

# Job Transitions and Employee Earnings After Acquisitions: Linking Corporate and Worker Outcomes\*

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## Abstract

This paper connects changes in employer characteristics through job transitions to employee earnings following mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using firm balance sheet data linked to individual earnings data in Canada and a matched difference-in-differences design, we find that after M&As, acquirers expand while targets shrink substantially, relative to their matched control groups. Additionally, profit margins decrease for both acquirers and targets in the medium-run. Furthermore, workers at target firms suffer losses in earnings, and this decline in earnings is entirely driven by workers who move to other firms after an M&A event. We find that workers leaving target firms after M&As move to larger firms with higher wage premiums, but with much worse match qualities on average. Taken together, it appears that job transitions to employers with poor match qualities primarily explain the post-M&A decline in worker earnings in our setting.

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# 1 Introduction

Research has uncovered persistent evidence of imperfect competition in labor markets (Staiger et al., 2010; Manning, 2011; Naidu et al., 2016; Dube et al., 2020; Kline et al., 2019; Lamadon et al., 2022). These findings have led to renewed interest in understanding sources of monopsony power. One thread of this recent literature links poor labor market outcomes to a rise in market concentration (Barkai, 2020; Azar et al., 2020; Benmelech et al., 2020; Rinz, 2020). Subsequently, recent work has assessed impacts on workers of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter, M&As) that generate large shifts in concentration (Prager and Schmitt, 2021; Arnold, 2021). However, even absent anti-competitive impacts, M&A events may still have large impacts on workers. For workers who remain in the merging parties, changes in firm performance could affect their wages, as firms are an important source of wage variation across workers (Card et al., 2013; Bryson et al., 2016; Song et al., 2018). Additionally, M&A events could lead to job transitions, which may have negative impacts on workers, as shown in the job displacement literature (Jacobson et al., 1993; Lachowska et al., 2020; Schmieder et al., forthcoming).

In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence on changes in workers' labor market outcomes following corporate M&As. Specifically, we assess the connection between changes in employer characteristics via job transitions and employee earnings after M&As. While prior studies focus only on either firm-level outcomes or worker-level outcomes, in our work we are able to link detailed firm balance sheet data from corporate tax returns to worker-level earnings data from individual tax returns in Canada.<sup>1</sup> This allows us to connect and simultaneously evaluate both corporate and employee outcomes, and helps us pin down potential mechanisms behind our findings. Furthermore, we can evaluate whether changes in job movers' earnings after M&As can be partly explained by productivity differences between new firms and old firms. Being able to observe detailed firm outcomes, therefore, allows us to determine whether other differences across employers besides firm fixed effects or match effects, explain changes in job movers' earnings. For identification, we exploit a large number of M&A events from 2005 to 2016 and a matched difference-in-differences design, where we compare M&A firms and workers with control groups that are similar in sizes, operate in the same province and sector, but are never involved in M&As.

We find that acquirers expand significantly, while targets shrink substantially after M&As. However, profit margins decrease significantly for both targets and acquirers after M&As. Acquirers' employment, average payroll, and revenue increase by 15.7 log points, 2.8 log points, and 22.5 log points, respectively, on average relative to their matched control groups after M&As.

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<sup>1</sup>While Arnold (2021) also uses employer-employee matched data in the U.S., the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data does not have detailed firm balance sheet information, such as profit margins, and therefore, cannot be used to simultaneously evaluate firm-level and worker-level outcomes.

By contrast, targets' employment, average payroll, and total revenue decrease by 8.8 log points, 2.6 log points, and 47.2 log points, respectively, on average after M&As. Given that the majority (roughly 80 percent) of M&As in our setting involves partial acquisitions, target firms in our sample remain as independent and separate entities after acquisitions, and sharp declines in their sizes are consistent with the fact that they sold a substantial part of their businesses to acquirers. At the aggregate (targets and acquirers combined) level, we find almost no changes in employment or average payroll, but significant declines in total revenue and profit margins. While these aggregate results suggest that employment and average wage stay roughly the same after M&As for targets and acquirers combined, there could still be significant changes in worker composition.

At the worker-level, we estimate that their annual earnings increased by 1.5 percent for workers at acquiring firms, but decreased by 1.1 percent for workers at target firms. In target firms, the probability of job transitions increases substantially, by 7.8 percentage points on average. Given that we observe the universe of workers in the formal labor market in Canada, we check that roughly 93 percent of these job transitions are to different companies, rather than to self-employment or unemployment. Importantly, we find that the decline in workers' earnings at target firms is almost entirely driven by those who transition jobs following an M&A event.

Our finding that earnings do not change for workers who remain at their original firm is suggestive evidence of a limited role for market-level impacts of M&As, such as increased monopsony power or increased product market power, driving wage changes. However, it is possible that our identification strategy (which compares M&A firms with non-M&A firms) nets out these equilibrium impacts. Nevertheless, in our setting, we find a limited role for either increased labor-market power or increased product market power. The vast majority of M&A events (99 percent) have essentially zero predicted impact on labor-market concentration. This finding arises because most labor markets in our setting are not concentrated to begin with, and the majority of firms going through M&As are located across different commuting zones. Turning to product market power, many of our firm-level outcomes suggest that an increase in product market power is not a primary factor in explaining our results. First, we do not find evidence that profits increase in either target or acquiring firms after an M&A event. If product market power rises, we would expect to see increases in profits. Second, we directly estimate markups following [De Loecker et al. \(2020\)](#) and find no evidence of increased markups for either target or acquiring firms.

While the firm-level results are inconsistent with a rise in market power driving the earnings losses for target workers after M&As, we additionally conduct heterogeneity analyses based on the initial labor market concentration or different types of M&A events to rule out a shift in market concentration as a potential channel behind the decline in target workers' earnings. These results contrast with [Arnold \(2021\)](#) and [Prager and Schmitt \(2021\)](#), who find M&A events that lead to

large shifts in labor market concentration lead to wage declines. In our sample of M&A events, we find a limited role for market concentration. While the prior studies utilize variation across M&As based on the size of concentration changes, there is a lack of such variation in our setting due to the aforementioned reasons. Thus, we interpret our evidence as complementary to these prior studies.

Given that the decline in worker earnings at target firms is entirely driven by those that move to other firms after an M&A event, we turn to the impacts on job movers. Workers who transition from target firms after an M&A event experience a decline in earnings of 4 percent. Among workers that leave target firms and whose reasons for job separations are non-missing in our data, we find that almost three quarters of these workers leave target firms involuntarily. Therefore, we follow a recent job displacement literature to decompose these losses in earnings into firm-specific components and match-specific components. For example, the decrease in earnings for job movers could be due to finding a new employer with a lower firm fixed effect or with a worse match quality. Broadly speaking, while firm fixed effects capture firm characteristics that result in above- or below-average earnings for all workers, match effects reflect a specific employee skill set that fits well with a firm's production function, or firm benefit policies that enhance their productivity.

We find that workers from target firms move to larger and more profitable firms with higher wage premiums on average. Despite this, these workers still suffer earnings losses from moving to these firms. To explore this further, we follow [Woodcock \(2015\)](#) and [Lachowska et al. \(2020\)](#) and estimate worker-firm match effects. We find that while the firms M&A workers move to are larger on average, they are particularly poor matches for these workers. Our results are qualitatively similar to [Lachowska et al. \(2020\)](#) who find that match effects for displaced workers explain a large portion of the wage decline following a job loss, with firm effects playing a relatively minor role. To explore potential sources of lost match effects for job movers, we conduct heterogeneity analyses based on the type of transition and worker characteristics. We find that those displaced involuntarily, those who move multiple times after the event, older workers, and those at the top of the within-firm earnings distribution suffer larger losses in earnings and match effects. These findings suggest that M&As create job displacements, where workers with high search frictions or who have accumulated firm-specific human capital particularly have a difficult time finding a new employer with good match quality. Taken together, it appears that after target firms shrink in size through an M&A event, workers move to larger firms and take a modest wage cut, possibly for higher earnings growth in the future ([Cahuc et al. 2006](#)). Their earnings loss remains in the medium run due to worse matches with new employers.

This paper contributes to a few distinct literatures. Most directly, we contribute to a literature on the impacts of M&As on the labor market ([Brown and Medoff, 1988](#); [Siegel and Simons, 2010](#)). Much of the recent work in this area has focused on particular mechanisms. For example, both

Prager and Schmitt (2021) and Arnold (2021) study how M&A events that lead to large changes in labor market concentration affect worker earnings. In these papers, the goal of the analysis is to argue that other changes, such as shifts in productivity or product market power, are stable across M&A events that differentially impact labor market concentration. In this paper, we seek to directly estimate these impacts using the firm-level balance-sheet data. Additionally, the sample of M&A events in this paper is quite different. We find that in our sample of M&A events, shifts in labor market concentration are relatively rare. However, we find these M&A events still have important impacts on job transitions that translate to changes in worker outcomes.

Relative to previous work documenting that M&A events create significant displacements of workers from target firms with higher wage premiums and reallocation to firms with lower wage premiums (He and le Maire 2022; Lagaras forthcoming), our work shows that many workers from target firms are displaced from target firms after an M&A event, and move to firms with higher wage premiums but with worse match qualities. While finding different mechanisms, our study complements Lagaras (forthcoming) by additionally using firm balance sheet data and showing that job movers do not move to less productive firms on average after M&As. This helps us rule out alternative mechanisms, such as other important differences between new firms and old firms, explaining the decline in worker earnings. Our analysis also complements the study by He and le Maire (2022), which focuses on the role of replacing managers in target firms. Theoretically, high-wage managers may be replaced after M&A events (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) leading to wage declines in target firms. While we cannot distinguish managers from other workers in our data, job displacements at targets may have been led by changes in management. Moreover, our work complements recent studies (Dessaint et al. 2017; Ouimet and Zarutskie 2020) documenting human-capital considerations and labor restructuring as important drivers of M&As. While these studies show that acquirers engage in M&As to hire more (productive) workers, we find that most workers at targets move to non-acquiring firms after the event, implying that acquirers engage in M&As to purchase particular assets or intellectual properties of targets, rather than to poach workers.

Second, there is a large literature in corporate finance and industrial organizations that studies how M&As affect firm performance, finding mixed empirical results. For example, Braguinsky et al. (2015) report positive impacts on productivity in the Japanese cotton spinning industry, while Blonigen and Pierce (2016) show negative impacts on productivity in a sample of U.S. manufacturing mergers. Furthermore, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) finds improved long-term profitability of merging parties when the target and the acquirer share asset complementarities, while Schoar (2002) shows that acquirers' productivity may decrease through a shift in focus of management towards new segments at the expense of existing ones. Additionally, while Boucly et al. (2011) find

that leveraged buyouts in France allow target firms to grow and become more profitable by relaxing financial constraints, [Malmendier et al. \(2018\)](#) show that acquirers that win bidding contests suffer long-run losses relative to firms that lose the bidding contests. Declines in stock performance of acquiring firms have been attributed to potentially misaligned incentives, such as empire-building motives ([Jensen, 1986](#)) or CEO overconfidence ([Malmendier and Tate, 2005](#)). Our paper contributes to this literature by estimating the impact of M&As on a variety of firm-level outcomes and by finding results consistent with the set of studies reporting negative impacts of M&As on firm performance. We then use these firm-level outcomes to rule out alternative mechanisms, such as changes in firms' market power, behind the decline in worker earnings.

Lastly, our paper relates to a literature on how job transitions impact wages. In particular, a large literature studies the role of firm-specific and match-specific components to explain changes in displaced workers' wages ([Lachowska et al. 2020](#); [Schmieder et al. forthcoming](#)). Much of the recent work leverages mass layoffs to identify impacts of job transitions on workers earnings. In this paper, we find that M&A events could lead to significant job transitions for workers from target firms, and that workers moving to new employers with a worse match quality could play an important role explaining the decline in their earnings after an M&A event.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a conceptual framework. Section 3 provides institutional details on M&A regulations in Canada. Section 4 describes our data and Section 5 describes our research design. Section 6 shows our main results and Section 7 discusses potential mechanisms of our findings. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Conceptual Framework

This section illustrates a model of wage bargaining following [Abowd and Lemieux \(1993\)](#) through which we will interpret the impacts of M&As. To begin, consider a group of  $\bar{l}_j$  workers bargaining over both wages and employment level with firm  $j$ . The workers seek to maximize  $l_j w_j + (\bar{l}_j - l_j)v$ , where  $w_j$  is the bargained wage,  $l_j$  is the employment level, and  $v$  is the value of the outside option to the workers. We assume any workers that are not hired by the firm receive the outside option  $v$ .

