

P H I L O S O P H Y
O F
ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

by

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‘ स्वतन्त्रमस्वतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।

Dedicated to

ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

*Who showed how Philosophy could fulfil its purpose
and attain its goal by enabling man to realize the
eternal and indissoluble bond of Bimbapratibimbabhāva
that exists between the Infinite and the finite.*

ABBREVIATIONS

AV.	Anu-Vyākhyāna
Bhāg.	Bhāgavata
B. T.	Bhāgavata-Tātparya
B. S.	Brahma-Sūtra
B. S. B.	Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad
C.	Commentary
Chān. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Cri. Sur. I. Phil.	A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy
D. M. S.	Daivī Mīmāṃsā Sūtras
I. Phil.	Indian Philosophy
G. B.	Gītā-Bhāṣya
G. T.	Gītā-Tātparya
KN.	Karma-Nirṇaya
KN. t.	Karma Nirṇaya Tīkā
M. G. B.	Madhva's Gītā Bhāṣya
M. Vij.	Madhvavijaya
M. S.	Madhvāsiddhāntasāra
Mbh.	Mahābhārata
Mbh. T. N.	Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya
Māṇ. Up.	Māṇḍūkyā Upaniṣad
Mith. Kh.t.	Mithyātvānumāna Khanḍana Tīkā
Muṇḍ. Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad

Nym.	Nyāyāmṛta
NS.	Nyāya Sudhā
NV.	Nyāya Vivarāṇa
PP.	Pramāṇa Paddhati
P. M. S.	Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras
R. V.	R̥g Veda
R.G.B.	Rāmānuja's Gītā Bhāṣya
S. N. R.	Sannyāya Ratnāvalī
Śvet. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tg.	(Nyāyāmṛta)-Taraṅgiṇī
TS.	Tattva Saṃkhyāna
TSt.	Tattva Samkhvāna ṭīkā
T.T.	Tarka Tāṇḍava
T.V.	Tattva Viveka
Tdy. ṭ	Tattvodyota ṭīkā
TP.	Tattva Prakāśikā
T. Ā.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
T. B.	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Taitt. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Up.Kh.ṭ.	Upādhi Khaṇḍana ṭīkā
VTN.	Viṣṇu Tattva Nirṇaya
VTNṭ	Viṣṇu Tattva Nirṇaya ṭīkā

KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

ā	ଆ
ī	ି
ū	ୁ
ṛ	ରୁ
ñ	ଙ୍ଗ
c	ଚାନ୍ଦ
ch	ଚାନ୍ଦୁ
ñ	ଶୁଣ୍ଟ
ṭ	ତୁଳୁ
th	ଥାମୁ
ḍ	ଢାମୁ
ṇ	ପୁଣ୍ୟ
t	ତାମୁ
th	ଥାମୁ
d	ଦାମୁ
dh	ଧାମୁ
n	ନାମୁ
s	ଶାମୁ
ś	ଶୁଣୁ
s	ସାମୁ
Jña	ଜନ୍ମା

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Śrī Madhvācārya (1238–1317) was the historical founder of the Dvaita system of Vedānta, which is one of the three principal schools of Vedānta. He was a native of Tulunād, in Karnatak. Pañjaka-kṣetra, eight miles south-east of the modern town of Udupi, on the west coast of S. India, was the village of his birth. He was born in 1238 A. D. and lived for seventynine years.

He appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had become well-established. The reasons that led him to propound a new system of Vedānta were his doctrinal differences and ideological dissatisfaction with contemporary trends and schools of thought, within and without Hinduism and particularly with the system of Śaṅkara, which was the dominating philosophy of the times. In spite of the Theistic revolt against Śaṅkara led by Rāmānuja, Madhva could not agree with him on many points of Theistic doctrine. So he felt called upon to give a new lead in thought, to his countrymen.

Madhva called his system “Tattvavāda” (Realism). It is described by Vidyāraṇya, in his *Savyadarśanasāṅgraha*, as “Pūrṇaprajñadarsāna”. Pūrṇaprajña and Ānanda Tīrtha were other names of Madhvācārya. All these three names have been found used by him, in his works. He is now more widely known by the last name of Madhva or Madhvācārya.

While yet in his teens, the call of the spirit took him to Acyutaprekṣa, an ascetic of the Ekadaṇḍī order, belonging to the Ekānti or Brahman-Sampradāya. He received initiation from him as a Sannyāsin. After this, Madhva studied the classics of the Advaita school such as the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Later he began to expound the Prasthānatrayī, independently and from a new standpoint, laying bare the defects in the received interpretations of Śaṅkara and his school. Sometimes, he used to enter into

scholastic disputations with veteran scholars of the day. Mention has been made in his biography of Buddhisāgara, Vādisimha and Bhānu Pañdita. He toured all over India several times and visited Badarikāśrama, Bengal, Bihar and Banaras in the north and many centres of learning on the Godāvarī and important places like Goa, Śrīrangam and Kanyākumāri, in the south.

Madhva has left thirtyseven works in all. They include (i) Daśa-Prakaraṇas or ten philosophical monographs expounding his logic and metaphysics; (ii) Commentaries on the Ten Upaniṣads (iii) cc. on *Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*; (iv) a brief c. on the first three *Adhyāyas* of the *R̥g Veda*, an epitome of the *Mbh.* in verses and brief notes on the *Bhāgavata*; and (v) miscellaneous works comprising Stotras, poems and works on worship and ritual. His greatest work is the *Anu-Vyākhyāna*, a critical exposition of the philosophy of the *Brahma-sūtras*. It is a metrical work. It is his masterpiece. It was commented upon by Jayatīrtha in his famous work, the *Nyāya-Sudhā*.

Madhva's writings are characterized by extreme brevity of expression and compression of thought. They need the help of a very good commentary to be understood in their fulness of thought and depth of meaning. His commentator Jayatīrtha has infused into them the necessary amplitude of utterance and expansiveness of thought.

Madhva was endowed with a fine magnetic personality. He was a born leader of men. As a creative thinker, he cared little for the conventions of fashionable belief and interpretation. He was not cowed down by mere technical display of learning. His logic was as inexorable as his faith in Theism was unshakable. He made a deep impression on his contemporaries. Some of his eminent disciples like Trivikrama Pañdita, Padmanābha Tīrtha and Narahari Tīrtha were distinguished scholars of Advaita and other systems before they became converted to

his views. They belonged to different parts of India and spoke different languages. After establishing his system on firm foundations, Madhva erected a temple for Śrī Kṛṣṇa at Uḍipi and installed in it the idol of Bāla Kṛṣṇa secured from Dvārakā. He made Uḍipi the spiritual centre of his school and entrusted the worship at the temple to eight ascetic disciples. Their lines and those of the other disciples, entrusted with the task of propagating his system, are flourishing to this day. According to tradition, Madhva disappeared from vision and retired to Badarikāśrama, in his seventyninth year. Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, the son of his direct disciple Trivikrama Paṇḍita, wrote his biography in a Sanskrit Kāvya of 16 Sargas, known as *Madhva-Vijaya*. It is the main source of Madhva's life and activities.

Madhva went directly to the fountain heads of ancient thought,—the source-books of Hindu philosophy, to draw his inspiration from them. He followed the streams of thought and interpretation emerging directly from them and flowing thro' the Epics, Purāṇas and Pañcarātras and other interpretative literature of more ancient standing than the interpretations of later day commentators, however eminent. There was a strong note of mystic fervor in his thought and writings. His arguments were often so intimately connected with the authorities he had so diligently collected for himself from forgotten and fading sources as to appear to be almost entirely dependent on them. It was Jayatīrtha who successfully brought out the inherent logical strength behind his authorities. There were certain great ideas behind Madhva's writings,—ideas of tremendous philosophical power, significance and potentialities—such as the conception of Sākṣi, the doctrine of Svatantratattva, “Viśeṣas” in relation to the concept of identity and difference, and creation in the new sense of “Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti”. With these fruitful ideas, which he derived partly from his study of his sources and partly from his own cogitations

based on them. Madhva built up a cogent and independent system of Theistic philosophy and worked out its details and put it on a firm and enduring basis of textual sanctions and logical satisfyingness. He urged the necessity of adopting a fresh attitude of mind and a new set of fundamental concepts and categories in place of the old and worn out ideas of the fashionable schoolmen, including the latest in the field. Once the metaphysical necessity of discarding the outmoded ideas and going in for more effective theories and newer modes of approach was established, the whole course of philosophical inquiry was bound to take a new turn and enter upon a new terrain. Providence blessed Madhva with two great assets : an interpreter of such outstanding eminence as Jayatīrtha and a dialectic expositor of the calibre of Vyāsārāya, whom it harnessed to the cause of expounding his system to posterity.

JAYATĪRTHA (1365-88)

Jayatīrtha was Madhva's commentator *par excellence*. According to tradition, he was the son of a nobleman of Mangalvedha, now in Maharashtra State. As a young man, Jayatīrtha renounced the pleasures of his married life and became the disciple of Akṣobhya Tīrtha, one of the direct disciples of Madhva. This Akṣobhya himself was a redoubtable scholar and is reputed to have engaged the famous Vidyāraṇya, in a historic disputation over the "Tat tvam asi" text, at which the celebrated follower of Rāmānuja, Vedānta Desīka, is reported to have acted as umpire and given his verdict in favor of Akṣobhya :

“ असिना तत्त्वमसिना परजीवप्रभेदिना ।

विद्यारण्यमहारण्यमक्षोभ्यमुनिरच्छिनत ॥ ”

(Quoted in *Muvvāyirappađi Guruparamparāprabhāvam* of
Brahmatantra Svatana Jeer).

Jayatīrtha studied Madhva's works under Akṣobhya Tīrtha and later succeeded him as Pontiff of his Mutt in 1865. He toured all over India and propagated Madhva's Siddhānta by writing commentaries on most of the important philosophical works of Madhva. He seems to have spent the major part of his life at Ergola and later at Malkhed or Mānya-kheṭa (the old and historic capital of the Rāṣṭra-Kūṭas of Karnatak) now in the Gulbarga district of Mysore State. He passed away at Malkhed in 1388. His mortal remains lie entombed there.

Jayatīrtha has left commentaries on most of the important works of Madhva. He has also left us two independent works, one on logic (*Pramāṇa Paddhati*) and another on metaphysics, (*Vādāvalī*). All his works have been printed. His greatest work is the *Nyāya-Sudhā* the c. on Madhva's *Anu-Vyākhyāna*. It is a work of monumental erudition in philosophy.

Jayatīrtha standardized Madhva's thought and its interpretation. He was a born stylist. His style is noted for its elegance, lucidity, brilliance and felicity. His arguments are most scholarly and penetrating and his dialectics superb. His writings are characterized by an extreme orderliness of thought and presentation. He brings out the architectonic unity of Madhva's philosophical system and the grandeur of his metaphysical ideology of the Svatantratattva, impressively. He has placed Madhva's philosophical theory and his interpretation of the Vedānta on a self-sufficient basis in respect of its Adhikaraṇa Prasthāna and Vādaprasthāna. For these memorable services to the system, tradition has honored him with the title of "Tikācārya" or Commentator *par excellence*.

VYĀSARĀYA (1478--1539)

About a century after Jayatīrtha came Vyāsarāya or Vyāsa Tīrtha, the Prince of dialecticians in the Dvaita system. He was born about 1460 A. D., in Bannūr, in the Mysore district. He became a Sannyāsin, while still in his teens. He studied logic and Madhva-Śāstra under the celebrated Mādhva Saint and scholar Śripādarāja of Mulbāgal (near Kolar). Later, he is reported to have studied the classics of the Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Mīmāṃsā systems at Kāñcipuram, in Tamilnād. He succeeded to the Pontifical seat of his Guru, Brahmanya Tīrtha, in 1478 and held sway for a long period of sixtyone years.

Vyāsarāya had many sides to his personality. He became the leader of the Devotional Movement of the Haridāsa Kūṭa of Karnatak after Śripādarāja. The famous Purandara Dāsa, Kanaka Dāsa and others were his disciples. The illustrious writers Vādirāja Tīrtha and Vijayīndra Tīrtha were also his disciples. He was the religious adviser and spiritual Guru of the Emperor Krishnadeva Rāya of Vijayanagar and was held in the greatest honor and esteem at the court of Vijayanagar, by the Kings of the second and third dynasties of Vijayanagar. We have a full account of his glorious life and career in the *Vyāsayogicarita*, a fine Campū Kāvya in Sanskrit by Poet Somanātha. Vyāsarāya passed away in 1539 at Vijayanagar (where he lived for the major part of his life) and his mortal remains lie entombed in Navabṛndāvana, an island near Ānegondi, on the Tuṅgabhadrā river.

Vyāsarāya wrote nine works in all. The most famous of these are the *Nyāyāmrta*, *Tarkatāṇḍava* and *Tātparya-Candrikā*. They show his encyclopaedic range of knowledge of contemporary thought and philosophical literature and an astonishingly brilliant intellect of great clarity

and penetration, rarely to be met with in one man. He had the ability to marshal vast quantity of factual material and extraordinary ramifications of thought into half a dozen propositions, couched in terse and telling terms. His works embody the highest achievements of Madhvā's philosophy in the spheres of constructive exposition of Siddhānta and polemical refutation of other views and reinforcement of Siddhānta. Dasgupta has paid him the highest tribute in saying that "the logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought" (*His. of I. Phil.*, Vol. iv, p. viii.).

P R E F A C E

This is the first complete critical and comparative exposition of Sri Madhvācārya's Philosophy, in English. I am indeed very happy that it has been possible for me to bring out this work, which I had promised my readers in the Preface to the first volume of my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* (1960), so expeditiously. I earnestly hope that the present work, together with its companion volumes on the History of the Dvaita school will place in the hands of the reading public ample materials for a close and intensive study of Madhva's philosophical system, as a whole, in its historical and doctrinal aspects.

Works written on the subject of Madhva's philosophy, years ago, by pioneers in the field have now become outmoded, naturally. Of more recent ones, in the field, Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma's *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy* (Madras, 1937) is restricted to an exposition of the ten small philosophical monographs of Madhvācārya. It does not draw upon Madhva's major works like the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* or the *Anu-Vyākhyāna*. It is not, therefore, a complete and organic presentation of Madhva's philosophy. H. N. Raghavendrachar's *Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in the Vedānta* (Mysore Uni. 1941) has erred in representing Madhva's thought as a pure Monism in principle. This is a novel and revolutionary interpretation, which is opposed to the established traditions of the system. It has not only *not* found any wide acceptance among scholars; but has evoked refutations from orthodox spokesmen. His advocacy of what he calls "Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi" (creation of the essence) of Souls in Madhva's philosophy is, indeed, a very unfortunate misinterpretation of Madhva's position, as it has been explained in the works of accredited exponents of the Siddhānta. Moreover, the doctrine of Creation as "Parādhinavīśeṣāpti", specially formulated by Madhva, would lose its point, if Raghavendrachar's interpretation is accepted. This point has been dealt with in the present work.

The treatment of Madhva's philosophy in Dr. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (1927) has been "brief and summary". We have a more detailed and sympathetic treatment of Madhva's thought in Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV. (1949). But it has not taken any notice of the new issues raised by Raghavendrachar's book. Apart from that, Dasgupta's treatment of the subject is, by no means, exhaustive. Obviously, it could not be expected to be exhaustive as his object was not to write an independent treatise on Madhva's philosophy; but simply to deal with it as part of the general and larger movement of thought known as Indian philosophy. It is but natural then, that he should have passed over many important aspects of Madhva's thought. His method of approach has been more or less descriptive in that he does not attempt any expression of opinion on the issues involved or any evaluation of doctrines.

My aim in writing this book is to give a complete, critical and comparative *exposition* of Madhvācārya's system of philosophy, bringing out its logical strength and metaphysical consistency and satisfyingness. It is intended to be an organic presentation of the system in all its essential aspects. It differs from all the other works in the field, including Dasgupta's, in showing how the concepts and categories of Madhva's philosophical system have been conceived and formulated and have been put into a coherent system and in what relation they stand to those of other allied and rival systems. It brings out the special significance and interconnections of Madhva's doctrines and the architectonic unity of his system in relation to its parts. The reader is enabled to see for himself and appreciate the precise value and significance of some of Madhva's distinctive contributions to the perennial problems of religion and philosophy; — particularly Indian philosophy, for which he can justly claim credit, — such as the doctrines of Sāksi, Svatantra, Savisēsabheda and Paradhiṇavisēṣapti. The present work may therefore claim to be a fresh interpretation and exposition of Madhva's philosophical system.

Not only is such a systematic and critical exposition of Madhva's philosophical system called for ; but *it has long been overdue*. Metaphysically, it embodies the most powerful and sustained refutation of Vedāntic monism. It has produced front-rank thinkers like Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. It has an extensive philosophical literature of rare philosophical penetration, in Sanskrit. It has influenced the philosophical thought of Caitanya and his followers in distant Bengal. It has given birth to a Devotional movement of the Haridāsa Kūṭa, from within ; which in its turn has enriched the literature of one of the major languages of South India. It has become the living faith of a large section of the Indian people, speaking seven different languages of present-day India.

In its own right, then, this system deserves much more attention than has been given to it by our modern scholars and writers on Indian philosophy. They have done it an injustice by classifying it under 'minor religious systems' belonging "more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India". Every system of philosophy, in India, not excluding the Advaita, has its own religious basis and development. It is an error of judgment to suppose that the religious and theological aspects have overshadowed the philosophical, in Madhva's system; while it (the latter) stands in undiminished brightness in the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. The cult of the Saguna-Brahman has invaded a large part of the philosophical territory of Advaita. The recognition given to such aspects as Pañcāyatana-pūjā and Tantric forms of worship of Śrī-Cakra and Goddesses like Rājarajeśvarī among Advaitins shows that the religious element is by no means negligible in Advaita. As for Rāmānuja's system, he "attempts a harmonious combination of absolutism with personal theism", — to quote a modern authority. To quote another, "Rāmānuja's beautiful stories of the other world, which he narrates with the confidence of one who has personally assisted at the origination of the world, carry no conviction. The followers of Rāmānuja move with as much Olympian assurance thro' the chambers

of the Divine mind as Milton thro' the halls of Heaven" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p 720).

There is as much of substantial philosophical thought in Madhva's system as there is in those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Failure to recognize this, for want of a first-hand acquaintance with the works of the three great master-minds of the system : Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, does not entitle responsible authors and writers on Indian philosophy to pronounce *ex cathedra* judgments on the philosophical status of Madhva's system or dispose of it in a few pages, summarily. The progress of philosophy is generally due to a powerful attack on current traditions when men feel compelled to go back upon received opinions and raise once more the fundamental questions which their predecessors had disposed of on the basis of some older schemes of thought. The movement of thought initiated by Madhva constitutes a new era in Vedāntic thought in India. It relaid the foundations of philosophy at a much deeper level of philosophical certitude open to man — viz., the Sākṣī and thereby opened up a new line of Samanyava between authority and experience : Sruti and Anubhava. For this reason, this philosophy deserves careful study by all lovers of thought, as a fresh adventure of the philosophical spirit.

Freedom of opinion and independence of thought are the birth-right of every philosopher. In opposing Śaṅkara's philosophy, Madhva has but exercised this right of a philosopher. There is no point, then, in pompously accusing him for this as a "born foe of Śaṅkara" and make it an excuse for dismissing his philosophy in *three and a half pages*, as has been done in a recent work on Indian philosophy, claiming to be a 'Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, written by an Indian scholar. One is amazed at the wrong sense of 'values' shown by some of our living philosophers, which makes them forget the claims and importance of living systems of Indian thought and lavish their attention on those that are dead and have often no more than a

purely antiquarian, technical or academic interest today. Without disputing their right to recognition, I will only say that *our living systems deserve more attention from our philosophers*. In this sense, the University of Bombay has given the right lead to the reorientation of philosophical studies in independent India, by making suitable provision for the study of Madhva's philosophy, in its curricula. I would fain hope that this example will be followed by other Universities in our country and abroad. The honor our temples of learning can show to the thinkers of this country lies in providing facilities for our young men and women to study their contributions to human thought.

Materials from the original Sanskrit texts and sources of the system have been presented here, in a modern garb, keeping in view the modern philosophical temper and its likes and dislikes, in the selection of materials and emphasis on problems. Doctrinal fidelity has been scrupulously observed, side by side with fairness and impartiality of judgment.

The special merit of the work lies in its being designed to be the most fully documented work, so far published, on Madhva's philosophy, quoting profusely from the accredited works and original sources of the system, for purposes of elucidation and authentication. For this reason, the Sanskrit quotations have been freely introduced within the body of the reading matter in English, in many places. So much textual matter could hardly have been pressed within the limits of a few footnotes here and there. On the other hand, the full weight, significance and bearing of the quotations on the doctrines at issue and the effectiveness of their contextual appeal, as intended by their particular interpretations could hardly have been conveyed to the reader, in full force, if the quotations had all been relegated to a separate

section, at the end of the book. In these circumstances, a *via media* had to be found. I hope the general reader will see the point and pardon me for the inconvenience that may be caused by this arrangement. I have, however, tried to introduce the texts in a way that would allow the general reader to skip over them, if necessary, without much interruption to thought or intellectual appeal. These quotations have not, however, been translated as a rule, as that would have increased the bulk of the work and the cost of publication. But their general purport has been sought to be brought out by the trend of the discussion or exposition. These quotations are also intended to serve as a corpus of reference-materials (which will be welcomed by many, as the printed editions of the original works themselves are now out of print and very difficult to obtain) for those interested in pursuing specialized study of the system and to stimulate their interest in going to the originals for further light.

I have gone to the standard works of the different systems of Indian philosophy, in Sanskrit, for purposes of comparing and contrasting the views of Madhva and his commentators with those of the other schools, wherever necessary. I have consulted and have often quoted from the works of several modern Indian and Western writers, in English, on Eastern and Western thought. My obligations to these distinguished writers and their works have been acknowledged in the body of the work, and in the footnotes.

This is also the first modern work, in English, on Madhva's system to present adequate collateral evidence from the standard works of the Advaita, Visistādvaita and other schools, for purposes of intelligent criticism, comparison and evaluation. In drawing attention to the value and significance of Madhva's contributions to the various problems of religion and philosophy, I have invited attention to striking parallelisms of thought between Madhva and some Western philosophers including Christian thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas and Ralph Cudworth. I have

also drawn attention to those aspects of Madhva's thought which strike a modern note or are strikingly in advance of his times and the views of his predecessors and contemporaries. So far as I am aware, these aspects of his thought have *not* been touched upon or adequately emphasized by any of the modern scholars, who have written on the subject of Madhva's philosophy.

For reasons explained in the Biographical Note, I have incorporated substantial material, both interpretative and dialectical, from the works of Jayatirtha and Vyāsatīrtha. Further materials from the works of Vyāsatīrtha have been reserved for another work I have in view.

In discussing doctrinal and philosophical issues, I have generally confined my attention to the problems of Madhva's philosophy alone,—except where a further examination or criticism of their counter-doctrines, pertaining to other schools, was felt to be desirable or necessary in the interests of further elucidation or reinforcement of Madhva's own doctrines. That is why I have not entered into any elaborate polemical discussions of such doctrines of the Advaita school as "Mithyātva", the nature of "Avidyā", its definitions and proofs, "Adhyāsa", "Ekajivajñānavāda", "Sabdāparokṣa", "Pratikarmavyavasthā" and so on, as falling outside the scope of this work.

Before concluding, I have a very pleasant duty to discharge,—to express my deep sense of gratitude and thankfulness to the Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India, for the generous grant of Rs. 2450/- in aid of the cost of publication of this work. As a Bhāratīya, I feel richly rewarded and honored by this token of recognition of my work from the Government of my country.

My next duty and an equally pleasant one is to thank the institutions and individuals who have responded to my appeal for further financial assistance to complete the work. I have to mention among these the management of the Ruparel College, Bombay, the Śrīman Madhva Siddhānta Unnāhini (S. M. S. O.) Sabhbā, Tirupati, the Akhila Bhārata

Mādhva Mahāmaṇḍal, Udipli, the Svamijis of the following Mādhva Pīṭhas : Śrī Rāghavendra Svami Mutt, Nanjangud, Śrī Adamār Mutt, Śrī Sode Vādirāja Mutt and Śrī Pejāvar Mutt, Udipli and Śrī Vyāsarāja Mutt, Sosale ; and several enlightened Mādhva gentlemen : my esteemed friends and well-wishers. I tender my heartfelt thanks to all of them.

I thank the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, for coming forward to have this work printed and published on my behalf. It gives me particular pleasure to record my thanks, heartily, to my son Sudhīndra, for the keen interest and ready enthusiasm he has shown in helping me by reading and passing the proofs and in preparing the Index etc.

Ruparel College,
Bombay-16.
1st March, 1962. }

B. N. K. SHARMA.

PHILOSOPHY
OF
ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION AND GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There are no people who could be impervious to the demands of this world for an explanation of its apparent chaos and contradictions. Only an all-embracing explanation of life consistent with experience would satisfy the requirements of reason, man's highest instrument for the regulation of life. For this reason, philosophy cannot be a mere exercise of the intellect or a pursuit for sheer aesthetic interest or curiosity. It must have a spiritual *raison d'être* and must satisfy man's spiritual needs. It must deal with problems which force themselves on our thought and press for a solution, viz., what man is, why he is conditioned as he is, what his goal is and how he is to attain it.

The question is not, therefore, merely one of philosophy or no philosophy; but one of good philosophy or a bad one. Every rational being, then, has a philosophy of his own, whether he knows it or not. It is the business of an earnest aspirant to go thro' the entire process of thought, under proper spiritual guidance and find a solution of the problems which vex him. The Śāstras are there to guide him on right lines.¹

Philosophy asks for an imaginable unity in place of the mysterious multiplicity. But neither a pure abstraction of being nor a mere totality or aggregate of beings can give us true unity. Some community or reciprocity there must be. "The question is how little would suffice. It seems clear that either each must be connected with all, in at least one way; or that all must be connected with some one. There must be a universal principle directly relating all; or a Supreme Individual to which all are related. The latter would imply the former insofar as thro' their

1. Cf: अनादिकालोऽवृत्ताः समया हि प्रवाहतः ।
न चोच्छेदोऽस्ति कस्यापि समयस्येत्यतो विभुः ।

* * * *

तथापि शुद्धबुद्धीनामीशानुग्रहयोगिनाम् ।

सुयुक्तयस्तमो हन्त्युरागमानुगताः सदा ।

इति विद्यापाति: सम्यक् समयानां निराकृतिम् ।

चकार निजभक्तानां बुद्धिशाणत्वसिद्धये ॥ (Madhva, AV. ii, 1)

common relation to the Supreme One, all would be related, tho' only indirectly, to each other.”¹

Madhva finds such a principle of unity in the unity of government, sustenance and control of the Universe, by Brahman. He finds this idea tellingly expressed in the Śruti text :

विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषस्ताद्विश्वसुपर्जनावति ।

The Supreme and Independent Brahman is not so much the cause *in time* of the dependent realities as the logical and metaphysical explanation of all else that is. Hence the definition of the principle of Independence in Madhva's system ;

स्वरूपप्रभितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविद्ये परानपेक्षम् । (Jayatīrtha, TSt)

Reality presents, to an inquiring mind, three primary data : the thinking self, a world of external realities and indications of an Infinite Power rising above them. Tho' these three data are commonly postulated as distinguishable essences, terms like 'reality', 'substance' or 'existence', are *not* applied to all of them, in the same sense, by all persons, in all stages of spiritual or philosophical development. It has happened time and again in the history of Philosophy, both in the East and in the West, that the one or the other of them has been raised to a position of greater prominence than the rest. Such shifting of emphasis has led to the emergence of several forms of Materialistic, Panegoistic and Monistic heresies which, in the history of speculation, are quite familiar. Justifications for each point of view could easily be found. The Self is the immediate starting point of all experience. It is so borne in upon us as to easily usurp the place of honor. The existence of things outside of us in time and space and even the reputed existence of a Deity are, after all, secondary, being reached only thro' acts of private consciousness and may, for aught we know, be illusory or at any rate, not so irrefragably real as the self. From an opposite point of view, Matter which can be moved and measured and is therefore tangible, could be set up as a sterner reality than either God or the souls, who seem to shrink into shadowy abstractions by its side. To the Mystics, on the other hand, the Infinite Being alone, conceived as :

नित्यशुद्धवृद्धसुकृतसत्यसुखाद्यप्रत्येकपूर्णम् ।

(D. M. S. q. by Madhva, B. T. p. 78)

1. James Ward, *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 42. An identical view is propounded by Jayatīrtha, in his c. on T'S. See P. 5.

is so all-absorbing as to transcend all and constitutes the sole reality of all that there is or can be.

An unbalanced exaltation of any one of these three data, over the rest in the realm of thought, feeling or action, is the cause of much false philosophy and bad morals. The more pretentious philosophies of ancient and modern times, which have sought to resolve the three data into one, have failed inexorably in the end or have been obliged to make compromises, or concede some sort of a "conditional" or "phenomenal" reality to the other data. If the material world, which fills the horizon of senses, is taken to be the single reality that matters most, it would lead us to a Materialism of the West or the Cārvāka philosophy of the East. The ego-centric explanation would land us in a Panegoism, Solipsism or Subjective Idealism, Ekajivavāda and the like; while the theocratic attitude would end in an Absolutism, Deism or Pantheism.

But the true function of philosophy, aided by reason and experience, is to determine by what relationship of the threefold data of experience could man's thirst for an ultimate explanation of the enigma of existence be really and fully satisfied. Reason seeks to interpret the plurality of things and processes which constitute the world as a system of parts evolved or conditioned by one Universal Power or Mind so as to be factors of one whole and subject to one universal reason. As a true philosopher, Madhva ignores neither of the three data of experience; nor does he exaggerate the claims of any one of them at the expense of the other. The changeable no less than the unchangeable, the Independent no less than the dependent, is an ultimate component of Reality as a whole :

द्विषयं हि प्रमेयं, स्ततमस्ततं च (NS. p. 286 b.)

This is one of profoundest conclusions of Dvaita metaphysics reached by the evidence of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabdapramāṇas. It would not be possible to understand or explain the universe if we are indifferent to Matter and Spirits, much more so to the Deity. One must face facts established by our own knowledge and be guided by them, in interpreting them philosophically.

The fact of knowledge is indisputable. And as there can be no knowledge without a knower, a known or knowable object, the reality of the knower and objects of knowledge must be accepted. Whatever else we may choose to admit or reject, absolute scepticism as to the possibility of knowledge of any kind is unsustainable. Even supposing that all our knowledge of reality, so far, has been proved to be contradicted, the

possibility of knowledge has still to be admitted. One cannot deny the possibility of knowledge and yet claim that knowledge has been proved to be contradicted. Madhva says well, referring to Śrihara's dogged scepticism :

यदि नाज्ञीकृते किञ्चिदनर्थाकृतातापि हि ।
नाज्ञीकृतोति मूकः स्यादिति नास्मद्विवादिता ॥ (AV).

At the worst, thinking or the mind would still survive as the residuum of universal doubt.

Starting then, from knowledge as one of the uncriticized certainties of life, we are faced with a plurality of objects and with other thinking beings like ourselves.¹ We think and reason, feel pleasure and pain. Can any of these states be *less evident* to us than our own existence? In conceding, then, the existence of our own good selves, we are also forced to admit the reality of our most intimate and poignant experiences of pleasure and pain, in short, the joys, sorrows and limitations of life :

न दुःखात्मभवः क्वापि मिथ्यानुभवतां ब्रजेत् ।
कोऽपि द्व्यर्थो न निश्चेतुं शक्यते अमवादिना ॥
अमलमध्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा ।
शुद्धः साक्षी यदा सिद्धो दुःखिलं वार्यते कथम् ? (AV., ii, 3)

The fact of knowledge, again, establishes the presence of many more things and persons besides ourselves. Reality is not apprehended as *one* but as *many*; and there is no reason to reject the apprehension of the many as an 'appearance' :

कल्पनागौरवादेव पदार्था न स्युरेव हि ! (AV).

It is at this point that Madhva introduces the philosophical distinction between the Independent and the Dependent. The reals cannot all of them be Independent, lest there should be chaos and strife. Neither can *all* be dependent, without an Independent principle to relate them. The dependents cannot obviously control one another, without a *higher Principle* to connect them. Otherwise, there would be a regress of strife and opposition thro' which they would destroy one another and perish in the transaction.

1. चेष्टालिङ्गेन सामत्वे परदेहस्य साधिते (AV).

And there would be no reality left in the end ! It is, thus, very necessary to dichotomize reality into "Sva-tantra" and "Para-tantra"¹. Experience shows that the human souls and their material environments are not independent:

न च कर्मविमामलकालगुणप्रभूतीशमाचित्तनु तद्वियतः ।
(*Dvādaśa-Stotra* of Madhva).

Were human beings independent masters of their own destiny, we should expect to find peace and plenty and bliss unalloyed, in human life. We should lack nothing and have everything for the asking. But we know only too well that it cannot be:

आत्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः । (*Svet. Up. i, 2.*)

This shows that things are directed by an unknown agency ; which, for want of better name, all the world agrees to designate as "God" or the "Paramātman" or 'the Supreme Being'.

In this way, then, does Madhva establish the existence and reality of Matter, Souls, Svabhāva, Kāla, Karma and other eternal verities under the control of a Supreme Being. The Svatantra and the Paratantra are thus the fundamental presuppositions of his system. The dependence of the finite reals is the proof of the existence of the Deity, according also to the great Nyāya philosopher, Udayana:

सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वात् वैचिन्यादित्ववृत्तिः ।
प्रत्यात्मनियमात् भुक्तेरस्ति हेतुरलौकिकः ॥
(*Nyāya-Kusumāñjali, i.*)

The aim of philosophy, then, would be not merely to realize the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'; but to understand and realize the still more important distinction between the Independent Real and the dependent realities. Madhva is not, therefore, an uncritical realist who takes everything to be real; nor a sentimental idealist who would deny all but one reality. He is for a rational realism, which would admit whatever is established on the uncontradicted evidence of the Pramāṇas, the senses, the mind and the Sāksī, in addition to

1. एके तु एकमेव तत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते । तदसत् । प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात् । सर्वस्य स्वतन्त्रत्वे, नित्यसुखादिप्रसंगः । अस्वातंत्र्ये, च, न कस्यापि प्रश्नत्वा । अन्धपुण्ड्रवत् स्यादिति चेच । प्रत्यासत्तेनेवालुपपत्तेः । यदि सर्वमेव स्वतन्त्रं स्यात्, तदा पारतंत्र्यादिप्रतीतिविरोधः । नित्यसुखादिप्रसंगश्च । यदि वा परतंत्रमेव तत्त्वं भवेत्, अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च न कस्यापि सत्तादिकं स्यात् ।

(*Jayatīrtha' Ts*)

reason and revelation. He introduces a new element of value into the discussion of the problem of Pramāṇas in the form of the concept of Sākṣi, whose nature and scope will be explained in the appropriate place. The Sākṣi is man's highest instrument of all valid knowledge and experience. It is on its evidence that we become conscious, however dimly, of the existence of a higher power than ourselves, in this vast and mysterious Universe.

It will, therefore, be seen that any other approach to the problem of philosophy and any other analysis of the reals or the data of experience into 'positive' and 'negative' reals (*bhāva* and *abhāva*) as in Nyāya thought, or as Cit and Acit (as in Jain or Rāmānuja view) would be irrelevant to the aim and purpose of religion and philosophy, which is to evaluate phenomena and enable man to get out of the bondage of life which is the outcome of a misplaced assumption of his independence (*svātantryābhimāna*) in it¹.

1. यद्यपि, भावाभावतया चेतनाचेतनतया वा, नित्यानित्यतया वा द्वैविद्यं शक्यते बक्तुं, तथापि तस्य वैयर्थ्यादयमेव विभागो न्यायः । परतंत्रप्रमेयं स्वतंत्रप्रमेयायत्ततया विदितं हि निःश्रेय-साय भवति । अन्यथा, गंगावालुकादिपरिगणनवत् इदं तत्क्षसंख्यानमपार्थकं स्थात् । (*ibid*).

CHAPTER II

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO EARLIER AND CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS

The system of Madhva is founded on the continuous authority of a wide range of religious and philosophical literature of India which has been the main source of Indian thought, in its widest sense.:The history of the evolution of Madhva's thought from these source-books of his system and the history of its development at the hands of Madhva and his numerous commentators and expositors have been dealt with by me in the two volumes of my '*History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*'.

The present work aims at a fairly complete and comprehensive critical exposition of Madhva's philosophy, as presented in his own works and as further interpreted and elaborated by his illustrious commentator Jayatīrtha, in the first instance and by the famous dialectician of the Mādhva school, Vyāsarāya, who came a hundred and twentyfive years after Jayatīrtha.

If Indian philosophy is to be accepted as much more than an interpretation of certain basic texts and traditions, tho' not as completely detached from them, attempts should be made to present the various systems of thought and their logical, epistemological and ontological foundations and their metaphysical superstructure in their architectonic unity. The philosophical system of Madhva and his commentators has not received adequate attention, from this point of view.

No doubt, Indian philosophers, particularly the Vedāntins, have stressed the limitations of discursive thought and shown the possibilities of spiritual intuition in understanding the nature of reality, urging the necessity to correct and supplement the conclusions of pure logic and metaphysical speculations with the help of one's own intuitions and those of bygone generations, handed down thro' the Scriptures and intended to be recaptured in our own religious and spiritual experiences and discoveries.

But this is not to say that reason has had no part to play in the evolution of their thought. Philosophy, as an interpretation of reality, cannot spin out its theories *in vacuo*, away from the world of experience. As Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, perhaps a little too extravagantly, "the

Indian philosophers first arrive at a system of consistent doctrine and then look about for texts of an earlier age, to support their position. They either force them into such support or ingeniously explain them away" (*I. Phil.*, i. p. 130).

All schools of Indian philosophy, save the Cārvāka, show two main aspects in their system-building : one rational or philosophical and the other a dogmatic, textual, revelatory or authoritarian aspect. The former examines the fundamental presuppositions of thought and constructs a metaphysical theory on certain *a priori* epistemological and ontological foundations of its own, on which they erect a full-fledged system and correlate it to the interpretations of texts which have come to be regarded as ultimate sources of philosophical knowledge and inspiration, in the land and community of their birth and invested with special authority and sanction, on problems of philosophy. While accepting the judgments of established traditions and authority, on such problems, the Indian philosophers have, to an equal extent, used the methods of reasoned thought and criticism, to examine the presuppositions of their textual systems and the nature and constitution of their categories of thought and interpretation, in the light of independent proofs.

In doing so, they have always tried to make out a case for their respective theories before the bar of reason, on such unexceptionable criteria of system-building as adherence to a strictly philosophical method and outlook, sound logical deductions and analysis of principles, consistency of thought and faithfulness to experience. It is the business of philosophy to look at experience as a whole and take note of the suggestions forced upon it by the mind of man and confirm them as theories if they have the requisite explanatory value.

Such is the essence of the Hindu method of Tattvanirṇaya (truth-determination). In the body of any Siddhānta, then, there is a good deal of critical analysis and exposition of the principles of epistemology, logic and metaphysics of one's own school, together with a reasoned examination of those of other schools. As a modern writer¹ puts it "Philosophy is essentially a collective and co-operative business. Effective co-operation consists in disagreement. The true process of philosophy, as a science, is that of a Platonic dialogue, in which the propositions, objections and rejoinders of numerous interlocutors are found

1. Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Revolt of Dualism*, Open Court Publishing Company America,

focussed upon a given question and the argument shapes itself thro' its own immanent dialectic, to a conclusion". The Vikalpa method of Śāstric discussion in Sanskrit philosophical writings is nothing more than the Platonic dialogue in its perfect form. Every important doctrine of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, of the different schools of Indian philosophy, has been developed on the same lines. They are the result of a long and arduous process of thought-dissection. No doctrine or strand of philosophic belief can thus be put down as absolutely original, isolated from or uninfluenced by contemporary opinion or as devoid of a nexus with the past.

So closely are the two aspects of rational thought and textual interpretation and synthesis intertwined in most of the Indian schools that it is often difficult to pronounce any opinion whether they are actuated more by a predominantly philosophical purpose or an authoritarian outlook. They disclose both kinds of leanings and it is often a question of emphasis whether a given system is to be treated as being more speculative and rational than dogmatic and textual. Western scholars have generally held that the philosophy of the Vedānta is essentially dogmatic, being nothing more than a clever, ingenious and elaborate system of textual interpretation of the Prasthānas, doubtless with a good deal of philosophic insight and acumen. But its achievement cannot be accepted as truly philosophical, insofar as the pursuit of philosophy is not the outcome of a disinterested love of thought or a quest of truth, but has been undertaken to achieve individual salvation. Others regard the Vedānta as a truly philosophical system, in conception, method and execution. That it is bound up with the interpretation of sacred texts is only circumstantial in that true to Indian traditions, it has merely used material handed down by former generations, and built on its foundations a new and vigorous system of thought, reserving the fullest right of selection, emphasis, alteration and criticism, in the name of interpretation (Vyākhyāna). It embodies the greatest independence of thought and originality of conceptions under the guise of Reconciliation (Ekavākyatā) with the help of canons of interpretation. The commentators are seldom obliged to call a halt to philosophic speculation when faced with a trying or obscure text or with contradictory ones. They exercise their reason to synthesize and extract sense out of seeming enigmas and contradictions. In this they bid fair to direct the authorities, instead of their letting them

direct their thoughts.¹ In this sense, then, Indian philosophy can claim to be as genuinely philosophical in spirit as any other attempts made elsewhere, on the basis of pure reason. It is thus a purely *historical accident* that has made Indian philosophy textual tho' some are inclined to view it as incorrigibly text-ridden. The supreme place Madhva has assigned to the Sāksī as "Upajīvyapramāṇa" of Scripture, in the event of the latter encroaching on the legitimate jurisdiction of the former is a striking example of the unflinching rational outlook of Mādhwā thought. But with all the limitations imposed on the free movement of thought by the respect for texts and traditions, the Indian philosophers have shown themselves to be actuated by an essentially philosophic spirit like their compeers in the west and have risen to great heights in the art of philosophizing, which for alertness of mind, acuteness of thought and boldness of ideas, cannot be rivalled by others, claiming to be more scientific or free from dogmas. The achievements of Indian thought cannot, therefore, be said to be lacking in merit or devoid of a true philosophic spirit; tho' these are often hidden from view by the trappings of authority in which they are often clothed and concealed.

Criticism is the life-breath of Indian philosophical systems, as philosophic life, like biological, is governed by the same law of strife and survival of the fittest. Each of the older systems of thought should thus have contributed something to Mādhwā thought also, at least negatively, by way of material for criticism. It is not as if his system alone grew up *in vacuo*, without *reference* to anything that went before. Historical interpretation must admit, here, as in other cases of contact of minds, the impact of contemporary thought, and echoes of forgotten schools which tho' then out of court or not "living" must still have continued to exercise a great deal of intellectual influence on successive thought currents by their technique and methods of treatment, —in short, by laying down the high-ways and byways of thought along which all current ontological and epistemological progress had to be made with freedom to differ in details and conclusions.

The critical side of Madhva's system, consisting partly in its dialectical struggles with earlier schools both major and minor, shows how it was able not only to avoid their pitfalls and mistakes but also to absorb

1. Cf. Madhva's plea for interpreting "Tattvam asi" in conformity with Upajīvyapramāṇas. See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vol. II, pp. 120-24.

some of their good points, or improve upon them or transcend them into a higher system. That such impact of ideas is by no means denied in Madhva's case is clear from the description of his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* as a critique of twentyone earlier ones in the field. A critic is not an iconoclast out and out. He receives ideas while in the act of demolishing older opinions. The contact of minds is a very subtle affair. Deeper things happen there than meet the surface. As Vijayendra Tīrtha observes, in his *Madhyādhyā-Kantakoddhāra*, as an exponent of a new Prasthāna, Madhva exercised his right to agree with or differ from his compeers, to the full and in doing so rejected much that was cumbersome, or effete in the older theories and used whatever ideas were fundamentally sound tho' not in the same place or within the same design. Often in his criticisms, he rescued and rehabilitated ideas of permanent significance from the ill-balanced views of earlier and contemporary schools and realigned them to better advantage.

The Cārvāka system is condemned outright for its unmitigated hedonism. But its faith in the reality of experience and of sense-awareness is the pivot of realism which is accepted by Madhva. The Cārvāka is condemned, unreservedly for his hedonism, for his atheism and for his Materialism (Dehātmavāda); but not for his bold stand for the supremacy of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Only, he had stopped short at Pratyakṣa, refusing to go beyond, which is rather unphilosophical in that there are more things in the Universe than could be measured by Pratyakṣa alone. Enjoyment of life is no sin. One need not, like the Buddhist, give a counsel of despair to shun the world, abhor life and court gradual suicide or extinction. कुरु भुज्वत् च कर्म निजं नियतम् says Madhva with the salutary advice : हरिपादविनप्रधिया सततम् ; for one should not, like the Mīmāṃsakas, surrender the aim of life to a mess of pottage, Svarga, understood in the transient sense of a limited pleasure : अपाम सोममसृता अभूम् ! To take such a view of life's purpose is to miss the true goal of the Vedic philosophy of Karma, says Madhva. The Vedas enjoin the performance of sacrifices with set rewards, not from the highest point of view, but only in a limited sense. Karma-phala, attractive as it is, is not the ultimate intention or message of the Scripture. It is only an inducement to effort of the right kind¹ with a view to raising the spiritual standard of man higher and higher and taking him on and on the upward march, by stages.

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1. रोचनार्थी फलश्रुतिः (*Bhāg.* XI, 3, 46) यथा भैषज्यरोचनम् (xii, 21, 23).
कर्ममोक्षाय कर्मणि विधते हृगदं यथा (XI, 3, 44).

Karma is only a step in the ladder tho' a necessary one. It is not the be-all and end-all of scripture as the Mīmāṃsakas would have it. The best Karma is that performed without attachment and for the sake of no other reward than the satisfaction of God and as His worship : तत्कर्म हरितोषं यत् (*Bhāg.* iv. 29,49) वृणीमहे ते परितोषणाय (iv, 30,40) एतं ह्येव वीणायां गायन्ति (*Chān. Up.* i, 7,6). While accepting the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of Svataḥpramāṇya of Śabda, Madhva emphasizes that the highest subject-matter of the Veda is God and not merely a round of duties or acts of sacrifice.

Jain philosophy and moral code have some affinity to Madhva's thought. The new type of Vedic sacrifices with flour-made animals (*Piṣṭa-paśu yajnas*)¹ instead of living animals, introduced by Madhva as a much needed reform in Brahminical society was, in all probability, partly due to the moral pressure and influence of Jain ideas. A powerful community of Jainas inhabited the S. Kanara district then, as now. It was also under Jain rule in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Madhva's views on some questions of logic, epistemology and ontology show many striking parallels to and affinities with corresponding Jain theories, notably on the nature of the Universal (*Jāti*) and in the theory of the self as an object of perception (*Aham sukhi*) which is denied by the Advaitin. The recognition of certain types of cognitions like *Manalparyāya* and *Kevala* in Jain philosophy, corresponds in a measure, to the *Yogipratyakṣa* and *Kevala-Pramāṇa* of Madhva. The self-revelatory capacity of knowledge of the perceiver ज्ञातुरात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वं is based on the triunity of Jñātṛ, Jñeya and Jñāna, all of them being admitted to be revealed in knowledge. So also, the Jain conception of Substance in relation to its attributes, as a *distinction of reference and not of existence*: अनन्तवर्थात्मकं वस्तु as Haribhadra Sūri, puts it, is perfected by Madhva, by formulating the doctrine of "Savisesabheda", to hold the substance and attributes together, in one integrated mould. The further distinction of qualities or attributes as "Paryāya" and "Svabhāva", in Jain ontology, is parallel to Madhva's distinction of attributes into "Ayāvad-dravyabhāvi" and "Yāvad-dravyabhāvi". The Jain dichotomy of reality into Jīva and Ajīva appears in the form of Svatāntra and Paratantra, with greater philosophi-

1. The *M. Vij.* (IX, 44-50) refers to an actual performance of a *Piṣṭapaśuyāga*, under Madhva's direction and the opposition he had to encounter. For a work in defence of *Piṣṭapaśuyājña* see under VijayIndra Tīrtha, in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Lit.* Vol. ii, p. 187.

cal aptness and justification, as pointed out by Jayatirtha. The peculiar doctrine of the Jainas that the whole Universe is filled with Jīvas, is also shared by Madhva: परमाणुप्रदेशेषु ह्यनन्ताः प्राणिराशयः (VTN).

Madhva is not enamoured of the extreme realism of the Mīmāṃsakas. He recognizes the need for periodical creations and dissolutions of the Universe. He also sets right the extreme epistemological realism of the Prābhākaras and admits the possibility of error in human cognitions. He is for calling error by its proper name and not for confusing the issue by using misleading names like "Akhyāti", "Akhyātisamvalitasatkhyāti", and so on. But his realism does not demand that the object of illusions must have a reality of *its own elsewhere* (*anyatra sat*) as the Naiyāyikas would have it. If experience is any test, the object of illusions is an absolute unreality. At the same time, Madhva takes care to state that no illusions could be explained without the acceptance of two necessary reals,¹ – a substratum (*adhisthāna*) and a Pradhāna (prototype) of the superimposed object.

Madhva has rejected much that was defective, superfluous and outmoded, in the conceptions, categories, definitions and methodology (*Prakriyā*) of the older schools of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The interpretative principle of "Upakramaprābalya" of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is set aside by him in favor of the more logical "Upasamhāraprābalya", on the authority of the *Brahmatarka*.² He has given us his own revised views about the Vedāntic conceptions of Sākṣi, Svaprakāśatva, Bhāvarūpajñāna, Māyā, Pratibimba, etc. He has propounded a fresh doctrine of validity of knowledge with special reference to the principle of Sākṣi, as a corrective to all the earlier theories on the subject. Tho' traceable to some of the older sources referred to by him, the merit of these new doctrines lies in the scientific and forceful way in which he has developed their potentialities and fitted them into their proper places, in his own realistic metaphysics and elucidating their bearings

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1. अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं सत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना ।
न ब्राह्मिभवति क्वापि स्वप्नमायादिकेष्वपि ॥ (VTN.)

2. Madhva refers to the thesis of "Upasamhāraprābalya" in his *AV*.
उपक्रमादिलिङ्गानां वलीयोद्युतरोत्तरम् ।

The question has been fully discussed and established, refuting the counter-thesis of "Upakrama-prābalya" (of Advaitins) in Vyāsārāya's *T.T.*, and in the *Upasamhāra-Vijaya* of Vijayendra Tirtha. For a summary of their arguments see my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, Vol. ii. pp. 54-56 and 183-86

upon the different aspects of his thought. Similarly, his revised definition of 'Pramāṇa' as "yathārtham", so as to embrace all types of valid knowledge and its instruments and to ensure the validity of memory is a significant departure and advance on contemporary thought.

But, tho' open to the ideas of the older systems and their thought-patterns, Madhva has made many striking contributions of his own, in many important respects. It is these that entitle him to a place of honor in Indian philosophy. He has drawn the attention of the philosophical world to the imperative need for going in for a new set of concepts and categories like "Svatantra" and "Paratantra", Sākṣi, Viśeṣas, Bheda as *dharmisvarūpa* and as *savīśeṣābhinna* from it, "Svarūpabhedā and "Svarūpa-tāratamya" among selves, Bimbapratibimbabhāva relation between Brahman and Jivas and 'eternal creation' thro' "Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti". These ideas were so radically different from those till then entertained in dealing with philosophical questions, that if their necessity was demonstrated, the whole treatment of the problems of philosophy would change its drift and enter upon a fresh phase. We shall see something of this new aspect and direction of thought, ushered in by Madhva, in the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER III

MADHVA'S SAMANVAYA OF UPANIŚADIC PHILOSOPHY

Labels are convenient as a rule, tho' they might mislead at times. Insofar as Madhva admits a plurality of selves, for ever distinct from Brahman tho' always subject to and guided by It, his system might be tentatively regarded as a Pluralistic Theism. But it would not express the whole truth about the system, in its highest reach. There has been a persistent tendency, however, to represent the philosophy of Madhva as an "absolute Dualism". This has naturally prevented the system from getting its meed of recognition, as a sound philosophical system in the first place and a Vedāntic one at that; for most people have an aversion for the term "Dualism" which has some unpleasant associations. That apart, "Dualism" signifies the recognition of "*two independent principles*".¹ Madhva is *not*, certainly, a Dualist *in this sense*. It will be shown, presently, that neither the term "Dualism" nor its Sanskrit equivalent "Dvaita" is commensurate with the highest metaphysical ideology of Madhva's thought, which consists in the acceptance of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Being as the Source and explanation of all finite existence.

There is a fundamental difference in outlook between the 'dualism' of Madhva and those of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. Dualism has as much to do with the question of the *status of the reals* recognized, as with their *number*. Neither the Puruṣas nor the Prakṛti have, in Madhva's system, an *independent status* or functioning-capacity as in the Sāṃkhya :

शरीरेन्द्रियादिसंबन्धोत्पत्तौ या शक्तिः सा वीजशक्तिः । जीव एव तद्वानिति ब्रूते (साङ्क्षयः) न तु, तदीयां वीजशक्तिं तत्त्ववादिन इव भगवदधीनाम् ॥ (NS. p. 329).

Nor does it ascribe to God the position, merely, of an Onlooker (*Draṣṭā*) or a *deus ex machina*, or even of a co-operating force in the cosmic evolution, as is done by the Nyāya and Yoga schools. Mere Deism has no attraction for Madhva. God is not only above the universe; but *in it*. By virtue of these two aspects, He becomes the very ground of the reals,² the giver of their reality to them.

1. See Dogbert D. Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, 1902, p. 84.

2. cf. प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः ' तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यज्ञाभवत् '

' स जीवनामा भगवान् प्राणथारणहेतुतः ' ।

One distinguishing mark of the Vedānta in all its forms is the fundamental belief that everything in the Universe has to be traced to an absolute principle which is the ultimate source and explanation, both logical and ontological, of all else (सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्). Nothing in the world is self-explained or self-explicable. Brahman is the only self-explained reference of all. Such a transcendent reference is denied by the Sāmkhya : (या जगदुपानं सा प्रकृतिरेवोपादानत्वशक्तिमत्तिति ब्रूते । न पुनर्वेदवादिन इव तामपि शक्तिमीश्वरायत्ताम् (*NS.* p. 329) ; while its acceptance is by no means a strict metaphysical necessity in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or Yoga systems. The Vedānta, on the other hand, traces the world of matter and souls to Brahman, which is the cause of the world and gives meaning to its being and becoming.

This metaphysical dependence of the Universe on Brahman is differently conceived in the several systems of Vedānta. Sāmkara equates it with an *Adhyāsa* (appearance). The world of appearance would not be there but for the reality of the Brahman, which is superimposed on the world. It has no existence outside the Brahman's : (तदनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेणाभावः । *Sāmkara, B.S.B.* ii, 1. 14.). Śrīdhara explains the inner significance of the Advaitic position: ब्रह्मसत्त्वैव जगत्सत्यत्वम् as यत्सत्यतया मिथ्यासर्गोऽपि सत्यवद्वभासते (c. on *Bhāgavata*, i, 1, 1): "in virtue of whose reality, even the *unreal creation appears to be real*".

