

Business Analytics

# Session 11a. Linear Programming

(Sensitivity Analysis and Duality)

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# Exercises

- What are the three essential components of linear programming (and optimization models in general)?
- (T/F) The optimal solution to a linear program always exists.
- (T/F) It is possible to formulate all the linear programs as a maximization problem.

# Google's AdWords Problem

- Decisions:

Advertiser	Query 1 "4G LTE"	Query 2 "largest LTE"	Query 3 "best LTE network"
AT&T	$X_{A1}$	$X_{A2}$	$X_{A3}$
T-Mobile	$X_{T1}$	$X_{T2}$	$X_{T3}$
Verizon	$X_{V1}$	$X_{V2}$	$X_{V3}$

- Revenue:

$$0.5X_{A1} + 0.5X_{A2} + 1.6X_{A3} + X_{T1} + 0.75X_{T2} + 2X_{T3} + 0.5X_{V1} + 4X_{V2} + 5X_{V3}$$

- Constraints:

- Budget for AT&T:  $0.5X_{A1} + 0.5X_{A2} + 1.6X_{A3} \leq 170$
- Budget for T-Mobile:  $X_{T1} + 0.75X_{T2} + 2X_{T3} \leq 100$
- Budget for Verizon:  $0.5X_{V1} + 4X_{V2} + 5X_{V3} \leq 160$
- Number of Q<sub>1</sub>:  $X_{A1} + X_{T1} + X_{V1} \leq 140$
- Number of Q<sub>2</sub>:  $X_{A2} + X_{T2} + X_{V2} \leq 80$
- Number of Q<sub>3</sub>:  $X_{A3} + X_{T3} + X_{V3} \leq 80$
- Non-negativity:  $X_{A1}, X_{A2}, X_{A3}, X_{T1}, X_{T2}, X_{T3}, X_{V1}, X_{V2}, X_{V3} \geq 0$

# Linear Programming (LP) for Google AdWords

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & 0.5X_{A1} + 0.5X_{A2} + 1.6X_{A3} + X_{T1} + 0.75X_{T2} + 2X_{T3} \\ & + 0.5X_{V1} + 4X_{V2} + 5X_{V3} \end{aligned}$$

Subject to

$$0.5X_{A1} + 0.5X_{A2} + 1.6X_{A3} \leq 170$$

$$X_{T1} + 0.75X_{T2} + 2X_{T3} \leq 100$$

$$0.5X_{V1} + 4X_{V2} + 5X_{V3} \leq 160$$

$$X_{A1} + X_{T1} + X_{V1} \leq 140$$

$$X_{A2} + X_{T2} + X_{V2} \leq 80$$

$$X_{A3} + X_{T3} + X_{V3} \leq 80$$

$$X_{A1}, X_{A2}, X_{A3}, X_{T1}, X_{T2}, X_{T3}, X_{V1}, X_{V2}, X_{V3} \geq 0$$

# Google AdWords Solution

- Use the Python package "cvxopt" to obtain the optimal solution.

- Optimal Ad Display Strategy:

Advertiser	Query 1 "4G LTE"	Query 2 "largest LTE"	Query 3 "best LTE network"
AT&T	$X_{A1}^* = 40$	$X_{A2}^* = 40$	$X_{A3}^* = 80$
T-Mobile	$X_{T1}^* = 100$	$X_{T2}^* = 0$	$X_{T3}^* = 0$
Verizon	$X_{V1}^* = 0$	$X_{V2}^* = 40$	$X_{V3}^* = 0$

- Optimal Revenue=\$428

# Sensitivity Analysis

# Sensitivity Analysis

- What if questions:
  - What if the budget for T-Mobile is 10 dollars higher?
  - What if the number of displays for  $Q_1$  decreases to 135?
- How would the optimal decision variables and optimal objective function value change if the constraints or the coefficients change?
  - You can change the constraint(s)/coefficient(s) and re-run the optimization.
- Alternatively,
  - "GoogleAd['z']": The shadow price (the change in the optimal objective function value associated with a unit change in this constraint).

