

(1)

Home or Domestic Administration (of E.I. Company)
(Extract)

In January 1744 it was intimated to the court of Directors that if the Company would advance and lend to his majesty for the service of the Government, the sum of one million at 3% it might be the means of procuring the prolongation of the Company's term in the exclusive trade to the year 1780, their present expiring at Lady Day 1766: The Company to be empowered to borrow the said sum million on their bonds. The proposition was agreed to - the three years notice to be given from 1780.

The 17 Geo 2nd Cap 17 was accordingly passed.

It was at the same time declared that the Company were to have the benefit of all charters and acts which had been made in their favour.

This measure secured to the Company the exclusive trade for the prospective term of 36 years from 1744 and the several periods for which, and the term upon which it had been extended will be seen (p 149) by the following summary:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Reign</u>	<u>Granted for Years</u>	<u>TERMS</u>
1698	9 & 10 Wm 3rd	The charter granted 10 years & from the 29th Sept to 3 years 1701 to 29th Sept 1711. notice.	On lending £ 2,000,000 at 8%.
1707	6 Anne	The charter extended from 29.9.1711 to 25th March 1726.	14½ years & on lending 3 years notice. £ 1,200,000 at 5% and agreeing to receive only 5% on the two million.
1712	10 Anne	Charter extended from the 25 March 1726 to the 25 March 1733.	7 years & 3 years notice. No further terms.
1729	3rd Geo 2	Charter extended from the 25th March 1733 to 25th March 1766.	33 years & 3 years notice. And a right granted to continue a corporate body for ever; giving £ 200,000 by the 24 Dec 1730; and agreeing to receive from the 29 Sept 1730 Only £ 128,000 or 4% on the £ 3,200,000.
1744	17 Geo 2	Charter extended from 25th March 1766 to 25th March 1780.	14 years & 3 years notice. On lending £ 1,000,000 by the 29.9.1744 at 3%. The £ 3,200,000 to continue at 4%.
		From 29 Sept 1701 to the 25th March 1780.	78½ years Total Loan to Government £ 4,200,000.

(12)

MINUTES OF PRIVY COUNCIL

Whitehall: Nov 5, 1741
(Extract)

(ff 52v) ..Mr Haddock should be directed to go, with his majesty's whole squadron; or with part of it, as he may think sufficient; to Barcelona; or to such port, whence he shall have intelligence, that the Spanish embarkation is; and endeavour to destroy it; either at Barcelona; or in any port in Italy; or in their voyage thither; and to attack, take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy, all Spanish ships, or other ships, in the service of Spain; and to attack, take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy the French squadron, wherever they are, if he shall come up with them, joined with, convoying, or giving any assistance, or protection to the Spaniards, in port, or at sea, or ...

Whitehall: Mar 22, 1744
(Extract)

Mr Thomson's letters of the 25th, 28th, and 29th instant received yesterday giving an account of the declaration made to him by M. Amelet, of the intention of France to declare war forthwith, and to publish a manifesto, setting forth their reasons received.

..(ff 79v) Notice to be given immediately to the directors of the East India Company, and consideration to be had for the security of our East India ships, and the molesting those of France on their return to Europe; and the times of the return of the several branches of their trade; and the best, and most probable means of intercepting them. ...

Whitehall: Mar 28, 1744
(Extract)

The minutes of the cabinet council, of Feb 2, and the instructions of Sir John Norris, signed by his majesty, in consequence of these minutes; and a petition to his majesty, signed by a great number of merchants; delivered to the Duke of Newcastle, on the 23rd instant, were also read.

..(ff 81r).. that the merchants should be acquainted, in answer to their petition, that the disposition, and appointment of his majesty's ships of war, were not taken out of the power, and direction, of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. ..

BM: Newcastle Papers: Add Ms 33004: Minutes of Privy Council 1739-45 (Above minutes on ff 52r-3, 78v-80r, and 80v-81r)

NOTE: Minute of 22 Mar 1743/4 (BM Add Ms 33004 f 78) referred to in Cambridge History of India, Vol V, pp 119 (Ed 1929).

A reference to 1744 is also made in "The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics" by Lucy S. Sutherland (Principal of Lady Margaret Hall Oxford) 1962 edition, on pp 45-6 (Chap 2: The Monied Company). It reads:

"The French Company was comparatively a newcomer to the East. It can be said to have come into permanent existence in 1664, when it obtained a site at finally with permission to trade at Surat. Though in the early years of the eighteenth century it set up factories which competed in each of the three English fields of enterprise, it was in Madras, where the 'country powers' were weak, that their rivalry was to have spectacular results. At first it seemed as if the great struggles between England and (p 46) France, which were being fought out in all their varied spheres of influence, might pass India by, for in the war of the Spanish Succession an unofficial truce was made between the two Companies. An attempt by the French to make a similar arrangement with the English Company in the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-8) was defeated, however, by the action of the English Government in sending a fleet to harass the French in these valuable possessions, and the French did not delay in taking up the gauntlet.

(13)

ADMIRAL WATSON'S EXPEDITION TO INDIA : 1754-

A List of His Majesty's Ships Employed on the Expedition to the East Indies:

Ship's Name	Commander	Number of:		
		Guns	Bearmen	Soldiers
Kent	R.A. Watson	70	380	110
	Henry Speke			
Eagle	George Focock	60	380	94
	Thomas Latham	50	280	89
Salisbury	Thomas Knowler	50	280	89
	William Martin	24	140	56
King's Fisher Sloop	Best Nihell ?	10-24 ?	70	33
				475

14 March 1754
(Admiralty Office)Separate and Secret Instructions (to Rear Admiral Watson): 2.3.1754

Whereas it will not be safe for the ships under your command, to remain on the coast of Coromandel later than the first week in October, you will then proceed to Bombay, on the coast of Malabar, and you will advise with the Company's Governor, and council there, how the ships can be most advantageously employed for the publick and the Company's service during the monsoon, when if (p 166) it shall be their and your opinion, that the possessions, ships, vessels or forces of the noted Angria can be attacked with a prospect of success, without any hazard or risque of the ships under your command, you will undertake the same, as soon as the Company shall have furnished you with such men, stores and ammunition as you shall find necessary for the purpose. But this service is not to be undertaken, upon any account, unless the same can be so timely performed, that the ships may be refitted, and enabled to return to the coast of Coromandel by the breaking up of the monsoon.

M. Pitt to Admiral Watson: Whitehall, 11 January 1757. G. B.
Sir,

The Secret Committee of the East India Company having made strong and repeated representations to the king of their inability to protect their trade and settlements, against the dangers, to which they are exposed, from the great armaments, which the French have sent, and are sending to the East Indies, his majesty has been graciously pleased to order a regiment of four ships of the line, and one frigate, to proceed forthwith (p 108) for the assistance and protection of the Company in those parts.

You will receive particular directions from the Lords of the Admiralty, with regard to the ships already under your command, and to your own return to England, with such ships, or ship only, as cannot be rendered fit for the king's service in these seas, where having been long employed, and given distinguished proofs of your prudence and ability, it is unnecessary for me to recommend it to you to communicate, before your departure, any lights, and informations, which may be useful to the king's service, and his majesty (p 109) doubts not but those on whom the command shall devolve, will exert their utmost endeavours, for the protection and support of the Company, agreeable to his majesty's gracious intentions in sending this reinforcement.

The Company, it is hoped, having a perfect knowledge of their own affairs, may form such plans of operation, as may best secure their possessions, or annoy the enemy, and it is therefore his majesty's pleasure that the commanders of his ships shall concur and assist in the execution thereof, nevertheless, consulting, on all proper occasions, what may be practicable, (p 110) and fit, for the king's ships, and most advisable for the general service.

Your success in the extirpation of Angria the pirate, and the reduction of his ports and settlements, has given the king great

IOR: HM Vols 93; Letter 11.1.1757 Vol 94.

these
satisfaction, and has been followed with the expressions of
acknowledgements from the Company, as are justly due to your
diligence and conduct. The Company are also inclined to hope that
what passed with the Moratoss on that occasion will not have
prevented the completion of the treaty with them which you very
rightly judge to be essential to the security of that part of
the country.

I am &c

W. Pitt

(p 111)

P.S. It is hoped that his majesty's declaration of the war
against the French king, whereof copies were sent to you,
have reached your hands in due time.

Col

W. Pitt to Col Adlercron: Whitehall, January 27, 1757.

Sir,

I am commanded to signify to you his majesty's pleasure, that
you should forthwith return to England, with the regiment under
your command, on board such of the Company's ships, as you shall
be able to find a passage in, directions being given by the
Company to their officers for that purpose; but as it will be
necessary for the East India Company to keep up a considerable
force for the security of their settlements it is the king's (p 117)
further pleasure that as many of the commissioned officers of your
regiment, under the rank of field officers, and also such of the
non-commissioned officers, and private men, as shall be willing
to engage in the service of the Company, be permitted to remain
in the East Indies; and the king would not have the least
compulsion used to prevail on any of the officers, or men, to stay,
yet I am to acquaint you, that the more of them that shall consent
to continue there (p 118) the more agreeable it will be to his
majesty, as it will greatly tend to the protection of the Company's
trade; and you will acquaint the officers, that such of them as
shall engage in the service of the Company, shall from the time
of their so engaging be entered upon the list of his majesty's
reduced officers, according to their respective ranks; and whenever
they return to England, after having so engaged served, they shall
be entitled to the receipt of the half pay, from (p 119) the time
of such return, respectively, according to the rank which they
held in his majesty's service.

I am &c

W. Pitt

(Back page: by India ships and Duplicate by Man of War)

W. Pitt to Col Adlercron: Whitehall, March 18, 1757

Sir,

The it is scarcely to be supposed that you can have any doubt
about the manner in which the small train, which was sent to the
East Indies, with a detachment of men, from his majesty's Royal
Regiment of Artillery, commanded by Captain Hislop, is to be
disposed of; yet, I am commanded to signify (p 127) to you, the
king's pleasure, that the said train be continued in the service
of the Company, as long as his majesty's artillery companies
remain in India, to be there employed in such manner as the
commander in chief of the Company's forces, shall think
for the service.

I am &c

W. Pitt

IOR: EM 94

NOTE: The general instructions dated 2.3.1754 to Admiral Watson,
from the British king (G. R) are on pp 159-164 of EM 93.
Vol 93 and 94 have much material for the period 1753-7.

Whitehall, 19 February 1754

Present: Lord Anson, Lord Holderness, Mr Chauncy, Mr Drake,
Mr Burrow, Mr Mabbet, Mr Hume

The East India Companys of England and France having hitherto confined themselves to act only as auxiliaries to the princes of India; with whom they are mutually in alliance, and it being material not to deviate from this method of proceeding, and to avoid, as much as possible, becoming principals in the war, the India Company will take care to give the strictest orders to their Governors and other officers in India, (p 152) cautiously to avoid whatever might be construed as an act of hostility against the French East India Company, unless the proceedings of the French should force them to reprisals.

IOR: HM 93:pp 151-2 (Minute of Privy Council)

ALIST of His Majesty's Ships Employed on the Expedition to the East India Company's Requests for Commission for Seizing "Pirates"

Date of Request	Ship	Commander	Tons	Men	Guns
21.11.1748 (93/1)	Griffin	Thomas Dethich	499	99	26
	Boscawen	Benjamin ..	499	99	28
2 . 1.1749 (93/2)	Warren	A. Glover	499	99	26
25. 1.1749 (93/5)	Shaftesbury	Wm Bossey (?)	499	99	26
7.10.1751 (93/9)	Houghton	Richard Walpole	499	99	26
	Prince of Wales	Wm Peck	499	99	26
9. 11.1752 (93/81)	Harcourt	William Webber	499	99	26
	Clinton	John Banfan ?	499	99	26
	Walpole	Francis Fowler	499	99	26
	Winchester	Christopher Baron	499	99	26
	Plymouth	Thomas Field	499	99	26
	Egmont	Thomas Tolson	499	99	26
6.12.1753 (93/141)	York	Edward Ward	499	99	26
14.10.1754 (93/199)	Earl of Holderness	Matthew Court	499	99	26
	Hardwicke	John Samson	499	99	26
16. 1.1755 (93/219)	Streatham	Charles Masen	499	99	26
25. 9.1755 (93/269)	Caernarvon	Norton Hutchins	499	99	26
	Stornoway	Josiah Hendman	499	99	26
4. 1.1757 (94/101)	Worcester	Edward Tideman	499	99	26
	Fox	Alexander Hume	499	99	26
28. 1.1757 (94/120)	Howe	Richard Drake	499	99	26
	Leatham	John Foot	499	99	26
4.11.1757	Tilbury	Roger Mainwaring	499	99	26
	Osterley	Frederick Vincent	499	99	26

IOR: HM Vols 93 and 94: pages as shown above

NOTE: It is possible that this is an incomplete statement of requests made during this period. Besides ships which would have obtained such commission earlier are excluded in the above.

The request was worded as under:

"The court of directors of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies do desire that a commission for seizing pirates may be granted to the commanders of the following ship outward bound to India in the service of the said Company: vizt .." (request 6.12.1753:HM 93/141)

(P 10)

Sir

The gentlemen of the Committee of Secrecy of the East India Company desire the favour that you will acquaint the Right Hon'ble Mr Fox, that they will do themselves the honour of waiting upon him on an affair of importance on Tuesday morning next the 18th instant at ten O'clock, if that time will be agreeable; be so good to let me know Mr Fox's answer as soon as it may be convenient, that I may give the gentlemen notice accordingly, and you will very much oblige, sir.

your most obedient and most humble servant,

East India House, 12th May 1756. Robt James, secretary.