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, views the dependence of the world of matter and souls on God, on the analogy of the dependence of the human body on the soul, for its subsistence. God is the soul (*ātmā*) of the world. When the soul departs, the body perishes. So it would be, in the case of the world and the souls. While it remains perfectly true that our bodies cannot exist and function in the absence of the life-giving capacity of the soul, Madhva finds this analogy misleading insofar as the soul is not bound to the body as the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* theory of Brahman would appear to assume. The relation of body and soul does not also do complete justice to the more or less derivative being of matter and souls that is admitted in that system¹. It is all very well to say that identity means *Appṛthaksiddhi* or inseparable existence. But it would cut both ways. That seems hardly fair. The mutual depend-

cf. 1. सहकारिभिरारम्भे न स्वातन्त्र्यं विहन्यते ।
तत्सद्वावप्रवृत्योश्च स्वाधीनत्वव्यवस्थितेः ॥

(Vedānta Deśika).

ence (अपृथक्सिद्धि) between God and His 'body' (or attributes) viz., matter and souls, could not be of the same kind or order as exists or might be said to exist between God and his essential attributes of reality, knowledge and bliss. It is the inevitable implication of Rāmānuja's position that the Infinite cannot exist without its attributes of Cit and Acit which are *necessary* to it. Yet Rāmānuja himself is unable to concede so much in view of many texts to the contrary, especially *Gītā* ix, 4, wherein he admits frankly that the Cit and Acit contribute in no way to the existence of the Deity: मतिथ्यतौ तैर्न कविदुपकारः (R.G.B.). Here, for once, Rāmānuja gives up his theory of reciprocal dependence and equates inseparable existence (*avinābhāva*) as "dependence": अविनाभावथ नियम्य ग्योते 'मतः सर्वं प्रवर्तते' इत्युपकम एवोदिता (R.G.B. x, 21). The logical consequence of such a view is that the world of matter and souls is immaterial and non-essential to God in the end. Such a view is, however, inconsistent with Rāmānuja's general position that it has its basis in the *nature of God*. It is also difficult to conceive how Brahman could be said to be unchanging in view of the changing nature of his Viśeṣas (Cit and Acit). The modes change from subtle to gross state and *vice versa*. If these changes of modes make no substantial impression on the Brahman, they cannot be said to be grounded in its nature. But Rāmānuja, nevertheless, concedes that Brahman is *subject to change of some sort* in and thro' these changes of the modes themselves: उभयप्रकारविशिष्ट-नियन्त्रशे तदवस्थातदुभयविशिष्टारूपविकारो भवति (Śrībhāṣya, ii, 3, 18).

"Unless Rāmānuja is willing to explain away the immediate perfection of the Absolute and substitute for it a perpetually changing process, a sort of progressing perfection, he cannot give us any satisfactory explanation of the soul of the Absolute to its body" (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 716). That is why Madhva abandons the metaphor of 'body and soul' and the doctrine of 'reciprocal dependence' and the 'contribution theory', which it implies.¹

In his view, the world of matter and souls has come out and exists only as a result of an act of will of God, which is its *nimittakāraṇa*.

1. पारार्थलक्षणं हि शेषत्वम् । अतः शेषभूतो मुक्तः स्वप्रयुक्तेन केनचिदतिशयेन हि शेषिणं संयोजयति । आकिञ्चित्करस्य शेषत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

(*Nītimālā*, X, p. 74, Annamalai Uni. Skt. Ser.)

The 'contribution theory' would also have to concede that "God is *not absolute actuality, but is Himself in the making*" (Radhakrishnan, ii, p. 715) [Italics mine]

P. M.—2.

It cannot exist without his sufferance. This is the meaning of texts like : इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः स्थिः (*Mānd. Up.* 8) द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च (*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12). But the existence of matter and souls is, in the last analysis, immaterial to God : नहि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीथरस्यार्थः (*Madhva, B. T.* ii, 9, 31). It is the world that is bound to God, not He to it. The Universe is thus dependent on Brahman (ब्रह्मसमेक्ष) neither in the Advaitic nor in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sense of the term ; but as existing and functioning at God's will. The self-existent being of God would in no way have been affected if the world had never existed at all. The relation in which the world stands to Brahman is, thus, neither superimpositional as in Advaita, nor physical and intra-organic as in Viśiṣṭādvaita, but a trans-empirical one, symbolized by the idea of "Bimba-Pratibimbabhāvā," in which "Bimba" is defined as that which determines the *sattā*, *pratīti* and *pravṛtti* of the "Pratibimba," as will be made clear in Chapter XXXV. The statement that the world cannot exist without God means that it owes its very power of existence, functioning etc., to God and derives them from Him : तदधीनस्तापत्तिप्रवृत्तिमत् । The entire Universe is thus an expression of the Divine will¹. It is in His absolute power. He can make and unmake it all, at will. His power over it is absolutely unrestricted². Alone among Indian philosophers, Madhva would concede that, theoretically, there is nothing impossible or absurd in agreeing that God *can* create a world out of nothing, that He *could* bring into existence a Universe not unlike the one with which we are now familiar, without the aid of a pre-existent matter or souls. But the fact remains that He has *not*, in His infinite wisdom, *chosen to do so*. And all our philosophy has necessarily to take note of this and respect it. Similarly, He does not choose to destroy the eternal existence of Matter and Souls and other entities, even tho' they are all dependent on Him : तदधीनस्तापत्तिपि तेन नोत्सायते (*Tdyt.* p. 9).

Madhva introduces the symbolism of "Bimbapratibimbabhāvā", (Original and Reflection) in place of "Adhiṣṭhānāropyabhāvā", and "Sarīraśarīribhāvā" of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, to illustrate the nature of the dependence of the selves on God. It is intended to avoid the defects of assuming an *unreal* or a *reciprocal dependence* and establish, in their place, a real but unilateral dependence of all finite reality upon the Independent, for its existence, knowledge and activity. On

1. स्वमतिप्रभवं जगदस्य यतः । (*Dvādaśa-Stotra*)

2. cf. भस्म कुर्याजगदिदं मनसैव जनार्दनः । (*Mbh.* iv, 67, 18)

the Advaitic view of Āropa, the *adhiṣṭhāna* cannot confer any true reality on the superimposed or *sustain* it of its own free will, as God does¹, in respect of the world. Creation, then, would be completely mechanical and unregulated by a purposive will. The knowledge of the substratum, on the Advaita view, far from *sustaining* the illusion, would destroy it, at once. Hence, the relation between the world, God and souls would not be a *true and permanent one* as it appears from texts like: सत्यस्य सत्यम् । नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्, on this view. But the Original or "Bimba," as conceived by Madhva, *does sustain* the reflection (*pratibimba*) while maintaining its own transcendence and without making the *pratibimba* an intraorganic part of itself. The mutual relation of विब्रतिविवभाव would be *permanent and true of all states of the Jīva (and Jāda)* and not merely a *passing one* true of Samsāra alone (as their अविद्यानारोप्यभाव would be). There will be no destruction of the *Pratibimba* so long as the contact of Upādhi is intact. The function of an "Upādhi" is to manifest the *Pratibimba*. In the present case, it is the pristine nature of the *Jivasvarūpa* itself as *Cit* that would suffice to manifest itself, to itself in its true nature of metaphysical dependence on and similarity with the Supreme, in release. (cf. स्वयमेवात्र प्रदर्शकः । चित्तात् । Madhva, G.B.) This power of self-revelation is hidden in Samsāra (B. S. iii, 2, 5; iii, 2, 19.)

Hence, the *Pratibimbavatva*, tho' a fact, always, is *not* realized in full, in bondage. It is by means of its internal "Viśeṣas" that the soul acts as its own medium (upādhi) in realizing its true relation of dependence etc., to the Supreme. It is in this sense that an "Upādhi" is at all called for, to manifest to the individual his own *Svarūpa* and his relation to God. As this true *Svarūpa*, free from all impurities, constitutes the essence of the *Jīva*, it is termed "*Svarūpopādhi*", in Mādhva terminology. The term *Pratibimba* would be misleading, if understood in its popular sense of an 'appearance' brought about by a material and an external medium. This is *not* the sense in which the figure of *Pratibimbavatva* is used and meant to be understood, in Madhvāsiddhānta (See B. S. B. iii, 2, 18.)

Madhva takes us to the extreme limit of Divine transcendence. The Supreme is independent of all accessories in creation :

1. Cf. गतिभैर्ती प्रभुः साक्षी निवासः शरणं सुहृत् ।

गामविश्वं च भूतानि धारयामि ।

(*Gītā*).

शक्तोऽपि भगवान्विष्णुरकर्तुं कर्त्सन्यथा¹
स्मिन्नं कारणाभिन्नं सिन्नं विश्वं करोत्यजः (AV.)

Tho' capable of doing without accessories or making such changes in them as *He* pleases, God, out of his own free will, has made the world different from Himself and *भिन्नाभिन्न* from its material cause (*Prakṛti*). Jayatīrtha, in explaining this point, shows how the practical and theoretical aspects of God's omnipotence are to be reconciled, in accordance with the Śruti.

Taking his stand on Bimbapratibimbabhāva as the only satisfactory metaphysical relation that would do full justice to and correctly represent the Svābhāvika-sambandha between God and his creation, Madhya finds the key to the reconciliation of the "Bheda" and "Abheda" Śrutis in the twin ideas of "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" that underlie the very conception of Bimbapratibimbabhāva. The Bhedaśrutis, bearing testimony to the reality of the world of matter and souls, speak the truth from the point of view of factual existence and dependence of all finite reality on God. The Abhedaśrutis speak the truth from the point of view of the utter transcendent majesty and Independence of One Supreme Principle. There is no essential contradiction in accepting the reality of both these truths. The mistake lies in pressing for "Svarūpaikya" by abolishing the finites (as unreal) or in treating them as an intra-organic part of the Infinite, which would destroy its homogeneity. The "Svatantra" of Madhva is not a mere theological concept, into which all plurality is sacrificed. It is a philosophical idea corresponding to the Spinozistic conception of substance, defined as *res completa*, "complete in itself, determined by itself, and capable of being explained entirely by itself". Such substantiality is possessed only by Brahman. The Pratibimba

1. "अन्यथा" कारणैर्विना कर्तुं शक्तोऽपि हरिः कारणान्तराण्युपादायैव करिष्यामीति स्वेच्छानियतः कारणैरेव जगत्सृजति । एवं "अन्यथा" प्रकृत्या अहंकारमहंकारेण महान्तमियेवं, तथा प्रकृतिं निमित्तीकृत्य कालादिकं चोपादानीकृत्य कर्तुं शक्तोऽपि, एतेनैवेदमुपादानीकृत्यैवेदं स्वक्षयामीति स्वेच्छानियतो नियतैः कृत्यैरेव स्वनियतसत्ताशक्त्यादिमद्विरेव, तथा "नियतैः" स्वनियतसत्ताशक्त्यादिमद्विरेव कारणान्तरैरिदं जगत्करोतीति योजना ।

इदमुक्तं भवति —यदुक्तमीश्वरस्य कारणोपादनगियमोऽस्ति न वेति, तत्रास्तीति ब्रमः । तथा च प्रकृत्यादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तम् । स च नियमो न कुलालादेरिव तान्यपहाय व्यत्यस्य वा करणे शक्त्य-भावनिबन्धनः । येन, तस्य स्वातंत्र्यमन्येषां पारतंत्र्यं च न स्यात् । किं नाम, स्वेच्छानियमत एव (*NS. II*, p. 299).

cannot be complete in itself, is not determined by itself and is not capable of being explained by itself.

The true reconciliation of finite and infinite must be based on this basic fact. Hence, Madhva holds that God or Brahman is the *only Independent Reality* or the highest reality, so to speak (Cf, अद्वैतं नाम यदुच्यते तत् भगवदपेक्षयेर्थः Madhva *Chān. Up. c.*) that exists. Everything else, Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, Karma etc., is *ex hypothesi* dependent on Brahman for its very existence and functioning, tho' not *created* by It *de novo*. As dependent reals, they do *not* constitute a 'challenge' to the Absolute or a limitation of It. Their existence is not irreconcilable with the existence of Brahman in any metaphysical sense. Madhva thus rises to the highest level of Transcendentalism while still keeping his feet firmly on the *terra firma* of facts, without sacrificing the reality of the world and its values or abolishing the individuals, in the last analysis. If philosophy is an interpretation of reality as a whole, it must have relation to the facts of life and experience. However high and for however long the philosopher might soar on the naked peaks of the Absolute, he must, at last, set his feet on hard earth. *We cannot deny this world to have the other.* Madhva indicates the right "angle of Brahman" (ब्रह्मशिं) from which the philosopher should look at the world of matter and souls :

इत्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया (*Bhāg. ii, 10, 12*).

इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिवेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभवः । (*Bhāg. i, 5, 20*).

नहि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीश्वरस्यार्थः (*B.T. ii, 9, 31*).

यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदिस्तेव भण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदेऽपि मिथो निल्यं स्वरूपतः (*B.T. ii, 5, 2*).

देवतानां स्वभावोऽपि स्वरूपमापि सर्वदा ।

तदधीनं यतो यामी * * * ॥

स्वभावसत्तादातृत्वं यंत्रत्वमिति कीर्त्यते (*Bṛh. Up. c. p. 45*)

काल आसीत् पुरुष आसीत् परम आसीत् तद्यदासीत् तदाश्रितमासीत् तदधीनमासीत् । अथ हैक एव परम आसीत् यस्यैतदासीत् । न हैतदासीत् (*Śruti q. B. S. B. ii, 1, 17*).

नहि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते (*Brh. Up. C. IV, 4, 14*).

अद्वैतं परमार्थतः (*Mān. Up. i, 17*)

यदद्वैतं नामोच्यते तत् "परमार्थतः" भगवदपेक्षयेर्थः (*Chān. Up. C. II, 22*).

In his *Bhāgavata-Tātparya*, rising to the highest pitch of Transcendentalism, he distinguishes the highest reality from mere existence. What is truly real is what has being in itself and for itself. Such reality is possessed only by Brahman :

पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमभिधीयते ।
तद्विष्णोरेव नान्यस्य तदन्येषां सदास्तिता (B.T. XI, 24, 1).

The others, especially Prakṛti and Purusas, insofar as they *depend* for their very existence and activity on the Supreme, merely *exist* from eternity. They cannot lay claim to be *as real* (Independent) as the Supreme. In a hypothetical sense, then, it is even permissible to speak of them "*as if not-existing*" or "*other than real*".² Such descriptions in Scripture should not blind us to the *fact* of their actual existence distinct from Brahman and in complete dependence on It. We are welcome to hold that dependence signifies want of substantiality in the Spinozistic sense of the term. Madhva would not be perturbed by this and would accept the contention. But it does not deprive a thing of its *reality*. Reality, in other words, is not the same as "*substantiality*", in the highest philosophical sense. It is just uncontradicted existence (अनारोपितं प्रमितिविषयः). We have no right to deny the reality of the world (of matter and souls), simply because it is not *independent* or does not exist in the same form, *always*. It is *there*, *has been there* and *will be there*, changing and depending always on Brahman. Even the eternal substances, we have seen, are *not exempt from creation, in a sense*, in Madhva's philosophy. *Such* creation is the badge of the finite तदशतकापनाथर्थमेव सृष्टिः । Why there should, at all, be such a world of matter and souls, or why God should *tolerate* their existence, is more then what any philosophy could answer. Nor is it its business to do. The only Theistic answer to such a query is that given by Jayatīrtha :

ननु, शक्तस्यापि परमेश्वरस्य तत्त्वियमातुसरणेच्छा कुतः ? इति चेत् । किं कारणं पृच्छासि ?
उत ज्ञापकम् ? आद्ये, स्वभावोऽयमिति ब्रमः । द्वितीये श्रुतिप्रसिद्धेरिति । (NS. p. 289)

Tho' Brahman can do very well without Prakṛti or Purusas, It prefers, in its infinite glory and inexorable will, to *do with them* ! Such

1. Cf. 'न हेतदासीत्' 'द्वैतमित्र भवति'

Also "Quo comparata neo pulchra sunt, neo bona sunt, neo sunt"
(St. Augustine. Con. XI, 4).

2. यदाविरासीत् अनृतस्य सर्वम् । (Śruti q. by Madhva B. S. B. i, 1, 1.,)

'dependence' (*apeksā*) of Brahman on things which are in themselves dependent on It, is no mark of inferiority or limitation. It is, at the most, a self-limitation out of its own free will and even that attests and enhances its majesty :

साधनानां साधनत्वं यदात्माधीनमिष्यते ।
तदा साधनसम्पत्तिरैश्चर्ययोतिका भवेत् ॥

The dependent is often treated as of "no consequence" and having *no separate status* :

नहि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4, 14).
यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्रादित्येव भण्यते (*B. T.* ii, 5, 2).
न वै वाचो न मनांसि इत्याचक्षते, 'प्राणा' इत्येवाचक्षते ।
(*Chān. Up.* v, 1, 15).

All this would show that Madhva has given earnest thought to the position and status of the reals in his system, with the insight and imagination of a true philosopher. He has substituted a Brahman-centric view for the ego-centric interpretation of Upanisadic thought. It is a pity that missing this distinction of Madhva's philosophy, some historians of Indian philosophy should have tried to dismiss him as belonging "more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India"! He has shown that if we are to avoid playing tricks with *evidence*, the only satisfactory synthesis of the conflict between "dvaita" and "advaita" Śrutiś, in the Upaniṣads, would be in the adoption of the idea of the One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Reference of all phenomena. He has no sympathy with the reckless monism of Saṃkara which is indifferent alike to the hopes and aspirations of man and reduces the panorama of creation to a random illusion.¹ At the same time, he is not for ascribing false perfection of any kind to the world of matter and souls. It is given just what is its due and nothing more. The world and the souls are real in that they are Anāropita,—not the effect of any superimposition or *Adhyāsa*, or personal delusion. *Independent* they are not; and God is greater than His creation;² and is *immanent* in it. Such, in a nutshell, in the position

1. Cf. अपि च, नेयं पारमार्थिकी सुष्टुः । नहि द्विचन्द्रालातचकगन्धर्वनगरादिविभ्रमा समुद्दिष्टप्रयोजना भवन्ति (*Bhāmatī*, ii, 1, 33).

2. सारतो जगतः कृत्स्नादतिरिक्तो जनार्दनः । (*Mbh.* iv, 67, 17).

of Madhva. When we emphasize the existence of subordinate reals side by side with the Independence of Brahman, we have a Dualism or, more properly, a Theistic Realism. When we think exclusively of the transcendence of Brahman and isolate or abstract It from everything else, we may and do sometimes resort to the 'language of monism'. Such, according to Madhva and Jayatīrtha, is the summit level of Upaniṣadic thought. Jayatīrtha expounds this ultimate synthesis of Upaniṣadic thought, with his characteristic clarity and brilliance :

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यानि असंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविभूरं एकस्पमेव परं ब्रह्म
 * * * प्रतिपादयन्ति । किंतु, १) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्वसौन्दर्यादीर्यादीर्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया; २) कानिचित् अपहृतपापमत्वनिर्दुःखत्वभौतिकदेहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावविशिष्टतया ३) कानिचित्दतिगहनताज्ञापनाय अवाङ्मनसगोचरत्वाकरेण; ४) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्मैवोपादनोयाद्वितीयत्वेन : ५) कानिचित् सर्वसत्त्वप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तात्प्राप्तिपत्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवाभावनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति । ततो व्याकुलबुद्धयो गुरुसंप्रदायविकलः सर्वत्राप्येकरूपतामनुसन्दधाना वेदं छिन्दन्ति (N.S. p 123).

[All the Upaniṣadic texts, without exception, speak the glory of Brahman, which is the abode of infinite attributes and free from all imperfection. Of these, some (1) represent It as endowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner rulership, munificence, beauty and so on. (2) Others represent It as free from all such limitation as sin, misery, liability to physical embodiment etc. (3) Yet others describe It as beyond the reach of mind and speech to bring home to us its comparative inaccessibility. (4) Others depict It as the Only One that exists in order that we might all seek it to the exclusion of everything else. (5) Others represent It as the Self of all, that It might be taken as the source of all existence, knowledge and activity. But confused heads miss the central unity of Vedic teaching amidst the multiplicity of approaches and introduce artificial distinctions of standpoints like Saguṇa and Nirguṇa, Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika, in interpretation.]

This new synthesis of Upaniṣadic philosophy propounded by Jayatīrtha, in the light of Madhva's interpretation of the Vedānta, would be seen to be more satisfying than the characterless monism (Nirviśeṣādvaita) of Śāmkara, on the one hand and the intraorganic monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita) of Rāmānuja, which hardly allows Brahman to

exist by itself. "Svatantrādvitiya-Brahmavāda¹" (or Bimba-Pratibimba vāda), if we might so agree to designate the philosophy of Madhva, would appear to be logically the more consistent and philosophically the more commensurate solution of the problem of the finite and infinite. The Advaitin altogether ignores the relative aspect and existence of the Universe and the souls, for all time; while the Viśiṣṭādvaitin detracts from the self-sufficiency of God by his intra-organic conception of their relation. The new synthesis of Madhva has the advantage of preserving these two vital elements in proper blend. Under the terms of

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्तम्भावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुप्रहृतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्ष्या ॥ (*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12).

which is the corner-stone of Madhva's new synthesis, Brahman as Svatantra is implied in the very existence of the relative and the Paratantra.

1. This new designation first suggested by me, in 1936, received the approval of the late Śrī Satyadhyāna Tīrtha Svamiji of the Uttarādi Mutt, the greatest authority on Dvaita philosophy in recent times. It was later adopted as the title of one of my works on Madhva's philosophy, published in 1942. Dr. Radhakrishnan refers to "the implicit monism" of Madhva (*I. Phil.* i. p. 40.). In recent years, H. N. Raghavendrachar has claimed that Madhva's philosophy should rightly be called by the name of "Brahmādvaita" and that Madhva is a true Monist in the truest sense of the term. Alur Venkatarao of Dharwar prefers to call it "Pūrnabrahmavāda." All this is a sign that philosophical interest among the followers of Madhva is very much alive and resurgent.

CHAPTER IV.

MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Madhva's philosophical categories differ much in their scope and function from those of contemporary schools. Sometimes the nomenclature is retained; but the conception is different. In other cases, everything, including names, is different. Madhva is generally allergic to over-elaboration of details and picturesque Prakriyās, in the establishment of his theories. A robust commonsense and a rigid adherence to the tests of truth characterize his logic and epistemology. He does with the barest minimum of metaphysical presuppositions. His theories disclose both realistic and idealistic trends, in important respects. He does not shrink from them because of their scholastic affiliations with this or that system of contemporary philosophy. His acceptance of 'Sa-viśeṣabheda' (identity-in-difference) between substance and attributes and between "Difference" and its substratum (*dharmī*) shows a strong idealistic bent. On the other hand, his rejection of the Universal (*sāmānya*) shows an extreme realistic attitude undreamt of in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Realisms. There is, therefore, little truth in the assumption that "the philosophical side of Madhva's teaching is mainly based on the Pre-Madhva realisms like those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā" or that "he makes a clever use of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, in the development of his views".

Madhva is original in his ontological theory of Svatantra and Para-tantra, which is the keynote of his philosophy and in his philosophical ideal of a Svatantra-advitiya-Brahman, to which it leads. The concept of "Difference" is given an entirely new orientation by the acceptance of "Viśeṣas". Of course, categories like substance, quality, generality, existence, time, space, causation and the like are the common problems of philosophy. But it is the distinctiveness and merit of their conceptions that mark one philosopher from another. So it is with Madhva. His views on the nature of Substance and its relation to the qualities "possessed" by it, and on Space and Time, are quite different from those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Realists and are, in many respects, strikingly modern and far ahead of contemporary views. He has four new categories : Viśiṣṭa, Amṛti, Śakti and Sādrśya, not recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists. He rejects the Samavāya (inherence) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism, *in toto*. He makes his "Viśeṣas" do duty for Samavāya. But his Viśeṣas have nothing, *save their name*, in common

with those of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Tho' a Bhedavādin, he does not subscribe to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view that substance and attributes should be absolutely different or externally related (by Samavaya as in Nyāya). Nor does he accept the Bhāṭṭa view of their identity-cum-difference (*bhedābheda*), in all cases. He dismisses the dogma of युणे गुणानन्तीकारः that a quality cannot reside in another, as unproved.¹ He has no use for the universal essence (Jāti) and *anugatasattā* of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools. He holds a position akin to that of Nominalists that difference and resemblance (*sādṛśya*) are both unique and *sui generis* in each case, tho' perceived thro' a counter correlate (*pratiyoginirupya*), thus effectively barring the argument from universals to Monism. He is as much opposed to the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṃkhya as to the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya. He does not agree with the Nyāya that the mind is only inferentially established thro' non-simultaneity of cognitions.² It is, to him, intuitively established (Sākiṣvedya)—which has great psychological significance.

There are fundamental differences between Madhva and other Realists in regard to the theory of knowledge and error, on the question of the sources of validity of knowledge, the status of Memory as a valid source of knowledge, on the admissibility of indeterminate perception, the nature of soul, self-consciousness, God and ultimate release. His conception of Sāksī as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validity, is essentially built on Vedāntic foundations. He is concerned more with the philosophical status of the world and the selves than with any qualitative and quantitative analysis of phenomena and their properties, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; or with their physical and intellectual classification of Padārthas. He sets himself, in the spirit of a true philosopher, to discover and elucidate the nature of the highest principle behind the cosmos. The Universe is not self-sufficient or self-important to a Vedāntin, as it might be to a Sāṃkhya or a Naiyāyika. There is nothing to be gained by too much preoccupation with it. It would be enough if it is realized as, at all times, dependent on Brahman³ and controlled by It, in all stages of its being and becoming. This is the main point emphasized by all schools of Vedānta, from different angles. Madhva, also, approaches the Universe from this particular angle. The

1. अस्मत्पक्षे गुणाद्याद्वा तद्वन्तो हि विशेषतः (AV.)

2. युगपञ्जनानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ।

3. ईशावास्यामिदं सर्वं यत्किंच जगत्यां जगत् (Iśa. Up.)

doctrine of the world is only an “*Apara-Siddhānta*” or subsidiary truth (*ānuśāṅgika*) to the doctrine of Brahman, says Madhva.¹ His system therefore, has its roots in the Aupaniṣada standpoint and cannot be treated as divorced from it. It is true that Vedāntic systems have made extensive use of the categories and thought-measuring devices of the Logical Realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the metaphysical bearings of Madhva's system could not be grasped except as a reaction against the different types of Monism that preceded it, such as the pure monism of Śāṃkara (Nirviśeṣādvaita), the correlative or intra-organic monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita) of Rāmānuja and the transmutative Pantheism (Brahmaparināmavāda) of Vṛttikāra, Bhāskara, Brahmadatta, Yādavaprakāśa and others, within a strictly Vedāntic set-up. Madhva's agreement with non-Vedāntic realisms is in respect of the general principles of empirical realism such as the acceptance of the reality of the world of difference, the possibility of knowledge, the scheme of Pramāṇas and the dualism of matter and spirit. But the conception, aim and philosophical significance of his categories are quite different from the scholastic traditions of these schools. These have been evolved by Madhva, as a result of independent cogitation and a critical analysis of the principles and categories of contemporary Vedāntic schools, in the light of materials gathered from an older school of Vedāntic Realism, traces of which are found in the texts from *Brahmatarka* and other sources cited by him. For purposes of logical refutation of other schools, including the Vedāntic, Madhva and his followers have freely drawn upon the dialectical machinery of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools. They have utilized it in self-defence against the Advaitins and in refuting the criticisms of the Advaitins themselves, on all earlier forms of realistic thought, as reorientated in the light of their own special theories. They have also used it in the constructive exposition of their own Siddhānta. This excessive use of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika methodology of logical dialectics, in the later phases of the Mādhva school, tended, in the popular estimation, to give it an air of being an absolute 'Dualism' fighting for the reality of every human being and particle of matter in the Universe, as a birthright and as being of the same order and degree as that of the Supreme Being. But the keynote of Madhva's philosophy has always been the acceptance of the ONE INDEPENDENT REAL as परसिद्धान्त and all the rest as of secondary importance : विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्षे हि महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ।

1. द्विविधः सत्सिद्धान्तः । परापरभेदात् * * * अनेनापरसिद्धान्तात्तरमाह * * * उपलक्षणं चैतत् । प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वादिक्लापि ग्राहम् । (*NS.* p. 518 b).

By applying the doctrine of *Savisesabhedā* to Brahman, Madhva preserved its complete homogeneity, without sacrificing the infinite richness of its qualitative content, thereby introducing a more dynamic conception of Brahman thro' the doctrine of identity-in-difference, *for the first time in Indian thought*. His theory of "Viśeṣas" is the life-breath of the doctrine of identity-in-difference. Without it, it would be impossible to conceive of an identity-in-difference, in any school of thought, ancient or modern. Since no other school has accepted the "Viśeṣas", the credit for the philosophical conception of "identity-in-difference," should also go to Madhva. This theory of Viśeṣas is his most outstanding contribution to the stock of philosophical ideas in Indian thought. Its elasticity and resilience to admit of internal distinctions of reference without the disadvantage of "difference", "difference-cum-identity", "Samavāya" or "fictitious difference" (*kalpitabhedā*), thro' the resources of the substance itself, replaces many worn out and outmoded conceptions of Time, Space, Causation and Creation, by more satisfactory ones. This is no small contribution to thought.

In the field of epistemology, also, his contributions have been outstanding and, in some respects, far ahead of his time. His comprehensive definition of *Pramāṇa* and its clear distinction into "Kevala" and "Anu"; and above all, his conception of the *Sākṣī* as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validity are front-rank contributions to epistemology. There is nothing approaching it in any other system of Indian philosophy. It remains Madhva's unique contribution to the theory of knowledge. Its repercussions on Realism in modern thought are sure to be fruitful, if properly exploited. His own Realism is thereby established on the firm philosophical foundations of intuitionism, instead of on empiricism pure and simple. Similarly, his thesis of "Bimbapratibimbabhāvā" between God and soul is a new conception that goes beyond all contemporary attempts to solve the problem of the eternal and mutual relation between God and the finite selves. "Bheda" (difference) in the sense of pure exclusion, between Jīva and Brahman, has no attraction for Madhva. He is not satisfied with a mere external master-and-servant relation between God and Soul.¹ God can neither be excluded from the Jīva at any stage of his being; nor can the individual be utterly merged in the Supreme. The only way in which he could retain his individuality of orbit and yet be bound to the Supreme by a

1. Cf. पारतन्त्र्यमात्रोक्तौ तु, राजपुरुषवदेव प्रतीतिः स्यादिति ॥

(Jayatīrtha *Tdyt* p. 29).

natural attraction of being is thro' the relation of *Bimbapratibimbabhāva*. It is not extinction of individual consciousness but its sublimation in tune with the Infinite¹ that is at the root of the conception of *Bimbapratibimbabhāva* between the Supreme and the individual. This touches Mysticism at a crucial point.

It will be seen that Madhva's views on the *Svarūpabhedā*, *Tāratamya*, and *Traividhya* among souls make important contributions to the problems of Evil, Freedom and Freewill. He does not promise *Sarvamukti*. But as a broad hypothesis of human nature and destiny, in the widest sense, his views on those questions are not without their strong points ; tho' there may be many other philosophers who may not be disposed to take such a rigid view of the diversity of human nature and destiny. Madhva, for his part, would argue that the business of philosophy is to tell the truth, — whether it pleases or irritates and not simply to indulge in pious platitudes and pleasant imaginings. His theory is a logically derived conclusion. It goes beyond the commonly accepted explanation of the theory of Karma in *Vedānta*, as an ultimate explanation of the inequalities of life. It points out that if the inequalities of life are to be explained satisfactorily, the theory of Karma, which is supposed to explain such inequalities, must, in the last analysis, take its stand on the basic differences in the "svabhāva" (nature) of the souls themselves. The plurality of selves which is experienced by us will have to be grounded on something that is more fundamental than *Prākṛtic* vestures and influences, including Karma. If that something is not there, the law of Karma itself would be a cruel joke upon humanity. It is *Svarūpabhedā* alone that would supply the missing link in the theory of Karma. Madhva has shown great boldness of spirit in detecting this weakpoint in the theory of Karma, as generally advanced in Hindu philosophy, and rectifying it by filling the gap in the theory with his doctrines of *Svarūpabhedā*, *Tāratamya* and *Traividhya*, among souls. Considering the importance of the Karma theory in Hindu philosophy, Madhva's emphasis on *Svarūpabhedā* of Souls would be seen to put the whole theory of Karma itself in a better light, for the first time, in Indian thought.

1. Cf. कामेन मे काम आगात् (*T. A.* iii, 15, 2).

नित्यसिद्धत्वात् सादृश्यस्थ नित्यानन्दज्ञानादेः, न भक्त्यादिना प्रयोजनमित्यतो ब्रवीति —
अम्बुदप्रहणात् न तथात्पूर्व (*B. S.* iii, 2, 19). अम्बुदत् स्लेहेन ! प्रहणं ज्ञानम्।
भक्तिं विना न तत् सादृश्यं सम्यगभिव्यज्यते । (*Madhva, B. S. B.*)

II. ONTOLOGY

CHAPTER V.

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL THEORY

As already explained in the Introduction, Madhva Ontology turns upon two principal ideas of being, viz., reality and independence. The former represents the idea of reality expressed in space-time relations pertaining to the world of matter and souls. The other is the transcendental aspect of reality, that is characteristic of the Deity alone. Reality, in the ordinary sense of the term, may consist in one or more of the three aspects of existence, consciousness and activity : स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणासत्तात्-विद्यम्, as Jayatīrtha refers to them. This idea is found in other systems as well, as in the Advaita, where existence (*asti*), consciousness (*bhāti*) and bliss (*priyam*) are appropriated to Brahman (*brahmaṇam*);¹ or in Buddhism, which defines phenomenal reality (*Paratantrasatya*) in terms of practical efficiency (*arthakriyākārityam*).

Appearance and Reality

Madhva defines reality as 'what is unsuperimposed' (अनारोपितम्) with a rider: प्रमितिविषयः ('and is an object of knowledge'). This embraces Vātsyāyana's definition of the real: सत् सादिति ग्रहमाणं अथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वम्। The difference between the real and the unreal lies in this—the former is or, under specific and known conditions, may be the object of direct perception, while the unreal would appear in erroneous perceptions *only*. The tortoise-hair, tho' unsuperimposed (because it is not a fact) is not a reality as it is not an object of direct perception to any one. Thus, both the terms in the definition are necessary to have an adequate conception of the real. The above definition bars the possibility of a real existing somewhere, without being given as an actual psychological fact in immediate apprehension, such as "a comet rushing thro' unpeopled space, entirely unheheld." For, Madhva, like Bradley, would argue that the real is present to the mind of God as a system of presentations, even when our perception of it is suspended or is not there; or even in respect of realities which no human subject perceives : विश्वभीष्मः सदा पश्यति (Tdy). Madhva derives this

1. cf. आस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्यशप्त्वकम् ।

आद्यं त्रयं ब्रह्मरूपं जगद्वूपं ततो द्वयम् ॥ (Drgdrśya-Viveka, 20)

epistemological doctrine from his interpretation of the Upaniśadic text : तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम् (*Kaṭha Up.*). This is the implication of his metaphysical doctrine that all acts of consciousness (*pramiti*) by the dependent selves (*Cetana*) are ultimately dependent on God's (प्रभितौ पराधीनम्). He would not, therefore, agree with the views of modern Realists that the fundamental characteristic of what is real lies in its *independence* of all relation to the experience of a subject. This is the reason why Madhva rejects the definition of *Svaprakāśatva* in Advaita as "unknowability" as an object of knowledge (*avedyatvam*). The existence of the Ātman must be a part of an experience of the ātman himself : न च स्वप्रकाशत्वमपि विना मानं सिद्धयति. The failing of intuitionism is that it offers no account of the way in which things are known. The addition of the explanatory phrase "intuitively" (*svaprakāśatyena*) seems only to deny an explanation, tho' seeming to give one :

प्रमाणाभावे, सत्यत्वं न स्यात् इत्यस्य, प्रमाणेन विना सिद्धयतीत्यस्यानुसरत्वात् ।
सिद्धयपायान्तरस्यानुपन्यस्तत्वात् । (V.T.Nt, p. 96 b)

Madhva's definition of reality as *Anāropitam* raises the question of the nature and limitations of reality. Is mere existence "reality"? Is 'appearance of existence' reality? Or, is *real existence* in space and time; or else, real existence for *all time and thro' all space*? It is here that the issue assumes its familiar philosophical aspect. We have here one of the dividing lines of philosophical systems which splits them into different schools. Sāṃkara's approach to metaphysics is said to lie in his making a *philosophical distinction* between existence and reality, as against the commonsense view that accepts surface phenomena as real. "If all that occurs or what we perceive were true, there would be no false appearances. Dissatisfaction with the first view of things is the mother of all philosophy. While commonsense accepts surface-phenomena as real, reflective thinking asks if the first view is also the final view. The purpose of philosophy is to distinguish the unreal from the real, the transient from the eternal".¹ This distinction between the existent and the real is the point of departure between physics and metaphysics. The Platonic distinction of the actual and the ideal, the Matter of the Milesians, Empedoclean element, Pythagorean numbers, all these represent the persistent attempt of philosophers all thro' the ages, to locate the real behind the apparent. No philosopher would be worth his salt, if he did not undertake such an analysis into the nature of being. Modern philosophy

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* i, p. 527.

has been dallying with the same problems for centuries, under different names. Descartes and Spinoza were both obsessed with it. Wolff and Kant merely changed the names and opposed 'phenomena' to 'noumena'. Hegelian philosophy distinguished 'being' from 'existence'. Modern Science also has its own theories of phenomena as the splitting up of electric energy¹.

The distinction is not, however, the monopoly of idealistic thinkers. Madhva, as a realist, readily admits the criticism of Bradley that between recognizing a datum and blindly recognizing its content as a reality, there is a world of difference. There is room in experience for both truth and illusions². Our senses need not always be veridical.

Appearance is not reality. But there is no reason why existence should not be. Even the critical philosopher like Kant, in holding that the thing-in-itself cannot be objectively known, would appear to recognize objective experience as a reality. To say that the objects do not *exist* simply because they do not *persist*, is an unwarranted perversion of logic. It involves a confusion between opposites and distincts. Distinction is not denial. If an object perceived in a given setting does not exist at another place and time, we cannot rush to the conclusion that it is unreal. Existence, then, is a test of reality. Madhva would define "satyam" as existence at (some) time and place (किञ्चित्कालसंबन्धितम्) and not necessarily as *existence for all time and throughout space* (सर्वदेशकालसंबन्धितम्). *Actual existence* at some time and place is sufficient to distinguish the real from the unreal (त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि), which cannot be said to *really exist* at the time and place of its appearance (or at any other), save in our distorted imagination. The unreal has no *actual existence* in time or space tho' it may *appear* to have it. Such an *appearance* is indeed the characteristic mark of unreality (असतः सत्वेन प्रतीतिहि आनन्दः ।). The Advaitic dialecticians, in denying that the unreal can appear as the real, in immediate experience, are disloyal to experience. We can have no conception of the unreal apart from such appearances: असतः ख्याति निषेधतत्त्वयातिरभूत् वा ? यथभूत् न तत्त्वयातिनिषेधः । यदि नाभूत् तथापि ॥

(Madhva G. T. ii, 26).

1. *Op. cit. ii, p. 527.*

2. Cf. ब्रमेऽप्यब्रमभागोऽस्ति (AV.)

अनादौ च संसारे, इन्द्रियलिङ्गशब्दं जन्मेषु हानेषु द्वयां गतिमनुसन्दर्भत् * . *

(NS. 218 b)

We are, however, concerned here with actual facts. Śāṅkara admits that the illusory snake in the rope has no actual existence at any time : नहि रुचा आन्तिबुद्धया कल्पितः सपों विद्यमानः सञ्चिवर्तते ! (G. K. c. i, 17). Illusions, then, arise when the non-existent appears *as if* existent and vice-versa : यदविद्यमानं रूपं तस्य सत्वेन प्रतीतोरेव आन्तित्वात् ! (Madhva, G. T. ii, 26). This is borne out by our own experience and no useful purpose would be served in trying to escape it by dialectic ingenuity.

The second test of reality recognized by Madhva is : अर्थक्रियाकारित्वम् (practical efficiency). One cannot make vessels out of the illusory silver in the nacre. Even where an illusory appearance of a snake in the rope is found to produce certain reactions of fear and the like, there is always a definite modicum of reality behind it :

सर्पभ्रमादावपि हि ज्ञानमस्त्येव तादृशम् ।

तदेवार्थक्रियाकारि तस्यदेवार्थकारकम् ॥ (AV).

It is not the "rope-snake" that causes the fear or worse reactions ; but the "consciousness" of there being a snake, however mistaken it might be, at the time. So far as that particular psychological experience is concerned, there is not the slightest difference in the intensity of feeling between it and that of an actual experience of a snake in daylight. The "snaky-feeling" may be overcome soon afterwards ; but it exists for the time being and that alone is the cause of fear, not the non-existent snake.¹

The real, then, is neither momentary (*kṣaṇika*) nor necessarily eternal, as the Buddhists and the Advaitins assume, in their respective theories of truth (यत्स्त, तत्क्षणिकम् ; अबाधितं सत्यम्). Śāṅkara posits that the real must be so *for all time*. This is metaphysically-motived. It is not an epistemological or a logical deduction : नहि सता सकलदेशकालसता भवितव्यमिति नियामकमस्ति (NS. p. 217 b). This is the Mādhyva view of the matter and it cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. As a matter of fact, even those entities whose reality is *limited* to a particular period of time or place, can be reckoned to be real within the meaning

1. तज्ज्ञानस्यैव भयकंपादिजनकत्वात् । सर्पतया ज्ञातरज्जोरेव विशेषणत्वेन, व्यभिचाराभावात् । सर्पजन्यत्वाच्च । (Vādāvali, p. 49).

Cf. also Śāṅkara :

यथापि, स्वप्रदर्शनावस्थस्य सर्पदर्शनोदक्लनानादि कार्यजातमनृतं तथापि तद्वग्गतिः सत्यमेव ।

B. S. ii, 2, 14.

of the dictum : त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं सत्त्वम् ; for, what actually *is*, at a given time and place, cannot admit of *absolute negation with reference to all periods of time and place* : नहि विनाशो बाधः । अपितु, कालत्रयसत्तानिषेधः । न द्येकस्मिन्काले सतः स संभवति । (VTNt. p. 95) Its present existence must be admitted; tho' it may cease to exist the next hour or day. The Mādhwā doctrine of truth reminds us of the timelessness of truth as a logical content, propounded by Plato. Reality, then, consists simply in 'relation to time and place': देशकालसंबन्धितम् which cannot be predicated of unrealities like hare's horn. The Mādhwā conception of reality is thus a *via media* between the extreme momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of Buddhists and the eternalism of Advaitins. Mādhwā endorses the Nyāya view that a thing is real so long as it is assignable to a definite space-time setting and not simply so long as it *appears to be*. The immediate corollary of such a position is that the doctrine of tripartite classification of reality (Sattātraividhya) in Advaita, into absolute, practical and apparent (पारमार्थिक व्यावहारिक, प्रातिभासिक), is a myth. The Mādhwā definition of reality as अनारोपितम् is intended to show that the so-called Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika are *not realities* in the true sense of the term. All existents that are not superimposed (*anāropitam*) are absolutely real (पारमार्थिकसत्य). The "Vyāvahārika" and the "Prātibhāsika" 'reals', are both admittedly falsifiable (bādhya), one earlier and the other later: न च वियदिग्धिपञ्चस्यात्प्रतिनिकं सत्त्वमस्ति । प्राक् तु ब्रह्माभद्रेनात् वियदिग्धिपञ्चो व्यवस्थितरूपे भवति । सन्ध्याश्रयस्तु प्रपञ्चः प्रतिदिनं बाध्यत इति । (Śaṅkara, B. S. B. iii, 2, 4). They are, as such, both equally unreal and have no common ground with the Pāramārthika, which is never sublated. As Kumārila puts it, there can be no common ground between the false and the true to justify the distinction of degrees between them or their being brought under a single category of thought :

सत्यत्वं न च सामान्यं मूष्यार्थपरमार्थयोः ।

We may speak of the *opposition* of the real and the unreal; but *not* of internal degrees of *reality* between the real and the unreal. We may speak of a man and his shadow; but not of a real man and a shadow man ! It would be as ridiculous, if not more, to speak of the truly real, the falsely real (*vyāvahārika*) and the still more falsely real (*prātibhāsika-satya*).

There being, then, only two possible modes of predication acceptable to logic, Mādhwā is unable to concede any *tertium quid* between reality

and unreality. X is either real or unreal. It is a misuse of language to call it provisionally real : (व्यावहारिक) : कालान्तरेऽप्यमानं चेदिदार्थं मानता कुतः ? asks Madhva. The unreal cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be accepted as real, in serious thought : नासतो विद्यते भावः । Such an attempt can only be treated as a piece of sophistry or a perversion of thought calculated to mislead the unwary :

सत्या चेत्संवृतिः केयं भूषा चेत्सत्यता कथम् ?

वचनार्थमुपन्यासो लालाक्षवासवादिवत् ॥ (Kumārila)

Madhva, therefore, rejects the concept of "Mithyātva" as a *tertium quid* as quite unproved and equates it with absolute negation or unreality:

मिथ्याशब्दस्त्वभावावद्येव । तदन्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् (KN.)

The Advaitins have, from the beginning, been trying to distinguish between the two ; but to Madhva, it is a distinction without a difference.¹

Orders of Reality

The 'existence' is thus "reality", Madhva is so essentially a metaphysician that he recognizes fully the necessity for a ground-real to account for the reality of the world of reals². Existence is but one aspect of reality; it does not exhaust it. Nor is it the highest or fullest expression of it. As Dawes Hicks puts it so well, "There is no mystery whatsoever about the notion of pure being. Being is simply the fundamental category of thought which denotes everything and cannot, therefore, specifically denote anything, in other words - connotes nothing. That which every entity is, cannot be a property by which one entity could be distinguished from the others. God, whatever else He is, must certainly be. But so must a triangle or a pebble in the street, a planet or the Sun. In short, there is no being which is simply and purely, being. It is what God is over and above mere being that is of primary significance to the religious consciousness" (*Philosophical Bases of Theism*, p. 117).

While existence is thus reality and is possessed by the world of matter and souls, there must be something more than mere existence, having metaphysical independence or substantiality in its own right which we

1. For fuller discussion of this question see *NS* and *Nym.* and my *History of Dravida School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, ii, pp. 108-10.

2. In the true spirit of Upaniṣadic philosophy :

‘नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्’ । ‘सत्यस्य सत्यम्’

Cf. प्रकृत्यादिसत्त्वप्रदल्वं चाङ्गीकृतमीधरस्य (T.P.)

may agree to designate as the highest real or the philosophical Absolute, which would be the ultimate explanation of all else. Such independent reality should be immanent in the Universe, whence the latter could derive and draw its sustenance. Without presupposing such a basic and transcendental reality that would have to be immanent in the world, there would be chaos and disorder in the Universe. Madhva makes a strong plea for recognizing such a principle :

1. अधिग्रानमिति प्राह्मूर्लाधारं विचक्षणाः ।
यत्स्थितं दृश्यते वस्तु संस्थानं तदुदीरितम् ।
उभयं हरिरेवास्य जगतो मुनिपुङ्क्षं ॥ (B. T. p. 13)
2. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्ष्याणा ॥ (Bṛhg. ii, 10, 12)
3. स्वभावसत्तादात्मत्वं यन्तृत्वमिति कीर्तयते (Bṛh. Up. C. p. 45)
4. सत्ताप्रधानपुरुषशक्तीनां च प्रतीतयः ।
प्रबृत्यश्च ताः सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यतः ।
शक्तीसत्ताः प्रेरयत्यंजः तदधीनाश्च सर्वदा ॥ (AV)
5. कालर्कमस्त्वभावादि नित्ययेवरेच्छ्या ।
प्रासमेव विशेषेण सृष्ट्यादात्मयत्यजः ॥ (BT. p. 146)
6. यथापि नित्यत्वं जीवस्याप्यस्ति, तथापि सर्वप्रकारेण
अविनाशित्वं विष्णोरेवेति । (GT. p. 665)
7. दधिस्थधृतवत्काष्ठे ब्रह्मवच्च जनार्दनः ।
देहेन्द्रियाभुजीवेभ्यो विविच्य ज्ञायते न तु ॥ (BT. p. 53)

This is quite a new point of view in the interpretation of Upaniṣadic thought, for which Madhva should get due credit. It is not, of course, new in the sense of its having been unknown to the Upaniṣadic tradition. What is meant is that Madhva was the pioneer to penetrate into the tangled mass of Vedic and Post-Vedic literature and rediscover, refine and rehabilitate the point of view and give it a proper exposition.

According to Madhva, independence is the highest form of existence which includes independence of activity and consciousness :

सत्त्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमुद्दिष्टं तत्त्वं कृष्णे न चापरे
अस्वातंत्र्यात्तदन्येषामसत्त्वं विद्धि * * * ।

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1. Cf. न राजादीनामिव नियामकत्वमात्रमन्तर्यामित्वम् । अपि तु, सत्तादिप्रदत्त्वमित्युक्तं भवति । (NS. p. 166.)

वस्तु स्वतंत्रमुद्दिष्टमस्वतंत्रमवस्तु च ।
स्वाधीनं सदिति प्रोक्तं पराधीनमस्तु स्मृतम् ॥

(B. T. p. 108)

Independence is philosophical "self-determination" which is explained almost in the same terms as the substantiality of Spinoza, as a *res completa* which gives meaning and completion to everything else. This idea is contained in the classical definition of "Svatantra" put forward by Jayatirtha viz., स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविये परानपेक्षम् । Madhva says that from the highest point of view, even sentience is synonymous with independence : स्वेच्छानुसारितामेव स्वातंत्र्यं हि विदो विदुः (AV. p. 20) inasmuch as "self-determination" is the real mark of sentience.¹ चेतनत्वे स्वतंत्रं स्थात्स चैको विष्णुरेव तु । (BT). The insentient (jāda) is so because it cannot act of its own accord (स्वतःप्रत्यशक्त) . Inasmuch as the human souls are not independent existents, knowers and agents, in a philosophical sense, they are regarded by Madhva as so many "Reflections", Images, or "Ābhāsas" of the Supreme Reality, in the sense that all their powers are rooted in the Supreme Source and derived from it : नहि प्रतिविवस्य किया । स हि विम्ब-किययैव कियावात् ।² (G.B. ii, 19) like the reflected light of the moon.³

While the Independent Real is thus the ultimate presupposition of all philosophy, the dependent reals embody the justification and proof of the independent. The independence of God is not seriously disputed by other schools of thought, its significance and philosophical necessity have not been so well brought out, as in the system of Madhva. It is not as a concession to religious prejudice or a fashionable belief that Madhva accepts the Svatantra as the highest expression of reality. It is the warp and woof of all metaphysics. The Advaitic Brahman, being *ex hypothesi* attributeless (*nirdharmaka*) and static, could not be spoken of as "Svatantra" within the definition of

स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तात्रैविये परानपेक्षम् ।

1. Cf. ज्ञानमेव हीच्छाजनकम् । सेच्छं चेदगीकृतं तदा तदचेतनं किं ? चेतनमेवे-त्यर्थः । अचेतनमपि प्रधानं स्वातंत्र्येण प्रवृत्तिमदस्तिवाति वदता अचेतनमिच्छावत् आस्तिवत्युक्तं स्यात् । स्वेच्छानुसारित्वस्य स्वातंत्र्यशब्दार्थतया सर्वसंमतत्वात् । अचेतनसेच्छावत्वमर्हाङ्गेण चेतनत्वमप्यगीकर्तव्यं स्यात् । (NS. p. 322)

2. Meaning : विभाधीनकिययैव ।

3. Cf. को हेवान्यात् कःप्राप्यात् यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्? *Taitt. Up.* (ii 7); *Gītā*, xv, 12.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Brahman being *ex hypothesi* "Viśiṣṭaikyaruṇa", cannot be shown to be superior to its modes of Cit and Jāḍa or *independent of them* (*Parānapekṣa*), so long as the system is committed to their reciprocal dependence of Śeṣaśeṣibhāva and its corollary of the "contribution theory" of mutual advantage between the two¹, held by at least a section² of the Rāmānuja school, tho' Rāmānuja himself rises above such necessity in one context (under G.B. ix, 4) and Vedānta Dōṣika openly endorses Madhva's view, as already pointed out, and thus abandons the position believed to be characteristic of the Rāmānuja school that "the difference of parts of God, as matter and souls, always existed and there is no part of Him which is truer and more ultimate than this" (Dasgupta, *I. Phil.* iii, p. 200). If this is so, Madhva's stand would by no means be redundant or superfluous.

The independence of God and His freedom from all imperfections is very much compromised in the Pantheistic philosophies of Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka, so long as these systems adhere to the actual transformation of the Brahman-stuff, whether wholly, directly or in part; or indirectly even, thro' its existential aspect (*sacchakti*) or energy-aspect (*cicchakti*). They lead to a great disruption of moral experience of remorse and responsibility. Logical Pantheism is inconsistent with our ideals of goodness and evil. God is perfect. As His personal effects, whatever and whoever exists must also be perfect. But such Pantheistic unity is disproved by the inevitable presuppositions of human life. Our instincts refuse to think that evil is good and to see the Deity in disorder, virtue in crime, truth in error. Nor can our evaluations of truth and error be dismissed as illusory. If the events of the world are the modes of God, how can they be illusory?

We find the same inability to rise and stick to the high level of the independence of God or the Absolute and the necessary dependence of the entire Universe on God, in the non-Vedāntic systems of Theism like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga.

Their limitations in this respect have already been made clear (See reference in *NS*. p. 329, quoted *ante*.). Even the eternity of the atoms, admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, could not be exempted from the sway of the Deity :

1. *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, p. 255.

2. Tengalais. See also passage from *Nītimālā* quoted earlier on p. 17 f.n. I.

नित्यस्य पराधीनतासंभवादित्यत आह- नित्यमिति । यथाह घटादग्नेऽनित्यवभावा अपि नाकस्मादनित्या भवन्ति । तथा सत्युत्पत्युत्तरक्षण एव विनाशप्रसंगात् । एवं नित्यस्थापि नित्यता यदि पराधीना, तदा का दोषः ? न चानित्यता पराधीनेति कहाचित् घटादेर्नित्यता प्राप्ता ! विनाशकारणोपनिपातत्रैव्यात् । तथा, नित्यस्य नित्यताया: पराधीनतेऽपि न जात्वनित्यताप्रसक्तिः । तत्रियमननियमादिति । तदिदमुक्तं नित्यं चोति ॥ (N.S. p. 330)

[There is no need to suppose that what is eternal cannot possibly be 'dependent' on another. Let us take a non-eternal object like a pot. It is not a matter of 'accident' that such objects are non-eternal. Their non-eternity is 'determined' by some reason. Otherwise, they might as well be destroyed the very next moment after coming into being. Similarly, what is wrong if one should suppose that the eternity of the eternal objects is also determined by a governing principle ? Surely, we do not find the non-eternal objects like pots foregoing their non-eternity and becoming eternal just because their non-eternity is determined by another principle. It is the nature of the non-eternal to become destroyed sooner or later. In the same way, even where an eternal entity is "determined" by an other, there is no fear of its losing its eternity and becoming non-eternal by the caprice of the determining principle. For the governing principle will maintain and guarantee the *status quo* of the other as an eternal entity, for all time. There is, therefore, nothing illogical or inconceivable in holding the view that 'eternal' padārthas also are 'dependent' upon God.]

The reality of the Universe is, thus, in Madhva's opinion, an important philosophical accessory (*ānusāṅgika*) to the realization of the ideal of the Svetāntara. He cannot, therefore, be charged with an obsession for the reality of the world and of Pañcabheda, as some critics have done. Jayatīrtha puts the Mādhva attitude to the world in its proper perspective by referring to the doctrine of the reality of the world as a "lesser metaphysical doctrine" or Apara-Siddhānta (NS. p. 538 b.). The world is not important *in itself* to the Dvaita philosopher :

परंत्रप्रमेयं हि स्वतंत्रायत्तरया विदितं निश्चेयसाय भवति । अन्यथा,
गंगावालुकापरिगणनवदिदं तत्संख्यानमपार्थकं स्यात् ॥ (Jayatīrtha, TSt.)