The workers bargain with a firm with a profit function  $p_j(q(l_j))q(l_j) - w_j l_j$ . We assume that the price of firm  $j$ 's output depends on the total output  $q(l_j)$ , implying that firms may have some level of product-market power. The threat point for workers is the value of the workers' outside option, while the threat point for the firm is zero profits. We assume workers and firms bargain over both wages and employment. In particular, they choose  $l_j$  and  $w_j$  to maximize:



$$\max_{l_j, w_j} [l_j w_j + (\bar{l}_j - l_j)v - \bar{l}_j v]^{\gamma_j} [p_j(q(l_j))q(l_j) - w_j l_j]^{1-\gamma_j} \quad (1)$$

where  $\gamma_j$  is the bargaining weight associated with workers. A higher value  $\gamma_j$  implies placing a higher value on the utility of workers relative to firm profits. Taking the first order conditions for the bargaining problem yields the following two optimality conditions:

$$w_j = \underbrace{\gamma_j \left( \frac{p_j(q(l_j))q(l_j)}{l_j} \right)}_{\text{Rents Per Worker}} + (1 - \gamma_j)v \quad (2)$$

$$q'(l_j)p_j(q(l_j)) \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon_j} + 1 \right) = v \quad (3)$$

Equation (2) controls the optimal wage of the firm and is governed by three terms: the bargaining parameter  $\gamma_j$ , the value of workers' outside option  $v$ , and the rents per worker,  $\frac{p_j(q(l_j))q(l_j)}{l_j}$ . We assume the rents per worker are greater than the value of the outside option, otherwise workers would just take the outside option. Therefore, in this model, wages are increasing in the bargaining power of workers, the outside option of workers, and the rents per worker at the firm.<sup>2</sup>

Equation (3) controls the optimal size of the firm. The term on the left of the equation is the marginal revenue product of labor.<sup>3</sup> This depends on the marginal product of labor ( $q'(l_j)p_j(q(l_j))$ ) as well as the elasticity of product demand ( $\varepsilon_j$ ). If product markets are perfectly competitive, then even small changes in prices lead to a firm losing all sales, implying  $\varepsilon_j \rightarrow -\infty$ . In this case, the outside option of workers will be equal to the marginal product of labor, implying the negotiation leads to the optimal size of the firm. The more inelastic the demand (implying higher market power), the smaller the firm size, all else equal.

<sup>2</sup>Many alternative models of wage setting yield similar wage equations. For example, a wage posting model, as in [Kline et al. \(2019\)](#), shows that the wage for incumbents is an average of the marginal product of labor and the entrant wage (an object similar to the outside option in this model). Standard search models, as in [Manning \(2003\)](#), also produce a similar formulation of the wage as an average of marginal revenue of product and the outside option available to workers. The rent-sharing literature often writes out the wage equation as  $w_j = \gamma_j QR_j + v$ , where  $QR_j$  are the quasi-rents per worker at the firm and in our model are equal to  $\frac{p_j(q(l_j))q(l_j)-v}{l_j}$  ([Van Reenen, 1996](#)).

<sup>3</sup>To see this, note that  $MRPL = \frac{\partial q(l_j)}{\partial l_j} p_j(q(l_j)) + \frac{q(l_j)p_j}{p_j} \frac{\partial p_j(q(l_j))}{\partial q(l_j)} \frac{\partial q(l_j)}{\partial l_j}$ . The elasticity of product demand is given by the term,  $\varepsilon_j = \frac{\partial q(l_j)}{\partial p_j} \cdot \frac{p_j}{q(l_j)}$ . Substituting  $\varepsilon_j$  into the equation for the MRPL and rearranging yields the left-hand side of Equation (3).

## 2.1 Potential Impacts of M&As on Wages

In terms of the model, M&As could impact workers' wages through a variety of channels. The first two channels we will discuss fall under the broader umbrella of market power: product-market power and labor-market power. The next channels are about firm-specific components of the production process that might impact workers' wages, even without any market power impacts. The final component discusses how workers who exit the firm may be impacted relative to incumbents who remain at the firm.

### 2.1.1 Market Power

*Labor Market Power:* In this wage-bargaining model, impacts on labor-market competition can be potentially interpreted through two parameters: the bargaining parameter and the value of outside options. In the model so far we have taken the bargaining parameter as exogenous. However, it is possible that the bargaining weight of workers decreases following M&As. A decline in  $\gamma_j$  will imply workers get less of the overall rents in the firm; thus, wages would go down, with no impact on total employment in the firm. One mechanism through which bargaining power could decrease is by the replacement of high-wage managers (Shleifer and Summers 1988; He and le Maire 2022).

M&As may also impact labor-market power through the value of the outside option  $v$ . Before the M&A events, workers in the target and acquiring firms could potentially be employed at the other firm in the market. After a complete merger, the workers are in the same firm, which could reduce the value of the outside option to workers. In other words, monopsony power of firms could increase in the market due to a decrease in the value of outside options for workers. In product markets, such anti-competitive impacts are often predicted using either diversion ratios (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010), concentration (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990), or discrete-choice merger simulations (Nevo, 2000). This channel has been studied in prior work that focuses on impacts of labor-market concentration on wages, using M&A events as a shock to concentration (Arnold, 2021; Prager and Schmitt, 2021). In our setting, however, most M&A events are partial acquisitions, where the target sells a part of the firm, and remains a separate entity. This distinction likely has implications for how much we expect a given event to shift the outside option of workers in these firms.

*Product Market Power:* The primary focus of the industrial organization literature on M&As has been the potential for price increases due to increased product market power. In this wage-bargaining model, an increase in product-market power can be interpreted as demand becoming more inelastic (i.e., a lower value in absolute terms of  $\varepsilon_j$ ). Lower overall output also results in lower overall employment. In terms of wages, higher profits and fewer workers will generate increases in the size of rents available to bargain over, leading to an increase in workers' wages.



Note that a wage-posting model has different implications for how increases in market power may impact wages. In wage-posting models, firms face upward sloping labor supply curves, implying declines in employment lead to declines in wages. Since increased market power will incentivize firms to lower employment, firms will cut wages in response to increased market power.

### 2.1.2 Changes in Productivity

A common justification for M&As is the possibility of increased profitability through synergies. For example, [Braguinsky et al. \(2015\)](#) finds evidence of increased productivity in the Japanese cotton spinning industry after acquisitions, while [Blonigen and Pierce \(2016\)](#) finds little evidence of increased productivity in manufacturing acquisitions in the United States. Furthermore, [Hoberg and Phillips \(2010\)](#) finds improved long-term profitability and sales of merging parties when the target and the acquirer are similar in terms of asset complementarities, while [Schoar \(2002\)](#) shows that productivity of acquirers' incumbent plants may decrease due to a shift in focus of management towards new segments at the expense of existing ones. Furthermore, [Malmendier et al. \(2018\)](#) finds that acquirers that win bidding contests for targets suffer losses in stock returns relative to competitors. Possible motivations for productivity-reducing M&As include empire-building motives ([Jensen, 1986](#)) or CEO overconfidence ([Malmendier and Tate, 2005](#)). If firms become more productive after M&As, they may become more profitable, which can be interpreted as an increase in the marginal revenue product of workers that will increase both the size of the firm and wages. By contrast, decreases in productivity will lead to decreases in employment and wages.

### 2.1.3 Impacts on Job Transitions and Movers

In this model, if a worker leaves her current firm, then the worker receives the outside option  $v$ . While this is common across all workers in this model, it likely in practice varies at the worker-level. A large literature in economics finds that job displacement often leads to large and persistent earnings declines for workers ([Jacobson et al., 1993](#); [Lachowska et al., 2020](#); [Schmieder et al., forthcoming](#)). However, separations during an M&A event may impact workers very differently than separations studied in the prior literature, which generally focuses on mass-layoff events. In the aggregate, M&A events tend to be pro-cyclical ([Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004](#)), which could imply that workers who transition jobs during M&A events face different circumstances relative to workers displaced in a mass layoff.

To understand how job transitions impact worker outcomes, we will decompose changes in earnings into different components, following [Lachowska et al. \(2020\)](#). In particular, we will examine the characteristics of firms that workers transition to. To do so, we will estimate firm fixed

effects (Abowd et al., 1999), which capture the premium associated with working for a given employer, and examine whether workers that leave M&A firms move to lower or higher-paying firms on average. We will then utilize an extension of the AKM model proposed by Woodcock (2015) and implemented by Lachowska et al. (2020) to examine the role of match effects in explaining earnings changes. Additionally, given the firm-level balance sheet data, we can examine in detail what types of firms workers transition to, in terms of size, revenue, and profit margins.

### 3 Institutional Background

This section describes relevant institutional details about competition policy and labor regulation. Competition policy in Canada is administered by the Competition Bureau, an independent law enforcement agency. In 2009, a major reform instituted a two-step process for merger reviews, similar to the American process with notification thresholds, a waiting period, and a supplementary information request. The thresholds for a pre-merger notification requirement are set by the Competition Act. The two most relevant thresholds are the size of parties and the size of transaction. Both of these must be met to trigger a pre-merger notification.<sup>4</sup> In our analysis sample, most M&A deals and involved parties are not large enough to trigger any of these thresholds.

The parties may close the deal when the statutory waiting period (30 days) has expired, been waived, or is terminated; unless extended by the Commissioner of Competition through a Supplementary Information Request similar to a second request in the United States under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act). Furthermore, all mergers are subject to challenge from the Commissioner for up to one year after closing unless an Advance Ruling Certificate has been issued.<sup>5</sup> Reviewing a merger, the Commissioner considers multiple factors, such as concentration and barriers to entry, and may challenge the proposed merger if it substantially lessens competition. In general, most transactions that underwent pre-merger reviews resulted in no enforcement action.

Section 96 of the Competition Act explicitly lays out an “efficiencies defence” of mergers, which allows anti-competitive mergers to proceed if potential cost savings outweigh the losses to consumers through higher prices. In the United States and many other jurisdictions, efficiency can

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<sup>4</sup>The parties together must have aggregate assets in Canada, or aggregate annual gross revenue from sales in, from or into Canada, in excess of 400 million Canadian dollars. The aggregate value of the assets in Canada to be acquired, or the aggregate annual gross revenue from sales in or from Canada generated from those assets, must be greater than 93 million Canadian dollars. There is also a size of equity threshold that less frequently comes into play: the acquirer holds 20 percent of the shares of a public corporation, 35 percent of the share of a private corporation, or 35 percent of the profits or assets on dissolution of a non-corporate entity.

<sup>5</sup>An Advance Ruling Certificate notifies the parties that the Commissioner does not intend to make an application under section 92 of the Act which is akin to “early termination” in the U.S. under the HSR Act.

also be considered as a factor in antitrust decisions for mergers but is given less weight.<sup>6</sup> A review of the Competition Act launched by the Government of Canada targets the efficiency defence, citing concerns about the realization of potential efficiency gains. The review is also interested in how and whether the outcomes of workers should be considered for competition policy. Our work, assessing how acquirers' and targets' performance change after M&As through a retrospective study, may be beneficial for policymakers designing effective regulations on M&As.

Labor markets in Canada share many similarities with those in the United States. Labor regulation is the jurisdiction of the provinces for most industries, but unemployment insurance is national through the Canada-wide Employment Insurance program. Measures of employment protection from the OECD show Canada close to the United States with much lower levels of protection from dismissals than European countries (OECD, 2020). To dismiss a worker requires several weeks of advance notice to the worker and mandatory severance depending on years of service. Non-compete clauses have recently been banned in certain provinces, but were generally unenforceable even before the explicit banning (Hanson and Cohen, 2012). Therefore, non-compete clauses are unlikely to be a substantial issue for worker transitions following an M&A event in our setting. One difference for labor markets in Canada is the degree of unionization. During our sample period, the overall coverage in the private sector by union contracts in Canada is about 17 percent on average, compared to 8 percent in the United States. While the higher union coverage rates in Canada may render it more difficult to lay off workers in general, they may also present a source of inefficiency to be targeted by M&As.

## 4 Data

This section describes two datasets used for our analysis. First, we use the SDC Platinum database which contains information on M&A activities around the globe. Second, we use the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database, a matched employee-employer dataset that covers the universe of firms and workers in Canada from 2001 to 2017. To prevent disclosure of confidential information, Statistics Canada requires researchers to round estimates and observation counts.

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<sup>6</sup>Ware and Winter (2016) assert (p. 366) for Canada that "...in no other jurisdiction in the world would a court accept evidence of substantial price effects from a merger and yet allow the merger." A comparison of efficiency defences across many OECD countries is found in OECD (2013).

## 4.1 SDC Platinum

The SDC Platinum database allows detailed search on M&A activities around the world, covering all corporate (public or private) transactions. This data set includes names of the parties, NAICS industry code, and other identifying information such as addresses and phone numbers. The dataset on M&A activities was merged with the firm-level data from the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database using all available identifying variables, such firm names and addresses. The match rate is about 75 percent on average from 2001 to 2016.

## 4.2 Canadian Employer Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD)

The Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database draws information from both individual (T1) and corporate (T2) tax return records, merged with job-level information using T4 employee tax records (like a W-2 in the United States, with information on annual earnings) and Record of Employment (ROE) data (with information on work history), and with firm-level information from the National Accounts Longitudinal Micro-data File (NALMF). This database has rich information on the universe of firms and workers in Canada from 2001 to 2017.

The main firm-level outcome variables are employment, average payroll, total revenue, and profit margins. Employment is defined as the average number of employees reported on the T4s in a given year. Average payroll is defined as the total wage bill divided by the number of employees. Profit margins are defined as total revenue minus total expenses, scaled by total revenue.

Additionally, we look at realized capital gains and markups. We link ownership data with the firm-level data to compute realized capital gains by owners for a given firm in each year. The ownership data contains unique individual IDs of investors in private firms and their ownership rates. After merging individual tax returns data with the ownership data at the investor-level, we aggregate owners' realized capital gains of a particular firm in each year to compute total realized capital gains by these investors at the firm level. We define markup as the elasticity of output with respect to variable costs as well as the variable costs share (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). For the elasticity of output with respect to variable costs, we use estimates from De Loecker et al. (2020) that allow for different elasticities across two-digit NAICS industry codes and years. Given the elasticity estimates, this allows us to estimate firm-level markups as the output elasticity multiplied by the inverse of the variable costs (wages and material costs) share:  $\hat{\theta}_{st} * \frac{Sales}{Costs\ of\ Goods}$ .

At the worker-level, the key outcome variable is annual earnings, aggregated across all employers for that worker in a given year. While we include earnings across all employers, we associate workers with the “dominant” employer (i.e., the employer from which the employee receives the

highest pay in the year). We also use information on workers' gender and age derived from the T1 income tax filing for creating a matched control group and for heterogeneity analyses.