Whitehall, 10th September 1756.

Secret Committee of the East India Company

Gentlemen

I have taken the first opportunity of laying before his majesty and his ministers, your letter to me of the 18th past, and they have the contents of it under their serious consideration.

The French Company, as you observe, are supported, in a great degree, at the expence of the crown of France; but then it must be remarked, that the king has a principal share (p 24) in the trade of the Company; the exact state of whose affaires is precisely known to the French ministers, and indeed the Company's ships are of that size and construction, that, upon their arrival in the East Indies, they are capable of acting, to all intents and purposes as ships of war. The first part of this case you are sensible, gentlemen is very different here, but if you could imitate the French Company (p 25) the second, by increasing the force and quality of your own ships, you would find therein a considerable advantage, and have much less reason to be in any apprehension from the enemy. You will therefore give me leave to recommend this to your consideration; altho you may be assured, that, in the meantime, nothing will be wanting in the king's servants, (who are fully sensible of the great importance of the East India trade to this country) humbly to advise his majesty, to contribute as much to your assistance, and support, as the present exigency will permit.

(Draught: Henry Fox ?)

AN ACCOUNT OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TROOPS ON THE COAST OF COROMANDEL TAKEN FROM THE LAST GENERAL RETURN DATED AT PORT ST GEORGE 28 th February 1756:

	Men
Europeans including officers	<u>2,309</u>
Topasses incorporated with the Europeans	335
Coffres the same	<u>120</u>
Seapeys	<u>7,144</u>
Total of the Forces on the 28 Feb 1756	<u>9,963</u>
<u>NB Recruits sent by the Dodington the beginning of the 1755</u>	<u>80</u>
Recruits sent from England last season being all the Company could raise	292
Recruits intended to be sent this season if they can possibly be raised about	<u>500</u> 872

The above are exclusive of his majesty's Regiment under the command of Col Adeleron, also of the detachment of artillery commanded by Captain Hislop or any of the companies of artillery in his majesty's pay.

East India House, 21 December 1756.

(Back: in the letter from the Secret Committee of the East India Company of December 21, 1756.)

HMS Vol 94

(14)

(KING'S SHIPS AND PRIVATEERS; TWIN ARMS OF NAVAL SUPREMACY)
:cir 1791

(ff 14r) ... The naval force of Great Britain in time of war is of two sorts.

First King's ships.

Secondly Private ships of war, commonly called privateers. These privateers receive their commissions from the admiralty, which the Lord High Admiral, or the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty are obliged to give at the request of the owners, by the directions of an act of Parliament.

In a naval war it is not the Government alone that carries it on; the nation itself may be said to take a part in it, and such a spirit ought certainly not to be discouraged. (see 29 Geo II ch 34 & the 32 Geo II ch 25 and many other acts of Parliament) The king and the two houses of parliament, are of this opinion, for the king has in every war given up his right to all the capture made by private ships of war, and parliament has enacted many excellent provisions for their encouragement. *

The ships belonging to the king are supported (ff 14v) at the publick expence.

Privateers are supported, not at the publick expence, but by the profits derived from the captures made by them.

In proportion as you diminish the chance of making captures, you discourage the fitting out of private ships of war; and if you so far restrain the (ff 15r) right of making captures, that the Amateurs, or those, who are disposed to fit out private ships of war, are not likely to derive advantage, sufficient to compensate the charge and risque, you in fact, annihilate this branch of the publick force. In time of war, the ships of his majesty's navy, attack and destroy the ships of war belonging to the enemy, and thereby make Great Britain mistress of the sea. It is then, that private ships of war, begin to act with success, and they have (ff 15v) a great share in destroying the commerce of the enemy. The some privateers are equipped for long voyages, and are able therefore to sail into distant seas, yet much the greater number, being equipped and victualled, but for a few weeks, can only make captures near at home, that is, in the European seas.

The the ships of his majesty's navy from their size, and other circumstances, may not take so many merchant vessels, as ships fitted out by private persons, expressly for this (ff 16r) particular sort of warfare; yet it is well known, that the fortunes of all our great naval officers have been made, not so much by the emoluments of their professions, as by the capture of merchantmen, taken by ships under their command. If you deprive therefore, the officers of the British navy of this prospect, to improve their fortunes, or even diminish

British Museum: Liverpool Papers: Add Ms 38351: Letter dated 12.10.1791 (?) from Lord Hawkesbury (1st Earl of Liverpool) to Mr Pitt (Prime Minister): ff 3-93: draft with many alterations.

* Note in Pencil (Insert the following and any other reference that may hereafter seem to occur in the margin with red ink) Dharampal Archives CPS-TS-01 www.cpsindia.org

it to a considerable degree, you thereby take away, one great encouragement to active service.

The right to seize in time of war, the property of an enemy on (ff 16v) the open sea, in whatever ships it may be found, is so essential to all maritime powers, that it has never, I believe, been denied by one eminent writer on the law of nations. In the famous report of the 18th January 1753, made by Sir George Lee, Dr Paul, Sir Dudley Ryder, and the present Lord Mansfield, it is expressly said, that "they, who maintain the freedom of the sea in its utmost extent, don't dispute, but that, when two powers are at war, they may seize the effects of each other upon the high seas, (ff 17r) and on board the ships of friends".

In discoursing on this subject, we are too apt now to pay attention to, the principles of the late armed neutrality, and to suppose, that when we insist on seizing the goods of an enemy, on board neutral ships, we are acquiring a new right, or supporting one that is doubtful; when in fact, we are only claiming the exercise of a right, which our ancestors have always hitherto maintained/thinking it essential to Great Britain as /ed a maritime power.

(ff 17v) Let us now see how far, the concessions proposed to be made to the Republick of Holland, as before stated, will limit and restrain the lawful exertions, either of his majesty's ships, or of private ships of war, in making capture, in any future war with France. In case of a war with Spain, or with other maritime powers, the same arguments in many respects be applicable.

The letter was written by Lord Hawkesbury on "Dutch Treaty". It began as

Dear Sir, I sit down to state upon paper, as you desired, the arguments I urged the other day in conversation, and such others, as have since occurred to me, against the proposition of granting to the Dutch the privilege, which they wish to obtain, of being the carriers of the property of an enemy, whenever Great Britain shall be engaged in war; which privilege is proposed to be inserted in a treaty, called a commercial treaty, now under consideration.

When I wrote a discourse (ff 3v) on the rights of neutral nations, in time of war, more than two and thirty years ago, I then treated this subject principally as a question of right, adverting only occasionally, to the question of Policy: I mean to treat of it at present, merely as a question of Policy.

So many alterations have already been made, and so many others are now proposed to be made in the original project, on which the present negotiation is founded, that I find some difficulty in stating correctly, what is at present intended by either party, at least by the minister of Holland. The sense however, which I give to the propositions, as they now stand, is, as follows.

That the ships (ff 4r) belonging to the subjects of each of the contracting parties (Great Britain and Holland) shall have a right, when the other is at war, to carry to and from the ports of an enemy in Europe, all articles of merchandize, tho' they are the property of an enemy; and/likewise manner /in to carry from one port to another, belonging to the same enemy, and from the ports of one enemy, to the ports of another enemy, all articles of merchandise, tho' they are the property of an enemy.

(13)

(DIVISION OF PLUNDER MADE IN INDIA : 1756-7)

To
The Right Hon'ble William Pitt Esq,
one of his majesty's principal secretary of state

16 August 1757

Sir

In obedience to your commands signified to us by your letter of the 29 July last, acquainting us that the secret committee of the East India Company had requested you to assist them in an application to be made to His Majesty, for his approbation of the agreement made between his majesty's admiral and officers in India in regard to the division of any plunder, which may be made in India, and taken from the Moors, and the Company's governor and council at Fort St George; and that in consequence of such agreement, his majesty will be graciously pleased to grant to the Company the moiety of the booty, which was to be deposited, till his majesty's royal pleasure should be known; and in the (ff 14v) said letter inclosing the extracts delivered to you by the said committee; and further desiring that we will report to you, for his majesty's information, our opinion how far the king can comply with the Company's request.

We have taken the said agreement into our consideration, and have herewith returned all the said extracts. And we are humbly of opinion that this case does not, in any part of it, fall within the provisions made by the statute of the year 29th of his majesty's reign, for the encouragement of seamen, and for the more speedy and effectual manning of the navy); in as much as that law relating only to captures made in the present war between his majesty and the French King, and has no concern with the disputes and hostilities between the East India Company, and the Nabob of Bengal. It must therefore be judged of by general rules of law and his majesty's prerogative.

- (ff 15r) And we are of humble opinion,
1. That all such places as are retaken return to the old dominion; and ~~especially~~ consequently, that the town and settlement of Calcutta within the former territorial limits must be restored to the East India Company.
 2. That all such places as may be newly conquered in the expedition accrue the sovereign, and are vested in his majesty, by right of conquest.
 3. That with respect to the moveable goods, retaken, the property of all such, was altered by the capture, and totally lost to the original owners, after a possession by the enemy for a limited time; and consequently every thing within that description, belongs to his majesty, in whose name, and under whose protection, and by the assistance of whose fleet, the same is regained.

British Museum: Hardwicke Papers: Add Ms 35917: ff 14-5.
A final draft, with one or two additions, is on ff 16-7.

^a the portion within brackets is from the final draft.

4. That, by stronger reason all moveables and plunder (ff 15v) of every kind first taken and acquired from the enemy, either by land or sea, are vested in his majesty, subject to his power of disposing, by virtue of his known prerogative.

Upon these grounds, we concur in opinion, that his majesty, if he shall think fit in his royal wisdom, may comply with the Company's request.

(All which is submitted to your consideration.) ~~as~~

Aug 16, 1757

G. Hay
C. Pratt
C. Yerke

British Museum : Add Ms 35917

~~as~~ this sentence is from the final draft.

A further communication dated 31 Aug 1757 to W. Pitt acknowledges that "his majesty was graciously pleased to declare his intention of granting to the East India Company one moiety of the booty or plunder..."

(16)

Pewis House
Nov 11, 1757.

Sir,

I received the favour of your letter, dated from Calcutta the 23rd of February last, about the latter end of Sept, whilst I was in the country, and, at the same time, a journal of your proceedings in the expedition, carried on to the taking of Chandernager. I am highly obliged to you for this communication, and for the regard shewn to me in it; and I must heartily congratulate you on the important service you have done your king & and country, and the great honour you have acquired to yourself. You have, by the blessing of God, gained a compleat and most original victory over such a superiority of numbers, as sound prodigious to European ears, and thereby shewn what(our) English spirit and courage, under the direction of right conduct, is capable of performing. It was very happy also that you had the assistance of so able a sea officer as admiral Watson, who I find by your narrative, as well as from others, did his part extremely well. The amount you give of the () ~~loss~~ at Calcutta is surprising, since the loss of private property is valued at so great a sum as two million sterling.

(ff 104v) The services, which you have rendered to the East India Company, by the recovery of so considerable a settlement, and by the vengeance, which you have justly taken for the unprovoked injuries done them, can not fail to recommend you, in the strongest manner, to their favour and protection, without any other support. But, if any other were wanting, you may rest assured of my best assistance with the court of directors, or in any other place, where my good offices may be of use to you.

I wish I could, in return, send you an account of any success of our military operations, in this part of the world, equal to what you have obliged us with. But our misfortune is not being able to do this, does, by contrast set your ~~out~~ in the strongest light. You have my most earnest wishes for the () ~~success~~ of your life and health, and for the continuance of your good success for the (advantage) ~~success~~ of your country, and your own honour.

Since my coming to town, I have seen my old acquaintance, your father, who is very happy in the reputation his son has gained, and to whose application, for your success, I shall always wary.

I am, with the greatest esteem and truth,

Sir &c

Draft to Lt Col Clive

British Museum: Hardwicke Papers: Add Ms 35595: letter from Hardwicke to Clive. Clive's letter of 23,2,1757 to the Lord Chancellor, to which perhaps the above letter refers, is in Clive Papers (NLW) vol 201 pp 16-8. The reference in the last para to Clive's father's application, is perhaps, to the appointment of Governor Generalship, which Clive asked his father to canvass for him in his letter of 23 Feb 1757. (vol 201 pp 19-20) "king" added later "our" may not be right word ~~loss~~ illegible ~~loss~~ illegible ~~success~~ "advantage" crossed, altered

(17) British Prime Minister Newcastle to East India Company: 30.9.1757 ^{cc}

Newcastle House,
September 30, 1757.

Gentlemen,

The services lately performed by Colonel Clive, in the East Indies, at the hazard of his life, and with little or no benefit, (as I am informed) to his private fortune, will, I am persuaded, make it unnecessary for me to recommend him to the favour of gentlemen, who are always ready to reward merit. But as I have the pleasure of knowing Mr Clive, personally; and have a great regard for his father, I cannot, in justice to either, decline giving you this trouble, as a testimony of my good wishes, that some proper mark of approbation (p.) may be soon bestowed upon Col Clive, by so respectable a body, as the East India Company; which at the same time gives me an opportunity of assuring you of the great truth, and regard, with which I am, Gentlemen,

your most obedient, humble servant,

Holles Newcastle

Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Noted on back: "letter from His Grace the Duke of Newcastle recommending Col Clive to the Court's notice")

(18)

Clive to British Prime Minister Newcastle: 13.10.1761 ^{cc}

My Lord Duke

I just now learn from Mr Jones that your Grace is desirous of having my intended title in order to put a finishing hand to the honour His Majesty intends me through your Grace's interest.