Madhva is no theological Dualist. There is no place in his new creation theory of Sadasatkāryavāda and 'eternal creation' thro' " Parādhina-viśeṣāpti" for the 'Oriental Augustinian monarchotheistic' idea of creation at a certain date by sheer fiat of God out of fathomless *nothing*.

Paradoxically enough, Madhva admits the creation of eternal substances also in a Pickwickian sense of "Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti", which will be explained later. Real creation, in his view, means such an *eternal dependence* of the world of matter and souls on God, as would involve their non-existence in the absence of God's will to that effect, while His will is the essential condition and sustaining principle that invests them with their reality and without which they would be but void names and bare possibilities. The scientific value of the doctrine of "Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti" would be evident when it is contrasted, for a moment, with the fact that Biblical chronology in the West fixed the date of creation of the world at 4004 B.C. Geology has since vastly extended cosmic time; but altho' the actual date might be thus thrust back indefinitely, the view of creation as an event in time, at some indefinite period, in the past, still continues to lurk in many quarters and even eminent theologians like Flint have clung to it heroically. But, thanks to the stupendous advance of Science in recent times, such crude notions have no place in serious thinking, quite apart from the difficulty of having to answer the question of why the Deity should have chosen a particular time to create, after having kept in its shell all along, before. It will be clear then, that the dependence of even eternal entities on God and their 'creation ' thro' "Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti", brings out the independence of God, all the more prominently.

The supremacy of God as the immanent-cum-transcendent principle of the Universe, introduces order and unity in the cosmos, in spite of its internal differences. The multiverse of reals becomes a Universe, in that it owes its allegiance to a single source and derives its strength, power and reality, beauty, goodness etc. now and forever, from One:

तत्तंत्रलादैतदात्म्यम् । सर्वमेतत् ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रतीतिमत्वात् ,
नतु, तत्स्वरूपत्वात् । उक्तं हि पाद्य—
तदधीनं यतः सर्वमतः सर्वो भवानिति ।
वदन्ति मुनयः सर्वे न तु सर्वस्वरूपतः ॥ इति ॥ (M. G. B. iv, 24)

Thus, Madhva's chief ontological classification of being into Svatantara and Paratantra does full justice to the three primary data of philosophy in the light of the requirements of religious consciousness and speculative reason.

CHAPTER VI
MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL SCHEME.

Brahman as the Only Independent Real is the highest ontological principle of Madhva's philosophy. It is Infinite (अ॒प्णी), of perfect bliss भूमा ; संप्रसाद), the Real of reals (सत्यस्य सत्यम्), the Eternal of eternals (नित्यो नित्यानाम्), the Sentient of all sentients (चेतनश्चेतनानाम्), the source of all reality, consciousness and activity (सत्ताप्रतीतप्रवृत्तिनिभिराम्) in the finite.

Dependent reality (परतंत्रप्रमेयम्) consists of Cetanas and Acetana. The subdivisions of the Cetanavarga are, to some extent, theological in character. A special place is given there to Śrītattva as the presiding deity (principle) over the entire domain of Jāga-Prakṛti. Śrī or Lakṣmī is, for this reason, designated as Cetana-Prakṛti. Similar presiding principles (Abhimāni-Devatās) are accepted for other material principles like Mahat, Ahāmkāra, Bhūtas, Indriyas etc. on the clear authority of the *Upaniṣads*, *Brahmasūtra* (ii, 1, 6)¹ and the *Pañcarātras*. The Śrītattva ranks next to the Supreme Being, *qua* Paratantra. But it is not without a partial parity of status with the Supreme in virtue of being co-pervasive in Time and Space and being ever-free from bondage (*nityamukta*) and therefore designated as "Sama-nā" (B.S.B. iv, 2, 7). Śrī is placed in the (ईश्वरकोटि) and has cosmic sway², accordingly, over the destinies of the souls and the modifications of Matter. An analogous position, with some difference in details, is given to Śrī, in the theology of Rāmānuja also.

The rest of the Cetana-varga, is subject to the bondage of Prakṛti and is further subdivided into "released" and "unreleased". There is an intrinsic gradation among the released and the unreleased alike, Hiranyaagarbha among the released (and in Samsāra too) occupying a privileged position as Jīvottama. Unlike Rāmānuja, Madhva accepts an innate distinction among (released) souls into Deva, Ṛṣi, (Pitr, Pa) and Naras. The Devas are *Sarva-prakāśa* (fit to realize God as pervasive), the

1. Śaṅkara also admits as a Siddhānta view, the existence of Abhimanidevatās. See B.S.B. i, 8, 33.

2. See Āmbhīṇī *Sūkta*, R. V. X, 125.

and विश्वस्थितिप्रलयसर्गमहाविभूतिशृतिप्रकाशानियमाश्रुतिबन्धमोक्षः ।

यस्या अपांगलवमात्रतः * * * (Dyādaśa-Stotra)

Sages are *Antalprakāśa* and the rest *Bahilprakāśa*.¹ The non-released are again classified as salvable (मुक्तियोग्य), ever-transmigrating (नित्यसंसारि) and damnable (तमोयोग्य). This tripartite classification of souls is unique to Mādhva theology. Its ethical and philosophical merits will be discussed later.

The Acetana section falls into two groups of positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*). Three kinds of negation are accepted: प्रागभाव (antecedent negation), प्रत्यंसाभाव (subsequent) and अत्यन्ताभाव (absolute). The mutual negation (अन्योन्याभाव) of Nyāya philosophy is equated with "Difference" and is not treated as an *abhāva*, as it does not involve significant negation in the first act of perception. The conception of *atyantābhāva* differs radically from the Nyāya view in that its counter-correlative (प्रतियोगी) has no factual existence (अप्रामाणिक).

In the domain of positive reals, we have both the eternal and the non-eternal. If everything is eternal and uncreated, causation would cease to have any meaning. Even if it were interpreted in terms of manifestation, the question would still arise about the *manifestation* itself, whether it is caused or uncaused. In the former case, the question could be continuously repeated involving a regress. In the latter case, the same redundancy of causal effort would be there.

It would also be impossible to account for creative evolution, dissolution etc., in the absence of some enduring stuff out of which things could be created and into which they would be resolved. The doctrine of momentary creation and dissolution cannot be accepted by a reflective mind, as it is disproved by our experience (Pratyabhijñā) and conviction of the continuity of the objects.

There is, thus, a clear case for the acceptance of both eternal and non-eternal Bhāvas. Space, time, the Vedas, the subtle aspects of the elements, senses, Āhamkārika Prāṇa, Mahat, Āhamkāra and the qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are deemed eternal. The grosser developments of these are non-eternal. Where the substances show both the aspects, as for example, time viewed as an eternal process and as a succession of moments, each aspect would be referred to its appropriate category and the substance itself could be spoken of as a "Nityānitya".

1. 'अन्तःप्रकाशा बहिःप्रकाशाः सर्वप्रकाशाः । देवा वाव सर्वप्रकाशाः ऋषयो
न्तःप्रकाशा मनुष्या एव बहिःप्रकाशाः ।' इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम् । (Madhva,
B. S. B. iv, 3, 16)

The world of attributes comprising qualities (primary and secondary), actions, Sattā, Śakti, Sādṛśya, Viśiṣṭa etc., are regarded by Madhvā as constituting the very essence of the substances themselves. They need not, then, be regarded as having a separate existence of their own requiring independent enumeration or classification. But where they are mentally distinguished from their substances, by the power of (internal) Viśeṣas, they could certainly be enumerated, classified and studied separately.¹ Madhvā, however, puts forward a twofold classification of attributes in general as (i) *yāvad-dravyabhāvī* (coeval) and (ii) *ayāvad-dravyabhāvī* (changing). The former type of attributes or properties, being coessential, are *identical* with the substances themselves. The latter are to be considered as partly different and partly identical (*bhinnābhinna*) with their substances, in an equal measure. This relation applies in respect of the pairs (1) cause and effect (2) temporary qualities of substances and their substratum (3) genus and species (4) Viśiṣṭa and Śuddha (the thing-in-itself and the thing as qualified) and (5) part and whole etc.

1. It is from this standpoint that the conventional classification of Padārthaś (into ten categories), in *Madhvāśiddhāntasāra* and other works is to be understood.

CHAPTER VII
THE CONCEPT OF VIŚEŚAS.

The relation between substance and attributes is one of the intriguing problems of philosophy. It has well-nigh taxed the ingenuity and resources of philosophers in the East and in the West. Madhva's contribution to the solution of this problem is both original and significant. *He has actually contributed a new idea—the concept of Viśeśas—to the treatment of this philosophical problem.* It is an outstanding discovery of his. Madhva accepts a relation of 'colorful identity' (सर्वशेषाभेद) in respect of coessential attributes and difference-cum-identity (भेदाभेद) in the case of transient attributes:

खण्डिते भेद ऐक्यं च ; यावद्वस्तु न भेदवत् (TV)

He has thus made a striking effort to rise above the 'dualism' of substance and attributes and combine them into a homogeneous whole that admits, however, of logical, conceptual and linguistic distinction, whereever necessary, thro' the self-differentiating capacity of substances themselves, to be known as "Viśeśas".

These Viśeśas are ubiquitous and are not confined to material substances. They exist among sentients as well, including the Supreme Being. In sentient beings, these Viśeśas, whether manifested or not, are identical with their substrata; while in regard to insentients, attributes which are coeval would be identical with the substances (and distinguishable by Viśeśas); while changing or impermanent ones would be different-cum-identical with their substances. The whole question has been very clearly expounded by Jayatīrtha,¹ in his c. on the G. T. xi, 15, p. 184.

1. चेतने कथित्विशेषो जायते कथित्वित्य इति एवं विशेषोऽपि द्विविधो भवति । चेतनद्रव्यात्म-कल्पे नित्यस्यापि विशेषस्य व्यक्तिविशेषविवक्षया जननोक्तिसंभवात् । अचेतने विशेषाद्रव्यस्यैव विशेषोपादानत्वात्, उपादानविशेषादिव्यात्मना यावद्रव्यभाव्यपि, कार्यरूपेण कथित्विशेषो जायते कथित्, यावद्रव्यभावीति द्विविधो विशेष इति भावः । । चेतनवस्तुस्वरूपमस्तीत्यत्र चेतनत्ववस्तुत्व-स्वरूपत्वास्तित्वविशेषाः नित्याभिव्यक्ताः । चेतनः करोति, भुक्त्वात्, गच्छतीत्यत्र करणगमनयोजन-विशेषाः व्यक्तस्वरूपमस्तीत्यत्र [शक्तिरूपेण नित्या, व्यक्तिरूपेण जायन्ते] ते द्विविधा अपि विशेषा अत्यन्ताभोदिनः ।

तथाच, चूतफलस्वरूपं अस्तीत्यत्र चूतत्वफलत्वादिविशेषाः यावद्रव्यभाविनो विशेषिणात्यन्ता-भिन्नाः । पीतं चूतफलमित्यत्र पीतत्वादिविशेषाः कादाचित्का, विशेषिणा भिन्नाभिन्ना इति भावः ॥

The argument for the acceptance of Viśeṣas is thus presented by Trivikrama Paṇḍita. The conception of the relation between substance and attributes is a very difficult one. If they are identical, the distinction of ' substance ' and ' attributes ' is meaningless. We would have substance alone or attributes alone, in that case; and not *both* of them. If the two are different, their relation becomes a purely external one. If they are related internally by Samavāya, this relation itself has to be related to the terms and so on *ad infinitum*. The difficulty will persist even if Substance and attributes are treated as partly identical and partly different. The only way in which a regress could be avoided, on any one of these alternatives, would be by agreeing to invest the first relation itself with a certain capacity to take care of itself, explain itself, and relate itself to the relata, without waiting to be explained or related to its terms by another relation. Since an appeal has thus ultimately to be made to the self-explicability of the relation, it will be wiser, more economical and expedient, to invest the substance itself with such an intrinsic capacity of integrating its attributes into a homogeneous whole, with itself, without prejudice to their distinction of references according to exigencies, and without the need for any external *relation*. This intrinsic capacity of substances is proposed to be called "Viśeṣas"—a very appropriate name, so far as any one could see, and one which could not be improved upon. We have, here, in the Viśeṣas of Madhva, a remarkable anticipation of the Hegelian doctrine of "internal relations".

Experience shows that the various qualities of a thing are not the fictions of the imagination. The temporal, spatial, qualitative, quantitative and causal characteristics of objects that we see are not altogether the fancies projected by the mind; for there is no reason why and how *all minds* should or could project alike and carry on with a sense of pre-established harmony of world-building impressions. But there are attributes like the "light of the Sun" and the "primary qualities" which could not be perceived apart from the objects possessing those qualities. The idea of a triangle as a three-sided figure involves the other idea of the sum of its angles being equal to two right angles. The two ideas are not however the same tho' they involve each other. There are a number of practical difficulties which stand in the way of an *absolute identity* of the two : substance and attributes. Jayatīrtha draws attention to some

important considerations of this kind which justify a certain measure of practical distinction between the two, consistent with our experience.¹

In the perception 'the jar is white', the whiteness and the jar cannot be regarded as coterminous and coextensive. The jar is something more than its whiteness. When one is asked to fetch a white thing, one does not necessarily fetch a jar. (2) The two terms, the jar and whiteness, are not synonymous in denotation, for there is no contradiction in saying that the jar is not white as there would be in saying that the jar is not a jar. (3) The jar is perceived irrespective of its whiteness as when a blind man feels its presence with his hands, even when he is unable to perceive its whiteness. This shows that the perception of a jar is not the same as the perception of its color. When the whiteness of the object is changed into redness by a coating of paint, we still continue to perceive and recognize the pot as such, tho' not in its former color. All this points to an undeniable distinction between the ideas of substance and attributes. The attributes not merely subsist, but exist. Their distinction from the substance is not illusory, as there is no correcting judgment to the contrary. At the same time, the attributes have no reality *apart* from the substances and are always presented in all judgments about them as identical with their substances: शुक्रः पटः ; नीलो घटः. This identity of form and content between the subject and the predicate [सामानाधिकरणम्] is an accepted proof of identity [अभेदे प्रमाणम्]. It is in this crossing or intersection of identity and difference that Madhvā finds the clue and justification for his concept of Viśeṣas, to bridge the gulf between substance and attributes and preserve the basic unity of experience without in any manner sacrificing the numerous distinctions demanded and

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1. दद्यन्ते च भेदकार्याणि (1.) पटशौक्ल्यबुद्धयोरन्वूनातिरिक्तविषयत्वाभावः (2.) तच्छब्द-योरपर्यायत्वं (3.) अपर्यायशब्दसमाकलत्वम् (4.) जलाहरणाद्यर्थकियाभेदः | (5.) पटमानये-त्युक्ते यत्किञ्चिच्छुक्रानानयनं, (6.) अघटः पट इतिवत् अशुक्रः पट इत्यनयोविरोधाभावः (7.) अन्धस्यापि पटोयमितवत् शुक्रोऽयमिति च प्रतीत्यनुत्पत्तिः शुक्रप्रतीतिवत् पटाप्रतिप-त्वभावः (8.) महारजनसंपर्केण शुक्रत्ववत् पटस्याप्यावृतत्वाभावः (9.) पटवद्वा शौक्ल्य स्याप्यनावृतत्वाभावः इत्येवमादीनि । न चैषा प्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिः । बाधितत्वाभिमानीभा-वात् । व्यवहाराद्यविसंवादाच्च । तदेतयोरभेदभेदकर्ययोः प्रतीत्योरन्वथानुपपत्त्या निभेदेऽपि पटे अस्ति कक्षनातिशयो भेदप्रतिनिधिः यदशादिदं सर्वं समंजसं स्यादित्येव कल्पनीयम् सच्चातिशयोऽभिभेदपि विशेषकत्वात् विशेष इति गीयते ॥

(N. S. p. 106)

drawn by the necessities of scientific usage and practical utility. We can never do without such "Viśeṣas", in whatever way we might choose to conceive of the substance. Madhva would, therefore, willingly endorse the criticism of D. M. Datta that "the necessity for an interposition of a third entity or relation arises from a narrow and exclusive conception of "terms". If we widen our outlook and think of an entity as possessing in addition to its *essential* non-relative and intrinsic character, other extrinsic relative characteristics which it might have in the infinite situations in which it may be placed, then we can easily dispense with the existence of a third entity or relation. A thing thus comes to be viewed as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects. Different words are then found to denote different forms of the same thing in different aspects" (*Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 115). These criticisms will not apply to the Viśeṣas which are not conceived as extrinsic to or different from the terms. Viśeṣa is neither a "third entity" nor a *relation*. It is part and parcel of the terms and yet capable of distinguishing them where and when necessary. Its help would be *indispensable* in any attempt to "widen our outlook and think of an entity as possessing, in addition to its *essential and intrinsic character*, other extrinsic characteristics, which it might have in the infinite situations in which it may be placed" (*Op. cit*)—Italics mine. It would be impossible to effect an "identity" between the "intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects" of a thing, without the help of "Viśeṣas". It is the only way out.

Viśeṣa is thus the same as the principle of identity-in-difference. It is defined by Madhva as :

भेदहीनेत्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।

विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वेषतः ॥

(AV).

the peculiar characteristic or potency of things which makes description and talk of difference possible where as a matter of fact only identity exists. It is a differentiating or pluralising agency which serves at the same time to exhibit the pluralities as flowing centripetally towards a given object which happens to occupy the focus of attention on account of a dominant pragmatic interest at the moment. It renders possible the validity of countless viewpoints while the object itself retains its unity, independence and integrality. Jayatīrtha defines it as- भेदहीनपूरुपचरितभेदव्यवहारनिमित्तम् । (N.S. p. 106) the principle of thought whereby, in all cases of identity-judgements, a real practical distinction of a non-figurative

nature, is or has to be drawn and accepted, if the judgments in question are not to be tautologous (*paryāya*), belonging to the pathology of thought-as 'धटो घटः'।

Madhva and his commentator show that such experiences, involving the mediation of Viśeśas, are to be found everywhere in the Scriptures and in our daily life of lay and scientific commerce:¹ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म। आनन्दं ब्रह्मणः। राहोः शिरः। पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम्। शुक्रवर्णः। अहे: कुण्डलम्। समवाय एकः। सामान्यं सत्॥ etc.

They introduce order into the world of substances (*padārtha*) and keep intact the unity of the substance in and thro' all its various modes, predicates, aspects, attributes and relations. Madhva indicates in his *B.T.* (p. 84) about six places where Viśeśas usually come into play:

- 1) "अवयव्यवयवानां च 2) गुणानां गुणिनस्तथा ।
- 3) शक्तिशक्तिमतोशापि 4) कियायास्तद्वतः तथा ।
- 5) स्वरूपांशांशिनोद्धैव (नित्याभेदः। * * * * ॥)

It is this category or "power of things in themselves" which, thro' an underlying identity of essence, enables us to distinguish (1) a particular from its universal; (2) a quality from its substance; (3) motion or power or energy from things possessing them; (4) the Svarūpa from the Svarūpin and Svarūpatvam. Jayatirtha points out that in the term "Svarūpatvam", the use of the suffix *tva* stands for Viśeśas and that without acceptance of such a shade of meaning, its use would be redundant. Viśesa is, therefore, but another name for the potency of the thing whereby it maintains its unity and continuity thro' all its modes, predication and aspects:

स्वकियाभिस्तयैवेकं नित्यं स्वावयवैपि ।
 स्वरूपेषु विशेषो यः स्वरूपं तस्य सोऽपि तु ।
 विशेषस्य विशेषोऽन्यो न चैवास्ति कदाचन ।
 स्वस्यापि तु विशेषश्च स्वयमेव भविष्यति ।
 यथा जनेर्जनिर्नान्या तस्या वस्तुजनिर्जनिः ।
 स्वरूपेणापि संयोगः स्वरूपस्यैव युज्यते ॥

(Madhva, *Bṛh. Up. C.* p. 18).

1. Cf. यथा कालस्य पूर्वेणाभेदेऽपि काल इति विशेष्यो भवति, पूर्वे इति विशेषको विशेषादेव। तथा गुणात्मकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विशेषादेव 'गुणि ब्रह्म' इति विशेषणविशेष्यभावो युज्यते इति भावः (TP. III. 2, 30).

A luminous stone is not something totally different from its lumenosity. It stands self-related to its lustre :

यथा रत्नस्य संयोगः स्वरूपस्तैव गुज्यते ।
यथा रत्नस्य संयोगः तत्प्रकाशेन नित्यदा ।
रत्नस्य च प्रकाशस्य न भेदः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥

(Bṛh. Up. C. p. 18 b)

The thing itself is so constituted :

द्रव्यमेव ततोऽनन्तविशेषात्मतया स्थितः ।
नानाव्यवहृते हेतुरनन्तत्वं विशेषतः ॥ (AV.)

that it can relate itself to and distinguish itself from its modes, predicates or properties, without invoking the aid of any other relation or a "third entity" (as Prof. Datta terms it). It is *Svanirvāhaka*, self-explicable, self-contained and self-related. It is only by the acceptance of such a potency in things that we can "widen our outlook" and conceive of a substance "as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects" (Datta, p. 115). This conception of substance as a unity of countless Viśeṣas :

द्रव्यमेव ततोऽनन्तविशेषात्मतया स्थितः । (AV.)

held by Madhva, resembles the Jain theory of substance as that which has many qualities forming its essence : अनन्तधर्मात्मकं वस्तु (Hari-bhadra Sūri). There is however this difference that the Jain theory of substance as a dynamic reality, an identity that *changes*, would be incomplete, without the acceptance of something like Viśeṣas to round it off. As the Anekāntavāda of the Jains involves the Kṣanikatva of things, it will be difficult to maintain the basic identity of the substance *per se*, without the Viśeṣas.

Viśeṣas should not, therefore, be *mistaken* for *new* or *additional attributes of things*, that mediate among other relations and manage to distinguish them where necessary. Such a view will be not only opposed to the nature and role of Viśeṣas, as conceived by Madhva; but also defeat the very purpose for which they have been conceived. It is such a misunderstanding of the nature of Viśeṣas that is at the back of the criticism that "If Viśeṣa is different from the subject, it breaks its integrity. If it is non-different from it, we cannot call it Viśeṣa" (Radha-krishnan, I. Phil. ii, p. 746) [Italics mine].

The same confusion of thought regarding Viśeṣas in Madhvā's system, that it is either an *attribute* of the substance, or an additional entity, is to be seen in the writings of even distinguished traditional critics of the system like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Brahmānanda. The author of the *Advaitasiddhi* writes : भेदे ऐकरस्यशुतिविरोधवत् अनापि (सत्यविशेषेऽपि) तत्तदवस्थात् * * * * न । स्वभावविशेषादेव सर्वस्याप्युपपत्तेः । न तर्हि विशेषाग्निकारणे मन्मतप्रवेश इति वाच्यम् । तत्तदसाधारणस्वरूपस्यैव स्वभावविशेषशब्दार्थत्वेन, त्वदुक्तविशेषानुकृतेः ॥ (N. S. Press edn. p. 807).

This criticism that the acceptance of Viśeṣas in Brahman would destroy its oneness quite as much as the acceptance of an internal difference of substance and attributes therein, betrays a presumption that the Viśeṣas must be different from the substance (Viśeṣin) which is categorically denied by Madhvā. The criticism also suffers from a self-contradiction in that Madhusūdana himself declares that there can be no Viśeṣas other than the *distinctive nature of things*, and nothing more is claimed for the Viśeṣas by the Mādhva philosophers also ! To say, as does the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, that it is *not* the nature of Viśeṣas in the Dvaita system, simply shows that he has *not* rightly understood their true nature according to the Dvaitins. But strangely enough, he himself goes on to point out that "the Dvaitins unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, *do not* regard their Viśeṣas as *different from the essence of things* : द्वान्तं इव द्वार्थनिके स्वरूपात्तरेकस्य त्यैवान्मीकारेण वैषम्यात् । (p. 807). The author of the *Tarangini*, therefore, points out that the talk (of the Advaitin) of *there being no Viśeṣas, other than the "distinctive natures of things"* (तत्तदसाधारणस्वरूप) in itself involves the presumption of Viśeṣas : विशेषं विना स्वरूपसाधारण्यायुक्तेः ।

(Tg. p. 383)

In view of so much confusion even in learned quarters about the true nature and scope of Viśeṣas, it is well to set forth its authentic nature in the words of the original works clearly and categorically :

द्रव्यमेव ततोऽनन्तविशेषात्मतया स्थितः ।

नानाव्यवहृतेहेतुः * * *

(AV)

Jayatīrtha defines Viśeṣas in the clearest terms as the "potency of things" स्वनिर्वाहको विशेषो नाम पदार्थशक्तिरभिष्यताम् (*Vādāvali*, p. 97 b). Rāghavendra's commentary on it clinches the matter once for all : पदार्थशक्तिरिति न वस्तवन्तरमित्यर्थः । Jayatīrtha again writes elsewhere : नन्वय

विशेषो यदि द्रव्यात्मैव, कथं तर्हि द्रव्यस्य विशेषः स्यात् ? मैवम् ! विनापि भेदेन, तत्प्रतिनिधिना विशेषेणैव विशेषस्य तदीयतोपपत्तेः ॥ The *Vādaratnāvali* (written a century before the *Nyāyāmṛta* and the *Advaitasiddhi*,) expounds the nature of Viśeṣas as “nothing but the potency of things themselves” :— अयं वस्तुशक्तिर्विशेषो हि अभिन्नेष्वपि विशेषकल्पादिशेष इति गीयते । दीपदीप्त्योरिकेत्युदाहरणार्थम् । एकमेव इत्यं प्रभाप्रभावद्द्रव्याकारेणावतिष्ठते । तथा शक्तिविशेषोऽस्तीति चेत्, तर्हि हन्त, स एव विशेषः ।

(*Viśeṣavāda* Ms.)

There is, thus no point in the criticism that “if it is non-different from the substance, we cannot call it *Viśeṣas*”. Call it by whatever name you will, *Viśeṣa* will be there in the nature of things as it is only another name for the substance, with all its wonderful capacities.

Madhva is thus fully justified in holding that it would be impossible to establish any adequate theory of the relation between substance and attributes without invoking the aid of *Viśeṣas*, which are also called *Svarūpaviśeṣas* in order to show that they are not other than the Substance. Such *Viśeṣas* are forced upon us by the very laws of thought as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta, says Madhva :

अद्वाण्डखण्डवादिभ्यां * * * *

महादरेण शिरासि विशेषो धार्य एव हि ।

एतादृशो विशेषेऽस्मिन् को द्वेषा वादिनां भवेत् ?

(*AV.*)

They lurk everywhere in relations between substance and attributes from whatever angle they might be approached, as the “mysterious Mrs. Harris of metaphysics”, as one writer has racily put it. *Viśeṣa* is just a “peculiarity” an unnameable something recognized by all, tacitly, and Madhva has only tried to give it a special name and a form and has rendered its existence explicit, in the interests of clearness of thought and judgments. This is no small service to scientific thinking and metaphysics.

Madhva undertakes to convince the open-minded that *Viśeṣas* must be accepted as a postulate of thought. There are only three possible ways in which the relation of substance and attributes could be conceived, (1) that they are entirely different from each other (*atyanta-bhinna*), (2) absolutely identical with each other (*abhinna*) or (3) both identical and different (*bhinnābhinna*). These three views have been put forward by the *Naiyāyikas*, the *Advaitins* and the *Bhāṭṭas* respectively. Madhva shows by argument that every one of these views hasulti-

mately to fall back on Viśeṣas. He, therefore, examines them and dismisses them all, in favour of a forth view of Saviśeṣābheda (identity based on Viśeṣa) as the only acceptable view, free from the difficulties incidental to the other three.

The theory of absolute difference between substance and attributes is not only full of difficulties but cannot also commend itself to our philosophic imagination. Is the said difference No. 1, different from the terms or identical with them? In the first case, is the difference No. 2, also different from or identical with the terms and so on indefinitely, so that we are left with a regress. If difference No. 1 were *identical* with the terms, it could not be conceived as the difference of *this* or *that* term, as such descriptions would themselves presuppose a difference. The terms and the differences would all be synonymous. If the said difference were said to be self-supporting, is such self-sufficiency (*svanirvāhakatvam*) different from or identical with the terms and with the act of self-supporting? In the former case, an endless regress is sure to arise and in the latter, the expressions "nirvāhya" and "nirvāhaka" (supporter and supported) and supporting (*nirvāhana*), involved in the definition of Svanirvāhakatva, would be tautological. If it be said that the difference between substance and attributes is naturally endowed with such self-supporting and self-linking capacity, it would be but another name for "Viśeṣas" and such potency could as well be claimed for and vested in the substance itself instead of in "difference"!

If substance and attributes are to be different and externally related by Samavāya, the question arises if the Samavāya relation too, is similarly related to the relata by another Samavāya and so on. If Samavāya is self-linking (*svanirvāhaka*) without the aid of *another* link, such a self-linking capacity may as well be posited of the substance itself, at the very outset, so that the luxury of an additional relation (*padārtha*) may be dispensed with: धर्मकल्पनातो धर्मकल्पना वरम् !

If the difference between the substance and attributes were however, *identical* with the relata, there would be no *difference* left as such, but only the two *terms*. In the absence of any difference, we cannot even speak of the two *terms*, substance and attribute as such, as even this idea is born of difference. If the terms and difference are identical, one may contend that difference alone exists as a matter of fact and no terms whatever! Difference then, between substance and attributes

must be accepted *not* as being *absolutely identical* with the terms but “identical with a qualification” (*Saviśesābheda*), that would preserve all three of them intact and prevent their mutual synonymity. Such distinction of reference may indeed be most profitably attributed to the substance themselves, instead of to the relation of difference.

The *Bhedābheda* view of substance and attributes is in need of Viśeṣas, at the very outset. Identity and difference being opposites and therefore mutually exclusive, cannot be brought together and conceived to coexist (*samānādhikaraṇa*) without the aid of a mediating factor. Either of them should therefore be invested with the peculiar capacity of putting up with its opposite : भेदसहिष्णुभेदः or अभेदसहिष्णुभेदः ! Such a peculiar capacity of making opposites meet will indeed be a “Viśeṣa” !

Even supposing that substance and attributes are connected by a relation of *Bhedābheda*, what will be the sort of relation between the identity and the difference, mutually and to the terms ? If that is also one of *bhedābheda*, there will be a regress, if the *bhedābheda* is to be accepted as *svanirvāhaka* (self-linking), it could only be so with the help of a peculiar potency in it called *Viśeṣa*, for want of a better name. If *bhedā* and *abheda* are different from the terms, there will be a regress. If identical, they *cannot* be represented as “belonging” to them (*tadīya*) without some kind of a peculiarity. Nor can difference and identity between the terms, be again identical with them. If they are, *difference and identity will both become identical in their turn*, which will lead to an absurdity and there will be no possibility of establishing a relation between them.

The doctrine of undifferenced reality (*akhaṇḍatā*) of the Advaita is equally dependent on Viśeṣas. This may be illustrated with reference to the famous definitive text (*lakṣaṇaparādhyā*) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म which is in the nature of a proposition or judgment on the nature of Brahman and ascribes to it three attributes of reality, consciousness and infinitude. It will be necessary to call to aid Viśeṣas if the unity of the judgment and the oneness of Brahman in and thro’ the three attributes are to be preserved. Are the attributes *satvam*, *jñānam* and *ānanyatvam* mutually different or not ? If they are, we have to admit an element of plurality in Brahman, which cannot be. If they are all the same, there is no need to predicate three of them, as any one of them would do. They will thus be synonymous in effect (*paryāya*) and hence redundant.

It cannot be that there are subtle shades of difference among them ; for the Brahman is *ex hypothesi* Nirviśeṣa i. e., without any shade of any kind of difference or plurality. Nor can their employment be defended on the assumption of *affirmation thro' negation of the opposites* (अनुत्तरादिव्यावृत्तिसुखेन). Even there, must be recognized, some kind of distinction from the opposites negated, as otherwise, the entire negation would be a meaningless proposition.¹ The distinction from unreality must perforce be distinct from distinction from ignorance, limitation etc. The doctrine of Savīśeṣābheda is thus forced upon all as a universal principle ' सर्वत्रसिद्धान्तं ' . None who cares for the laws of thought can escape it.

Madhva's Viśeṣa is thus the counterpart of the principle of identity-in-difference recognized by many Western philosophers and that of the Samavāya and Svarūpasambandha recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Advaitins. But it is not just another name for Samavāya. In fact, it is *not a relation* at all in the sense Samavāya is ; tho' it is *svanirvāhaka* like the latter. It has a clear advantage over the Samavāya, in that its self-sufficiency is more directly and easily established than that of Samavāya. The acceptance of Samavāya has to be supplemented by the assumption of its self-sufficiency and ability to render a distinction of reference without a distinction of essence, possible (अभिक्षेपपि भेदव्यवहार-नियामकम् !) which is the hall-mark and *raison d'être* of Viśeṣas (धर्मग्राहक-प्रमाणासिद्धम् !).

This concept of Viśeṣas is thus Madhva's most original and substantial contribution to the problem of substance and attributes in Indian ontology. He is in no way indebted to the Samavāya or any other category of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for this. The general impression of many that Madhva Philosophy is based on the doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and their catagories has already been shown to rest on ignorance of facts and imperfect understanding of the basic principles of ontology upon which the Realism of Madhva is based. It may perhaps be said with better reason that the Viśeṣa of Madhva is reared on the ashes of Samavāya.

Lastly, it has nothing save its name in common with the Viśeṣa of the (Nyāya)-Vaiśeṣikas. (1) It is easily distinguishable from the Vaiśeṣika

1. Cf. व्याख्याते निर्विशेषे तु, कि व्यावर्त्यबहुत्वः ? (Madhva, AV.)

Viśeṣas which are *ex hypothesi* restricted to eternal entities alone : नित्यद्वयवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव । (*Muktāvalī*). But Madhva's Viśeṣas are *not* confined to eternal substances. They exist in non-eternal also. (2) The purpose and function of Viśeṣas too are different in the two systems. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, those peculiarities are found in eternal things alone and serve to *distinguish* one eternal from another and one eternal of a genus from others of the same class. They are accordingly known as "Vyāvartaka-Viśeṣas" and apply where such differentiation (vyāvṛtti) is *not otherwise possible* thro' class-concept or other means, as between a pot and a cloth. They are not, therefore, recognized by the Naiyāyikas in "Sāvayava" - entities, which could be distinguished from one another thro' distinction of parts.

The function of Viśeṣas, in Madhva's philosophy, is *not merely* to distinguish, but to *unify* the part and the whole, and to render a distinction of reference, without loss of existence or essence, possible, where necessary or desired, into substance and attribute, part and whole etc., *within inseparable wholes*. The Viśeṣas of the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, operate *only in cases of absolute difference*. This fact is of utmost importance. It suffices to keep the Viśeṣas of the two systems as the Poles apart and expose the fallacious assumption of some scholars that the Viśeṣas of Madhva's system are either derived from or inspired by those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is the failure to grasp the true nature of Viśeṣas taught by Madhva, that is responsible for wholly misleading estimate of its role in his philosophy that we have in such sweeping assertions as, "By means of the category of Viśeṣas, it will be possible for us to account for the world of distinction without assuming them to be ultimate" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 746). "It is thro' the functioning of Viśeṣas that we have difference or Bheda" (*ibid.* 746). It is therefore necessary to point out that Viśeṣas have been admitted by Madhva, *only* in cases of *absence of actual difference*, as between parts and whole, substance and attributes etc., and where despite such absence of actual difference, a certain measure of internal distinction of parts, qualities or aspects is met with, in lay and scientific parlance and validated by experience. Viśeṣa is, thus, category of thought or power of things inherent in them which, by definition, is intended to justify and rationalize this lay and scientific acceptance of "difference in identity". The *Vādaratnāvalī* makes this *raison d'être* of the acceptance of Viśeṣas, clear : न चैव घटपटादेरपि भेदाभावमर्गीकृत्य विशेष-

बलैनैव भेदव्यवहारसिद्धिः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तत्र भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षासिद्धत्वात् । यत्रहि भेदाभावे प्रमाणमास्ति, भेदव्यवहारश्च प्रमितः, तत्रैव भेदप्रतिनिधिर्विशेषः प्रमाणद्वयान्यथानुपपत्याह्युपादकतया भेदकार्यकृदित्याकारेणैव कल्प्यते । It could, on no account, be applied or *extended* to cases where a *genuine and absolute difference reigns supreme*, and where there is no room for the slightest trace of factual identity (*syarūpaikya*) or coexistence (*sāmānādhikaranya*). It cannot therefore be universally substituted in all cases of actual difference in the world as between a man and a horse, and difference *as such* and as a *category of thought*, *banished* from the world of experience, or dismissed as *not being "ultimate"*. To attempt such a substitution is to confuse the original with the substitute and prevent the function of the latter by extending it beyond its legitimate scope and sphere of application. Difference and Viśeśas has each its own place in life, well-defined and their jurisdiction is fixed beyond possibility of encroachment. It will be illegitimate then, to suggest that difference as such can be replaced by Viśeśas *everywhere* under all circumstances and that we may account for the world of differences without assuming it to be "*ultimate*", thro' the miraculous help of Viśeśas. It should not be lost sight of that Viśeśas are strictly limited to cases of proved basic identity which however admit of an internal distinction of reference, valid in experience: यत्र भेदाभावः प्रमाणावसितो भवेत्तत्रैव विशेषो व्यवहारनिर्वाहकोऽन्नीकियते । गवादिषु तु, भेदस्यैव प्रमाणावसितत्वात् न व्यवहारो विशेषनिबन्धनं इति ।

(Jayatirtha, G. T. Nyāyadīpikā, p. 182).

The position cannot be made clearer than this. Nor can the operation of Viśeśas, in their own sphere, of difference in identity, in any way lessen the ultimacy of Difference as a category of experience *in other spheres* of life. The one does not and cannot annul the other, in its legitimate sphere. Both are necessary for the interpretation of reality. "Bheda" and "Viśeṣa" may therefore be described as the two poles of Madhva's ontology.

CHAPTER VIII

MADHVA'S DOCTRINE OF "DIFFERENCE."


Madhva rejects the Universal as a natural corollary of his doctrine of the uniqueness of the particular, be it a person or a thing. This uniqueness is to be understood in terms of difference from all else. Difference is not merely a component part of reality, but constitutes its very essence. So much so, that to know a thing is to know it as distinct from *all others*, in a general way and from some in a particular way : प्रायः सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते । (*VTN*).

This is because difference constitutes the essence of things (*dharma-svarupa*) and is not merely an attribute of them, related from outside. A substance, according to Madhva, is not a bare substratum of qualities, or an abstraction, but a synthetic unity, capable of inner distinction of parts and aspects, in speech and thought, according to exigencies, under the *aegis* of *Viśeṣas*. For, difference cannot be taken to be flatly and colorlessly identical with objects (but only colorfully identical or *saviśeṣābhinna*), lest judgments of both identity and difference, that we do have of them, should become unaccountable.

Such, in brief, is Madhva's theory of Difference. It is plainly different from the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and *Mīmāṃsa* view and this is another striking proof that the logico-philosophical bases of Madhva's system are in no way borrowed from or inspired by these pre-Madhva realisms and that they are the result of independent cogitation on the problems of philosophy.

We have seen that God, matter and souls constitute the three major realities of Madhva's system. The number of souls is unlimited and the modifications of matter are numerous, in various states. These three are conceived as distinct entities. The reality of God is of the independent order. That of the rest is dependent. Between matter and souls, the former is of a lesser order of reality. It is only in this sense we can speak of 'degrees' of reality in this system. The reality of things in space and time, involves the differences in name, form, attributes, relations, and tendencies. These manifold differences are generally classified under these heads : (1) *Sajātiya* or difference of one thing from others of its own kind (2) *Vijātiya* or difference from those of another kind and (3) *Svagata* or internal distinctions within an organic

whole. The last one is not admitted by Madhva in its absolute sense. In the sphere of the other two differences he has adumbrated a scheme of "five-fold Difference" (*Pañcabheda*¹) :-



This fivefold difference is collectively spoken of by Madhva as " *Pra-pañca* " - प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदः प्रपञ्चः (*VTN*).

It is real and eternal and admits of no stultification.²

The Advaitins have sought to deny the reality of this fivefold difference, in establishing their thesis of the falsity of all the three :

स्वाज्ञानकालिपत्रजगत्परमेश्वरतजीवत्वमेदकल्पीकृतभूमात्रा । (*Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, i, 2). They have, therefore, subjected the concept of Difference to a searching criticism and sought to discredit the logical realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools, grounded on the reality of difference. Realistic Vedāntins like Rāmānuja and Madhva have, therefore, been obliged to review these criticisms of the famous Dialecticians of the Advaita school and redefine their attitude to Difference in such a way as to overcome the difficulties raised by them . We may, therefore, examine Madhva's position with reference to some of these criticisms of the category of " Difference ", urged by the Advaitic dialecticians.

There are only two possible ways in which difference could be conceived (1) as an attribute of things (*dharmaḥbheda-vāda*) and (2) as an integral part of the thing itself (*dharmaśvartupa*). Neither can be said to be entirely free from logical difficulties. All attempts at conceiving of difference in a logical manner are eluded by it. The Advaitins therefore hold that it cannot be " real " (*Prāmāṇyika*) and must therefore be put

1. Jayatīrtha, in his C. on *VTN* shows how this fivefold distinction is clearly: presupposed in the very terms of predication made in the Mānd. Up. text अनादर्मीयया (i, 16) and अद्वैतः सर्वभावानाम् (i, 10)

2. Jayatīrtha has explained the derivation of the term on the basis of Pāṇini, V, 1, 60 : पञ्चानां वर्गः पञ्चः । 'पञ्चद्वयौ वर्गे वा' इति वाशब्देन पञ्चशब्दस्यापि निपाताग्नीकारात्, प्रकृष्टः पञ्चः प्रपञ्चः । प्रकृष्टता च, सोक्षणं गजानतया भवति । (*NS*. i, 230 b).

down as a product of Avidyā. For the conception of difference is vitiated by many fallacies, such as interdependence and infinite regress, if regarded as an attribute of things. Whether difference is viewed as in its turn 'different' from its relata or as different-cum-identical with them, this relation again will have to be similarly viewed as so related and that again similarly, *ad infinitum*.

The supposition of 'identity' between difference and the object will tend to abolish the reality of difference altogether and leave the object alone to exist, inasmuch as difference cannot claim to have a separate existence of its own, apart from an object : भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे, भेदाभेदे च, तत्य तस्य भेदाद्वस्तुनश्चान्योऽज्ञयो भेद इति, अनवस्थानाश कथित् भेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् । अभेद तु एकमेव, तत्र वस्त्रेव । न भेद एव । वस्त्रभावे, तस्याप्यभावात् ॥ (*Iṣṭasiddhi*)

The theory of difference as "Dharmisvarūpa", held by the Prabhākaras, is equally objectionable. For difference, being in the nature of disjunction (*Vidāraṇātmatā*), the oneness of a thing will be in danger of disruption by the numerous disjunctions (distinctions) which will form part of or constitute its nature and penetrate its very essence and individuality. The oneness or integrity of the object will thus be destroyed and in the absence of oneness, manyness also would cease to be, so that only nullity (*śūnyatā*) would be left in the end !

विदारणात्मनो भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपेव, न किञ्चनैकं वस्तु स्यात् * * * एवं च, शून्यतैव तात्त्विकी विश्वस्यापयेत् ॥

(*Ānandabodha, Nyāyamakaranda*).

Thirdly, if difference were included in the essence of a thing, such difference should become fully known, once the object is known, and there would be no more room for doubts of any kind subsequently, so far as that thing and its difference from others are concerned. But such is not the case in experience. This shows that difference could not be treated as the essence of things, but as something outside their content : यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः, तदा, धर्मेण द्वष्टे स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति वचनिक्ष सेवहः स्यात् ।

(*Sriharṣa, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*)

Lastly, difference is not cognized by itself, and independently, but only in relation to its terms, either as qualifying them, or as being qualified by them. But in any case, unless the terms themselves are previously cognized, their difference from each other which is either

attributive, or bound up with the cognition of the correlate, and counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms is dependent on that of the difference already referred to. There is thus an inescapable (mutual) interdependence in any attempt to define the nature of difference or conceive of it.¹

It is evident from the writings of Madhva, that he has carefully examined the problem in the light of these and many other criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians like Maṇḍana, Viṁuktātmā, Ānandabodha, Śrīharsa and Citsukha and has attempted to find a way out. His position may be summed up in a few words : Whatever may be the difficulties in the way of expounding the nature of difference and accounting for its perception, the fact of its experience cannot be denied. If logical difficulties are felt in elucidating the process by which it comes to be apprehended, it is open to us to go beyond the accepted theories on the subject and explore the possibilities of other suitable explanations and adopt newer angles of vision in dealing with the issue, without discrediting the very truth and reality of the experience of difference itself as such. It would be unphilosophical to give up the attempt as beyond solution : नहि प्रक्रियापरिक्षणे वस्तुपरिक्षायाद्गीवान् (Jayatīrtha, *Mīh. Kh. t.p.8*), much more so , to try to escape the responsibility by condemning the perception of difference as a delusion and giving it a bad name (and hanging it) as the Advaitins have done !

Moreover, granting that all known theories on the nature of difference are untenable, it would still be impossible to prove that the conception of difference is itself a delusion, simply because of our incapacity to make it conform to a definite pattern already familiar to us, or to define it in some particular way. The Advaitins have *not shown* and could not show that the ways and means of accounting for the perception of difference, which they have attempted to overthrow, are the only ways of defining it or that they could not be bettered or improved by suitable devices : किंच, स्पष्टदृष्टं भेददर्शनं प्रकारान्तरं कल्पयिष्यति अस्मिन्नेव वा प्रकारे कमप्यवान्तर-

1. भेदो हि न स्वतंत्रः प्रतीयेत किंतु, घटपटविशेषणतया, तद्विशेष्यतया वा । तथाच, घटपटाविति वा, घटपटेयारिति वा द्विवावच्छयोर्धटपटयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यतया प्रतीतौ, भेदप्रतीतैः । विशेषणादिप्रतीतेविशेष्यादिप्रतीतिकार्यत्वात्, विशेषणविशेष्यभावप्रतीतेश्च भेदप्रतीत्यपेक्षा । तथा चान्योन्याश्रयता । (*VTNt. p. 48*)

विशेषं कल्पयति । न तु स्वयं निवर्तते । (*VTNt*, p. 52). They could not show that the concept itself was fraught with such inherent contradictions that in whatever way it may be defined, one cannot escape them. To show that particular definitions or methods of explanation are wrong, is not to show the things themselves are indefinable and therefore unreal. In order to show that, a particular concept has got to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrence and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis, shown. The Advaitins could not afford to do this as *they themselves are obliged to accept the category of difference* and make use of it, not in criticizing the doctrines of their rivals, where one could plead the right of परन्यायैस्तु दृष्टिम्; but in formulating some of their own Siddhāntas on topics like Anirvacanīya and Jīva-Brahmaikya. For example, “*anirvacanīya*” is defined by the Advaitins as सदसदिलक्षणत्वम् or the nature of being different from *Sat* and *Asat*, in essence. This element of “difference” from *Sat* and *Asat*, which is the differentia of *Mithyātva*, must be real and true; in which case it would be impossible to hold all differences to be false. It cannot be claimed that the distinction from *Sat* and *Asat*, present in the conception of *Mithyātva*, is a spurious one; while the difference that is sought to be denied by the Advaitin, is of the genuine order [परमार्थिक], and that, therefore, there is no self-contradiction between his theory of difference and its application. In that case, *Sad-vailakṣanya* and *Asad-vailakṣanya* being both of them admittedly false, the Universe will have to be regarded as both existent and non-existent (*sadasadātmaka*), rather than as something *different from both*. Such a position will be inconsistent with the Siddhānta of the Advaitins.

The dismissal of difference as a fiction of thought and its relegation to the category of a delusion as a product of *Avidyā*, gives rise to a serious difficulty in defining the *nature of tattvajñāna*, in Advaita. This knowledge of ultimate truth is said to be knowledge of non-duality (*abheda-jñāna*) which operates as a “*Bādhaka-jñāna*” in stultifying the agelong perception of difference and duality. Such a sublating cognition must naturally involve an element of difference and “opposition” to the past. One is therefore entitled to ask if the *Bādhaka-jñāna* of non-duality embodies some content of difference from the earlier state of knowledge, or simply takes the ‘form’ non-difference? In the former case, the reality of difference of some kind will stand conceded and come to stay even after the birth of *Tattvajñāna*, if it is not to relapse

into the former state of ignorance ! If, however, the *tattvajñāna* of the Advaitin is simply one of *non-duality*, it will be necessary to *define* the precise significance of the negative element (*a-bheda*) in terms of one or the other of the three well-known meanings of 'otherness', 'negation', or 'opposition.' In any alternative, difference and its reality will be implicated. For the stultifying knowledge which is to take the form of "absence of difference" (now) - *bhedābhāva*, must necessarily fix and define its content as something different from its counter-correlate (*bheda*). It must, in other words, be expressed in any of these three forms : 'There is not, difference' (now); or 'there is no difference (here)' or else 'that something has till now been passing for difference.' Every one of these forms of the sublating cognition will involve an element of difference and would be powerless to transcend it. In this way, the denial of the reality of difference, by the Advaitin, will involve a self-contradiction, in the last analysis.

Madhva meets the logical objections to the reality of difference, positively also. The socalled difficulties of interdependence etc. are no bar to the *validity of the experience* of difference अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वा प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । (Jayatirtha, *VTNt*). It is possible to find other ways of overcoming these and justify the perception of difference and its reality. Otherwise, it would be equally impossible for the Advaitin to show that the realization of non-difference is the highest teaching of the Vedānta, to be attained by study and meditation; for the conception of Abheda (non-difference) is as much open to these logical difficulties as 'Difference' itself.

It should be noted, in this connection, that most of the criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians of the concept of difference, made *before* the time of Madhva, have reference primarily to the views about difference held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā realists. The fomer have treated difference as an attribute of objects. Such a position is hardly tenable as writers like Vimuktātmā and Citsukha have rightly shown. But the other view of difference as "Dharmisvarūpa," or as constituting the essence of objects, does not seem to have been held by any save the Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara school. The Advaitic dialecticians have, no doubt, urged objections against this view also. But their criticisms in this respect, do not affect the new and peculiar theory of the nature and status of difference formulated by Madhva, and expounded by Jayatirtha, on the basis of the new principle of "Viśeṣas"

and "Saviśeṣābheda", devised by Madhva. These early Advaitic dialecticians, till the days of Citsukha, *and including him, do not seem to have been aware of the doctrine of Viśeṣas introduced by Madhva for the first time in Indian philosophy*, or its repercussions on the discussion and settlement of the problem of difference. This is conclusive proof of the fact that Madhva's new doctrine of Viśeṣas and its application to the rationalization of the perception of difference, heralds almost a revolution in the history of logic and the Vedānta, in the Middle Ages. With its help Madhva gives a new orientation to the doctrine of difference and tides over the difficulties raised by the Advaitic dialecticians against the theory of Dharmisvarūpabhedavāda. He straightway agrees with his critics that difference as an attribute of things (*dharmaabhedyāda*) is untenable.¹ In doing this, he has gone far ahead of the Rāmānuja school which clings to the theory of Dharmabhedavāda. If the new solution of Difference as Saviśeṣābhinna (colorfully identical) with the substratum, does not commend itself to the Advaitins who came after Madhva, it is not because of any further difficulty in the conception of difference viewed in the light of Viśeṣas, but because of a deep-rooted metaphysical bias in favor of the unreality of difference and in the Nirviśesatva of reality.

Difference, then, according to Madhva, is not something that falls outside the content of an object or what is generally considered to constitute its essence :

धर्मिप्रतीतिरेव भेदप्रतीतिरिति प्रतीतिद्वयाभावात् (*VTNt*, p. 48).

The 'thing-in-itself' is a metaphysical abstraction. A thing is what it is, just *because of* and *not in spite of* its difference from others. In perception, the essence of a thing is the sumtotal of its distinction from others : अतो व्यावृत्तिरेव स्वस्थम् । (*Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya*, p. 10). A world of difference lies latent and hidden in the bosom of everything. But these differences are not all of them necessary or presented to cognition in detail, everytime an object is perceived. The number of differences that might be perceived and correlated depends on the exigencies of the

1. This is the reason why Vyāsatīrtha and the other followers of Madhva have not felt called upon to meet the arguments directed against the conception of difference as पुथकत्व, वैधर्य, etc. For further remarks on this see Dasgupta; *I. Phil.*, IV, p. 179-80; Chandradhar Sharma, *Cri. Surv. I. Phil.*, p. 375, and my remarks in my *History of Dvaita school*, Vol. II, p. 59.

situation. Out of the world of differences with which an object is for the nonce placed in opposition, only such as are relevant to the occasion or interests of the percipient are marked and emphasized and the rest are excluded and ignored without any reference to their counter-correlates. It follows then, that in all acts of perception of an object, its difference from others is revealed in the same act, *in a general way*, and for the most part : प्रायः सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते । (Madhva, *VTN*). Where however doubts arise, they must be put down to the perception of difference from a few prominent counter-correlates only and missing the differences from others, owing to their bearing a more or less, close degree of resemblance to the object in question, aided by other unfavorable conditions like distance, want of sufficient light etc. : कुतश्चिद्देयावृत्तस्य वस्तुनः प्रतीतात्परि व्यावृत्तिक्षेपाग्रहणादेव संशयोपपत्तेः । (*Vādāvali*, p. 83). The sphere of doubt is thus limited to cases of resemblance and other contributory factors. It is by no means *unlimited* as the objectors make out : यदा तु संशयते, तदापि कुतश्चिद् व्यावृत्तमेव ज्ञायते । नहि सर्वमिदं भवति नवोति कस्याचित् संशयः । (*Taitt. Bhāṣya*, p. 10 b).

शास्त्रैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं यत्किञ्चिदेव सद्वशे संशयं करोति । (*VTN* p. 5).

This disposes of the objection of Śrīharṣa : यदि स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि द्वये स्वरूपं दृष्ट्यामि क्वचिन्न संदेहः स्यात् । (i, p. 210).

Difference being thus *dharmisvarūpa*, the socalled perception of the object is nothing but the perception of its difference—, in other words, the perception of an object is the same as the perception of its difference from all others in a general and from some in a specific way. Inasmuch, then, as there are *no two psychoses here, but only one unitary act of cognition*, and inasmuch as there are *no two things cognized*, (viz., the object *and* difference) but *only one*, there is no room for the fallacy of interdependence at all : स च भेदो धर्मिणः स्वरूपमवेति धर्मिप्रतीतिरेव भेदप्रतीतिरितिः, प्रतीतिद्वयाभावाज्ञान्योन्याश्रयता । (*VTN*. t. p. 48).

This disposes of the objection of interdependence raised by Citsukha and others. Tho' difference is admittedly the nature (*svarūpa*) of objects,

the acceptance of Viśeṣas in the svarūpa of these objects, renders occasional doubts, possible: सविशेषत्वेन जाताज्ञातत्वोपपत्तेः । (*NS.* p. 382)

This disposes of the objection of Śrīharṣa that doubts would be unaccountable if difference were regarded as the essential nature of objects, and of Vimuktātman : अभेदे त्वेकमेव तत्त्वं वस्त्वेव, न भेद एव * * * *. As Jayatīrtha points out, the mediation of Viśeṣas meets all these difficulties, effectively: विशेषणान्यतरमात्रावशेषश्च न भवति । विशेषस्य भेदप्रतिनिधित्वात् ।

(*VTN.* t.p. 52 b).

