducting an ethical hacking research on a 2017 Lexus NX300, Keen Security Lab [1] has discovered several security findings in **Bluetooth** and vehicular diagnosis functions on the car, which would compromise AVN unit, internal CAN network and related ECUs. By



# E Tu Rivian?

- Regex: ^Rivian Sensor [1234]\$ e.g. Rivian Sensor 1
- Regex: ^Rivian Phone Key\$
- Regex: ^Rivian Camp Speaker\$





# E Tu Rivian?



- Regex: ^Rivian Sensor [1234]\$ e.g. Rivian Sensor 1
- Regex: ^Rivian Phone Key\$
- Regex: ^Rivian Camp Speaker\$



Address type: **Public** (0x00)

Address: AC:4D:16:FD:40:93 (OUI AC-4D-16)

Name (complete): Rivian Sensor 3



# E Tu Rivian?



- Regex: ^Rivian Sensor [1234]\$ e.g. Rivian Sensor 1
- Regex: ^Rivian Phone Key\$
- Regex: ^Rivian Camp Speaker\$



Address type: **Public** (0x00)

Address: AC:4D:16:FD:40:93 (OUI AC-4D-16) ← Actually Texas Instruments

Name (complete): Rivian Sensor 3

btmon just didn't have it in  
its vendor database

```
For bdaddr = AC:4D:16:FD:40:93:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (AC:4D:16): Texas Instruments  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: Rivian Sensor 3  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```




# ETU

- Register
- Register
- Register

Address  
Address  
Name (c)



For bdaddr = A  
Company  
No BTC  
Device






# ETU

- Register
- Register
- Register

Address  
Address  
Name (c)



For bdaddr = A  
Company  
No BTC  
Device





# E Tu Rivian?

- Regex: ^Rivian Sensor [1234]\$ e.g. Rivian Sensor 1
- Regex: ^Rivian Phone Key\$
- Regex: ^Rivian Camp Speaker\$



Address type: **Public** (0x00)

Address: AC:4D:16:FD:40:93 (OUI AC-4D-16) ←


Name (complete): Rivian Sensor 3

Actually Texas Instruments  
btmon just didn't have it in  
its vendor database

```
For bdaddr = AC:4D:16:FD:40:93:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (AC:4D:16): Texas Instruments  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: Rivian Sensor 3  
    In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)
```



Rivian Key Fob





# Other Car Things

- Regex: "`^Tesla Model S.*`", "`^Tesla Model X.*`" e.g. "Tesla Model S IDRISI"
- Regex: "`^TOYOTA 4Runner$`", "`^TOYOTA Camry$`", "`^TOYOTA Corolla$`", "`^TOYOTA Highlander$`", "`^TOYOTA Rav 4$`", "`^TOYOTA RAV4$`", "`^TOYOTA SIENNA$`"
- Regex: "`^GM_PEPS_VKM$`", "`^GM_PEPS_VKM[1234]$`"
- Regex: "`^Audi_MMI_[0-9]{4}$`", "`^Audi MMI [0-9]{4}$`"
- Regex: "`^VW BT [0-9]{4}$`"
- Regex: "`^Porsche BT [0-9]{4}$`"
- Regex: "`^Polestar2$`"



# Other Car Things



- Regex: "^Tesla Model S.\*", "^Tesla Model X.\*" e.g. "Tesla Model S IDRISI"
- Regex: "^TOYOTA 4Runner\$", "^TOYOTA Camry\$", "^TOYOTA Corolla\$", "^TOYOTA Highlander\$", "^TOYOTA Rav 4\$", "^TOYOTA RAV4\$", "^TOYOTA SIENNA\$"
- Regex: "^GM\_PEPS\_VKM\$", "^GM\_PEPS\_VKM[1234]\$"
- Regex: "^Audi\_MMI\_[0-9]{4}\$", "^Audi MMI [0-9]{4}\$"
- Regex: "^VW BT [0-9]{4}\$"
- Regex: "^Porsche BT [0-9]{4}\$"
- Regex: "^Polestar2\$"





# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest

- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037





# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest

- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26

LE Advertising Report (0x02)

Num reports: 1

Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)

Address type: Random (0x01)

Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)

Data length: 14

Flags: 0x02

LE General Discoverable Mode

**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**

**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**

Name (complete): **N0037**

RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26

LE Advertising Report (0x02)

Num reports: 1

Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)

Address type: Random (0x01)

Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)

Data length: 14

Flags: 0x02

LE General Discoverable Mode

**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**

**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**

Name (complete): **N6ANS**

RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)





# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest



- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

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LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest



- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

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LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest


- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



Where in the world is  
Nest 0001?





# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest

- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
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Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



Where in the world is  
Nest 0001?

```
"trilat": 44.85729218,  
"trilong": -93.43252563,  
"ssid": "N0001",  
"qos": 0,  
"transid": "20190615-00000",  
"firsttime": "2019-06-15T17:00:00.000Z",  
"lasttime": "2019-06-15T16:00:00.000Z",  
"lastupd": "2019-06-15T16:00:00.000Z",  
"netid": "6c:06:d0:eb:7d:4d",  
"type": "BLE",  
"capabilities": [  
    "Uncategorized"  
,  
    "userfound": false,  
    "device": 7936,  
    "name": "N0001",  
    "country": "US",  
    "region": "MN",  
    "road": "Singletree Lane",  
    "city": "Eden Prairie",  
    "housenumber": "12300",  
    "postalcode": "55344"
```



WiGLE data ->



# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest

- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



Where in the world is  
Nest 0001?

```
"trilat": 35.68451691,  
"trilong": 139.74157715,  
"ssid": "N0001",  
"qos": 0,  
"transid": "20230223-00000",  
"firsttime": "2023-02-23T16:00:00.000Z",  
"lasttime": "2023-02-23T06:00:00.000Z",  
"lastupd": "2023-02-23T06:00:00.000Z",  
"netid": "69:e3:a2:9a:1e:81",  
"type": "BLE",  
"capabilities": [  
    "Misc"  
,  
    "userfound": false,  
    "device": 0,  
    "name": "N0001",  
    "country": "JP",  
    "region": "麹町一丁目",  
    "road": "麹町学園通り",  
    "city": "千代田区",  
    "housenumber": null,  
    "postalcode": "102-0083"
```



WiGLE data ->



# Surveillance Cameras

## Google Nest

- Regex: ^Nest Cam\$
- Regex: ^N[A-Z0-9]{4}\$ e.g. N0037

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 42:39:35:69:EC:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N0037**  
RSSI: -90 dBm (0xa6)

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 26  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - ADV\_IND (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: 78:4E:57:0D:C4:22 (Resolvable)  
Data length: 14  
Flags: 0x02  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
**16-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry**  
**Nest Labs Inc. (0xfeaf)**  
Name (complete): **N6ANS**  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



Where in the world is  
Nest 0001?