Being in possession of an estate in Ireland of near 2000 per annum I have given orders to have it called Plassey the name of the place where we gained our last victory in India to which I owe all my good fortune. If therefore your Grace thinks there is no impropriety in the thing I propose (ff 66v) my title to be, Robert alias Lord Clive Baron of Plassey in the kingdom of Ireland. But this I submit as well as every thing else to your Grace being with the greatest respect,

Your Grace's most devoted and obliged humble servant,

Berkeley Square, 13 October 1761

Robert Clive.

^{cc} IOR:E/1/40; (1757) No 222 (A copy of this letter does not seem to be included in the corresponding volume of the Newcastle Papers (Add Ms 32874: 11.9 to 9.10.1757))

NOTE: This letter is evidently written after the receipt of the news of the capture of Calcutta by the British in Feb 1757. On this occasion Clive also personally conveyed the news to Newcastle through his letter dated 23.2.1757 (add Ms 32870). This letter concluded: "As I have already been honoured with your Grace's protection and favour I flatter myself with the continuance of it and that if your Grace thinks me deserving your Grace will recommend me to the Court of Directors". (ff216-7)

^{cc} BH: Add Ms 32685: ff 66r-v (Autographs 1714-61) ff 69.

(19)

Copy of An Article of Lord Clive's Letter to the Marquis of Rockingham, Calcutta September 6, 1766.

(ff 27r) That your lordship may have some idea how much the nation has at stake in Bengal, and how necessary it is we should have able managers both at home and abroad, I enclose you an abstract of the Company's receipts and disbursements, for one year, in the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa. And I do assure your lordship, the treasure received is neat and clear of all deductions. Neither do I see, under able conductors, the least appearance of any considerable interruption in the receipt of our revenues, for some years to come. (ff 29v-30r)

A STATE OF THE COMPANIES REVENUES FOR THE YEAR 1766

<u>Receipts</u>		<u>Disbursements</u>	
Bengal	Current Rs 1,86,76,908	King's Tribute	Current Rs 30,16,000: £ 351,866-13
Behar	67,43,040	Nabob's Allowance	41,76,000: £ 487,200
Gun Lands etc (also customs & others)	64,89,000	Company's Expen ses, Civil & Mil	£ 980,000 £ 1,819,066-13
C.Rs	3,39,08,948	Neat Balance Brought to the Company's Credit	£ 2,136,977-5
	23,956,043-18		£ 3,956,043-18

(110)

Substance of A Late Conversation held by the E of Chatham: ff41-2
(unengaged except by transcription)

Clarendon September 7, 1766.

... (ff 41v) ... That his plan of conduct should be upon the principles of the last administration, the not with the same persons.

That the two great objects, which required the early meeting of the parliament, were, the East Indies and America. He did not enter into any particulars about either; but did not seem to apprehend any difficulties about them.

(111)

Newcastle to Lord Hardwicke: September 13, 1766
(ff 70r-v; Extract)

... The parliament was to sit at the beginning of November; which, I see, is now fixed for the 11th.

I know nothing of what is doing, or intended (ff 70F) to be done. I know, my lord Chatham said to a friend of mine, that the two great objects, which required the meeting of the parliament, early, were the East Indies, and America. But his lordship did not explain himself upon either.

BN: Add Ms 32977 (3.9. to 20.11.1766): Ff 75r-v has a letter to Lord Grantham similar to the one to Hardwicke. There are various other references to this topic and interest in the E. Indies. ff 17-26 and 51-5 is from Bengal General Letters.

(1.9) [Duplicate =

of Walter
on Pg 13J.

Clive to Rockingham : 6.9.1766 (extract, last but one para)

That your lordship may have some idea how much the nation has at stake in Bengal, and how necessary it is we should have able managers both at home and abroad, I enclose you an abstract of the Company's receipts and disbursements for one year in the provinces of Bengal, and Bahar and Orissa and I do assure your lordship the treasure received is neat and clear of all deductions, neither do I see under able conductors the least appearance of any considerable interruption in the receipt of our revenues for some years to come.

(Abstract of receipts and disbursements) Accounts 1766 cc

<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Disbursements</u>
Bengal £ 2,178,972 - 12	King's tribute £ 351,866- 13
Bahar 786,688	Nabob's allowance 487,200
Later 990,383 - 6	Company's Expenses 980,000
acquisitions	(same)
	£ 1,819,066- 13
	Nett Balance to the Co's credit 2,136,977- 5
£ 3,956,043 - 18	£ 3,956,043- 18

(1.12) =

Goo Mosen to Marquis of Rockingham: 2.3.1767 ccce

Buxton Dury
March 2, 1767.

My Lord

As the ocean of riches flowing into the East India Company's treasury from Bengal may dazzle and make small streams althe rich, glide unnoticed and unheeded, the Company's acquisitions on the coast of Coromandel may possibly be unknown to your lordship, I have therefore taken the liberty to state them, and the means by which they became possessed of them, leaving to your lordship to decide on their right, and am with most profound respect
your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant
Goo: Mosen

Goo Mosen to Marquis of Rockingham: 5.3.1767 ccce

(acknowledges Rockingham's reply and would wait on the Marquis 'tomorrow at 11 A.M.)

to Lord Mansfield: 21.8.1768 cccecc

...Their scheme is to force the East India Company to pay for every thing; viz towards the supplies for the current service of the year, and, I dare say, no inconsiderable sum, for the discharge of the king's civil list debt. They are making the necessary enquiries into the profits of the acquisitions of the East India Company, in order to dispose of them, as they please. They assert the undoubted right of the crown to all the acquisitions and conquests of the E.I.Co. They seem to go roundly to

(1.13)

Rockingham to Charles Turner : 7.4. 1772 (?)

Extract

...I expect no success, but it will afford some satisfaction to see right and proper efforts continued to be made to check the court views, (p) on the East India business. Unfortunately many things combine to further, and promote the court views in that matter. It is useful to the court, that there should be a general prejudice against Nabobs. The East India directors, and the ministry join in proving the misconduct, and rapaciousness of the East India Company's servants in India. The ministry will proceed to show the inability, or even perhaps the iniquity of some of the East India Juncture directors at home, and then will expatiate on the necessity of something being done, to remedy the grievances, and to save so important an object/the /to country. The result will naturally be, that Parliament is the Ministry must take the super direction of the East India Company's affairs. The lucrative offices, and appointments relating to the East India Company's affairs, will virtually fall into the patronage of the crown. Such an addition to the ways and means of corruption, which is at least equal to all the appointments of the crown in army, navy and revenue, church etc must be felt, when already what the crown possesses in patronage has nearly over-balanced the boasted equipage of this constitution, which consisted in the equality, and independence of the three separate estates, of king, lords, and commons. The danger to the constitution is imminent, I fear unavoidable. Charles the First and his ministers (p) had not the advantage of a diffusive patronage to create influence, and therefore strove to create a high undefined prerogative in the crown.

(1.14)

Rockingham to William Dowdeswell:

cc

...If the comparison would hold between the Company and the Publick, as between landlord and tenant I should say, that tenants who to divide annually among themselves 3 or 400,000 £ occasioned 12 or 1,300,000 £ to be paid into the landlord's treasury, were surely well deserving of faveur.

Sheffield City Libraries: Fitzwilliam MSS: Rockingham Papers: R 1/1402. Prime Minister of
The Marquis of Rockingham was England from
cc - R 1/1415 (2 copies, 6 pages)

(115)

Sir M. Fetherstone to Duke of Newcastle on Indian News: 19.6.1767

18

Friday Night, 10 O'Clock

My Lord,

Though your Grace will hear tomorrow all the letters, and the you have likewise talked with Mr Walsh and learnt from him the intelligence that is come; yet in compliance with your Grace's request, I have wrote these few lines to inform you that the news which is come by the Cruttenden, is the greatest that the most sanguine could wish; that all the debts owing by the Company in India are paid; that all the investments are made, and yet near £ 600,000 are left in the treasury. That the Nabob of Gude's debt is paid, which was called rotten by Lord Camden among other articles; that the country is in a state of the utmost tranquility; subordination restored; the Marattas quelled, and sent home; Lord Clive says he (ff 357v) shall leave the Government in the hands of a person (Mr Verelst) who is most upright and every way deserving of it. Lord Clive is out of danger and coming home in the Britannia. Jaffier Aly Cawn left by will 5 lacs to Lord Clive for his conduct, bravery &c in India. Lord Clive (according to the covenants entered into) would not accept it, but has generously given it for a fund for the widows and orphans &c of the officers of the army; and has got the Nabob to add 3 lacs to it, which makes in all £ 100,000; and will produce there an income of £ 8,000 per annum for the charity. In short your Grace will find (mixed with great good news), such a scene of, practices committed by some of the servants, that wanted to be washed white, that will astonish you as I hear. And that the (ff 358r) officers who are come or coming home have merited, what I hope they will find here, the indignation that must arise in good minds at bad intentions.

I am my lord your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,
Matthew Fetherstone(hough)

P.S. I write this as well from private letters come, as from those your Grace will hear tomorrow.

Note on News from India (following Letter from Rockingham): 26.6.1767

7.

(ff 371r) By the letters received the debts in India appear to be all satisfied, the investments to be all made and yet near 600,000 £ left in the treasury in Bengal. The Nabob of Gude's debt paid, the Country in the utmost tranquility and the Marattas quelled. So that the whole riches arrived in the Cruttenden supposed to be near a million; and the effects of all the Company's other ships that are daily expected, must amount to a sum equal to all their simple contract debts at home.

Letter to Duchess of Newcastle: 19.6.1767
(ff 359r)

Newcastle House, June 19, 1767
Madam Eight O'clock.

My Lord Duke is just come from the House of Lords; and, it is with the greatest pleasure, I acquaint your Grace, that he is extremely well, and very happy. The House of Lords is adjourned to Monday next; and his Grace proposes to be at Claremont, early tomorrow. The ship (Cruttenden), so long expected from the East Indies, is arrived, and has brought very great news, from Lord Clive, of the prosperous state of the Company's affairs; which will afford a very strong argument, to shew the impropriety of the Bill now depending in the House of Lords.

My Lord Duke sends his kindest compliments to your Grace; and I am, with the highest respect, Madam, your Grace's dutiful
humble servant, Thos Hurdie

BMSAdd Ms 32982 (Newcastle Correspondence 18.5. to 30.6.1767; ff 462)
This volume has much correspondence on the 1767 India Bill.

(1.16)

J.Z.Holwell to E.I.Co forwarding(His Explanatory Memoranda): Jan 1766
No 3
Sir

The enclosed letter to the Court of Directors transmitted to me by Governor Holwell he desired me to present to the hon'ble Board (?) thro your hands. I request therefore in his name that you will lay it before the Court the first opportunity.

I am &c
 Your most obedient servant
 W. Birch, Norfolk Street

To Mr Secretary James
 at the India House
 January 21, 1766.

(No 5 'A-4', 16 pp, is the enclosure referred to. The back of the last sheet is headed "Memorial of J.Z.Holwell Esq vindicating his former publication in August last relative to Bengal Affairs: consideration: Committee of Correspondence: Read in 29 Jan 1766")

No 4

Sir

As the subject of Governor Holwell's letter to the Court of Directors is of no small importance to the Company it is probable that most if not all the directors may be desirous of having a copy of their own use. To prevent the trouble of taking /for so many manuscript copies of so long a letter Mr Holwell directed me to get it printed and to send 24 impressions for the use of the Board. Accompanying this you will receive 24 carefully printed off which with Mr Holwell's compliments he desires you will present to the hon'ble Court.

Jany 24, 1766.
 Norfolk Street

I am Sir
 Your most obedient servant
 William Birch

IOR:E/1/48: Letters received in 1766. The printed version is available at T 11322. (20pages)

(1.17)

Goneshandass's Evidence about Hindoos Going Out to Sea: 18.6.1773

Then Goneshandass was asked:

Question: Do you think Hindoomar would come to England?

Answer: Without force he can't come, because it is contrary to the laws of his religion, he being a Bramin. It is contrary to the religion of the Hindoos to come to England - the consequence would be losing their cast; but by paying money and doing penance at their return they would regain it. - I am a Hindoo.

Question: Is a Hindoo deemed infamous for quitting his country?

Answer: It is contrary to the law, but he recovers himself by penalty and penance.

Question: Did you ever know any instance of Hindoos who lost their cast by going upon the sea, who afterwards regained it?

Answer: I never heard of a Hindoo going upon the sea out of my country, but from the coast of Malabar they go very frequently, and are not affected by it. (p 550)

Question: Do they go long voyages?

Answer: I don't know, but they do go upon the sea.

Question: Do any but the sailor cast go?

Answer: Yes - some others - I don't know what, for I never was in that country.

Fifth Report from Committee (House of Commons) 18.6.1773: (as reprinted in Vol 3 of the 'Reprinted Reports' relating to the 18th century.)

Note: Vol 5 (pp 39-40, 2cols) contains the evidence of 'Honwuntrow' an ambassador of the Marathas, a Brahmin, in London in 1781, on

the above with a detailed account of his journey through India.

(118)

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FORMER AND PRESENT STATE OF
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY : 24 NOVEMBER 1772

(p 7) ... One thing however is certain, that aggrandised as we are, we can nevertheless without ceasing to be at all. The Company's civil servants in India, the free merchants and other British subjects who are allowed inhabitancy are not less than 2000. The military black and white about 65,000 of which 10,000 are Europeans. Our possessions are more extensive than France and Spain united. The inhabitants who may now be called (p 8) subjects not fewer than 20 millions and the revenues little short of six million sterling per annum under proper management. Such is the state to which we are risen.