There is thus no logical impediment, whatever, in regarding Difference as " Dharmisvarūpa " constituting the essence of objects. In the light of Viśeṣas, the category of difference has been fully vindicated by Madhva and shown to be perfectly valid and intelligible.

CHAPTER IX

SOME OTHER CATEGORIES : VIŚIṢṭA, AMŚI AND SAKTI.

We may now turn to a few other categories of Dvaita ontology which have important bearing on Madhva's theology and cosmology. These are 1) the group of three represented by Viśeṣaṇa, Viśeṣya and Viśiṣṭa, 2) the pair represented by Amśa and Amśi and 3) Sakti.

VIŚIṢṭA

Viśiṣṭa includes the Viśeṣaṇa and the Viśeṣya. Viśiṣṭa means the "composite whole". Viśeṣana means the component or the qualifying element and Viśeṣya (or Śuddha) the substance to which the qualifying element is attached, in other words, the thing-in-itself.

The conception of Viśiṣṭa varies in the different schools. The conceptual Realists would not look upon it as an objective real :

विशेषाणं विशेष्यं च तत्संबन्धफलार्पकम् ।
ज्ञानरूपं स्वसामर्थ्यात् विशिष्टमिति गीयते ॥

According to Nyāya philosophy, all the three are mutually and absolutely different. The Mīmāṃsakas believe in the relation of Bhedābheda among them. The Monists hold them to be simply identical.

Madhva holds that every new relation alters or modifies the Substance to a greater or lesser extent. His view of the Viśiṣṭa is akin to the conception of whole and part in Hegelian philosophy, according to which the whole is something more than the sum of its parts tho' dependent on them for their existence in the physical world. The subtraction of any one of the parts, destroys the whole. Only, Madhva would add that a new Viśiṣṭa would step in then : दण्डादिविशेषणसंबन्धेन देवदत्तो विशिष्टस्य इव्यान्तरमुत्पादयति (VTN t) दण्डकुण्डलसंबन्धाद्विशिष्टस्यैवोत्पत्तेः (Up. kh. t.)

Madhva distinguishes carefully between relations and qualities which are coeval (Yāvaddravyabhāvī) with the Substance (Viśeṣya) as for e.g. God and His attributes of Omnicience and those which are changing and impermanent (ayāvaddravyabhāvī). In the former case, there is identity (always subject to internal distinction of reference thro' Viśeṣas). Hence such identity is termed Sa-viśeṣābheda. In respect of changing attributes and relations, there is only Bhedābheda or difference cum-identity .अयावद्वद्व्यभावविशेषणेन, विशिष्टस्य, विशेष्येण भेदाभेदांगीकारात् ।

(G.T. t, p. 188 b; NS. 365).

The same principle applies to Amśāmśis also. The concept of Viśiṣṭa

has important bearings on Madhva's theory of Causation, as will be shown hereafter.

AMŚA AND AMŚI

These two terms may be taken roughly to correspond to the idea of fraction and unit, understood metaphorically. They are also sometimes used for the part and the whole. Madhva applies the idea of *amśa* and *amśi* to sentient beings also. He distinguishes between *Svarūpāmśa* and *Bhinnāmśa*. The Avatars of God are His *Svarūpāmśa*. The Jivas are *Bhinnāmśas*. The Devas also have their *amśas* (cf. Indra and Arjuna). The theory figures in Madhva's theology to a great extent. In respect of ordinary Jivas also, the operation of *amsāmśibhāva* is considered necessary to account for the harmonious working of the quantitative adjustment of their innate potencies for bliss, volition and activity in regard to requisite ends, thro' the agency of *Viśeṣas* (see *B. S. B.* ii, 2, adh. 7).

ŚAKTI

Śakti is accepted by Madhva as *nitya* and *anitya* according to the nature of the substance in which it resides. They are of course inseparable from their substances, if they are coeval with them and *bhinnābhinna*, when impermanent. The differentiation of Śakti and Śaktimat, is rendered possible by the agency of *Viśeṣas*, as in the case of *amśa* and *amśi* etc.

The creative energy of Brahman, is for instance, identical with the Brahman; but it can be distinguished by the play of *Viśeṣas*. The Śaktis themselves have two aspects: *Śaktitā* (latent state) and *Vyaktitā* (manifested state), also regulated by the play of *Viśeṣas*. Hence they do not operate in mutual conflict, at the same time. To illustrate, the creative and destructive energies of Brahman are both eternal and identical with Its being. But there is an inner pre-established harmony which regulates their working periodically and without overlapping. At the time of dissolution, the creative energy of Brahman is in dormancy (*Śaktirūpa*) and comes into play (*Vyakti*) only at the right time. The distinction of Time into 'the time of creation' and 'the time of dissolution,' is likewise based on internal *Viśeṣas* in Time which are also *Savīśesābhinnā* from it.¹

1. शक्तिरूपस्थिता सैव क्रियाशक्तिरितीयेते ।
सा च व्यक्तिस्तु जनिवत् क्रियाया स्वप्रमेव तु ।
तथापि तु विशेषणं स्वरूपेण विशेषणी
जनेऽनिवदेवासौ ज्ञातव्याभ्यातिरेकतः ॥ (*Brh. Up. C.* iii, 4.p. I8)

CHAPTER X
SĀDRŚYA VS. THE UNIVERSAL

Sādrśya (*resemblance*) is the category that replaces the Universal, in Madhva's system. Here, Madhva parts company with the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas and Mīmāṃsaka-Realists, and joins hands with the modern Nominalists and the Jainas.

There are three main theories in Western philosophy about the universal. The Nominalists look upon the particulars alone as real. There are only individual things in Nature and particular ideas in the mind. There is no universal at all. Only the name is common to many. This view approximates to that of Madhva and the Jainas.

The Conceptualists think that tho' only individual things exist in Nature, without any universal class-essence running thro' them, the human mind has the power of forming abstract and general ideas about them. The universals then, exist in our minds as concepts. The Realists, on the other hand maintain that the universals exist both in nature and in the mind.

In Indian philosophy, the Buddhists are extreme Nominalists, splitting even the so-called individuals into momentary essences (*Svalakṣaṇam*). The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools show varying degrees of realistic bias in their conception of the universal. The argument from universals to Monism is easy to guess. The Jains have argued that the nature of the universal is not one of class-essence, but of similarity or resemblance. Such resemblance is actually experienced and should be taken as the objective ground of the notion of universals.

The same is the stand taken by Madhva. His rejection of the universal (*Sāmānya*) is a direct corollary of the pluralistic implications of his Svarūpabhedavāda. He believes in the distinctiveness, nay, uniqueness of each individual and particular.¹ He could ill afford then, to recognize a single universal class-essence running thro' a number of particulars, which will surreptitiously open the door to Monism, in the end. He therefore sets his face resolutely against the universal and gives it no quarter.

In his discussion of the problem of Sādrśya Vs. the Universal, Madhva has surprisingly anticipated many of the arguments against the

1. Cf. किंच न स्त्वं नामैकमनुगतं किंतु प्रतिवस्तु सत्त्वानि भिद्यन्ते (*NS*, i, 1,1.).

Nominalist view of the Universal, advanced by modern writers. The Realists' contention is that most of the words we use in common life refer to things, qualities and relations or their actions (*dravya**guṇa**karmāṇi*) which do not exist by themselves. Unless our words express some elements which a number of particular things, qualities or relations have in common, the purpose of language and thought would not be served. To that extent, inference based on Vyāpti between *hetu* and *sādhyā*, would also be impossible, as our words and thoughts could not rise above particulars, and inferences take us from particulars to the general.

It is urged by modern Realists that the Nominalist's attempt to meet these difficulties by substituting 'resemblance', for the universal, is futile. Resemblance itself, as proposed to be used, would be a true universal in order to apply to different kinds of resemblances. These 'resemblances' would be far too vague, as everything resembles everything else in some respect or other. We should have to admit a different kind of resemblance for each universal term. It would be simpler and less cumbersome to admit, an objective universal characteristic corresponding to each term, instead of trying to detect more and more particular forms of resemblance.¹

Madhva points out in reply that there is a basic difference in the *modus operandi* of resemblances and universals, which the Realist has failed to note in his arguments. It is this. The extension of significance of terms to a number of resembling particulars is achieved by 'Resemblance' *not*, as in the case of the universal, by means of accepting any conventional reference (*śakyārtha*) or on the basis of etymology (*pravṛttinimitta*) of these words, *directly*, but only *indirectly* as pointers (*lingatayā*) as to how these objects could be referred to by the same names, in virtue of their possessing a striking content of resemblance with the one already known : 'अयं गौरिल्यस्यायमेतत्सदृशाश्च सर्वेऽपि गोशब्दवाच्या इत्यर्थोऽभिप्रेयते वक्त्रा । द्वयोरपि सार्वत्रिकव्युत्पत्तिकामत्वेन एकवाक्यस्य एकपिण्डविषयत्वकलनानुपपत्ते ।' (N. S. p. 372) The extended significance being already understood in the first instance of learning the language, there is no difficulty in limiting or extending the significance to suit the exigencies of a given context. The further objection that "we cannot distinguish a vast number of resemblances, by inspecting the resemblances of each relation", is pointless, says

1. See *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, A. C. Ewing, p. 218.

Jayatīrtha, as such partial resemblances could not be eschewed even in respect of universals : न च वाच्यं, गोसादृश्यमधेऽप्यरत्तीति तत्रापि गोशब्दवाच्यतानुभान-प्रसंगः । जातिनिमित्तोष्ट्वपि एवं प्रसंगस्य समानत्वात् । (N.S. p. 373)

If the universe of reference is narrowed down to specific forms of the universal and not too generalized ones, the same thing could be done in the case of "Resemblances" too : जातिविशेषो निमित्ततयांगीकियतेऽतो न व्यभिचार इति चेत् । तर्हि सादृश्यविशेष एव लिङं यो लक्षणभूत इति वदामः । (N.S. p. 373)

Madhva also takes the wind out of the sails of the Realist by maintaining the extreme Nominalist position that even resemblance is *not a universal* and that it is *sui generis* in each case. This is consistent with his Svabhāvabhedavāda according to which no *single* characteristic can be the *essence* of more than one entity¹ :

न सर्वधर्म एकोऽस्ति * * * * * ||
एतादशं च सादृश्यं पदार्थेषु पृथक् पृथक् ।
नरत्वादिकमयेवं तत्तद्वर्मतयेष्यते ॥ (AV)

The uniqueness of resemblance does not, however, prevent its facilitating inferential extension of significance of terms in required cases, just as "differing" attributes are apprehended as "different" without requiring the help of another difference to render them intelligible.

Madhva also argues that the contention that extension of significance of terms would be impossible without the idea of a universal, will be suicidal. For, if that be so, we should have to admit a series of universals one behind the other in order to justify the title of each universal to be so called. Similarly, to know all the particulars by the name "particular", we shall have to admit a 'universal' of particulars !

जातिश्वेत कथं तासु, तत्र चेदनविश्वितः ।
तथैव व्यक्तिविज्ञानं व्यक्तित्वाभावदृष्टिम् ॥ (AV)

The metaphysical consequence of Madhva's view that resemblance is *sui generis* in each case, appears to be that the "pratibimbatva" of each individual self to God, based on a certain measure of Sādrśya also, is also unique and distinctive in each case and that no two individuals will bear the same resemblance to the Bimba, i. e. Brahman, in respect of their spiritual attributes of consciousness and bliss.

1. Cf. सर्वस्य भवतः स्वभावत्वानुपरते : ।

(Udayana)

CHAPTER XI

SPACE AND TIME

The Hindu theory of Mahāpralaya, which could be traced to the Rg Veda (X, 129), presupposes an absolute theory of space and time, according to which, they have a being in themselves, apart from the things in space and events in time. Space and Time must *ex hypothesi* be infinite. If we deny this, there would be great logical difficulty of conceiving of a boundary to finite space and time. We shall have to recognize more space and more time beyond them and this would lead to a regress : ‘अथ देशो, नास्ति’ ‘इदानीं कालो नास्ति’, इत्यस्य व्याहतत्वात् देशकालयोः परिच्छेदनिरूपणयापि तयोरपरिच्छेदसिद्धिः । देशकालयोः स्तोपाधी निषेधे विरोधेन, अविरोधाय निषेधोपादेत्या देशकालान्तरयोरावश्यकत्वाच्च । (*Nym.*).

No doubt, the conception of infinite space and time, also, has its difficulty of involving the contradiction of a completed infinite. But Mādhusa thought, with its most serviceable doctrine of “*Svarūpa-Viśeṣas*”, overcomes this difficulty and makes it possible to hold that space and time have infinite potential divisibility¹.

Madhva therefore holds that space and time are distinct realities intuited by the Sākṣī and that they are not merely ‘forms of intuition’ as in Kantian thought. Otherwise, they could not be intuited : गगनं साक्षिगोचरं प्रदेश इति विज्ञेयम् (*AV.* ii, 3).

The Mādhusa conception of space and time is, thus, much ahead of that of other Indian schools and looks surprisingly modern in some aspects. This is due not a little to their being interpreted in the light of the new doctrine of Sākṣī and Viśeṣas, which are Madhva’s most striking contributions to philosophic thought. These seem to hold great possibilities for the future of metaphysics. With these two ideas, Madhva overcomes the antinomies which beset the conception of space and time in other philosophical systems of ancient and modern thought as well.

Space is termed “*Avyākṛtākāśa*” by Madhva, as distinguished from ether (भूताकाश)². The former is eternal and uncreated and the latter

1. देशः सर्वत्रास्ति, कालः सदास्ति, पूर्वः काल, इत्यबधितप्रतीत्या, तयोः स्वनिवाहकतया, प्रमेयत्वादिवत् स्वसंबन्धसंभवाच्च । (*Vyāsarāya, Nym.*)
2. भूताकाशव्यतिरिक्ताया देशकालापरिच्छेदायास्तार्किकाभिमतदिश एवाव्याकृताकाशत्वात् । (*Vyāsarāya TC*).

is a product of matter. *This twofold classification of space, is a special feature of Madhva's philosophy.* It is tersely termed as आकाशप्रदत्तम् by Jayatirtha and Vyāsarāya.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is one eternal ubiquitous space (*vibhu*) which is not open to perception, but is only inferred from the spatial characteristics of proximity, remoteness etc. But spatial properties and relations like distance, size etc., can be perceived directly thro' touch, sight etc. The Mīmāṃsakas hold similar views. The Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools look upon Space and Time as categories of the understanding (*buddhikalpita*). Some Naiyāyikas regard space as perceived by the visual sense. Jayatirtha dismisses this as impossible on the Nyāya view that space is colorless. Nor can Space be left to be entirely inferred thro' sound, as even the congenitally deaf have a perception of space.

Madhva's theory of the intuitive perception of space and time has received assent from many modern European thinkers. The ordinary 'scientific' view of space is what makes movement possible. The idea of possible movement is formed by abstraction from the experience of movement. This is circuitous. Madhva says that we cannot understand movement as such without being already conscious of space. Movement does not explain space. Space explains movement. He therefore suggests that space must be accepted as a reality given by direct perception, not of the ordinary senses, but of Sākṣi, which is specially fitted to sense the supersensuous. No memory of movement is therefore necessary to establish space inferentially and mentally, as some of the older Naiyāyikas thought and some modern philosophers do.

Madhva's definition of space as distinguished from ether, is true to its essential nature of providing room for bodies to exist: अवकाशमात्रं ह्याकाशः (*AV. ii, 3*).

This is explained by Vyāsarāya as अवकाशप्रदत्तम्. This is supported by a passage from the *Bhāgavata* (iii, 30, 43) quoted by Madhva. He holds that space and time are infinitely divisible, into further spaces and further parts of time, each such part being held to be a "natural" part of it and not merely conditioned by Upādhis! For, "Upādhis", according to Madhva, are not so much the causes of distinction (where they do not actually exist)—भेदकारक as 'pointers' (ज्ञापकाः) thereof.

Madhva shows that it is logically inconceivable that Space is *created*:

अवकाशमात्रं ह्याकाशः कथमुत्पयते ऽन्यथा ।

यद्यनाकाशात् पूर्वं कि मूर्तनिबिडं जगत् ? ॥

(AV).

We cannot conceive of the antecedent non-existence of space anywhere, if space is to be created. Production also needs a material stuff and there is no such stuff out of which space could be created. If Prakṛti is that stuff, the question could be repeated in respect of it, as to why it should alone be uncreated. If the reply is that the production of Prakṛti from another stuff is inconceivable, the same thing could be said of space also. The Buddhists' view of space as मूर्तद्व्याभाव (negation of tangible reals) would lead to other difficulties such as that such reals existed at a time when space was not yet in existence (or created). This would reverse the ideas of Sṛṣṭi and Pralaya. Madhva therefore pleads strongly that space must be accepted as an uncreated and eternal substance, a view which receives striking support from the remarks of Herbert Spencer: "If space is created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, however, be imagined by any mental effort. If the non-existence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then, necessarily, its creation is absolutely inconceivable" (*First Principles*, p. 27).

As a Vedāntin believing in the Brahmakāraṇatvavāda of the entire Universe, Madhva seeks to reconcile the essential uncreated nature of space (and other *ex hypothesi* eternal reals) with the Vedāntic axiom: that everything in the Universe is, in some sense, created by Brahman (B. S. i, 1, 2)¹, by interpreting the 'creation' of eternal substances like space, and time in a Pickwickian sense of "Parādhīnaviśeṣapti", (पराधीनविशेषाति) which will be explained later. This shows that Madhva has been the only commentator, who has had the right insight into the *raison d'être* and metaphysical significance or the principle of Samanvaya enunciated by the Sūtrakāra. Madhva explains the references to the creation of Akāśa, in Upaniṣadic cosmology, as referring only to the भूताकाश and this is the reason why he has admitted two kinds of Akāśa, in his system.

Time

Time, in Dvaita Vedānta, is the essential constituent of all experience : तेन च कालेन सञ्चितेषणतया नुभूयत इति सर्वधारतयास्थेयम् । (Vādāvali, p. 95).

1. 'Creation' includes other cosmic determinations like स्थिति.

But it is *not*, as in Advaita, apprehended by the ordinary sense of perception.¹ It is held to be perceived by the Sākṣī, on the testimony of सौषुप्तिकानुभव. At the stage of Susupti, there is no functioning of the sense organs, including the mind. Hence, there is no scope for Pratyakṣa or Inference. The perception of time in this *dreamless state*, is borne out by the immediate evidence of its intuitive experience, recollected immediately on waking up² and expressed in the judgment : ' एतावत् कालं बुद्धमहस्याप्सम् ' (so long, I have slept in bliss). This cannot be disregarded as a mere recollection as there can be no recollection of what has never been experienced by oneself. For the same reason of its immediacy, it cannot be treated as an inference to a condition of complete freedom from any kind of infelicity " at the period of time just elapsed ". If such a condition has been *experienced* by the person who draws the present inference, he should have had a direct experience of " that period of time which has just elapsed ". There can be no inference of its condition, had it never been experienced by him. There would thus be no explanation of the experience of dreamless sleep (सौषुप्तिकानुभव) unless the perception of time (besides that of the Atman and of bliss i. e. ख्यात्पुरुषं) is accepted. For the same weighty reasons, the intuitive perception of time by the Sākṣī, must be admitted:

काले हि साक्षिप्रत्यक्षः सुषोमै च प्रतीततः (AV.)

The Naiyāyikas look upon Time as only inferable and not open to direct perception as it is formless. But as Madhva rightly points out, the inference of time would itself presuppose time as its Pakṣa (minor term) and the ascertainment of Vyāpti in respect of time would be impossible without a prior perception of time. There is, thus, no other Pramāṇa, than the Sākṣī, by which time could be proved. The Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga philosophers would appear to hold that time is more a category of the understanding (बुद्धिकल्पित) -as a necessary " form of intuitor " known only thro' inference as there is no perception of blank time without a sensible content. Madhva shows that this is not so. It should be regarded, says he, as a fundamental ontological category that conditions all our being and becoming. No experience is possible

1. नीरूपस्यापि कालस्येन्द्रियवेदत्वाभ्युगमात् । (Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 22, Calcutta)

2. औचरिकानुस्मृतिसिद्धसौषुप्तिकानुभवसिद्धत्वात् ।

without it. It is experienced along with the experience itself : स्मृत्यनुभवात् सर्वाः प्रतीतयः न केवलमर्थमवगाहन्ते, विन्दु, कालकलितमेव ।

The organ by which the intuiting Self becomes aware of time, is termed the Sākṣi or स्वरूपेन्द्रियम्, which is no other than the Sākṣi itself turning its own inner searchlight, so to say, upon itself. This answers the difficulty felt by many Western thinkers like William James that we have no sense for bare time, that we cannot intuit a mere duration. The difficulty lies in our taking only the waking experience as the basis for philosophizing. The Vedānta, on the other hand, draws its certified data from the other states also including Suṣupti, in particular, which is the highest state of ideal experience (of bare ego, bare time and bare felicity, if you please) of which every one of us has had direct experience, as the coveting of it so conclusively proves. Madhva has thus anticipated Kant's notion of pure intuition of time without any sensible content in his doctrine of the intuitive perception of Time by the Sākṣi. His view has also a remarkable affinity with Alexander's acceptance of the intuition of time and space prior to sensations and his view that it is thro' intuition that they are immediately perceived.

Madhva does not hold that time is an undifferenced and indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*). It is an infinite and infinitely divisible¹. It is an infinite stream of duration without beginning or end. Each duration is pervasive. As in the case of Paramāṇus, the shortest conceivable duration is also theoretically divisible, still further. Electrons in physics, tho' physically indivisible are not logically so. Madhva holds that at whatever size they might be said to be "atoms", we can always conceive parts of them smaller than the whole, altho' it may not be possible, for physical reasons, to split them : अविभागः पराणुता । (AV)². This enables him to hold that the divisions of time are all "natural" parts of it and not merely औपाधिक or superimposed : अस्माभिः काले स्वभावत एव भेदोऽज्ञीकियते (NS. p. 387 b). As in the case of space, so in respect of

1. In his *B. T.* (iii) Madhva gives an interesting table of the smaller units of time starting from the occupying a point of three *trasareṇus*. 3 *trutis* make one *vedha*, three *vedhas* a *lava*, three *lavas* a *nimeśa*, three *nimeśas* a *kṣaṇa* and so on.
2. Cf. यस्य विभिन्नाववेषु सत्त्वपि, तेषां विभागो न कश्चपि भवितुमर्हति, स परमाणुरिति व्याख्यानात् (N S. p. 349 b.)

time. Madhva posits that it is eternal and uncreated in the sense of bare empty time (*anādi*) and non-eternal (divisible). Both are intuited by Sāksī. This is how he reconciles the Vedic and Upaniṣadic and Puranic texts which speak of time in both ways :

नासदासीको सदासीत् तदानीं (*R. V. X, 129. 1.*)

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च (*Bhāg. ii, 10, 12*)

सर्वे निमेषा जज्ञिरे (*T. A X, 1, 2*)

नित्यौ कालश्च सत्तम (*Viṣṇu Pur. q. by Madhva*)

It is also pointed out by Madhva, that unless intrinsic parts are accepted in Time, the established order of time in Sṛṣṭi and Pralaya could not be maintained without risk of overlapping and the admission of Upādhis for this purpose would be pointless unless there were already natural distinctions in time to which these Upādhis could attach themselves apart from the difficulty of interdependence which would also ensue, in the event of Upādhis *de novo* ¹.

1. कालभेदेन जगत्पृष्ठप्रलयव्यवस्था च परमते न घटते । कालस्य भावात्, ईशस्य नित्येच्छवात् ।
स्वमते तु कालभेदसद्भावात् सृष्टादिव्यवस्थोपपत्ता । (*SNR. p. 19*).

CHAPTER XII CAUSATION.

The Mādhwā theory of Causation cannot be understood without relation to its doctrine of Viśiṣṭa, already referred to. The true bearing of this doctrine on the question of creation of "eternal substances" like Prakṛti, Jīvas, Space, Time etc., would not be missed if the distinction of यावद्द्रव्यभावी and अयावद्द्रव्यभावी relations is clearly borne in mind. Jayatīrtha's statement : विशिष्टाकारक वस्तुस्वरूपाभिन्न इति तस्यैवासातुपूजनो भवति । (NS, p. 431) if rightly understood, in the light of the important distinction drawn between these two types of relations, would have prevented the utterly baseless tho' sensational conclusion of the 'essential creation' (स्वरूपस्थिति) of the Jīvas (as of other eternal substances) according to Madhwā's theory of Causation, drawn by Prof. H. N. Raghavendrachar¹. This has evoked protests from many orthodox quarters, as a misinterpretation of Madhwā. The embodiment of selves and such other Viśeṣaṇas of finite reality being in the nature of the things, *not coeval* with the entities concerned, there is no possibility at all of applying the principle of Saviśeṣabhedā between them. The proposition विशिष्टाकारश्च वस्तुस्वरूपाभिन्नः (NS, p. 431) would *not* therefore, apply to them !

Madhwā's doctrine of Bhedābheda between Viśiṣṭa and Viśeṣya, (or Śuddha) in respect of changing attributes and relations of things, leads to the corollary of "Sadasatkāryavāda" of Causation, which is his general theory of Causation.

Causation implies a change, a beginning and an end :
 सञ्चिति व्यवहित्यमाणमेव पदार्थस्त्वरूपं उत्पत्तेः प्राङ्मानशोतरं च नास्तीति सर्वो लोको व्यवहृति—
 आयन्तयोः सर्वकार्यमसदिद्येव निश्चितम् ।
 अयस्त्र विशेषोऽत्र जायते, कोऽत्र जायते ? (G. T. ii, 16)

"Causation", therefore, has reference only to the "Viśeṣa" aspect of the substance in question. Madhwā, therefore, rejects the Satkāryavāda (of the Sāṃkhyas) and the Asatkāryavāda of Nyāya philosophy as half-truths. He combines them into a new theory of Sadasatkāryavāda ; for change is not merely something *new* appearing, but it presupposes a substratum that changes, in form or state, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. Causation would be impossible and meaningless, without the assumption of

1. *Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in the Vedānta*, Mysore Uni. 1941.

continuity of the cause in and thro' the changes it has undergone. Hence Jayatīrtha defines Causation as follows: तदेव हि वस्तु अवयवोपचयापचयाभ्यामन्यथा क्रियते । न पुनरन्यदेव भवति इति हि परिणामवादिनो मन्यते (NS. p. 394). Such a definition is intended to meet the criticism that if cause and effect were different events they will be absolutely separate and there would be no *relation* between them. The gulf between the two will remain unbridged. The Buddhist doctrine of causation as an ever-changing, constant, ceaseless flux, each moment (*kṣaṇa*) of existence being but a "specious present" with no duration, is sharply criticized by Madhva and Jayatīrtha. We cannot think of a "change" without a changing thing at the back. There *must be* a "something" that is not contained in the succession which carries on each vanishing point of the succession and *adds* it to the next (B, S, ii, 2, 21). Such a link would be missing in the Buddhist doctrine of *Kṣaṇikatva*, as a *kṣaṇa* is, according to the Buddhist view, indivisible like a mathematical point (and *nirviśeṣa* at that). There would be no split-second interval between any two vanishing points of moments at which the cause and effect could have met and "causation" taken place by the transference of "Samskāras"! For, mere sequence or succession (in time) is *not* Causation.

Madhva holds, therefore, that the effect is *partially* non-existent in its definite form and shape, while being existent in the form of the cause:

असयत्कार्यरूपेण कारणात्मतयास्ति हि ।

तनुभ्योऽन्यः पटः साक्षात् कल्य दृष्टिपर्थं गतः ? (AV)

He does not, however, subscribe to the Sāṃkhya view of *absolute identity* of cause and effect, as that will render casual effort superfluous and causation meaningless. Even if that were understood in the sense of "manifestation", the same difficulty would arise in its case:

व्यक्तावपि समं हेतदनवस्थान्यथा भवेत् ।

(G. T.)

Manifestation and non-manifestation cannot be understood in the sense of the effect being perceived or not perceived (tho' pre-existent in the cause). That will land us in solipsism (दृष्टिशै). There will be no answer to the question why the effect is *not manifested* if it were really and *absolutely* and without any qualification (*Viśeṣa*) identical with the cause and so pre-existent in it. The idea of manifestation itself will be similarly open to an antinomy of production or manifestation,

CHAPTER XIII

NEGATION

Negation, as a fact of experience, is a Prameya. It is an important ontological category. As a thought-category it lies at the root of many other philosophical conceptions like Bhāvarūpājñāna, Mithyātvā, Bheda and Causation. The positive and the negative represent the two aspects of reality. The Mādhwā philosophers agree with the Naiyāyikas in accepting the negative as an independent category of experience. The argument by which some philosophers have sought to deny independent status to negation, by equating it with the mere existence of the *locus*, has been rejected by Jayatīrtha, in his *TST*. He points out that the judgment 'there is no jar on the ground' must signify something more than the mere *locus* and that that something must be a non-being. Without reference to such a non-being, it will be impossible to define what is meant by the *locus per se*. Otherwise, it would be open to us to speak of the non-existence of the jar, even when it is present on the ground, as the *locus* as such exists even while the jar is there on it.

Madhva defines the negative as : प्रथमप्रतिपत्तौ निषेधरूपत्वम् or what is presented in the primary act of perception as something that is "given" and which does not involve the *significant negation* or denial of a "something" or of a relation or property to a given something or in respect of a particular locus : आपतजायां संविदि विशेषतः सप्रतियोगिकप्रतिषेधाकारणे प्रतीयमानत्वम्। In other words, the perception of the non-existent is conditioned by reference to a particular counter-correlate (प्रतियोगी), according to the exigencies of the situation. The doctrine of "Savisesābheda" between substance and attributes enables Madhva to admit the logical possibility of integrating negative aspects with positive entities and *vice versa*, in propositions.¹

1. Cf. घटोऽपि प्रथमं विधित्वेन धर्मस्वरूपेण, प्रतीतोऽनन्तरं पटो न भवतीति पटनिषेधात्मकतया प्रतीयते । प्रागभावादिरपि प्रथमं निषेधत्वेन, धर्मस्वरूपेणावगतोऽनन्तरं प्रमेय इति विधितया प्रतीयते । अभेदेऽपि धर्मधर्मभावो विशेषशक्त्याः संगच्छत इत्युक्तमेव ।

Madhva recognizes three types of negation: antecedent (*Prāg-abhāva*), subsequent (*pradhvamsa-abhāva*) and absolute (*atyanta-abhāva*). The first has an upper limit; the second a lower and the last is unlimited. Its counter-correlate (प्रतियोगी) is the absolutely non-existent (e.g. square circle, hare's horn, tortoise hair etc.). Such non-existence is also called निष्पत्तियोगिक or अप्राप्याणिकप्रतियोगिक or a negation whose counter-correlate is a myth.

Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya argue that there is nothing illogical in an utterly non-existent figuring as Pratiyogī in respect of अत्यन्ताभाव; for “pratiyogitvam” (being the counter-correlate) is not an attribute which requires or presupposes the actual existence of an object like other predication of attributes like color. To be the counter-correlate of a negation is merely being the object of such knowledge as would enable us to form the idea of a negation : अभावज्ञानोपयोगिज्ञानविषयतामात्रस्य प्रतियोगित्वात् (Tdt.) If the physical existence of the Pratiyogī or its factual reality at the time of the perception of the *abhāva* is insisted upon, even the perception of the antecedent and subsequent negations would become equally impossible, as there surely is no Pratiyogi in actual existence at the time of the perception of the *Prāgabhbāva* or of the *dhvamsa*. That a Pratiyogi (like the jar) is going to come into existence later or that it did exist earlier (in the case of *dhvamsa*), makes no difference to the point at issue. If then, it is the idea of the “Pratiyogi” that counts, such an idea is possible even in regard to mythical things like the hare's horn. The concept of अप्राप्याणिकप्रतियोगिकाभाव holds the key to Madhva's theory of illusions. The अन्योन्याभाव of the Nyāya school is equated by Madhva with “difference” which has already been treated at length,

III. EPISTEMOLOGY

CHAPTER XIV

THE THEORY OF PRAMANAS

Life and human experience being at times vitiated by illusions, it becomes necessary to define truth in experience so as to enable us to distinguish it from the false. The ascertainment of truth being the first and foremost aim of philosophy, it is incumbent on it to define truth and error in clear terms and indicate the instruments or channels of their ascertainment. The value of such preliminary ascertainment of the sources, bounds and limitations of human knowledge cannot be too highly commended. In the words of Max Muller, "Such an examination of the authorities of human knowledge ought, of course, to form the introduction to any system of philosophy. To have clearly seen this is, it seems to me, a very high distinction of Indian philosophy. How much useless controversy would have been avoided, particularly among Jewish, Mohammedan and Christian philosophers, if a proper place had been assigned *in limino* to the question of what constitutes our legitimate and only possible channels of knowledge, whether perception, inference or anything else. Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of truth, the Hindu philosophers have built up their various systems of philosophy or their various conceptions of the world, telling us what they take for granted and then advancing step by step from the foundation to the highest pinnacles of their systems."¹

Man is essentially an epistemological animal. His irrepressible thirst for knowledge is itself a thesis about knowledge. Whatever differences of opinion there might be about the status and validity of particular experiences, there can be no two opinions that there are and needs must be, certain experiences which are logically valid; for, if logical certainty is denied or impugned, logic itself would be without foundation. All our experiences presuppose the existence of certain *a priori* or objective standards by which they are judged. A wholesale denial of such criteria would cut at the very roots of our experience and bring all reasoned activities to a standstill. Any inquiry into the true and specific nature of such standards has meaning only when their existence is admitted in a general manner. Absolute scepticism would be unsustainable, even for a moment. If everything is invalid, the contention of scepticism

1. *Six Systems*, 1912, Preface xiii.

itself would be invalid. The possibility of doubt is itself a sufficient proof of something that is not open to doubt. The contention of Buddhism and Advaita, that there is nothing in this phenomenal world that is valid or that there is nothing the certainty of which could be accepted, is therefore, inadmissible. It stands to reason then, that there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible. That being so, an investigation into the means of such knowledge is naturally in order.

In Indian philosophy, such validity is known as prāmāṇya. But the term pramāṇa (from which it is derived) is used in two senses (1) true knowledge and (2) the means or instruments by which it is engendered, according to the two senses of the suffix “*ana*” (*lyuṭ*)¹. Madhva has done a distinct service to epistemology in distinguishing these two senses and usages of the term and coining two separate terms “Kevala” and “Anu” pramāṇa, to denote them, without ambiguity. He defines pramāṇa in both the above senses as यथार्थम्.

“Pramāṇa” in the first sense (of valid knowledge) refers to the capacity of true knowledge to reveal the nature of an object as it really is : यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारि । As applied to Anu-Pramāṇas like Perception, Inference and Sabda, it signifies the means (*sādhana*) by which such correct knowledge of objects is obtained. But there is no difference in the directness of their relation to their objects.² The Anupramāṇas function with as much immediacy as the “Kevala”. But the instruments produce “ज्ञेयता” in Jñāna while Jñāna merely acts as a manifesting condition thereof. Hence the two classifications are based on their respective mode of *relation* to knowability.

This definition is suitably expanded by Jayatīrtha and others so as to bring out the full force and significance of the terms “यथा” and “अर्थम्”

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1. भावे ल्युट् and करणे ल्युट् as they are technically known.
 2. The term “Yathārtham” is an Avyayibhāva compound, composed of “*yathā*” and “*artham*”. The adverb “*yathā*” signifies : पदार्थननिश्चितं or not going beyond the “*artha*”. “*Artha*” denotes a knowable object from the root *r̥* with the *uṇādi* suffix “*tha*”, the root itself being understood in the specialized sense of “knowing” (*avagati*) : अर्थतैव ज्ञेयतैवार्थत्वमर्थशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तामस्माकं विवक्षितं । अर्थत इत्यर्थं इति व्युत्पत्त्या तद्वाचिता अस्तेव । अतेरौणादिकस्य थ प्रत्ययस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । गत्यर्थानां च ज्ञानार्थत्वादिति (NS. p. 247 b).

as applied to valid knowledge on the one hand and its means on the other. Pramāṇa is defined by Jayatirtha as the knowledge of a thing as it actually is, with reference to a particular space-time setting : यथावस्थितमेव ज्ञेयं विषयीकरोति, नान्यथा in other words, as knowledge which "answers" to the nature of the thing. But by correspondence, here, is meant, *not* either spatio-temporal co-existence of Pramāṇa and Prameya or correspondence on all fours extending to one and all of the aspects of a given object. It is no more than— याचदावेदितस्य सत्त्वम् or the existence of such aspects as are actually perceived by each person according to the extent of his capacity or understanding and other conditions governing the rapprochement to the object : यत् यदेशकालयोर्यथाप्रतीते तस्य तदेशकालयोः तथात्त्वम् ! or the actual existence of an object with reference to a spatio-temporal setting in the manner perceived *with reference to that setting*.

The problem of Perception looms large in modern philosophy,— whether physical objects are directly perceived, and if so, to what extent. The main obstacle to the theory of direct perception of objects as opposed to the theory of perception of the sense-datum is the alleged 'gap between evidence and conclusion.' The Mādhwā theory overcomes these difficulties by a frank admission that the way in which things appear to us is causally determined by a number of factors which are extraneous to the thing itself and that there are gradations of knowledge and finally that no knowledge at the human level could lay claim to complete comprehension of a thing, in all its innumerable aspects and relations: कस्यापि सर्वात्मना विषयीकरणभावात् (N.S. p. 251). But this limitation of knowledge does not make it 'invalid'. The correspondence to facts (ज्ञेयाभ्युभित्वारितम्) is to be understood naturally with reference to certain definite space-time settings and other properties of objects conditioned by external factors and subject to the 'normal conditions' of perception being fulfilled.¹

Kavala-Pramāṇa is divided into four types, in the descending order of merit as Iṣvara-jñāna, Lakṣmi-jñāna, Yogi-jñāna, and Ayogi-jñāna, on the basis of intrinsic difference in quality, luminosity and range. The first two are in the nature of Svarūpa-jñāna alone while the other two include Vṛtti-jñāna (sensory knowledge) also. The classi-

1. यथाभूतं प्रतीतं, तस्य तथाभूतस्य सत्त्वम् । देशकालयोरपि, विशेषणान्तरवत्
यथाभूतमित्यनेनैव गृहीत्वात् । विशेषानुक्रतेस्तदोषोप्रसन्नोश्च । (N.S. p. 248 b.)

fication tho' partly theological, is not without mystic, epistemological and psychological significance. Iśvara-pratyakṣa is accepted by the Nyāya and Vedānta schools as the necessary presupposition of all human knowledge (as in Berkeley). It is, according to Madhva, all-comprehensive, always veridical, eternal and independent and part of the divine nature itself and extremely luminous, — luminosity being an intrinsic quality of this knowledge itself, unrelated to objects. Lakṣmijñāna is next only to God's, in these respects. The ramifications of Yogi-jñāna include those of Rju, Tāttvika and Atāttvika souls and of the last into those of Muktiyogyas and others. The nature of the constitution of the Svarūpajñāna of these is explained by Jayatīrtha in his *Pramāṇapaddhati*.

Kevala-pramāṇa has two aspects : knowledge consisting of the essence of selfhood and that arising from mental processes. These are graded in regard to validity as regards both, into *utama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*. Details have been given by Jayatīrtha.

CHAPTER XV.

PERCEPTION, INFERENCE AND VERBAL TESTIMONY.

Sense-perception is defined by Madhva as निर्दोषार्थनिदियसंक्षिकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानम् or knowledge produced by the right type of contact between flawless sense-organs and their appropriate objects. Such contact would be in the nature of an Anu-Pramāṇa. The Naiyāyikas accept six different kinds of contact (*sannikarṣa*) including a special one for *abhāvapratyakṣa*. With the rejection of Samavāya of the Nyāya school, all these stand rejected by Madhva. He accepts only one direct type of *sannikarṣa* of the different senses, including the Sākṣi, with their appropriate objects and their negations. The senses (*indriyas*) being the products of *Taijasa-ahamkāra-tattva*, such contacts are presumed to be effected thro' the medium of "rays". Another view is that in the case of the eyes alone, the contact is thro' "rays" and in others, directly between the organs and the objects and their *abhāvas*.

The flawlessness of the senses and their contact etc., is to be borne out by the truthfulness of knowledge, within the meaning of "yathārtha" already given, which is itself ascertained by the Sākṣi. Hence there is no mutual dependence in the establishment of the flawlessness of the senses etc. Absolute flawlessness of *indriyas*¹ is possible only in respect of the knowledge of God, Laxmi and the released. The Svarūpa-jñāna of Uttamajīvas is always true while the Vṛttijñāna of all the three classes of unreleased souls, is open to error, as the senses (here) are material. These limitations in the nature of Svarūpjñāna and Vṛttijñāna of the different orders of beings may perhaps explain from the Mādhva point of view, the impossibility for ordinary human perceptions to know the "*ding an sich*" as it is. It is another way of explaining that our senses are not constituted in such a way as to enable us to know all about given objects of perception but only as much of reality as is adequate for our normal life. This would suffice to answer the argument of Scepticism about our right to make a transition from sense-experience to physical objects. The contents of individual experiences are proverbially fragmentary. Even of the reality of which I take note, I can never perceive more than just those aspects that attract my attention for the time being or are significant to my interests. There is an element of selective attention in individual experiences. Experience is

1. Technically, Svarūpjñāna also is engendered by Svarūpendriyas.

not a mere awareness of a succession of presented objects or relations, undetermined by the controlling interest or purpose of the pramātā. We are thus forced to admit the necessary existence of a superhuman experience to which the whole Universe of being is directly presented (God's knowledge being only Pratyakṣātmaka, according to Madhva) as a complete and harmonious system. As reality has been defined as अनारोपितं प्रसिद्धिविषयः it follows that it can have no meaning apart from presentation to a sentient experience. Hence Madhva posits a graded series of more and more harmonious wholes culminating in the perfect and systematic unity of the absolute experience of the Brahman which embraces the totality of all existence, all at once, in its sweep (*sarvavisiyakam*). The Mādhva theory has thus deep philosophic significance, tho' apparently treated as a purely theological doctrine.

As all reality is Saviśeṣa in essence and in the last analysis, and the "bare something" being inconceivable, all Pratyakṣa is considered to be fundamentally "Savikalpa" or determinate, in origin and the distinction of perception into determinate and indeterminate accepted in the Nyāya and Advaita schools, is rejected.

The Sākṣi intuits its own self (atman) and its characteristics of bliss etc., as well as the mind and its processes, Avidyā, knowledge arising from external senses, the feelings of pleasure and pain etc., Time, Space and God. The mind comprehends external reality *thro'* the sense organs and acts as the independent instrument of memory (aided by Samskāras).

The other senses have their own well-defined sphere of objects.

Inference

According to Madhva, inference consists in the knowledge of the mark of inference as pervaded by the Sādhyā and invariably concomitant with it, leading to the ascertainment of the Sādhyā, (निर्देशोपपत्तिः). The Buddhist logicians regard the principles of essential identity and causality (तादत्त्वम् and तदुत्पत्तिः) as specific grounds of determining Vyāpti, while the Vaiśeṣikas enumerate five such specific grounds in the Sūtra : अस्येद कार्यं कारणं एकार्थसमवायि विरोधि च (V. S.). The Sāṃkhyas enumerate seven such principles on which we may base a universal proposition.¹ Madhva holds that invariable concomitance is the only relation

1. Cf. मात्रानिमित्तसंयोगिचिरोधिसहचारिभिः ।

स्वस्त्रामिवधधातायैः साकृत्यानां सप्तधानुमा ॥

on which all inferences ultimately rest. Even Pakṣadharmatā (the middle term) being a characteristic of the Pakṣa (minor term), is not considered by him to be an essential factor in inference as even a Vyadhikarapahetu (which is not spatially coexistent with the *sādhya*) can lead to valid inference. He also rejects the claim of the Naiyāyikas that सप्तकासत्त्वम् and विपक्षासत्त्वम् are necessary conditions of inference as these are not obviously to be found in the Kevalānvayī and Kevalavyatireki types of inference. Madhva dismisses "Vyatirekavyāpti" as providing any independent basis for inference, as it merely corroborates the positive concomitance between Sādhyā and Sādhana, in cases of doubt. Consistent with this position, Madhva repudiates the threefold classification of inference as Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki based on purely positive, purely negative and combined concomitance, and recognizes only one genuine type of inference based on *anyaya-vyāpti*. Jayatīrtha puts down the acceptance of the other types to a love of classification or for the sake of facility of understanding.

The Nyāya school insists on a five-member syllogism in Parārthānūmāna. The Buddhist logicians require two and the Mīmāṃsakas three.¹ Madhva is not in favor of any hard and fast rule. The irreducible minimum for him, is the statement of the Vyāpti. The rest would depend on the exigencies of the occasion. Where the subject-matter of dispute is clear to the disputants, the statement of the "Pratijñā" could as well be dispensed with. In any case, if the five-member syllogism serves merely as a reminder to the person addressed, he could reach the desired conclusion by just remembering the Vyāpti alone. In that case, the use of the other members would be superfluous. If the five-member syllogism acts as an authoritative pronouncement (*āgama*) leading to the inference, it will have no force as the disputants (in a Vāda) have no faith in the trustworthiness of each other. If it is taken on trust, it can be done so outright without the paraphernalia of a five-member syllogism! Moreover, if it should act as an Āgamavākyā, the Kevalavyatireki type would have no legs to stand on. If the five-member syllogism is looked upon as a dialectic method, Madhva points out that it would entail the same being pursued till all difference of opinion is finally set at rest and

1. [तत्र पञ्चतयं केचित्] द्वयमन्ये वयं त्रयम् ।

उदाहरणपर्यन्तं यद्वोदाहरणादिकम् ॥

absolute agreement reached between the parties. This would require a series of five-member syllogisms and not one.

The errors in reasoning are classified into formal and material. The most important of these are विरोध and असंगति in which are subsumed all the defects of reasoning including the fallacies and निग्रहस्थानाः (grounds of defeat) of the Naiyāyikas.

Verbal Testimony

Madhva makes out a strong case for according verbal testimony an independent status as a Pramāṇa. The Vaiśekikas regard verbal judgments as inferences (वाक्यं वाक्याधेऽनुमानम्). The Prabhākaras while assigning an independent status to Apauruṣeyavākyā subsume verbal judgments of human origin under inference. This is invidious as the accessories to verbal judgments (such as समयस्मरण, शाब्दन्यायानुसंधान) are the same in both the cases. As verbal judgments do not involve any Vyāptijñāna, they could not be treated as inferential in character and should be given a separate status.

Śabdapramāṇa is divided into Pauruseya and Apauruseya. The Vedic literature is regarded as “Apauruseya” and the Smṛtis, Purāṇas and other works based on Vedic authority are accepted as Pauruseya Āgama. Madhva is the only Vedāntin, after the Mīmāṃsakas, to have given the question of the infallibility and the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas serious attention. He has taken special pains to establish the doctrine with some new and original arguments of his own which go beyond the usual and conventional arguments based on the conception of the eternity of Varṇas and the impossibility of proving that the Scriptures were spoken or uttered by a particular person.

The Vedas are self-valid. Their validity cannot be derived from the authority (*āptatva*) of any author, human or divine. To the modern mind, the ascription of Apauruseyatva and Anāditva to the Vedas may seem absurd. But Madhva introduces a new line of argument, which is indeed thought-provoking, in that it goes to the very crux of the problem —the *raison d' être* of any Apauruṣeyavākyā in the domain of Pramāṇas. It is this that the ultimate sanction for all religion, ethics and morality and for the acceptance of all supersensuous values like *dharma* and *adharma* would have to be founded on some textual authority which is not the composition of any particular individual and does not derive its

authority or validity from the fact of being the words of that person regarded as reliable (*āpti*). Unless our ideas of *dharma* and *adharma* are grounded on such impersonal authority, it would be impossible to establish the very existence of such values and concepts on any satisfactory basis. A philosopher who would not admit the existence of such supersensuous values as *dharma* and *adharma* would have no scope for his Śāstra, as the object of a Śātra is to show the ways and means of realizing those truths which cannot be secured by other means, falling within the scope of perception and inference. Nor can such a philosopher claim that his system would, by proclaiming the absence of *dharma*, *adharma* and other supersensuous values, confer a real benefit on humanity by ridding society of its superstitious belief in them. Madhva points out that far from benefiting humanity, such teachings undermining the faith of the people in *dharma*, *adharma* etc., would let loose violence and disorder everywhere by proclaiming the theory 'might is right.' In the long run, the people will curse the philosopher whose teachings would expose them to such misery. As such teachings will only lead to adverse results and as he has no faith in any other unseen benefits, his Śāstra would be futile either way.

Insofar then as *dharma* and *adharma* and other supersensuous values will have to be admitted by all rational thinkers and since there is no other ultimate sanction upon which they could be grounded, save the impersonal authority of a Śātra, one has to accept an Apauruseya-Śātra as furnishing the basis of universal faith in *dharma*, *adharma* etc. There is no other way in which their existence could be established. It is hardly possible to determine their nature and existence on the supposed authority of individuals, however great they might be; for, every human being would have the limitations of ignorance and of being liable to deceptiveness. It would not be justifiable to postulate for this purpose the existence of some teacher who will be omniscient. That would be postulating much more than what is warranted in our experience; for omniscience in any individual is not a matter of our ordinary experience. One would have to postulate, moreover, not only omniscience to an individual but also that such an individual is not given to deceiving others and further that he is the author of a particular statement or doctrine or body of texts about the nature of *dharma* etc.

Postulation of the existence of an Apauruseya-Śātra, on the other hand, would be the simplest thing. It would not necessitate any further

assumptions. As there is no ascertainable author of the Vedas, their authorlessness would follow automatically. On the contrary, it would be an unwarranted assumption that they have an author, when no such author is ascertained or ascertainable. The analogy of worldly testimony would be powerless here as in respect of worldly testimony there is no conception that it is authorless, as there is, in respect of the Vedas. There is no fear that at this rate any statement from any irresponsible source may be claimed as Apauruṣeya; for established traditions would always be a sufficient check against such wild claims and there are other ways of ascertaining the genuine from the spurious, when such claims are made.

The qualification of *nirdoṣatva* (flawlessness) applies to every Pramāṇa. Verbal testimony, to be valid, must be free from such flaws as want of an objective reference to the words employed, lack of syntactic connection or denotative fitness. There are different theories as to how the verbal judgment is produced by the distinctive elements forming part of a sentence. Madhva holds the Anvitābhidhāna view, according to which the words in a sentence convey their specific senses compositely thro' requisite syntactic interconnection with the rest. This obviates the necessity for recognizing the Sphoṭa Vāda and other theories. The Prabhākaras also hold the Anvitābhidhānavāda. But while, according to them, every word in a sentence is invested with the capacity to convey the net syntactic relation as a whole and in that process its own specific sense also, Madhva would appear to recognize two stages in the process of *anyaya*, each word having, at the outset, only a general capacity to convey its definite sense as correlated to *such others* to which it stands immediately related by fitness and *then* by juxtaposition in the sentence taken as a whole, with yet others, an additional capacity to convey a more specialized form of the same *anyaya*, in all its completeness.

Other Pramāṇas like Arthāpatti are not given an independent position by Madhva. Arthāpatti (presumption) shows a way out in cases of *apparent conflict* between two facts. Given that X is alive, if he is not at home, he must be presumed to be out somewhere. This can be easily put in a syllogistic form : “चैत्रो बहिरस्ति जीवनकले सति गृहेऽस्त्वात् । यो जीवन् यत्र नास्ति स ततोऽन्यथास्ति, यथा अहम्” (PP.) The point here is that both the alternatives, *taken together*, constitute the mark of inference. There can be no real conflict between the two alternatives of a man being alive and his not being at home. So there *can be no* difficulty in one of the alter-

natives qualifying the other and collectively leading to the inference. Should the conflict be real, there would be no room for Arthāpatti either; but only a doubt as to what may have happened to X! Similarly, Upamāna also, as a means of establishing similarity between two things, may be brought under inference, perception or verbal testimony according to the conditions of each case. "Anupalabdhi" also, in the same way, could be brought under any of the three according to the nature and conditions of the experience. When a jar is suddenly removed from its place, the perception of its non-existence is the result of direct perception by the Sākṣī, the non-perception of the jar being merely the logical consequent of the former. Where one feels the absence of the jar in darkness by judging thro' groping with his hands, the non-perception serves the purpose not of an instrument of *abhāvapratyakṣa* but as a mark of inference. The necessity of recognizing Anupalabdhi, as a separate Pramāṇa, is thus obviated by the acceptance of the possibility of direct sensory contact with *abhāva* as in the case of *bhāvas*.

The well-known "Tātparya-liṅgas" like "Upakrama", "Upasam-hāra" and Śruti, liṅga, vākyā, prakaraṇa etc. are also similarly to be brought under the purview of Inference.

CHAPTER XVI

THE STATUS OF MEMORY

The contribution of memory to knowledge is quite considerable and important. The question of its status and title to be admitted as a Pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge has engaged the attention of philosophers in the East and in the West. While some modern philosophers have been very critical and sceptic of the claims of memory, others have overweighted it. In Indian philosophy, the prevailing tendency has been to exclude memory from the title of 'Pramāṇa', on the ground of its 'merely' representative character. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas have deliberately defined Pramāṇa in such a way as to exclude memory from its scope¹. The Advaitins generally follow the Mīmāṃsaka view. The followers of Rāmānuja seem to be divided in their opinion. Meghañādāri seems to be definitely *against* the admission of memory to the title of Pramāṇa, as can be seen from his definition of Pramāṇa as: अन्यप्रमाणानपेक्षं अर्थपरिच्छेदकम्² while Vedānta Deśika is quite in favor of it :

स्मृतिमात्राप्रमाणत्वं न युक्तमिति वक्ष्यते ।

अबाधितस्मृतेऽके प्रमाणत्वपरिभ्रहात् ॥ (*Nyāya-Parīśuddhi*)

As a Realist, Madhva stakes his all on the validity of Memory and supports its claim to be admitted as a Pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge :

प्रामाण्यं नातुवादस्य स्फुटेरपि विहीयते ।

यथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यशब्दार्थो यद्विक्षितः ॥ (*AV*).

He brings Memory under Pratyakṣa and considers it as a direct perception by the mind : प्रत्यक्षं सप्तविधम् । साक्षिषिद्दिन्द्रियमेदेन । मानसप्रत्यक्षजा स्मृतिः (*PL*). Its validity cannot, he says, be treated as merely inferential. Otherwise, even the perception of an object can be treated as an inference from a *kārya* to a *kāraṇa* : साक्षात्कारेण कार्येण, कर्मकारकतया घटायतुमानम् । (*NS*. p. 227). Apart from that, it cannot be said that we may know the past by inference from the retention of the impression of the past experiences or from its revival as an image. Such inferences in their turn would involve memory. Moreover, if memory is invalid as a source of knowledge, then all inferences which are based on the remembrance of Vyāpti between

1. Cf. अनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणम् (*Mīmāṃsaka*)

2. *Nayadyumani*, q. by Dasgupta, *I. Phil.* iii, p. 239.

the *hetu* and the *sādhyā* would cease to be valid ; for no knowledge can be valid when it has its basis in what is invalid. Inference then, would be at a standstill. It can similarly be shown that the other Pramāṇas accepted by the other schools would also involve memory of some kind as one of their basic conditions.