## 5 Empirical Strategy

This section describes our empirical design and provides descriptive statistics on our matched sample. To estimate the effects of M&As on firm-level outcomes, we implement a matched difference-in-differences design by estimating a regression of the following form:

$$Y_{jt} = \sum_{k=-4}^5 \beta_k^{MA} \mathbb{1}(t_j = t^* + k) \times MA_j + \sum_{k=-4}^5 \mathbb{1}(t_j = t^* + k) + \psi_j + X_{jt} + u_{jt} \quad (4)$$

where  $Y_{jt}$  is an outcome variable for firm  $j$  at year  $t$ ,  $MA_j$  is an indicator for an M&A firm,  $\mathbb{1}(t_j = t^* + k)$  indicates an M&A event occurred  $k$  years in the past relative to the period of the M&A event  $t^*$ ,  $\psi_j$  are firm fixed effects, and  $u_{jt}$  is an error term.<sup>7</sup> To absorb any industry specific shock in a given year, we include 4-digit industry dummies interacted with year dummies as control variables. Furthermore, we include quartics in firm age to ensure that our results are not driven by differences in financial constraints of firms. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

To assess worker-level impacts, we estimate a similar matched difference-in-difference design of the following form:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{k=-4}^5 \beta_k^{MA} \mathbb{1}(t_i = t^* + k) \times MA_i + \sum_{k=-4}^5 \mathbb{1}(t_i = t^* + k) + \omega_i + \mu_{it} \quad (5)$$

where  $y_{it}$  is an outcome variable for incumbent worker  $i$  at year  $t$ ,  $\omega_i$  are worker fixed effects, and all other variables are defined as in Equation (4). The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-by-firm level.<sup>8</sup>

The key identifying assumption is that outcomes for M&A firms and workers and for control firms and workers would have trended similarly in the absence of the M&A event. This assumption may be strong since M&As are the result of firms' endogenous decisions. For example, acquiring firms may target firms that will be profitable in the future, whose earnings may grow even absent the merger. By contrast, acquirers may target mismanaged and underperforming businesses whose

<sup>7</sup>For control firms,  $\mathbb{1}(t_j = t^* + k)$  is equal to one if an M&A event occurs in  $k$  years relative to the current period at the matched treated firm.

<sup>8</sup>Our results are robust to two-way clustering standard errors at the worker and the market (commuting zone by 2-digit sector) level – see Appendix A.

employment and earnings would fall regardless of a merger. One way to determine the direction of the potential bias is by comparing outcomes for M&A firms and workers to the control firms and workers in the years prior to the M&A event. Parallel pre-trends in firm-level and worker-level outcomes help alleviate the aforementioned concerns.

While verifying common pre-trends is reassuring for a causal interpretation, contemporaneous shocks that occur with M&A events could still bias our results. For example, there could be a negative demand shock that hits a commuting zone and causes both a decline in employment and an increase in merger activities as firms get purchased before they shut down. In this case, M&A activities are correlated with shocks that decrease labor demand. We can also have the opposite scenario; in fact, merger activities tend to be pro-cyclical on aggregate (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). We address this concern by also looking at M&As that are less likely to have been triggered by local economic conditions of the firm. Specifically, we consider the impact of national M&As that occur among domestic firms with multiple establishments across different commuting zones. The intuition is that these changes in ownership are less likely to be driven by local economic conditions faced by the firms or workers (see Appendix A).

## 5.1 Matched Samples

During our sample period, the total number of M&A events is about 2,200 per year on average within our data. Before performing a matching procedure between M&A firms and potential control firms, we make the following restrictions. First, we require a firm to have at least 10 workers one year prior to the event and positive employment among years  $[t - 4, t - 2]$ . This choice focuses our sample on economically active firms with enough pre-period observations, and drops most small businesses that are not comparable to either acquiring or target firms. We then match each firm in the year prior to an M&A event to a “control” firm in the same province and 2-digit NAICS industry. A firm is a potential control firm for firm  $j$  if: (1) the firm is never involved in an M&A event during our sample period, and (2) the firm is in the same decile bin of average payroll and is in the same 15-quantile bins in total revenue and firm age in the year prior to the M&A event of firm  $j$ .<sup>9</sup> Of all the possible counterfactual firms for a given M&A firm, we choose the firm with the closest propensity score, which is estimated by predicting treatment using a linear probability model with quadratics in average payroll, total revenue, and firm age in year  $[t - 1]$ . This matching strategy is similar to a number of recent papers implementing a dynamic difference-in-differences research design (Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017; Smith et al., 2019; Arnold, 2021). The match-

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<sup>9</sup>While this specification yields the cleanest parallel pre-trends on key outcomes, which are important for our identification strategy, our main results remain qualitatively similar when we use different bin sizes or other related firm characteristics for matching. Results based on other variation in matching can be provided upon request.



ing strategy finds a counterfactual firm in 23 percent of all cases, leaving us with 513 M&A events per year on average during our sample period (Figure 1).

Choosing one counterfactual control firm per M&A firm in a given year ensures that the treated and control groups are comparable on the matched variables. We construct an unbalanced panel of firms which extends 4 years prior to and 5 years after the M&A event. M&A firms in our analysis sample are larger than those that fail to find a control group on average; therefore, the M&A deals in our analysis sample are meaningful and larger than an average M&A deal that happens in Canada during the sample period. Furthermore, our results remain similar when we focus on smaller M&A firms (based on pre-event firm size) within our analysis sample, implying that our results are not driven by a particular set of M&A firms for which we could find a comparable control group.

Matching on size, province, and sector finds treatment-control pairs that would plausibly exhibit common trends in the absence of an M&A activity. While we do not explicitly match firms based on commuting zone, it is possible that firms are matched within the same commuting zone. This is a potential concern if M&As have impacts on local labor markets through increased concentration. If M&As have negative effects on firms in the same industry and commuting zone, then the impact of M&As on firms will be biased towards zero. However, these potential spillover effects are minimal in our setting given that the number of M&A deals within the same market is small and the number of competitors in a given market is so large that most M&A deals do not contribute to a meaningful increase in concentration (see Section 7). To minimize this concern, we do a robustness check by matching firms within the same province, but in different commuting zones, and find similar results to our main results without this restriction (Appendix A).

To construct the worker-level sample, we extract all workers who were continuously employed in the matched M&A firms during the pre-event period. This tenure restriction is chosen to obtain a sample of workers with attachment to the M&A firms and is similar to tenure restrictions used in the mass layoff literature (Jacobson et al., 1993; von Wachter et al., 2009; Lachowska et al., 2020). Additionally, we restrict workers to have at least 4,000 CAD in annual earnings to ensure that we study workers with stable income and attached to their firms (Card et al., 2013; Sorkin, 2018). Since we do not observe work hours in our data, we make these restrictions so that we mostly focus on full-time workers. For each worker in a treated firm, we choose a worker in any of the matched control firms in the same sector, province, worker age (five-year) bin and gender. If more than one match is found, we choose the worker with the closest propensity score to the treated worker, where the propensity score is estimated by predicting treatment using a linear probability model with a quadratic in worker age. In total, a counterfactual worker is found in roughly 70 percent of the treated-control firm pairs. To compute earnings in the worker-level data, we aggregate annual earnings across all employers if a worker is employed at more than one firm in a given year.

Since we use a matched control group that is never treated, the specifications above do not suffer from the identification issues that arise in conventional event-study designs (Borusyak et al., 2021) or difference-in-differences designs with staggered timing (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). Identification here comes solely from differences in always-treated and never-treated units over time, not from units coming in and out of treatment.

## 5.2 Descriptive Statistics

We close this section with descriptive statistics of our analysis sample. Panel A of Table 1 shows the averages for key variables across firms, comparing M&A firms to the set of matched control firms one year before the event. On average, M&A firms are a bit larger than their control firms, in terms of total revenue and employment. However, for average payroll, leverage ratio, and markup, M&A firms are comparable to their control firms, suggesting that firms that go through M&As and firms that never get involved in M&As are comparable with regards to their average employee compensation and financing structure prior to the event. Importantly, as we show in Section 6, M&A firms and their control firms share parallel pre-trends on these variables, implying that they exhibited similar patterns in terms of sales, profitability, employment, and average payroll, prior to the M&A event. The dominant sectors are manufacturing, wholesale, and services; together these sectors make up almost 70 percent of our firm sample.

Panel C of Table 1 shows average worker characteristics in our analysis sample one year before the event. We distinguish between workers at acquiring firms and workers at target firms. Annual earnings are roughly 70,000 CAD and 72,000 CAD among workers at acquiring firms and target firms, respectively. Annual earnings for workers are roughly 70,000 CAD among workers at control firms on average prior to the M&A event. The difference between average payroll in Panel A and annual earnings in Panel C arises because not all workers from treated firms are matched to workers at control firms, as we impose restrictions on worker age, gender and tenure for matching. Hence, the average payroll at a given firm may not equal the average annual earnings of workers at a given firm in our matched sample. The age and gender compositions are similar for workers at both acquiring and target firms, compared to their matched workers in control firms.

## 6 Results

This section reports the results from the estimation of the difference-in-differences model in Section 5, and presents additional tests supporting the interpretations of the results.

## 6.1 Post-M&A Firm Size and Performance

Figure 2 plots estimates of  $\beta_k^{MA}$  from equation (4) across the main firm-level outcomes using our matched sample. Panel (a) shows that acquiring firms' and target firms' employment followed a similar pattern as those of their matched control firms before the M&A event. This pre-event stability is important evidence in support of our empirical strategy. While acquirers' employment significantly increased after the event, targets' employment substantially decreased after the event, compared to those of non-M&A firms. For Panel (b), the pre-event trends for average payroll are also similar between M&A firms and their matched control firms. While acquirers' average payroll increased following the M&A event on average, targets' average payroll significantly decreased after the event, compared to control firms' average payroll.

Sales and profitability results are shown in Panels (c) and (d), which exhibit parallel pre-trends between M&A firms and their control firms. While acquiring firms' total sales increased, their profit margins decreased significantly after the M&A event on average, relative to their control group. For target firms, total revenue shrank drastically, and their profit margins decreased on average after the event, except for the initial spike in the first year. The initial increase in profit margins for targets is likely mechanical, due to a larger saving in fixed costs from downsizing relative to the initial fall in sales at the event year.

Panel (e) shows similar pre-trends in realized capital gains for acquiring firms and target firms, relative to their matched control firms. While owners' realized capital gains at acquiring firms remained flat after M&As, those at target firms spiked significantly on the first year, as they sold a part of their shares through M&A transactions. Finally, Panel (f) depicts parallel trends in markups between M&A firms and control firms prior to the event, and but markups remain relatively flat after the event.

To interpret the magnitude of these results, Table 2 presents the difference-in-differences estimates on these outcomes, separately for acquirers and for targets. Column (1) shows that acquiring firms' employment increased by 15.7 log points on average, relative to non-M&A firms, whereas target firms' employment decreased by 8.8 log points after the event. Column (2) shows that acquiring firms' average payroll increased by 2.8 log points on average, relative to non-M&A firms, whereas target firms' average payroll decreased by 2.6 log points after the event. Column (3) shows that acquiring firms experienced a 22.5 log points increase in total revenue, while target firms experienced a decrease of 47.2 log points in total revenue. Column (4) shows that acquiring firms' and target firms' profit margins decreased by 1.6 percentage points and 1.1 percentage points, respectively, on average relative to non-M&A firms after the event. Column (5) reports that the change in realized capital gains of owners at acquiring firms is not statistically different from

zero, while those of owners at target firms increased by 31,753 CAD on average after the event. Finally, Column (6) presents estimates suggesting that markups stayed roughly similar for both acquirers and targets after M&As.

Overall, these firm-level results show that acquirers expanded significantly, but became less profitable after M&As. In contrast, target firms shrank substantially, become less profitable, and their initial investors cashed out by selling a part of their shares after M&As.

Figure 3 shows estimates across the main firm-level outcomes, where we combine targets and acquirers and compare their outcomes with those of their control firms before and after the M&A event. Note that we add previously missing firms in target-acquirer pairs (mostly acquirers that were not matched to control firms) to our main analysis sample for this aggregate analysis, so that we can comprehensively look at the overall impacts of M&As on both targets and acquires combined.<sup>10</sup> Across these outcomes, M&A firms were in a similar trend prior to the event compared to their control firms. After M&As, changes in employment and average payroll on both combined firms are close to zero. By contrast, we observe significant declines in total revenue and profit margins, while realized capital gains spike on the first year, entirely driven by initial owners at target firms (Panel (e) of Figure 2). Finally, we observe no change in markups after M&As.

Table 3 shows that employment increases by 2.5 percent on average, without much effects on average payrolls. In contrast, revenue and profit margins decrease by 21.3 log points and 1.1 percentage points, respectively. Finally, realized capital gains increased by roughly 30,000 CAD, without much effects on markups. Therefore, the main aggregate-level changes are declines in total revenue and profit margins, without much changes in employment and average payroll. We next turn to worker-level data to assess the impacts of M&As on worker earnings and reallocation.

## 6.2 Post-M&A Worker-level Earnings and Job Transitions

Given the considerable turnover at target firms going through M&As, changes in average payroll may reflect changes in worker composition. Furthermore, while average payroll at the acquiring firms increased after M&As, earnings of their incumbent workers at the acquiring firms may not change after M&As if new entrants' wages increase. Therefore, we next turn to the worker-level data that allows us to flexibly control for composition by tracking the same workers over time.

Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that annual earnings for workers at target firms trend similarly to those of their matched control workers in the years prior to the event, but fall significantly afterwards. By contrast, annual earnings of workers at acquiring firms trend similarly to those of

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<sup>10</sup>We also repeat the same aggregate analysis using our default matched sample and find qualitatively similar results across these outcomes (see Appendix A).

their matched control workers and increased after the event. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the average impacts on workers at target firms after an M&A event are a decline of 1.1 log points on average. This decline could be due to M&A workers moving to lower-paying firms or M&A firms reducing earnings for their incumbent workers. Column (2) shows that the annual earnings of workers at acquiring firms increased by 1.5 log points on average, although the estimate is only weakly significant.

The drop in employment at target firms, as shown in Table 2, suggests that job transitions could explain a part of the decline in worker-level earnings. The reduction in employment could come primarily through decreased hiring, implying incumbent workers may be relatively unaffected. We first consider the impact of M&As on the probability of worker transitions from a job. This transition could be to another firm or to non- or self-employment. In our data, most of the workers who leave their original employers do so involuntarily, but find a job afterwards.<sup>11</sup> Panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the estimates of equation (5) with an indicator for a job transition as the outcome. Column (2) of Table 4 reveals that one year after an M&A event, job transitions spike in target firms, with target workers 7.8 percentage points more likely to switch jobs relative to control workers on average. Given this notable increase in job separations, part of the effects on earnings may be coming from departures from their employers rather than within-firm decreases in earnings. By contrast, we find that workers at acquiring firms do not experience any increased probability of a job transition relative to their control counterparts.

To study the impacts solely due to within-firm changes in compensation, Panel (c) of Figure 4 restricts the analysis to workers who stay in the same firm in the years following the event. We make this restriction for both M&A workers and control workers so that the treatment group does not mechanically contain workers who have more stable job histories. Column (3) of Table 4 shows that annual earnings for firm stayers in M&A firms do not change much at either target or acquiring firms on average in the years following the event. These results imply that the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is almost entirely driven by those that move to other firms after the M&A event. In the next section, we additionally examine workers at target firms that move to other firms after the event, and explore potential mechanisms behind their earnings responses.

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<sup>11</sup>Our data has an indicator for reasons for job separations, which can be broadly categorized into involuntary (i.e., shortage of work, takeovers, or retirement) or voluntary (i.e., personal or medical reasons). Roughly half of the observations in the relevant sample has these reasons as “unknown”. Among the other half, about three quarters of workers moving from target firms left involuntarily after the M&A event.

## 7 Potential Mechanisms and Economic Interpretations

In this section, we discuss and empirically test potential mechanisms behind the responses of worker-level earnings following M&As. Based on the model described in Section 2, the main channels through which M&As can induce lower wages are (1) decreased bargaining power of workers, (2) increased market power of firms, (3) changes in firms' productivity which may affect rents per worker, and (4) job transitions which lead to changes in firm-specific or match-specific components in earnings of workers who move to other firms after the M&A event.

### 7.1 Increased Market Concentration

#### 7.1.1 Labor Market Concentration

Our findings on the decreases in employment and worker-level earnings in target firms can be potentially rationalized by an increase in monopsony power of firms through increased concentration. [Prager and Schmitt \(2021\)](#) and [Arnold \(2021\)](#) study this channel in the U.S. context and find that M&A events that generate large shifts in concentration result in market-level declines in earnings. While this channel may still be a factor for a subset of the M&A events we study in Canada, we rule it out as being the only factor determining wage losses.

In particular, we find that 99 percent of M&A events have a zero predicted change in local labor-market concentration. This is consistent with the finding that in Panels (c) and (d) of Table 5 that the M&A events are not associated with positive increases in concentration.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, [Prager and Schmitt \(2021\)](#) and [Arnold \(2021\)](#) isolate M&A events with statistically significant increases in concentration.

To examine this in more detail, in Figure 6 and Table 6, we turn to a metric that antitrust authorities consider: the initial concentration level. To study this channel, we split the analysis sample by quintiles in the HHI measured one year before the event. In both the high-concentration markets (fifth quintile) and the low-concentration markets (first quintile), we find similar levels of declines in earnings of workers at target firms, while we do not find any impacts on worker-level earnings at acquiring firms regardless of the initial concentration level.<sup>13</sup> This is not surprising given most of these events do not actually increase concentration in the local labor market.

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<sup>12</sup>We also implement a flows-adjusted measure of labor-market concentration ([Arnold 2021](#)) that adjusts for substitutability in jobs across industries, and find similar results (see Appendix A).

<sup>13</sup>Given that the change in concentration after M&As was close to zero for about 99 percent of labor markets in our sample, cutting our analysis sample based on the predicted change in HHI after M&As, as in [Arnold \(2021\)](#), is not meaningful in our setting due to the lack of variation in the predicted change in HHI.



We additionally examine worker-level earnings in target firms, separately for M&As that happen within the same labor market and for M&As that happen across different labor markets (Prager and Schmitt 2021), and find that the decline in earnings is similar for both types (see Appendix B). Taken together, these results suggest that increased monopsony power due to changes in local labor-market concentration or outside options is unlikely to be the primary driver of declines in worker earnings in our setting.<sup>14</sup>

To summarize, while anticompetitive impacts of M&A have been documented in prior work (and may be present in a small subset of M&A transactions in Canada), we do not have the power to explore this channel in this paper as most of our M&A events have negligible impacts on labor-market concentration. However, since we continue to find negative impacts on workers, we can rule out labor market concentration as the sole driving force behind the negative impact on workers. Below, we explore additional mechanisms that may be at play even in M&A events without impacts on labor-market concentration.

### 7.1.2 Product Market Concentration

There are several results that suggest product market power is not the main driver of the observed labor-market impacts. First, we find that profit margins decrease for both target and acquiring firms. If product market power increased on average after M&A events, we would expect to see a rise in profits, not a decline. Additionally, we estimate markups and do not find any statistically significant impacts of M&A events on markups for either target or acquiring firms.

To further support this conclusion, we also conduct our analysis separately by tradable and non-tradable goods sectors. The intuition is that an M&A would have a larger impact on a firm's market power if the firm does not face competition outside its geographical (i.e., international) markets. We define firms as active in tradable good sectors if they fall under Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction, and Manufacturing. Firms active in other sectors (i.e., Construction, Retail, Real Estate, Services, etc) are defined as falling under non-tradable sectors (Berger et al., 2022; Delgado et al., 2014).

Figure 7 and Table 7 show the results on worker earnings in acquiring firms and target firms, separately for tradable and for non-tradable sectors. The parallel trend holds prior to the event for both types of workers, and we see similar declines in magnitude for workers at target firms after

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<sup>14</sup>Even if the results are not driven by changes in concentration, changes in bargaining power of workers may be independent of concentration changes. For example, He and le Maire (2022) finds that M&A events in Denmark result in high-wage managers being replaced in target firms. Such a change in management may result in shifts in bargaining power of workers at target firms. However, a change in bargaining power through a change in management is only relevant for incumbent or new workers at target firms, and thus is unlikely to explain the decline in earnings of workers leaving target firms.

the event. This provides further evidence against product market concentration driving the decline in worker earnings. In Appendix B, we additionally look at earnings of workers at target firms, separately for M&As that happen within the same 4-digit industry and for M&As that happen across different industries. The intuition is that M&As that happen within the same industry (i.e., horizontal M&As) would likely have a greater impact on firms' product market power, and therefore, may have a stronger impact on worker-level earnings. We find that the decline in workers' earnings is similar for both types of M&As.

## 7.2 Changes in Employer Characteristics via Job Transitions

As shown in Section 6, the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is almost entirely driven by those who move to other firms after the M&A event. Since three quarters of these workers leave their firms involuntarily, we follow the job displacement literature to decompose the decline in earnings of job movers into (1) firm-specific wage premiums (employer fixed effects) and (2) match-specific premiums (match effects).

Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows annual earnings of workers at target firms that move to other firms after the M&A event. Relative to their control workers, job movers from target firms show parallel trends in their earnings prior to the event, but show a significant drop one year after the M&A event. The drop in earnings in subsequent years comes both from workers that had already left target firms and from workers that leave two or more years after the event. Roughly 60 percent of workers that leave target firms move only once, and among those, 90 percent leave target firms within 5 years of the M&A event. Panel (b) shows that roughly a half of these workers move to other firms one year after the M&A event. Panel (c) separates these movers into those that move to acquiring firms and to completely different firms, and show that while both types of workers experience a decline in earnings, workers who move to acquiring firms experience a larger decrease in their earnings. Table 8 shows that workers who move from target firms experience 4.1 log points decrease in earnings on average relative to their control workers. Furthermore, workers who move to acquiring firms experience 10.3 log points decline in their earnings, and workers who move to completely different firms experience 6.6 log points decline in earnings after the event on average. Next, we decompose this decline in earnings of job movers into firm-specific and match-specific components.

### 7.2.1 Employer Fixed Effects

Following a growing body of literature that assesses the importance of firm-specific premiums (employer fixed effects) in determining wages, we examine whether there is any change in employer

fixed effects for target workers who move to other firms after the M&A event. Tracking changes in firm fixed effects provides us one way to characterize the transitions that workers at target firms make after the event and put their earnings losses into context. For example, if workers are moving to firms with lower wage premiums, then the loss of the employer wage premium from the old firm would explain the decline in workers' earnings. [Lachowska et al. \(2020\)](#) find that employer fixed effects can explain only 17 percent of the long-run decline in hourly wages for displaced workers in Washington. In contrast, [Lagaras \(forthcoming\)](#) finds that the loss of employer wage premiums is the primary factor in explaining the lower earnings of employees displaced by M&As in Brazil.

Using our matched data, we estimate an employer fixed effect for each firm. We then characterize a firm-specific wage premium of the old and new employer for each worker who undergoes a separation following an M&A event to understand the decline in earnings of workers who move to other firms. Our implementation of the AKM model regresses log earnings observed for individual  $i$  working at firm  $j$  in year  $t$  ( $y_{ijt}$ ) on employer-specific fixed effects which reflect firm characteristics that result in above- or below-average earnings for all workers at firm  $j$  ( $\phi_{j(i,t)}$ ), individual fixed effects ( $\omega_i$ ), and year effects ( $\tau_t$ ):

$$y_{ijt} = \phi_{j(i,t)} + \omega_i + \tau_t + u_{ijt} \quad (6)$$

We can then assess the role played by employer fixed effects by estimating an analogue to equation (5), substituting in as the outcome variable the estimated firm fixed effects  $\hat{\phi}_j$ . The goal is to estimate the share of earnings losses following job transitions that can be attributed to a mover's reemployment by an employer with a different  $\hat{\phi}_j$  than the employer from which the mover left.

Panel (d) of Figure 8 shows firm-specific wage premiums of workers at target firms that move to other firms after the M&A event. Relative to their control workers, movers from target firms show a significant increase in their firm fixed effects after the event, implying that on average, they move to employers with higher wage premiums. The increase in employer fixed effects in each post-M&A year comes both from workers that had already left target firms and from workers that leave in each subsequent year. Column (5) of Table 8 shows that workers who move from target firms experience 2.1 log points increase in firm-specific wage premiums after the event.

This suggests that workers are actually moving to firms with higher wage premiums after a M&A event. In practice, many factors may contribute to a firm having a higher wage premium. Therefore, to get into the black box of AKM effects, we next take advantage of our firm balance sheet data to characterize the types of firms that target workers transition to after M&As.

Figure 9 shows average firm characteristics of target workers who move to other firms after the M&A event. Because of the tenure restriction, any change in pre-event firm characteristics is

driven by yearly changes in target firms' characteristics (i.e., changes in firm size). The change in firm characteristics in event year ( $t = 0$ ) still reflects the change in target firms' characteristics, given that the first job transition happens one year after the event. Starting from one year after the event ( $t = 1$ ), changes in firm characteristics reflect both changes in new employers where target workers moved, and changes in target firms of workers who had not left yet. Figure 9 shows that workers transition to firms with more employees, more sales, and higher profit margins. Table 9 presents the difference-in-differences results summarizing these impacts, finding workers from target firms move to firms with higher employment (31.1 log points), higher revenue (31.7 log points) and higher profit margins (1.1 log points).

To summarize, we find that workers that transition jobs after M&A events move to better firms along a number of dimensions. Despite this, their actual earnings are 4.1 log points lower on average. One explanation for these results is that the workers are not as well matched to these new firms, perhaps because they have lost some firm-specific human capital in the transition. A long literature in labor economics has argued that some human capital is to some degree, firm or industry-specific, and not fully transferable across firms (Becker, 1962; Neal, 1995; Lazear, 2009). In the next section we directly estimate match effects in order to explore this channel.

### 7.2.2 Match Effects

We estimate match effects following Lachowska et al. (2020) which implements a strategy based on Woodcock (2015). For each employee-employer spell, we first calculate the average of residualized log earnings ( $\overline{y_{ij}}$ ) by removing calendar-year effects and regressing this adjusted log earnings on years of job tenure and worker-employer match indicators. We then compute within-match averages of the outcome after subtracting the contribution of job tenure. Then we estimate a model similar to the AKM model in equation (6), but using within-match averages as the dependent variable:

$$\overline{y_{ij}} = \alpha_i + \pi_{j(i,t)} + e_{ij} \quad (7)$$

where  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\pi_{j(i,t)}$ , and  $e_{ij}$  denote the worker fixed effects, employer fixed effects, and an error term independent of individual and firm fixed effects, respectively.

We then calculate the residuals from equation (7) and interpret them as worker-employer match effects averaged over the years we observe a given worker-employee match:

$$\hat{e}_{ij} = \overline{y_{ij}} - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\pi}_{j(i,t)} \quad (8)$$

We proceed to take the estimated  $\hat{e}_{ij}$  terms relevant for the employee in each time period and use them as the dependent variable in equation (5) to see the contribution of match effects in explaining the earnings loss of target workers who move to other firms after the event.