(p 12) ... The East India Company having from merchants become in a manner sovereign, is of itself a sufficient argument for a new formation of their constitution. That such a measure should immediately take place will be obvious if we consider the situation of affairs at the present moment particularly in Bengal.

(p 16) ... The increase of expence is another very serious matter. It has arisen from various causes. It can't proceed merely from the pay of officers (p 17) and men on the military and civil establishments; that expence is fixed and certain. But the contingent bills of contractors, commissaries, engineers etc are without bounds and they seem also to be without control.

(p 19) ... The system of government both at home and abroad ought to be strengthened in proportion to the increase of weight and importance which are to be supported. That the necessary alteration (p 20) should first take place at home is evident. If we consider only that all the power and authority for acting abroad, are delegated from here and that upon the wisdom, uniformity and stability of the orders of the court of directors depends the foundation of good government in the different settlements in India.

The 24 directors should be impartially chosen for their abilities, resolution and disinterestedness.

To give efficacy to their power they should continue in office 7, 5 or at least 3 years.

To prevent self interest from gaining ascendancy over that of the public, they should be bound by the severest penalties that can be inflicted by charter or act of parliament not to have (p 21) any concern directly or indirectly in buying or selling East India Stock or in any article of the India trade; and as a gratification for their trouble, I think the chairman should have £ 1500 per annum, the deputy £ 1000 and the other directors £ 750 each.

These salaries can not be thought too much for gentlemen who will pay due attention to the business, and act with integrity, and the expence to the Company is not worth mentioning.

The qualification of a director may stand as at present because only men of large fortune (who may perhaps be too indolent to accept such an office of business or attendance) can afford to tie up a mere considerable part of their property. But I would have no man be entitled to vote at the (p 22) election of directors or upon any other question who has not £ 1000 capital East India Stock bona fide in his own right, and who has not been in possession of the said stock six calendar months. This increase of the qualification of voters is absolutely necessary to destroy or at least to check the practice of creating temporary proprietors.

IOR: HOME MISC 211: pp 1-66: (by Robert Clive)

The directors of the first 7, 5 or 3 years nomination, as may be fixt by charter, should have power to fix up all vacancies that may happen in the direction by death or resignation, by ballot among themselves.

After the term of the first nomination is expired, the proprietors should elect by the qualification as mentioned.

It should not be in the power (p 23) of a general court to dismiss any director of the first nomination without consent of parliament, but after that term the privilege of a general court in that aspect may be exercised as under the present charter.

The court of directors ought to have absolute power over the servants abroad both civil and military. The proprietors should not be allowed to interfere in any of the appointments or dismissals; in short all orders to be sent abroad should be left to their sole management. The proprietors however should have a right to call upon them annually for a state of receipts and disbursements and even to interpose in general when there is reason to suspect that the directors are taking impulsive or venal steps.

The court of directors should have the power of resolving themselves as occasion may require into a secret committee consisting as formerly of the chairman, (p 24) deputy chairman and three other members of the direction for the conducting of political and military affairs only. The committee of correspondence is so numerous that administration will not in all cases communicate to them their sentiments and views with regard to the East Indies and I believe that in the conduct of his majesty's affairs not near that number of the privy council are usually consulted or let into the secret of any great enterprise.

The nomination of the 24 directors for the first term of 7, 5 or 3 years should be by the king or the parliament and ever after by the proprietors.

Such ~~assemblies~~ a court of directors being formed and invested by charter and act of parliament with full powers to enforce their orders, the next step must be to appoint a governor and council general (p 25) and that they may have no incitement or temptation to a breach of integrity, their rewards should be ample. The appointment of the governor general should be 20,000 £ per annum clear of all deductions. The expence of his table and ensigns of honour to be defrayed by the Company. The rest of the council general should have £ 10,000 each and £ 5,000 each for a table and all other expences and they should be shut out as far as laws and oaths can bind them from any other emoluments or advantages whatsoever.

(p 32) I conclude that with proper management of India affairs at home and abroad, a considerable surplus will (p 33) annually accrue. The surplus, be it from trade, or revenue, shall belong to the Company, and to Government, in the following proportion: viz, one third to the Company, and two thirds to Government.

The Company's one third of the surplus, to be applied, in the first instance, to discharge the debts and not to an increase of dividends. It should also be applied towards establishing a fund to answer emergencies.

If it should be thought that this degree of participation may render the court of directors inattentive to the interest of the nation in the matter of the surplus, it may be settled by act of parliament that two of the directors shall, upon every election, be nominated by the king on the part of Government, and that these two directors shall be members of all committees at the India House, but be absolutely exempt from filling any of the chairs.

(p 34) A measure of this kind may be necessary as a check in the hands of Government against any great abuses, and I think the method here proposed will be more constitutional than the appointment of a controlling power in the hands of a secretary of state or any other person.

All these great preliminaries being settled, the next point which I would recommend is the recruiting of the army. The method hitherto pursued by the Company is most infamous, and attended with so many disadvantages that we can never be supplied with a sufficient number of good men. I hope therefore, that parliament will still enable them to adopt the plan I proposed so long ago as the year 1764 unless a better can be devised. (p 35) I mean that a regiment (the Company in one shape or other bearing the whole expence) should be kept up in England, from whence might be drafted both officers and men for service in India. The attempt made in the year 1770 for an act of parliament, for this purpose, failed, but I do not recollect that any unanswerable objections were raised to the general plan.

...The importance of Bombay (p 36) is known to consist in its docks. If any accident should happen to us there Batavia is the nearest place where any ship of war could be repaired and even that convenience would depend upon the courtesy of the Dutch, or perhaps, the French, who will never scruple to exert their influence when it can serve their purpose, and when they are strong enough to enforce it.

(p 37) ... It may seem unnecessary at this time to dwell upon the expediency of having a squadron in the East Indies, as Government has already supplied the Company with that protection. But I hope the prospect of peace which is now happily returned, will not occasion a recall of his majesty's ships.

(38) ... Arguments have been urged in parliament, against the present size of the Company's ships but I am of opinion they ought to be still larger. The time may come, when Government may not be able to afford a considerable squadron to protect the East Indies. It is (p 39) therefore incumbent upon parliament to permit the Company to be prepared to do something in their own defence. The court of directors from self interested motives have been in ... to employ a much greater number than necessary. The number may very well be reduced to 60, but many of them should be 70 gun ships. Such a force aided by a few of the king's men of war would render the Company invincible at sea in the East Indies.

(p 40) Such are my ideas of those political points which require the assistance of the king and parliament. I shall now deliver my sentiments in a few words upon one subject which relates to the interior government of India. *

(46) ... All accounts agree that she has not less than 10,000 Europeans at the islands. The islands are understood to be merely a place of refreshment for the French Company's ships going to and returning from India. St Helena to us answers the like purpose. ... 500 would undoubtedly be a compleat garrison for the Mauritius. (p 47) All beyond that number must be a dead expence to the crown of France, and can be designed for no other purpose than that of embracing the first opportunity of conveying them to Pondicherry and disputing with us the empire of the East. Should she succeed she will be in the actual receipt of near six million sterling, as we might be at present if we chose to put the Carnatic on the same footing as Bengal, which sooner or later must be done. Our East India Company as I have before observed, keep up an army of 65,000 men of which 10,000 only are effective Europeans. France will have as large an army, with

* Here proceeds a discussion of a judicial arrangement, £2000 being earned by wretches who knew nothing of law, need of Attorney General etc.

this difference, that having plenty of money and no want of men, she may keep up the proportion of 20,000 Europeans and 40,000 natives. If she be not satisfied with what she takes from us, she will have it in her power to over run all Indostan. But if she does not wish to extend her possessions she may lay the richest provinces under contribution and carry home some part of these (p 48) immense treasures which for centuries past have been finding their way into Indostan, for Nadir Shah did not drain India so much but that great treasure still remains for the next conquerors. The Dutch possessions will also fall an easy prey to France. ☺

(p 51) ... Let us cast our eyes upon the map, and trace the coast from Cape Comorin the southern point of Indostan, to Cuttack and Balasore. From Cape Comorin to Nellore is the Carnatic, absolutely under our influence, nor is there any power within 200 miles of the sea coast, capable of giving assistance to the French except Hyder Ally. From Nellore to beyond the northern provinces, (p 52) which extend north east as far as Ganjam there is no power within 150 miles of the sea capable of assisting the French materially except the Subah of the Deccan, for I put the Rajahs and petty chiefs out of the question, since they may be too closely watched to have an opportunity of doing mischief. To the northward of Ganjam begins the Marratta country, which reaches along the coast to Cuttack and Ballasore, from whence we enter the Bengal territories, extending north west to the Comamirassa (?), which is the boundary between us and Sujah Dowla. Through the whole of this last space, there is no power within 600 miles of the sea from whom the French can receive any sort of supply except the Marrattas, who are however at a considerable distance from the coast.

My principle ever was to use every means in my power to render (p 53) our great acquisitions permanent. For this purpose I looked forward beyond the time of my own Government considering a French war an event that must happen. I encouraged Mr Palk to request and I accordingly obtained a grant of the northern provinces, and when the grant was obtained I urged him to take possession of them. From the same motive I wished to see Hyder Ally crushed, proceeding as I have long done, that he is the ladder by which the French will take attain the summit of their ambition in India. ... It was also from the same motive that I entered into a treaty with the Marrattas for Cuttack, and could I have been remained in Bengal another year, we should have been in compleat possession (p 54) of the sea coast from the Bay of Bengal to Cape Comorin.

(p 56) One of my first objects should be Hyder Ally. To counteract the French I would offer him almost any terms; and if they proved ineffectual I would immediately take into pay a large body of Marrattas who are at any time to be bought for a sum of money. In order to be prepared against these emergencies and to be ready in every respect to conduct a war with vigor, I will hope that at Bengal not less than (p 57) 100 lacs, and at Madras a sum not less than 50 lacs of rupees will be lodged in the treasury, agreeably to the plan lately proposed by Mr Verelst.

☺ Here a discussion begins about marines.

(1.19)

HINTS OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (cir
1772)

Fundamental Maxim

That as our influence and possessions were acquired, so they must be maintained by Force; and that the Princes of the country are only to be kept in order by fear.

1. The French can never attack Bengal directly. They must begin upon the coast, and be supported by a league with some powerful country prince.

2. The Subah of the Deccan, be he who he may, must, at all events, be supported against the Mopattas.

3. On the same principle, the peace with Sujah Dewla must be religiously observed.

4. General care must be taken to preserve a balance of power among the country princes.

5. The Morattoes, whom we are to consider as the most formidable power of India, are not to be resisted by a defensive war. As it is impossible to force such a body of light cavalry to a decisive action, the only way is to enter their country, and attack their capital. To keep them quiet by money is only increasing their power, and encouraging them to raise their demands.

6. To entertain dissension between the two great chiefs of the Morattoes, Janagee and Ramrajah or Nanah.

7. We should not attempt to extend our possessions (p 38) on the coast. Nothing should be taken from the Subah of the Deccan, and Hyder Nag's acquisitions should be restored to the original possessors. In the case of war, our indemnification to be received in money not lands.

8. We cannot be less than we are, without ceasing to be at all.

9. All rights of sovereignty and allegiance being confounded among the inferior princes, who have set up for themselves, it is highly improbable that the natives should ever unite against us under one head; and as long as we are able to pay our black troops, and use them well, we are secure of their attachment.

10. No distant conquest to be made without the assistance of the natives.

Present Establishment for Bengal:

6 Battalions of Europeans	}	Exclusive of Officers	3,400
4 Co. of Artillery			
300 black cavalry			
32 Battalions of Sepoys	}		25,900
			<hr/>
			29,300

of whom 11,200 are employed in overseeing the collection of the Revenues.

NB. Every Brigade ?) of sepoys is composed of Mahometans and Gentoos, who are irreconcilable; and no black officer is intrusted with the command even of 100 men. (39)

11. Infantry the natural defence of Bengal; and in this our chief force must of necessity consist.

IOR: Francis Papers: Ms. Eur. E. 12: From Clive Papers received from Henry Strachey: Note: This document is probably the one written by R. Clive himself and sent to Strachey on 7.11.1772 "a sketch of my ideas which I flatter myself might be carried into

12. The fortifications of Calcutta useless with respect to dominion. When we are unable to keep the field, all is lost.
13. To employ fewer ships, of greater force, to act as men of war.
14. The importance of Bombay consists in its docks, and Batavia is the nearest place, where ships of way can be repaired. For want of such a place as Bombay, the French were undone in the last war. Bombay considerable as a check to the Marattas.
15. Necessity of a fleet to watch the French.
16. Necessity of maintaining a Nabob, both at Bengal and in the Carnatic, as well for the forms of internal Government, as to serve for an authority to check the other European powers.
17. War the inevitable ruin of trade and revenue, when most successful.
18. In 1766, it was Lord Clive's determination, if the Marattas entered Bengal, to make the Brigades act separately.
19. Nothing the Marattas of the Deccan dread so much as an alliance between us and Nizam Ally; and this is the only method to them quiet. (p 40)
20. Supposing ourselves embarked in war with the Marattas, with the Subah of the Deccan, and with Hyder Ally at the same time, Bombay ought to cooperate with the plan upon the coast, be it what it may. From Bonbay an impression might be made on the Maratto country, and their capitals Poona and Sitalah attacked.
21. The chief strength of the Marattas is horse; the chief strength of Hyder Ally is infantry, cannon, and small arms. From the one we have nothing to apprehend but ravages; from the other extirpation.
22. Mohammed Reza Cawn, his diligence, disinterestedness, and abilities exceed those of any other Mussulman I have yet seen.
- Mem. Copy of Lord Clive's Letter to the Select Committee at Fort William, dated 7th January 1767, viz:
1. The dignity of the Nabob to be supported.
 2. The territorial jurisdiction still to rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under the Nabob and our Presidency in conjunction.
 3. Not to increase the Revenue, unless you can in proportion increase your investments; as the supply of silver must either lie dead in the treasury or be exported.
 4. Our possessions to be bounded by the provinces; to avoid war, and banish all thought of a march to Delhi.
 5. To discourage Sujah Bowla from attacking his neighbours, or marching to Delhi. (p 41)
 6. To cultivate the friendship of Janacee, and agree to pay him a Ghout of 16 Lacks, on condition of that he appoints the Company Zemindar of the Balasore and Cuttack countries. We should then have a free passage between Bengal and Madras. Force not to be attempted.
 7. Divisions to be kept up among all the other powers.
 8. As long as any of our forces remain in the king's or Sujah Bowla's dominions, Illahabad must be garrisoned by us; and if at any time they should call upon us for our assistance, we are never to grant it, without having Illahabad, Chunar, or some other fortress put into our hands.
 9. The greatest care to be taken in the choice of field officers. Seniority must here give place to distinguished merit, nor should the commission of Major be ever bestowed upon a man, to whom the command of a Brigade could not soon after be intrusted.