Madhva holds that Samskāras (former impressions) provide the necessary contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the mind with the past. The possibility of such a penetration into the past, by the mind, is established, says he, on the evidence of Yogic perception of past and future and is not, therefore, inconceivable. It is indeed very remarkable that Madhva should have anticipated the views of Western thinkers like Russel, Hobhouse and others in recognizing memory as a primary source of our knowledge concerning the past. He agrees with them that the immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past by inference. Otherwise we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred at all. If the validity of memory is questioned, there would be no proof of our past experiences having occurred to us : पूर्वानुभवे किमानमित्युक्ते स्यात् किमुत्तरम् ? (AV). It is no argument against this point that " the fact that one seems to remember an event is a good reason for believing that it occurred ; but it is only because there is independent evidence. If we are all to lose our memory of events, it would be harder for us to reconstruct the past events, but not impossible. The cross-checking of written and other physical records, the utilization of scientific theories which they support, would suffice¹". This would not apply to the question of one's own personal experience and its remembrance. If I lose my memory, I cannot by any written or other records reconstruct my past experience, for myself. Others with their memories intact may be able to do so. But that will hardly help me or have any binding force, so far as I am concerned. If the reconstructor should lose his memory, no interpretation or correlation of evidence would be possible. The part played by memory in human life, is thus considerable and it would be suicidal to question its validity *in toto*. Of course, there are delusive memories at times. But so are there cases of delusive perceptions and inference also ! That does not affect the validity of memory *per se*. Madhva's insistence on " *nirdoṣatva* " of the causal complement would be sufficient to cover such cases.

1. *The Problem of Knowledge*, A. J. Ayer. 1956 p, 186.

The general objection to the validity of memory is that it does not fulfill the condition of correspondence (*yathārtham*). The state or condition in which an object is first apprehended is no longer present at the time of its subsequent remembrance. Thus memory cannot lay claim to be faithful to the experience and reproduce it exactly. This objection is answered by Madhva, by pointing out that it is not the re-presentation of the experience *in toto* that makes for the validity of memory but faithfulness to its object-content¹. The existence of an object in the same condition whenever it is known is not essential for the validity of knowledge. What is required is that the particular state or condition, in which knowledge apprehended a given object with reference to a particular space-time setting, should really belong to it in that space-time setting. What memory does is to recall the fact that the particular object was in such and such a condition or state at such and such a time (तदासौ तात्कालः). This certainly is so. It is irrelevant to the validity of the memory that the former condition is no longer present. Its existence now in the same state or condition, or in a different one, is simply irrelevant to the validity of memory. It is only in this sense that scientific deductions about the past or future conditions of phenomena could be held to be valid. The same applies to memory also:

स्मरणकालेऽर्थस्य तदवस्थत्वाभावादयाथार्थं स्मृतेरिति चेत् । न । अतीतानागतविषयानुमानागम-प्राप्ताण्यप्रत्युतिः ॥ (NS. p. 251.)

There is not much force in the objection that it is not the function of a pramāṇa to make known an already known object, to us. For, it can never be seriously maintained that no further knowledge can arise in regard to a known object. Neither is knowledge opposed to knowledge in any way, so that subsequent knowledge may be barred. It cannot also be held that want or absence of knowledge is a part of the conditions which produce knowledge. Knowledge is bound to arise if the necessary conditions for its production are there. The objection that a pramāṇa should not be dependent on anything else, or any other knowledge would cut at the very root of Inference. There is thus no justification to define "Pramāṇa" in such a way as to exclude memory from its purview.

1. स्यादिदं, यदनुभवानुसारित्वं याथार्थमिति वदामः । अर्थानुसारित्वं तु तथेत्युक्तम् ।

(NS. p. 251.)

Memory is generally supposed to be caused by Samskāras (impressions) left on the mind by the first experiences. A difficulty arises in this connection. Such impressions, then, could only relate to the actual state of the object as it *was experienced*. But the "experience" did not certainly present its object with the words "I am past", stamped on it, as it were. If, then, Samskāras corresponding to the objective content of experience produce memory, how is this discrepancy to be explained?

This is really a ticklish question. The difficulty seems to have been felt by some modern writers also, on the subject. But their explanation is vague and non-committal. The correct answer according to Ayer is that "perhaps, there is no one thing that is present in every such instance of remembering. Sometimes it is the matter of one's having a vivid image; sometimes with or without image, there is a feeling of familiarity; sometimes there is no specific mental occurrence."

This leaves the difficulty unsolved. Madhva cuts the Gordian knot here by boldly formulating a new theory that our memory experiences are not purely and simply the reflections of the Samskāras, impressions, feelings or beliefs. They are direct apprehensions of the mind penetrating into the past¹. Only such a theory as this would justify the position taken by modern thinkers like Russel that memory resembles perception in point of its *immediacy* and differs from it in being referred to the past². That the mind has got this power to penetrate into the past and the future is established on the evidence of Yogic perceptions of past and future, which are recognized as direct perceptions (*Sāksātkāra*) and not as inferences. Such mental perception in the case of memory is, however, limited to the sphere of previously experienced objects or events by the nature of the limitations imposed by the Samskāras, which act as the connecting links (*sannikarṣa*) with the past; whereas, in the case of Yogic perceptions of the past and future, such *Sannikarṣa* or connecting link is supplied by the power of Yogic merit itself. Hence, Yogic vision is more comprehensive than ordinary mental or memory experiences. This explains why memory is, by its very nature, connected with one's past experiences.

The position taken up by Madhva that Memory should be regarded as an immediate perception of the past by the mind is quite unique. It

1. Cf. the view of Samuel Alexander that "the object is compresent with me as past" (*Space, Time and Deity*, i. 113, q. by Ayer).

2. *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 76.

goes very much beyond the views of the Jainas who have valiantly upheld the right of memory to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge, but have classified it as a form of mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*). Madhva's view of Memory as a direct perception of the past by the mind is a remarkable anticipation of the views of some modern philosophers like Russel who claim that "we often remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise presented to our senses and in such cases, *we are still immediately aware of what we remember*, inspite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present". (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 76).

Another minor objection to the right of memory to be admitted as a "Pramāṇa" is its alleged inability to serve any useful purpose (*nisphalatvam*), as a source of knowledge. This is pointless, says Madhva. In the first place, validity is a matter of *fact* and hardly one of utility. Apart from that, not all instances of memory can be dismissed as serving no useful purpose. We feel happy to remember pleasant experiences and seek to dwell on them and go from one to another. Exercise of memory increases the potencies of the impressions. Feelings of love and hatred are evoked by agreeable or disagreeable memories.

Insofar then as memory is uncontradicted and true, it would be fully entitled to the status of "Pramāṇam" in the sense of "*yāthārthyam*". It has been argued, however, that there is a peculiarity about memory which deserves notice. "The only claim of memory to the status of knowledge and acceptability rests upon an explicit reference to a past experience, which it professes to *reproduce faithfully*. A remembered fact is believed to be true just because it is regarded as identical with the content of a past experience, which it claims to reproduce".¹ This conformity to a past experience and falling back upon it for its own validity are said to be proof of its "self-abdication", in favor of its archetype. Thus, the question of treating memory as a distinct type of knowledge is "barred by definition". In this view, the Advaitin follows the Bhāṭṭas, who hold that the only kind of knowledge, so called, is knowledge of the already unacquired : अनविगतार्थगन्तु. Memory, though not, therefore, a distinct source of knowledge, is still a distinct *experience* that has to be distinguished from knowledge and given a separate name. "The experience in which the new emerges is called

1. D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 22-23.

'Anubhūti' and reproductive knowledge is called Smṛti." (D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 22-23).

As a Realist, Madhva establishes the right to validity of memory and *anuvāka*, both in the enlarged sense of the term "Yathārtham", as defined by him and in the narrow sense of अनधिगतार्थगन्तु प्रमाणम् accepted by the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins:

प्रत्यक्षं मानसं चैव स्यादतीतार्थगोचरम् ।
 तदा स्मृतिप्रमाणत्वं अतीतत्वविशेषितम् ।
 आधिक्यमनुभूतात् यदतीतत्वमिष्यते ।
 मानता च कर्त्त्वं न स्यात् स्मृतेवार्थवशं नात्र हि ।
 मानत्वं प्रत्याभिज्ञाया अपि सर्वानुभूतिगम्यम् ।
 अतीतवर्तमानत्वधर्मिणी सा च दृश्यते ।
 न च सा स्मृतिमात्रार्थं तदिदल्पवैकल्पः ।
 अतो न वर्तमानैकनियमः स्यात् ग्रहेऽक्षजे ॥

(AV. iii. p. 34.).

He argues that we *experience the past* by means of Mānasa-patya-akṣa, aided by the Samskāras. The experience of memory is valid in so far as it is uncontradicted. Thus, it is *not* barred by definition. Apart from that, there is an element of "novelty" (*anadhigatārtha*) in memory. It is not a mere photographic reproduction of a previous experience or wholly "identical with the content of the past experience." For, it comprehends events, or objects *qua past* i. e., as qualified by the special attribute of "being past": अतीतत्वविशेषितम्; whereas, the first experience of them would, naturally, have conceived of them *qua present*! Memory, then, involves an element of novelty,—a something more than a mere photographic reproduction of experience. As Hobhouse puts it, "Memory is an assertion of the past *as past*." In the same way, an analysis of Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) shows that it is an indivisible act of cognition, produced by the visual sense, aided by Samskāras: अनुभवरूपमेकल्पमेव विज्ञानं संस्कारसञ्चिवेन चक्षुषा जातम्! (NS. p. 496 b) and that it is neither a simple perception of a mere "this"; nor an act of memory involving a "that"; nor even two separate cognitions consisting of a perception and a memory; nor even a *compound* of "mental chemistry", as the Jainas would have it: तदिदल्पवैकल्पः ।

Jayatīrtha quotes Vācaspati Miśra to show that he too is *not* averse to recognizing the validity of memory in the sense of possessing “yāthārthya” (validity). For, in commenting on the definition of Pramāṇa in the Sūtra : उपलब्धेतुः प्रमाणम्। Vācaspati first qualifies the term “Upalabdhi” (cognition) by the adjunct of “being correct” (*Yathārtham*), to avoid the overpervasion of the definition in respect of doubts. But, lest the definition as modified, viz., यथार्थोपलब्धेतुः प्रमाणम्। should embrace “memory” also, he qualifies “Upalabdhi” once again, by saying that यथार्थोपलब्ध does not here include *all correct knowledge, as such*, but only immediate experience. This shows that the validity of memory is accepted by him. Otherwise, he would not have raised any further objection to the qualified definition of Pramāṇa as यथार्थोपलब्धेतुः which would have sufficed to rule out memory, if it had been intended to be excluded from the field of valid knowledge. Or, having raised an objection of that kind, he should again have excluded the validity of Smṛti, by the selfsame adjunct—“yathārtham” instead of restricting the term Upalabdhi to “anubhava” as distinguished from memory. This establishes that in the opinion of Vācaspati, memory is ruled out, not because of its containing any element of invalidity (*ayāthārtham*), but because of its *not* being in the nature of a direct or a primary experience (*anubhava*). This shows that its validity is irrefutable and *ergo*, a proper definition of “Pramāṇam” must be such as to *include it*. There is no point in giving a partial definition and then exclaim that memory is “barred by definition!” It is unfair to interpret or define the term “Pramāṇam” in such a way as would fail to achieve such a result or foil it. Hence, the need for redefining “Pramāṇa”, so as to bring within its range all types of valid knowledge, without any invidious distinction or preconceived ideas.

Madhva has thus done a great service to the cause of truth in restoring memory to its rightful place as a valid source of knowledge and therefore fully entitled to be accepted as a “Pramāṇa”. He has also given a great lead to philosophers in bringing it under “Pratyakṣa” by assigning it a special place as “Mānasa-pratyakṣa” under his scheme of sevenfold division of Pratyakṣa. It is a tribute to the keenness of his mental powers that his recognition of the immediate character of memory is receiving assent from several modern thinkers like Ewing who have come to recognize the ‘direct view’ of memory.

CHAPTER XVII

DOCTRINE OF VALIDITY

Pramāṇas give us valid knowledge of things "as they are in fact". The nature of this validity and correspondence with facts, as understood by Madhvā, has already been defined. The problem that remains is that of the criteria of truth by which we convince ourselves of the validity of our experiences and judgments. Modern philosophers have put forward different tests of truth such as correspondence, coherence, pragmatic tests and even intuition. In Indian philosophy, also, these different criteria figure under different names.

The Sāṃkhyas have held that both validity and invalidity are innate to knowledge. This means that the same factors which produce knowledge make for the validity pertaining to it and similarly, in the case of invalidity. The same principle applies to the *apprehension* of that validity or its reverse. The factors which make known the knowledge are alone responsible for the apprehension of its validity and invalidity. This theory seems to rest on a naive commonsense realism that both validity and invalidity are organic to knowledge.

The Sāṃkhya position is clearly self-contradictory. It may, however, be explained by the Sāṃkhyas that as the machinery of the production of knowledge could not at any time be expected to be absolutely free from the operation of *gunas* or *doṣas* that arrest the capacity to produce invalidity or validity as the case may be, one cannot altogether escape the conclusion that knowledge is bound to be intrinsically true or false, according to the prevailing condition of the *Karāṇas* that produce it. The only excuse for such a roundabout explanation will be the acceptance of the principle that knowledge by itself cannot have the contradictory features of validity and invalidity at the same time. The same fear of self-contradiction should have counselled the Sāṃkhyas against attributing two mutually conflicting *capacities* to the *Karāṇas* themselves, in their attempt to justify the dual nature of knowledge. Such a view will actually make the auxiliaries responsible for the Karāṇas' acquiring this dual capacity. That will land the Sāṃkhyas in a theory of Parataḥ-pramāṇya of *both validity and invalidity*, instead of their Svastastva, as they want to maintain.

Reflection shows, then, that truth alone is organic to knowledge and invalidity must be extraneous to it and must not be put down to the same causes as produce knowledge, but to defective adjustment of conditions or environment.

It is clearly illogical to regard both validity and invalidity as innate characteristics of knowledge. One of them must be natural and organic and the other extrinsic. Tests and verifications are needed to make sure of validity only in cases of reasonable doubt,— and not as a rule. This confirms the position that validity is intrinsic to knowledge and must be so.

According to the Nyāya school, both the genesis and apprehension of validity and invalidity are extrinsic to knowledge, i.e., caused by factors other than those which give rise to or make known the knowledge. This is consistent with the practical realism of the Nyāya and its pragmatic theory of truth. Knowledge, according to this school, is generated by well-defined contact of sense organs with objects or by other specific factors (गति) (which differ according to the nature of each case, i. e. perceptive, inferential or verbal); while its validity is brought about by certain special virtues in the *indriyas* or other causal apparatus, according to the type of knowledge. Invalidity, on the other hand, is produced by defects of sensory contact or other pertinent factors. This school also holds that while knowledge *per se* is apprehended by mental perception, its validity is inferred by correspondence or other tests. Invalidity, likewise, is inferred from want of correspondence, unworkability etc.

The weakness of the Nyāya theory lies in its making validity depend upon the satisfaction of external tests. This is clearly unsatisfactory. If the tests require further tests to validate them, there will be a regress of them *ad infinitum*. If the first or second test itself is sufficient guarantee of validity without the need for further tests, it would be tantamount to an admission of self-validity of the result of *that test*, which is, also as much a piece of knowledge as the earlier ones.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, regard validity as extraneous and invalidity as intrinsic to knowledge, as all ordinary knowledge according to them is discursive and hence based on mental construction (*kalpanā*) in terms of name, form etc.

The Bhāṭṭas accept validity to be innate and invalidity to be extrinsic. But then, valid knowledge itself, according to them, is inferred by the peculiar mark of "cognised-ness" (ज्ञातना) which is a property produced in knowledge, while invalidity is inferentially established thro' want of correspondence etc. The Prabhākaras regard knowledge as self-luminous and therefore capable of manifesting its own validity in the same act. But they do not accept any invalid knowledge as such,—the so called "invalid", of popular conception, being regarded by them as due merely to a failure to *distinguish properly* between an actual perception of a given something and a memory of something else (resembling it), arising almost in a flash.

Madhva disagrees with all these theories. According to him, the sense organs themselves are capable of producing correct knowledge, by proper contact etc. There is no need to assume any special characteristic (guṇas) for this purpose. But when vitiated by flaws the natural capacity of these is arrested or distorted and they give rise to invalid knowledge. As knowledge, by itself, is jaḍa (insentient) as a modification of the *antahkaraṇa* and therefore incapable of self-revelation, we have to admit some other principle by which the knowledge itself and its validity could be intuited. Such a principle is the Sākṣi or Svarūpendriya of the knowing Self; which, as Caitanyarūpa, is capable of both स्वप्रकाश and परप्रकाश i.e. revealing itself and its content. Both knowledge and its validity are, thus grasped by the Sākṣi, in the ultimate analysis. But in respect of invalid knowledge, the Sākṣi grasps only its bare content or essence (*svarūpam*) while its invalidity, as such, is ascertained by the Sākṣi indirectly thro' incoherence (*visamvāda*) or other tests. In respect of Anuprāṇas, their validity is inferentially grasped thro' the ability to stand the test of correspondence etc.

Implications of Madhva's Doctrine of Validity

It will thus be seen that validity, as defined by Madhva, cannot admit of any degrees, such as are recognized in Buddhism and Advaita, in terms of Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika-prāmāṇyam. It is indeed difficult to justify the theory of degrees of validity in the light of Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, ostensibly admitted by the Advaita, just as it is in the other systems of the Vedānta.

Degrees of validity will be inconsistent with the dictum : अनाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवत् भूतेः (Sureśvara). On the Advaitic view, it will be more appropriate, logically and terminologically to speak of degrees of invalidity or unreality of experience. Validiy, if intrinsic to knowledge, must be *ipso facto* absolute and unlimited and not relative or confined to particular moments or periods of time : प्रामाण्यस्य च मर्यादा कालतो व्याहता भवेत् (AV). Even supposing that unstultifiability for all the three periods of time (बैकलिकावाद्यत्वम्) is the true test of reality, it will not be difficult to secure such " abādhyatvam " (unfalsifiability) to our empirical knowledge, which in so far as it is uncontradicted with reference to its own space-time setting, is technically बैकलिकावाद्यत्वम्—

स्वकाले ह्यस्तितां गृह्णन् साक्षात्कारब्रिकालगम् ।

* * * गृह्णत्वेवात्यबाधताम् ॥ (Nym).

If our knowledge is absolutely sure to be disillusioned and set aside at a subsequent period of noumenal level, it would be tantamount to saying that it has not been valid and true to facts, even when it has been appearing to be so all along : कालान्तरेऽप्यमानं चेदिदार्थं मानता कुतः ? (AV) in other words, that we have been under a cruel delusion played on the screen of knowledge and have been dealing with metaphysical shadows instead of with the realities of life. The Advaitic philosopher is inconsistent with himself in accepting the doctrine of Svataḥprāmāṇya of knowledge and advocating the doctrine of degrees of reality and of validity in the same breath. The Mādhwā view of validity as " *yathārtham* " is free from this defect. On this view, correspondence is nothing more than having a real object conceived as it truly is with reference to a given place and time : तद्विषयत्वमेव तदाकारत्वम् । नहि ज्ञानशेययोरेकाकारता ! It inclines more to the correspondence theory than to pragmatism. Madhva lays stress on the fact that emotional satisfaction does not make a proposition true nor the fact that a particular belief may induce such a satisfaction : फलवत्त्वं न चासाभिः प्रामाण्यं हि विवक्षिनम् । (AV).

Implications of Theory of Pramāṇas

The definition of Pramāṇa as " *Yathārtha* " and of Anupramāṇa as यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वसाधनम् confers on them a certain measure of self-validation (सतस्त्वम्). The repercussion of such inherent validity on our experiences of the reality of the world and its values, can be easily un-

derstood. This is one of the strong points in favor of Realism. Madhva has naturally pressed home this argument (from the self-validity of Pramāṇas to the reality of the world and of its experiences). On the other hand, the Advaitic philosophers, tho' paying lip service to the Svataḥprāmāṇya doctrine of pramāṇas have been at great pains to stigmatize Pratyakṣa as vitiated by flaws (of Avidyā), referring to phenomenal reality (व्यावहारिकमेदपर) being limited to the present (वर्तमानमात्रग्राहि) and so on, and hence incapable of establishing the absolute reality of our experiences. The tendency to pick holes in Pratyakṣa and impugn its validity is found among Idealist thinkers of the West also. Dismissing the belief in the reality of the world as a superficial doctrine of Naïve Realism, the Advaitins have tried to invalidate it both by Inference (मिथ्यात्वानुमान) : विश्वे मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् जडत्वात्, etc. and by an appeal to monistic texts like नेह नानास्ति किंचन ! which are supposed to deny the reality of world-experience.

In combating these moves, Madhva has naturally tried to take his stand on the validity of Pratyakṣa in its own right. The theory of Pratyakṣa being vitiated by foatal flaws (*doṣajanyatvam*) cannot be put forward until the unreality of experience is otherwise established and that cannot be done until the Doṣajanyatva of Pratyakṣa is proved. There is thus a palpable interdependence in argument. The argument from illusions : विश्वे मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् * * * शुक्लतरूपवत् to the unreality of all experience is equally illegitimate. The normal experiences of life are not on a par with passing illusions. They are not contradicted within our own experience, as illusions are. The plea of *future stultifiability of experience* is dubious. Inferences being dependent on sound Pratyakṣa for their *Vyāptiniścaya* cannot possibly go against their very prop and support (Upajīvya). Perception may be limited to the present, but with the help of the Sākṣī, it can assure itself of absence of stultifiability, as in the case of the perception of falsity of nacre in the shell, which is vested with absolute certainty by the Advaitin himself.

Finding these attempts to discredit Pratyakṣa unsuccessful, the Advaitin tries to base his conclusion on the authority of the identiy-texts which, by implication and by express reference, are supposed to establish the unreality of dualistic experiences,

This is also refuted by Madhva on the basis of Upajīvyapramāṇapavirodha and the primacy of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, even as against the Śruti. He shows in his theory of the Sākṣi, that it is and should be the ultimate criterion of all truth and validity and that its testimony must necessarily be supreme and absolutely binding and one which cannot be transcended by any further experience. He also shows that our experiences of the world, so far as they come within the direct purview of the Sākṣi and are testified by it, are entitled to unquestionable veracity. Since this is so and must be so, the only way to reconcile the seeming contradiction of the monistic texts with the verdict of Sākṣi would be to agree to their reinterpretation in some other ways, short of factual and essential identity of Ātman and Brahman, as have been indicated by Madhva.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DOCTRINE OF SAKṢI

The' Madhva accepts that validity is intrinsic to Pramāṇa, defined as *Yathārthatam*, he does not rule out the possibility of error in experience. Under ideal conditions, of course, error will have no chance. But the actual conditions of life being what they are, error cannot altogether be eliminated. This leads us to the question of greater and less chances of error among the different Pramāṇas and to the most important question of epistemology viz., the quest for an ultimate basis of certainty of all experience and knowledge, without which all our claim to secular and scientific knowledge must remain suspect and for the conditions which exclude not merely the fact but even the possibility of error. It is only the discovery of such a principle that could be regarded as the true fulfilment of the epistemological quest. The attempt to put Knowledge on a foundation that will be impregnable and will not be open to doubt is historically associated with the philosophy of Descartes in the West. In Indian philosophy, the issue has engaged the attention of the different schools *from much earlier times*. The frequently occurring discussions on "Svastastva" and 'Parastastva' of Pramāṇya are essentially concerned with this moot problem. But unfortunately, most of the schools have touched only the fringe of the problem and have not tackled it in all its bearings and in its proper perspective, as we shall see, presently.

We have shown earlier that the right theory of knowledge is that which admits that truth is organic to knowledge¹. प्रामाण्यं हि ज्ञानस्योत्तर्गतोऽपवादादप्रामाण्यमिति विद्यसंमात्रेः । Knowledge carries and must carry its own proof. If the truth of a cognition should depend upon its agreement with some other factor, such agreement, again, would have to be similarly demonstrated on the basis of further agreement and so on *ad infinitum*. If the validity of the confirming and corresponding knowledge could be intrinsic, such a distinction could as well be conferred on the first knowledge itself at the first blush. The Mādhwā philosophers point out that if the function of 'agreement' (*samvāda-pramāṇa*) were just one

1. Cf. ज्ञानं च, भावाभावलक्षणं स्वविशयं सत्त्वेनैवावगाहते । नासत्त्वेन, नाप्युदासीनेन रूपेण (NS. p. 217 b) प्रमाणं चेज्ञातत्त्वावेदकम् । अतत्त्वावेदकं प्रमाणं चेति व्याघातः (Vādāvali.)

of "removing grounds of mistrust", the validity of the knowledge in question would turn out to be intrinsically made out:

अतोऽवग्रोधकर्त्तेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।

अवाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिक्षुद्देः ॥

If, on the other hand, the *samvāda* should establish validity inferentially, the validity of the mark of inference would have to be established first and if that is also to be inferred, there would be a regress of inferences. Nor can the proveness of validity be established by the absence of falsification (*bādhakābhāva*) as the conviction of the fact of there being no falsification is itself a knowledge like the affirmation of validity and it cannot have a greater value attaching to it, than any other earlier knowledge: नहि बाधकस्य शृंगमस्ति. If agreement with another item of knowledge is to determine validity, such agreement also, as we have shown, would need further corroboration and ratification.

Jayatīrtha points out in the course of a penetrating analysis of the problem of validity, that there are only six possible ways in which it could be ascertained: (1) by reason of its being caused by flawless senses; (2) or the certainty of its not being generated by defective sense-organs; or (3) on the basis of practical or pragmatic efficiency; (4) or agreement with another knowledge; or (5) at least absence of disagreement with another; or else (6) lastly, *in its own right*. And in every one of these cases, the acceptance of the doctrine of "Svatah-prāmānya" is inevitable. For, in the first case, the flawlessness of the senses will itself be open to question. If that is to be decided in the light of the validity of the knowledge itself, there will be a clear interdependence between the two. The same difficulty will remain in the second case also. The test of practical efficiency will not apply to cases of neutral acts of awareness or passive witnessing (*udāśinajñāna*). The awareness of pleasure and pain, being unique forms of intuition, standing apart from other ordinary acts of knowledge, will not admit of coherence with others. If agreement of knowledge with one of its own kind is to be the test of validity, even a succession of illusory impressions (*dhārāvālikabhrāma*) will have to be passed as valid knowledge. If the intended coherence is with another unit of *valid knowledge*, the validity of the latter will have to be similarly established and so on *ad infinitum*,

Mere absence of contradiction, *so far*, will not be a sufficient proof of validity as there may conceivably be uncontradicted or undisturbed illusions, in experience, like the common belief of the sky being blue. Any attempt to establish the validity of knowledge thro' external aids is thus foredoomed to failure. *We are thus left with the only other alternative of the inherent validity of knowledge.*

But even this is not altogether free from difficulties. Knowledge, as an activity of the mind, cannot be invested with any kind of self-luminosity : वृत्तिज्ञानानां स्वप्रकाशत्वमेव तावदस्त। प्रमाणाभावात् (*NS.* p. 591) अचैतन्य-ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वाभावात् (*NS.* p. 436 b). Judgments like " I know this " point to the existence of a knowing self which alone could be claimed to be self-revelatory. Even assuming that knowledge *as such* is capable of revealing itself, it can only manifest its *content* or form ; but *not*, also, its validity : भवतु वा ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशम् । तथापि स्वरूपमात्र एव ; न तु स्वधर्मे प्राप्ताण्येऽपि (*NS.* p. 591). If validity is inherently revealed by knowledge, the knowledge arising from Vedic texts must make its validity felt by unbelievers like Buddhists. If they do realize its validity, they could not possibly refute it, as they do. This shows that the validity of knowledge is not revealed by the mere awareness of such knowledge ; in other words, that validity is not made known by the knowledge itself, even if it be *Svapra-kāśa*. The power of self-lumination, as has been shown, can at best, help knowledge to manifest its essence, to itself. But it cannot have any power to endorse the *validity of its content*. Such a power could only belong to a principle of truth-determination which is not materially constituted, like the mind, and can, therefore, be credited with absolute validity in all judgments. Madhva finds such an ultimate and absolute principle of knowledge and validation, in the inner sense (organ) of the Self of man —his " *Svarūpendriyam* " —which he calls *Sākṣi*, and which is " *Jñāna-grāhaka* " and also " *Jñāna-prāmāṇyagrāhaka* " (intuiting knowledge and its validity). The *raison d'être* of attributing to *Sākṣi-pratyakṣa* absolute infallibility and self-validation, which is denied in respect of ordinary perceptions of the mind and the senses, is that *the mind is liable to err and is open to doubts*, albeit rarely ; whereas, *the judgments of the Sākṣi could not be doubted and have never been shown to have been in the wrong and invalidated at any time in life* :

मानसे दर्शने दोषाः स्वर्तं वै साक्षिदर्शने । (AV. iii, 4)

दोषात्र मानस एव दर्शने भवन्ति । अतस्तत् संशयात्मकं जायते । निश्चयतया जातस्य विषये वा आहार्यः संशयो भवति । न तु, साक्षिदर्शने दोषसंभवः । (NS. p. 591).

The best proof of the unerring precision and infallibility of Sākṣi is furnished, says Madhva, by the most intimate and poignant experiences of life (of pleasure and pain) of which none of us has occasion to entertain the least doubt in his life : न जागुचिन्मम सुखमस्ति न वेति संशयो, नापि प्रतीयमानामिदं सुखं सदरुद्धेति संशयः । (NS. p. 591 b).

‘ चुद्धो निष्ठयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत्साक्षिदर्शनम् ।

इच्छा ज्ञानं सुखं दुःखं भयाभयकृपादयः ।

* * *

साक्षिसिद्धं न कथिद्वितीयं संशयवान् च चित् ॥ (AV. iii, 4).

The whole of rational existence in the world would be made impossible, if the verdict of our Sākṣi as the ultimate reference, foundation and criterion of all knowledge and validity is questioned or proved to be in the wrong, even in one single instance at any time. The entire basis and superstructure of all religion, philosophy, and science and of every activity of life would be blown up to nothingness, as by an atom bomb, the moment we dare to question or doubt the verdict of the Sākṣi :

कोऽपि ह्यथो न निश्चेतुं शक्यते भ्रमवादिनः ।

भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च यदैवातुभवोपगम् ।

एकस्य भ्रमता तत्र परस्याभ्रमता कुतः ? (AV)

साक्षिणोऽपि व्यभिचारश्चेत्, आगमार्थ-अनुमाननिर्दोषत्वाद्यवसाये च समः ।

अत ऊर्ध्वदिवसे अभेदवाक्यस्य भेदोऽर्थःस्यात् । निदोषातुमायाः सदोषवम्,

सदोषातुमाया निर्दोषत्वमित्यव्यवस्था । (Madhva, Pramāṇalakṣaṇa)

It is, thus, incumbent on all thinking persons to accept the primacy of Sākṣi as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and evaluate experience in the light of its foundations. The doctrine of Sākṣi, rightly understood, would be seen to be both the true foundation and the crowning point of a really sound and thoroughgoing theory of knowledge, in metaphysics. No theory of knowledge can really be complete without it.

While all other adherents of the *Svataḥprāmāṇya* view have been content with assuming that knowledge itself carries with it its own validity, Madhva has been the only one among Indian philosophers to insist upon a further analysis and to probe into the problem and go a step further and demonstrate that only the verdict of the *Sākṣī* could be the true terminus of validation. This marking off of the spheres of *Vṛtti-jñāna* and *Sākṣi-jñāna* constitutes a remarkable advance of Madhva, in Indian epistemology. It may be seen to bridge a gap in the theory of self-validation and answer conclusively the objection of Udayana : प्रामाण्यं न स्तो ग्राह्यं संशयानुपत्तिः । It is no use to contend, as do most adherents of *Svataḥprāmāṇya*, that if knowledge had no power by itself to affirm its validity, nothing on earth could give it that power and there would be no way in which such validity could be affirmed. But then, is the *Svataḥprāmāṇyavādin* aware of any single instance or form of knowledge that is incontrovertible and uncontroverted ? If there is any such knowledge or judgment, it must perforce be the verdict of the *Sākṣī* and nothing else. It is only at that point that real self-validation and self-luminosity are possible : यदि प्राहकातिरिक्तस्य यथाकथचिदपि प्रवेशात् प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वमिति मतं ; तदा, साक्षिण एव स्वतःप्रामाण्यं, अन्यस्य परत इत्यांगीकरेऽपि न कथिद्विरोध इति सङ्क्षेपः ॥ (N.S. p. 218).

The ordinary doctrine of “ *Svataḥprāmāṇya* ” explains that doubts do not arise in all cases, but only where there is positive knowledge of conditions which seem to contradict the knowledge we have had ; and if arguments are employed to test knowledge, it is not so much for the positive task of establishing its validity, as for the negative one of *eliminating the chances of contradiction and clearing doubts*. The essence of *Svastastva* is that knowledge carries with it its own validity, which is implicit in it. This is seen from the behavior of persons who act unquestioningly upon their knowledge, as soon as they have it without waiting for its truth to be tested and ratified by a validating inference. This shows that non-contradiction is the only test of validity and that this guarantee does not forsake knowledge till it is positively disproved or doubted.

It has been objected that this sort of an explanation is unsatisfactory as it “ confuses logical certainty with mere psychological belief ”. A belief of validity is no indubitable index of its truth and no substitute

for certainty. Prof. D. M. Datta argues that "this distinction tho' apparently sound is, in the last analysis, untenable. Certainty is nothing but a quality of knowledge. It is belief strengthened by a process of logical reasoning. It would be useful if we could ascertain the degree of strength or amount of reasoning that would be necessary to turn a mere belief into a logical certainty. But that is logically and psychologically impossible, as different persons require different degrees of certification¹ for the validity of their knowledge and because no objective or logical limit can be set to the degree of strength that is required to establish certainty. *There is no way hitherto discovered of wholly eliminating risks of error*" (*Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 856).

It is precisely at this point that Madhva interposes his criterion of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, backed by Parikṣā (tests), as the terminus of all tests and processes of reasoning by which "belief could be converted into a logical certainty". The approbation of the Sākṣi is the logical limit of all certainty, clarification and validation, as it is intuitive:

न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् साक्षिसिद्धे त्वं संशयात्

He explains all cases of doubtful cognitions as "mental perceptions" not reaching down to the level of personal and intuitive level of Sākṣi-nirdhāraṇa :

गतिकच्छ्रद्धयमिच्चारि स्यादृशेन मानसं तु तत् ।

मानसे दर्शने दोषाः स्युन् वै साक्षिदर्शने ॥ (AV.)

As Jayatīrtha explains, "The Sākṣi is the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validation. Being however accustomed to truth and falsity in respect of sensory, inferential and verbal knowledge, the Sākṣi is not able to come to a decision straightway, about the validity of a particular item of knowledge before it. To this end then, it resorts to the application of tests. These may be tested by further experiments till it reaches a certain level where knowledge issues in an

1. Cf. "As to evidence, the kind and amount required to warrant knowledge, in distinction to opinion or belief, varies generally according to the character of the cognizing mind and the kind and amount of knowledge obtainable. The term 'sufficient reason' affords no help here. (G. Trumbull Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, p. 289).

intuitive perception of pleasure, pain, satisfaction, relief or similar intuitive reactions. Since such intuitive experiences of the Sākṣī have not been known to have miscarried in any instance before, it is not assailed by any further misgivings about their truthfulness and so desists from the application of further tests of truth-determination and rests *satisfied* in the validity of the knowledge and judgment so arrived at". (*NS.* p. 218 b. translated).

Knowledge, then, receives its true and highest validation by the verdict of the Sākṣī and no theory of the self-validity of knowledge will be complete without the acceptance of such a final principle of validation. Such is the position of Madhva's epistemology.

CHAPTER XIX

SĀKṢI AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH¹

The Mādhwā theory of knowledge distinguishes between ordinary knowledge thro' sensory channels, termed Vṛttijñāna, and intuitive perception by the self called Sākṣijñāna. This distinction helps Madhva to give a consistent account of both valid and erroneous or doubtful cognitions, without impugning the fundamental claims of truth and knowledge to universal acceptance. It is conceded by Madhva that the normal judgments of the mind are generally correct and valid and that certification by tests is not always necessary. Tests are therefore applied only where validity is desired to be argumentatively established or logically ascertained in case of doubts. The acceptance of the Sākṣi obviates the necessity to carry on verifications up to "three or four stages", as proposed by Kumārila (*Ślokavārtika*, ii, 61). For, if truth is to be known and judgments of validity are to be passed at any stage of the process, it could not be at any level prior to the ratification by the Sākṣi. From the ultimate point of view, even tests of non-contradiction would be helpless as guarantors of validity, unless the Sākṣi is summoned to vouch for the satisfaction of the condition of there being not only no contradiction, but also no possibility thereof. Non-contradiction, again, may be uncontradictedness so far; or non-liability to contradiction for ever. The latter cannot be asserted on any authority save that of the Sākṣi.

The epistemological necessity for such an ultimate principle of knowledge and its validation is accepted by the Advaitin also²: मानाना तात्त्विकं किंचित् वस्तवनाश्रित्य दुर्भाणा । But such a principle cannot be a mere registering machine, as in the Advaita. The very purpose of recognizing the Sākṣi as a *validating principle* would be lost, if, as in Advaita, the great Censor of Sākṣi were to be put down as susceptible to both true and false knowledge : साक्षिज्ञानस्य ब्रह्मप्रमासाधारण्यात् (Brahmānanda). That is why Madhva keeps the Skāṣi above all doubts and vacillation and makes it an absolute principle of infallibility.³ It is untouched by any breath of uncertainty— its credentials are never dubious. The reason for

1. तथाहि — प्रमाता संदिहानोऽयसंदिग्धः, विपर्यस्याप्यविपरीतः * * * *
(*Bhāmatī*)

2. Cf. साक्षाद् दृष्टे संज्ञायाम् (*Pāṇini Sūtra*).

this is precisely the same as is given in Advaita : साक्षिणो बाधे, तस्य साक्षीञ्च्यो वाच्यस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्यनवस्था (*Brahmānandīya*, i, p. 438, Bombay).

The same point is thus elucidated by Madhva :

ध्रमल्लमध्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा ।
 स चेत्साक्षी क्वचिद्दृष्टः कथं निर्णय ईर्यते ?
 तस्मात् सर्वप्रसिद्धस्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धये ।
 साक्षी निर्देष पूर्वैकः सदाज्ञाकार्यं एव नः ।
 शुद्धः साक्षी यदा सिद्धः * * *
 स्वप्रामाण्यं सदा साक्षी पश्यत्येव सुनिश्चयात् ॥ (*AV.*)

Madhva has thus gone far ahead of his contemporaries and compeers in having postulated a new principle of truth-determination in epistemology, in the form of the *Sākṣi* as the ultimate criterion of truth which is infallible and intrinsically valid. Its *raison d'être* are (1) that it alone can be the ultimate guarantor of the validity of all other *Pramāṇas*; (2) that it is the logical fulfilment and culmination of any really self-complete theory of knowledge and (3) that it is the only means of intuitive perception of certain supersensuous categories like Time, Space, the nature of the self and its attributes, the mind and its modes, all knowledge of pleasure and pain etc. These experiences are regarded by Madhva as immediate experiences (*sākṣāikāra*) and not as inferences, as in other systems. Take for instance, the category of time, revealed in dreamless sleep, embodied in the recollection of the happy repose of sleep, expressed in the judgment ' I have slept soundly and blissfully, all this time'. This direct experience of time and bliss in *Suṣupti* cannot obviously be put down to the activity of the mind which is admittedly at rest then. We have, therefore, to attribute them to the instrumentality of a *special sense organ, that is active even during dreamless sleep*, when the mind itself is at rest and coordinates the inmost experiences of the Self. It is this spiritual sense-organ of the self that is designated as the *Sākṣi*, very appropriately: सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपभूतं चैतन्येन्द्रियं हि साक्षीसुच्यते || (*NS.* p. 258.). Once the existence of such an instrument of intuitive perception is recognized, it would be easy to bring other intuitive perceptions of life, under its scope. The *Sākṣi*, as an instrument of knowledge and validation, is not something extraneous to the knowing self or *Pramāṭa*, as such: साक्षिणश्च आत्मत्वात् (*P. L. t.* p. 30). The distinction of *Sākṣi* into

Svarupa and *indriya* (self and organ) is only one of reference and not of essence. Such a distinction is rationalized by the play of " *Viśegas* " (already dealt with).

We cannot go beyond the verdict of the Sākṣi. It is the last word on validation, not only of ordinary experiences, sense-perception and inference, but even of the teachings of Scripture. Even the identity-texts of the Advaitins, to be valid, must concede the infallibility of the identity-judgments based on the verdict of the Sākṣi ratifying their expressed sense as understood by them.

It is easy to see that the validity established by Sākṣi must *ex hypothesi* be absolute and true for all time (*ātyantika*) or वैकालिकसत्तायुक्त and not merely provisional or Vyāvahārika. If it were not so, even the personal conviction of oneness said to be produced by the identity texts would have merely a provisional and limited validity and would not hold good for all time, so much so that it might be liable to be set aside by some other doctrine of the Buddhist or other philosophers :

तात्कालिकं प्रभाणत्वं अक्षजस्य यदा भवेत् ।

ऐक्यगमस्य किं न स्यात् ? तस्याप्येतादृशं यदि ।

ऐक्यप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्मं यदा विश्वस्य सत्यता ॥ (AV)

The verdict of Sākṣi must, willynilly, then, be credited with absolute validity for all time, by every philosopher, be he a Dualist or a Monist, a Realist or an Idealist. It is the basis, prop and support of all theory of knowledge :

साक्षिप्रत्यक्षतो त्वेवं मानानां मानतैर्यते ।

ऊरीकृत्य च तान्सर्वान् व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते ॥

(AV).

Madhva deserves very great recognition for having discovered and formulated such an *a priori* criterion of epistemological reference and certitude and built up his system of metaphysics, on its solid foundations :

विश्वसत्यतामपि तेनैव साधयाम इत्यापि दृष्ट्यम् (NS. p. 210). अस्माभिरपि, दुःखादिबन्धस्य सत्यतार्थं साक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेवोपन्यतं इति हृदयम् (NS. p. 30 b).

CHAPTER XX

THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Error is the reverse of valid knowledge. It is an experience where an object is cognized as something else or as having certain characteristics that really fall outside of its being. The cognition of a shell as silver, of a rope as a snake, and so on are instances in point. The explanation of errors of perception has been a live issue in philosophy. Is error due entirely to the object or solely to the subject or equally to both? Quite a number of interesting theories have been propounded by Indian philosophers as to how error arises and what should be the status assignable to the object represented therein. Five main theories of error are generally referred to in Indian philosophical literature :

आत्मरूपातिरसत्व्यातिः अरुपातिः रूपतिरन्यथा ।
तथानिर्वचनरूपातिः इत्येतत् रूपातिपद्धकम् ॥

These are held by the schools of Buddhist idealism, Nihilism, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Advaita-Vedāntins, respectively. To these may be added the Rāmānuja theory of error known as "Akhyātisamvalita-Yathārthakhyāti" and the Mādhwā theory of "Abhinava-Anyathākhyāti". The Mādhwā theory is the outcome of an implicit criticism of the other theories. Madhvā, in his *AV.*, has briefly reviewed the Advaita theory of error, while formulating his own definition of what constitutes "Bādha" (sublation) :

विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यचिवज्ञानं हेतु तन्मतम् ।

Jayatīrtha takes advantage of this opportunity, while commenting on the above passage, to initiate a full-fledged discussion of all the leading theories of error held by the different schools ; and reviews them critically in the light of Madhvā's own theory, which he shows to be the most satisfactory one, in the end.

In his review of the various "Khyātivādas", Jayatīrtha raises many subtle questions about the problem. His arguments touching the details of the controversies regarding the Khyātivādas are sure to provoke thought on fresh lines among modern scholars and students of Indian philosophy. It seems worth while for this reason to give a resume of his examination of the different Khyātivādas, before we come to his exposition of Madhvā's own theory of Error.

(1) The Prābhākara View

Error, according to the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, is made up of a fusion of two different cognitions. They may both be presentations or representations or one may be a percept and the other a memory image. In any case, error is only a partial truth. It is only imperfect knowledge. It is an omission rather than a commission. In the illusory experience of shell as silver, which takes the form "*Idam rajatam*" (this is silver), the "this" refers to the perception of the given object. Owing to abnormal conditions of defect, it is perceived as just a shining, white something. There is no perception of the specific class-essence of nacreousness (शुक्लत्वसामान्यविदेश). This partial perception produces a memory image of silver by reviving the impressions of it, owing to the similarity subsisting between the whiteness and brightness of the presented object and the brightness etc. of silver recalled by the memory image. Tho' memory, as a rule, is representative in character, yet, on account of abnormal conditions of defect, it functions here in a purely presentative capacity, by losing its representative aspect of "thatness". Thus, for want of discrimination between the essential features and content of these two different cognitions, they get fused into one and give rise to an identity-judgment, in respect of their relation, owing to the similarity of the forms of the cognition and this is expressed in a judgment of their identity as "*Idam rajatam*", and the person acts on it.

Jayatirtha rejoins that the illusory cognition is felt to be a single determinate cognition of a given object (as in ordinary perception): विशिष्टविषयकमेक विज्ञानम्। It is not felt to be a composite cognition or a cross or amalgam of two different psychoses, -a percept and a memory. There will be no responsive activity on the part of the percipient, if there is no positive determinate cognition of the given thing. In the last analysis, the Prābhākara must admit that this dual-cognition appears as what it is *not*, -viz., a single determinate cognition. That would be a tacit admission of error as a misapprehension (*viparyaya*), which he is fighting shy of. His attempt to take shelter under alleged non-discrimination between the true nature of the two cognitions, to account for the ready responsive activity, is futile. For, non-discrimination, as mere confusion of knowledge, cannot be the basis of such sure activity as follows the cognition. Moreover, the Prābhākara will have to face a serious difficulty in defining the precise nature of the difference between the two cognitions which,

according to him, is missed in the illusory experience. This *difference* between the two cognitions cannot be put down as the essence (*svarūpa*) of the cognitions themselves; or as their *differentia* (*prthaktva*), or contrariety (*vaidharmya*). As knowledge, according to the Prābhākaras, is self-luminous in respect of itself and its content and as no erroneous knowledge as such is recognized in the system, how could the difference between the two cognitions, which is, in reality, part and parcel of the content of a self-luminous cognition, be missed and remain unrevealed? Nor can the said difference be a differentium (*prthaktva*); for cognition which is an attribute of the self cannot have another quality residing in it. If the difference in question were to be viewed as Vaidharmya (contrariness), one will have to define the nature of such *vaidharmya*. Is it of the nature of a mutual difference (*anyonyābhāva*)? Even then, is it the mutual difference between "this" and "silverness" that is not revealed in the experience; or the reciprocal negation between "this" and "silver"? It will not be possible to hold, that where distinctive terms like "idam" and "rajatam" are used in the proposition, in non-synonymous connotation, the difference between "this" and "the class-essence of silverness" remains unrecognized. For, Vaidharmya, in the sense of reciprocal negation of identity, is to the Prābhākara absolutely identical with its correlatives (अभिकरणस्वरूप). It is, therefore, impossible for the Prābhākara to contend that even tho' there are two different cognitions here, in the illusory experience, the mutual difference between them as a percept (*idam*) and a memory image (*rajatatvam*), is not realized. For the same reason, the difference between the cognition of "this" and "silver", also, could not remain unrecognized. Similarly, the contrariness between "thisness" and "silverness" must also be admitted to be cognized by the very terms of the judgment— "Idam rajatam", where the attribute of "thisness" (*idamitva*) which is incompatible with the silver is cognized in the object presented to the vision and the attribute of "silverness" (*rajatatva*), which is incompatible with the object presented to the eye, is also grasped in the silver. The explanation that what is missed in the illusion is the *absence of association* between "this" and "silverness" (इदं रजतत्वयोरसंसर्गाप्रहः) and not the presence of their difference, would also be futile. For, 'absence of association' (असंसर्गी) is the same as negation of such association (संसर्गाभाव) and such negation, according to the Prābhākara, is absolutely identical

with its correlatives (अधिकरणात्मक). Hence, neither difference between the cognitions in question nor absence of association could remain unrecognized, on the Prabhākara view. Jayatīrtha is quick to point out, that no such difficulty will be there on the Mādhyāda theory of Anyathākhyāti, wherein also the given entity is mistaken for something else, by missing the difference between the presented and the represented objects ; for to Madhva, 'difference' or अन्योन्याभाव is not absolutely identical with the correlatives, but something that is only colorfully identical with it (सविशेषाभिन्न). The Prabhākara cannot also explain the responsive activity to secure the silver, in the illusory experience, on the ground that there is the non-comprehension of the specific attribute of the given object viz. shellness which would distinguish it from silver and of the specific attribute of silverness as being present somewhere else which would distinguish it from the given object. Jayatīrtha says that the two non-comprehensions together will prevent all activity. They will hardly explain the person greedy of silver stretching out his hand to the object before him unless he is under the strong (mis-) conception that what lies before him is the silver (that his memory image has brought up before him, as the Prabhākara would have it). Such activity, then, is clear proof of the perceiver laboring under a misapprehension. The Prabhākara attempt to evade the fact of misapprehension in illusory experience and explain it away as a case of non-discrimination between two separate cognitions is epistemologically unsound.

(2) Rāmānuja's View

Rāmānuja propounds the Yathārtha-Khyāti view which he inherits from the precursors of his school, tho' he expresses approval of the अन्यथाल्याति view also. However, it is the Yathārthakhyāti view that has come to be prominently associated with his school, as its official view. Accordingly, Jayatīrtha also takes special notice of it and ignores the other view in dealing with Rāmānuja's theory.

According to Rāmānuja, the object represented in error is always real and there is, strictly speaking, no invalid cognition at all. His theory is influenced by the Prabhākara view. The cognition of silver in the shell is relatively true and not absolutely false. The perception of silver in the shell is true enough, with reference to the element of silver present in the shell. For, says Rāmānuja, every object in the world has some elements of the other objects, in its constitution,

in varying proportions. He finds support for this idea in the doctrine of triplication (त्रिवृत्करण) and of quintuplication (पञ्चीकरण) of elements (out of *tejas*, *ap* and *anna*) taught in the Upaniṣads and Purāṇas. He also argues that Vedic texts which permit the substitution of Pūtika for Soma and of Nivara by Vṛihi (in the case of non-availability of the original), clearly presuppose that the substitutes have in their make-up some elements of their originals. Perception also establishes so many resemblances among things. Such resemblances must necessarily be on account of their possessing similar parts. Hence, the experience of silver in shell is to be treated as a valid experience to the extent that it is a perception of the actual silver elements in it. The reason why it is regarded by ordinary people as *invalid* is because it has no practical utility. The question of designation and acceptance of validity of a particular experience are governed, in normal life, by the fact of given objects possessing a preponderance of the distinctive elements that constitute their being. The cognition of silver in the shell is, no doubt, a correct one in the sense already explained. Only, it is a partial experience of silver in the shell. But owing to certain defects in the sense organ, there is a distortion of the shell element and the small portions of silver which constitute the shell gets undue attention for the nonce and we have a perception of the silver in what is really shell-silver. This perception is wrong, not because it is a cognition of the unreal or what is not in fact there, but because, it is a partial view or an imperfect cognition of the real. Thus, error, according to Rāmānuja, is not so much a misapprehension of one real as another; but a blundering into a subtle truth about things, unawares,— which, under normal conditions, is generally missed or ignored.

Jayatirtha rejects this theory as a picturesque fancy. The doctrine of Trivṛtkarana (triplication of elements) on which Rāmānuja takes his stand to support this novel theory of illusions, has reference primarily to the combination of the primal elements of *tejobanna* in primordial creation. It would be extremely far-fetched to attempt to legitimize our perceptual errors on its basis. If remote causal relation is to be relied upon to validate the perception of silver in shell, on the basis of Trivṛtkarana, it would be possible to have the illusory perception of ever so many other things also in shell. It cannot be argued that owing to Adṛṣṭa (unseen merit) and other special factors, only

silver comes to be perceived in shell. Such an explanation would be in order only after it is conclusively established that silver is actually present in shell.

The presumptive reasoning based on the examples of Pūtika and Soma etc., is equally unsustainable. For then, the question would arise : Are we to ascribe to Pūtika a preponderance of Soma elements ; or an equal measure of them ; or only a very small number of Soma parts ? In the first case, Pūtika would be indistinguishable from Soma and could not be treated as a mere substitute for it. Indeed, even Soma, according to this theory of Rāmānuja, is not *pure and simple Soma* but something else besides and called Soma by virtue of preponderance of Soma-parts, in its composition ! If, then, the Pūtika also should have a preponderance of Soma parts, there is hardly any reason why it should not be regarded as Soma itself instead of as a substitute for it. If the Pūtika should contain Soma and Pūtika parts in equal measure, it will lead to the perception of both, in the object. If Pūtika should contain only a small number of Soma parts it could not do duty for Soma. Otherwise, even the shell could do duty for silver in normal life. If the authority of the Śruti confers such right on Pūtika, one could as well bow to the Śruti and dispense with the luxury of ascribing to Pūtika parts more or less similar to Soma, on the basis of some farfetched theory of things possessing all sorts of undetected similarities with all other things.

The question of responsive activity, in such cases of illusory experience, would pose a serious difficulty to Rāmānuja. What on Rāmānuja's view is it that makes one who desires silver, as in the case of Śuktirajatabhrama, stoop to pick up the shell ? It can hardly be the non-perception of the preponderant elements of shell, in the given object. For non-perception cannot lead to such activity and if it does, even a man in his sleep may be expected to act that way. It cannot also be the perception of the limited number of silver-elements in the shell. In that case, it should be clarified by Rāmānuja if it is the perception of the *small number* of silver-elements *as such* that inspires the activity or their perception *as preponderant*, or their merest perception (*ज्ञानमात्रम्*). On the first view, the shell will never become perceived as silver and there will be no responsive activity, to pick it up. The second view would open the door to Anyathākhyātivāda or the theory of misapprehension, which Rāmānuja seeks to avoid. On the last

alternative, every other object in the world bearing similarity with silver elements may come to be picked up and the activity may not be confined to the shell.

Again, why should the perception of the small number of silver elements in the shell be normally regarded as an 'erroneous experience'? If it is only because it is an experience of a partial truth and not a complete truth comprehending the fulness of the attributes of the given object, then, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin will have to accept that knowledge of the Supreme Brahman attained by the very best among gods and men would remain the biggest error¹.

(3) Buddhist Views

The idealistic school of Buddhism looks upon the silver represented in the illusion as real but not external, as in the Nyāya school. This silver, if actually non-existent, could neither be presented in the illusion nor sublated. There is no proof of its existing elsewhere, outside, as an extra-mental reality. Error consists in projecting subjective ideas as objective extra-mental facts. The silver represented in illusion is thus merely "ideal" and therefore "internal" (*jñānarūpam*) and its immediate apprehension without actual sensory contact also proves its internal existence. The sublating cognition also merely corrects the misinterpretation.

Jayatīrtha shows that this (Yogācāra) view of error is not supported by the sublating cognition, which clearly establishes the truth that the silver represented in the illusion is totally non-existent. (सत्त्वे असदेव रजतमित्यसत्त्वावेदकप्रत्ययविरोधस्य उक्तत्वात्). We have no right to twist its verdict and confer upon the silver represented in the illusion any reality of its own either internal or external. The Buddhist idealist himself has to admit that the totally non-existent can be represented in illusions, when he opines that what is internal appears as external. Does this not amount to an acceptance of the position illusion is the presentation of a given something as something that it is not or as involving a non-existent association ?

1. कथं चास्य ज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तितम्? अल्पांशप्रहणादिति चेत् नूनं प्रद्वाज्ञानमपि महाभ्रान्तिराप्णा।
(N. S. p. 53 b.)