```
"trilat": 52.28806686,  
"trilong": -1.58548605,  
"ssid": "N0001",  
"qos": 0,  
"transid": "20190505-00000",  
"firsttime": "2019-05-05T15:00:00.000Z",  
"lasttime": "2019-05-05T07:00:00.000Z",  
"lastupdt": "2023-03-08T14:00:00.000Z",  
"netid": "68:ad:8f:18:f0:d3",  
"type": "BLE",  
"capabilities": [  
    "Misc"  
,  
    "userfound": false,  
    "device": 0,  
    "name": "N0001",  
    "country": "GB",  
    "region": "England",  
    "road": "Wathen Road",  
    "city": "Warwick",  
    "housenumber": null,  
    "postalcode": "CV34 5BG"
```



WiGLE data ->



# Mini-Takeaway



## Vendor identification

- 16 bit service UUIDs are useful
  - *to associate products with vendors*
  - to differentiate between different products with similar names
- Filed tickets with WiGLE to request they be added



# Flippers



- Regex: ^Flipper [A-Za-z0-9]{8}\\$ e.g. "Flipper Eironeoo"
- Flippers beaconing to find other Flippers? Or just because?

• <b>Bluetooth LE 5.0</b>	TX Power: 0 dBm max
	RX Sensitivity: -96 dBm
	Data rate: 2 Mbps



# Flippers



- Regex: ^Flipper [A-Za-z0-9]{8}\\$ e.g. "Flipper Eironeoo"
- Flippers beaconing to find other Flippers? Or just because?
- **Bluetooth LE 5.0**

TX Power: 0 dBm max

RX Sensitivity: -96 dBm

Data rate: 2 Mbps




# The Bluetooth Range Estimator

Calculate the expected range between two Bluetooth devices

# Flippers

- Regex: ^Flipper [A-Za-z0-9]
- Flippers beaconing to finc
- **Bluetooth LE 5.0**





# Flippers



- Regex: ^Flipper [A-Za-z0-9]{8}\\$ e.g. "Flipper Eironeoo"
- Flippers beaconing to find other Flippers? Or just because?
- **Bluetooth LE 5.0**

TX Power: 0 dBm max

RX Sensitivity: -96 dBm

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# Flippers



- Regex: ^Flipper [A-Za-z0-9]{8}\\$ e.g. "Flipper Eironeoo"
- Flippers beaconing to find other Flippers? Or just because?

- **Bluetooth LE 5.0**



TX Power: 0 dBm max  
RX Sensitivity: -96 dBm  
Data rate: 2 Mbps

← This low transmit power diminishes the long-term utility as a BT active-scanning/ attack tool




- Flipper Ectruv
- **Flipper Eironeoo**
- Flipper Emiperda
- Flipper Eota
- Flipper Ew1csed4
- Flipper Himuti
- Flipper Hl4ken
- Flipper Iludaow
- Flipper Inudy
- Flipper Itey
- Flipper Jaalmo
- Flipper Kiteko
- Flipper L4spil
- Flipper Leotar
- Flipper Luneor
- Flipper Noda
- Flipper Nyn4k4
- Flipper Ogoty
- Flipper Opot
- Flipper Orable
- Flipper Ost4rder
- Flipper Otaro
- Flipper R4g0
- Flipper R4u0
- Flipper Roswigd
- Flipper Tuna
- Flipper Un1l0
- Flipper Ylepjl0d



# Flipper Eironeoo


- WiGLE data saw it near a *Panera Bread* in Peachtree Corners, GA (outside Atlanta GA)
- I saw at Hardwear.io 2022 in The Hague
  - WiGLE doesn't have that data, probably because I didn't have GPS lock in the hotel





# Flipper Eironeoo

- WiGLE data saw it near a *Panera Bread* in Peachtree Corners, GA (outside Atlanta GA)
- I saw at Hardwear.io 2022 in The Hague
  - WiGLE doesn't have that data, probably because I didn't have GPS lock in the hotel



Address type: **Public** (0x00)

Address: **80:E1:26:6A:4A:E6** (OUI 80-E1-26)


Data length: 28

Flags: 0x06

LE General Discoverable Mode

BR/EDR Not Supported

Name (complete): **Flipper Eironeoo**





# Flipper Eironeoo

- WiGLE data saw it near a *Panera Bread* in Peachtree Corners, GA (outside Atlanta GA)
- I saw at Hardwear.io 2022 in The Hague
  - WiGLE doesn't have that data, probably because I didn't have GPS lock in the hotel

Even if the name is changed, the BDADDR is not randomized...



Address type: **Public** (0x00)

Address: **80:E1:26:6A:4A:E6** (OUI 80-E1-26)


Data length: 28

Flags: 0x06

LE General Discoverable Mode

BR/EDR Not Supported

Name (complete): **Flipper Eironeoo**



# Change Dolphin Name?

Cwruidth

Jun '22

C

This is almost certainly answered somewhere, but i've been searching around and couldn't find a topic for it:  
Is it possible to change the unique dolphin name, or should i just reserve my effort for learning to love the goofy  
name mine was supplied by the factory?



created

Jun '22

last reply

16d

12

replies

8.5k

views

10

users

6

likes

1

link



Astra Support

Jun '22

The Dolphin name is written into the OTP (one-time programmable) memory, so changing it is not possible.  
However, you can edit the firmware to read the name from a string instead.



# Maybe they will change it


## Someday

- <https://github.com/flipperdevices/flipperzero-firmware/issues/2031>
  - Filed November 2022, last post April 2023
  - Still open as of today
  - Until then, if you've got a Flipper 🐙🌊👊



# Hotels


- Regex: `^[0-9]{8}\.[0-9]{8}$`
  - E.g. `46351777.00007702`
- At the time I saw no obvious semantic association between the first portion of the name and either the BDADDR or room number
- Saw 17 instances from my room





# Hotels


- Door physically looked like this:



## HT RFID Lock with DirectKey™ Module

### Features


- On-board DirectKey module provides secure wireless communication of credentials from a user's smartphone to a locking device via Bluetooth® Smart communications
- Reading technology: contactless RFID (ISO14443A, 14443B part 4, NFC)
- Multiple opening devices available: keycards, wristbands, keychains, etc.
- Average battery life: approximately 2 years
- Non-volatile memory records the last 500 lock openings – including date, time and card used
- Programmable to customer needs (meeting rooms, offices, housekeeping, etc.)
- LEDs to indicate lock status including a low battery warning
- MIFARE® compatibility - no need for proprietary keycards
- Corrosion-treated for normal atmospheric conditions






# Hotels

- Company Name by IEEE OUI (00:17:55):  
*GE Security*
- UUID16 0xfea7 (Company ID: *UTC Fire and Security*)
- What's WiGLE say if we search for that OUI?






# Hotels - GE Security OUI 00:17:55





# Hotels - GE Security OUI 00:17:55





# Hotels - GE Security OUI 00:17:55

WiFi Cell BT

Lat: 35.1879 to: 35.1889

Lon: -80.9156 to: -80.9145

Last Updated: 20010925174546

BSSID/MAC: 00:17:55


Network Name (wildcards<sup>1</sup>: % and \_):  
foobar or foobar%

Only Nets I Was the First to See

**Query**

<sup>1</sup>'%': 0-or-more characters, '\_': a single character.

✖ 44039037.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a3:f2:61	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084700.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a4:c0	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084714.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a4:ce	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084738.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a4:e6	?	2021-11-15 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084798.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a5:22	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084906.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a5:8e	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44084915.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a5:97	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44085226.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a6:ce	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44085241.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE	00:17:55:a4:a6:dd	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
✖ 44085256.00008208 QoS: 1 type: BLE			





# Hotels - GE Security OUI 00:17:55 @ Hilton

search for networks

WiFi Cell BT

Lat: 35.1909 to: 35.192

Lon: -80.9245 to: -80.9233

Last Updated: 20010925174546

BSSID/MAC: 00:17:55

Network Name (wildcards<sup>1</sup>: % and \_): foobar or foobar%

Only Nets I Was the First to See

Query


<sup>1</sup>'%': 0-or-more characters, '\_': a single character.

00:17:55:14:aa:a0	?	2023-06-27 - 2023-06-29
Bluetooth LE 44039037.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a3:f2:61	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084700.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a4:c0	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084714.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a4:ce	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084738.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a4:e6	?	2021-11-15 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084798.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a5:22	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084906.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a5:8e	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44084915.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a5:97	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44085226.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a6:ce	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44085241.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a6:dd	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44085256.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a6:ec	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44085259.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a6:ef	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11