10. No less care to be taken to keep the military in subjection, and to reserve the power of dismissing any officer, without waiting for the sentence of a court martial.
11. The reformations proposed by the Committee of Inspection to be strenuously enforced; and never relax in the discipline of the civil branch.
12. All the Company's servants, free merchants &c (except those fixed at the subordinates and necessarily employed in the silk business) to be recalled from the out-factories and / (942) Aurungs and confined to Calcutta. is sine qua non. Their numbers to be gradually reduced.
13. All vagabonds to be apprehended and sent to Europe.
14. To check the ruinous and vain expence of fortifications.
15. The only method is to perform all public works by contract.
16. Debate or difference of opinion in Council to be carefully concealed from the public.
22. Chief strength of Abdalla consists in Horse. To endeavour therefore to bring him to action, (in case he should invade Bengal) in an inclosed country, on our side of the Sone, and as near as possible to the Ganges. Not to buy him off, but in the last necessity.
23. Unity of authority in the person of the Governor to be as much as possible preserved in the eyes of the people. He should take an annual tour thro the country as Supervisor General.
24. To ascertain the true value of the Company's own lands.
25. Writers should be considered merely as apprentices for five years, and not allowed any mercantile indulgence whatsoever. (p 43)
26. The black officers of the sepoys must rise from the ranks. Men of family and influence are deterred by this circumstance from entering into the service. These officers are therefore entirely our creatures, and will never desert a people, among whom alone they can have any power; for no acquired discipline will give weight to a mean man sufficient to bring to the Field an army of Indians. (Bow. 2. 403)
27. Opening a communication between the Northern Circars and Bengal must prove mutually advantageous to the two settlements.
28. The true and only security for our commerce and territorial possessions in this country, is, in a manner, to have it always in our power to overawe the very Nabob we are bound by treaty to support. (Clive. July 1765)
29. Bengal, like other subjected provinces, must yield its tribute; but experience will inculcate the necessity of moderating our demands, that the country may be long enabled to continue the payment. If the directors will, for the future, be contented with an annual investment not exceeding five or six hundred thousand pounds, and discontinue entirely the exportation of silver from Bengal, the foreign trade of that country may again revive. (Verelst)
- 103)
- NOTE: Some of the above hints must have got modified or even reversed as time passed. Some others must also have been added from this period to 1860. One such added by Cornwallis, and steadfastly adhered to, except with one or two temporary exceptions, was about the selection of the Governor General himself. This was: that he should be a man of rank and so strongly Cornwallis felt about it that on hearing of Shore's appointment to Governor Generalship (whom he had known as an able subordinate) he observed, "I should as a public man have been much better pleased to have delivered over my charge in August next to a stranger of a certain rank and character with very inferior talents. . . I will explain more fully when we meet." (to H. Dundas 7.3.1793)

(1.20)

Chatham to Shelburne: 24.5.1773
(Extract: Vol 4:pp 264-5)

I always conceived that there is in substantial justice a mixed right to the territorial revenues between the state and the Company, as joint captors: the state equitably entitled to the larger share, as largest contributor in the acquisition, by fleet and men, &c. Nor can the Company's share, when ascertained, be considered as private property, but in trust for the public purposes of the defence of India and the extension of trade, never in any case to be portioned out in dividends to the extinction of the spirit of trade.

Chatham to Shelburne: 17.7.1773
(Extract: Vol 4:283-5)

Nothing can be more flattering to my mind, or make me happier, than to know that, in principle, your lordship and I entirely agree on this most important subject. The interference of parliament is unquestionably necessary; and the right of parliament to interfere is, by the whole tenor of the constitution, self evident. India must be reformed, or lost. Force and rapine will not secure and defend it; but justice and force will; equal, open, independent justice, administered by real judges, who have no masters to serve, but God and their conscience. As to territorial revenues, (p 285) they should go between the Company and the public, in due proportions. If the crown is to seize them, through the medium of the House of Commons, there is an end to the shadow of liberty. English kings would become Moguls; rich, splendid, weak; gold would be fatally substituted in the place of trade, industry, liberty and virtue. We shall have conquered ourselves, when we might, by a wise use of victory, have lastingly established true, national felicity on the ruins of the name of Bourbon. But heaven avert these forebodings!

(1.21)

William Beckford to W. Pitt: Fonthill, Sept 11, 1758
(Extracts: Vol I: 352-4)

France is our object, perfidious France: reduce her power, and Europe will be at rest. This cannot be done in any other way than by destroying those resources from whence she draws money to bribe Germany and the northern powers against their own interest.

I mentioned in my last an attempt to the southwards which I am sure will succeed under a wise and active general, one who shall not delight in calling councils of war — such an one as Amherst has shewn himself. Whatever is attempted in that climate must be done uno impetu; a general must fight his men off directly, and not give them (time) to die by drink and disease; which has been the case in all our southern expeditions, as I can testify by my own experience, having been a volunteer in the last war. The isle I mentioned has but one town of strength: take that, and the whole country is yours; all the inhabitants must submit for want of food, for they live from hand to mouth, and have not victuals to support themselves and numerous slaves for one month, without a foreign supply. The negroes and stock of that island are worth above four million sterling, and the conquest (p 354) easy; as I can explain, when I have the pleasure of seeing you. For God's sake, attempt it without delay and noise.

1.22

(REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AS THE NOMINAL INSTRUMENT FOR GOVERNING INDIA)cir 1780

The territorial acquisitions and revenues in the possession of the East India Company are the most fertile source of wealth which at present belong to Great Britain. The commercial advantage derived from these possessions are prodigious. The sailors and shipping employed by means of this trade are great foundation of our naval power. The revenue arising from the duties imposed on the various articles imported from the East Indies makes a considerable part of the present income of Government; add to all this that Government did for some time enjoy, and is now entitled again to enjoy, a considerable annual revenue arising from the profits derived from the trade and revenues of the Company considered (ff 64 v) jointly; for these two objects in the present state of things can hardly be separated. Without the territorial revenues the Company could hardly trade to any profit. These revenues enable the Company to purchase their investments. On the other hand without the trade no part of the territorial revenues could be remitted to this country. For it is idle to suppose that any considerable sum in cash could be sent from thence, as there are no mines of gold and silver in the country, and as it has but little commerce at present except with us. The cash of it would soon be exhausted, and the country thereby impoverished if we were to attempt to remit the revenues of it in specie. The extent of all these advantages is very particularly set forth in the third report of the Secret Committee on the affairs of the East India Company which sat (ff 65 r) about seven years ago. Some have carried these speculations very far on the revenue which this country may draw from these territorial acquisitions and revenues and raised the expectations of the Publick such higher on this subject than I can venture to do. I have little doubt however that if the affairs of the Company were under tolerable management, the Publick and Company might at an average divide a sum to the amount of £ 800,000 annually being the profits which it is possible in my opinion to derive from the joint concern of revenue and commerce and to realize every year in England.

About eight years ago the Company thro their own ill management were in the most extreme distress, and almost in a state of bankruptcy. It was at that time that the (ff 65 v) Secret Committee before mentioned was constituted, who examined very minutely into the affairs of the Company and by their advice and in consequence of reports made by them, his majesty and the Parliament took such effectual measures as have not only relieved the Country from Company from their distress, but have established their affairs on a more prosperous and permanent footing than they ever stood on before. The Publick then lent the Company £ 1,400,000 to pay off such debts as required immediate payment; they consented to forego their share of the profits till such time as the £ 1,400,000 then lent was discharged, and that the Company had paid off so much of their annual bond debt as would reduce it to £ 1,500,000. Parliament made also at the same time many excellent

British Museum: Liverpool Papers: Add Ms 36404:
Bots, seemingly, by the 1 Earl of Liverpool, then
Hon'ble Mr Jenkins and a member of Government. /North
A rough draft is on ff 57-63.

regulations (ff 66 r) for the future government of the Company; All these measures had so beneficial an effect that in less than five years a period much shorter than many thought would be necessary, the Company paid off the £ 1,400,000 before mentioned and reduced their bond debt to £ 1,500,000 enjoying during this interval a dividend first of 6% afterwards of 7%, and they are now in the enjoyment of a dividend of 8% the the Publick do not at present receive their share of the profits to which of right they ought to have returned as soon as the Company had reduced their bond debt in manner before mentioned and began to receive again a dividend of 8%.

Lord North has tried in (ff 66 v) vain, during the last two years, to bring the Company to some reasonable agreement; the court of directors or the court of proprietors have in their turn rejected some part or other of the propositions which his lordship thinks necessary and by keeping the business in suspense they derive this advantage that they continue in possession of every thing, and it is evident from what has passed that they will never come to any reasonable agreement with Government but will keep things in the present situation, unless they are by some means or other compelled to it.

It is proper further to observe that the right of the East India Company to their exclusive trade, was determinable on the 25th of March (ff 67 r) 1780 on three years notice, which has not yet been received. The Company have a perpetual right, not only to continue as a company but also to trade to the East Indies.

The only measures which Government can pursue in order to bring this business to a settlement are either to take the territorial acquisitions and revenues into their own hands and manage them themselves, or, to establish a new company giving to them the management of these territorial acquisitions and revenues.

If neither of these measures are advisable, no other remains to be taken but that Parliament proceeding legislatively should oblige the present Company to continue in the management of (ff 67 v) the territorial acquisitions and revenues upon such conditions and under such regulations as appear to them to be reasonable and proper.

As far as I am hitherto informed, my opinion is, that the Government should not take the management of these acquisitions into their own hands, but should leave them in the hands of the Company, reforming and altering the Government of the Company so as to make it more fit than it is at present for the management of such a concern.

My reasons against taking the management into the hands of Government are as follows:

First I have never seen any plan to my satisfaction, by which (ff 68 r) these acquisitions can be properly transferred from the Company to the Government or by which they are likely to be managed in a better manner than they may be by the Company, provided the government of it be amended and made subject to the superintendance of

and frequent control of the legislature.

Secondly The change itself would be very difficult and even dangerous in the present moment, when we have a rebellion in our colonies, a foreign war, and many other difficulties to contend with.

Thirdly The Government of these acquisitions and the commerce carried on in them are from the nature of the people greatly connected, and the (ff 68 v) manner of remitting any part of the revenue of these acquisitions to which the Publick may be entitled, is still more nearly connected with the general trade of the Company: so that the I do not absolutely say, that these objects can not be separated, I think it more wise and more politic to keep them in some degree united.

Fourthly I am violently against pledging the revenues and substance of this country for the security of these acquisitions, in return for any advantage by way of revenue that may be derived from them; and yet this must be the case, if the Government take the management of them into their own hands.

Fifthly I think that the errors which must be committed in the management of such acquisition (ff 69 r) at so great a distance from the seat of Government, had better fall upon the directors of the Company, than fall directly upon the ministry of the king, who in the midst of the difficulties, that at present surround them, and of the calumnies, to which they are necessarily subject, can hardly now retain a sufficient degree of authority and respect for the Government of this country.

For these reasons I am of opinion that Government ought not to take the management of these acquisitions into its own hands. I think it also very dangerous to attempt to establish a new company and to put the management of these acquisitions and revenues into their hands.

First There will be at least (ff 69v) as great difficulty in shifting the possession of this property from the hands of one Company into those of another, as there would be into the hands of Government. To settle the respective rights and pretensions of the two companies would be a business of extreme difficulty and endless litigation;

It might produce a war between the servants of the two Companies in the heart of these very possessions, and might end in the loss of them both.

Secondly It is impossible to grant to any new Company an exclusive right of trade into these countries consistently with the rights which the present Company enjoys by act of parliament, and I doubt whether an exclusive right to trade in these countries or to speak more (ff 70r) properly a right to exclude from thence all other subjects of Great Britain except their own servants and such as are there by their permission is not necessary for the proper government of them.

Thirdly I see no reason to suppose that the present Company may not be made by proper regulations as fit

to govern these possessions as a new company, I doubt whether it would not be more easy properly to regulate the one than to establish the other. It is at all event necessary to come to some settlement with the present Company for the ensuing three years unless the Publick will give up all its rights for that period. And the same means which it will be necessary to use in order to effect this and the same regulations (ff 70v) which it will be proper to make will serve as well for a longer term as for three years.