The element of externalism (बाह्यता) that is presented here, on the Yogācāra view, is certainly not something that pertains to the silver, which is claimed to be a purely internal reality. The contention of the Yogācāra that there is immediacy in the presentation of silver, without sensory contact, is untenable as there is *actual sensory contact with the shell*, which is responsible for the misrepresentation. The theory of internal reality of objects represented in illusions would lead to absurd results. There would be an actual burning sensation inside the body when there is an erroneous superimposition of fire on a heap of Gunja-weights. The Yogācāra view seems to be more interested in finding ontological support for its doctrine of Vijnāna as the sole internal reality than in giving a straightforward explanation of illusions. The Asat-Khyāti of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism holds that error lies in the manifestation of the *non-existent as existent*. But it fails to recognize that this illusion is due to the contact of the sense-organ with the shell as the *adhiṣṭhāna*, and under certain conditions. This point is brought out by Madhva in his theory of Neo-Anyathākhyāti.

(4) Nyāya View

The Nyāya theory of Error is "Anyathā-Khyāti". It explains error as the misapprehension of one *real object as another real object, existing elsewhere*. What happens, according to the Naiyāyika, in an erroneous perception of silver in shell is simply this. The visual perception of shell as "this", takes place in the ordinary, normal way. The attribute of "silveryness" which belongs to the real silver, existing elsewhere, is presented in this cognition as an attribute of shell, which is before the eye, in a general way. Neither the real silver which is present elsewhere nor its characteristic of silveryness could, however, be connected with the visual organ thro' ordinary sense-contact. But as no perception of silveryness as synthetically connected with the substratum could arise without such sensory contact, the Nyāya philosophers have thought it fit to invent a special type of extra-ordinary sense-relation connecting the real silver and silveryness with the visual sense. This contact is the contact thro' cognition [ज्ञानलक्षणप्रत्यासन्ति]. Thus, in the present case, three things are presented: a "this" (*idamākāra* or *adhiṣṭhāna*), the silver (*āropyam*) and their identity (*tādātmya*); or a "this" (*idam*) silveryness (*rajataत्वम्*) and their synthesis (*samsarga*). The Naiyāyikas argue that as silver, silveryness (and the substratum) remain uncontradicted (even after the sublating cognition

arises)—as existing elsewhere in actual life—and as only the identity of “*idam*” and “*rajatam*” or the association (*samsarga*) between “*idam*” and “*rajatavam*” stands contradicted, the sublating cognition must be understood to negative only the aspect of this identity or association and not the very reality of the silver (elsewhere). The “Bādhakajñāna”, in other words, should not be taken to establish that the “silver” represented in the illusion is non-existent (*asat*). *It does exist elsewhere.* If the silver, which was represented in the illusion, was non-existent, it could never have been presented directly to our perception. We are thus justified in assuming that the silver represented has an existence elsewhere, and that the sense-organ vitiated by defects, tho' in contact with the shell, causes it to be perceived as identical with the silver existing elsewhere.

Jayatīrtha opens his criticism of the above theory by pointing out that it is opposed to the verdict of the sublating cognition which roundly and categorically asserts that there was no silver anywhere within the sphere of the given substratum and that what appeared is totally non-existent: सत्त्वे सति रजतस्य, ‘असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात्’ इत्यनुभवविरोधात् (N. S. p. 54 b). The point is this. There is no evidence in the Bādhakajñāna that the *very silver* that was represented in the illusion has an actual existence of its own, elsewhere. The exixstene of real silver (elsewhere) in a real world is one thing and the claim that that selfsame silver was represented here is another thing. The question is not whether silver really exists in the world! The question is of the *status* of the *superimposed silver* (*āropitarajata*) and *not of the unsuperimposed real silver* (*anāropitarajatam*). Madhva readily grants that the knowledge of the “*āropita*” presupposes the knowledge of the “*anāropita*” and that no superimposition is possible without the reality of the substratum, and the prototype (*pradhāna*) of the superimposed object.¹ But all that does not mean that we should give more than what is due to the superimposed object and regard it as having an existence of its own *per se* elsewhere. That, says Madhva, is going beyond the verdict of the Bādhakajñāna. The Naiyāyika Realist seems to be in the grip of a mortal dread of admitting ‘non-

1. अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं सत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना ।
न भ्रान्तिर्भवति क्वापि * * * || (VTN).

existence' (*asat*) coming anywhere within the range of any of our psychological experiences, for fear that it may undermine the foundations of his Realism. But this is sheer nervousness. *If the unreal and the non-existent cannot intrude upon our consciousness even in our illusions, where else can they intrude?* Not certainly in our valid experiences! If our faith in Realism is strong enough, it can resist the siren song of *Viśvam mithyā drṣyatvat ...śukti rūpyavat*. But more of this later. Jayatīrtha rightly points out that it cannot be seriously contended that the illusory experience itself is an evidence of the actual existence of the silver figuring in the illusion, elsewhere. For, this illusory experience is in itself an invalid one. What probative value can it have, then? If it has such value, why should we not give the go by to the Bādhaka-jñāna and accept that the silver is actually there in the substratum where it is experienced at the time of the illusion? Nor can the sublating cognition itself be cited as evidence for the actual existence of the superimposed silver, elsewhere. Its function is simply to deny the presence or existence of the silver actually in the locus where it was apprehended. It is neutral to the question of its existence or non-existence, elsewhere. There is not much substance in the contention that an illusion cannot be satisfactorily explained without assuming the actual existence of the 'represented object' (as such) elsewhere. As the illusion cannot be accounted for without the reality of the substratum, sensory and environmental defects etc., only those factors can be taken to be established by implication. The question: how silver could be perceived, if it is not existent, could be met by another: how could the silver existing elsewhere be perceived here? The existence of an object elsewhere is not an indispensable contributory factor for or a necessary antecedent to its subsequent perception, in another place. The insistence on its existence elsewhere may be deemed necessary either to account for the sensory contact with it or for the purpose of providing the requisite mental impressions for the revival of a memory image. In the present case, sensory contact with silver (existing far away) is clearly out of the question and there is actual sensory contact with the substratum, which will do to revive the Samskāras of formerly experienced silver and thus account for the rise of the illusion without obliging us to invest the very silver (अन् प्रतीतस्यैव रजतस्य) that is superimposed, with a factual existence elsewhere. One cannot understand the point that Samskāras of silver presuppose a prior experience of silver. And that experience, if valid, would, in its turn, presuppose the real

existence of that silver somewhere within the orbit of our own experience. But all this has nothing to do with the *āropita-rajatam* with which we are here and now concerned, in error. The Naiyāyika seems to be obsessed by his sense of realism, in trying to confer a sort of vicarious reality upon the superimposed object. But forgetful of his own epistemological dictum that the non-existent cannot be presented, he is prepared to admit that the identity of the given (shell) with the other real (presented) or the association (*samsarga*) between " *idam* " and " *rajatatva* " that is presented is non-existent (*asat*) and that they are somehow presented. Madhva's question is : why should we draw the line at ' identity ' or ' *samsarga* ' and not extend it to the *āropa* as such ? Take again the case of a jar which has been destroyed or one which is to be produced. Suppose it is mistaken for some other jar. Some of us at any rate, fall into the former type of error. How will the Naiyāyika explain such cases ? Will he maintain that the jar that is no longer in existence or is yet to come into being has even now a physical existence of its own, elsewhere and figures in the misapprehension ? That the jar in question did once exist or may come into existence at a future time, may be true enough. But the point is that such existence at other times has no direct bearing on the production of the illusory experience regarding it now. The existence of the object is useful only in producing the necessary impressions of it, which may, under certain conditions, engender a misapprehension. The Naiyāyika is fighting a ghost of his own imagination if he is presuming that theoretically it is possible for any philosopher to explain a perceptual illusion without recognizing the reality of both the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the *pradhāna* (prototype) of the superimposed object (*āropa*). Perhaps the position taken up by the Buddhist Mādhyamika or the Māyāvādin made him think of such a possibility, and safeguard the position of realism by insisting on the reality of the superimposed object elsewhere, with a vengeance. But the Mādhva philosophers, by insisting on the equal necessity for accepting the reality of both the prototype (*pradhāna*) and the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) in accounting for illusions, have taken the wind out of the sails of the Nyāya Realist.

(5) Advaitic View

The Advaitic theory of error is known as Anirvacanīya-Khyāti. It prefers to treat the object represented in illusions as ' neither real and existent ' (as in the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools) nor as unreal and non-existent as in Buddhistic Nihilism ; nor even as ' internal ' as in Yogācāra.

Starting to explain illusion as an epistemological problem, it ends by metamorphosing it into a metaphysical problem. It introduces certain complicated and cumbersome technicalities (Prakriyā) in explaining the genesis of error. By clever dialectical quibbling, it invents the concept and category of an 'indescribable and undefinable' *tertium quid* between the poles of Sat and Asat and introduces it into the realm of erroneous experiences in the first instance and ultimately seeks, by more ingenious dialectics, to extend it to the whole of human experience (including the so-called "Vyāvahārika") and sweep it off from the sphere of reality and liquidate it in the bosom of the great Anirvacanīya. The Anirvacanīya-Khyāti is, therefore, to say the least, metaphysically-motived. It regards the cognition of silver in shell as a dual-cognition. It also holds that after the contact of the defective sense-organ with the shining shell, there is a mental modification in the form of 'this object' (*idamākāra-vṛtti*). Then, thro' the operation of Avidyā, supported by the former impressions of silver, revived by the similarity of characteristics of the given object, there is the *actual production* of 'indescribable silver' (अनिर्वचनीय रजत). This indescribable silver lasts as long as the illusion itself lasts (*dhīkāla*). But then, its status is only "Prātibhāsika" (apparent). It is neither real (existent) nor unreal (non-existent) nor both (Sadasat). Its special status as defying characterisation in terms of Sat and Asat (and both together) is established by the famous Arthāpatti argument adumbrated by Śāmkara : सच्चेन्न बाध्येत । असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत । The concept of Sat and Asat being mutually exclusive, their coexistence also is ruled out.

This theory has its own defects. In the first place, the view that the illusory silver is *produced* by nescience and is destroyed by the true knowledge of the substratum, will be inconsistent with the terms of the sublating cognition which denies the existence of the silver *per se* with reference to all the three periods of time : तथाते, तैकालिकानिषेधायोगात् । रूप्यं नासीदस्ति भविष्यतीति स्वरूपेणैव निषेधात् (Nym). The illusory silver being a transformation of Avidyā, which has the Ātman for its locus cannot be presented as an external reality. The externalisation of this illusory silver cannot be explained on the ground that as the Ātman is pervasive, he pervades the shell also and that in this way, the silver which is a transformation of Avidyā having its locus in the Ātman delimited by the shell, comes to be cognized externally as associated with the shell.

Assuming that this is so, this silver should be open to perception by other persons also who may be looking at the shell at the time. Anyway, granting that this silver is actually produced, we may ask how it is actually apprehended. Is it by sensory contact or thro' Samskāras (impressions) or by Sāksī? In this case there is no silver prior to the contact. It is said to be produced at the very time of its apprehension. There is a stalemate here. As the illusory silver has had no prior existence, its apprehension by Samskāras is out of the question. Nor can the cognition of the silver be ascribed to the witness-consciousness as in the case of the inner perception of bliss. For this cognition is invariably concomitant with sensory activity and cannot therefore be put on a par with the perception of bliss etc., by the Sāksī. It cannot be said that as the sensory activity terminates with the awareness of the substratum there is need for the witness-self to cognize the silver produced by Avidyā. For, as the knowledge of the substratum does not seem to have any direct bearing on the perception of the silver, on the Advaitic theory, its indispensability would seem to suggest strongly that far from being due to a transformation of Avidyā and all that, the apprehension of the silver in the shell is the outcome of a mental distortion of the given datum caused by the sense organ being vitiated by certain defects and abnormal conditions and that it is a case of Anyathākhyāti and nothing more. By implicating the Sāksī in the error the theory takes away the right of the Sāksī to pronounce judgment upon it thro' the Bādhakajñāna. For it cannot both be the accused and the judge. The Mādhab theory, as will be seen, shows a correct appreciation of the position and the role of the Sāksī in the sphere of epistemology. However even supposing that sensory contact with the substratum is in some way contributory to the apprehension of the illusory silver by the Sāksī, in the Advaitic theory, it will entail a compromise with the Akhyāti theory, inasmuch as the cognition of the Prātibhāsika silver is thus a compound of two cognitions, one of the substratum by the sense-organ and the other of the Āvidyakarajata by the Sāksī. Such dual cognition will bar activity. Even if the Sāksī is made to apprehend the identity of silver with the shell and make activity possible, still the fact that there are two cognitions here will militate against the fact of the present cognition of silver being felt to be a single determinate cognition. The attempt to establish a unitary cognition on the basis of the simultaneous reflection of the witness-self in both the mental states of

इदमाकारान्तःकरणवृत्ति and स्प्याकाराविद्यावृत्ति presupposes the acceptance of a pet theory of the Advaita school.

The concept of "Anirvacanīya" itself rests on the presumption that the object presented in illusions cannot be a non-existent thing as the non-existent cannot be directly presented as existent in experience. This assumption itself is not well-founded. In fact, the Advaitin himself cannot explain the illusion without accepting the fact that the non-existent does appear and is presented *as existent*, directly, in our illusions. For the anirvacanīya silver must appear *as existent* in order that there may be responsive activity on the part of the perceiver. If the anirvacanīya is presented *as anirvacanīya*, there will be no illusion to speak of. Or if it should appear as *non-existent* (*asat*). The error can arise only when and where it is presented as *existent* (*sat*). How then can the Advaitin assert: असचेन प्रतीयेत and conclude that *ergo* the object presented in the illusion cannot be "*asat*". Advaitic dialecticians have indulged in a lot of dialectical verbiage to cloud the issue. Jayatīrtha has fully brought out their unteachability. The responsive activity of the illusion cannot be explained on the assumption that there is merely a presentation of silver without its presentation "*as existing*" (*sat*). There can be no direct knowledge which is not expressed without a specific determination either positively or negatively. Hence, the question has got to be answered: whether the "*existence*" that is presented (of the association of "*thisness*" with the shell : *samsarga*) is *Sat*, *Asat* or *Anirvacanīya*? It cannot be *Sat* as that would be inconsistent with the very concept of *Anirvacanīyatā* of the silver. How can the silver be *Anirvacanīya* if its existence (as presented in the illusory perception) is true and real? The second alternative can be accepted without any difficulty. The third will be mutually incompatible and cannot therefore be accepted. If the mutual association of *thisness* and shell and the association of reality of shell in the silver that are presented in the illusion are both *anirvacanīya* in their turn, there is sure to be a regress in the argument. The question is bound to arise: what is meant by saying that both these *samsargas* are '*anirvacanīya*'? Are they *Vyāvahārika* or *Prātibhāsika*? The first alternative is not accepted by the Advaitin as that would make the silver too "*vyāvahārika*". If they are purely "*Prātibhāsika*" even then one should state if they are presented *qua Prātibhāsika* or as *Vyāvahārika*? In the first case, there will be no activity, as no one has found a *Prātibhāsika* to be capable of practical efficiency. In the latter case the question will

again arise if the Vyāvahārikatva perceived of them, is true or false to their actual nature? It cannot be true to their nature as that would not accord with their Prātibhāsikatva. If it is not true to their nature, it would mean that what is Asat does indeed appear directly as existent. If it is argued that even that Vyāvahārikatva is actually anirvacanīya and is being superimposed, the whole series of alternatives will have again to be raised with reference to this second Anirvacanīya and where such superimposition terminates, there again will arise the impossibility of responsive activity or the direct perception of Asat as Sat. Thus, the concept of anirvacanīya, as applied to the object represented in illusions or its relation, makes the problem of error more confused and complicated than any of the other theories.

CHAPTER XXI

MADHVA'S THEORY OF ERROR : ABHINAVANYATHĀKHYĀTI

A realistic theory of knowledge has no reason to fight shy of errors and illusions in human life. Illusions do not upset the normal foundations of life and knowledge. On the contrary, they serve as foils to valid experience and give it its significance and value. The Mādhva theory of knowledge is, as we have seen, wide enough to provide a place for dreams, errors and illusions in life. The Mīmāṃsakas and Rāmānuja, however, fight shy of errors and seek to explain them away. Madhva feels that there is hardly any justification for doing so. Life is wide enough to hold both truth and error. Human nature and conditions of life being what they are, it is not possible to eliminate errors or expect our experiences and knowledge to be always veridical. This is proof of the limitations of the individual. A sound theory of knowledge, therefore, must take note of the limitations of life and human understanding and reckon with occasional jolts, disappointments and illusions in life and be able to explain their true nature and conditions, so as to arm us against them.

It is idle to shut one's eyes to errors and refuse to recognize them as such or call them by different names as "Vivekāgraḥa", "Pramuṣṭatattākasmarāṇa" and so forth. The senses deceive us at times. But that is only rarely and in exceptional cases and under definite conditions. Madhva feels, therefore, that there is hardly any justification for either extreme of banishing errors altogether from life and transforming them into truths and half-truths, by verbal juggleries and theological quibbles¹ or dismissing *all experience*,—errors as well as certainties,—as the merest illusions *a la* accepted ones, as in the case of Buddhistic Nihilism and Advaita:

यथा माया यथा स्वन्तो गन्धवर्णगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पत्तिः तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतः ॥ (Mādhyamaka-Kārikā)

“स्तंभादिप्रत्ययो मिथ्या प्रत्ययत्वाच्छापि हि ।

प्रत्ययः स मृषा दृष्टः स्वन्तादिप्रत्ययो यथा” ॥

The Mādhva theory of truth and error is expressed in the formula :

औत्सर्गिंकं ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं, अपवादाद्विपर्ययः। साक्षी खलु निश्चितंयाथार्थः कदाचिदपि

1. Cf. यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम् ।

अतो यथार्थं रूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्लिकादिषु ॥ (Śrībhāṣya, i, 1, 1).

संशयानास्त्रिद्वितोऽतःकरणवृत्तीनां याथार्थ्यं स्वयमेव गृह्णाति । परीक्षासहवृत्तसु अयाथार्थमिति बादरायणीयं मतम् । (NS. p. 48 b.)

This appears to be the most rational attitude to take to the problem of truth and error and stand for a dispassionate assessment of experience. Madhva is no sophisticated realist who denies that there can be any illusions of any kind in our cognitions or disputes the central assumption of all logic and philosophy that things are *not always* what they seem. The occurrence of illusions, at times, only confirms the possibility of true experiences at other times.

The Mādhva theory of perceptual illusions is a bold and dexterous combination of the salient features of the Asat-Khyāti and the Anyathā-Khyāti views. Madhva defines illusions as the contrary appearance of an unreal, non-existent object *as real and existent* and *vice versa* : असतः सत्य-प्रतीतिः सतोऽसत्यप्रतीतिरित्यन्यथाप्रतीतिरेव भ्रान्तिः (G. T. ii, 26). It is easy to see that such must be the nature of an illusion, if reality is defined as “*Anāropitam*” and “*Pramāṇa*” as यथार्थम् or यथाविषयतज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वम् । The root of this theory is the presentation of some non-existent entity, fact or relation as existent and real *in a given substratum*, with which the sense organ is in contact and when other conditions propitious for the erroneous cognition are also there : अत्यन्तासतो रजतत्वस्य शुक्रितकार्यां, अत्यन्तासभेव संसर्गां वा, रजतस्यैव तादात्म्यं वा भ्रान्तिविषयः (VTN, p. 55 b). वक्ष्यति चासतो रजतादात्म्ययोर्ज्ञानविषयतामाचार्यः (NS. p. 47). This element of false presentation is the differentia of illusions :

अन्यथात्वमसत् तस्माद्ग्रान्तावेव प्रतीयते । १ (AV).

It would be futile to deny it :

तस्माद्यदन्यथा सन्तमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ।

तविरात्म्यवने ज्ञानमसदात्म्यवने हि तत् ॥

(Buddhist Kārikā q. in NS.)

The Asatkhyātivādin is therefore right in holding that the object of illusions is utterly unreal. But he is not justified in denying any kind of

1. Cf. Rāmānuja's admission : ख्यात्यन्तरवादिनामपि सुदूरमपि गत्वा, अन्यथावभासोऽवस्थाश्रयणीयः । असत्त्वातिपक्षे सदात्मनो, आत्मख्यातिपक्षे अर्थात्मना, अल्पातिपक्षे अन्यविशेषणमन्यविशेषणत्वेन, ज्ञानद्वयात्मकत्वेन च, विषयासद्वावपक्षेऽपि विद्यमानत्वेन । (Śrībhāṣya, i, 1, 1).

reality to any of the constituents of that experience, including the *adhiṣṭhāna* etc., and dismissing the entire fabric of that experience as a baseless fancy: निरविष्णानभान्तेरयोगात् ।

If nothing in the constituents of an illusion is real, there would be no possibility of sense-contact, without which there would be no perceptual knowledge, true or false. Jayatīrtha clarifies another important point in Madhva's theory of perceptual illusions that the superimposed object and its identity with the substratum are both non-existent where the former is far away from the latter as in the illusion of the snake in the rope. But where, as in seeing a mango tree and a jack tree standing close to each other from a distance, one misses their distinction and errs in thinking that there is only one of them, only the identity is non-existent¹. Madhva therefore holds that notwithstanding the unreality of "the silver in the shell", it is thro' contact with the real piece of shell that the sense-organ, vitiated by defects, gets a distorted apprehension of it as a piece of silver. It is subsequently realized that this silver is absolutely non-existent within that spatio-temporal setting. Jayatīrtha gives classical expression to this view: शुक्तकासाज्जलं दुष्टमिन्द्रियं तामेवात्यन्तासद जतात्मना अवगाहमाने ज्ञाने जायते, स भ्रम इत्यागीकारात् ॥ (NS. p. 48 b).

He also indicates clearly the parting of the ways between the Mādhva doctrine and the Buddhistic view of Asat-khyāti in this respect : न वर्य शूद्यवादिन इव रजतज्ञानं निरालंबनं ब्रमः । शुक्ततविषयतांगीकारात् (Tdy. t. p. 11 b). अत एव नासत्त्वातिप्रसंगः । यावत्खलु विर्गाते प्रत्यये भासते तस्य सर्वस्य असत्त्वे खलु असत्त्वातिः स्यात् । नचैवमेत्युक्तम् (NS. p. 48 b). It is, thus, needless and impossible to confound the Mādhva theory as an "Asat-khyāti", in the accepted sense of the term.

Since the acid test of an illusion is in the sublating cognition (बाधकज्ञानम्), its true nature should be fixed in the light of the Bādhakajñāna. Now, the stultifying cognition takes the form : "there is no silver here ; only the non-existent silver had appeared to exist"². Madhva takes his firm stand on the express authority of this Bādhakajñāna, in adjudging the status of the object of illusion as an utter unreality (*atyantāsat*).

1. तात्क सर्वज्ञारोप्यमत्यन्तासदेव ? उच्यते । यत्रारोप्यमविष्णानसनिहितं तत्र तत्त्वादात्म्यमात्र-मसत् । यत्र पुनरसञ्चिहितमारोप्यं तत्र तत्, तत्तादात्म्यं चोभयमप्यसद् ॥ (NS. p. 54)

2. 'नात्र रजतं, असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात्' ।

The Anyathākhyātivādin merely intoxicates himself with an inferential unction that the superimposed object must have a reality of its own elsewhere, which is hardly relevant to the form or content of the sublating knowledge. This is precisely the point of departure between the Nyāya and Mādhusvāmin's view of Anyathākhyāti. It is to bring out this differentia of Madhva's theory that Jayatīrtha christens it as "Abhinavānyathākhyāti" (neo-Anyathākhyāti) and contrasts it with the Nyāya theory. He points out that the scope of the Bādhakajñāna is strictly limited to *denying* the presence of silver in the given substratum and its identity with it, and that it is quite indifferent to the question of the existence or non-existence of the silver elsewhere. The difficulty of establishing a sensory contact with an object existing elsewhere (*anyatra sat*) would also be insurmountable. It is unnecessary to assume the *reality* of superimposed objects elsewhere, when illusions could be satisfactorily explained without such an assumption, by certain defects in the nature of the sensory contact. Even the Anyathākhyātivādin must admit that, in point of fact, sensory contact has been only with the actual substratum before the perceiver, viz., the nacre. If then, sensory contact with the shell should, as has been the case here, actually produce the misapprehension of silver, for the nonce, it is surely a piece of misplaced ingenuity to propound a very elaborate theory that the *selfsame silver* must be having an actual existence somewhere else (*anyatra sat*). That is imagination running riot. What has actually happened in this case is simply that sensory contact with nacre has *somehow* led to its erroneous perception as identical with silver that is *not there*, i. e. to say, purely non-existent. The existence of real silver similar to the one perceived in the illusion, elsewhere, in the shop, is one thing and to claim that that very thing has come over here or that that very thing is there, is quite another. Real silver may be remotely responsible for furnishing the background to the present illusion. Madhva does not deny *that*. What he denies and what the Naiyāyika asserts is that the *selfsame silver* (that was superimposed) is existing elsewhere (and could not otherwise have appeared). The Naiyāyika unhappily is mixing up the issues. The first proposition is entirely true and unexceptionable—that there is a real silver outside the present illusion. It is not only conceded by Madhva but is laid down by him as the necessary pre-condition and invariable concomitant of all illusions :

अधिष्ठानं च सदशं सत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना ।

न भ्रान्तिर्भवति क्वापि स्वप्नमायादिकेष्वपि ॥ (VTN).

But, there is no justification, says he, for the dogma of the Nyāya Realists that the superimposed object must *always, as such and in its own self*, have an actual existence elsewhere : अत्र प्रतीतस्यैवान्यत्र सत्यं मानाभावात् । असत्ये कथं प्रतीतिरिति चेत् ? अन्यत्र सत्येष्वपि कथम् ? न हान्यत्र सत्यं अत्र प्रतीतेष्वप्तकारि ! (NS. p. 54). In the light of this clear and unmistakable criticism of the Nyāya view, one cannot but express astonishment at the statement of Madhva's doctrine that "the radical Realist that he is, Madhva wants to give a complete *objective basis to the content of error after the model of the Nyāya school*" (P. Nagarajarao, Error, Doubt and Dream in Dvaita Vedānta, *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, xi, pt. 4, p. 295). [Italics mine]. If anything, Madhva denies that the content of error (*bhramaviśaya*) has an objective basis : को हि ब्रूते रजतं सदिति ? (NS. p. 46).

The existence of an object of illusion, elsewhere, may be deemed necessary either for securing sensory contact with it, in order to render the perception of silver (or the like) possible, or for awakening the impression of silver in the mind (*rajatasamskārodbodha*). Neither ground is admissible. There is no possibility of sensory contact with an object existing somewhere else and if such existence is required merely to furnish the necessary mental impression of the object, such a result could be explained by the past experience of it, without making the selfsame object come down and present itself in the illusion¹. It is for this reason that Madhva insists on the reality of a "*Sadṛṣa*" (prototype) in addition to that of an *adhishṭhāna* (substratum) as the *sine qua non* of all illusions. But there is no reason to assign an intrinsic reality of its own to the *superimposed object per se*. One should not miss this subtle distinction between the Nyāya and the Mādhva view of the status of the *āropya* and confound the two.

A careful examination of the various theories of error held by different schools of Indian philosophy shows that the ideas of "*asat-khyāti*" and "*anyathākhyāti*" constitute their greatest common measure, of agreement. Madhva's theory of "*Abhinavānyathākhyāti*"², combines these two vital elements of the theory of illusions in right proportions and

1. इन्द्रियार्थसंक्षिकर्थं वा तदास्थेयं, संस्कारसिद्धर्थं वा ? नाद्यः । संस्कारश्च रजतान्तरानुभव-मात्रेण भवतीति व्यर्था तस्यैवान्यत्रसत्यकल्पना (NS. p. 54 b.)
2. वक्ष्यामो ह्यभिनवान्यथाख्यातिस्वरूपम् (NS. p. 46 b.)

formulates a balanced theory of Error. Its most important finding is, of course, the fact of the presentation of the non-existent, in illusions (असतः सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्युपपत्तिः). The whole theory of Madhva turns on this hypothesis. This is itself derived from the nature of the Bādhakajñāna (असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात्). The question of the presentability of " Asat " (the non-existent.) in erroneous knowledge (असतः सत्त्वेन अपरोक्षतया भ्रमे प्रतीत्युपपत्तिः as it is technically known) has been ably argued and established at length by Jayatīrtha¹ and Vyāsārāya, following Madhva. As a matter of fact, the category of Anirvacanīya itself, by definition, is made to rest on the presumption of the non-presentability of Asat. But the assumption itself is gratuitous and inconsistent with the conviction of difference from *asat* (*asad-vailakṣaṇya*), which the monistic philosopher has, in respect of the world :

असद्विलक्षणज्ञपौ ज्ञातव्यमसदेव हि ।

तस्मादस्तप्रतीतिश्च कथं तेन निवागेत ? (AV).

1. For details, see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vols. i, pp. 346-48; and ii, 151-2.

IV. THE WORLD OF EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER XXII

REALITY OF WORLD-EXPERIENCE

Belief in the reality of the world and its values is, naturally, one of the fundamental tenets of Theism. It is thus a metaphysical doctrine and not a mere theological dogma. We may, therefore, turn to the grounds on which it is based. These may be brought under the three heads of perceptual, rational and scriptural grounds admitted in the system of Madhva.

We have seen that Madhva recognizes an additional sense or instrument of knowledge, — the Sākṣī (besides the other six). The reality of world-experience follows as a consequence of the acceptance of the doctrine of Sākṣī and the implications of the doctrine of Pramāṇa (applied to the other instruments of knowledge.). The knowledge produced by the senses is normally valid and true, under requisite conditions of knowledge and proper types of contact of the sensory apparatus and this knowledge is not ordinarily contradicted. It is accepted in all schools of Vedānta that knowledge carries with it its own validity which is intrinsic to it. The Dvaita, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are pledged to this view. Validity implies the factual reality of the object of knowledge with reference to a given spatio-temporal setting : न हि विश्यावाथमनन्तर्भवत् प्रामाण्यग्रहणं नाम ! (Nym. p. 142). The reality of the world would thus follow from the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge :

यदि स्वतर्स्त्वं प्रामाण्ये विश्वसता कर्त्तुं न ते ? (AV).

The Advaitin, doubtless, pleads that Perception cognizes only the provisional reality (*vyāvahārika-satyam*) of objects ; while inference of unreality and texts to that effect disprove the absolute or noumenal reality thereof and that, therefore, there is no conflict of *Pramāṇas* :

पारमाण्यकमद्वैतं प्राविश्य शरणं श्रुतिः ।

विरोधादुपजीव्येन न विभेति कदाचन ॥

But this is counting the eggs before they are hatched, inasmuch as the threefold classification of reality into Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika, upon which the theory of provisional validity of *Pramāṇas* is based, is still an unproved assumption. The very idea of provisional validity (which ceases to be valid after some time) is meaningless and repugnant to the basic idea of *Prāmāṇya* :

प्रामाण्यस्य च मर्यादा कालतो व्याहता भवेत् ।

कालान्तरेऽप्यमानं चेदिदानीं मानता कुलः ? (AV).

Vyāvahārika-prāmānya is, therefore, a mere myth. It is invalidity writ euphemistically large. If the principle of self-validity of knowledge is to have any meaning, there can be no denying or escaping from the conclusion of the reality of world-experience : प्रमाणानि हि स्वगोचरे प्रवर्तमानानि तत्त्वमिदमित्येव प्रवर्तन्ते । न पुनः सांब्यवहारिकं नः प्रामाण्यं, न पुनस्तात्त्विकमित्येव प्रवर्तन्ते ।

(Bhāmatī, ii, 2, 32).

There is, thus, no need to go in search of subtle and elaborate reasonings in support of the validity of Pratyakṣa. As Madhva says elsewhere, reason may have to be summoned, if at all, only to prove the falsity of particular experiences in case of serious doubts ; but hardly to demonstrate validity of normal experiences : दृष्टवस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वांगीकारे च युक्त्य-पेक्षा । न तु सत्यत्वे ! Such validity is furnished by the perception itself where it is normally constituted, as we have seen under the theory of Pramāṇas. Nor are we without sufficient means of testing the soundness of the conditions of knowledge. It is open to us to institute the necessary tests (*parikṣā*) and make sure of the reality of normal experience. Madhva contends that all our normal experience and perceptions are capable of bearing such scrutiny and have been so tested and found to be true and valid. It would be preposterous to say that we could never trust our senses and that our perceptions are proverbially and inherently misleading and that we could never know the truth of things or that perception is capable of revealing only the present and that we could never be sure of what the future may hold and so on. Such wild and irresponsible objections would be suicidal to the Monist himself. If the verdict of normal perception is to be disbelieved in every case, there would be no distinction between truth and falsity in experience. There would be nothing to distinguish illusions from valid experiences. All experience would be suspect and no logical or scientific advance would be possible. If the perception of silver in the nacre and the stultifying cognition "this is *not* silver" were both of them on the same par of incredibility, all distinction between truth and falsehood would have to be given up. As Vyāsāraṇa says, in a humorous vein, the monist would stand to lose his principal in trying for the interest¹. If he does not concede the validity of the stultifying

1. नेदं रूप्यमिति प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यमानस्यकम् । अन्यथा, 'इदं रूप्यमित्यस्याप्रामाण्यं न स्यादिति वृद्धिमित्यस्तो मूलहान्यापत्तेः । (Nym. p. 139).

cognition : "this is not silver", he could never establish his pet theory of the unreality of the Universe, which rests upon the analogy of the illusion of silver in nacre.

Sense-perception could not, therefore, be deprived of its validity, except by a more valid perception : दृष्टस्तुनो बलवद्विष्टे विना नाम्यत वाधकम् (VTN). It cannot be set aside by any amount of specious reasoning or bald texts, unless the latter could be shown to be more valid than the perception in question. The attempt to upset perception by inference or texts would thus involve a fallacy of interdependence, inasmuch as the inference or the verbal testimony could not be invested with greater validity unless perception is shown to be invalid and that could not be, unless the inference or the verbal testimony is proved to be more authoritative, for whatever reasons. The validity of perception, on the other hand, is self-evident and does not need any ratification from outside. The superiority of perception to inference and *āptavākya*, is also self-evident, in that it is able to grasp even the minutest features of objects which are beyond the ken of inference or correct confusion of quarters which the pious words of an āpta are powerless to do. The perceptive judgment 'Fire is hot' is intrinsically superior to any inference of its being cold. The reality of experience derives support from the combined evidence of a number of facts like perception of difference, reasoning in support of such perception, the cosmogonic texts, texts prescribing *Sagunopāsanā* and the drift of the entire *Karmakānda*. Albert Schweitzer rightly emphasizes this point when he says "The ethics of action is hard hit by the assertion that the world has no meaning. Man cannot engage in ethical action in a world with no meaning. His ethical life in such a world must be limited to keeping himself pure from it. But if, further, the reality of the world is denied, then, ethics altogether ceases to have any importance." (*Indian Thought and Its Development*, p. 60)

From another point of view, also, perception where tested and found correct, has to be recognized as the basic ground or *Upajīvya* of any inference or texts in a contrary direction. Such a basic ground cannot be repudiated by any amount of wild reasoning or bald assertions of texts. This is known as the principle of "Upajīvyapramāṇavirodha" or conflict with the basic ground. The experience of the world rests on such *Upajīvya-pratyakṣa*. It is not the superficial one (of the *Sukti-rajata*-type) which is liable to be mistaken ; but one which has passed the test of

personal endorsement by the Sāksī after due examination. It is what Madhva calls “दृष्टव्य” or “सुप्रीक्षित”, which is indubitable and is the last word on tests, having reached down to the innermost intuitive level of certification by the Sāksī, which (as has been established) is the terminus of all Pariksā and converts belief into certainty. Madhva contends that the finite experiences of pleasure and pain in life belong to this category of Pratyakṣa certified by Sāksī and must therefore be accepted as impregnable. So too the consolidated experience of humanity of the reality of an objective universe and of its values, not to mention the realization of human limitations and the consciousness of a Power transcending human conceptions. *It is on this rock of Sāksipratyakṣa that Madhva has built his edifice of Dvaita-Vedānta.*

He points out that such universal experiences of the joys and sorrows of life with a deep sense of their reality is not of the hollow variety of the silver in the shell, inasmuch as it stands the test of practical utility and response-satisfaction. The objection of Vācaspati, therefore, that if the verdict of identity (of human souls and Brahman) and the consequent unreality of the experience of duality, is disputed on the ground of conflict with the basic Pratyakṣa (Upajīvyapratyakṣa), even the subsequent perception of “this is not silver,” would have to be dismissed as invalid, because it is opposed to the original (basic) perception of ‘this is silver’, is disingenuous. It purposely confuses the issue. The present is a question of strength between perception and Inference or texts, and the instance cited is one of conflict between two perceptions, which is irrelevant to Madhva’s position that no perception can be invalidated save by a more powerful perception. In other words, perception cannot be negated by mere reasonings not based on some other and a more powerful perception. Moreover, the basic nature of reality claimed for perception in this case is not based on considerations of its temporal priority or logical dependence for purposes of negation only (निषेद्यसमपक्षत्वे); but upon an intrinsic dependence established by rigid tests. The capacity to stand such a practical test is lacking in the ‘silver in the nacre’. But in respect of our normal experience of the world, all practical conditions of validity are fulfilled. They cannot therefore be regarded as illusory, with any justification.

As for Śruti texts, which may appear to teach the identity of God and man, not only will they be patently in conflict with numerous others which do teach their difference; but also with the personal experience

(of its own limitations and difference from Brahman) of the Sākṣī. If personal experiences of the Sākṣī are to be set aside by other Pramāṇas, however powerful, the foundations of philosophy would collapse ; for, then, there would be no surety left anywhere, in perception, reason or revelation. Even the conviction of identity reached by the monist *qua* personal and reached at the Sākṣī level, will be in the grip of doubt and stultification by some other conceivable form of knowledge such as that all is void,—so that, nihilism would be the end of philosophical quest. Madhva, therefore, insists that the verdict of the Sākṣī must be accepted as the basis of logical and philosophical certitude. It must be accepted as the ultimate criterion of all validity in experience, including the validity of Scriptural knowledge. Unless this is done, there can be no philosophy worth the name and there would be nothing but a reign of universal doubt and illusions *galore*. It would be simply suicidal, then, to dare to question the verdict of the Sākṣī or attribute the slightest touch of fallibility or doubt to its findings. This point has already been conclusively established earlier, *viz.* in Chapters XVIII and XIX.

The primacy of Sākṣī having been firmly established, the question of giving suitable and reasonable explanations to some identity texts which appear to support the identity of the human souls with Brahman and by implication or otherwise deny the reality of the world, against the firm conviction of the Sākṣī, will not be such a difficult thing after all, having regard to their mystic, figurative and analogical methods of philosophic discourse and approved canons of interpretation of texts, accepted by all.

Madhva cites, for example, the Vedic text “यजमानः प्रस्तरः” (‘the handful of grass is the Sacrificer’). Here the literal sense of the text cannot be accepted. We have the authority and sanction of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* to reinterpret such seemingly absurd or inconsistent declarations as figurative statements based on functional, genetic, etymological, mystic and other considerations : तत्सिद्धिजातिसार्थप्रशंसाभूमलिंगसमवायः । (P. M. S. i, 4, 23). Madhva claims the same latitude in interpreting the monistically worded texts, in conformity with Sāksipraty-akṣa and the numerous other texts which teach the reality of the world and the difference between the human souls and Brahman. He has, accordingly, indicated some fresh points of view from which these “monistic texts” could be more properly explained :

यजमानप्रस्तरत्वं यथा नार्थः श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
 ब्रह्मत्वमपि जीवस्य प्रत्यक्षस्याकिंश्चितः ।
 स्त्रातंत्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमतैकस्योरपि
 सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः (AV).

Even the most warmly cherished " Mahāvākyas " of the Monists will have to stand on the ground of the Sāksī for their ratification, in the same way as any intimate personal experience of the joys and sorrows of life. There is not the least difference in the status of these two experiences of the Sāksī and one cannot be partial to the one at the expense of the other. The highest deference and most fitting homage we can pay the Scriptures is in trying to find their true import in consistency with the logic of Sākṣyanubhava- instead of being swept off one's feet by the literal sense of such quasi-mystic statements of identity and acosmism : न ब्रूमो वर्यं नास्तीदं वाक्यमिति । नाप्येषां पदानामत्र शक्तिनास्तीति । किंतु अस्य वाक्यस्य प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वे तात्पर्यं नास्तीति । उपपत्तिविरोधाभावो हि प्रतीतार्थे तात्पर्यस्य ज्ञापकः । अन चास्त्युपपत्तिविरोध इति (N S. p. 601). It is too well known, that the literal sense of a proposition is, more often than not, found modified by so many exigencies of practical and theoretical considerations, syntactic and other difficulties or philosophical necessities. Literalism would scotch philosophy as nothing else would.

CHAPTER XXIII

SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE REALITY OF THE WORLD
ANSWERED

The Monist's attempt to challenge the reality of world on the doubtful analogy of dreams and illusions is like the proverbial drowning man catching at a straw to save himself. If our experience of the reality of the world could be negated by the knowledge that *Atman* alone is real and that all else is false, on the ground that perception is strictly limited to the present (even tho' the conviction of its reality may have been implanted in us from time immemorial, and have stood the test of time), the position of the negating knowledge, which is also claimed to be a perception (tho' not by the eyes) would be much worse, inasmuch as it has admittedly a distinct beginning and is practically an unknown quantity till now. If we could persuade ourselves that what is known and held to have been true and valid from time immemorial by the universal consent of human beings all the world over, is sure to be superseded by some unknown fact of knowledge to come, what is there to prevent our supposing that the same fate may overtake that new knowledge also ? If the known is false and the unknown alone true, one may seriously contend that cows and bulls are really without horns, even tho' they may appear to have them and that hares *have* horns even tho' they are not visible to any of us. The same kind of *reductio ad absurdum* would hold good in respect of any inference about the unreality of the universe. If this inference also is untrue in its turn, the reality of world-experience would remain unscathed. If it is real, the ground of generalization (*drśyatvahetu*) being obviously fallacious in this case, may be equally so, in other cases. The vague possibility of a future contradiction cannot be seriously entertained to the extent of repudiating the consolidated experience of all humanity. Belief in the reality of the universe, within the meaning of uncontradictability in the three periods of time is held, by Madhva and his followers, to be established *not* by Sense-perception but by the *intuitive perception of the Sākṣi*. This is where Madhva philosophy is on the vantage ground as compared with the Nyāya school of realism, in meeting the challenge of monism. Most of the dialectics of the school centres naturally on this aspect of the question and refutes the plea of the Advaita that perception is incapable of establishing the truth of things beyond the present. Jayatīrtha says that the perception of uncontradictedness for the present involves the perception of uncontradictability for the future also. This does not mean that it is or must be so in all cases ; or that there is no possibility of

illusions in experience. It is, therefore, necessary to explain the Mādhwā point of view, a little more clearly. So long as all Vedāntins are agreed that the validity of knowledge is intrinsically made out and that invalidity alone is dependent on contradiction, the normal and healthy perceptions of life cannot be dismissed as illusory. Even the most ruthless tests fail to prove the contrary, so that the uncontradictability of normal experiences could not be doubted by any reasonable creature. It will be absurd to presume contradictability of experience on mere inferential considerations or as a bare hypothetical possibility. The inference itself will have to depend upon another valid perception for the ascertainment of a sound relation of concomitance and cannot therefore afford to destroy its own standing ground (Upajivya) by casting a universal doubt on all perceptions as such. Even the perception of the blueness of the sky is a defect of distance and is not seen to arise in proximity or in case of verifiable scientific explanations. If perception *as such* is to be suspected of invalidity, there is nothing to forbid a similar fate overtaking the monistic texts on the analogy of "the text referring to the old ox singing foolish songs fit for the Madrakas":

जरद्वयो गायति मद्रकाणि ।

The reality of experience should thus be admitted as fully borne out by practical and theoretical considerations alike. The test of practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritvam*) is a potent one, in respect of reality. It is in this connection that Madhvā raises the question of the reality of certain aspects of dream-phenomena. Dreams are not absolutely unreal phenomena occurring without assignable cause. The element of unreality lies in the identification of the experiences therein with those of the waking state, i. e. in taking them, at the time, to be objects of waking experience.¹ But, the passions, feelings etc. stirred up in the course of the dream and the experiences as such are uncontradicted and are even remembered with feelings of pleasure or aversion as the case may be, and are often accompanied by incontrovertible proofs of their factual occurrence, as in erotic dreams (*svapnakāminisambhoga*). Gaudapāda (*Kārikās* ii, 1-7) and Śāṅkara (*B. S. B.* iii, 2,3) have adduced some arguments for the unreality of dreams. These have been refuted by Jayati-rtha in his *NS* and *TP*. Śāṅkara (following Gaudapāda) argues that dreams lack spatio-temporal conformity to facts. There is no material stuff out of which objects could be produced in dreams. They cannot be

1. यदन्यथात् जाप्रस्तं सा भ्रान्तिः (*Madhvā, B. S. B.* iii, 2,3).

regarded as different from the dreamer; or identical with him. In the former case, they should be perceptible by others too and in the latter case, they would be unreal as it is obviously impossible for the perceiving self to metamorphose itself into so many objects that appear in the dream. These objections are irrelevant to the Mādhyāda view that dreams are the experiences created by God, for the benefit of the Jivas and are destroyed by Him, immediately. The dream-creations are made of the stuff of Vāsanās (agelong potencies) embedded in the minds of Jivas. As these Vāsanās are subtle and supersensuous, by nature, their objectifications also are so and could be accommodated within the dream-centres of the mind (or the brain); so much so that there is no necessity for the dreamer to go out of his physical body to experience those phenomena, or any other difficulty regarding spatio-temporal conformity etc.,¹ as dreams are equipped with their own subtle space-time setting constructed by Vāsanās:

वासना: सर्ववस्तूनामनाद्यनुभवाणातः ।
सन्येवाशेषजीवानामनादिमनसि स्थिताः ॥
विशुणात्मकं मनोऽस्येव यावन्मुक्ति सदातनम् ।
तत्रैवाशेषसंस्काराः संचयन्ते सदैव च ॥
संस्कारैर्भगवानेव सृष्ट्वा नानाविधं जगत् ।
स्वप्नकाले दर्शयति भ्रान्तिर्जाप्रत्वमेव हि ॥ (AV.)

Śāmkara himself endorses the position that dreams are the products of Vāsanās²; but he seems to limit them to the Vāsanās of the waking state of the present life, which is hardly justifiable in the light of the Hindu belief in the influence of past lives and past Karma and their Vāsanās on our present lives. The acceptance of Vāsanās as the Upādāna (material) out of which dream-objects are created and projected will answer most of the objections raised against the reality of dreams. Śāmkara himself admits that in dreams it is the objective element that is contradicted by waking experience and not the experience as such.³ Madhyāda goes a step further and claims a special status for dream-creations as produ-

1. यदि बाह्यकारणकाः स्वन्नविषयाः तदा सम्यगभिव्यज्येत् । न चैवम् । अतः संस्कारोपादानका एवेति भावः । एतेनोक्तकण्ठकोलाहलः प्रत्युत्ताः । वासनामयानां मेरुमन्दरवसन्तादीनां शरीरादनिर्गत्यैव मनसा दर्शनसंभवात् । बाह्यकारणाभावात् भृत्यिष्ठादिप्रतीतिरप्रसंगात् । (TP. iii, 2, 3).
2. जाप्रत्यभववासनानिर्मितरूपात् स्वप्नस्य * * * (B.S.B. iii, 2, 6)
3. यथापि स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थर्य सर्पदर्शनोदक्षलानादिकार्यजातमनृतं, तथापि, तद्वगतिः सत्यमेव। (ii. 2, 14)

cts of these beginningless Vāsanās embedded in the minds of Jīvas, and therefore entitled to a reality of their own (of a subtler order)¹. They are not made of external ingredients (*bāhyakāraṇaka*) like objects of waking experience. That is why they are of such subtle nature as to be constructed by the mind and experienced internally. Madhva therefore interprets the term “*māyāmātram*” in the Sūtra (B. S. iii, 2, 3) (1) as ‘created by Vāsanās’ (as material cause) and (2) by the will of God (as their efficient cause—*nimitakāraṇa*).² These dream objects, because they are the products of Vāsanās, are different from physical objects of our waking experience. It is for that reason that they do not exhibit the properties of grossness or serve one’s external needs³. But that does not make them any the less real. The element of falsity in dreams lies not in the constitution of dream-objects but in their being (mis)-taken for waking realities, during the dream : प्रतीतं स्वप्नविषयाणां जाग्रत्पदार्थत्वमेव बाध्यते (TP). Rāmānuja also agrees with Madhva’s view that dreams are real creations of God. According to Vādirāja when sentient creatures are presented in dreams, their bodies are made of Vāsanās of the dreamer and they are temporarily made to be tenanted by some souls at the will of God.

Like dreams, illusions of snake in the rope etc. inspire fear and other reactions by virtue of the indisputable reality of such forms of consciousness underlying those experiences :

सर्पत्रसादावपि हि ज्ञानमस्त्येव तादृशम् ।
तदेवार्थक्रियाकारि ; तत्सदेवार्थकारकम् ॥ (AV)

1. भावनापरनामकाः संस्काराः । अनाद्यनुभवप्रवाहोत्पज्ञाः । संस्कारैरित्युपादानकीर्तनम् । न च तेषां गुणवेनोपादानत्वात्पुण्यपत्तिः । मनोवृत्तिलेन इव्यत्वात् । संस्काराणां चातीन्द्रियत्वेन व्यणुकजन्म-विनाशयोरिव प्राणूर्ध्वं चानुपलंभो न दोषाय । (NS. p. 460)
2. ‘माया बयुनमभिष्ठेति प्रज्ञानामसु पाठात् । प्रज्ञाशब्दस्य वासनोपलक्षणत्वात् । न केवलं जैवी प्रज्ञात्रमाया । किन्त्वैश्वरी च । यदि च वासनामात्रमिति मुख्य एव प्रयोगः कियेत, तदा इधेरप्रज्ञा न संगृहीता स्यात् पृथग्युभयप्रहणे गौरवं स्यात् । अतो मुख्यासुख्यविवक्षयोभयप्रहणाय मायामात्रमिल्लुक्तम् । (NS.)
3. यस्मात् स्वप्नविषया मनोजन्या वासनाविकाराः अत एव ते बाह्यवत् स्थूलाः संवृतदेशोऽव-काशानही न भवन्ति । तेषां तथा बाह्यवत् क्वचित् स्पष्टता बाह्यार्थक्रियाकारिता नास्ति । (NS. 499 b.)

The hypothetical assumption of the unreality of world-experience, on the analogy of illusions will end in making out a case for the reality of *some other world* very much like ours, as the prototype of the one superimposed for the nonce. In trying to damn the reality of *this world*, as we know it and stigmatize it as an illusion, the monist is in danger of catching a Tartar and accepting the reality of two worlds and thus make the remedy worse than the disease : भान्तिकर्लिपतत्वे च जगतः, सत्यं जगद्द्रव्यमेष्टितम् ॥ यदि जगत आन्तिकर्लिप्तं स्यात्, तर्हि कल्प्यमानजगत्सदृशसत्याधिष्ठानप्रधानपूर्वकममीकर्तव्यं प्रसञ्जेत । As between the known world and its prototypc to be, it will be simpler, says Jayatirtha, to admit and be satisfied with the known : सत्यं जगद्द्रव्यांगीकारात् अस्यैव जगतः सत्यत्वांगीकारस्य लघुत्वात् (*Vādāvali*, p. 53).

There is one more obstacle to the reality of the world, raised by Advaitins, viz., the impossibility of establishing any logically satisfactory relation between consciousness and the objects of consciousness in the world (द्वयसंबन्धानुपपत्तिः):¹ within the framework of accepted relations like Samyoga, Samavāya etc. It is, therefore, urged by the monists that a "real world" could not shine forth (*na prakāśeta*) in our consciousness. The objection is as old as the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Jayatirtha silences it by pointing out that the question "of the how" of the revelation of the objective world, to consciousness, is an illegitimate one : विचारणोचरत्वात् । वृत्तिः-विषयत्वेनैव व्यवहारोपपत्तेः (*Vādāvali*, p. 61-2). There is no logical difficulty in assuming that objects are revealed to knowledge thro' a process of "mental chemistry", called Vṛtti, facilitated by the sense-organs or by the intuitive self itself, immediacy being as much a characteristic of both,-even as knowledge is a common characteristic of mediate and immediate knowledge. He concludes the argument by saying that the difficulty of establishing a nexus between knowledge and objects, within the framework of accepted logic or its devices, is no reason to doubt the existence or reality of such relations between them. The paucity of our vocabulary and logical devices to correctly define the relation between the two in precise terms is no proof of there being no such relation in fact or that such relationship is unreal and superimposed by us. It only means that we have to revise and reorientate our thought-moulds about which there is no sacrosanctity : अन्य एव कथित् वास्तवः संबन्धः किं न कल्पनीयः ? न हि

1. Cf. similar objections in modern philosophy, based on the 'dualism of mind and matter' and of the difficulty of bridging the gulf between them.

वस्तुपरिक्षयात् प्रक्रियापरिक्षयो गतीयान् (Jayatīrtha, *Mith. Kh.* t. p. 8b). The difficulties raised are proofs, if at all, of nothing more than the defect in our technique. It is time we sharpen our wits and try to understand the true mechanism of knowledge ; but inability to do so, and penetrate further into it than we have done, is no proof of the unreality of the knowledge itself !

The incapacity to define a thing, in some particular way, cannot mean that the thing itself is false. Jayatīrtha winds up the argument with a pertinent question : How is the position bettered by agreeing to treat the world as lacking in reality ? How is the nexus between consciousness and its objects rendered more easy or intelligible on the assumption of the unreality of the latter ? If the objects are superimposed on consciousness and have no real existence of their own, everyone should be able to see and know everything or none anything at all. How, then, is the individualization of consciousness and the fixity of objects to be explained on the theory of the falsity (*mithyātva*) of all *Drśya* (objects) ? If the individualization etc. are to be accounted for by reference to contacts etc. why make a fetish of the superimposition of objects ? Why not allow them to be real too : मिथ्यात्वेऽपि दृश्यत्वं कथम् ? (*Mith. Kh.* t. p. 8b,)

CHAPTER XXIV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE REALITY
OF THE WORLD

In view of what has already been said about the primacy of Sākṣī as the criterion of all validity and of the doctrine of intrinsic validity of knowledge, it will be superfluous to cite a large number of texts from Śrutis and Sūtras in support of the reality of the world of experience. As Dasgupta observes : "There are so many passages in the Upaniṣads that are clearly Theistic and dualistic in purport that no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that they yield a meaning that would support Śaṅkara's position that the Brahman alone is the ultimate reality and all else is false" (*I. Phil.* ii. p. 2). Śaṅkara introduces an interpretational *tour de force* by distinguishing between an ordinary commonsense view of things and a philosophical view and explains the Upaniṣads in the light of this twofold assumption that while there are some passages which describe things from a purely philosophical point of view as the one reality without a second, there are others — naturally more numerous — which teach the commonsense view of "a real world, real souls and a real God as their Creator". This method is applied to the Sūtras also. But such a bifurcation of standpoints would seem to be hardly consistent with the fundamental presupposition of all Vedānta philosophers that there is only one uniform system of thought in the Upaniṣads and Sūtras. That apart, such a distinction of standpoints into philosophical and commonsense turns upon a distinction of (two) degrees of validity as absolute and provisional, which has been shown to be unsustainable. The argument for the reality of the word has thus been concluded by Vyāsāraṇa:

किंच, यदि जगत् कल्पितं स्यात्, तदा त्वमतेऽपि (1) 'जन्मादस्य यत्' इति सूत्रे 'यतो वे'-
त्यादिप्रतीते च जन्माद्युक्तिः (2) 'ईश्वरेनाशब्दं' मिति सूत्रे 'तदैक्षत' इतीश्वरस्येक्षापूर्वककर्तुत्वोक्तिः
(3) 'लोकवत्' इति सूत्रे आप्तकामस्य च प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि लीलया सृष्टयाद्युक्तिः (4) 'वैषम्य-
नैष्ठिष्ये ने'ति सूत्रे कर्मसापेक्षत्वेनवैषम्योक्तिः (5) तेज आदेवार्ब्यादिजन्मोक्तिः (6) पृथ्व्यादिल्यो-
क्तिस्त्रियाद्युक्तं स्यात्। नहि कल्पितस्य जन्मादिकमीक्षापूर्वकं सृष्टत्वं वा, तद्रान्तेः प्रयोजनापेक्षा वा

(*Nym.* p. 246). The Mādhyva philosophers, on the other hand, seek to reconcile the monistic descriptions in the Śrutis with the realistic texts, from the standpoint of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Reference viz., Brahman, as explained earlier. In doing so, they have not

been obliged to do any violence to the reality of world-experience. According to the Advaita thinkers, the Scriptures would appear to be speaking with a double voice and deceiving us all along, with realistic descriptions of the world and its creation, which is manifestly untrue : अपि च, नेत्रं पारमार्थिकी सृष्टिश्रुतिः येनाद्युज्जेत प्रयोजनम् (*Bhāmatī*, ii, 1, 33). Such a position is hardly complimentary to the Scriptures or compatible with their high position of validity as आस्तवाक्य ! It has already been stated that texts supporting the reality of creation and of " a real world, real souls and real God" are to be met with everywhere in the Upaniṣads and Sūtras and in the earlier and later literature also,¹ and it is hardly necessary to quote them here, *in extenso*.