Bluetooth LE 44085260.00008208 QoS: 1	type: BLE	
00:17:55:a4:a6:f0	?	2022-02-08 - 2022-02-11





# Hotels - GE Security OUI 00:17:55 @ Hilton





# Moving from Hacking IoT Gadgets to Breaking into One of Europe's Highest Hotel Suites

by Ray & mh






# Reminder Why Hotel Room Security Matters...

## 2010 Hotel Assassination of Hamas leader by Mossad

- <https://www.wired.com/2010/02/alleged-assassins-caught-on-tape/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJuJlwtdk8w>



## Possible ways of gaining entry:

gntv

- Entry by reprogramming the lock on the door to room 230, as the system shows an attempt to do this during this time.
- Kevin or Gail could have knocked on the victim's door posing as hotel staff.

Play (k)

SUBSCRIBE

## Possible ways of gaining entry:

- Entry by reprogramming the lock on the door to room 230, as the system shows an attempt to do this during this time.
- Kevin or Gail could have knocked on the victim's door posing as hotel staff.

Event		Date & Time	Event description	Event Details	User group	Keycard type
User ID		Name (Room)				
1	18/01/2010 20:00	Operation failed	Locklink	Write		
	Clock					
2	18/01/2010 19:05	15268	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	LAUNDRY	LAUNDRY
	Override on start time		LAUNDRY, LAUNDRY			
3	18/01/2010 19:00	14426	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	FLOOR 2	HR MAID
			SUPERVISOR, FLOOR2			
4	18/01/2010 15:25	3239	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	GUEST	GUEST ROOM
	Override on start time		Hassan Mr., Mahmoud (230)			
6	18/01/2010 14:10	12267	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	MINI BAR	MINIBAR
	MARSHALL, MARSHALL					
6	18/01/2010 13:35	12862	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	FLOOR 2	HR MAID
	SUPERVISOR, FLOOR2					
7	18/01/2010 12:45	12710	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	FLOOR 2	HR MAID
	FLOOR2, KEY2					
8	18/01/2010 23:05	3069	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	GUEST	GUEST ROOM
	Kolemitis Ms., Julia (230)					

Play (k)

22:40 / 27:26

gntv

21:40 / 27:26

21:40 / 27:26

21:40 / 27:26

21:40 / 27:26

21:40 / 27:26



## Locklink transfer lock events

Readout for lock: 230  
Number of events: 100

Read-out date: 03/02/2010 08:05  
Lock mode: Normal

Event	Date & Time	Event description	Event Details	
	User ID	Name (Room)	User group	Keycard type
1	18/01/2010 20:00	Locklink	Write	
	Operation failed			
	Clock			
2	18/01/2010 19:05	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	15255	LAUNDRY, LAUNDRY	LAUNDRY	LAUNDRY
	Override on start time			
3	18/01/2010 19:00	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	14426	SUPERVISOR3, FLOOR2	FLOOR 2	HK MAID
4	18/01/2010 15:25	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	3239	Hassan Mr., Mahmoud (230)	GUEST	GUEST ROOM
	Override on start time			
5	18/01/2010 14:10	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	12267	MARSHALL, MARSHALL	MINIBAR	MINIBAR
6	18/01/2010 13:35	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	12852	SUPERVISOR1, FLOOR2	FLOOR 2	HK MAID
7	18/01/2010 12:45	Opened/closed, Valid card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	12710	FLOOR2, KEY?	FLOOR 2	HK MAID
8	18/01/2010 23:05	Opened/closed, New card	Deadbolt not overridden	
	3069	Kolermann Ms., Julian (230)	GUEST	GUEST ROOM
	Override on start time			



# Random - "^\u00d7Pokemon GO Plus\$"



- Regex: ^Pokemon GO Plus\$
- "The Pok\u00e9mon GO Plus is a small device that lets you enjoy Pok\u00e9mon GO while you're on the move and not looking at your smartphone
- The device connects to a smartphone via Bluetooth low energy and notifies you about events in the game, such as the appearance of a Pok\u00e9mon nearby using an LED and vibration
- The Pok\u00e9mon GO Plus will begin to blink and vibrate whenever you're within range of a Pok\u00e9Stop; Press the Pok\u00e9mon GO Plus button to search the Pok\u00e9Stop for items; If you find any items, they'll immediately be added to your inventory"



# Fitness (*People?*) Trackers / Watches

## Fitbit

- Regex: ^Versa(| 2| 3| 4| Lite)\$ e.g. Versa 2
- Regex: ^Inspire(| HR| 2| 3)\$ e.g. Inspire HR
- Regex: ^Alta(| HR)\$ e.g. Alta HR
- Regex: ^Ionic\$
- Regex: ^Flex(| 2)\$ e.g. Flex 2
- Regex: ^One\$ e.g. One



# Fitness (*People?*) Trackers / Watches


## Fitbit

- Regex: ^Versa(| 2| 3| 4| Lite)\$ e.g. Versa 2
- Regex: ^Inspire(| HR| 2| 3)\$ e.g. Inspire HR
- Regex: ^Alta(| HR)\$ e.g. Alta HR
- Regex: ^Ionic\$
- Regex: ^Flex(| 2)\$ e.g. Flex 2
- Regex: ^One\$ e.g. One

Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: ED:BD:7C:77:18:EC (**Static**)




Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: D8:D0:87:BB:3A:6C (**Static**)



Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: DF:22:47:91:6D:B7 (**Static**)



Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: CA:C3:40:DB:BC:64 (**Static**)



Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: CA:C3:40:DB:BC:64 (**Static**)



Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: F2:0A:E8:4C:4D:4B (**Static**)





# Vendor-specific 128-bit UUIDs

- *abbaff00-e56a-484c-b832-8b17cf6cbfe8*
  - Versa (|2|Lite), Ionic
- *adabfb00-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba*
  - Inspire HR, Flex 2
- *adab0d57-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba*
- *adab6552-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba*
  - One
- *adab5b8c-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba*
  - Flex



# Vendor-specific 128-bit UUIDs

- *abbaff00-e56a-484c-b832-8b17cf6cbfe8*
    - Versa (|2|Lite), Ionic
  - ***adabfb00-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba***
    - Inspire HR, Flex 2
  - ***adab0d57-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba***
  - ***adab6552-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba***
    - One
  - ***adab5b8c-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba***
    - Flex
- > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 42  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - **ADV\_IND** (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: F5:6E:B2:C3:73:D2 (Static)  
Data length: 30  
Flags: 0x06  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
BR/EDR Not Supported  
128-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry  
Vendor specific (**abbaff00-e56a-484c-b832-8b17cf6cbfe8**)  
Service Data (UUID 0x180a): 2604329303  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)



# Vendor-specific 128-bit UUIDs

- *abbaff00-e56a-484c-b832-8b17cf6cbfe8*
  - Versa (|2|Lite), Ionic
- **adabfb00-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba**
  - Inspire HR, Flex 2
- **adab0d57-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba**
- **adab6552-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba**
  - One
- **adab5b8c-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba**
  - Flex


> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 42  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected - **ADV\_IND** (0x00)  
Address type: Random (0x01)  
Address: F5:6E:B2:C3:73:D2 (Static)  
Data length: 30  
Flags: 0x06  
LE General Discoverable Mode  
BR/EDR Not Supported  
128-bit Service UUIDs (partial): 1 entry  
Vendor specific (**abbaff00-e56a-484c-b832-8b17cf6cbfe8**)  
Service Data (UUID 0x180a): 2604329303  
RSSI: -93 dBm (0xa3)






# Background

## Passive Scanning




## Active Scanning






# Background

## Passive Scanning




## Active Scanning



Sometimes the name will be here


# Background

## Passive Scanning



Sometimes the name will be here

## Active Scanning



Other times you need to ask for it,  
and it comes back in the SCAN\_RSP



# Find New Devices

## I hadn't previously sorted any of the devices in bold as being fitbits

I suppose I should have looked at [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Fitbit\\_products](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Fitbit_products), but I didn't care that much