Whoever recollects the transactions in King William's reign upon the forming of a new East India Company, the difficulties that occurred at that time in forming it, the great dissensions that instantly arose between that and the old Company, and the final settlement of this business in the beginning of the reign of Queen Ann, which could not be effected but by a union of the old and new company under the award of Lord Godolphin, will be fully sensible of the force of the objections I have stated to the forming of a new company at present, when the power of the Company now subsisting afford them many more opportunities of throwing difficulties (ff 71r) in the way of any measure of this nature.

If it would be imprudent therefore to take those territorial acquisitions and revenues into the management of Government, or to form a new company for that purpose, and if the present East India Company will not comply with any reasonable propositions made by Government, so that this business may be settled by mutual consent, nothing remains to be done but that parliament should proceed legislatively to arrange the whole business in such manner as justice and true policy require by allotting to the Publick and Company in due proportion their share of the profits, by establishing such regulations as are necessary for the proper management of (ff 71v) this common concern, and by obliging the Company to conform to them.

Singular as this proceeding may be it will be justified by the necessity of the case. The object is of immense importance not only to the Publick but to the Company. The advantages which both expect from it may be lost to both if some thing is not done. There is no power upon earth to whom they can appeal for settling their differences. The East India Company is no longer to be considered as a mere commercial company according to their first institution, but they are become by the acquisitions that have been made as well as by their own armies as by the force of the state a great supreme engine of government, and they are in many respects disqualified, they are in fact a (ff 72r) necessary instrument for the government of a part of the empire. The court of proprietors the properly calculated for the management of a mere commercial concern in which however they used but seldom to interfere, leaving it in general to the court of directors, are totally unfit for the government of a large territory at so great a distance that it requires nearly six months to sail to them. They feel however their own importance, are full of faction and are less likely on that account to comply with what is reasonable. And nothing can shew more clearly the temper and character of this assembly than their refusal in 1773 to accept the

money which Government was then disposed to lend them, the they were at that time in a state of bankruptcy and their (ff 72v) preservation depended on the loan, and parliament then found themselves under the necessity of compelling them to accept it.

Upon this view of the subject it was proposed at a meeting of the servants of Government (where the business was fully discussed) that a plan should be prepared on which parliament might properly proceed to settle by their authority this great concern with the consent of the Company, if they could be induced by any honorable means to give it, but without their consent if they should still continue to be refractory. The plan was accordingly prepared and is as follows. ¶

British Museum: Add 38404

¶ The plan is on ff 73-97r. A rough draft of the plan is in Add Ms 38398 (ff 70-84).

ff 93 contains, in the margin, E. Burke's propositions on the matter. These briefly are:

1. Giving a power to negative the decisions of the council to the Governor General.
2. Crown to see the directors despatches to India.
3. Governors to obey crown in their conduct and transactions with country powers.

C. Jenkinson's opinion of the proprietors, on an earlier occasion, was conveyed in the following terms in a letter to R. Chambers (Add 38306, dated 20.12.1776, ff 107-8 pages 107-9):

"You will learn from other hands all the steps, that were taken for the dismissal of Mr Hastings. All the Indians (as they are called) were his friends and this support gave him a majority in the General Court, which was called to reverse the resolution of the directors for his dismissal".

At the time of the formation of the above mentioned plan C. Jenkinson was evidently responsible for the affairs of the E.I.Co. On 29.5.1781 (Add 38306: page 263) he thus wrote to Mrs Johnson, his mother-in-law, at Calcutta: "...the affairs of the E.I.CO make again a part of my labours."

And a few months later on 1.10.1781 he assured Chambers that "we are sending out a very great force to your assistance". (add 38306: page 359)

(1.23)

Private

MEMORANDUM OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR MR RUSSELL

(from Mr Dundas)

1791

Under what arrangement must the Government of India is in future to be carried on, is a question which the near approach of the expiration of the East India Company Charter, renders it necessary to decide.

It is not my intention in the present memorandum to enter into a detailed explanation of the grounds of my opinions, but to state what these opinions are, in order that Mr Russell may have full time to reduce them into the form in which the question is to be brought forward. I am well aware of the difficulty of all the topics concerned with this subject, either separately or aggregateately considered. It is a subject on which very opposite opinions prevail, and I am free to confess, that there is not one part of the subject, on which my opinions have not been different, at different periods in the course of these seven years. What I have now to state is the result of the best consideration I have been able to give to the different questions which occur, aided by the experience I have derived from a practical share in the Government of India for several years.

(ff 18v) Mode of Civil Government

If this subject is examined merely on principles of theory, and general reasoning it no doubt strikes as every one as a solecism that the executive government of a large empire should be vested in a commercial company consisting of such of his majesty's subjects as may chuse to purchase a share of the capital stock of the East India Company, and it is no doubt here that at the period of their original institution such a system of government could not be in the contemplation of any person concerned in the transactions of those times. But notwithstanding the plausibility which adheres to that species of reasoning and observation I am of opinion that the system as it now is, ought to be continued with very little variation. The subject in every part of it is anomalous, but the present system has experience in its favor, and it is at all times much wiser to found upon the basis of old established systems, than to substitute in their room the most plausible untried theories. Besides a great part of the objection, even in point of theory, has been done away, by the direct participation in the Government in India now established thro' the medium of the Board of Control. The members of that Board may have often found themselves teased and fretted by the perplexity of obstructions from the court of directors; and it may be also true, that at times they may fancy that if they had not been so obstructed they might have acted more beneficially for the public. But

B.M. Add Ms 37277: Wellesley Papers: ff18v- 31v.
 A later version, seems to be a year later in 1792, is on ff 81v-101v, and though is mostly a transcript of the first contains an elaboration on certain heads. Main heads are: Mode of Civil Government: ff18v ff 81v
 Military Establishment ff20v ff 84v
 Trade ff21v ff 87v
 Territorial Revenues ff23v ff 92v
 Patronage ff27v-31v ff 98v-101v

the best answer to every suggestion of that kind, is to advert to the great quantity (ff 19r) of beneficial arrangements, and the immense load of important business which has been in the course of a few years under the present system. It has been found adequate to its purposes, and therefore better not to unhinge it for the sake of a new experiment. Besides it ought not to escape observation, that if the obstructions alluded to had not existed, it is not impossible that the executive Government if acting without the check and remonstrances of the court of directors, might have been led to act carelessly and of course often rashly; according to the present system, the Board of Control, and the court of directors are mutually guards upon the conduct of each other.

I therefore conclude that the government and mode of correspondence should remain as it now is, with the few following variations.

1st The first named commissioner of the Board of Control, ought to be the real president of the Board, and the executive instrument of Government in all matters respecting India.

2ndly The appointment of the Governors and Commanders in Chief of the different settlements to flow directly from the crown. Lord Cornwallis is of opinion that the whole members of the councils should be appointed by the crown. I was disposed to think that the two junior members of the council might be left in the appointment of the court of directors, in order to preserve the respect of the court of directors among their own servants; and if the contrary opinion is to be attended with any serious alteration, I would still adhere to that mode, but I am decidedly of opinion Lord Cornwallis is right in the suggestion, and my reason is, that there is scarcely a possibility of inducing the court of directors (ff 19v) to follow any other rule in such appointments but mere seniority; than which a more absurd principle applied to a supreme government can not well exist. Whether these two junior members of council are to be named in the one way or the other, their selection ought to be from servants of twelve years standing; and with that restriction it is perhaps as well to leave their appointment with the court of directors, not because it is abstractedly right, but because it will prevent any clamour that may be raised on the ground of grasping at patronage.

3rdly The Secret Committee of the court of directors to be abolished, and the correspondence at present directed to be carried on thro the committee should be carried on between the Governors of the respective settlements and the President of the Board of Control.

4thly The constitution of the court of directors might be beneficially improved by a diminution of their members, and their business ought to be carried on more by separate committees corresponding to the departments in which foreign correspondence is carried on. The first of these alterations can only be done by act of parliament, and it ought only to be done with the approbation of the court of proprietors and therefore need not be introduced into any bill at present to be prepared by Mr Russell. The sub-division of the court of directors into committees may be done without any act of parliament by an internal

Territorial Revenues

(ff25v) ... The plan which has now been detailed naturally suggests the appropriation to be made of the territorial revenues. In the first place the military charges; 2ndly the interest of the funded debt; 3rdly the civil charges;

4thly It must be carefully investigated what sum is requisite from the territorial revenues to be appropriated to the purposes of investment, in order to fulfill the demands at home, hereafter to be specified; and the sum so requisite must be advanced to the Board of Trade. If I recollect right when I last considered the subject in that point of view the sum which appeared to be requisite was about 60 lacs or £ 600,000 stg. That however must be minutely investigated, previous to any specific appropriation.

5thly The surplus revenue to be appropriated in the (ff 26r) next place to the payment of the capital of the India Debt; and lastly; to be subject to the disposition of parliament for behoof of the public, and even in the progress of this last stage of the appropriation, the public will be gainers by such parts of its naval and military establishments being defrayed from the territorial revenues as shall be considered as the proper peace establishment corresponding to the exigencies of that country. I direct this observation more immediately to such parts of the naval expence as it may be thought expedient to defray in that country.

It is impossible for me to delineate with any precision the operation of the appropriation I have mentioned, as that must depend on several circumstances as yet impossible to be ascertained.

1st The amount of our revenues on the return of peace
2ndly The amount of our debts
3rdly The amount of our establishments.

(ff26v) There is reason to hope that the first will receive an addition; the second certainly will; the third I see no reason to doubt may be considerably diminished. But let the amount of them stand as they may, it can not alter the principles upon which it appears expedient to make the specific appropriation by a legislative enactment.

The proceeds of the Company's trade realized by their sales will form one aggregate fund to be applied
1st To the payment of their commercial charges of every description.

2ndly To the interest of their debt.

3rdly To the payment of their dividend at 8% to be increased by the interest of each £ 600,000 they pay off till their dividend amount to 10%; then to stop and the surplus to be added to the fund for extinction of the funded debt. This being extinguished, the surplus to be lent without interest to (ff 27r) the public and to remain as a collateral security for the capital of the Company in case from accident or calamity it should at any time be endangered or deteriorated. If this sum should accumulate in the hands of the public so as that the interest of it would, at an interest of 3% yield a dividend of 2% on the capital stock then the Company to

be warranted to make a further dividend to the amount of 12%. The surplus after that to be divided between the public and the proprietors of India Stock.

4thly The surplus after payment of the dividend of 8% subject to the contingent increase above mentioned to be applied as a sinking fund for the payment of the funded debt.

Patronage

Russell's Drafts are on ff 32-41, 42-52, 54-79(Heads of Bill)

(1.24)

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
IN THE EVENT OF THE CHARTER OF
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY NOT BEING RENEWED (cir 1812)

In the event of its becoming necessary to form a new system of government for the British possessions in India, it appears to be of the utmost importance that at the time when the nominal sovereignty of India is placed in other hands than those of the East India Company the subordinate changes in the administration of government in that country should in all other respects, for the present at least, be as (ff 171 v) few as possible.

In the first place the natives of India should not be led to suppose, that there was any intention of making any considerable change in the system of government which had been hitherto carried on in India. And that if, ever, some changes should become expedient, it would be advisable that they should be made gradually, and not be supposed as the consequence of the transfer of the sovereign authority from the body politic which now exercises it, to (ff 172 v) to any other individual or body.

In the second place, there can be no necessity for adopting such changes at present. If the East India Company's charter is to be renewed, it may be essential to determine whether any, and what, changes in the government, should be adopted as the condition of its. Because such changes could not be afterwards adopted, without Government being subject to the imputation of being desirous of violating the charter. But if the charter is not to be renewed, it will be in the power of Parliament, from (ff 172 v) time to time, to make such alterations as they may judge expedient; and it should therefore be the main object, to have in the first instance all the subordinate arrangements for the government of the country, as nearly as possible, upon the present footing.

It is proposed therefore, that the sovereign authority and power, civil and military, which have hitherto been exercised by the East India Company, should be transferred to the crown, to be administered in future by the crown through the medium of a Board of entitled the Board of (ff 173 v) Commissioners for the Affairs of India. The whole government of India would, by this arrangement, be carried on henceforward in the name of the king, and the Commissioners of any description, civil and military, would be held in his name. All the existing commissions derived from the Company, should by special provision, should be considered in the same light as if they had been originally issued by the crown and the persons who held them, should be confirmed in them, upon the understanding that they were in future (ff 173 v) to be subject to the directions and authority of the crown. All provision should go on in the different departments according to the existing law or custom -- and in short, no other change would apparently take place, in the manner of administering the government, except that the public officers would discharge the duties of it in the name of the king, instead of that of the Company.

The great objection which has been made on former occasions to any change in the system of the government (ff 174 r) in India, independent of the considerations which were connected with a violation of the Company's Charter, and which, have no application to the present case, have rested upon the danger which might arise to the constitution, from transferring the patronage of India to the crown.

The difficulties on this part of the question will in a great degree vanish, when the nature and amount of the patronage of the East India Company is considered.

The situation of Governors at the different (ff 174 v) Presidencies, and of commanders in chief of the forces, have always been substantially bestowed by the Government. In two or three instances, the East India Company have refused to appoint persons whom the Government were desirous of seeing nominated to these situations. But it may be confidently stated, that since the year 1793, or even since 1784, no Governor or commander in chief has been appointed, not only without the approbation of his majesty's Government, but when the nomination (ff 175 r) did not in fact originate with them.

The members of the supreme council at the different Presidencies have been nominated by the court of directors, but with exception of the commanders in chief, they have of late years been uniformly nominated from those servants, who were in high office, in the respective Presidencies, and who appeared to have the best claims to such situation.

The same rule would of course be adopted upon the transfer of the government to the crown, (ff 175 v) and would leave very little opening either for patronage or favour.