Panel (e) of Figure 8 shows match effects of workers at target firms that move to other firms after the M&A event. Relative to their control workers, movers at target firms show a significant and large decrease in their match effects after the event, implying that on average, they move to employers with a lower match quality. The decrease in match effects in each post-M&A year comes both from workers that had already left target firms and from workers that leave in each subsequent year. Column (6) of Table 8 shows that workers who move from target firms experience 6.4 log points decrease in match effects after the event.

The decline in match effects may imply that these workers lose a specific employee skill set that fits better with the previous employer. A possible explanation for worse match effects is that a significant share of workers moving from target firms switch their industries. Column (7) of Table 8 shows that the probability of switching industries for job movers increases by 3.9 percentage points after the M&A event. While the match effect is firm specific (rather than industry specific), the chance of having a worse match with the new employer increases when the employee moves to a completely different industry (possibly indicating a switch in occupation). Furthermore, the decrease in match effects could simply indicate that these workers lose an employer-specific contract that yields a better work environment or amenity.

Note that the decline in match effects is larger than the decline in actual earnings on average; however, the combined employer fixed effects and match effects is 4.3 log points, which is almost equal to the decline in earnings (4.1 log points) for workers who leave target firms after the event.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, we conclude that the decrease in match effects is the primary factor explaining the earnings losses for workers who leave target firms after the M&A event. Taken together, it appears that after target firms shrink through an M&A event, workers move to larger firms with higher wage premiums and take a modest wage cut in the medium run due to worse matches with new employers. Relative to previous work (Lagaras forthcoming; He and le Maire 2022) documenting that M&A events create significant displacements of workers from target firms with higher wage premiums and reallocation to firms with lower wage premiums, we find that a significant share of workers' losses in M&As stems primarily from a decline in match quality.

<sup>15</sup>The third potential factor is the direct effect of a job loss, which is the residual after accounting for time-invariant employer fixed effects and match effects. Direct effects encompass time-varying factors emanating from the worker, such as scarring driven by asymmetric information. Direct effects also include time-varying aspect within a specific employee-employer match, such as career progression through a firm's salary scale for a particular kind of worker. Estimates of the contribution of direct effects to wage losses in Lachowska et al. (2020) suggest that for the first couple of years after a separation, direct effects explain the majority of wage losses, but this effect shrinks by more than half over the span of five years post-separation.

### 7.2.3 Potential Drivers of Lost Match Effects

One limitation of the match effect estimation is that the match effect is a residual that attempts to explain why a given worker is receiving more or less pay at a given firm. Understanding what exactly drives match effects, however, can be opaque. Therefore, in this section we explore additional heterogeneity to consider settings in which the match effects may be more or less important. This will allow us to provide additional evidence for the match effects channel, as well as to understand some of the potential drivers behind the decreased match effect.

*Type of Transition:* When an M&A event occurs, some workers voluntarily exit the firm while others are displaced. In our sample, roughly three quarters of these workers leave target firms involuntarily after the M&A event.<sup>16</sup> If the match effect drives our results, we would expect the displaced workers to experience larger declines in earnings, and experience larger declines in match effects, relative to a sample that voluntarily left their firm. Panel (a) of Figure 10 shows earnings of workers at target firms that move to other firms, separately for those that move voluntarily and for those that move involuntarily. Relative to their control workers, those that move involuntarily show a larger decline in earnings compared to those that move voluntarily after the event. Panel (c) shows that these workers move to firms with higher wage premiums on average. However, Panel (d) shows that those who move involuntarily experience a much larger decline in match effects, implying that those who got fired are more likely to meet employers with much worse match qualities.

Relatedly, about 40 percent of workers that move to other firms after the M&A event end up moving more than once after the M&A event. Panel (a) of Figure 11 shows earnings of workers at target firms that move to other firms, separately for those that move only once and for those that move more than once after the entire post-event period. Relative to their control workers, those that move more than once show a larger decline in earnings compared to those that move only once after the event. Panel (b) shows that while most of these workers move one year after the event, those that move more than once continue to experience job transitions in subsequent years. Panel (c) shows that these workers move to firms with higher wage premiums on average. However, Panel (d) shows that those who move more than once experience a much larger decline in match effects, suggesting that those who continue to move probably do so due to poor match qualities. Table 11 confirms that workers that move more than once experience economically and statistically significantly larger declines in earnings and match effects. These results imply that M&A events lead to significant job separations of workers from target firms, many of whom end up experiencing multiple transitions to employers with poor match qualities.

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<sup>16</sup>In some cases, the reason for exit is missing. We omit these individuals from this calculation, although the effects on earnings for these individuals are much smaller and closer to zero.



*Type of Worker:* Lastly, we consider heterogeneity by the type of worker. Intuitively, for some workers match quality may be more important than others. Young workers, for example, may have accumulated less firm-specific human capital, and therefore may be less impacted by the M&A event. In Figure B9 (Appendix B), we plot the impact of M&As on the earnings for four different age groups: 20 to 30, 30 to 40, 40 to 50, and older than 50. Interestingly, we find significant negative impacts on earnings stemming primarily from the older than 50 age group on average.

To decompose this impact further, we again focus on individuals who transition jobs after an M&A event. In Panel A of Figure B10, we find negative impacts on earnings across all age groups, with the largest decline among the older than 50 group. In Panel B of Figure B10, we find that workers of different ages have similar rates of job transition, with slightly higher rates of transition for the older than 50 age group. Across all age groups, we find that the job movers are transitioning to firms that pay higher wage premiums. However, the AKM effect for the older than 50 group is slightly lower. Still, the fact that the impact is positive predicts that these workers will earn more following the job transition. However, in Panel (d), we find stark differences in the match effects at their new firms. For the older than 50 group, we find substantial long-term decreases in match effects, on the order of magnitude of 13 log points on average. For the 40-50 group, the decrease in match effects is 6.6 log points, while it is around 2 log points for both the 20-30 and 30-40 groups. Overall, these results imply that older workers are particularly negatively impacted by M&A events. They face slightly higher rates of job transition, but suffer much more severe earnings losses, driven by the fact that they experience a large decline in match effects.

Next, we study variation by the within-firm earnings quintiles. Intuitively, workers at the upper end of the earnings distribution may have skills that are more specific to the job. In hospital mergers, [Prager and Schmitt \(2021\)](#) finds impacts for nurses, but no impacts on unskilled workers such as cafeteria workers, whose skills were not tied to the hospital industry. Individuals higher in the wage distribution within the firm are likely to be higher skilled, and have potentially spent more time at the firm – both factors may increase the importance of match effects.

In Figure B11 we plot the impacts of M&A for individuals in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution versus individuals in the top quintile of the earnings distribution.<sup>17</sup> For individuals in the bottom quintile, we find no impacts on earnings in Panel (a) of Figure B11. In contrast, we find a 2.3 log point larger drop in earnings for individuals in the top quintile. These differences are not due to differences in the probability of job transition. In Panel (b), we find nearly identical rates of job transition.

The differences are also not due to top quintile workers moving to worse-paying firms on

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<sup>17</sup>For this analysis, we implement the matching strategy again to ensure control workers are in the same quintile of the earnings distribution within their firm as the target workers. See Appendix B for details.

average. As can be seen in Panel (c) of B11, both bottom quintile and top quintile workers are moving to firms with higher levels of AKM effects, and of similar magnitude. Therefore, what explains the difference is again the difference in match effects. Both experience a decline in match effects, but within 5 years after the event, the decline in match effects is roughly 1.7 log points larger for top quintile workers, while it is about 2.7 log points for bottom quintile workers.

To summarize, we find that the decrease in earnings in our setting is primarily driven by workers that transition jobs after an M&A event and move to different firms. While some M&A events may increase labor-market or product-market power, we find the number of these events is limited in our setting. Interestingly, workers that transition to new firms after M&A events move to firms that have better observables along a number of dimensions. These firms pay higher wage premiums and have higher revenue and profit margins. Despite this, workers that transition to these firms still experience decreases in earnings overall. We find that this can be explained by a decrease in match effects for these workers. Our worker heterogeneity results are consistent with this story, finding that older workers and those in the upper income distribution of the firm (for which firm-specific human capital may be more relevant), suffer the largest earnings losses after an M&A event.

## 8 Conclusion

In this paper, we use linked employer-employee data to connect the impact of M&A events on firms to the impact on their employees. Previous research has looked at the financial impact on firms and the impact on workers' outcomes separately, but our paper is the first to link these impacts directly using our administrative data from tax records on both firms and workers. This allows us to look deeper into firm-based mechanisms than has been possible in previous research.

Using a matched difference-in-differences design, we compare firms that went through an M&A to matched control firms of the same size bins, province, and sector. Our results show that acquiring firms expand, but target firms shrink significantly. Furthermore, both targets and acquirers experience a significant decline in profit margins on average in the medium-run. This is consistent with parts of the literature that show negative impacts of M&A activities on firm performance. For workers at target firms, we find that their earnings decline and job separations increase significantly after an M&A event.

Leveraging detailed firm balance sheet data, we investigate different potential mechanisms for the decline in workers' earnings at target firms. Since we see no meaningful change in labor market concentration after M&As, we conclude that a rise in market concentration is unlikely the key mechanism behind post-M&A wage declines. Furthermore, since profit margins decrease at

both targets and acquirers, without any meaningful changes in markups, a rise in product market concentration is unlikely to have driven the decline in worker earnings either. Instead, we find that the decrease in earnings of workers at targets is almost entirely driven by those that move to other firms after the M&A event. While these workers move to larger firms with higher wage premiums on average, their new employers turn out to be worse matches for these job movers, and they continue to experience lower earnings within five years after the M&A event.

Our findings provide important context for research investigating the labor market consequences of corporate M&As. Whichever mechanism is under investigation, care should be taken to account for how firm-level outcomes, especially their profitability and growth, as well as worker-level outcomes, may change after M&As. Our results also matter for policy. In Canada, a review of the Competition Act targets both the impact of M&As on labor and how potential efficiency gains are weighed in merger decisions. Similar debates are happening in other countries, including the United States (Naidu et al. 2018). Our results provide new evidence of the negative impact of M&As on wages that add perspective to these policy debates, and our findings on post-M&A firm performance raise doubts about the efficiency arguments made in support of M&As.

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
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
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Figure 1: Number of M&A Deals




*Notes:* This figure plots the total number of completed M&A deals (navy line) and the total number of completed M&A deals in the matched sample (orange line) over time during our sample period. See Section 5 for how we construct our matched sample.

Figure 2: Firm Size and Performance After M&As




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on firm-level outcomes, separately for acquiring firm (navy lines) and for target firms (orange lines). Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of average payroll. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for profit margins. Panel (e) shows the estimates for owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level. Panel (f) shows the estimates for log of markups. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 3: Aggregate Firm Size and Performance After M&As




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on aggregate (targets and acquirers combined) firm-level outcomes. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of average payroll. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for profit margins. Panel (e) shows the estimates for owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level. Panel (f) shows the estimates for log of markups. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 4: Worker Earnings and Job Transitions After M&As



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on worker-level outcomes, separately for workers at acquiring firms (navy lines) and for workers at target firms (orange lines). Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings for workers in the matched sample. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of total earnings for stayers. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.


Figure 5: Distribution Markets Across HHI



*Notes:* This figure plots the distribution of labor markets, defined as 2-digit NAICS by commuting zone cell, across our measure of concentration (HHI) during our sample period.




Figure 6: Worker Earnings By Initial Level of Labor Market Concentration




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on log of total earnings, separately for workers in markets with low initial level of concentration (first quintile in HHI) and for workers in markets with high initial level of concentration (fifth quintile in HHI). We define labor markets at the 2-digit NAICS sector by workers' commuting zone level. Panel (a) shows the estimates for workers at acquiring firms. Panel (b) shows the estimates for workers at target firms. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 7: Worker Earnings: Tradable Sectors vs. Nontradable Sectors




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on log of total earnings, separately for workers at firms in tradable sectors and for workers at firms in nontradable sectors. Tradable sectors belong to the following 2-digit NAICS codes: 11, 21, 31, 32, 33 and 55. Panel (a) shows the estimates for workers at acquiring firms. Panel (b) shows the estimates for workers at target firms. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 8: Workers Moving from Targets




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on workers moving from target firms. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of total earnings based on their destination. A small share of workers also move within their original parent company; however, we do not observe any impact for these workers, so we do not report their estimates here. Panel (d) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (e) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. Panel (f) shows the estimates for probability of transition to a different industry. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 9: Firm Characteristics of Workers Moving from Targets




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for average firm characteristics of movers from target firms, as described in Section 7. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of average payroll. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for profit margins. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 10: Worker at Targets – By Type of Separation



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As for workers moving from target firms, categorized by the reason of separation. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure 11: Worker at Targets – By Number of Moves



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As for workers moving from target firms, categorized by the number of moves they make post-event. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Firms and Workers

	(1) Acquirer	(2) Control	(3) Target	(4) Control
<i>Panel A: Firm Characteristics</i>				
Total Revenue (in millions)	61	47	33	29
Total Expense (in millions)	57	44	32	28
Net Profit Margin	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.05
Number of Employees	183	124	105	87
Average Wage Bill	70972	71168	68700	67719
Leverage Ratio	0.65	0.68	0.70	0.65
Markup	1.86	1.67	1.87	1.66
Number of Firms	1100	1100	3100	3100
<i>Panel B: Sectors (Firms)</i>				
Construction (23)	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
Manufacturing (31)	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.26
Wholesale (41)	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.14
Retail (44)	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05
Transportation (48)	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
Information (51)	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
Services (54)	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32
Other Sectors	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.11
<i>Panel C: Worker Characteristics</i>				
Total Earnings	69904	69437	71812	70269
Age	46.5	46.8	47	47.3
Female	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32
Number of Workers	43300	43300	65400	65400
<i>Panel D: Sectors (Workers)</i>				
Construction (23)	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
Manufacturing (31)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Wholesale (41)	0.16	0.16	0.11	0.11
Retail (44)	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03
Transportation (48)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Information (51)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Services (54)	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.21
Other	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08

*Notes:* This table reports descriptive statistics on the matched sample of firms and workers, measured one year prior to the event. Panel A reports characteristics of firms such as total revenue, profit margins, number of employees, average payroll, and leverage ratio. Columns (1) and (3) report these statistics for acquiring firms and for target firms, respectively, and column (2) and (4) report these statistics for their respective matched control firms. Panel B reports the distribution of firms in the matched sample across 2-digit NAICS sectors. Panel C reports characteristics of workers such as total annual earnings, age, and gender. Column (1) and (3) report these statistics for workers at acquirers and for workers at targets, respectively, and column (2) and (4) report these statistics for their respective matched control workers. Panel D report the distribution of workers in the matched sample across 2-digit NAICS sectors. Other sectors include (1) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing [11], (2) Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction [21], (3) utilities [22], (4) Real estate and rental and leasing [53], (5) Arts, entertainment and recreation [71], (6) Accommodation and food services [72], (7) Other services [81], and (8) Public administration [91].