# Sensitivity Analysis: Shadow Price

- Shadow prices for the budget and query number constraints:

	A	T	V	$Q_1$	$Q_2$	$Q_3$
Shadow price	0	0.5	0.875	0.5	0.5	1.6

- Shadow prices for the non-negativity constraints:

	$x_{A1}$	$x_{A2}$	$x_{A3}$	$x_{T1}$	$x_{T2}$	$x_{T3}$	$x_{V1}$	$x_{V2}$	$x_{V3}$
Shadow price	0	0	0	0	0.125	0.6	0.437	0	0.975

- If the budget for T-mobile increases to \$110, the revenue of Google will be  $\$428 + 0.5 \times (110 - 100) = \$433$ .
- If the number of  $Q_1$  decreases to 135, the revenue of Google will be  $\$428 + 0.5 \times (135 - 140) = \$425.5$ .
- To use the shadow price, we assume that **only one** RHS of the constraints is changed.



# Duality in Linear Programming

# Primal and Dual

$$\text{(Primal)} \quad \max_{(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)} C_1 x_1 + C_2 x_2 + \dots C_n x_n$$

subject to

$$\begin{cases} A_{1,1}x_1 + A_{1,2}x_2 + \dots + A_{1,n}x_n & \leq B_1 \\ A_{2,1}x_1 + A_{2,2}x_2 + \dots + A_{2,n}x_n & \leq B_2 \\ \dots\dots\dots \\ A_{m,1}x_1 + A_{m,2}x_2 + \dots + A_{m,n}x_n & \leq B_m \\ x_1 \geq 0, x_2 \geq 0, \dots, x_n \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{(Dual)} \quad \min_{(y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)} B_1 y_1 + B_2 y_2 + \dots B_m y_m$$

subject to

$$\begin{cases} A_{1,1}y_1 + A_{2,1}y_2 + \dots + A_{m,1}y_m & \geq C_1 \\ A_{1,2}y_1 + A_{2,2}y_2 + \dots + A_{m,2}y_m & \geq C_2 \\ \dots\dots\dots \\ A_{1,n}y_1 + A_{2,n}y_2 + \dots + A_{m,n}y_m & \geq C_n \\ y_1 \geq 0, y_2 \geq 0, \dots, y_m \geq 0 \end{cases}$$

# Dual for Google AdWords

$$\min 170\mathbf{y}_1 + 100\mathbf{y}_2 + 160\mathbf{y}_3 + 140\mathbf{y}_4 + 80\mathbf{y}_5 + 80\mathbf{y}_6$$

Subject to

$$0.5\mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{y}_4 \geq 0.5$$

$$0.5\mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{y}_5 \geq 0.5$$

$$1.6\mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{y}_6 \geq 1.6$$

$$\mathbf{y}_2 + \mathbf{y}_4 \geq 1$$

$$0.75\mathbf{y}_2 + \mathbf{y}_5 \geq 0.75$$

$$2\mathbf{y}_2 + \mathbf{y}_6 \geq 2$$

$$0.5\mathbf{y}_3 + \mathbf{y}_4 \geq 0.5$$

$$4\mathbf{y}_3 + \mathbf{y}_5 \geq 4$$

$$5\mathbf{y}_3 + \mathbf{y}_6 \geq 5$$

$$\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{y}_3, \mathbf{y}_4, \mathbf{y}_5, \mathbf{y}_6 \geq 0$$

# Primal and Dual

- As long as either the primal or the dual has a finite optimal solution, the other one also has a finite optimal solution.
- If either the primal or the dual has a finite optimal solution, the optimal objective function values of the primal and the dual are the same.
- If either the primal or the dual has a finite optimal solution, the shadow price of the primal is an optimal solution to the dual.
- If either the primal or the dual has a finite optimal solution, the shadow price of the dual is an optimal solution to the primal.
- Dual of dual is primal.
  - Solving one problem obtains solutions to both.