```
btmon -T -r logs/btmon/2023-02-07-05-51-24_pi1.bin | grep  
-A 3 bffaa68956ba | grep Name | sort | uniq
```

Name (complete): **Ace 2**

Name (complete): **Ace 3**

Name (complete): Alta HR

Name (complete): **Blaze**

Name (complete): **Charge 2**

Name (complete): **Charge 3**

Name (complete): Flex 2

Name (complete): Inspire 2

Name (complete): Inspire HR

Name (complete): Versa Lite

Name (complete): **Zip**

```
btmon -T -r logs/btmon/2023-02-07-05-51-24_pi1.bin  
| grep -A 3 8b17cf6cbfe8 | grep Name | sort | uniq
```

Name (complete): **Charge 4**

Name (complete): **Charge 5**

Name (complete): Inspire 3

Name (complete): **Luxe**

Name (complete): **Sense**

Name (complete): Versa

Name (complete): Versa 2

Name (complete): Versa 3



# Mini-Takeaway




## Vendor & model identification

- 128 bit service UUIDs are useful
  - *to associate products with vendors*, even without human-readable names
    - and even within a *completely passive* scanner
  - to determine how similar one generation of product is to the next
  - to find similarities across product lines



# In the Car OBDII-to-BT



- ^FIXD\$ : ("ISSC Technologies Corp." or "SHENZHEN XIN FEI JIA ELECTRONIC CO. LTD." or "SST Taiwan Ltd." or no match OUI)
  - I connected to one of these with their app, and it didn't seem to have auth? (But couldn't get meaningful data since car was turned off)
- ^OBDBLE\$ and ^Zus\$ : ("NO NDA Inc" OUI)
- ^OBDeleven 2\$ : Voltas IT <https://obdeleven.com/> ("Teltonika" OUI)
- ^OBDLink CX\$ : OBD Solutions, LLC. ("Dialog Semiconductor Hellas SA" OUI)
- ^OBDII\$ : Unknown brand (could be white-label), but highly likely ODBII-to-BT car monitor



# Plug-N-Pwned: Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis of OBD-II Dongles as A New Over-the-Air Attack Surface in Automotive IoT

Haohuang Wen<sup>1</sup>, Qi Alfred Chen<sup>2</sup>, Zhiqiang Lin<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ohio State University

<sup>2</sup>University of California, Irvine

USENIX Security 2020





# A Quick Word About Threat Models

## BT sniffers vs. automated license plate readers (ALPRs)

- It is starting to become common to surreptitiously install automated license plate scanners in public places [1][2]
- For any device that is \*not\* adequately randomizing its identity, bluetooth scanners can serve as much the same function
  - I once spoke with a local county police officer who had brought this up without prompting
- Thus far I've only seen BT tracking discussed in the context of advertisement [3], not forensically placing criminals at a given location based on BT data

[1] <https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr>

[2] <https://theintercept.com/2023/03/22/hoa-surveillance-license-plate-police-flock/>

[3] <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/14/opinion/bluetooth-wireless-tracking-privacy.html>



# A Quick Word About Threat Models

## Surveillance vs. Sousveillance

- The sword cuts both ways ✕: surveillance or sousveillance
  - "Sousveillance (/su:'veɪləns/ soo-VAY-lənss) is the recording of an activity by a member of the public, rather than a person or organisation in authority, typically by way of small wearable or portable personal technologies."
  - <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sousveillance>
  - WiGLE is an example of sousveillance



# Body Worn Cameras

- Regex: `^TW370_[A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}$` e.g.  
`TW370_QDA00224`
  - Semantically: `TW370_{serial}`
  - I knew based on the GPS location, that I had driven past an officer who had stopped a motorist in an uncommon location



# Body Worn Cameras

- Regex: `^TW370_[A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}$` e.g.  
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From eBay



# Body Worn Cameras

- Regex: ^TW370\_[A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}\$\$ e.g.  
TW370\_QDA00224



From eBay

- Semantically: TW370\_{serial}

- I knew based on the GPS location, that I had driven past an officer who had stopped a motorist in an uncommon location




## Panasonic®

### Important Information

#### Body Worn Camera

Model No. WV-TW370



WV-TW370



# Body Worn Cameras

- Regex: ^TW370\_[A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}\$ e.g.  
TW370\_QDA00224




From eBay

- Semantically: TW370\_{serial}

- I knew based on the GPS location, that I had driven past an officer who had stopped a motorist in an uncommon location

> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3)  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable undirected (0x00)\_IND (0x00)



Address type: Public (0x00)

Address: BC:C3:42:54:63:AD (Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.)

Data length: 21

Flags: 0x06

LE General Discoverable Mode

BR/EDR Not Supported


128-bit Service UUIDs (complete): 1 entry

## Panasonic®

### Important Information

#### Body Worn Camera

Model No. WV-TW370



WV-TW370



# Body Worn Cameras

- Regex: ^TW370\_[A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}\$ e.g.  
TW370\_QDA00224




From eBay

- Semantically: TW370\_{serial}

- I knew based on the GPS location, that I had driven past an officer who had stopped a motorist in an uncommon location


> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3)  
LE Advertising Report (0x02)  
Num reports: 1  
Event type: Connectable und  
Address type: **Public** (0x00)  
Address: BC:C3:42:54:63:AD (**Panasonic Communications Co., Ltd.**)  
Data length: 21  
Flags: 0x06



Does this only broadcast if  
it's recording?  
Or is it configurable?






**Panasonic®**  
**Important Information**  
**Body Worn Camera**  
Model No. **WV-TW370**



WV-TW370

LE General Discoverable Mode  
BR/EDR Not Supported  
128-bit Service UUIDs (complete): 1 entry









# Medical 😬 Continuous Glucose Monitoring System



- Regex: ^Dexcom[A-Z0-9]{2}\$ e.g. "DexcomBR" or "Dexcom36"



```
For bdaddr = c2:33:98:f6:fd:4f:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (c2:33:98): No Match  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: Dexcom9Q  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
            NamePrint: match found for ^Dexcom[A-Z0-9]{2}$: Dexcom Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (https://www.d)  
                This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV_IND)  
    DeviceName: Dexcom9Q  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
            NamePrint: match found for ^Dexcom[A-Z0-9]{2}$: Dexcom Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (https://www.d)  
                This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
        UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    No transmit power found.  
  
    No Appearance data found.
```








# Medical 😬

## Continuous Glucose Monitoring System



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
```
For bdaddr = c2:33:98:f6:fd:4f:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (c2:33:98): No Match  
  
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        UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    No transmit power found.  
  
    No Appearance data found.
```





# Medical 😬

```
For bdaddr = c2:33:98:r6:fd:41:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (c2:33:98): No Match
```

No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.

DeviceName: Dexcom9Q

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 1 (Random Static)

NamePrint: match found for ^Dexcom[A-Z0-9]{2}\$: Dexcom Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (<https://www.dexcom.com>)

This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)

DeviceName: Dexcom9Q

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 1 (Random Static)

NamePrint: match found for ^Dexcom[A-Z0-9]{2}\$: Dexcom Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (<https://www.dexcom.com>)

This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN\_RSP)

UUID16s found:

UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)

Found in BT LE data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_UUID16s)

UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)

Found in BT LE data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_UUID16s)

No transmit power found.

No Appearance data found.

Manufacturer-specific Data:

Device Company ID: 0x00d0 (Dexcom, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!

Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0xd000 (No Match)

Raw Data: 3703

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_mf\_specific), bdaddr\_random = 1 (Random Static)

This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)

Device Company ID: 0x00d0 (Dexcom, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!

Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0xd000 (No Match)

Raw Data: 3703





# Medical 😬

```
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No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.

DeviceName: Dexcom9Q

In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_name), bdaddr\_random = 1 (Random Static)

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This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN\_RSP)

UUID16s found:

UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)

Found in BT LE data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_UUID16s)

UUID16 0xfebc (Company ID: Dexcom Inc)

Found in BT LE data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_UUID16s)

No transmit power found.

No Appearance data found.

Manufacturer-specific Data:

Device Company ID: 0x00d0 (Dexcom, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!

Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0xd000 (No Match)

Raw Data: 3703


In BT LE Data (LE\_bdaddr\_to\_mf\_specific), bdaddr\_random = 1 (Random Static)

This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV\_IND)

Device Company ID: 0x00d0 (Dexcom, Inc.) - take with a grain of salt, not all companies populate this accurately!

Endianness-flipped device company ID (in case the vendor used the wrong endianness): 0xd000 (No Match)

Raw Data: 3703






#1 rated

AID system!

# Medical 😬

## Insulin Pump



- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device



# Medical 😬

## *Insulin Pump*

- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device





#1 rated

AID system!

# Medical 😬

## *Insulin Pump*



- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device







#1 rated

AID system!

# Medical 😬

## Insulin Pump

- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\'*\\\'*\\\'*[0-9]{3}\$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device





#1 rated

AID system!

# Medical 😬

## Insulin Pump



- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device

```
For bdaddr = cd:a5:53:4d:49:5d:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (cd:a5:53): No Match  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: tslim X2 ***611  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0xfd9b (Company ID: Tandem Diabetes Care)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    Transmit Power: 4dB  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)
```



# Medical 😬

## Insulin Pump



- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device

```
For bdaddr = cd:a5:53:4d:49:5d:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (cd:a5:53): No Match  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: tslim X2 ***611  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0xfd9b (Company ID: Tandem Diabetes Care)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    Transmit Power: 4dB  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)
```





#1 rated

AID system!


# Medical 😬

## Insulin Pump



- Regex: `^tslim X2 \\\\*\\\\*\\\\*[0-9]{3}$` e.g. "tslim X2 \*\*\*611"
  - Semantically: I'm *guessing* the `***[0-9]{3}` is a masked form of the serial number, for people to more easily identify their device

```
For bdaddr = cd:a5:53:4d:49:5d:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (cd:a5:53): No Match  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: tslim X2 ***611  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
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    Transmit Power: 4dB  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)
```



```
For bdaddr = cd:a5:53:4d:49:5d:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (cd:a5:53): No Match  
  
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    DeviceName: tslim X2 ***611  
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    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0xfd9b (Company ID: Tandem Diabetes Care)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    Transmit Power: 4dB  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    No Appearance data found.  
  
    No Manufacturer-specific Data found.  
  
    No Class of Device Data found.  
  
    GATT Information:   
        GATT Service: Begin Handle: 1 End Handle: 9 UUID128: 00001800-0000-1000-8000  
        GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 1  
        GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 2  
        GATT Descriptor: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 3  
            GATT Characteristic: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Name),  
            GATT Characteristic value read as b'tslim X2 ***611'  
        GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 4
```

```
For bdaddr = cd:a5:53:4d:49:5d:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (cd:a5:53): No Match  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: tslim X2 ***611  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0xfd9b (Company ID: Tandem Diabetes Care)  
            Found in BT LE data (LE_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)  
  
    Transmit Power: 4dB  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 1 (Random Static)  
        This was found in an event of type 4 which corresponds to Scan Response (SCAN_RSP)  
  
    No Appearance data found.  
  
    No Manufacturer-specific Data found.  
  
    No Class of Device Data found.  
  
    GATT Information:  
        GATT Service: Begin Handle: 1 End Handle: 9          UUID128: 00001800-0000-1000-8000  
            GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 1  
            GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 2  
            GATT Descriptor: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 3  
                GATT Characteristic: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Name),  
                GATT Characteristic value read as b'tslim X2 ***611'  
            GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 4
```

ice Data found.

:  
rvice: Begin Handle: 1 End Handle: 9 UUID128: 00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic Attribute Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 1  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 2  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 3  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Name), Properties: 10 ('Readable', 'Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'tslim X2 \*\*\*611'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 4  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 5  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Appearance), Properties: 2 ('Readable', 'Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x00\x00'  
        Appearance decodes as: Category (0): Unknown, Sub-Category (0): Generic  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 6  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 7  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Peripheral Preferred Connection Parameters)  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x0c\x00\x18\x00\x1d\x00\x0f\x01'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 8  
GATT Descriptor: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 9  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Central Address Resolution), Properties: 1 ('Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x01'  
rvice: Begin Handle: 10 End Handle: 13 UUID128: 00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic Access Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 10  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 11  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 12  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Service Changed), Properties: 32 ('Indicatable', 'Non-connectable', 'Writeable')  
GATT Descriptor: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 13  
rvice: Begin Handle: 14 End Handle: 22 UUID128: 0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Information Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 14  
rvice: Begin Handle: 23 End Handle: 65535 UUID128: 0000fdfb-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (This is a test service)

ice Data found.

:  
rvice: Begin Handle: 1 End Handle: 9 UUID128: 00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic Attribute Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 1  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 2  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 3  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Name), Properties: 10 ('Readable', 'Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'tslim X2 \*\*\*611'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 4  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 5  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Appearance), Properties: 2 ('Readable', 'Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x00\x00'  
        Appearance decodes as: Category (0): Unknown, Sub-Category (0): Generic  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 6  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 7  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Peripheral Preferred Connection Parameters)  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x0c\x00\x18\x00\x1d\x00\x0f\x01'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 8  
GATT Descriptor: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 9  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Central Address Resolution), Properties: 1 ('Writeable')  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x01'  
rvice: Begin Handle: 10 End Handle: 13 UUID128: 00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic Access Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 10  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 11  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 12  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Service Changed), Properties: 32 ('Indicatable', 'Notify', 'Writeable')  
GATT Descriptor: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 13  
rvice: Begin Handle: 14 End Handle: 22 UUID128: 0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Information Service)  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 14  
rvice: Begin Handle: 23 End Handle: 65535 UUID128: 0000fdfb-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (This is a test service)

ice Data found.

:  
rvice: Begin Handle: 1 End Handle: 9 UUID128: 00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic A  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 1  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 2  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 3  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device Name), Properties: 10 ('Readable'  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'tslim X2 \*\*\*611'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 4  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 5  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Appearance), Properties: 2 ('Readable'  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x00\x00'  
        Appearance decodes as: Category (0): Unknown, Sub-Category (0): Generic  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 6  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 7  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Peripheral Preferred Connection Param  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x0c\x00\x18\x00\x1d\x00\x0f\x01'  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 8  
GATT Descriptor: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 9  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002aa6-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Central Address Resolution), Properti  
    GATT Characteristic value read as b'\x01'  
rvice: Begin Handle: 10 End Handle: 13 UUID128: 00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Generic A  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 10  
GATT Descriptor: 00002803-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 11  
GATT Descriptor: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 12  
    GATT Characteristic: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Service Changed), Properties: 32 ('In  
GATT Descriptor: 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 13  
rvice: Begin Handle: 14 End Handle: 22 UUID128: 0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (Device In  
GATT Descriptor: 00002800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb, Descriptor Handle: 14  
rvice: Begin Handle: 23 End Handle: 65535 UUID128: 0000fdfb-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb (This is a



# Medical 😬

- Regex: ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}\\$ e.g. "PR BT BE14"
- Phillips Respiration System One CPAP
  - CPAP = "continuous positive airway pressure"
  - Treats *sleep apnea*





# Medical 😬

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- Phillips Respiration System One CPAP
  - CPAP = "continuous positive airway pressure"
  - Treats *sleep apnea*



```
For bdaddr = 00:1f:ff:5f:0d:5a:  
    Company Name by IEEE OUI (00:1f:ff): Respiration, Inc.  
  
    No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
    DeviceName: PR BT 5C0A  
        In BT Classic Data (EIR_bdaddr_to_name)  
            NamePrint: match found for ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}\$: Phillip  
    DeviceName: PR BT 5C0A  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
            NamePrint: match found for ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}\$: Phillip  
    This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Conn  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0x1101 (Service ID: SerialPort)  
        Found in BT Classic data (EIR_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)
```



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```
For bdaddr = 00:1f:ff:5f:0d:5a:  
  Company Name by IEEE OUI (00:1f:ff): Respiration, Inc.  
  
  No BTC Extended Inquiry Result Device info.  
  