Table 2: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Firm Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	log(Employment)	log(Average Payroll)	log(Revenue)	Profit Margins	Realized Capital Gains	log(Markups)
Target	-0.088*** (0.020)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.472*** (0.033)	-0.011* (0.006)	31753*** (3832)	-0.016 (0.016)
Mean at t = -1	3.97	11.04	16.35	0.02	36466.00	0.42
Adj. R squared	0.866	0.760	0.817	0.371	0.284	0.756
Firm-Year	78800	78300	80600	81000	51500	48400
Acquirer	0.157*** (0.028)	0.028** (0.011)	0.225*** (0.011)	-0.016** (0.007)	-9790 (7687)	-0.015 (0.021)
Mean at t = -1	4.54	11.09	17.01	0.02	52241.00	0.40
Adj. R squared	0.883	0.769	0.849	0.374	0.211	0.791
Firm-Year	27400	27300	27500	27600	13700	16000

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on firm-level outcomes, separately for acquiring firms and for target firms. The dependent variables in column (1) to (6) are log of employment, log of average payroll, log of total revenue, profit margins, owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level, and log of markups. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 3: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Aggregate Firm Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	log(Employment)	log(Average Payrolls)	log(Revenue)	Profit Margins	Realized Capital Gains	log(Markups)
Target and Acquirer	0.025 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.213*** (0.026)	-0.011** (0.005)	27939.685*** (3536.303)	-0.007 (0.011)
Mean at t = -1	4.22	11.05	16.56	0.01	42132.00	0.41
Adj. R squared	0.888	0.762	0.84	0.391	0.252	0.76
Firm-Year	117700	116900	120500	121400	74100	71700

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on aggregate (targets and acquired combined) firm-level outcomes. The dependent variables in column (1) to (6) are log of employment, log of average payroll, log of total revenue, profit margins, owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level, and log of markups. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table 4: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Worker Outcomes

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Job Transitions	(3) log(Earnings) - Stayers
Target	-0.011** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	11.01	0.00	11.01
Adj. R squared	0.753	0.213	0.804
Worker-Year	2052500	2055900	1617100
Acquirer	0.015* (0.008)	0.01 (0.007)	0.008 (0.009)
Mean at t = -1	11.01	0.00	11.01
Adj. R squared	0.74	0.223	0.787
Worker-Year	1359600	1361900	1102500

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on workers' outcomes, separately for those at acquiring firms and for those at target firms. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are log of total earnings and the probability of job transitions for all workers in the matched sample. Column (3) reports the estimates on log of total earnings for staying workers. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Labor Market Concentration

	(1)	(2)
	HHI	Change in HHI
Average	0.1007	0.0001
Median	0.0350	0.0000
Min	0.0002	0.0000
Max	1.0000	0.0668
Observation	46240	43520

*Notes:* This table reports the descriptive statistics on our measure of concentration (HHI) and change in concentration of labor markets, defined as 2-digit NAICS by commuting zone cell during our sample period. Column (1) and (2) display average, median, minimum, and maximum HHI and change in HHI, respectively, across all labor markets in our sample.

Table 6: Worker Earnings By Initial Level of Labor Market Concentration

	(1)	(2)
	<b>Acquirer</b>	<b>Target</b>
	log(Earnings)	log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	0.016 (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.008)
Mean at t = -1	10.97	11.03
Worker-Year	150800	222100
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Q5	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.012)
Mean at t = -1	11.04	11.13
Worker-Year	40400	130400

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers in markets with initially low level of concentration (first quintile in HHI with the average of 0.004). The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers in markets with initially high level of concentration (fifth quintile in HHI with the average of 0.104). Labor markets are defined at the 2-digit NAICS sector by workers' commuting zone level. Columns (1) shows the estimates for workers at acquiring firms and column (2) shows the estimates for workers at target firms. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table 7: Worker Earnings: Tradable vs. Nontradable Sectors

	(1)	(2)
	<b>Acquirer</b>	<b>Target</b>
	log(Earnings)	log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.015** (0.007)
Mean at t = -1	10.97	10.96
Worker-Year	679500	1044900
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Nontradable	0.016 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.009)
Mean at t = -1	11.06	11.06
Worker-Year	680200	1007600

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers in tradable sectors. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers in nontradable sectors. Tradable sectors belong to the following 2-digit NAICS codes: 11, 21, 31, 32, 33 and 55. Columns (1) shows the estimates for workers at acquiring firms and column (2) shows the estimates for workers at target firms. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table 8: Workers Moving from Targets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<b>log(Earnings) - By Destination</b>						
	log(Earnings)	Transition	To Acquirer	To Other Firms	Employer FE	Match Effect	To Diff Industry
Workers Moving from Targets	-0.041*** (0.005)	0.168*** (0.01)	-0.103** (0.04)	-0.066*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.004)	-0.064*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	10.98	0.00	10.87	10.97	0.23	0.1	0.00
Adj. R squared	0.742	0.279	0.800	0.737	0.893	0.215	0.173
Worker-Year	1013500	1015500	14000	632900	1006400	996600	1015500

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As for worker moving from target firms. Column (1) displays the estimates for log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the job transition probabilities. Column (3) and Column (4) displays the estimates for log of total earnings based on moving workers' destination, respectively, to acquiring firms and to other firms. A small share of workers also move within their original parent company; however, we do not observe any impact for these workers, so we do not report their estimates here. Column (5) displays the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Column (6) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. Column (7) displays the estimates for the probability of transition to a different industry. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.



Table 9: By Firm Characteristics of Moving Workers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(Employment)	log(Average Payrolls)	log(Revenue)	Profit Margins
Workers Moving from Targets	0.311*** (0.035)	0.015 (0.01)	0.317*** (0.065)	0.011* (0.006)
Mean at t = -1	5.94	11.04	18.49	0.04
Adj. R squared	0.946	0.879	0.942	0.635
Worker-Year	796500	796500	754200	755600

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for average firm characteristics of moving workers from target firms. We omit the event year when averaging the post-event coefficients since workers are still at target firms at  $t = 0$ . Columns (1) displays the estimates for log of employment. Column (2) displays the estimates for log of average payrolls. Column (3) displays the estimates for log of revenue. Column (4) displays the estimate for profit margins. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table 10: By Separation Type of Workers at Targets

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Transition	(3) Employer FE	(4) Match Effect
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.037*** (0.009)	0.155*** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	10.95	0.00	0.20	0.10
Worker-Year	135500	135700	133800	132000
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Involuntary	-0.057*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.046*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	10.9	0.00	0.17	0.11
Worker-Year	367200	367700	363900	360100

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As for workers that voluntarily separated from target firms. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers that involuntarily separated from target firms. Columns (1) displays the estimates for log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the job transition probabilities. Column (3) displays the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Column (4) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table 11: By Number of Moves

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Transition	(3) Employer FE	(4) Match Effect
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.017** (0.007)	0.132*** (0.014)	0.018*** (0.005)	-0.041*** (0.004)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.00 605700	0.00 606700	0.24 601500	0.08 596300
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Moved More than Once	-0.049*** (0.011)	0.114*** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.045*** (0.006)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.95 409700	0.00 410700	0.21 406100	0.14 401600

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As for workers moving from target firms that moved once post-event. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers that moves more than once post-event. Columns (1) displays the estimates for log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the job transition probabilities. Column (3) displays the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Column (4) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

## ONLINE APPENDIX:

### Job Transitions and Employee Earnings After Acquisitions: Linking Corporate and Worker Outcomes

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## A Robustness Checks

In Appendix A, we provide results from robustness tests discussed in Sections 5 – 7.

### A.1 Aggregate Firm-level Outcomes Using Original Sample

In Section 6, we show aggregate (targets and acquirers combined) firm-level outcomes, where we add previously missing firms in the target-acquirer pairs (mostly acquirers that did not have matched control firms to our main analysis sample), so that we can comprehensively assess what happens to firm sizes and profitability of firms that go through M&As at the aggregate level. Since the previously missing firms were not part of the original firm-level analysis, we also look at aggregate outcomes just using our original targets and acquirers, without the missing firms. Figure A1 and Table A1 show that the results are qualitatively similar to the ones in Figure 3 and Table 3.

### A.2 Different Clustering

Our main firm-level results are based on clustering at the firm level and our main worker-level results are based on two-way clustering at both firm level and worker level. We also do robustness tests on key firm-level and worker-level outcomes, where standard errors are clustered at the market-level (commuting zone by sector) for firm-level results, and are two-way clustered at the worker level and market level for worker-level results. Figure A2 and Table A2 show that the results on employment, total revenue, profit margins, and worker-level earnings are similar to the main estimates. Note that the coefficient estimates on these outcomes are slightly different from our main estimates, even though we only change the way we cluster our standard errors. This is because some firms and workers have missing observations on their commuting zones, so they are dropped from our main analysis sample when we cluster our standard errors at the market level.

### A.3 Using Matched Control firms Across Different Commuting Zones


Matching on size, province, and sector finds firms that would plausibly exhibit common trends in the absence of an M&A activity. However, it is possible that firms can be matched within the same commuting zone, which is potentially concerning if M&As have impacts on local labor markets through increased concentration. If M&As have negative effects on firms in the same sector and commuting zone, then the impact of M&As on firms will be biased towards zero. To minimize this concern, we do a robustness check by matching firms within the same province, but across different

commuting zones, and find similar results to our main results where we allow M&A firms to be matched with control firms within the same commuting zone. Figure A3 and Table A3 show that the effects on key firm-level and worker-level outcomes from this approach are qualitatively similar to our main estimates.

#### **A.4 Using Private Firms Only**

Prior research points out that publicly listed firms engage in M&As more than private firms during merger waves, and that acquisitions can be efficiency improving, especially when buyers and sellers are publicly listed firms during on-the-wave mergers ([Maksimovic et al., 2013](#)). While the vast majority (94 percent) of firms that go through M&As in our matched sample are private, we repeat our analysis focusing only on private firms, since the effects of M&As on firm-level outcomes might be different between listed and private firms. Figure A4 and Table A4 show that the results on firm outcomes are similar to our main results where we include publicly listed companies, implying that our results are robust to just focusing on private firms in our sample.


Figure A1: Aggregate Firm-Level Outcomes



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on aggregate (targets and acquires combined) firm-level outcomes using our original matched sample. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of average payroll. Panel (c) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for profit margins. Panel (e) shows the estimates for owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level. Panel (f) shows the estimates for log of markups. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.




Figure A2: Different Clustering




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on firm-level outcomes. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-level earnings. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the market-level for Panels (a) – (c) and at the worker and market level for Panel (d). The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure A3: Matched Control Firms in Different Commuting Zones



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on firm-level outcomes. When matching, we restrict M&A firms to be at different commuting zones from matched control firms. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-level earnings. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level for Panels (a) – (c) and at the worker and firm level for Panel (d). The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure A4: Private Firms Only



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on firm-level and worker-level outcomes using only private firms in the matched sample (roughly 96 percent). Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of employment. Panel (b) shows the estimates for log of total revenue. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-level earnings. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the firm level for Panels (a) – (c) and at the worker and firm level for Panel (d). The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Table A1: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Aggregate Firm Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	log(Employment)	log(Average Payrolls)	log(Revenue)	Profit Margins	Realized Capital Gains	log(Markups)
Target and Acquirer	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.258*** (0.026)	-0.012*** (0.004)	25353*** (3285)	-0.017 (0.012)
Mean at t = -1	4.11	11.06	16.52	0.02	39839.81	0.41
Adj. R squared	0.874	0.763	0.828	0.372	0.253	0.766
Firm-Year	107100	106400	108900	109500	74100	65200

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on aggregate (targets and acquirers combined) firm-level outcomes using our original matched sample. The dependent variables in column (1) to (6) are log of employment, log of average payroll, log of total revenue, profit margins, owners' realized capital gains aggregated at the firm level, and log of markups. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table A2: Different Clustering

	(1) log(Employment)	(2) log(Revenue)	(3) Profit Margins	(4) log(Earnings)
Target	-0.087*** (0.013)	-0.471*** (0.044)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	3.97	16.35	0.02	11.01
Adj. R squared	0.867	0.821	0.375	0.756
Observation	78500	79900	80300	1980700
Acquirer	0.148*** (0.034)	0.225*** (0.038)	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.016 (0.01)
Mean at t = -1	4.54	17.01	0.02	11.01
Adj. R squared	0.885	0.854	0.375	0.744
Observation	27300	27300	27400	1310500

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on firm-level and worker-level outcomes, separately for acquiring firms and for target firms. The dependent variables in column (1) to (4) are log of employment, log of total revenue, profit margins, and log of worker-level earnings. The firm-level estimates' standard errors are clustered at the market level (defined by 2-digit NAICS  $\times$  commuting zone). The worker-level estimates' standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and market level.