# Duality in LP

- $A$  is a constraint matrix.  $\mathbf{a}_i'$  is the  $i$ th row vector, and  $A_j$  is the  $j$ th column vector.
- Primal on the left; Dual on the right:

$$\begin{array}{ll}\text{minimize} & \mathbf{c}'\mathbf{x} \\ \text{subject to} & \mathbf{a}_i'\mathbf{x} \geq b_i, \quad i \in M_1, \\ & \mathbf{a}_i'\mathbf{x} \leq b_i, \quad i \in M_2, \\ & \mathbf{a}_i'\mathbf{x} = b_i, \quad i \in M_3, \\ & x_j \geq 0, \quad j \in N_1, \\ & x_j \leq 0, \quad j \in N_2, \\ & x_j \text{ free}, \quad j \in N_3,\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll}\text{maximize} & \mathbf{p}'\mathbf{b} \\ \text{subject to} & p_i \geq 0, \quad i \in M_1, \\ & p_i \leq 0, \quad i \in M_2, \\ & p_i \text{ free}, \quad i \in M_3, \\ & \mathbf{p}'\mathbf{A}_j \leq c_j, \quad j \in N_1, \\ & \mathbf{p}'\mathbf{A}_j \geq c_j, \quad j \in N_2, \\ & \mathbf{p}'\mathbf{A}_j = c_j, \quad j \in N_3.\end{array}$$

# Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing

- **Arbitrage**: Positive cash flow now, non-negative cash flow for every possible state in the future.
- **Option pricing**: How should we price a call option to avoid arbitrage?

	Bond	Stock	Call Option	Probability
State 1	\$105	\$150	$\max(150-100,0)=\$50$	0.5
State 2	\$105	\$70	$\max(70-100,0)=\$0$	0.5
Current Price	\$100	\$100	$p_o = ?$	

- **Buying**  $x_b$  units of bond,  $x_s$  units of stock, and  $x_o$  units of option.
  - $x_i < 0$  means selling.
- No arbitrage means the following LP has a finite solution  $(0, 0, 0)$ :

$$(\mathcal{P}) \max[-100x_b - 100x_s - p_o x_o] \text{ (current cash flow)}$$

Subject to

$$105x_b + 150x_s + 50x_o \geq 0 \text{ (cash flow of State 1 is non-negative)}$$

$$105x_b + 70x_s + 0x_o \geq 0 \text{ (cash flow of State 2 is non-negative)}$$

# Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing

- The dual of  $(\mathcal{P})$ :

$$(\mathcal{D}) \min[0y_1 + 0y_2]$$

Subject to

$$105y_1 + 105y_2 = -100$$

$$150y_1 + 70y_2 = -100$$

$$50y_1 + 0y_2 = -p_0$$

$$y_1 \leq 0, y_2 \leq 0$$

- Non-arbitrage is equivalent to that the dual  $(\mathcal{D})$  has a feasible solution.
  - $y_1^* = -0.417, y_2^* = -0.536, p_0 = -50y_1^* = 20.83$ .
  - Risk-neutral probabilities:  $(P_1^*, P_2^*) = (0.438, 0.562)$ , **independent** of "true probabilities".
- For any asset written on the stock, where  $C_1$  is the cash flow in State 1 and  $C_2$  is the cash flow in State 2.

The non-arbitrage price is  $p^* = (P_1^*C_1 + P_2^*C_2)/1.05$ .

- No arbitrage  $\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{P})$  has a finite solution  $\Leftrightarrow (\mathcal{D})$  has a feasible solution  $\Leftrightarrow$  existence of risk-neutral probabilities

# Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing: General Form

- $M$  states (in period 1) and  $N$  assets, with cash flow  $C_{ij}$  for state  $i$  and asset  $j$ .
- Each state  $i$  occurs with probability  $P_i > 0$ .  $P := (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_M)$
- The price of asset  $j$  in period 0:  $p_j$ .  $p := (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_N)$



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## Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing

There is no arbitrage (for the cash flow matrix  $C$  and the price vector  $p$ ) if and only if there exists a linear pricing rule for the assets, i.e., there exists a vector  $(y_1^*, y_2^*, \dots, y_M^*)$  ( $y_i^* > 0$  for each  $i$ ), such that for each asset  $j$ ,  $p_j = \sum_{i=1}^M C_{ij} y_i^*$ . Moreover,  $y^*$  is independent of the true probabilities  $P$ .