With regard to all other civil appointments in India, the selection of the individuals to fill them has been usually left to the Governors at the different Presidencies. The East India Company rarely interfere as to their appointments, and in the few cases in which they have done it, they will be found to have done it improperly. It will hardly indeed (ff 176 r) be disputed, that with the exception of the supreme council, the selection of the proper officers for filling the respective departments in India, is more likely to be beneficially made by the Governors on the spot, than by any authority from this country.

The military promotion is in a great degree regulated by law and where this is not the case, the promotion, in the first instance, must be left to the commander in chief on the spot.

The result of (ff 176 v) this, is, that the patronage of India, which is not commercial or connected with the shipping interest, really consists in the nomination of writers and cadets. Every other description of patronage is so circumscribed, that the crown would actually gain little or nothing by the transfer of the Government from the East India Company.

To obviate all jealousy on the subject of the nomination of writers and cadets, I would suggest the

fellowing arrangement.

(ff 177 v) The East India Company would at all events, after the expiration of the charter, subsist as a joint stock company for the purposes of trade, and their concerns must be managed, as at present, by a court of directors. It is conceived that there would be no objection to leave the nomination of the writers to the court of directors, either in the manner in which they exercise it at present, or by rotation, or in any other way which might be thought/expedient. The /most nomination in (ff 177 v) each instance, to be subject to the negative of the commissioners for India, in order to check any abuse in the appointment.

The patronage of the writers, is certainly an important and valuable patronage to the individuals who have the advantage of it. But it appears to be very immaterial to the Publick (except as far as the constitutional question is concerned) in whose hands is placed the nomination of a number of young men of 17 or 18 years of age, who accept the writerships (ff 178r) as the first step in a profession, and whose advancement afterwards must depend upon their own industry and merits.

It can be only necessary to provide that they should be the sons of gentlemen, that their characters should have been unimpeachable, and that they should have received a proper education. And the nomination by the directors of such a body as the East India Company, is subject to the revision of the commissioners for India, would apparently secure the object, as well as any other mode that could be desired.

(ff 178 v) The peculiar advantage attendant upon the plan now proposed is, that it would make the least possible alteration in the system of patronage, as it is now carried on. The effects of it, as it exists at present, are known and felt, and if no public inconvenience is likely to arise in consequence, it appears to be better to continue in the established course, than to adopt any thing new which might be equally unobjectionable.

The objection that such a plan would be anomalous, is hardly worth attention. The (ff 179 r) existing system of the Government of India, is anomalous, and yet this is no reason in the contemplation of any person for altering it. The greater part of this anomaly, it is by the present plan, proposed to do away. But it is judged, upon the whole, more expedient to preserve the anomaly in a particular case where no practical inconvenience can arise from it, rather than resort to expedients which might be the occasion of supposed constitutional jealousy and alarm.

If this expedient should however not be approved I would suggest the following as an alternative:

Let one individual of not less than 14 nor more than 17 years of age, be chosen annually from the foundation of each of the great public schools of the kingdom viz: Eton, Westminster, Winchester, the Charter Town, and Harrow, by the Governors and masters of these institutions and let him be elected for the East India College to receive there the necessary instruction for the public

service in India.

Let the writers than be appointed from such of the members of the East India College as may be reported competent by seniority.

With respect to the cadets, (ff 179 v) as the army of the East India Company must in the case supposed, become the king's army, I would suggest that the cadets should in future be appointed by the commander in chief in Great Britain, but subject to the limitation, that they should be selected from the children of officers of his majesty, or of the East India Company, who had served a certain number of years in the respective army, or had died in the service.

It would be of the utmost importance that in transferring (ff 180 r) the army of the East India Company to the crown, the changes which are to be made in the system, should be made very gradually. The army should be considered as the king's Indian army, applicable to local services and the present system, either as to promotion, or as to allowances should not be altered without any mature consideration.

Upon the subject of trade the East India Company would still enjoy the privilege of carrying on their trade as a joint (ff 180 v) stock company, with all the advantages of established habits and local connexions.

The trade in other respects, would be thrown open to the merchants of the country at large, subject only, to such regulations, as the security of the revenue and political considerations might render necessary. The trade to China must be put upon under the control of a consul, who, being responsible to the Chinese Government for the good conduct of the subjects who resort there, must be invested with extraordinary powers to insure obedience (ff 181 r) to those rules and regulations, which, upon a communication with the Chinese Government, it might be advisable to adopt, to obviate all prejudices upon the part of the authorities in that country.

As the territorial revenues of India will be transferred to the crown, the crown must, in justice, take upon itself those debts to which the territories are now subject. The rights of the East India Company as a joint stock company, which they consider as at present inherent in them, (ff 181 v) and which it may be necessary in some cases to secure to them and in others to revoke or modify, must all be subject to a commission to be established by act of Parliament, to which must likewise be referred all claims, which, in such /pecuniary a state of things, the East India Company may have upon the Government and the nation.

Upon the whole, it does not appear that there is any insuperable difficulty in the way of forming a new system of government for the British possessions (ff 182 r) in the East Indies by which the affairs of that empire might be administered as justly and effectually as they are at present, and that there is no reason why such system should be liable to any of the objections which have, on former occasions, been made to similar attempts, as violating the chartered rights of the company, or as endangering the constitution by an undue augmentation of the influence of the crown.

1.25

confidential

MEMOIR RELATIVE TO INDIA

In addition to the observations contained in the printed Considerations Relative to India, (not published) * it is only necessary to state one solitary question, to demonstrate the inconsistency in which our different Governments have involved themselves by entertaining any apprehension from the result of the Princes of India having adopted the European system of war. The question naturally is: "If we in Europe think it necessary to employ thirty gentlemen of education to the superintendance of one battalion of a thousand men in such regular gradation of experience that each inferior officer is equal to supply the place of his immediate superior what can be expected from thirty thousand men among whom are only thinly scattered sixteen officers of very doubtful education and experience?" Yet such was the real composition of the armies in Hindustan which have been represented as so formidable and the facts of our conquests all corroborate this assertion because whenever the enemy have ventured to engage notwithstanding their superiority in number they have been universally defeated with the loss of an artillery infinitely superior to the one opposed by us: and as more than two thirds of our armies in India are composed of the native soldier (p 2) no great consideration is to be paid to the superior valor of Europeans: if such in India was ever founded in truth? At the same time we must admit that similar defects under the same circumstances of numerical superiority against us, could not be won by our armies against the worst troops of Europe. And why, but because the officers of all the European states are more upon a par than those of the native princes are with us. Such being the fact what has the enemy acquired by their introduction of European tactics? but to contend with us at the same weapons with inferior means. Nevertheless the universal opinion of our Government have been adverse to this system, and by way of a more remarkable inconsistency, have always agreed that the moment the European officers were taken from the Sepoy army, it became a nullity. Yet it was impossible that the armies of the native princes could be sufficiently officered by Europeans, even to the degree of ten officers to a hundred of ours. This mode of reasoning on the part of our Government has in my mind been productive of all the irritation now existing in the minds of the people of India. As if we had yielded to the inclination manifested by them to receive British officers into their service, these officers would have enjoyed (p 3) the greatest influence in the policy of India, with the smallest expence to us, and would in themselves without the sometimes difficult interference of Government, have provided the surest barrier against either the introduction of French officers or French principles.

Department of Paleography and Diplomatic, Durham: Papers of H. Earl Grey (1764-1845, earlier known as Viscount Hewick, Prime Minister 1830-4); Box 36/file 1 : from George C Braithwaite Boughton, dated Oct 25, 1806. Addressed to Lord Hewick.

* A printed copy, marked "not published" on the title page, of the "CONSIDERATIONS" is available in the British Museum, catalogued under 'Boughton, Sir George Charles Braithwaite; Bart', dated 1803, 42 pages.

And as a proof of this, in the year 1791 when I accompanied the Nizam's son with 10,000 horse to join Lord Cornwallis, a fine opportunity offered for me to enter the Nizam's service, where there was already a Frenchman by the name of Raymond commanding 2000 men and hoisting in the army of our allies the tri-colour flag.

But having understood that even Lord Cornwallis entertained the same apprehensions relative to the policy of introducing European tactics I declined the advantageous prospect. And shortly afterwards the two battalions of Raymond increased to 14,000 men, and the subsequent intrigues of that officer with the Nizam's family alarmed the sovereign, and it has been reported that poison was administered to Raymond. However he came to the sea coast for his health and dyed. Meanwhile the Nizam's minister threw difficulties in the payment of the troops, which as is usual in that country, directed the anger of the troops to their own officers (p 4) who were immediately arrested by their own soldiers, in which formidable state, our detachment found them after its arrival by invitation of the court of Hyderabad, which Government satisfying the soldiery by the payment of their arrears. The chief difficulty on our part was to preserve the lives of a few French officers, the most part of whom had been private soldiers, as Raymond himself had been. If there has been any wonderful talents employed in over-turning the French influence in the Dekkan, it must on the other hand be admitted that the French influence would either never have existed, or very soon have been done away had the 12,000 men been raised by British officers, instead of Raymond being allowed to attach them to his two battalions; because the Nizam was thus debarred having any officers but French, and yet he was required to have an army to join us in opposing Tipoo— and I had the honour of marching with Monsieur Raymond— and as a proof that the subsequent Government under Marquis Wellesley entered somewhat in this opinion. I recommended an officer of the 13th Foot to my father, then commanding in chief the army at Madras. The gentleman's name was (p 5) Sassen and by the interference of the British Government he obtained a brigade in the Nizam's service where he shortly afterwards died. And the celebrated General De Boigne formerly in the Company's service, stipulated with old Scindiah, that he never was to be employed against the British forces, yet under such a stipulation, Scindiah granted to him, the absolute jurisdiction of a territory equal to the maintenance of 30,000. And his successor the present Scindiah proposed to De Boigne to return to Hindostan upon the same terms. I saw the letter in which the prince said, till he received De Boigne's answer, the army would be kept in brigades without the nomination of a commanding in chief, that the villages allotted to De Boigne in jagheer should remain, and his pay had been regularly transmitted to General Martine his agent at Lucknow; and that all the authorities appointed by De Boigne for the collection of the revenue had remained uninterrupted in their functions and had received every assistance from Scindiah as sovereign. About the same period General Ferren wrote to De Boigne, saying he had acquired as much money, as he knew what to do with, and he wished to have opportunity of retiring with honours (p 6) that his health was declining, and that he could not place much reliance on the dispositions of Scindiah towards himself. There certainly does not appear in this correspondence

correspondence, much hostility in Scindiah towards us, or much ambition in the General. The the subsequent conduct of Scindiah towards Perren, fully ascertains the truth of the impression his conduct had stamped on Perren's mind as prior to the latter coming over to the British Government he had been superseded by Scindiah's having appointed a native called Unbagoo to the Subah-dar of Hindostan, from whose impeccable hatred, Perren had to apprehend the loss of his property if not his life. But if, as has been represented, the reverse had really been the case, and that Perren either through fear, or ambition was driven to rebellion, in what manner could such a contest have operated in prejudice to the British interests? Even if the Peishwah, Holkar, and Poonaiah had taken their share in the discord, each indirectly contending either to preserve, or obtain the chief influence in the Mahratta states, instead of their all uniting, except the Peishwah and Perren, against the British interests it seems extraordinary that a union of these land pirates, should be desired: yet that seems to have been the result (p 7) of the war against them. And it is no less extraordinary that in a publication intended to set forth the policy of the war, entitled The Vindication of The Justice and Policy of these measures, the following description of Poonaiah is given:

"It is the destructive feature of the Mahratta Government, that the Empire always considers itself, in a predatory or vindictive hostility; to fraud and violence is the worship paid at Poonaiah" meaning merely, the capital, of our faithful and loving friend the Peishwah, whom we have thus endeavoured to reconcile with his brother lame Scindiah and Holkar.

/ Barbary

Now to a plain man like me, the attempt to consolidate such a species of Government as the one described in the chapter on Poonaiah, as the means of securing a continuance of peace, appears not very unlike, reducing all the Hindoo states, to a system pf perpetual friendship in order to protect the commerce of the Mediterranean. It is also reasonable to enquire here, what probability there is (that such warlike and hughty chieftains, united into a confederacy of vindictive hostility, and whose rebellion forced the Moghul Emperor to grant them the chout or the collection of a fourth part of the revenue of the empire for their military services) should long submit to the disgrace of being shown to their soldiers, surrounded by a British guard (p 8) stiled a subsidiary force, otherwise interdicted from employing Europeans in their service. No treaty so repulsive to human nature can in my mind be durable, being destitute of refinement and every way at variance with the usages of Asia, which has universally employed the refined policy of confiding in the full assistance of minor states unable to contend with the greater power, preserving to those princes the full jurisdiction and dignity over their subjects, with all rights of sovereignty, in which sense many provinces of the Moghul Empire acknowledged the supremacy of the sovereign, the his troops had never entered their territory. And many of these states, could bring from thirty to fifty thousand horse into the field. And even when the effeminacy of the Moghul emperors and their feeble administration brought an rebellion among their own officers the throne was a long while suspended by the exertions of its Hindoo tributaries against the Mohammedan officers in revolt. Thus even when the present

emperor Shah Allum was reduced to the single province of Allahabad he was joined in these desperate fortunes by the Hindoo rajahs, Bulwan Sing of Budgspeer, and Bulbudder Raja of Amati and many others, to the amount of sixty thousand men (p 9)— while Suja ul Dewlat, who by the treason of his father Seifden Jung, had become independent, refused his sovereign all assistance; the in relation to Shah Allum, he was in the same state of duty, as the viceroy of Ireland is to the king of Great Britain. In short it is manifested throughout the Moghul history, that the object of a despotic prince is always the preservation of his dignity at home however small the circle, and when that is carefully and confidentially attended to, he will serve his superior with great zeal and alacrity, as the Rajahs of princes, (since plundered by the Mahrattas) have frequently bled in the emperor's service and acquired great distinction in the imperial armies, and did not scruple to quit their thrones to mount guard over the emperor.