Table A3: Matched Control Firms in Different Commuting Zones

	(1) log(Employment)	(2) log(Revenue)	(3) Profit Margins	(4) log(Earnings)
Target	-0.098*** (0.022)	-0.478*** (0.035)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.006)
Mean at t = -1	3.96	16.37	0.03	10.99
Adj. R squared	0.871	0.824	0.342	0.759
Observation	67700	69100	69500	1605200
Acquirer	0.117*** (0.029)	0.175*** (0.039)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)
Mean at t = -1	4.57	17.05	0.03	11.00
Adj. R squared	0.887	0.861	0.359	0.748
Observation	23000	23100	23200	1075400

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on firm-level and worker-level outcomes, separately for acquiring firms and for target firms. When matching, we restrict M&A firms to be at different commuting zones from matched control firms. The dependent variables in column (1) to (4) are log of employment, log of total revenue, profit margins, and log of worker-level earnings. The firm-level estimates' standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The worker-level estimates' standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table A4: Private Firms Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(Employment)	log(Revenue)	Profit Margins	log(Earnings)
Target	-0.085*** (0.020)	-0.485*** (0.033)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.010** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	3.97	16.35	0.03	11.00
Adj. R squared	0.868	0.819	0.356	0.753
Observation	76800	78500	78900	2019800
Acquirer	0.146*** (0.028)	0.224*** (0.04)	-0.014** (0.007)	0.014* (0.008)
Mean at t = -1	4.56	17.01	0.03	11.01
Adj. R squared	0.889	0.856	0.369	0.740
Observation	25900	26000	26100	1338300

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on firm-level and worker-level outcomes using only private firms in the matched sample (roughly 96 percent). The dependent variables in column (1) to (4) are log of employment, log of total revenue, profit margins, and log of worker-level earnings. The firm-level estimates' standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The worker-level estimates' standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table A5: Characteristics of Unmatched M&amp;A Firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<b>Acquirer</b>		<b>Target</b>	
	Without Restriction	With Restriction	Without Restriction	With Restriction
<i>Panel A: Firm Characteristics</i>				
Total Revenue	17	63	12	32
Average Wage Bill	66228	61678	63850	58761
Number of Employees	170	340	91	188
Number of Firms	2800	700	4600	1500
<i>Panel B: Sectors (Firms)</i>				
Construction(23)	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03
Manufacturing(31)	0.06	0.15	0.09	0.13
Wholesale(41)	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.08
Retail(44)	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03
Transportation(48)	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06
Information(51)	0.05	0.15	0.09	0.18
Services(54)	0.18	0.15	0.26	0.20
Other Sectors	0.62	0.42	0.41	0.30

*Notes:* This table reports descriptive statistics on M&A firms excluded from the matched sample, measured one year prior to the event. Columns (1) and (2) report these statistics for acquiring firms and column (3) and (4) report these statistics for target firms. The matching restrictions, namely, are (1) firms must have more than 10 employees the year prior to the event, (2) firms must not have any missing values for matching variables such as total revenue, average payrolls, age, industry, and province. Column (1) and (3) report these statistics for M&A firms without these restrictions, and columns (2) and (4) report these statistics with these restrictions. Panel A reports characteristics of firms such as total revenue, average payroll, and number of employees. Panel B reports the distribution of firms in these samples across 2-digit NAICS sectors. Panel B reports the distribution of firms in these samples across 2-digit NAICS sectors. Other sectors include (1) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing [11], (2) Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction [21], (3) utilities [22], (4) Real estate and rental and leasing [53], (5) Arts, entertainment and recreation [71], (6) Accommodation and food services [72], (7) Other services [81], and (8) Public administration [91].



Table A6: Descriptive Statistics on Workers at Targets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			<b>Movers from Targets</b>		<b>By Destination</b>	
	Stayers	Movers	Voluntary Separation	Involuntary Separation	To Acquirer	To Other Firms
Total Earnings	72288	68177	67530	65349	61350	67851
Age	48.7	45.8	41.2	46.6	46.3	45.2
Female	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.31	0.29	0.31
Number of Workers	33300	32100	6200	14400	500	20100

*Notes:* This table reports descriptive statistics on worker characteristics at target firms, measured one year prior to the event. Columns (1) and (2) report these statistics, respectively, for workers who stay at the target firm throughout the entire post-event period and for workers that move from targets after the event. Column (3) reports these statistics for workers voluntarily moving from targets and column (4) reports these statistics for workers involuntarily moving from targets after the event. Column (5) reports these statistics for workers that move to acquiring firms after the event and column (6) reports the statistics for workers that move to other firms after the event.

## B Additional Heterogeneity Results

In Appendix B, we provide additional heterogeneity results in addition to those discussed in Section 7.

### B.1 By Within vs. Across Labor Markets

In Section 7, we show that the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is similar between markets with initially low level of concentration and markets with initially high level of concentration. We further explore whether impacts on worker earnings are larger in markets where merging firms are located in the same labor market (defined at the sector by commuting zone level), following [Prager and Schmitt \(2021\)](#). In Figure B1 and Table B1, we find that decreases in workers' earnings in target firms where M&As occur within the same market were not larger than decreases in workers' earnings where M&As occur across different markets, suggesting a limited role for the change in concentration in explaining the change in worker earnings after M&As.

### B.2 By Local vs. National M&As

While checking common pre-trends is reassuring for a causal interpretation when implementing a difference-in-differences design, contemporaneous shocks that occur with M&A events could still bias our results. For example, there could be a negative demand shock that affects a commuting zone and causes both a decline in employment and an increase in M&A activities as firms get purchased before they shut down. In this case, M&A activities are correlated with shocks that decrease labor demand. We can also have the opposite scenario.

We address this concern by also looking at M&As that are less likely to have been triggered by local economic conditions of the firm. Specifically, we consider the impact of national M&As that occur among domestic firms with multiple establishments across different commuting zones. The intuition is that these changes in ownership are less likely to be driven by the local economic conditions of the firms or workers. Figure B2 and Table B2 show that the effect of local M&As on earnings of target workers is statistically indistinguishable from the effect of national M&As on the same outcome. Therefore, the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is unlikely driven by local economic conditions of firms where M&A activities occur.

### B.3 By Initial Level of (flows-adjusted) Concentration

In Section 7, we show our estimates on worker earnings, separately for markets with low level (below the first quintile) of HHI and for markets with high level (above the last quintile) of HHI measured one year before the event. A standard Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) takes as given the definition of the market and then computes

$$HHI = \sum_j s_j^2, \quad (B1)$$

as the measure of concentration. We describe a flows-adjusted concentration measure that takes into account transitions across markets, following Arnold (2021). To begin, let market  $m$  be defined by the interaction between 4-digit NAICS and commuting zone. The flows-adjusted concentrated measure (denoted  $C$ ) requires computing transition rates across markets. While, in theory, transition rates across markets may change, we instead choose to pool the entire sample in order to retrieve a consistent and more precise measure of the rate of transitions across markets. The share of firm  $j$  in market  $m$  is given by:

$$\tilde{s}_{jm} = \frac{l_{jm}}{\sum_k \alpha_{m \rightarrow k} L_k} \quad (B2)$$

where

$$\alpha_{m \rightarrow k} = \frac{P(k|m)}{P(m|m)} \frac{L_m}{L_k} \quad (B3)$$

where  $P(k|m)$  is the probability an individual from market  $m$  transitions to market  $k$  conditional on experiencing a transition. The intuition behind this formulation is that jobs in other markets likely provide viable options for workers. Arnold (2021) shows that one can use a discrete choice model and empirical flows across markets (*i.e.*,  $\alpha_{k \rightarrow m}$ ) to measure the value a worker from a given market places on another market.

Intuitively, if we observe a large number of flows from market  $m$  to  $k$ , then  $k$  likely serves as a viable outside option. Additionally, we need to take into account the relative sizes of the markets. For example, if  $k$  is a relatively small market, but we still observe high rates of flows to this market, it must provide a particularly good option for the workers. This is why the relative size between  $m$  and  $k$  is taken into account when determining the value individuals from  $m$  place in receiving a job in market  $k$ . The concentration in market  $m$  is given by:

$$\tilde{C} = \sum_j \tilde{s}_{jm}^2 \quad (B4)$$

One key difference in this formulation relative to [Arnold \(2021\)](#) is that transitions across both industries and locations are taken into account. In [Arnold \(2021\)](#), the market shares depend only employment in other industries within the same commuting zone. In this more general version, the market share depends on employment in other commuting zones as well.

Second, the relative size term in  $\alpha_{m \rightarrow k}$  (i.e.  $\mathbb{E}[\frac{L_k}{L_m}]$ ) is now the expected relative size of industries across commuting zones. To understand this factor, imagine there are two equally sized industries that use similar workers but are generally located in different areas. For example, imagine plastic manufacturing and rubber manufacturing plants hire similar workers, but plastic manufacturing primarily takes place in Texas while rubber manufacturing primarily takes place in Ohio. In this case, the aggregate relative size of the industries will be quite different than the expected relative size within a commuting zone given the two industries primarily operate in different commuting zones. Therefore, a low volume of flows between the two industries does not necessarily reflect low substitutability, but rather they are generally located in different areas.

The flows-adjusted local labor market concentration measure,  $C_{mc}$ , is defined as:

$$C_{mc} = \sum_{j \in c} (\tilde{s}_{jmc})^2 \quad (\text{B5})$$

Figure B3 and Table B3 show the effects of M&As on earnings of workers at target firms, separately for markets with high (flow-adjusted) HHI and for markets with low (flow-adjusted) HHI. Similar to our main results based on the regular HHI, these results show that the decline in worker earnings are not larger for high-HHI markets.

## B.4 By Within vs. Between Industry M&As

In Section 7, we show that the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is similar between M&As that happen in tradable sectors and those that happen in non-tradable sectors, suggesting a limited role for the change in product market power in explaining the change in worker earnings. To further support this conclusion, we also conduct our analysis separately by within-industry M&As and between-industry M&As. The intuition is that an M&A would have a larger impact on firms' market power if the acquirer buys another firm within the same industry (i.e., horizontal mergers). We divide our sample of all M&A firms based on the industries of the parties involved in a transaction. A merger is a within-industry M&A if the industries (4-digit NAICS) of both parties are identical and it is between-industry M&A (i.e., vertical mergers) if the industries are different. For firms with one transaction, we define a firm as “within” if it participated in a within-industry M&A and as “between” if it participated in a between-industry M&A. For firms with multiple M&A

deals, we consider the majority of transactions to determine the within- and between-indicator.

Figure B4 shows the results on worker earnings in target firms, separately for within-industry M&A events and between-industry M&A events. The parallel trend holds prior to the event for both types of workers, and we do not find that the decline is larger for workers involved in within-industry M&As. Table B4 confirms that the difference in the decline in worker earnings is statistically indistinguishable from zero between within-industry M&As and across-industry M&As. These results imply that a rise in product market power is unlikely the main driver behind the results on worker earnings.

## **B.5 By Mergers vs. Partial Acquisitions**

In our analysis sample, roughly 80 percent of M&A events are partial acquisitions (75 percent for the whole M&A events). In other words, the vast majority of M&A events in Canada (and in North America generally) involves an acquirer purchasing a part of a target's businesses. It is possible that a wage decline is larger in case of a full merger, where there is a complete transfer of ownership. We explore whether impacts on worker earnings are larger in case of a merger, compared to a partial acquisition. In Figure B5 and Table B5, we find that decreases in workers' earnings in target firms where M&As involve full mergers were not larger than decreases in workers' earnings where M&As involve partial acquisitions, suggesting that our results are not driven by the fact the majority of our M&A events involves partial acquisitions. In other words, both merger and partial acquisition events create job separations of workers from target firms, resulting in a wage loss that we observe in the data.

## **B.6 By Pre-event Firm Size**

In our analysis sample, M&A firms with matched pairs are larger on average than an average M&A firm from the sample that includes unmatched M&A firms, as shown in Table A5 in Appendix A. In other words, on average, M&A firms in our matched sample are larger than M&A firms that fail to find a matched control firm. In general, M&A firms are larger than firms that do not go through M&A, so the main reason for a match failure is due to the differences in firm sizes. However, the restriction that M&A firms and their control firms must have at least 10 workers drops many smaller M&A firms. Column (2) and (4) of Table A5 shows that conditional on this restriction, M&A firms that fail to find a matched pair are actually larger than M&A firms in our matched sample on average. Nevertheless, our results are not likely driven by a particular size of firms in our sample where we find a matched control pair.

To help mitigate this potential concern, we explore whether impacts on worker earnings are larger for bigger firms (based on pre-event total revenue) compared to smaller firms. In Figure B6 and Table B6, we find that decreases in workers' earnings in target firms with higher pre-event total sales were not larger than decreases in workers' earnings in target firms with lower total sales, suggesting that our results are not driven by particular firm size differences in our analysis sample.