  DeviceName: PR_BT_5C0A  
    In BT Classic Data (EIR_bdaddr_to_name)  
      NamePrint: match found for ^PR_BT_[A-F0-9]{4}\$: Phillips  
  DeviceName: PR_BT_5C0A  
    In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
      NamePrint: match found for ^PR_BT_[A-F0-9]{4}\$: Phillips  
  This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Conn  
  
  UUID16s found:  
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    DeviceName: PR BT 5C0A  
        In BT LE Data (LE_bdaddr_to_name), bdaddr_random = 0 (Public)  
            NamePrint: match found for ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}$$: Phillips  
    This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Conn  
  
    UUID16s found:  
        UUID16 0x1101 (Service ID: SerialPort)  
        Found in BT Classic data (EIR_bdaddr_to_UUID16s)
```






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  - CPAP = "continuous positive airway pressure"
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  Company Name by IEEE OUI (00:1f:ff): Respiration, Inc.  
  
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      NamePrint: match found for ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}$$: Phillips  
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      NamePrint: match found for ^PR BT [A-F0-9]{4}$$: Phillips  
  This was found in an event of type 0 which corresponds to Conn  
  
  UUID16s found:  
    UUID16 0x1101 (Service ID: SerialPort)  
      Found in BT Classic data (EIR_ad_to_UUID16s)
```





# Sleep Apnea <- Obesity <- Poverty

- "There is a linear correlation between obesity and OSA [sleep apnea]"[1]
- There is a link between poverty and obesity[2][3]
- Is a neighborhood with lots of sleep apnea machines likely to be a poorer neighborhood?
- Or can the people in poorer neighborhoods not afford bluetooth sleep apnea machines?

[1] <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5836788/#:~:text=There%20is%20a%20linear%20correlation,ultimately%20resulting%20in%20sleep%20apnea>.


[2] <https://www.seacaa.org/post/the-link-between-poverty-and-obesity#:~:text=There%20tends%20to%20be%20fewer,major%20contributing%20factor%20to%20obesity>.


[3] <https://scholars.org/contribution/why-poverty-leads-obesity-and-life-long-problems>



Rockville

GTE FYI









Rockville

GTE FYI







# Heavy Machinery

- Regex: ^CATBTNT-0(4|7) [A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}\$ (3 char model, 5 serial?)
  - "CATBTNT-04 DKS02123"
  - "CATBTNT-04 LHW00220"
  - "CATBTNT-07 WCH10725"





# Heavy Machinery


- Regex: ^CATBTNT-0(4|7) [A-Z]{3}[0-9]{5}\$( 3 char model,
  - "CATBTNT-04 DKS02123"
  - "CATBTNT-04 LHW00220"
  - "CATBTNT-07 WCH10725"



Illustration 1

g06087602

The Cat BTNT acts as a central hub for wireless Bluetooth devices on Cat machines. The Bluetooth network uses Bluetooth Low Energy technology. This technology enables the machine to read Cat key fobs and sensors wirelessly and convert the data to standard and proprietary J1939 messages. These messages are sent over the CAN datalink to a machine control ECM to enable operator identification or machine system security.





**Name of product:** Cat® Bluetooth® Network

**Make:** Cat® Brand

**Model:** CATBTNT

(A5:S4)

**Type:** Wireless Device (Module for the reception-transmission of data from Bluetooth® Key Fob and sensors)

**SMCS Code:** 7008; 7600-ZM

The CATBTNT part number 504-4980 is the buy-level part that includes a radio equipment and a software tied to the machine integration. The radio equipment contained in the CATBTNT is 462-0441. Such radio equipment complies with the applicable regional product compliance requirements as demonstrated with the attached DoC. The software included in the buy-level part does not impact regulatory performance parameters.



**Name of product:** Cat® Bluetooth® FOB

**Make:** Cat® Brand

**Model:** CATBTFOB


(A1:S1)

**Type:** Wireless Device (Chip-key for operator identification with Bluetooth®)


**SMCS Code:** 7008; 7600-ZM



# INTRODUCE THE MAC ID KEY CODE




# INTRODUCE THE MAC ID KEY CODE



Note: "50:65:83" is a Texas Instruments OUI (and all devices in my data use public TI BDADDRS)



# INTRODUCE THE MAC ID KEY CODE




Note: "50:65:83" is a Texas Instruments OUI (and all devices in my data use public TI BDADDRS)



# INTRODUCE THE MAC ID KEY CODE







## 2.4-GHz Bluetooth™ low energy and Proprietary System-on-Chip

Check for Samples: CC2541

## FEATURES

- RF
  - 2.4-GHz Bluetooth low energy Compliant and Proprietary RF System-on-Chip
  - Supports 250-kbps, 500-kbps, 1-Mbps, 2-Mbps Data Rates
  - Excellent Link Budget, Enabling Long-Range Applications Without External Front End
  - Programmable Output Power up to 0 dBm
  - Excellent Receiver Sensitivity ( $-94$  dBm at 1 Mbps), Selectivity, and Blocking Performance
  - Suitable for Systems Targeting Compliance With Worldwide Radio Frequency Regulations: ETSI EN 300 328 and EN 300 440 Class 2 (Europe), FCC CFR47 Part 15 (US), and ARIB STD-T66 (Japan)
- Layout
  - Few External Components
  - Reference Design Provided
  - 6-mm × 6-mm QFN-40 Package
  - Pin-Compatible With CC2540 (When Not Using USB or I<sup>2</sup>C)
- Low Power
  - Active-Mode RX Down to: 17.9 mA
  - Active-Mode TX (0 dBm): 18.2 mA
  - Power Mode 1 (4- $\mu$ s Wake-Up): 270  $\mu$ A
  - Power Mode 2 (Sleep Timer On): 1  $\mu$ A
  - Power Mode 3 (External Interrupts): 0.5  $\mu$ A
  - Wide Supply-Voltage Range (2 V–3.6 V)
- TPS62730 Compatible Low Power in Active Mode
  - RX Down to: 14.7 mA (3-V supply)
  - TX (0 dBm): 14.3 mA (3-V supply)
- Microcontroller
  - High-Performance and Low-Power 8051 Microcontroller Core With Code Prefetch
  - In-System-Programmable Flash, 128- or 256-KB
  - 8-KB RAM With Retention in All Power Modes
  - Hardware Debug Support
  - Extensive Baseband Automation, Including Auto-Acknowledgment and Address Decoding
  - Retention of All Relevant Registers in All Power Modes
- Peripherals
  - Powerful Five-Channel DMA
  - General-Purpose Timers (One 16-Bit, Two 8-Bit)
  - IR Generation Circuitry
  - 32-kHz Sleep Timer With Capture
  - Accurate Digital RSSI Support
  - Battery Monitor and Temperature Sensor
  - 12-Bit ADC With Eight Channels and Configurable Resolution
  - AES Security Coprocessor
  - Two Powerful USARTs With Support for Several Serial Protocols
  - 23 General-Purpose I/O Pins (21 × 4 mA, 2 × 20 mA)
  - I<sup>2</sup>C interface
  - 2 I/O Pins Have LED Driving Capabilities
  - Watchdog Timer
  - Integrated High-Performance Comparator
- Development Tools
  - CC2541 Evaluation Module Kit (CC2541EMK)
  - CC2541 Mini Development Kit (CC2541DK-MINI)
  - SmartRF™ Software
  - IAR Embedded Workbench™ Available

## • Microcontroller

 Please be aware that an important notice concerning availability, standard warranty, and use in critical applications of Texas Instruments semiconductor products and disclaimers thereto appears at the end of this data sheet.  
Bluetooth is a trademark of Bluetooth SIG, Inc..  
ZigBee is a registered trademark of ZigBee Alliance.