But we frequently fall into error by banding every thing to the usages of Europe, and from this view of our situation frequently attribute strength to our weakest parts and weakness to our strongest. In the imagination that a few subsidiary troops, are a greater check upon a prince, than the demonstration of confidence and a powerful army ready to pour upon him in case he swerves from the confidence granted (p 10) and falsely complaining of the craft and treachery of Asiatics, we think no deer safe, if we have not the key hung at our belt with the blustering air of a gaoler. The Asiatics however prove themselves of a less suspicious character, by confiding to the master the key of his own house, and yet esteem that master and his household among the most confidential servants. As in the character of a government in Asia like that of a landlord in England has its due weight and the family who fix a just rent, and continuall that justice, may have tenants at will, who vote with their landlord, and think themselves as secure as their neighbours who have leases — and thus in India he might be more secure of the service of minor states, by leaving the sovereigns in their full dignity in their full dignity and jurisdiction without a subsidiary force whose appearance is indeed sufficient to debase and mortify the prince without being sufficiently numerous to defend itself if seriously attacked. So that in the sudden commencement of hostility a part of your force might be cut off (p 11) whereas on the other hand an alliance offensive and defensive with a minor state, that state contributing handsomely to your protection, leaves /for the prince in the full enjoyment of his own dignity, and crushes rebellion in his own country from the dread of your assistance And therefore renders it eligible to him, particularly as the princes of India are situated, nominally absolute, but surrounded by a powerful military aristocracy, towards the leaders of whom the smallest attention on the part of the British Government, a civil message, a letter addressed with the intention of being intercepted, fills the mind of the prince with just alarm. On the other hand a firm and confidential alliance establishes the authority of the prince, as the intrigues and cabals of his officers however dangerous at home, are early smothered and kept down by British interference on whom they can have no operation. And as the sovereigns of these countries the in some view view despotic, are themselves the slaves of custom, and

prejudice, to the degree that even among the Mahrattas the lowest soldier venting his just demand, may challenge the prince to the Dherna that is to try the justice of the cause by (p 12) mutual fasting, and if the prince can not hold the trial he must pay the money. It is necessary to mingle with the natives and observe their unalterable prejudices, and bait your hooks accordingly, and guide the fish with a silken thread, more durable than massy chains of iron. From a want of this wise examination into their system of government, their customs and prejudices, which being invariable leaves them like a bowl whose movements are directed by a known bias, we frequently attribute effects to wrong causes; as once the Government of Madras were surprised at the steady firmness w^t with which the Nabob Sudit ul Sarah resisted giving up the jurisdiction of his country and consequently accepting a greater annual income, than he ever could receive from his own jurisdiction, a circumstance so contrary to his natural pliability of temper, love of pleasure, and detestation of business, that his refusal made him a new man in the eyes of the British Government. Nevertheless it was still true, that what he so strongly refused, he had personally little objection to grant. But the nobility, gentry, and yeomanry as they would be stiled here, saw that by this prince's acquiescence, they would be instantly rendered cyphers and beggars. Because they had truly (p 13) neither rank, authority, or property, but what arose from offices of which this concession on the part of their prince would have deprived them. In this extremity they pointed to their daggers, from which the Nabob's firmness arose. In a subsequent struggle for this point, the British Government surrounded the palace with a military(ference), and were able to appoint what terms they pleased. Because the same nobility saw the inclination of a superior power publicly evinced and that intimidation and resistance were equally vain; Yet had the British Government deposed the Nabob and appointed Bei-jent Shih Nabob of the Carnatic with injunction to govern according to the customs of the country it would have been seen by the zeal and obedience manifested, to Bei-jent Shih. That it was not the personal losses of the prince, they deplored but the dignities and emoluments arising to themselves from the existence of his Government. Altho this arrangement may not in all its extent be applicable to the ancient Hindoo princes, yet it applies to the greater part of India governed by usurpers, to the people of which countries it would (p 14) be little to change the sovereign, but very grievous to change the form of government.

And in considering Asiatic governments we must entirely do away the ideas sometimes realised in Europe, that what is lost by offending the aristocracy is gained by winning the favour of democracy. Because in India, the aristocracy are the military castes and the democracy harmless merchants and cultivators. Impressed with the truth of these sentiments, it appears to me that if the Government of India is to be secured upon a permanent and productive basis, we should renounce the vain attempt to wash the black white, and embrace with a conciliatory spirit the genius of Asia, who has long given shelter to a warlike aristocracy, whom an accession of territory must reduce to despair. And by manifesting this spirit of conciliation to the unchangeable prejudices of religion and custom, we might preserve

a preponderating influence, to that degree, that instead of this historic people, being eager to join the French, or any standard which may insure their existence, (p 15) feeling their existence to be preserved, they would be found gallantly fighting our battles, and similar effects were already produced from similar causes; as where a like confidence existed between the sovereigns of Asia and the Roman Republic, notwithstanding the frequent extortion and mal-administration of the Roman Pro-consuls over the provinces immediately under their jurisdiction yet in the tributary states, we find a great attachment to the Roman cause. And after the Roman armies had been defeated by the Parthians (sur Mahratta) and that upon a second and unexpected irruption of those hordes, when the remains of the Roman legions were in a doubtful and perilous state the tributary Kings Dehotars, and Aribazons by forced marches, hastened to join the armies to the desponding legions of Rome /ir and Cicero received the thanks of the Senate for the wisdom of his conciliatory measures which had strengthened the Roman power.

And if we examine carefully into the history of India, we shall find that the downfall of the greater chieftains has not arisen from the refractory disposition of their vassals (p 16) but from the unjust deviation of these chieftains from the original relationship between themselves and their vassals. Their wavering and fraudulent conduct in exacting additional demands under various nefarious pretexts, such as the fertility of the present year that the increasing prosperity of the tributary country, particularly the fertility of the present year's crop, were causes in themselves sufficient to do away former stipulations. But would not such a conduct of landlords in England have produced disaffected tenants?

Thus when the Nabob of Arcot found himself embarrassed by the sacrifices he had made to support his European influence his only remedy was unjust demands upon his tributaries, such as the Polygars, a people hitherto unconquered by any Asiatic power, certainly never by that of the Nabob. Yet in the year 1790 he applied to the Governor of Madras, Mr Holland to enforce his unjust demands, which being granted a military force was sent against the Murdees chieftains of the southern Polygars, composing which detachment of troops was the 72nd Regiment. These Polygars who have since been represented as savages, displayed upon that occasion a magnanimity and chivalry, unknown in Europe. (p 17) They determined if reduced to the sad necessity to repel force by force, but would never consider the British troops as their enemies. And with these sentiments very imprudently acted only on the defensive, and with an ill-timed generosity furnished the British troops with provisions, without which they might have been obliged to retreat. Their prince in going his rounds fell inadvertently upon some advanced sentries of sepoys, who fired at him but fortunately missed him. His attendance instantly meditated the death of the sepoys, but the prince interfered and ordered them to return in safety to their own camp. The fortress which the prince defended with so much gallantry was finally taken by the treachery of a French officer in his service. Peace was concluded, and the British officers were entertained with the most marked respect and hospitality. The prince himself, like another Patroclus carving with his falchion the venison and d^r

the venison and distributing it to his guests. Such an employment of the British troops was severely censured by Marquis Cornwallis in a letter to the Government of Madras and forbidden for the future (p 18) and in order to prevent future disappointment...

... And in respect to the Nabob of Arcot, he certainly could not make over to the English an estate with a better title than he had himself to it. I pay to the officers of Government the land tax of my estate. But I do not permit them (p 19) to receive my rents, or regulate my farms, or to send 2 commissioners to reside upon my estate, and interfere between me and my tenants, and by these means so derange my affairs, that perhaps another year I am really not able to pay the land tax. But if I did admit such proceeding, and was afterwards tired of them I should still hope to be considered as /not a subject in rebellion.

Thus Arcobeyaris, Deictarius, Elphy Ney, the Rajahs, Polygars and all the chieftains of India from time immemorial have always had the good sense to understand their own situation and to weigh equally what was due to themselves and the superior power by whose protection they received additional security. And if their policy is not complicated, it is the more easily understood, when it is comprehended ? We shall not believe that any of them will long submit, to a continual breach of contract, or a manifest disregard of the station in which they were born and educated. We may more reasonably expect that the warrior castes of India will either die bravely by our side or in opposition to our measures, as our counsels are directed. (p 20) And if there is any truth in the hasty sketch I have given of the customs and institutions of Asia, and of their unchangeable nature, it will appear that the circumstances of the sovereigns themselves were far from absolute in practice, the so in theory. And that from the general improvident, treacherous and faulty conduct of their government, the power of the greatest among them was no ways formidable to us, unless by an equal misconduct in ourselves we had administered to his strength. Because from the political situation of those sovereigns, and their misconduct which daily destroyed the confidence of those who were really and literally termed in Asia the pillars of their power, that is the military castes. We had always in our option to spread discord round the court of the unjust ruler and make a new sovereign without any detriment to the patrician or equestrian order. And the Hyder Ally could neither write or read he had sufficient policy to discover where the shoe pinched. He therefore attacked the sovereign maintained an interest in his court, and turned only a few out of office, when he had defeated the sovereign. And by these means he established in a short time an extensive and permanent dominion, which his son Tippee lost by having recourse to European tactics, and policy. (p 21) He had however the satisfaction while he did live, to know that he was the only absolute sovereign in Asia, a circumstance that can now be only accorded to the Governor General of India. And it seems, he felt this, as in reply to the admonitions of his people, Tippee replied I had rather live one day like a tyger than a thousand years as a lamb.

And when we took his place and demonstrated in all our conquests, (except a slight exception in favour of

the ancient sovereigns of his country) the cupidity of absolute dominion to the detriment of the fighting castes in a ten-fold degree than we concentrated their attachment to the government of their own sovereigns as preferable to the absolute government of Europe. And as Julius Ceaser in conquering the liberties of Rome was opposed by the senate and equestrian order so we found no difficulty in procuring alliances against Tippee, but after his defeat in admitting his measures, we leagued all over India the nativian and equestrians against us, that is the military classes in defence of their own rights and liberties. ...

(p 23) ... The soldier being worthy of his hire which Europe will come to know ere long. The common people of India, that is the rich merchants, lower tradesmen, mechanics, and labourers are mere cyphers made over from one troop of horse to another having neither heart or means to defend themselves and being incapable from their religious prejudices of being made soldiers as the Quakers of Europe are.

(p 24) ... And in regard to the great mass of people, the ryat or peasantry there does not appear to me any foundation after thinking their situation ameliorated under our government as under the Mogul emperors they enjoyed a tacit right to the possession of their fathers nearly similar (if we must have recourse to comparison as the means of explanation) to that of our copy-holders. And the zamindars, or collectors of the revenue belonging to the Mogul emperors, who in the decline of the empire farmed the rent of districts or in its powerful administration received a salary or a proportionable number of villages according to the percentage of the district, had not the power of augmenting their demand upon the ryat or peasants or of dismissing him from his possession unless his conduct was proved to be infamous. If the decline of the Mogul empire furnished to its usurpers, both the means and necessity, of a different conduct, there was not the same necessity, or ought not to have been on the part of the British Government. ...

(p 26) I shall after begging to be excused for this digression, return to the more urgent military concern...

(p 32) ... It has been observed by a celebrated historian of India, that the policy adopted in causing the native officer to rise from the ranks deterred men of influence and family from entering our service, and that consequently such officers are our creatures, and their fidelity further preserved by the European troops, and the natives finding our service preferable to the fraudulent treatment they were accustomed to experience from their own princes. (p 33) This observation appears to me entitled to greater confidence at the period when it was written, than at present. And in respect to the influence of birth and wealth, they are less companions in India than in any country in the world. There is no influence of birth among the natives, but what proceeds from cast. And as the profession of arms in all its ranks, is that of a superior cast, it may frequently occur that the private soldier in India is not only superior in birth to many of his officers, but even to his sovereign, with whom as with Scindiah many of the soldiers would not condescend to dine: or with Hyder, or Tippee. And in our service difficulties have arisen from the soldier under arms for the sake of subordination being required

to salute his officers, which officers from the etiquette of the country should salute the soldier in the street from the superior birth of the latter. In addition to these circumstances, the relative situation of the country being no longer the same, the sentiments of the people change with them, as from the like necessity as the princes of Europe those of India have lately paid more attention to their military department and have ceased to defraud the soldier by such glaring non-compliance with his contract.

(p 39).... I do not see the impossibility of the Hindoos joining in this service since they embarked for Egypt. Thus this measure would be providing for a part of the military population of India, in the defence of your other colonies.

(p 42) ... If something of this nature is adopted I shall be very happy to command the Nogul force. The more the military classes are employed, the less occasion will there be for the same quantity of Europeans: a great territory however particularly in India demands a great army.....

(p 44)...

October 25, 1806
Henwell, Middlesex.

Geo S. Braithwaite Boughton

P.S. If any thing here said, should incline you to have a copy taken of the suggestions, you are very welcome: Only I request to have the original returned to me, it having been extracted from part of a more voluminous composition the which I am desirous to compare with the one now submitted to your perusal.

To
The Right Hon'ble Lord Newick

G.C.B. Boughton.