1. Significant passages are *R. V.* ii, 15, 1 ; 24, 6 ; vii, 88, 6-7 ; x, 55, 6; 173, 4. *Bṛh. Up.* iii, 7, 18-24; *Svet. Up.* V, 5 ; i, 9, *Muṇḍ. Up.* iii, 1, 12; *Kaṭha*, ii, 2, 13; *Īśa* 3; etc. and many others cited in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* Vol. I, p. 22, fn. 2.

CHAPTER XXV

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF CREATION

The material universe, according to Madhva, is neither an emanation (*parināma*) of Brahman nor a production *de novo*. It is merely an actualization of what is in the womb of Matter and souls by the action of Brahman. This creation is a reminder, however inadequate, of the majesty of God¹. However vivid and profound a man's religious consciousness may be, he can only be conscious of God thro' His manifestations and working in the Universe. Creation, thus, gives us a glimpse into the majesty of God: भीषणास्माद्रातः पवते भीषेदेवि सूर्यः (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 8). Reason bids us assume a First Cause for the Universe. The first cause is advisedly one. Creative activity presupposes a complete foreknowledge of the effects, accessories, degree of effort and consequences of the act and a conscious effort directed towards its achievement. To say, then, that God is all-creator means that He is Omniscient (*Sarvajña*), All-Powerful and *Satyakāma* (*Jayatīrtha*, *KN*. t. p. 4 b).

Madhva is aware that creation as an event occurring at a specific date in the past, at the fiat of the Deity, is open to serious difficulties and inconsistencies. The awkward question arises at once,—as to what induced the Deity, which had obviously kept in its shell, all the time, to suddenly take it into its head to come out and call a Universe into being.² The objections apply, in the first place, to creation *ex nihilo*. But no Vedāntin subscribes to such a view. The hypothesis of creation *in time* and the argument to the existence of God from the supposed necessity of a prius to the temporal series are definitely abandoned by Madhva. Creation, to him, is no doubt a real process. But it is a continuous creation,—a constant dependence of the world on the Supreme for *all its determinations*: कल्कमस्तभावादि नित्यमेवेष्वेच्छ्या (*B. T.* p. 14). In so far as it is only the starting point in

1. बहुचित्रजगद्द्वधाकरणात् परशक्तिरनन्तगुणःपरमः (*Dvādaśa-Stotra*). Cf. also सुषिष्ठु प्राधान्यार्थमत्रोच्यते (Madhva, *Chān. Up.* C. vi, 1). Contrast in this connection, Śāṅkara's remarks on *B. S.* i, 4, 14, and Jayatīrtha's spirited rejoinder to it: अपुरुषार्थत्वात् प्रपञ्चसत्यतायां तात्पर्यमिति चेत्त। सत्यजगाञ्जिमातृत्वादिपरमेष्वरमहामाहिमज्ञापनस्यैव पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वात्। (*NS.* i, 4, p. 200)

2. Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 303.

the process of eightfold determinations¹, Madhva would, in a sense, endorse the view of Ulirici, that "God is *not first God* and *then the Creator*". This would not amount to tying down the Deity, as the various attributes are part of His nature (*svartupalakṣaṇa*) and there could be no limitation of His Self, and this creative energy of God has a dual aspect of *sakti* and *vyakti* (latency and patency) to be exercised as occasion demands :

अनित्यत्वाक्रियाणां तु कुत एव स्वरूपता ?

इति चेत्स विशेषोऽपि कियाशक्त्यात्मना स्थितः ।

शक्तिता व्यक्तिता चेति विशेषोऽपि विशेषवान् (AV. i, 2).

Madhva uses the term "cause" in the sense that a world of imperfect beings and of ceaseless change is explicable only as being maintained by and dependent on a Supreme Being, who is Himself unchanging and perfect in every way and whose constant presence *in them*, educes the series of forms latent in matter and brings the souls nearer to their self-development at every step and so brings them into full play and actual manifestation :

बलमानन्द ओजश्च सहो ज्ञानमनाकुलम् ।

स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य व्यञ्जयन्ते परमादिभोः ॥ (B. S. B. ii, 3,31)

प्रकृतावनुप्रविश्य, तां परिणाम्य, तत्परिणामनियामकतया तत्र स्थित्या आत्मनो बहुधाकरणात् ।
(B. S. B. i, 4,27)

The Universe thus depends on God as its ground and *ratio essendi*, but not as its cause in the narrow sense of the term :

अधिष्ठानमिति प्राहुर्मूलधारं विचक्षणाः ।

यत्स्थितं दृश्यते वस्तु संस्थानं तदुदीरितम् ।

उभयं हरिरेवास्य जगतो मुनिंगमव ॥

(*Vāmana Purāṇa*, q. B.T. p. 13).

1. स्वष्टिस्थितिसंहारनियमनज्ञानज्ञानव्यवस्थाक्षाः ।

All this will inevitably lead to the assumption of the co-existence of Matter and souls with God. Like Aristotle, and the Greek philosophers, Madhva looks upon the orderly realm of natural process as having neither a beginning nor an end (*pravāhato anādi*). The cosmos is as everlasting as the God on whom it depends. The changing no less than the Unchangeable is an ultimate component of reality as a whole :

स्वतंत्रं परतंत्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते (TS).

द्विविधं हि प्रमेयं स्वतंत्रं परतंत्रं च (NS. 286 b).

CHAPTER XXVI
DOCTRINE OF " ETERNAL CREATION " THRO'
" PARĀDHINA-VIŚEṢĀPTI "

The belief in the metaphysical dependence of all finite reality upon Brahman obliges Madhva to hold that all finite existence is in some measure created, preserved, destroyed or otherwise determined in numerous ways, by the Supreme Being. He has enumerated twelve such determinations. These are the *expression* of this metaphysical dependence of the world of Matter and Souls (including the Cetana-Prakṛti) on the One Source of all existence, activity and consciousness. The Śruti texts which declare Brahman to be the ultimate source and *Creator of everything*: स इदं सर्वमसृजत् । and others like यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते (*Taitt. Up.*) should therefore be understood to imply different forms of *metaphysical dependence* of countless substances, qualities and forces that constitute the world from the highest order of being to the lowest. Of the twelve determinations, creation or coming into existence is ontologically the most important one. It is understood by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in the gross and literal sense of the term as a creation *de novo* and *ex nihilo*: असतः सतासमवायो जनिः । Madhva does not, as a Parīṇāmavādin, recognize “अभूत्वा भवनम्” or “Asat-kāryavāda” in any instance of causation, whatsoever. But this does not mean that all things in the world are eternal and uncreated, *in every respect*, or abolish “अभूत्वाभवनम्” *in any form or aspect altogether*. Madhva has shown, on grounds of logic, elsewhere, that the beginningless and eternal existence of certain fundamental substances or categories like space and time, must be accepted by every scientific-minded philosopher, as an unquestionable axiom. It has already been shown that the creation of time and space is an impossible hypothesis¹.

The question then arises : How is the existence of uncreated substances like space and time to be metaphysically reconciled with the fundamental presupposition of the Vedānta and its ideal that all finite reality is explicable only as *derived from One Supreme Source of all*. This problem has not occurred to and has not been raised by any other Indian philosopher or commentator on the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedānta*. This shows how far in advance of his times Madhva's philosophic perceptions

1. See Chapter XI, on Space and Time.

were, over those of his compeers. Madhva's answer to the question rests on an analysis of the concept of Causation wherein he shows that it is capable of being distinguished into two kinds : (1) production of a substance *de novo* in the commonsense view of the term and (2) production in the sense of acquisition of a change of state or peculiarity that *depends on the will of another*; i. e. God : पराधीनविशेषात्पि । This distinction places the entire question of creation of eternal substances in an altogether new perspective and breathes a new meaning into the entire doctrine of Creation and marks a striking advance of thought in Indian philosophy, where the idea is quite novel. In the light of this new theory of Creation, it cannot be said that Madhva “ finds it impossible to reconcile the traditional Hindu doctrine of the eternity of the world and souls, with their creation ” or that “ it is a pity that the teaching of St. Thomas on the possibility of Eternal Creation, never reached his ears ”¹.

A correct understanding of Madhva's view of the Creation of eternal substances thro' “ Parādhinavišeṣāpti ”, to be explained presently, will show that it is the same as 'Eternal Creation' in the sense of positing an eternal and *constant dependence* of all finite reality in each and every one of its states of being and becoming (*sadbhāvavikāras*) and the eightfold cosmic determinations (*Sṛṣṭyādyāṣṭakam*), upon the One Infinite and Independent Principle viz., God or Brahman.

This is the utmost limit to which any philosophical theory of creation could go, short of assuming creation *in time* of even eternal substances, in some remote undiscoverable past, *ex nihilo*, which is fraught with logical contradictions. Such a doctrine of creation in time has been abandoned by speculative thinkers both before and after St. Augustine and Madhva's position that creation should be regarded as an eternal act coeval with the Divine nature and existence, is in perfect agreement with that of many early Christian Fathers, particularly Origen. Only we, should understand by “ creation ”, according to Madhva, not only the manifestation of being which is the starting point in the series of eight-fold determinations, but one and all of the rest, according to the nature

1. Cf. Remarks in a review of my work “ Svatāntrādvaita or Madhva's Theistic Realism ” in the *Light of the East*, Calcutta, Feb. 1943, p. 31. (Ed. Fr. Dundoy S.J.). It is interesting to note that St. Thomas Aquinas and Madhva were close contemporaries.

and fitness of each case. On this view, it will be impossible to conceive of anything at any time that could fall outside the jurisdiction of one or the other of the eightfold determinations or predication of finite existence : viz.,

स्थितिः संहृतिश्च नियमोऽज्ञानवद्धने ।

बन्धो मोक्षः सुखं दुःखमाद्विज्येतिरेव च ॥

The position is clearly explained by Jayatīrtha, in commenting on the concluding passage of the *TS* : अस्य समस्तस्यास्तत्त्वस्य । नन्वेत्पूर्वोक्तविरुद्धम् । समस्तस्य स्थितिसंहारोक्तौ, नित्यतोक्तिविरोधः अचेतनस्य बोधविरोधश्चेति । तत्रोक्तं- समासेति । उक्तधर्मेषु यत्र तत्त्वे अल्पीयांसः संभवन्ति तत्र तावन्तो विष्वधीना ज्ञातव्याः । यत्र तु बहवः तत्र तावन्तः । सर्वथा स्वरूपस्वभावौ अस्य तदधीनाविति । तत्र स्थितिनियमौ सर्वस्य । स्थितिसंहृती नित्यानित्यस्यानित्यस्य च ॥ (*TS*)¹

The eternal and absolute dependence of all eternal substances upon the Deity is not logically inconceivable. If there is nothing illogical in holding that impermanent things are so, not of their own accord, or for no imaginable reason (*akasmāt*), the same would apply to eternal substances also. Else, the impermanent objects may be expected to be destroyed the very moment after their coming into being. This does not happen, because there is something by which its impermanence is *determined*. The eternal substances, also, could, in the same way, and for a similar reason, of "eternal dependence" on an eternal reason, be regarded as *dependent*. Simply because the non-eternity (*anityatva*) of the non-eternals is limited, we don't find it terminating and making the non-eternals eternal! Even so, there is no possibility of eternal substances becoming non-eternal just because their eternality is said to be 'determined' or 'dependent' on something else like the will of God. *Dependence is thus a relation which could be true of both eternals and non-eternals.* It is something in the nature of things. So long then, as Creation is not defined in the narrow sense of अभूता भवनम् or प्रागस्तः समुत्पत्तिः as in the Nyāya, the acceptance

I. It should be noted here that Jayatīrtha's reference to अनित्य and "नित्यानित्य" substances alone does not rule out the "Nityapadārthas" (eternals) from the purview of creation etc., as the term नित्यानित्य itself, includes the नित्य in their subtle aspects, as explained by him, in his own commentary on *T*V (p. 3-4) and as elucidated by Vyāsarāya in his gloss on the same (p. 7 b).

of the creation of eternal substances also in the sense of subjection or liability to new phases of being or becoming at the will of some other agency (viz. God), cannot be said to involve any logical incompatibility.¹

The' in one sense all material transformation presupposes a basic continuity of essence of the cause, even after the change of name, form, properties and utility have taken place, there are cases in which the original substance remains intact without surrendering any of its fundamental qualities, temporarily or absolutely. There are also yet other instances of change where the nature of the substance is changed to such an extent or in essential particulars and qualities, so as to be no longer recognizable or nameable by the same term, as the basis of its modified state. We are thus obliged to recognize two kinds of change (1) one in which the substratum and most of its essential features are intact धर्मिणस्तादवस्थे सति धर्ममात्रपरिच्छितिः । tho' certain additional traits may have crept in, in the process of change ; and (2) another, in which as a result of the complete change effected in the substance, in the course of the casual process, we are faced with a total change in the constitution of the substance itself so as to make it almost a new and a different one, for all practical purposes धर्मस्वरूपस्यैव परिणामः । Madhva designates the former kind of change as “ पराधीनविशेषाति ” and the latter as “ अभूत्वा भवनम् ”

Applying these types of change to objects of experience or to ontological entities, whose existence we are appraised of by scripture or reasoning, we find that most of them come under the second type of change and are therefore to be regarded as “ anitya ” and *ipso facto* created at a particular time and place and have a beginning and an end. In regard to some others, however, experience and reason and the

1. Cf. नन्देतद्युक्तम्— नित्यस्य पराधीनतासंभवादित्यत आह—‘नित्यमिति’ । यथा अनित्यं घटादिकमनित्यतया नियम्यते, तथा नित्यमपि नित्यात्मना नियं सर्वदैवेश्वरो नियामयतिं यथा हि घटादयोऽनिलस्तमावा अपि नाकर्मादनित्या भवन्ति । तथात्वे चोत्पत्युत्तरक्षण एव विनाशसंभवात् । एवं नित्यस्यापि नित्यता यदि पराधीना तदा को दोषः ? नचा । नित्यता पराधीनेति कदाचित्तित्यता घटादेः प्राप्ता ! विनाशकारणोपनिपातप्रौद्यात् । तथा नित्यस्य नित्यतायाः पराधीनत्वेऽपि, न जात्वनित्यताप्राप्तिः । तज्जियमननियमादिति ॥

(NS. p. 830).

authority of Scripture oblige us to put them in the former group. They are, therefore, regarded as Nitya or uncreated in essence, tho' still open to certain new influences. It is useless to deny that the Hindu Scriptures do teach the existence of at least a few of such " eternal " entities called Nityapadārthas or Anādinitya, which are conceived as existing from eternity without a beginning or an end,—such as Time, Space, Matter, Souls and the Vedas. The question is, therefore, how to reconcile such eternity of theirs with the axiom of the absolute all-creatorship of Brahman, which is not only one of the prominent attributes of Godhead, conceivable by man, but is also the philosophical justification for a Deity. Is it possible to hold that even eternal things are *created* in some sense ? If so, in what sense should such creation of eternals be understood ? This question is of the utmost importance, tho' it does not seem to have been appreciated in its true bearings by any Indian philosopher before or other than Madhva. It is in connection with this momentous issue that he introduces his new theory of 'Eternal Creation' or Creation of Eternal entities, thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. *This is his most significant contribution to Indian philosophy.*

"Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti" means the acquiring of a new trait or complexion that depends on (the will of) an "Other" (God). These new traits would differ according to the nature of the substance concerned. Some of these have been enumerated and explained by Jayatīrtha :

<i>Nitya-Padārthas</i>	<i>Nature of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti</i>
1. Cetana-Prakṛti	सिस्कृतव्यक्तिविशेष
2. Avyākṛtakāśa (Space)	मूर्तसंबन्ध
3. Prakṛti	महदादिरूपेण विकृतिः
4. Kāla-Pravāha	प्रवाहिजन्म
5. Mahadādi	उपचयापचयावासि
6. Jīvas	देहोत्पत्तिः
7. Vedas	नियतविशिष्टानुपूर्वीकरणेर्थबोधकशक्त्याविभावः ।

The most important point to note in connection with the doctrine of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti is that the special kind of change or creation, applies

to the aspect of the *Višeśas* (*traits*) only, that have been assumed by the substance in question and not to its basic essence or *Dharmisvarupa*. Were it not so, the entire change would have been more directly termed as "Parādhina-svarūpāntarāpti". The specification of the change as (Parādhina)-*Višeśāpti*, instead, is therefore significant. The point is that it is not the विशेषाकार (substratum) that is produced by the acquisition of the new traits (अपूर्वविशेष); but, only the "whole" (विशिष्टाकार). The new traits, moreover, cannot, in the nature of things, be coeval (यावद्द्रव्यभावी) with the Substance, in regard to the Jivas, Prakṛti, Space, Time etc. In such cases, the विशेषरूप and the विशिष्ट cannot be said to be absolutely identical with each other, but only "भिन्नाभिन्न", as stated by Jayatirtha (Vide, *TVt.* p. 5, line 5 and Vyāsarāya's gloss on it: *Mandāra-maṇjari*, p. 8, line 16). We cannot, therefore, ignore this important point of distinction and treat the birth of the new trait as equivalent to the birth of the "Whole", taking Jayatirtha's remarkable अपूर्वविशेषोपजनने हि विशिष्टाकारोपजनोऽवश्यंभावी । विशिष्टाकारश्च वस्तुत्वरूपमित्र इति तस्यैवासामुपजने भवति । (*NS.* p. 431) as an unqualified dictum. This statement of Jayatirtha must be read along with the important distinction of attributes in question, as "Yāvad-dravyabhāvī" and "Ayāvad-dravyabhāvī", drawn by Madhva and accepted by Jayatirtha himself, in his *TVt.* and elsewhere. It is the failure to take note of this crucial point that has led to disastrous results in H. N. Raghavendrachar's claiming that in Madhva's philosophy, there cannot be any "eternal" or "uncreated" entities, in any sense of the term, and that all Substances including Space, Time, Souls and Matter undergo "Svarūpa-Sṛṣti" in the full sense of the term, inclusive of the very core of their being. This is a most unfortunate perversion of Madhva's teaching.¹

Jayatirtha makes it clear that creation in the ordinary sense of अभूत्वा भवनम् applies in the full sense of the term only to the *Višeśas*, which is therefore fittingly termed "अपूर्वविशेषोपजन" (birth of a new trait) that was not there before. The substratum (विशेष) could not, however,

I. H. N. Raghavendraohar's contention of *Svarūpa-Sṛṣti* of Jivas in Madhva's philosophy was repudiated by orthodox spokesmen like Pandit D. Vasudevaohar (in his Kannada work "*Dvaitapradīpa*") and others. But it appears that H. N. Raghavendrachar still feels convinoed of the correctness of his own view.

be said to be produced as it is termed “ अवस्थितस्वरूप ”¹. This implies that the change or “ creation ” is only with reference to the Viśeṣa in respect of eternal substances and it is thro' and because of this acquiring of new traits that the “ Viśiṣṭa ” (e. g. Jīva) comes to be designated as “ created ”. There is no point in describing the “ Viśeṣyākāra ” as अवस्थितस्वरूप “ if the Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi ” of the Viśeṣya is possible. Madhva and his commentator would not have labored so much to distinguish four kinds of change and draw a distinction between “ अभूत्वा भवन् ” (creation *de novo*) and creation in a restricted sense of पराधीनविशेषाति: by virtue of the Viśeṣya acquiring some new trait, applicable to certain ‘eternal entities’ only, like Space, Time, Matter, and Souls. These could never have any other kind of creation; whereas objects like jars could be created in the ordinary sense of “ अभूत्वा भवनम् ”

“ Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti ” is the only kind of creation that is possible in respect of Nityapadārthas. An objection may however be raised in this connection. From the point of view of Pariṇāmavāda or evolution theory accepted by Madhva, the production of a jar or a piece of cloth, is hardly other than a case of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, defined in terms of अवस्थितस्वरूपस्यैव वस्तुनो विशेषात्मिकात्रेण जन्मव्यवहारः: so that, strictly speaking, there can be no other kind of creation maintainable in the system, for any material object. This being so the restricted application of creation, thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, to ‘eternal entities’ alone, is pointless. Jayatīrtha meets this objection in this way. The crux of creation thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti is the fulfilment of the condition : अवस्थितस्वरूपस्यैव वस्तुन अपूर्व-विशेषाति ! The creation of a jar, out of clay, is *not* a case of this kind, i. e. धर्मिणस्तादवस्थ्ये सति धर्ममात्रपरिवर्तिः, even tho' the material stuff of clay may continue still to underlie the jar. The fact is that there have taken place, in the course of the change of clay into pot, some *far-reaching changes*; so much so, we have no longer the clay intact, nor can we *designate it as clay now* nor recognize its original shape or arrangement (*samsthāna*). We have a ‘new entity’, *jar*, i. e. धर्मस्वरूपस्यैव परिणामः ! Hence we say: मृदु घटो जातः । क्षीरं दधि जातम् and so forth :

1: Cf. अस्माकं तु, अवस्थितमेव द्रव्यमवयवोपचयापचयाभ्यां तत्त्वपरिमाणकतया विकियत इति दर्शनम् (NS p. 399 b).

* * * * जन्मतः स्थूलताभवः ।
 पूर्वशब्दविलोपत्र यदि जन्मेति कीर्त्यते ।
 रमाया नैव जन्मासि: चैतन्यस्यापि केवलम् ।
 प्रधानस्य च वेदस्य * * * * ॥ (AV. ii, 3. p. 28)

But no such essential transformation could be detected in the case of the eternal substances named. Hence, these are best put down in a separate category of creation, by themselves, as पराधीनविशेषास्त्रिमन्तः ।

This new doctrine of creation is intended by Madhva to reconcile and rationalize the existence of certain Nityapadārthas, with the all-creatorship of God.¹

1. Śaṅkara gives greater importance to the statement of the Śruti that Brahman has created everything and interprets texts like 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः' as gauna. He does not concede the existence of uncreated eternals and is not aware of पराधीनविशेषासि.

CHAPTER XXVII

MADHVA'S THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD

Madhva's theory of the constitution of matter and the evolution of the world is based on the 'Sāmkhya' metaphysics of *Upaniṣads*, the *Epics* and *Purāṇas*. He quotes profusely from the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhāgavata* and other *Purāṇas* and from the vast literature of the *Pañcarātras*, which still await exploration at the hands of modern scholars. Even a cursory view of the quotations made by Madhva from the literature of the *Pañcarātras* bears witness to the strong and persistent Theistic tradition of Upaniṣadic thought embodied in them and which Madhva inherited from them¹, and upon which he indented so largely, in the reinterpretation of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Sūtras* and in the exposition of his own system. The school of Rāmānuja, tho' ostensibly connected with the *Pañcarātra*, has not, in its interpretation of the *Vedānta*, touched anything more than the fringe of that literature. A reference to the numerous quotations from a large number of forgotten *Samhitās* of the *Pañcarātra*, occurring in the works of Madhva², would make this clear.

As a follower of the Epic Sāmkhya, Madhva has naturally accepted the doctrine of evolution of Matter (*Prakṛti*) as against the theory of Ārambhavāda or 'atomic genesis' of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The latter, as explained by Jayatīrtha, is fraught with hourly danger to the stability (*sthiratva*) of the world of objects. According to the *Pilupākavāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas, even the slightest displacement of a single atom in a jar would entail the ultimate destruction of it. Hence, Madhva would have none of it.³

He therefore accepts the theory of the evolution of Matter from a subtle to a gross state. This has the advantage of guaranteeing the basic identity and stability of the material stuff in and thro' the various changes it undergoes in its process of development from a subtle to a gross state. Only the *Parināmavāda* would be consistent with Madhva's theory

1. *M. Vij.* viii, 4.

2. See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, Appendix ii.

3. Cf. यदा हि घटादिषु सूत्यग्रादिना एकोऽपि परमाणुरपैति, तदा नष्टव्यमेव तदारब्धेन द्रव्यणुकेन, विमोगेनासमवायिकारणस्य संयोगस्य नष्टत्वात् । द्रव्यणुकनाशे, समवायिकारणनाशात् त्र्यणुक-नाश इत्यनेन क्रमेण घटनाशोऽप्यवश्यंभावी ॥ (*NS.* p. 394 b).

of Causation and our faith in the stability of material objects¹. He therefore accepts a primordial material stuff called Prakṛti which undergoes various modifications and develops by a process of evolution and involution of parts. The existence of Prakṛti is not logically established by Madhva. He takes it over bodily from the Upaniṣadic, Epic and Purāṇic Sāṃkhya cosmology. It is an eternal insentient stuff of the most subtle kind: अनादेशपादानस्य भूतसङ्क्रमशब्दाभिधेयस्य प्रधानत्वात्. (*NS.*)

Madhva has stoutly opposed the attempts of other commentators on the Vedānta who have denied a place to Prakṛti, as the material stuff out of which the Universe is evolved by Brahman, in the philosophy of the Vedānta. He establishes on sound textual authority, the Śāstrik character (*Sābdatvam*) of Prakṛti as an insentient, dependent material principle which is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, and repudiates the theory of Abhinna-nimittopādānatva of Brahman adopted by other Bhāṣyakāras on the Vedānta². Madhva thus champions the cause of the Sāṃkhya against the Advaitin and fights successfully for a place for Prakṛti in Vedāntic cosmology. Rāmānuja also, has perforce to recognize a material principle as defined in the metrical Upaniṣads, the Epics and the Purāṇas. Neither of them however could recognize, with the Sāṃkhya, the independence of that principle. Madhva's point is that the status of Prakṛti, as claimed by the Sāṃkhyas, has nothing to do with its being recognized by Vedāntins as the material stuff out of which the Universe is to be evolved. It is accepted as a principle dependent on the Brahman (Paratantra) by Madhva and Rāmānuja.

Prakṛti is both directly and indirectly the material cause of the world. It is the direct material cause of the development of time and the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* and indirectly of Mahat, Aharikāra etc. It is both eternal and pervasive; but not unlimited³. The three gunas are supposed to be differentiated at the beginning of creation, in the proportion of 4: 2: 1 (*B.T.* iii, p. 24). The evolution of other forms of matter takes place on account of the disturbance in their

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1. तदेव हि वस्तु अवयवोपचयापचयाभ्यामन्यथाविक्रियते, न पुनरन्यदेव भवतीति परिणामवादिनो मन्यन्ते । अतःप्रत्यक्षयोग्येषु सर्ववस्तुषु प्रत्यभिज्ञया स्थिरत्वग्रहणं युत्तमेवेति (*NS.* 394)
 2. The point has been fully discussed in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 133-137.
 3. न च परिमितस्यापि मूलप्रकृतित्वे वाधकम् (*NS.* 326 b.)

equipois which gives rise to the twentyfour principles commonly recognized—Mahat, Ahamkāra, Buddhi, Manas, ten sensory organs, five sense-objects and the five great elements. Mahat is the first and finest evolute of matter and energy. Ahamkāra is the principle of individuation, Buddhi that of discrimination and Manas of thought. The principle of Ahamkāra is divided into three classes of Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tāmasa. From Taijasa, the ten sense organs are produced and the five sense objects (*yisayas*) and the elements are the products of Tāmasa-Ahamkāra. The *tanmātrūs* stand for qualitatively distinct and irreducible sense-qualities with a definite leaning towards their appropriate objects. These twentyfour evolutes of Prakṛti are the constituents of the microcosm and the macrocosm of the entire Brahmananda. Madhva gives a proper reorientation to this theory of material evolution by linking it up with a systematic hierarchy of presiding deities from top to bottom. It is under the constant supervision and guidance of these Abhimāni-devatās (or Tattvābhimānins) that all material transformations and psycho-physical functions are carried on. The Supreme Brahman itself is ultimately behind all these activities and of each and every one of them :

तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्ततच्छक्तिः प्रबोधयन् ।

एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमजसा ॥ (B. S. B.)

The three forms of Matter - viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are specially controlled by the three aspects of Cetana-Prakṛti, in her three aspects of Śrī, Bhū and Durgā :

शक्यत्वाच्छक्तयो भार्याः शक्तिः सामर्थ्यमुच्यते । (B. T. p. 21)

The period of creation is said to be one-eighth of the period of involution :

ल्यस्यत्वष्टुमो भागः सृष्टिकाल उदाहृतः ।

तत्रैव वेदसंचारोऽन्यदा स्तुतिमात्रकाः ॥ (B. T. p. 71 b)

Involution takes place by the merger of the effects in their causes, in the reverse order of evolution. This applies to the Tattvābhimāni-devas also, both in **Samsāra** and in release.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARIṄĀMA AND VIVARTA VĀDAS.

Madhva's conception of the material world and its relation to Brahman is free from the difficulties that beset the Pariጀāma and Vivarta Vādas. Pantheism pulls down the Deity to the gutter. It is worse than irreligion. It utterly negates the independence of God. For, all material modifications are dependent originations (Parādhinavīśeṣa). They fall under two main heads of change : change of Substance (धर्मपरिवर्त्त) and change of aspect or attributes (धर्मपरिवर्त्त). Each of these may again be distinguished into reversible and irreversible modifications. All these four kinds of change are dependent upon external agencies. It would be impossible to recognize any such external cause of change in respect of Brahman, as that would immediately reduce it to a position of dependence. Pariጀāmavāda, moreover, stands committed to the view that Brahman alone existed in the beginning and that there was no other substance in existence then. It does not believe in any other eternal existent, uncreated by Brahman or co-existent with it (as those who believe in creation thro' Parādhinavīśeṣāpti do). No modification of Brahman is thus conceivable or possible in such circumstances, as the urge or direction for such modification must come from an outside agency. It will be inconsistent with Divine perfection to assume that Brahman itself, out of its own free will chooses to transmute itself into the world of beings and objects, - a world which is a state of sin, evil and misery. *We cannot say that the Brahman does not recognize the misery and imperfections of the world as it is.* For it is *ex hypothesi* Sarvajña. If Brahman does not experience the suffering in the world, who does ? Not the Jīva ; for he, too, is a modification of Brahman and is essentially the same as Brahman. Even supposing that the Jīva is only partially identical with Brahman it would not wholly exempt Brahman from a share in the misery of the world. Even the most subtle modifications in the development of sentient creatures are subject to external forces. Sentients are never known to undergo change of state or condition of being at their own free will. It is useless to argue that Brahman being Almighty could change at Its own will, without reference to any external stimuli or provocation or direction. For, the *change* from a state of blessedness and perfection to one of obvious misery and limitation can hardly be a token of Almighty ! It would be sheer dogmatism to say that we should not raise logical objections in a case that transcends all reason. In that case all philosophy should have to be given up as a wild goose chase. The

plea of ‘transcending logic’ can be urged with propriety only in cases where the authorities are *unanimous*. In this case, however, it is *not so*, as there are many texts which clearly deny to the Brahman any kind of physical or material modification (निर्विकारोऽक्षरःशुद्धः) so that the employment of reason becomes imperative in coming to a definite conclusion on the vexed question.

It is equally unavailing to put in that the change of state undergone by Brahman is a special kind of modification that does not affect its “deeper nature”. For the fact remains that the change of state attributed to Brahman by the Pariṇāmavādin is precisely and unfortunately of this very kind that plunges it into the abyss of misery and imperfection of the world, from a state of bliss and self-sufficiency. How can we pretend that this does not affect its “deeper nature”? That being so, and so long as it is conceded that Brahman does not undergo any change of state that is determined or controlled by external agencies, any state of *becoming* in which we might find It, will be as natural to It as any other! Since it is admitted (by the Paripāmavādin) that Brahman is with and without the forms of grossness at different times, it will be impossible to define which of them is Its “natural” state and which is adventitious; so that both the states would be quite natural to its being. Granting for argument’s sake that a transformation of Brahman with a complete loss of original nature is possible, the question will still remain if such a transformation will be partial or wholesale. As Brahman is partless and indivisible, the former alternative could not be true. In the latter case, Brahman having been “exhausted” in the transformation, there would be none left (as Brahman) during the lifetime of the world, with the result that all talk of acquiring knowledge of the Brahman, with a view to attaining the bliss of Mokṣa, will have to cease.

Madhva, therefore, rejects the view of Bhāskara and many others that Brahman is in itself the stuff of which the Universe is made. So far as all our received knowledge and the testimony of the Scriptures go, there would appear to be an unbridgeable gulf between Spirit and matter: Cit and Jada :

न चेतनविकारः स्याद्यत्र क्वापि ह्यचेतनम् ।

न चेतनविकारोऽपि चेतनः स्यात्कर्त्ताच्चन ॥ (AV. i, 4).

Brahman is essentially Saccidānanda. How, then, could such a perfect being of pure intelligence and bliss evolve, out of itself, an effect that is inert and wholly lacking in intelligence and is, in addition, the abode of

so much misery and subject to ceaseless change? There is no use in taking shelter behind alleged statements in the Śruti to the effect that Brahman is immediately and in its own person, the material cause of the world. For not even the vociferation of a hundred texts could make the crow white! Reason may test even where it cannot build. Where conflicting authorities claim to interpret the Śruti, each to suit his own metaphysics, the employment of reason becomes more important than the bare text itself.

Not even the Scripture says *directly* that the intelligent becomes the unintelligent. In that case, the Brahman could as well become the individual souls, too; and simplify matters for all philosophers. Moreover, the Śruti says emphatically that Brahman is immutable and unchanging : निर्विकरोऽक्षरःशुद्धः। Since no causation is possible without *some change* or modification in the cause, we must naturally look for the material cause of the Universe, elsewhere than in Brahman¹.

A strict adherence to the logic of facts and the spirit of the Śrutis compels Madhva to reject the profanity of Brahmapariጀāmavāda, in any garb. Even the oft-paraded promissory statement about the knowledge of the one leading to the knowledge of the many (on which Samkara himself tries to base the case for Brahmapariጀāma) does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that Brahman is the *material cause* of the Universe. Madhva has been the first critical commentator on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* to draw attention to the difficulties in the wording and form of the propositions, as they stand, which definitely militate against any facile conclusion of material causality (ब्रह्मोपादानतत्त्वं) being drawn from that text. No other commentator, ancient or modern, seems to have realized this crucial point. The difficulty pointed out by Madhva is a real and serious one and cannot be lightly passed over. The examples of मृत्यिण्ड, लोहमणि and नखनिकृत्तन in the form in which they appear in the text of Chān, Up. vi, 1,4–6, are virtually incapable of establishing anything more than a

I. The supposed reference to Brahmapariጀāmavāda, in the teaching of the *Brahmasūtras* (i, 4, 24) has been convincingly shewn by Madhva to have no relevance to that problem at all. For a full discussion of the issue and refutation of the remarks of V. S. Ghate and Bhandarkar, on this point, see my *HDSVL* i, pp. 137–144.

general resemblance or point of contact between Brahman and the world. The terms “*eka*” (used thrice), *pīṇḍa*, *māṇi* and *nakhanikṛntana*, prevent the establishment of an intimate causal relation (उपादानोपादेयभाव) among the pairs named in the text : अन्यथा, एकशब्दः पिण्डशब्दव्यर्थः स्यात् । ‘मृदा विज्ञातया’ इत्येतावता पूर्णत्वात् । न हेकमृतिपण्डात्मकानि अन्यमृण्मयानि । साहश्यमेव हि तेराम् । न हेकमण्यात्मकमन्यलोहमयम् । न चैकनखनिकृतनात्मकं सर्वं कार्णीयसम् ।

(Madhva, *VTN*. p. 25 b.).

A little reflection would show the truth of this contention :

जगतो ब्रह्मविकारलेन तदारोपत्वेन वा एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञाने विवक्षिते, ‘मृदा विज्ञातया, मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्थालोहेन विज्ञातेन लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्थात्कार्णीयसा विज्ञातेन कार्णीयसं विज्ञातं स्यादि’ येतावतैव पूर्णत्वात् व्यायामेकद्वानां पिण्डमणिनखनिकृत्तनशब्दानां “सर्वं” शब्दानां च विगतार्थत्वं स्यात् । सर्वमृण्मयादीनामेकमृतिपण्डादिविकारत्वाभावात् । विरुद्धार्थता च स्यात् ॥ (*NS*. i, 4, p. 226).

There is no use pleading that we should not take the text literally but look to the spirit ; for the spirit itself has got to be deduced from the wording. However that may be, the third and the last illustration of nail-scissors has *not even* the semblance of a causal argument. It gives the whole case away. For, the *nakhanikṛntana* is itself *an effect* and not the cause of anything else and cannot, in the nature of things, be the “cause” of ‘*all that is made of kārṣṇāyasa*.’ It should be clear then, that the argument for the material causality of the Brahman *breaks down, completely*, and at the very first touch of criticism, in *this* instance. The position is hardly better in the other two cases.

Madhva, therefore, prefers to take the teaching of Uddalaka in terms of the primacy of the knowledge of Brahman over all other forms or kinds of knowledge. To know Brahman is to know at one sweep, *all that is worth knowing*, about the world, that is so utterly dependent on It : यज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽन्यत् ज्ञातव्यमवशिष्यते (*Gitā*, vii, 2). The knowledge of Brahman is the end and aim of all secular learning and the culmination of all knowledge. Sage Uddalaka is naturally at pains to impress this great truth on his son who is conceited enough (cf. तत्त्वं एत्याय *Chan. Up.*) to gloat over his learning, divorced from Brahman-knowledge.

There is much truth in Madhva's contention, therefore, that a relation of material cause and effect could *not* be easily established among the pairs named in the text, consistent with the actual wording of it. The utmost point of contact between the दृश्यान्त and दर्शनिक that these examples could establish is one of resemblance of some kind: सत्यमस्ति साहस्रं । किं तु, सत्त्वादिनैव (*NS.* p. 451). The point is conceded by the *Bhāmatī* also in the *pūrvapakṣa*: 'यथैकेन मृत्युण्डेने'त्यादिदृश्यान्तः परमात्मनः प्राप्तान्यं सूचयति । यथा सोमशर्मणा एकेन ज्ञातेन सर्वे कठा ज्ञाता भवन्तीति ॥

The other familiar examples of (1) scorpions being produced from cowdung; (2) hair and nail growing from the human body; and (3) the growth of man from childhood to youth and old age, quoted to establish the material casuality of Brahman, are equally unavailing. The point at issue is the possibility of an unintelligent (*jada*) effect being produced solely from a sentient being. The analogy of scorpions etc. is therefore, doubly irrelevant as the scorpion is a living creature and the cowdung insentient. Even if such production were biologically true, it admits of other explanations in so far as the scorpion has a material body which might be derived from the dung. But the soul of the scorpion (in so far as it may have one), cannot be a product of dung ! Śaṅkara's explanation (*B. S. B.* ii, 1, 6) that Brahman has *sattā* in common with its effects like Ākāśa, overlooks the fact that this *sattā* is not, like the body of man, distinguishable from Brahman. The growth of hair and nails from the human body is possible only so long as it is tenanted and sustained by a soul and not at other times. But the Parināmavādin has necessarily to conceive of a state when Brahman alone existed in an incorporeal or pre-corporeal state and later produced the world out of itself. But a non-embodied Brahman cannot, on the very same analogy of man, produce anything. It would, in any case, be impossible to show that nails and hair are directly produced from the soul ! The example of the development of man from childhood to old age pertains, in the opinion of all Śastrakāras, only to the body (*sariradharma*) of man and not to his soul. The ripening of wisdom with the advance of years and the appearance of virility in youth, are possible only in the event of a body sustained by the presence of a soul. None of the developments instanced can or is known to take place *in the soul as such*. And in all these cases, the purely physical developments are traceable to the

physical part in the causal complement¹. Consistent then, with the implications of these analogies, the Pariṇāmavādin must admit that the purely material part of Brahman—if it can be credited with any—is the material cause of the world and that the soul-part or spiritual element in its make-up is the operative cause. This would be tantamount to a restatement of Madhva's position, in less accurate terminology. In such a contingency, the material part will have to be regarded as not-Brahman as there cannot obviously be anything material about Brahman! This could give us but a Kevala-nimittakāraṇavāda, in the end :

भागेन परिणामस्थेत् भागयोर्भेदं एव हि ।

यो भागो न विकारी स्यात्स एवास्माकमीश्वरः ॥ (AV. i, p. 13).

In so far as most Pariṇāmavādins, like Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha, do *not* admit the co-existence of a purely material principle (Prakṛti) which can figuratively be styled the 'body' of Brahman, the illustration of scorpions etc. cannot, with propriety, be cited by them. Bhāskara is the only Vedāntin who holds fearlessly to actual Brahmapariṇāma and regards not merely the material world but the souls also as products of Brahman. This lands him in further difficulties of having to visit the miseries and imperfections of the finite selves also, on Brahman, against repeated assertions in the texts to the contrary : अनश्रूत्योऽस्मिचाकशीति (Up.) संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेष्टा वैशेष्यात् (B. S. i, 2, 8.).

Rāmānuja is generally regarded as a believer in Abhinna-nimittopādānatva of Brahman. This gives him an apparent advantage over Madhva. But this is altogether deceptive. Rāmānuja cannot afford to go to the same length as Bhāskara and *deny* the co-existence of a purely material principle called Prakṛti, tho' it may be subject to Brahman and act as its 'body' (यस्याव्यक्तं शरीरं). Rāmānuja frankly admits the existence of Prakṛti : न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपतो नाभ्युगच्छामः । अपि तु, परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्मकत्वविरहेण । तथानभ्युपगमादेव तत्रसिद्धप्रक्रियानिराकरणम् ।

(Śrībhāṣya, i, 4, 3).

1. पित्रादिदृष्टान्तानामयं खलु निष्कृष्टोऽर्थः यत्पित्राद्युपभूतमन्तं तच्छरीरभूतं पुत्रादिगताचेतनांशोपादानं भवतीति । पक्षान्तरस्यासंभवात् । (NS. p. 197).

The so-called Brahmopādānatva, on his view, is really on a par with the procreation of a son (i. e. his body) by the father or the emergence of nails and hair from the body nourished by the soul :

अपादानत्वमेवास्य यशुपादानता भवेत् ।

अंगीकृतं तत्पितृवचैव विश्वात्मना भवः ॥ (*AV.* i, p. 12).

The position of Rāmānuja ultimately boils down to Kevalanimitta-kāraṇavāda of Brahman, so far as the Brahma-caitanya is concerned and all talk of Abhinnanimittopādāna, indulged in by him and his school, turns out to be a mere terminological exaggeration and flourish. The point is fully brought out by Jayatīrtha in a searching analysis and criticism of Rāmānuja's position : अत्र कथित् ' प्रकृतिश्चैत्यादीनि सूत्राणि ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानतया व्याख्याय सूत्रात्पर्यमेवमाह — परमसूक्ष्मादित्प्रधानशरीरं ब्रह्म ' योऽब्यक्ते तिप्रभुः ' यस्याब्यक्तं शरीरं मित्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धम् । तथा च, ब्रह्माद्यधिष्ठितं ब्रह्मात्मकं प्रधानं जगदुपादानमिति ब्रह्मव जगदुपादानतयाङ्गीक्रियत इति । तं प्रत्याह-अपादानत्वमेवेति ।

एवं हि वक्ता, पितुरिव पुत्रजन्मनि, जगदुत्पत्तौ ब्रह्मणोऽयवथित्वलक्षणमेवोपादानत्वमिदं स्यात् । सर्वथा निर्विकारस्य ब्रह्मणो विकारिप्रधानशरीरकस्य तदधिष्ठातृवेनोपादानताया उदितत्वात् । एवंभूतं चोपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽस्माभिरप्यंगीकृतमेवेति नात्रास्माकं प्रद्वेषः ।

नन्वंगीकृतं चेदुपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणः कथं तर्हि तश्चिराकरणमित्यत आह—नत्विति । शुद्धचैतन्यसैव ब्रह्मणो विश्वात्मना भवो भास्कराद्यंगीकृतो नास्माभिरंगीक्रियते अतस्तच्चिराकरणमुपपत्तमेवेति ।

अतायमभिर्सिधिः— यद्यपि परब्युपादितं ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वं नास्माकमर्थतो विरोधि, तथापि नैतेषां सूत्राणामर्थः । तथाहि—किमत्रास्य व्युत्पादनस्य कृत्यम्? न तावद्वास्करस्येव निमित्तोपादानमेदनिराकरणम्; प्रधानस्योपादानतयाङ्गीकृततत्वात् । विकारिवस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव मुख्यमुपादानत्वमिति चेत् । लोकविरोधात् । लोकव्यवहारानुसारैव हि परीक्षकैर्लक्षणं कार्यम् । न स्वामिप्रायेण लोकव्यवहारो नियन्तव्यः ॥ (*NS.* i, 4, p. 197 b)¹

The position of Śrīkaṇṭha and other (Brahma)-Śaktipariṇāmavādins like Nimbarka, Vallabha and others, is hardly better. In so far as this

1. For an exposition of this criticism, see Introd. to my edn. of *Catustuṣṭubhiḥāsyam* of Madhva, Madras, 1934 (p. xxii).

(Cit)-śakti of Brahman, which according to these writers, is the immediate substratum of the Pariṇāma is distinguished from the soul-part of Brahman conceived as Saccidānandātmaka, the latter ceases to be the real substratum of the change. It is the Cicchakti¹, Śakti or energy or 'body' (as Rāmānuja would call it) that turns out to be the *real* and immediate *material cause* of the world. Even this is a far cry from actual and immediate cent-per-cent Upādānatva or Pariṇāmitva of Brahman. Thus, in most cases, the so-called Upādānatva of Brahman thro' its Cicchakti or Sat-śakti, as the case may be, turns out to be nothing more than an "Apādānatva" i. e. अपायावधित्वलक्षणम् 'acceptance of Brahman as the residual spirit' that remains unaffected and untransforming in any given instance of change taking place in its tenement. This point also is convincingly established by Jayatīrtha : अथ मतम्-द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्यते, अनन्तानन्दचिदात्मकं सदात्मकं चेति । तत्रायेन स्पैण निमित्तं द्वितीयेनोपादानम् । अतो न कथिष्येषः निर्विकारित्वं चिच्छक्तिविषयत्वादवृष्णम् । तेन सच्छक्तिकं ब्रह्म परिणामीत्यंगीकारे न सुक्रिताविरोधोऽपि * * * * ।

यदि ब्रह्मणः सद्गुणेन परिणामश्चिद्गुणेन निर्विकारित्वमंगीक्रियते, तदा वक्तव्यम् । तयोर्भाग्य-योरभेदो, भेदाभेदोवा ? न तावदभेदः । द्वयोरपि परिणामित्वापत्या भागद्वयकल्पनावैयर्थ्यात् । नापि भेदाभेदौ । अभेदेन संकरप्रसादात् । भेदोऽभेदकार्यं निरुणद्वीती चेत्किं तद्यभेदेनाप्रयोजकेन ? तस्मा-द्वागयोरत्यन्तभेद एवांगीकार्यः । ततः किमित्यत आह-‘यो भाग’ इति ।

परस्परमयन्तभिश्च द्वे वस्तुनी । तत्रैकं निर्विकारं जगन्निमित्तमेव । अपरं परिणामि जगदुपादान-मेवैर्यंगीकारे, नेश्वरस्य केवलनिमित्तत्वादिनामस्माकं कथिद्विरोधः । निर्विकारस्य जगन्निमित्ततयास्मा-मिरीधरत्वेन, परिणामिनो जगदुपादानस्य प्रधानत्वेन चाङ्गीकृतत्वात् ॥

अत्र यो भाग इति पराभ्युपगमेनोक्तम् । स्वमतेन तु, यद्वस्तु इति ज्ञातव्यम् ॥

(NS. p. 200).

This criticism covers every shade and variety of Brahmapariṇāmavāda thro' aspects or modes considered as essential part of Brahman.

1. The term is peculiar to Śrīkaṇṭha. Cicchakti, on his view, is Cidacitprapañcākāra. It is sometimes identified with Brahman and sometimes distinguished from it, —a loose procedure.

As for the Vivartavāda, it is, strictly speaking, no theory of causation at all, as it does not accept any true effect that has got to be accounted for, but only an appearance. Quite apart from this, there is the difficulty of *accounting for* the obscuration of the Brahman by Ajñāna, which is the root-cause of the appearance of the world. There is again greater difficulty than even in the Pariṇāmavāda interpretation, in reconciling the promissory statement of एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् with the illustration of clay etc. and the requirements of *real* Vivartavāda : आरोपितत्वं तु एकस्यापि मृष्मय-स्यैकस्मिन् सृतिपण्डे नास्ति किमुतं सर्वस्य ? युक्त्या समर्थत इति चेत् ; तर्हि विवादास्थदत्तेन दृष्टान्तानुपात्तेः । ‘लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्बन्धे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तं’ इति हि न्यायाविदः ॥

(*NS.* i, 4, 6. p. 226).

It would be truer to say from the Vivarta standpoint that the knowledge of the One *sublates*: or *puts an end* to the knowledge of the many, rather than that it *produces* or gives rise to any such knowledge (Cf. the wording : अश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति । अमतं मतं भवति). There is not merely terminological inexactitude. The expressions used by Uddālaka are capable of suggesting a different and more sensible interpretation. There is nothing to show that Uddālaka was trying to equate the *many* with the *unreal*. The unreal is something which has been mistaken for another : अश्चासो नामातस्मिस्तद्बुद्धिः (Śamkara, *B. S. B.* i, 1, 1.). But the “many” in the promissory statement includes also things which have not at all been brought within the scope of Śvetaketu’s understanding or *misperception*: अश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति ! In any case, the illustrations of clay etc. would appear to assume the reality of effects,— the connecting link between the One and the many being nothing more than a resemblance; as actual cause-and-effect relation is unsustainable, for reasons already explained. Clay is never the Vivartopādāna of pots. Since no causal relation could be made out among the pairs named in the text without distorting the actual purport of the terms of the text, or glossing over or ignoring some of them like एक, मणि and पिण्ड, and also asserting a palpable travesty of a causal argument in the last instance of the nail-scissors, the interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja are misplaced.

The Advaitic theory of Abhinnanimittopādānatva of Brahman has also been discussed by Vyāsārāya in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, in the light of its exposition by Prakāśātman, in his *Vivarāṇa*. According to the *Vivarāṇa*, there are three ways in which the position that Brahman is the material cause of the world may be explained. (1) Brahman conjointly with Māyā is the material cause (*upādāna*) of the world, like two strands of a threadd which go to make a string. (2-3) Māyā which may be viewed as a power of Brahman or as dependent on Brahman is the material cause and Brahman thro' its association or connection with it is also, in a way, the Upādāna thro' such Māyā. Prakāśātman further explains that on the first view inasmuch as Brahman and Māyā would both conjointly constitute the material cause of the world, there would be no violation of the Nirvikāra Śruti which should be understood with reference to Brahman in its state of isolation, (i. e. when not in conjunction with Māyā). In the other two cases also the Nirvikāra Śruti is to be understood to refer to Brahman when it is not colored by Māyā or is not acting thro' Māyā.

Vyāsārāya criticizes all these explanations. He points out that in the first case, like the two threads conjointly going to make the string, Brahman also would be as much an Upādāna or transforming cause as Māyā; and there would be no point in claiming the Brahman alone to be "Nirvikāra" in the process. Moreover, as both Brahman and Māyā are the material cause of the world, we should expect to find the essential characteristics of Brahman viz., Pāramārthika reality, consciousness and bliss in the effect viz., the world ! It cannot be said that only an intellectual awareness of the essential characteristics of the Upādāna is to be associated with the effect and not the actual presence of those characteristics. In that case, how is the Advaitin justified in claiming that the world possesses the character of *anirvacanīya-tvam* in so far as it is a product of Māyā or Avidyā? If he should say that the world does not possess the character of Pāramārthika reality because it is not solely the product of Brahman (*samtūropādānakam*), then, by the same reasoning, he should refuse to call the world "anirvacaniya" because it is not solely produced by Anirvacaniya Māyā! Again, if Brahman associated with Māyā is regarded as changing and Brahman unqualified is to be accepted as Nirvikāra, the question will be 'Is the qualified entity (Viśiṣṭa) to be designated

as Brahman or not ? If the qualified entity is Brahman, it could hardly be unchanging ! If it is not to be regarded as Brahman, the question of regarding Brahman as Upādāna would simply not arise. Further if the transformation of the Viśiṣṭa is admitted then such transformation would be of the same order of reality as the substratum, which would go against the requirements of the Vivarta theory in which the product of Vivarta has a lesser reality than its substratum. It cannot also be held that real transformation takes place in the Viśiṣṭa while only an illusory transformation takes place in the Viśeṣya (the substratum). For, in order to speak of a Vivarta at all, there should be some illusory transformation in the Śuddha also. Hence it would be difficult to say that the Śuddha is absolutely Nirvikāra. If it is said that there is no *real* Vikāra in the Śuddha, then, it would be equally wrong to speak of any actual transformation in the Viśiṣṭa too, since it is primarily in the Viśeṣaṇa (Māyā) that any real transformation is taking place. As for the third view that Brahman is to be regarded as Upādāna thro' Māyā and not directly, like the constituent parts (*amśu*) of threads forming the cloth, Vyāsaraṇa shows that the analogy is misplaced. The constituent parts (*amśu*) of the thread are really the material cause of the cloth. But the Brahman is not the constituent cause of Māyā. How then could Brahman be regarded as the constituent cause of the world thro' Māyā ?

It would be equally unavailing to define Upādānatvam as being the substratum of an illusory change. The term "Upādāna" is nowhere used in philosophical writings in this sense. No one would designate "clay", which is the material cause of pot, as the substratum of the illusory appearance of the pot ! Nor is the shell, the substratum of an illusory appearance of silver spoken of as the 'material cause' of silver. If the Advaitin proposes to define Upādānatvam in a novel way which has no relation to the connotation of the term as other philosophers understand it, he may please himself with such a diversion. But it will not make the Brahman the material cause of the world in the accepted sense of the term ! Finally, Vyāsaraṇa points out that the Advaitic position that Iśvara is the efficient cause (*nimitta*) of the world, Māyā the material cause (upādāna) and Śuddha Brahman the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world makes the thesis of

"Abhinnanimittopādānatva" of Brāhmaṇ, so eagerly sought to be read into the Prakṛtyadhiκaraṇa of the *Brahmasūtras*, by Śaṅkara, pointless.