# CC2541DK-MINI

## CC2541 Mini Development Kit

[Overview](#)[Order & start development](#)[Technical documentation](#)[Related design resources](#)[Support & training](#)

## Overview

### Description & features

### Supported products

The CC2541DK-MINI development kit provides a working reference design for software development of single-mode *Bluetooth* low energy (BLE) applications based on the Texas Instruments CC2541. The included "keyfob" board operates as a BLE peripheral device, and contains modifiable software that can be tailored towards different applications. Using BTool (Windows PC application) along with the included CC2540 USB Dongle, the Texas Instruments BLE stack can be tested and verified while developing custom applications.



## Features

The kit contains the following hardware components:



Shop by category ▾

CATBTNT

All Categories

## Price

[All Listings](#)[Accepts Offers](#)[Auction](#)[Buy It Now](#)[Condition ▾](#)[Shipping ▾](#)[Local ▾](#)[\\$ Min](#)

to

[\\$ Max](#)[See all](#)

## Buying Format

 All Listings Accepts Offers Auction Buy It Now**No exact matches found**Save this search [to receive email alerts and notifications when new items are available.](#)[Save this search](#)[Tell us what you think](#)



## CAT 5 Caterpillar Keys Loader Skidder Paver Tractor Excavator Compactor Dozer

Condition: New

Bulk savings:

Buy 1  
\$8.95/ea

Buy 2  
\$8.06/ea

Buy 3  
\$7.61/ea

4 or more for \$7.16/ea

Quantity:

1

More than 10 available / 84 sold

Price: US \$8.95/ea

Buy It Now

Add to cart

♥ Add to Watchlist



Fast and reliable. Ships from United States.



This one's trending. 84 have already sold.



Hover to zoom



## Caterpillar ( CAT ) Equipment Igniton / Door / Hood Key

Golden Color

Parts No: 5P8500 , 5P-8500

**A package contains 5 keys**

If you are fed up with heavy and thick keys, It will be your best choice

### Compatible models

#### Wheel-Type Loader

901C 901C2 902 902C 902C2 903C 903C2 903D 904B 904H 906 906H 906K 906M 907H 907H2 907K 907M 908 908H 908K 908M 910 910E 910F 910K 910M 914G 914G2 914K 914M 916 918F 918M 920 920K 924F 924G 924GZ 924H 924HZ 924K 926 926E 926M 928F 928G 928H 928HZ 930 930G 930H 930K 930M 930T 936 936E 936F 938F 938G 938G II 938H 938K 938M 950 950 GC 950B 950B/950E 950E 950F 950F II 950G 950G II 950H 950K 950L 950M 950M Z 960F 962 962G 962G II 962H 962K 962L 962M 962M Z 966 GC 966C 966D 966E 966F 966F II 966G 966G II 966H 966K 966K XE 966L 966M 966M XE 970F 972G 972G II 972H 972K 972L 972M 972M XE 980 980B 980C 980F 980F II 980G 980G II 980H 980K 980K HLG 980L 980M 980XE 982 982M 982XE 986H 986K 988 988B 988F 988F II 988G 988H 988K 988K XE 990 990 II 990H 990K 992C 992D 992G 992K 993K 994 994D 994F 994H 994K G910 G916 G926 G936

#### Challenger

35 45 55 65 65B 75

#### Engine - Generator Set

3406C 3512 3512B 3516 3516B 3516B GEN 3516C 3516E C13 C13GENSET C15 C175-16 C2.2 C32 C4.4 C6.6 C7.1 DG150 DG60 G3412C G3516H PM3412 PM3456 PM3508 PM3512 PM3516 PMG3516 XQC1200 XQC1600 XQG400

#### Wheel-Type Skidder

120C 508 515 518 518C 525 525B 525C 525D 528 528B 530B 535B 535C 535D 545 545C 545D 555D

#### Off-Highway Truck

69D 768C 769 769B 769C 769D 770 770G 770G OEM 771C 771D 772 772B 772G 772G OEM 773B 773D 773E 773F 773G 773G LRC 773G OEM 773GC 775B 775D 775E 775F 775G 775G LRC 775G OEM 776 776B 776C 776D 777 777B 777C 777D 777E 777F 777G 784B 784C 785 785B 785C 785D 785G 789 789B 789C 789D 789G 793 793B 793C 793D 793F AC 793F CMD 793F OEM 793F XQ 794 AC 795F AC 795F XQ 796 AC 797 797B 797F 798 798 AC

#### Track-Type Loader

931 931B 931C 931C II 933 933C 935B 935C 935C II 939 939C 941 943 951 951B 951C 953 953B 953C 953D 953K 955 955L 963 963B 963C 963D 963K 973 973C 973D 973K 977 977L 983 983B

#### Engine - Industrial

3126B 3176C 3196 3306B 3406C 3406E 3408E 3412 3412C 3412E 3456 3508 3508B 3512 3512B 3512C 3516 3516B 3516C 3516E C-10 C-12 C-15 C-16 C-9 C11 C13 C13B C15 C15 I6 C175-16 C18 C18 I6 C27 C32 C4.4 C7 C9 C9 GEN SET C9.3 C9.3B DG100 DG125 DG60 DG80 G3508 G3512 G3512E G3512H G3516 G3516B G3516C G3516E G3516H G3520 G3520C G3520E G3520H PM3412

#### Articulated Dump Truck

725 725C 725C2 730 730C 730C2 730C2 EJ 735 735 OEM 735B 735C 740 740 GC 740B 740C 745 745C D20D D250B D250D D250E D250E II D25C D25D D300B D300D D300E D300E II D30C D30D D350C D350D D350E D350E II D35C D35HP D400 D400D D400E D400E II D40D

#### Mini Hydraulic Excavator

300.9D 301.4C 301.5 301.6 301.6C 301.7D 301.7D CR 301.8 301.8C 302.2D 302.4D 302.5 302.5C 302.7D 303 303.5 303.5C 303.5D 303.5E 303.5E2 303.5E2 CR 303E CR 304 304.5 304.5E2 304E 304E2 304E2 CR 305 305.5 305.5D 305.5E 305.5E2 305.5E2 CR 305C CR 305D CR 305E 305E2 CR 306 306.5 306E 306E2 307 307.5 307B 307D 307E 307E2 308 308.5 308D 308E 308E2 308E2 CR 309 310

#### Road Reclaimer

RM-250C RM-300 RM-350 RM-350B RM-500 RM400 RM500B RR-250 RR-250B SM-350 SS-250 SS-250B

#### Motor Grader

120 120G 120H 120H ES 120H NA 120K 120K 2 120M 120M 2 12F 12G 12H 12H ES 12H NA 12K 12M 12M 2 12M 3 12M 3 AWD 130G 135H 135H NA 14 140 140 GC 140G 140H 140H ES 140H NA 140K 140K 2 140M 140M 2 140M 3 140M 3 AWD 143H 14G 14H 14H NA 14L 14M 14M-3 14M3 150 16 160 160G 160H 160H ES 160H NA 160K 160M 160M 2 160M 3 160M 3 AWD 163H 163H NA 16G 16H 16H NA 16M 16M3 18 18M3 24 24H 24M 404F-22



TELEHANDLER

RT100 RT50 RT50SA RT60 RT80 RTC60 TH103 TH210 TH215 TH220B TH255C TH306D TH314D TH330B TH336C TH337C TH340B TH350B TH3510D TH355B TH357D TH360B TH406C TH407C TH408D TH414C TH417C TH417D TH460B TH514C TH514D TH560B TH580B TH62 TH63 TH82 TH83 TL1055C TL1055D TL1255C TL1255D TL642C TL642D TL943C TL943D

Wheel Dozer

814 814B 814F 814F II 814K 824B 824C 824G 824G II 824H 824K 824S 834 834B 834G 834H 834K 834S 834U 844 844H 844K 854G 854K

Backhoe Loader

414E 415 415F2 415F2 IL 416 416B 416C 416D 416E 416F 416F2 420 420D 420E 420F 420XE 422E 422F 422F2 424B 424B HD 424B2 424D 426 F2 426B 426C 427F2 428 428B 428C 428D 428E 428F 428F2 430 430D 430E 430F 430F2 432 432D 432E 432F 432F2 434 434E 434F 434F2 436B 436C 438B 438C 438D 440 442D 442E 444 444E 444F 444F2 446B 446D 450 450E 450F