## **B.7 By One-time vs. Repeat Acquirers**

Prior research points out that a part of motives behind M&As involves empire-building, which could result in losses in efficiency and profitability after the event (Jensen, 1986). Even though it is practically difficult to discern whether a particular acquirer is an empire-builder in our data, we test whether the effects on firm sizes and profitability are different depending on whether an acquirer engages in multiple M&A transactions. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of acquirers that involve in a single M&A deal relative to the outcomes of acquirers that involve in multiple M&A deals during our sample period. Figure B7 and Table B7 show that acquirers that involve in repeat M&A transactions tend to grow larger, in terms of the number of employees and total revenue, pay higher average salaries, but become less profitable after the event, compared to acquirers that involve in a single M&A deal. While these results provide suggestive evidence consistent with the empire-building story, these differences could be also simply driven by the fact that acquirers that involve in multiple deals might mechanically increase in sizes more, and lose more profits through larger accumulated acquisition costs.

## **B.8 By Worker Characteristics**

We additionally explore whether the decline in earnings of workers at target firms is different based on worker characteristics, such as gender, age, and within-firm distribution in worker earnings. Prior studies have found differential impacts of firm-level shocks on worker earnings depending on their gender and age (Kline et al. 2019; Saez et al. 2019). Figure B8 and Table B8 show that the decline of workers' earnings at target firms is similar between male workers and female workers. By contrast, Figure B9 and Table B9 show that most of the decline in earnings at target firms is concentrated on workers who are at least 50 years old on average.

As shown in Section 6, the decline in workers' earnings at target firms is entirely driven by those that move to other firms after the M&A event. Therefore, we focus on these movers from target firms, and estimate what happens to their earnings, job transitions, employer fixed effects, and match effects separately across different age groups. Figure B10 and Table B10 show that


while we observe declines in earnings and match effects across all age groups for workers moving from target firms, the decline in earnings and match effects is largest among movers who are at least 50 years old before the event, without much changes in wage premiums. Taken together, these results imply that there exists a substantial degree of heterogeneity across age groups for changes in worker earnings, employer fixed effects, and match effects after the M&A event, and that older workers end up moving to other firms with worse match qualities, likely because of greater accumulation of firm-specific human capital at their previous firms.

Finally, we evaluate whether the effects on earnings are different depending on a given worker is a high earner vs. low earner within the firm's distribution. To do so, we matched workers based on the within-firm distribution of worker earnings at  $t = -1$ . Specifically, for each M&A firm, we sort workers based on quintile bins in within-firm earnings. Then we match these workers to control workers based on the within-firm distribution in control firms' worker earnings, gender, and age (5 year bins). For example, a female target worker in the first quintile of her firm's earnings distribution is matched with a female worker in a (target) control firm, as long as the control worker is also in the first quintile of the control firms' earnings distribution and in the same age bin in one year prior to the event. Since this requires us to re-do worker-level matching, we have a slightly different worker-level sample compared to our original sample. This step was necessary because in our original sample, a worker in a target firm may not be in the same bin in the within-firm earnings distribution as her control worker, since we did not explicitly match workers based on their earnings. However, the worker-level outcomes, including all the heterogeneity results, remain qualitatively similar to our main results using this newly matched worker-level data.

Figure B11 shows the effects on worker earnings, job transitions, employer fixed effects, and match effects, separately for workers in the first quintile and for workers in the fifth quintile in the within-firm earnings distribution measured at one year prior to the event. As the figure shows, we see larger declines in earnings and match effects for workers in the top quintile in earnings. Table B11 shows that workers in the bottom quintile experience almost no change in earnings, while workers in the top quintile experience 2.3 percent and 1.7 percent larger declines in earnings and match effects after M&As.

Figure B12 shows similar results, focusing on workers that move from targets after M&As. Table B12 shows that movers from targets in the bottom quintile experience 4.6 percent and 5.5 percent decline in earnings and match effects after the event, respectively, while movers from targets in the top quintile experience 3.4 percent and 4.8 percent larger declines in earnings and match effects after the event, respectively. These results suggest that high earners had likely accumulated more firm-specific human capital prior to the event, and experience a larger decrease in earnings through a worse match with a new employer after the M&A event.


Figure B1: Worker Earnings: Within Market M&As vs. Across Market M&As (Targets)



*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately for M&As that happen within the same labor market and for M&As that happen across labor markets. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.




Figure B2: Worker Earnings by National M&As vs. Local M&As (Targets)




*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately for national M&A deals and for local M&A deals as defined in Section B2. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B3: Worker Earnings By Initial Level of Flows-adjusted HHI (Targets)




*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately, for workers in markets with low initial level of concentration (first quintile in flows-adjusted HHI) and for workers in markets with high initial level of concentration (fifth quintile in flows-adjusted HHI). The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B4: Worker Earnings: Within Industry vs. Across Industry (Targets)




*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately for M&As that happen within the same 4-digit industry and for M&As that happen across different industries. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B5: Worker Earnings: Partial M&A vs. Full M&As (Targets)




*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates for the impact of M&A on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately for partial acquisitions and full mergers. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B6: Worker Earnings By Firm Size (Targets)




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on log of total earnings, separately for workers at target firms in the first quintile of total revenue and for workers in target firms in the fifth quintile of total revenue. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B7: One-time vs. Repeat M&As (Acquirers)




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates for the impact of M&As on firm-level outcomes, separately for acquiring firms with one M&Ae event throughout our study period and for acquiring firms with repeated M&A events. Roughly 70 percent of the acquirers in our matched sample have repeat M&A events. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B8: Worker Earnings By Worker Gender (Targets)



*Notes:* This figure displays event-study estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately, for male and female workers. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.


Figure B9: Worker Earnings By Worker Age (Targets)



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms, separately for various age groups. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.




Figure B10: Workers Moving from Targets - By Worker Age




*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates of the impact of M&As on worker-level outcomes for workers moving from target firms, separately for various age groups. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B11: By Within-Firm Earnings Distribution (Targets)



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates of the impact of M&As on worker-level outcomes, separately for workers in the bottom quintile (Q1) of firms' within-firm earnings distribution, and for workers in the top quintile (Q5) of firms' within-firm earnings distribution. We re-do the worker-level matching where we additionally match workers based on quintile bins of within-firm earnings distribution in one year prior to the event. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Figure B12: By Within-Firm Earnings Distribution (Movers from Targets)



*Notes:* These figures display event-study estimates of the impact of M&As on worker-level outcomes, separately for workers in the bottom quintile (Q1) of firms' within-firm earnings distribution, and for workers in the top quintile (Q5) of firms' within-firm earnings distribution. We re-do the worker-level matching where we additionally match workers based on quintile bins of within-firm earnings distribution in one year prior to the event. Here, we focus on workers that move from targets after the event. Panel (a) shows the estimates for log of total earnings. Panel (b) shows the estimates for job transition probabilities. Panel (c) shows the estimates for the employer fixed effects. Panel (d) shows the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals where the standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The M&A event is in year 0 and the coefficient is normalized to be zero in year -1.

Table B1: Worker Earnings: Within Market M&As vs. Across Market M&As (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.019*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.99 1696100
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Within Market	-0.012 (0.012)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.08 330900

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms involved in M&As that happen across different labor markets, as defined in Section B1. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms involved in M&As that happen within the same market. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B2: Worker Earnings By National M&As vs. Local M&As (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.019*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.99 1677900
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Local	-0.012 (0.012)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.08 330900

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms involved in national M&As, as defined in Section B2. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms in local M&As. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B3: Worker Earnings By Initial Level of Flows-adjusted HHI (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.029*** (0.01)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.02 142700
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Q5	-0.022 (0.014)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.09 185000

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms in markets with initially low level of concentration (first quintile in flows-adjusted HHI). The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms in markets with initially high level of concentration (fifth quintile in flows-adjusted HHI). The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B4: Worker Earnings: Within Industry vs. Across Industry (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.025*** (0.006)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.96 864500
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Within Industry	0.006 (0.009)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.04 1187500

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms involved in M&As that happen within the same 4-digit industry. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms involved in M&As that happen across different industries. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B5: Worker Earnings: Partial M&A vs. Full M&A (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.027*** (0.011)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.01 270700
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Merger	0.006 (0.012)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.01 1781100

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms involved partial vs. full acquisition. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms involved in full M&As. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.



Table B6: Worker Earnings By Firm Size (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.029*** (0.01)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.96 114000
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Q5	0.008 (0.013)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.03 1202500

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for workers at target firms with initially low total revenue (first quintile of total revenue distribution). The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers at target firms with initially high total revenue (fifth quintile of total revenue distribution). The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B7: One-time vs. Repeat M&amp;A (Acquirers)

	(1) log(Employment)	(2) log(Average Payrolls)	(3) log(Revenue)	(4) Profit Margins
Post $\times$ Treated	0.094*** (0.030)	0.004 (0.012)	0.127*** (0.044)	-0.005 (0.008)
Mean at t = -1	4.40	11.08	16.86	0.01
Firm-Year	19900	19800	20000	20100
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Repeat	0.132** (0.055)	0.061** (0.024)	0.246*** (0.082)	-0.030* (0.016)
Mean at t = -1	4.87	11.10	17.34	0.04
Firm-Year	8800	8700	8700	8800

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on firm-level outcomes for acquiring firms with one M&A event throughout out study period. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for acquiring firms with repeated M&A events. Roughly 70 percent of acquirers in our matched sample have repeated M&A events. Column (1) displays the estimates for log of employment. Column (2) displays the estimates for log of average payrolls. Column (3) displays the estimates for log of total revenue, and column (4) displays the estimates for profit margins. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

Table B8: Worker Earnings By Worker Gender (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.022** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.12 1404600
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Female	0.000 (0.008)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.75 647900

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of M&As on log of total earnings for male workers at target firms. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for female workers at target firms. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker and firm level.

Table B9: Worker Earnings By Worker Age (Targets)

	(1)
	log(Earnings)
20s	0.010 (0.014)
Mean at t = -1	10.72
Adj. R squared	0.799
Worker-Year	70600
30s	-0.004 (0.006)
Mean at t = -1	10.98
Adj. R squared	0.765
Worker-Year	400600
40s	-0.007 (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	11.07
Adj. R squared	0.790
Worker-Year	705500
50s+	-0.024*** (0.006)
Mean at t = -1	11.00
Adj. R squared	0.767
Worker-Year	871700

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on log of earnings for workers at target firms across various age groups. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-firm level.

Table B10: Worker Earnings By Worker Age (Movers from Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Transition	(3) Employer Fixed Effects	(4) Match Effects
20s	-0.018 (0.016)	0.146*** (0.014)	0.037*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.009)
Mean at t = -1	10.67	0.00	0.13	0.11
Adj. R squared	0.781	0.292	0.885	0.340
Worker-Year	44900	45000	44300	42700
30s	-0.032*** (0.008)	0.149*** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.004)
Mean at t = -1	10.96	0.00	0.23	0.10
Adj. R squared	0.746	0.248	0.871	0.199
Worker-Year	228600	228900	226200	223900
40s	-0.036*** (0.006)	0.161*** (0.010)	0.024*** (0.005)	-0.066*** (0.004)
Mean at t = -1	11.04	0.00	0.25	0.10
Adj. R squared	0.771	0.293	0.898	0.233
Worker-Year	373900	374500	371500	369200
50s+	-0.064*** (0.008)	0.185*** (0.012)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.132*** (0.006)
Mean at t = -1	10.98	0.00	0.22	0.11
Adj. R squared	0.737	0.330	0.915	0.35
Worker-Year	364600	365700	362900	359400

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on worker-level outcomes for moving workers from target firms across various age groups. Columns (1) displays the estimates log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the probability of transition. Column (3) displays the estimates for employer fixed effects. Column (4) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-firm level.

Table B11: Worker Earnings By Within-Firm Earnings Distribution (Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Transition	(3) Employer Fixed Effects	(4) Match Effects
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.007 (0.008)	0.086*** (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.003)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	10.46 363700	0.00 364300	0.24 361000	0.05 355500
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Q5	-0.023 (0.015)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.004)
Mean at t = -1 Worker-Year	11.58 351100	0.00 351700	0.25 349100	0.08 347800

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on worker-level outcomes for workers in the first quintile of firms' within-firm earnings distribution. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers in the fifth quintile of firms' earnings distribution. We re-do the worker-level matching where we additionally match workers based on quintile bins of within-firm earnings distribution in one year prior to the event. Columns (1) displays the estimates log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the probability of transition. Column (3) displays the estimates for employer fixed effects. Column (4) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-firm level.

Table B12: Worker Earnings By Within-Firm Earnings Distribution (Movers From Targets)

	(1) log(Earnings)	(2) Transition	(3) Employer Fixed Effects	(4) Match Effects
Post $\times$ Treated	-0.046*** (0.010)	0.172*** (0.010)	0.013*** (0.005)	-0.055*** (0.005)
Mean at t = -1	10.45	0.00	0.22	0.07
Worker-Year	184000	184400	182300	179200
Post $\times$ Treated $\times$ Q5	-0.034* (0.020)	0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.048*** (0.008)
Mean at t = -1	11.52	0.00	0.23	0.13
Worker-Year	171700	172000	170200	169300

*Notes:* This table reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the impacts of M&As on worker-level outcomes for workers in the first quintile of firms' within-firm earnings distribution. The triple interaction term captures the triple-difference estimates for workers in the fifth quintile of firms' earnings distribution. We re-do the worker-level matching where we additionally match workers based on quintile bins of within-firm earnings distribution in one year prior to the event. Here we focus on workers that move from targets after the event. Columns (1) displays the estimates log of total earnings. Column (2) displays the estimates for the probability of transition. Column (3) displays the estimates for employer fixed effects. Column (4) displays the estimates for worker-employer match effects. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the worker-firm level.