Skid Steer Loader

216 216B 216B3 226 226B 226B3 226D 226D3 232B 232D3 236 236B 236B3 236D 236D3 239D3 242B 242B3 242D3 246 246B 246C 246D 246D3 247B 247B3 248B 249D 249D3 252 252B 252B3 256C 257B 257B3 257D 257D3 259B3 259D 259D3 262 262B 262C 262C2 262D 262D3 267 267B 268B 272C 272D 272D XHP 272D2 272D2 XHP 272D3 272D3 XE 277 277B 277C 277C2 277D 279C 279C2 279D 279D3 287 287B 287C 287D 289C 289C2 289D 289D3 297C 297D 297D XHP 297D2 297D2 XHP 299C 299D 299D XHP 299D2 299D2 XHP 299D3 299D3 XE

Asphalt Paver

10 FT 10-20B 10-20WB 10B 8 FT 8-16B AP-1000 AP-1000B AP-1000D AP-1000E AP-1050 AP-1050B AP-1055B AP-1055D AP-1055E AP-1055F AP-200 AP-200B AP-255E AP-300D AP-500E AP-555E AP-600D AP-650B AP-655C AP-655D AP-800 AP-800B AP-800C AP-800D AP-900B AP300F AP355F AP500F AP555F AP600F AP655F AP655F L AS2251 AS2252C AS2301 AS2302 AS2302C AS3251C AS3301C AS4252C BG-2255C BG-225C BG-230 BG-230D BG-240C BG-2455C BG-2455D BG-245C BG-260C BG-260D BG1000E BG1055E BG500E BG555E BG600D BG655D SE50 V SE50 VT SE60 V SE60 V XW SE60 VT XW SE60VT XW

Pipelayer

561D 561M 561N 571G 572G 572R 572R II 578 583K 583R 583T 587R 587T 589 594H PL61 PL72 PL83 PL87

Integrated Toolcarrier

IT12 IT12B IT14B IT14F IT14G IT14G2 IT18 IT18B IT18F IT24F IT28 IT28B IT28F IT28G IT38F IT38G IT38G II IT38H IT62G IT62G II IT62H

Marine Products

3126B 3412E 3508B 3512B 3516B C12 C30 C32 C7 C9

Expanded Mining Products

6015B 6020B MD5150C MD6200 MD6250 MD6310 MD6640

Track-Type Tractor

10 10C 10S 10SU 10U 11 11SU 11U 140 141 143 153 163 183B 3 3P 3S 4 4A 4P 4S 5 53 54 55 56 56H 57 57H 58 58L 59 59L 59N 5A 5A PAT 5P 5S 6 6A 6S 6SU 7 7A 7S 7S LGP 7SU 7U 8 8A 8D 8S 8SU 8U 9 9C 9S 9SU 9U D1 D10 D10N D10R D10T D10T2 D11 D11N D11R D11T D2 D3 D3B D3C D3C II D3C III D3G D3K LGP D3K XL D3K2 LGP D3K2 XL D4 D4B D4C D4C II D4C III D4D D4E D4E SR D4G D4H D4H III D4H XL D4K LGP D4K XL D4K2 LGP D4K2 XL D5 D5B D5C D5C III D5C PAT D5C PATLGP D5E D5G D5H D5H XL D5K LGP D5K XL D5K2 LGP D5K2 XL D5M D5N D5R2 D6 D6 XE D6C D6D D6D SR D6E D6E SR D6F SR D6G D6G SR D6G2 LGP D6G2 XL D6GC D6H D6H II D6H XL D6H XR D6K D6K LGP D6K XL D6K2 D6K2 LGP D6K2 XL D6M D6N D6N LGP D6N OEM D6N XL D6R D6R II D6R III D6R LGP D6R STD D6R XL D6T D6T LGP D6T LGPPAT D6T XL D6T XL PAT D6T XW D6T XW PAT D6XE D7E D7E LGP D7F D7G D7G2 D7H D7R D7R II D7R LGP D7R SERIES D7R XR D8H D8K D8L D8N D8R D8R II D8T D9G D9H D9L D9N D9R D9T

Load, Haul, Dump

R1300 R1300G R1300G II R1600 R1600G R1600H R1700 II R1700G R1700K R2900 R2900G R3000H

Utility Vehicle


CUV102D CUV105D CUV82 CUV85

Oem Solutions

CAT WDS



eBay



FCC



User Manual



**Me:** It's probably possible to steal expensive construction equipment with a Bluetooth exploit!

**Them:** The security baseline for construction equipment is very low, and it's actually super easy to steal them with cheap universal physical keys...

**Me:**





# So...This is Actually A Security Win!?

- If my understanding is correct, and the prior state of physical security for these devices was that it only required a universal physical key to steal one of them<sup>[1]</sup>...
- Then clearly adding a BT proximity requirement is a ***net security improvement!***
- An important reminder to consider the *total threat model*



<sup>[1]</sup><https://www.quora.com/Is-it-true-that-you-can-operate-all-Caterpillar-machinery-with-one-key>



# **End - Anecdotes - Devices**



# Final Takeaways 1

- *Bluetooth sniffing goals are different from WiFi goals*, and consequently the sniffing tech is under-developed to help with those goals
- When there's a BT FW bug, **no one knows what all it affects**



# Final Takeaways 2

- There are lots of devices that do not have human-readable names, so it's not clear what they are
  - *Somebody (/me!)* ought to start learning to *toothprint* BT devices!
- There are lots of devices that are advertising names, but it's not clear what they are
  - I'm looking at you "**UGZZF\_X[AB10]{4}**"
  - Somebody ought to start a database! Or at least a wiki?!



# Call To Action!



JOIN ME! AND TOGETHER  
WE CAN RULE THE  
BLUETOOTH GALAXY!



# Call To Action!

- WiGLE's Android app is open source! If you know Android dev, it'd be great if you could help get more Bluetooth info collected within WiGLE
- I'd like to crowdsource more information, but my web-fu is weak
  - I could use help creating a website that allows people to contribute as well as query this kind of information
- Go collect some information and then share what you find out
  - My data will be available to other researchers on a "share and share alike" basis - you need to collect some useful information that you share with me, and then I'll share my data back



# Conclusion

## What I now know I didn't know

- Basic Bluetooth sniffing can *sometimes* give me some of the information I'm looking for, in a roundabout way:
  - If the BDADDR is for a BT Classic device or BLE Public device, if OUI is a silicon vendor (like Texas Instruments), this provides a good indication of which chip they're likely using
  - The same holds true for two other 16-bit IDs that have assigned companies according to the BT assigned numbers document (Member UUID16 and BT Member Company ID)



# Conclusion

## What I now know I didn't know


- Some of the information mentioned in the BT spec that would help point at which BT chip a device uses, is not exposed
  - Even though when I did raw BT sniffing, I could see that it's actually queried by the Linux BlueZ stack in some cases!
  - Therefore I need to collect it myself...
    - One problem is that this will not be collectable via phone apps, and thus will be less scalable



# Conclusion

## What I now know

- Some of the information about which BT chip are supported by the Linux BT stack
  - Even though not explicitly listed by the Linux BT stack
- Therefore I need to
  - One problem will be less





# Conclusion

## What I now know

Stay tuned (@XenoKovah) for the next research!





# Conclusion

## What I now know

Stay tuned (@XenoKovah) for the next research!





# Fin



- BT research is pretty cool IMHO
- But *OpenSecurityTraining2 (<https://ost2.fyi>, @OpenSecTraining) is cooler!*
  - We'll have BT classes eventually, but in the meantime there's so much other stuff to learn! Reverse Engineering, Vulnerabilities, Firmware, System Architecture!
- You should take a class, or *teach* a class!