Madhva thus establishes his point that Brahmopādānatva theory is logically and textually unsustainable, and philosophically unsound. We have to stick to Kevala-nimittakāraṇatva only. This will not land us in a plurality of Causes. The clear fact that Prakṛti is a metaphysically dependent principle just like Space and Time (tho' eternal), will effectively bar the possibility of plurality of causes. This point has been established by Madhva under B. S. ii, 1, 15, *et. seq.*

V. DOCTRINE OF ĀTMAN

CHAPTER XXIX ESSENCE OF SELFHOOD

Souls are conceived in Madhva's system as finite centres of conscious experience, each with a unique essence of its own. The essence of individuality is that one finite centre of experience cannot possess, *as its own immediate* experience, the experience of another. It is this non-transferable immediacy of experience that distinguishes one self from another, in spite of their possessing certain similar characteristics : वैतन्यावच्छिन्नमैक्यमनुसंधानैकप्रमाणकम् । अनुसंधानं नाम भोगसमाख्यातः स्वीयतया दुःखादिसाक्षात्कारोऽभिमतः । (NS. p. 507). Each has a specific content of consciousness, reality and bliss and constitutes a focalization which is nowhere exactly repeated in nature. Their very *raison d'être* is to be distinct personalities or exclusive focalizations of a common Universe. The best definition of the self is that given by Jayatirtha : कर्तृत्वमोक्तृत्वशक्त्युपेतं साकारं देहादिव्यतिरिक्तं रूपमहमिति साक्षिसिद्धम् । (NS. p. 633). This refers to a dynamic personality endowed with the triple properties of will, cognition and activity. The basis of individuality is to be found in the uniqueness of 'personality', which is a blending of consciousness, experience and works, in proportion to its intrinsic stature (*yogyatā*). It is the core of all hedonistic, ethical and spiritual activities of man:

अहमित्येव यो वेदः स जीवं इति कीर्तिः ।

स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्रं बन्धमोक्षयोः ॥

The nature of the souls, at its best, is said to be one of unalloyed bliss and pure intelligence. It is essentially free from any kind of misery or pain : स्वतन्त्रिदानन्दाद्यात्मकस्य जीवस्य (UK!), tho' subject to a natural gradation of intelligence and bliss in a cosmic hierarchy of selves and subject always to the Supreme, in bondage and release. The sense of misery, which is bondage, is external to their essence and is brought about by a *real* tho' misplaced sense of independence of initiative and conduct:

तत्यापरायत्तलाभास अविद्यानिभित्को ऋमः ।¹ (NS. p. 26)

जीवस्य सुखरूपस्य न दुःखं किञ्चिदिष्यते ।

अतो मनोऽभिमानेन दुःखी भवति नान्यथा ॥ (B.T. p. 106).

1. Dasgupta unhappily has misread and misinterpreted this passage from the NS. in his *Hist. of Ind. Phil.* (iv, p. 113).

The question has been raised : "If each individual possesses in finite and material outlines, the perfection of consciousness, it seems to become a mere point of existence when it casts off the body and enters release. Will there not be overlapping of souls there ? If not, what is it that distinguishes one from the other ?" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* p. 719). In other words, what is it that constitutes the essence of selfhood, if we are to subtract from it, as we should, in the state of release, all the content and vestures that enfilm its essence and are obviously incidental and non-fundamental to its being or make-up in each case ? " We seem to be reduced to an abstraction of pure being or intelligence,—a monadism. It is merely then an *assumption* to hold that the single colorless unit, called "self", is *different* in each individual".

It is easy to ask such a question or pass such *ex cathedra* judgments. But it is not easy to give a thoroughly convincing answer to it, here and now *sub specie alterni*. Indeed, we should be in possession of the highest form of self-realization, which is the goal of religion and philosophy, if we should be able, *here and now*, to place our finger on what constitutes individuality and define it in precise terms. That will be unravelling the greatest of all mysteries, that has remained inscrutable for ages. We should cease to be embodied, if we *catch our selves* in their pristine essence of selfhood unconditioned by the floating perceptions of heat and cold, light and shade, pleasures and pain. If the Advaitin could silence the objection to Avidyā with the lofty remark that "if we can understand the relation of Ātman to Avidyā, we must be beyond the two"¹, the Dvaitin could as well plead with equal propriety that it would not be possible to deny the doctrine of intrinsic plurality of selves and their natural gradation, so long as we have no means of realizing the true essence of selfhood here and no means of proving that there is no basis of distinction in release. Madhva does not, after all, lay stress merely on sensations, feeling and bondage, in support of his doctrine of plurality of selves, as if these were the only movements of the real. It does not require much argument to show that the real nature of the souls and their true essence of individuality are now hidden from us by some mysterious veil of ignorance called Avidyā (*Svaguṇācchādikā*). Thanks to the light of Scripture and the exercise of reason and introspection, we may however expect to lift the veil ever so little and to take a peep into the truth of things and the vision might be enlarged as we go up in the scale of discipline and

1. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 577,

Aparoksha. We can arrive at some kind of working solution of the problem now, by examining the evidences of Scripture and advancing logically from the known to the unknown. This is the utmost that the best of us can do and we need not despair or despise this method so long as we have no other means of approach open to us. The individuality of experience and the impossibility of our entering into others' experience, with the same fourth dimensional inwardness as our own, are sufficient proofs of the basic distinction of selves : एवं व्यवस्थया नानात्मानः सिद्धाः । न व्यस्माभिर्धर्मभेदो वा भिन्नाश्रयधर्मभेदो वा व्यवस्थेत्यंगीक्रियते । अपि तु, सुखदुःखाद्यनु-संधानभावावरूपव्यवस्थाया अज्ञीकृतत्वात् । अनुसंधानं नाम, अनेन सुखेनाहं सुखी इत्यनुभवः ॥

(*Vādaratnāvali*, ii.)

CHAPTER XXX.

METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCE OF SOULS

In spite of their intrinsic nature of consciousness and bliss, the souls, as finite beings, are in a state of absolute dependence and limitation at all times, in bondage and release. Release is only from the fetters which *prevent* the realization of their true natures and their metaphysical dependence on Brahman. Dependence is not a passing chapter in their lives. It is the very condition of their being as finite entities. The eightfold determinations of the cosmos are simply the *expression* of such dependence. Such dependence is most vividly felt in the pre-natal and post-mortem conditions of life: अस्मात् गर्भस्थस्य जीवस्येष्वरत्वं नास्ति, अतो निधनानन्तरं नरकगमनात्र विद्यते । (B.T. p. 76), as well as in Pralaya, dreams, deep sleep and swoons. It is only in the state of *sthita* that man is found to arrogate independence to himself. He lies helpless and weak at other times, both before and after. It may therefore be concluded that even this temporary assumption of independence is misplaced :

“ विष्णोरधीनं प्राकृसुष्टैस्तथैव च लयादतु ।

अस्य सत्त्वप्रवृत्त्यादि विशेषणाधिगम्यते ।

स्वातंश्च रिथतिकाले तु कथंचित् बुद्धिमोहतः ।

प्रतीयमानमपि तु तस्माजैवेति गम्यते ” ॥ (B.T. ii, 18)

“ तन्वाः स्वस्वामिसंबन्धः प्रपञ्चोऽस्य शरीरिणः ।

वस्तुतोऽसौ न चैवास्ति परमात्मवशे यतः ।

तन्वादिकः ; तथाप्येष ह्यभिमानात्प्रदश्यते ॥ (Mānd. Up. C.)

The description of impending death in *Chān. Up.* VI. 15, wherein all psycho-physical powers are merged in their causes, one after the other, is another graphic instance of the soul's absolute dependence. The very fact of its achieving freedom from the shackles of Prakṛti by the grace of God is an unmistakable proof of its continued dependence on Him, even in release. It would be preposterous to expect the essential metaphysical dependence of finite beings on the Independent to be cut off

at any time. It cannot be destroyed without destroying the very constitution of the self *qua* Pratibimba of the Infinite. The relationship of Bimbapratibimba between Brahman and Jīvas, being the result of Avidyā, in Advaita, is taken to be destroyed in release along with the extinction of individuality as such. But the same relation being Svābhāvika and not due to Upādhis, in Madhva's view, is not therefore liable to destruction in Mokṣa. Hence its persistence in release, also, along with the persistence of individuality, shorn of all obscuring elements. Madhva, therefore, holds that even in the state of Mokṣa the realization of personal bliss, to the full, is dependent on the will of the Supreme :

अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुज्ञानिनां मोक्षदद्वयः ।

आनन्ददद्वयं मुक्तानां स एवैको जनार्दनः (AV).

The limitations of the soul are, therefore, partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic —

पराधीनश्च बद्धश्च स्वतप्तज्ञानसुखोद्दितः ।

अल्पशक्तिः सदोषश्च जीवात्मा * * * (B.T. p. 4 b)

The extrinsic ones are terminable. The intrinsic remain with the self. The limitations of the self are, in general expressed in and thro' the eight-fold determinations of cosmic life, which include life in Mokṣa also, to which they are subject. Tho' essentially uncreated, they are, nevertheless, associated from eternity with a series of material coils known as Āvaraṇas. They are (1) Liṅga-sarīra or the subtle body or psycho-physical mechanism of sixteen elements. This carries the causal potentialities that lead to a number of future lives, in the fulness of time. (2) Prārabdhakarma or Karma which has begun to bear fruit, (3) Kāma or desire which is the seed of activity and (4) positive ignorance (भावरूपज्ञानम्) or Avidyā which is both *real* and destructible. This is not simply a negative element (ज्ञानाभाव¹). It must be recognized as a positive force in view of its

1. Dasgupta (*I. Phil.* iv, p.159) is not correct in stating that Ignorance (*avidyā*) in Madhva's system "is a negative substance which, by God's will veils the natural intelligence of all". He has misread and misinterpreted the passage from the *NS* relating to this topic.

being a product of Tamoguna encircling the soul and getting destroyed by Aparokṣajñāna. The essence of this Ignorance is the assumption of independence and initiative and looking upon the accessories given to the self as *his own*, in his own right : तस्यापरायतत्वावभासो अविद्यानिमित्तको ग्रम ।

(*NS.* p. 26)

The locus of this Ignorance is the self. Such ignorance is not incompatible with the self-luminous character of the self, inasmuch as the Supreme Being which is Independent and All-powerful (अधित्तपृष्ठनापटीयान्) obscures a part of the self's nature by means of Viśeṣas. This positive nescience has two aspects – Jīvacchādikā and Paramācchādikā. The former conceals the true nature of the self (*qua* Pratibimba and metaphysically dependent on Brahman) from itself : स्वगुणाच्छादिका whereby man comes to assume independence of initiative and believes himself and the world around to be self-subsisting :

द्वितीया प्रकृतिः प्रोक्ता तदपा हि गुणास्त्रयः ।

तेषां संपत्तज्ञे भावो ममाहसिति या मतिः (*B.T.* p. 18).

Indeed, it is the assumption of this independence that is the root-cause of bondage : प्रमादात्मकत्वात् बन्धस्य (*B.S.B.*). The marvellous hold of this ignorance on people which makes them oblivious of their own weaknesses, while being alive to the shortcomings of others, is effectively portrayed in the *Viśṇupurahasya* :

परेषां रोगहृतारः स्वरोगं न विजानते ।

एतन्मायाबलं विष्णोर्महाशक्तर्महात्मनः ॥

It would, thus, be seen that dependence is the distinctive mark of the finite, *at all times*. It may find expression in one or more of the eightfold determinations of cosmic development. It is for this reason that Madhva brings the eternal substances also, under the causal scheme of Brahman, by means of the doctrine of Parādhinavīśeṣāpti¹.

1. The dependence of eternal substances on God, is accepted by Vedānta Desīka also : नित्यानां स्वरूपस्थित्योः परमात्मसंकल्पानुविधायित्वं नाम तत्त्वत्येच्छासिद्धत्वम् । He defines such dependence as the possibility of reversal when it no longer pleases God to let them be : तत्त्वं अनिच्छासंभवे निवर्तयितुं शक्यत्वमात्रम् । (com. on *R. G. B.* p. 9. Ananda Press Edn. Madras).

The second type of Ignorance prevents the souls from realizing the true nature of their dependence on God and their intrinsic resemblance to Him. Such ignorance is beginningless but has an end. There is no logical impropriety in conceiving of an end to what may be beginningless and conversely of endless continuity to what may have a beginning,—e.g. Mokṣa. These are facts accepted by reason and supported by Śruti:s:

अनादिमायथा सुरो यदा जीवः प्रबुद्धयते ।

The origin of bondage is also in the same way to be put down ultimately to the will of God. There is no other explanation of the beginningless association of ignorance obscuring the selves except the mysterious will of Brahman : अतो बन्धोऽपि तत एवेत्यर्थः—

सतां विमुक्तिदाद्विष्णोमुक्तिर्याभ्युपेयते ।

बन्धोऽपि तत एव स्याद्यस्मादेकः तयोः प्रभुः (B. T. X. p. 74)

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।

कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्मं विष्णुरेव सनातनः (Skānda q. by Śridhara)

It is the will of the Lord that the souls shall know Him and realize their respective selfhood only by cleansing themselves of the impurities of Prakṛti and the distractions of Avidyā, after a long and arduous process of physical, intellectual and moral effort and spiritual discipline. The seed must be planted in the earth before it could sprout and develop into a fruit-tree. The accessories of Liṅgadeha, Prārabda Karma etc. are just the material environment provided by God to help the Jīvas to unfold themselves. This is indeed the *raison d' être* of creation according to the Viṣṇupurahasya :

अनादिकर्मणा वद्वा जीवा नित्यं ह्यनन्तशः ।

लिङ्गदेहयुताः सर्वे पतिता मूर्च्छिता इव ।

यदि ते स्थूलदेहेन युता न स्युरिमेऽखिलाः ।

कथं कर्माणि कुर्वन् विष्णुमक्तिपरायणाः ?

अपूर्णभक्तयस्ते वा कथं मोक्षमवाप्नुयः ? (Chap. V).

There is, thus no problem at all of the first Fall of Man, in Madhva's philosophy, The question is only of the Ascent of Man by degrees,

after he has qualified himself steadily thro' sincere effort to realize the full force and content of his personality. "Not having possessed the freedom and purity of the supreme" at any time in their lives, or have been "in any way sharers in the Divine nature", the question does not also arise for Madhva, of how the souls came to "lose these and transfer themselves to the rule of Karma" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 695-6). "Rāmānuja holds that neither reason nor Scripture can tell us how Karma got the souls into its power; because, the Cosmic process is beginningless" (*ibid.* 696). It is true enough that the cosmic process is beginningless; but, it is the souls that forge their own chains due to basic nature of their Svarūpa.

CHAPTER XXXI

SELF-LUMINOSITY OF SOULS.

The individual soul, as a sentient being, is admitted by Madhva to be self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश). It is not merely of the form of knowledge (ज्ञानस्वरूप) but is a knower (ज्ञातृ). The conception of the self as a conscious personality is the same as it is in respect of God :

स्वेता वेदनं च स्वं स्वेन वेदः स कैश्चावः ।
परस्य वेता वित्तिश्च वेद्यश्चापि पैरः * * ॥ (G. T. xiii)

except for the fact that *even the self-luminosity of the Jiva is dependent on the Supreme*, which makes bondage possible :

जीवानां स्वप्रकाशत्वं तत्प्रसादात् स्ववेदनम् ।

Self-luminosity, in the Advaita, is a state of pure consciousness, without a subject-object relation : अवेद्यत्वे सति, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् (Citsukha). But this is self-contradictory. The Ātman must be both a knowing subject (*jñātṛ*) and the object of his own knowledge. He should know *himself and others* and be known by them also. Jayatirtha, therefore, rejects the Prabhākara view of the self as essentially *jada*, in that it is non-intelligent, being only the *substratum of qualities like consciousness, action, enjoyment and suffering*¹. The Bhāṭṭas, tho' conceding the ātman to be both conscious and the substratum of consciousness, hold that he is not self-conscious (*sva-jñātṛ*), but is only inferred thro' *aham-pratyaya* (ego-consciousness). This is also rejected by Madhva, who holds that the ātman must be self-intuiting.² The epistemological

1. स च, ज्ञानस्वरूपेण भिजत्वात् जडः । जानामीति ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेनैव भाति । न तु ज्ञानस्पत्वेन ।
(*Nyāyaratnāvalī*)

2. न चात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वे विवदितव्यम् । अहमित्यनुभवात् । न चायं मानसोऽनुभवः । तस्यापि ज्ञायमानत्वेनानुभवान्तरान्वेषणेऽनवस्थानात् । कस्यचिददुभवस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे, स्वात्मन एव तत् । जिज्ञासायामेवानुभवोऽनुभूयत इति न वाच्यम् । अनुभवविरोधात् । न ह्यज्ञायमान-ज्ञानसङ्ग्रहे किञ्चिन्मानम् । न च स्वप्रकाशसंविदाश्रयतया आत्मा अवभासत इति युक्तम् । औत्तरिकानुसृतिंसिद्धौषुतिकानुभवाभावप्रसंगात् । न हि सुषुप्तावात्मातिरिक्ता संविदस्तीति संभवति । संविदात्मकत्वाचात्मनो न संविद इव संविदाश्रयतया प्रतीतिः । [अतः स्वप्रकाश आत्मा] TP. i, 1. 1.

dogma of monism that the subject of all knowledge cannot itself be an object of knowledge, for fear of offending the dictum of the impossibility of the subject operating on itself (कर्तृकर्मभावविरोध) is rejected by Madhva as unwarranted by Scripture and experience. The acceptance of " Viśeṣas " in the self, enables Madhva to get over the difficulty of partial obscuration of the self's nature, in bondage, without denying the law of identity. Viśeṣa is the peculiar agency by which Madhva is able to divide consciousness from itself.

Such an explanation will not be available to the Advaitin, to whom the ātman is essentially colorless and aspectless (निर्विशेष); so that there is bound to be great difficulty in accounting for the *temporary and partial obscuration* of ātma-svarūpa by Avidyā or Ajñāna :

निर्विशेषे स्वर्थं भासे निमज्जानाकृतं भवेत् ? (AV)
निर्विशेषत्वादात्मनो नानधिगतो विशेषः । सिद्धवात् स्वरूपस्य विशेषाभावाच्च नाज्ञानं कास्यचिदावरकम् (Māyāvaddā Kh.)

The Śrutis also establish the ātman to be an active knower, employing such terms like विज्ञातु with the suffix (*tr*) in the active sense, which Saṅkara is at pains to explain away as a reference to *a philosophical looking back upon the world that was* (भूतपूर्वगत्या निर्देशः). But this explanation breaks down, elsewhere, in Brh. Up. i, 4, 10, where the Supreme Being is said to have known itself as " I am Brahman ", when it existed all alone prior to creation in a state of blessedness. The knowability of the self must be recognized, if the pursuit of *Brahmavicāra* is to have any meaning. The plea of कर्तृकर्मभावविरोध is unsustainable here. We can not surrender facts to a mere dogma: नहि वस्तुपरिक्षयात् प्रक्रियापरिक्षयो गरीयान । Jayatīrtha says that the opposition of subject-object in a proposition like 'I know myself', if due merely to the way of defining objectivity in the manner of the grammarians as परसमवेत्तक्रियाफलशास्त्रित्वम् (or " reaping the fruit accruing from an act, inhering in another), could be overcome by redefining subject and object in such a way as to avoid the overlapping : क्रियाश्रयः कर्ता । क्रियाविषयः कर्म । The Advaitic ātman could not be invested with any kind of self-luminosity. The idea would presuppose some objective content. Such a content may be either one's own self or an " Other ". The Advaitin is prepared to concede neither. The self cannot be the object

of such a luminosity. The reality of *another self* is not admitted. The only sense then in which we are entitled to speak of the Ātman as Svaprakāśa in Advaita will be that it has *no luminosity* with reference to either (*Tdy.* t. p. 18 b). In the absence of any objective or subjective reference of luminosity, it would be just non-luminous : विषयवर्जितः प्रकाश एव नास्ति धटवत् । (*Tdy*) which is elucidated by Jayatirtha : आत्मा न प्रकाशः । प्रकाशयशून्यत्वात् । धटवत् । There is no reason to make an exception in the case of the ātman alone and claim luminosity for him even in the absence of an objective reference or content — स्यादयेवं यद्येवं प्रमाणं स्यात् । नैतदस्ति (*Tdy.* t. p. 19 b). Nothing beyond the pale of Pramāṇas could be described as real: प्रमाणाभावे सत्यत्वं न स्यादित्यस्य, प्रमाणेन विना सिद्ध्यतीत्यस्यागुत्तरत्वात् । सिद्ध्यपायान्तरस्यागुपन्यस्तत्वात् । (*VTN.* t. p. 96b).

CHAPTER XXXII

MADHVA'S THEORY OF BONDAGE : SVABHĀVĀJÑĀNAVĀDA

According to Madhva, souls exist from eternity, in the chaos of a material *milieu*, under the ken of God. At the conclusion of each Mahāpralaya, He brings them to the forefront of creation¹. He has no purpose in doing so, save that of helping the souls², to exhaust thro' enjoyment (*bhoga*) the heavy load of Karma and Vāsanās, lying to their credit from time immemorial and thus work out their destinies³. Creation is, thus, an indispensable requisite for the ripening of individual Karma and the full development of each soul. This self-development, when complete, leads the soul to its deserts. Madhva thus guarantees both the integrality of the souls, in so far as they exist from eternity, as finite beings and the independence of God as their Ruler. This enables him to meet and satisfy the demands of both the moral and the religious consciousness of man.

The bonds and impurities of the souls are not, however, their essential nature (*svarūpa*), at any rate, of those of the highest order⁴. They are foreign to the core of their being, like the rust on copper and are taken to be associated with them from the beginning, at the pleasure of the Lord. This event is beginningless in time; but is, all the same, subject to the Lord's pleasure. He is thus ultimately responsible (metaphysically) for their bondage, – not in the sense that He threw them into it at a certain point of time in history, but that its continuous association with them is, in every way, subject to Him and its riddance will depend on

1. *Mbh. T. N.* i, I-3.

2. भूत्यै निजाभितजनस्य हि सूज्यसृष्टवीक्षा वभूत् (*ibid.*)

3. आत्मप्रयोजनाय स्यहां श्रुतिरत्वारथत्।

‘न प्रयोजनवत्वेने’ त्वत आह जगद्गुरुः ॥ (*AV* ii, 1, 33)

अतो, ‘न प्रयोजनवत्वात्’ इति हेतुं ब्रुवाणः स्त्रकृता, आत्मप्रयोजनोद्देशमेव निवारितवाऽप्त, न परप्रयोजनोद्देशमपीति । श्रुतिरपि ‘आपकामस्य का स्यहा’ इति हेतुगर्भविशेषणं प्रयुज्ञाना, आत्मप्रयोजनस्युहामेवाक्षिपाति । परप्रयोजनस्युपैतीति ज्ञायते (*NS.*) Cf. ‘यत्र त्रिसर्गे मृषा’ । यत्रेति विशेषणाङ्गान्यत्र । तदिष्य एव मृषा । (*BT*).

4. बल्म्यानन्द ओजश्च सहो ज्ञानमनादुलम् । स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य (*BSB. II.* 3, 31.) एतच्च सज्जीवाविषयम् । (*TP.*)

His grace and cooperation¹. Its onset is rendered possible by the power of concealment or obscuration of the true nature of souls, which is vested in the Lord² and which corresponds to the "Tirodhāna-Śakti" recognized by Śrikanṭha and in Tamil Śaivism, as one of the five characteristics of Paramesvara.

It may, no doubt, appear to be a despotic thing for God to envelop the souls in beginningless Māyā³, but as already pointed out, it is a necessary evil in the scheme of the universe. The association with Prākṛtic bonds is a necessary step in the spiritual evolution of souls and is, therefore, permitted by God. It is an ordeal thro' which every one of them has to pass before attaining his or her full stature,—whatever that might be. It is the desire of the Almighty that the souls *shall* fulfil themselves *only in this way and in no other*. And there is no questioning His will, as He is Satyasamkalpa.

The bonds of souls are thus *real* in that they are *not imaginary*. They have no beginning, in time tho' depending always on His will. The essence of this bondage is ignorance and misunderstanding of the true nature of God and of one's own self : तस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि जीवस्य परमेश्वरे-च्छ्या परमेश्वरे स्वधर्मेषु चाज्ञानं संभवत्येव । अज्ञानमपि सत्यमेव, नाज्ञानकल्पितम् ।

(*NS.* p. 64)

That is precisely what the Brahmajñānavāda of Śamkara denies. According to it, it is the Brahman that is really obscured by ignorance and appears as the individual.⁴ Madhva's view has certainly one advantage over it, in that one can understand a finite being suffering from ignorance ; but not an Infinite Independent Brahman. The greatest stumbling block to the Advaitic view is that Ignorance can never invade the Brahman which is both independent and of the nature of self-luminosity and absolute consciousness (*Svaprakāṣajñānasvarūpam*).

1. पराभिज्ञानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ । (*B.S.* iii, 2, 5)

2. मतः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपेहनं च । (*Gītā*, xv, 15). Cf. *Svet. Up.* Vi, 16.

3. Māyā is understood in Madhva's philosophy as the mysterious will of the Lord. (*Madhva, B.S.B.* i, 4, 25). A similar power is ascribed to Ajñāna itself in Advaita : अज्ञानमावरणविद्रमशक्तियोगात् । (*Samksepasārīraka*, i, 20) It is not inconceivable that a Svatana-Cetana should have such a power.

4. Cf. ब्रह्मेवाविद्या संसरति मुच्यते च ॥ (*Bhāmati*)

Madhva rightly points out the weakness and untenability of the monistic theory of bondage¹.

अज्ञातादिलसंवेतुर्धृते न कुतश्चन ।

उपाधिभेदात् घट इति चेत्स स्वभावतः ?

अज्ञानतो वा ? द्वैतस्य सत्यता स्वत एव चेत् । (Up. Kh.)

If Brahman is the only real that is, where and whence can ignorance come in? If it is rendered possible by the intervention of "Upādhi", the question would arise about the Upādhi itself, viz., whether it is a real and essential feature of Brahman or is itself due to an earlier layer of Ignorance. A real Upādhi would annul Monism. To rely on a previous ignorance to create a subsequent Upādhi would give rise to a double fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* and a mutual inter-dependence between Upādhis and ignorance-layers. It is thus impossible to make out any logically intelligible relation between Upādhi and Brahman. It is passing strange that so insuperable a difficulty should have been represented as a point of honor to the Advaita :

द्वैतत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दृष्णम् (Iṣṭasiddhi)

Commenting on Deussen's remarks that "On this question of how ignorance could possibly affect the Brahman, the authors of the Upanisads give us no information", Radhakrishnan writes : "They give no information because no information is possible. It is true no explanation is possible of the rise of the bewildering force of Avidyā, creator of false values, which has somehow come into being, in spite of the eternal and inalienable purity of the original self-existent Brahman" (I. Phil. ii, 578). "How Avidyā and Brahma can co-exist, is just the problem for which we don't have any solution" (p. 577). Such is the solution of the problem of the origin of bondage, in the system of Samkara which is said to be "unmatched for its metaphysical depth and logical power, where thought follows thought naturally, until Advaitism is seen to complete and crown the edifice" (op. cit. ii, 657). The worst that could be said of Madhva's view of the origin of bondage is that it involves God in a benevolent despotism. But Samkara's reduces Brahman to a position of helpless submission to its own ignorance. Certainly, there is much to choose between the two.

1. Cf. नहि कश्चिदपरतंत्रो बन्धनागारं आत्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति ।

(Samkara, B. S. B. ii, 1, 21)

According to Madhva, tho' bondage is *real*, it does not follow that it is eternal and indestructible. The possibility of its termination does not make it any the less real as a fact so long as it lasts. This follows from his definition of real as अनारोपितं प्रभित्विषयः। There is no difficulty either in conceiving of the final disruption of ignorance and bondage as a result of the prolonged effort of the Jivas and the grace of God: तथा विद्यस्यापि बन्धस्य निवृत्तिं वक्ष्यामः। (NS. p. 64). The objection of the Advaita that if bondage were *real* it could not be destroyed suffers from a confusion of ideas; for reality is not always the same as eternal existence. If the Lord wills it, even beginningless (*real*) ignorance can be terminated: अधित्पटनानन्तरैश्चर्युणवान् (NS). The Monist could not appeal to any such mysterious power of God, as self-delusion, thro' Ajñāna, is hardly a sign of independence and sovereignty of Brahman.

The essence of such a theory is that it is realistic. It is not obliged to dismiss any stage of bondage as unreal. It accepts the *kartrtva* (doership) and *bhoktrtva* (enjoyership) of Jivas as actually existing in them, tho' dependent on God (B. S. ii, 3, 33). But instead of realizing that these capacities of Jivas are derived from the Supreme Being, the Jivas, in their ignorance, look upon them as self-derived. *This is Avidyā*. Such Avidyā is real, both in itself and as pertaining to the self. Similar is the case with *buddhi*, the senses, bodies and their objects of enjoyments. These are also as much real as anything else; but God-given. We, however, in our ignorance, look upon them as entirely under our control and as our 'possessions'. The fact, however, is that they are 'our possessions', subject to the Lord's wish. बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरविषयाः स्वरूपसन्त एव ईश्वरवशा अपि अविश्वादिवशात् आत्मीयतया अध्यस्थन्ते। परायत्तात्मीयतापि अस्त्येव ॥ (NS. p. 26). These various 'possessions', tho' essentially different from the essence of selfhood are not apprehended by the selves as clearly and vividly distinguished from 'self', on account of intimate permeation of the self in the body and on account of deep attachment to these. Hence on account of their inextricable association, the self comes to regard them as his very own and is affected by their effects in terms of regarding himself as fortunate or unfortunate and having a feeling of elation or shrinking of his personality as a result. This leads to love and aversion and similar pairs of opposites of feelings in successive efforts to seek what is agreeable and avoid

what is disagreeable in the embodied state. Every successive step is thus directed by this misplaced sense of values. This is the essence of what is known as *Samsāra*, leading to countless births and deaths in the cycle of life. It is only true knowledge of the soul's relation to God that can redeem it from this bondage. The true and final explanation of bondage is, thus, the will of the Lord and not merely, Karma, *Ajñāna*, *Kāla*, *Guṇas* etc.

The objection that Dr. Chandradhar Sharma raises in his *Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (London, 1960), against Rāmānuja's theory of bondage : " if the soul is essentially pure and changeless and self-conscious subject, why should it get associated with Karma and be bound? If the soul is tinged with Karma, it is already bound. Rāmānuja explains this difficulty by the conception of a beginningless *Samsāra*. But if you have to fall back on something beginningless why not admit the beginningless *Avidyā*? " (*Op. cit.* p. 371) cannot apply to Madhva. For Madhva has gone beyond Rāmānuja in tracing the origin of bondage, ultimately to the Divine will, for reasons which will be made clear presently. Credit goes to Madhva for realizing that neither Karma nor *Ajñāna* can be the ultimate explanation of the origin of bondage of souls :

न च कर्मविमामलकालगुणप्रसूतीशमचित्तु तद्वियतः ।

(*Dvādaśa-Stotra*)

unless such *Ajñāna* is understood in terms of *Svabhāvājñāna* as defined by Madhva. The acceptance of *Viśeṣas* in the nature of the *Jivas*, by Madhva, is a convincing explanation of the difficulty raised against the 'pure, changeless self-conscious subject becoming associated with Karma and becoming bound' by the Divine will. Dr. Chandradhar Sharma is very much mistaken if he thinks that falling back on beginningless *Avidyā* will be a panacea which will cure all his ills. For both Karma and *Avidyā* are equally insentient principles and cannot imprison or obscure the self on their own initiative. It is conceivable that the finite and ever-dependent souls can be subjected to temporary and partial obscuration of their full nature by the Divine will. But the other theory of monism that the Infinite and Independent Brahman itself deludes Itself by throwing the veil of concealment over its own being :

स्वाज्ञानकल्पितजगत्प्रमेश्वरत्वजीवत्वमेदकल्पीकृतभूमाभावा ।

स्वाभाविकस्वमहिमस्थितिरस्तमोहा प्रत्यक्षचित्तिर्विजयते भुवनैक्योनिः ॥

(*Samkṣepasārīraka*, i, 2).

and becomes the empirical ego, to which Chāndradhar Sharma evidently subscribes is, surely, not more convincing logically! For he himself agrees that "the 'why' and the 'how' regarding Avidyā are illegitimate questions and therefore an insoluble mystery!" (*op. cit.* p. 281).

Madhva calls his view of the origin of bondage as "Svabhāvajñānavāda" or the theory of the souls' ignorance of their true nature and of their dependence on the Supreme: स्वस्य भावो धर्मः पारंत्र्यादिः । तद्विषयकमज्ञानं जीवस्य इति वादः "स्वभावाज्ञानवादः" (*NS.* p.64). The term "Svabhāva", here, has been explained by Jayatirtha *in six different ways*. The first explanation is as given above. The second takes "Svabhāva" to mean what is in fact and what is not imagined by ignorance. On this view, Ajñāna which is the cause of the soul's bondage exists in reality and is not merely something which is imagined to exist. Thirdly, "Svabhāva" signifies, "Independent Being" or God; fourthly, the Jīva's own nature of metaphysical dependence. Thus, "Ajñāna" of the true nature of God and of one's own dependence is "Svabhāvajñāna." It is also explained as "Ajñāna" that is induced *in the Jīva by the Independent Being i. e. God*¹.

Madhva contends that even tho' the Jīva is a self-luminous being, still, it is *not inconceivable* that he should become subject to ignorance of his own true nature and of the nature of God and of his own true relation to Him, as he is a dependent and finite being. The difficulty of the incompatibility of ignorance obscuring certain aspects of a self-luminous being, which would arise in Brahmājñānavāda will *not arise in this theory*; for the Jīvas are here, by definition, "Asvatantra" and also "Sa-viśeṣa" (with aspects). It is with the help of such "Viśeṣas" that while some aspects of the self (like its existence) are unobscured, yet others like ānanda are obscured. *This is*

1. Cf. (i) तथा स्वयमेव भवत्यस्तीति स्वभावो नाज्ञानकल्पित इति यावत् (ii) स्वश्वासौ भावश्वेति स्वभावो जीवः तदाश्रितं तदावरणं चाज्ञानमिति वादः स्वभावाज्ञानवादः । (iii) स्वः स्वतन्त्रो भावः परमात्मा । स्वस्य भावो धर्मः पारंत्र्यादिर्वा स्वभावः । तद्विषयमज्ञानं जीवस्य इति वादः स्वभावाज्ञानवादः । (iv) तथा स्वभावमूलमेव अज्ञानं, न मिथ्या, इति वादः । (v) तथा स्वभावेन स्वतन्त्रेण परमेश्वरेण अज्ञानं जीवस्य इति वादः ॥ (*NS.* p. 64 b.)

where Madhva's theory has an advantage over the Advaitic theory of the "nirviśeṣatva" of the Ātman. On the "nirviśeṣatva"-view of the ātman (or Brahman) the obscuration would be simply inexplicable and inconceivable (दुर्घटम्)¹.

Dr. Chandradhar Sharma dismisses the arguments by which the Sāṃkhyas and Rāmānuja have tried to establish the quantitative pluralism of the spirit as "flimsy" (*Op. cit.* p. 168) and reaching not beyond the empirical egos "whose individuality nobody denies" (p. 369). It is true that a quantitative pluralism of transcendental subjects cannot be derived as a logical conclusion from the concept of Puruṣas in the Sāṃkhya system as stereotyped, indifferent and inactive beings, who take no real part in the cosmic drama. But this cannot be said of Rāmānuja's theory of selves, in which the Puruṣas are active self-conscious individuals participating wholeheartedly in the struggle of life for their deliverance from bondage. No doubt, monistic idealism thinks that there will be inconsistency in holding one and the same individual to be subject to actual bondage and suffering in the beginning and achieving freedom from suffering later on in the state of Mokṣa. But as these two states of bondage and blessedness are not coexistent or simultaneous, there is no inconsistency or violation of the principle of non-contradiction, in both being real states of the individual. The contradiction is purely imaginary. There is only a temporary obstruction of the capacities of the individual in bondage and this obscuration is a reality and a fact and is caused by the Divine will and its removal too is as much due to the same Divine will. This is obviously the opinion of the Sūtrakāra :

पराभिद्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो द्वयस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ (B.S. iii, 2,5.)

The idealist, on the other hand, is only trying to run away from the problem by dismissing the very problem as an illusion. It is difficult to see how Svājñānavāda of Ātman or Brahman allowing itself to be deluded by Avidyā and getting finitized into empirical egos and fighting mock battles to regain its forgotten status is a better hypothesis than that of realistic pluralism. There is, however, one weak point in Rāmānuja's theory of selves that they are only numerically different, but otherwise essentially alike. Difference and distinction constitute individuality. If

1. Cf. दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दृष्णम् ।

कथंचित् घटसानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi)

the selves are essentially the same, in every respect, there is no meaning in their quantitative plurality. A difference is no difference unless it *makes a difference*. Madhva removes this anomaly by laying equal emphasis on quantitative and qualitative differences among them. The doctrine may be "peculiar" to Madhva; but it is, nevertheless, quite essential for a reasoned theory of pluralistic realism and it is the failure to accept it that constitutes a logical inconsistency in the case of the Jainas, the Sāṃkhyas and Rāmānuja. Even the most merciless critic of Madhva must admit that Madhva is utterly consistent in accepting the quantitative and the qualitative pluralism of souls. We fail to understand why the critics who have been quick to point out the inconsistency in the position of the Sāṃkhyas and Rāmānuja should not have expressly noted the improvement made by Madhva, in this respect.

CHAPTER XXXIII

PLURALITY OF SELVES AND THEIR SVARŪPA-BHEDA

The glaring inequalities of equipment, endowments and rewards of life have rightly been made the starting point of the presumption of the plurality of selves by the Sāṃkhyas :

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमाद्युगपत्रवृत्तेष्व ।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ (*Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, 18.)

This stock argument emphasized by the Sāṃkhyas and Rāmānuja has been sought to be dismissed as proving nothing more than the plurality of the empirical ego "whose individuality nobody denies". Madhva shows the fallacy of this argument by showing that we have to arrive inductively at some fundamental bases of distinctions among souls taking empirical facts into consideration. Empirical facts and empirical egos cannot be laughed out of existence. They have to be reckoned with. Philosophy is concerned as much with the problem of our genesis as with that of our future and destiny. We have to see if empirical facts can or do throw any light on the 'how' of Samsāra. How have empirical differences arisen? By themselves or by earlier empirical ones and they by yet others *ad infinitum*? Do they presuppose or go back upon something that is fundamental? Can all the complex variations and differences in the psycho-physical, mental and spiritual lives of beings be explained without going back upon intrinsic and fundamental differences in the essence of beings, with the help of the Law of Karma alone or of the theory of beginninglessness (*anāditva*) of Samsāra? That the theory of Avidyā is an illegitimate intrusion into Hindu religion and metaphysics is clear from the fact that even in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa only the two theories of Karma and Anāditva of Samsāra have been mooted as legitimate explanations of the divergences in life. These two theories of Karma and Anāditva of Samsāra presuppose the reality of existing differences among selves and try to explain them on some real and more fundamental bases. But neither the law of Karma nor the Anāditva of

Samsāra will be consistent with a repudiation of the present differences as really superimposed ones.. The impression that the law of Karma and the anāditva of Samsāra are merely empirical explanations is due to an incapacity to understand their real and true significance in throwing light on empirical differences. This point comes out clearly in Madhva's interpretation of the law of Karma as applied to the explanation of empirical differences. The inexorable law of Karma is commonly taken to be the final explanation of these inequalities in the lives of beings. But, it will break down as an ultimate explanation of cosmic differences, unless it is admitted that these differences themselves are in principle rooted ultimately in the nature of beings. This is the decisive contribution which Madhva has made to the interpretation of the problem of life and its diversities. He has thus gone beyond the principle of Karma, unerringly, to the "Svabhāvabhedā" (intrinsic or essential differences in the nature of beings). No other philosopher, in the East or in the West, has done this. Herein lies the boldness, originality and thoroughness of Madhva's approach to philosophical problems. He does not stop at any half-way house on the philosophical road to Truth.

It is interesting to note that starting from another angle, Prof. Albert Schweitzer, also, comes to the same conclusion as Madhva, in his interesting work : *Indian Thought and Its Development* : " How do individual souls come into existence from the Universal soul and how are they reabsorbed into it * * * * The doctrine of reincarnation in no way requires the assumption that the individual souls have issued from the Universal soul and will return to it again. Indeed, it can do nothing with it. For this doctrine, the most natural thing is simply to start from the fact that in a way which cannot be further explained, all through eternity, there have been an endless number of eternal individual souls (which constitute the spiritual element in the Universe), for which is prescribed the passing of a constantly renewed existence in the world of senses,¹

1. With this compare Madhva's *Svabhāvajñānavāda*.

until finally they succeed in winning freedom from it. And what need is there to regard liberation from the cycle of rebirth and return of the soul into the Universal soul as equivalent? The doctrine of reincarnation has no interest whatever in asserting such an inexplicable thing as that the individual soul, in the end, *loses its individuality*.¹ It is sufficient for it to establish the fact that as a result of the freedom attained, the soul is in a state of perfect bliss" (*Op. cit.* p. 61)— Italics mine.

Karma implies freedom of choice to do right or wrong, good or bad. But it does not explain *why a particular choice alone has been made*, in preference to another. This is the crux of the moral problem. We are willynilly thrown back on the hypothesis of innate distinctions of nature among the selves (*Svarūpabhedā*), in the ultimate analysis of this question. All other explanations break down in the end. The inequalities of Karma do not carry us very far. It is therefore, only a half-truth to say that it is thro' different Karma that men are not all alike. It simply begs the question and lands us in an anterior distinction of natures, aptitude or outlook. However beginningless the chain of Karma may be, it is still incapable of explaining why a particular course of action has been pursued in preference to another, without reference to an ultimate difference in the nature of the moral agent. Even a beginningless chain of Karma could not fully *explain* why all souls are not equally good or bad, when all of them are equally eternal, their Karmas too, equally beginningless *and their start also, simultaneous*. Karma has no self-contained answer to give to this question. It is itself the effect of something else. Desire is the seed of action. This desire or inclination must then be admitted to differ in each case to such an inscrutable extent as to render diversity of natures and activities intelligible. If all souls are constituted *absolutely alike*, it would be impossible to account for the different courses of action pursued by them as a result of which, they accumulate a heavy load of Karmas, thro' ages. If these inequalities of endowments, opportunities and rewards are to be made consistent with freedom and freewill of souls, they must be attributed to an essential distinction in

1. Cf. बन्धमिथ्यात्वं नैव मुक्तिरपेक्षते (AV)

their very nature and constitution. The plurality of souls cannot therefore, be explained with reference to the material plane alone, as it would not explain the difficulties involved in the theory of *anādi-karma*, unless these distinctions are proposed to be dismissed as *not ultimate*. But this is running away from the problem and not solving it. As Jayatirtha points out, the Sāṃkhyā doctrine of plurality of selves really suffers from this basic defect : यत्पुरुषग्रहुत्वं साङ्ख्येनांगीकृतं तदपि मायावादिभेरस्युपगतमेव । न तु स्वरूपे कथितस्मिन परस्परतो विशेषः । (*NS.* p. 328). If plurality is to be ultimate, it must be grounded on something more than Prākṛtic vestures and influences, *including Karma*. No doctrine of plurality of selves that shies at this logical decision to ground it upon a principle of innate distinction of essence among selves and invariable concomitance of natural selection of good or bad which that would lead to, could ever hope to give a solution that would be consistent with pure reason. The same is the weakness of Rāmānuja's position. According to him, there is no basic distinction of Svarūpavisheshas, among souls, in the sense of a qualitative gradation of properties of *jñāna*, *ānanda*, character and inclination. All are equally endowed in every respect. There is no distinction of measure. Madhva objects to this on the ground that multiplicity without distinction (of essence) would be inconceivable, particularly among Cetanas. Sameness or equality of essence does not rule out individual variations (in an infinite scale) which may be too subtle to be obvious. But such underlying variation of degrees *must be recognized* to exist, if plurality of selves is to have any real meaning or justification. However much they may be alike, there can be no absolute likeness in all respects between any two beings in creation. If there is, they would be identical and not merely *similar* to each other. Difference in essence is thus bound up with the idea of fundamental peculiarity. In the case of physical or material objects, it is possible to distinguish between likes on the basis of difference in organization of parts or atoms. But in respect of spiritual entities like souls, which are impartible wholes, there is no way to account for multiplicity except thro' an essential tho' mysterious distinction of natures

(*Svarūpabhedā*) or *Svarūpa-viśeṣas* which are not the same in any two individuals. We have to extend the same principle to the Kingdom of Heaven too, on the analogy of Arnold's famous lament on the death of his little daschhund :

" And not in the course
Of all centuries yet to come,
And not the infinite resource
Of Nature with her countless sum
Can ever quite repeat the past
Or just thy little shape restore "¹

To the ordinary passer-by, the sheep may all be just so many *numerable units*; but to the shepherd who lives with them all thro' their lives and in daily contact, they are *real individuals* each with very different features and characteristics. Even so, to Madhva, the Divine Shepherd, who knows all about the constitution of the souls, knows how to distinguish one soul from another, on the basis of essential peculiarities embedded in their natures!

The wide range, then, of deep-rooted inequalities in the lives of the living beings, extending over the human, animal, plant, aquatic and other species of life, could not be satisfactorily explained except on the hypothesis of *intrinsic differences of nature*, expressing themselves in potentialities for good or bad. It is no use, says Madhva, to take refuge against this inescapable fact in so-called disparities of past Karmas shaping the lives of beings. These Karmas are, in fact, conditioned by some sub-conscious influences of past deeds and unseen merit accruing therefrom (*adr̥ṣṭa*); which, again, presupposes an earlier merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) and that another and so on endlessly. We are, thus, ultimately left with a practically beginningless gradation of fitness and potentialities for good or for bad, termed अनादिस्तर्पयोग्यता or natural fitness or हठ by Madhva. (See Chapter XLIII).

1. Quoted from Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 268.

If unseen merit which determines the disparities of Karma is inexplicable and devoid of a reason at any particular stage in history, the same excuse could be trotted out at the outset; so that the very need for a previous birth and belief in metempsychosis could be dispensed with. If this unseen merit recedes in an interminable cycle, we have really a beginningless distinction of essence and potentialities accepted, in a different manner. If such unseen merit is not produced by a previous merit and that by another, but is taken to find its *raison d' être* in the intrinsic nature and worth of each soul, we accept the principle of intrinsic differences among Souls (अनादिस्वरूपोभ्यताभेद), without further ado :

यद्यनादिविशेषो न साप्रतं कथमिष्यते ?

अहश्चेव चाहृष्टं स्तीष्टतं सर्ववादिभिः ।

आकस्मिको विशेषश्वेदट्टप्रे क्वचिदिष्यते ।

सर्वत्राकस्मिकत्वं स्यान्नादप्रोक्षिता क्वचित् ।

अहश्चेदिशेषोऽयमनादित्वं कुतो न तत् ?

(AV. iii, 4, adh. 5-6).

The uniqueness of individual experience (व्यवस्था) and the inequalities of equipment etc, point ultimately to the existence of an inalienable, incommunicable essence of personality which underlies all states of experience and coordinates them into a meaningful whole, which is never seen to be repeated or to overlap in any two cases. It cannot be seriously contended that there is actual overlapping of consciousness in release where all material conditions fall off. Such overlapping would be inconceivable without identity of essence *here and now, also,* and identity of consciousness would render the present multiplicity of personalities, purposeless. If it should be true then, that there is really one individual throughout the Universe, that one being must be in a position to co-ordinate to itself the experience of all other apparently different centres, which is not the case, so far as we are aware (Cf. अनश्चन्योऽभिचाक्षीति). Moreover, all selves struggling for freedom should get automatically released, the moment a single centre gets switched off from the main. *The very existence of both freed and bound souls at the same time*

is a proof of their distinction and plurality : संसारिण्युक्तव्यवस्थया च भेदः सिद्धः । न् च कोऽपि मुक्तो नास्तीति प्रलापो युक्तः । (*Vādaratnāvali*, ii).

The theory of Svarūpabhedā of Souls elaborated by Madhva is, thus, the only solution of the agelong problem of plurality of selves, their freedom and freewill. Questions like the following have been asked by thinkers, all the world over :- “ The Jīva was not created of a void, at a particular time. But he is, nevertheless, an expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect while his archetype is also the type of perfection ? ” St. Augustine’s agony of soul was still more poignant : “ Who made me ? Did not God who is not only good but goodness itself ? Whence then, came I to will evil and nill good, so that I am thus justly punished ? Who set this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was made wholly of my most sweet God ? ” (*Confess*, Bk. VII, 4; 5). The question is answered by Madhva, under *B. S.* ii, 3, 51 : प्रतिविज्ञानां मिथो वैचित्र्ये कारणमाह— अद्यानियमादिति । अनादिविद्याकर्मादिवैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यम् ! on the basis of a fundamental difference in beginningless Karma, Vidyā etc., which rest ultimately upon an intrinsic difference in *nature*. This interpretation is clearly endorsed by Rāghavendra Svāmin : स्वरूपेषाधिवैचित्र्यस्यैव ‘अद्यानियम’ पदेनाभिशेतत्वात् । विवृत-मेतत् चन्द्रिकायाम् । (*Bhāvadīpa*, p. 224 b). This above is an original and suggestive interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra* in question by the Mādhwā school. It goes beyond the commonly accepted theory of Karma for an ultimate solution of the problem of distinction and inequality among souls. And the solution given is much more definite and precise than the vague one of ‘original sin’, which would not be adequate as an explanation of inequality of nature.

It is, thus, in the nature of some souls to will evil and nill good and of others to will good and nill evil. Yet others there may be of mixed nature and these, in the language of Hume, will be “ neither good enough for a supper, nor bad enough for a drubbing ”. These will correspond to the “ Nitya-samsārins ” of Madhva. It is thus only a half-truth to say that “ freedom is the cause of our doing evil ” (Augustine). The question must inevitably arise as to *why*, when one is “ free ” to will good and nill evil, one does the *contrary* ? Not because one has *free will* ! For, the same will might

have suggested to him the other course ! That it has *not done so* must depend on *something more fundamental and foundational to the nature of the individual*. *That something*, says Madhva, *is the core of the individual*,—his *Svabhāva*. It will be difficult to dispute the ruthless logic of this contention, however distasteful to one's *amour propre* the conclusion may be. The tripartite classification of souls, put forward by Madhva, is only a comprehensive theory embodying the same idea of Svarūpabhedā and giving it a definite shape in the form of a broad generalization. It will be dealt with in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIV

RATIONAL BASIS OF INTRINSIC GRADATION AMONG SOULS AND THEIR TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION

Madhva's doctrine of the Soul insists not only upon the distinctiveness of each soul but also upon an intrinsic gradation among them based on varying degrees of knowledge, power and bliss. This is known as Tāratamya or Svarūpatāratamya, which comes out all the more clearly in the released state, where the souls realize their true status. This position is peculiar to Madhva and is not found in any other school of Indian philosophy. Together with the allied doctrine of Jīva-traiividhya or tripartite classification of Souls into (1) Muktiyoga (salvable) (2) Nitya-samsārin (ever-transmigrating) and (3) Tamoyogya (damnable), it has come in for a good deal of adverse criticism at the hands of modern scholars.

These criticisms suffer mostly from sentimental bias against Tāratamya and appear to confuse the Mādhva doctrine of Svarūpatraividhya, with the Calvinistic theory of Election, without examining the ethico-philosophical grounds on which the twin theories of Traividhya and Tāratamya are based by Madhva. The theory of Election rests upon a dogmatic exercise of Divine prerogative without reference to the worth or eligibility of the souls chosen for deliverance or damnation. In fact, there is no room for any question of fitness or eligibility of the souls, in the view of Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, that "each soul is specially created and made to vitalize the embryo at the moment of conception"¹. The Mādhva doctrine, on the other hand, is a philosophical theory intended to justify and reconcile the presence of evil with divine perfection, in the only rational way in which it could be done,—by fixing the responsibility for goodness or evil upon the moral freedom born of diversity of nature of the souls who are themselves eternal and un-created in time.

This question has been discussed at length by Alexander Campbell Fraser, in his "*Philosophy of Theism*" (Gifford Lectures, 1894-6). His conclusion affords a striking parallel to the position of Madhva; and it is not unlikely that he would have expressed himself more decidedly in favor of the position taken up by Madhva, had it been known to him. Fraser's analysis of the problem is, therefore, of great interest to us in this connection. Says he :

1. James Ward, *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 453.

"The mixture of good and evil in the Universe is a sure enigma to Theism and a challenge to it. To believe in perfect goodness is to believe that all is as it ought to be and this is destroyed if anything is found existing that ought not to exist, however insignificant the place in which it is found or however rare the occurrence. Pain, error, sin and death are the chief evils in our world. Sin is absolutely evil. Pain is the correlative of pity and sympathy. It is natural and, therefore, a divine means of education of spiritual life. *But the continued presence of what is unconditionally bad cannot be disposed of in this way. How to relieve the mystery of moral evil, including what seems an unfair distribution of pleasure and pain and an unequal adjustment of opportunities for moral growth, has been a human perplexity from the beginning.* [Italics mine]. It finds expression in the Hebrew poets like Job and in the Greek dramatists like Aeschylus. How can it be reconciled with the goodness of God?"

Discussing the merits of three possible solutions of the problem in terms of (1) a Manichean Dualism or (2) an Imperfect Deity; or (3) an Indifferent Power of the Monist, he continues: "that this world of good and evil must be the issue of a constant struggle between two rival and eternal powers, the one benevolent and the other malevolent is an explanation of these strange appearances. This is symbolized in Zoroastrian anthropomorphism of Ormuzd and Ahriman. Its implied subversion of the primary ethical postulate must alone discredit this dualistic hypothesis. A similar difficulty attends Monism which concludes either that the Universal Power is itself a mixed good and evil¹ or that both are unreal. Manichean Dualism in the form of two eternal powers or Monism of a single eternal power partly good and partly evil or else indifferent to good and evil are both inconsistent with the indispensable moral hope and faith.

"Can moral evil be a necessity of finite personality or of the intractableness of matter or a mere negation? Several attempts have been made to explain the fact of evil in a morally governed Universe. Some are conjectures formed at the expense of moral perfection of the Universal Power. Others explain away moral evil as an unconditional necessity of finite existence or treat it as an unreal negation or hide the difficulty by referring to a Tempter".

I. As it would be in the Pantheism of Bhāskara and others.

Then comes the Professor's own view :-

"The question why God *admits* into His Universe what is bad seems to involve an unproved assumption. What ought not to exist, it is assumed, *cannot co-exist* with God. But this dogma has never been proved. As moral agents, persons must be free to originate voluntary acts that are bad or undivine as well as those which are in harmony with the Divine order. To say that if God is perfect, free agents cannot produce volitions that they ought not to is not to vindicate divine perfection, but to destroy it! Omnipotence cannot be power to realize contradictions. God cannot make two and two five; cannot make a square circle. Inability in morally responsible persons to make themselves bad, is *as much a contradiction, tho' less obvious.* If free to act, one must be able to originate evil acts as well. Offences must needs be, if persons exist. It does not appear that even Omnipotence can exclude what ought not to exist, while there are beings whose essential character is that they are able to bring this into existence.

Is the existence of persons who can make and keep themselves bad, *only a transitory episode in the history of the Universe;* or must there be *ever bad persons increasing in number and increasingly bad?* The question is incapable of settlement. That the moral agency of persons, their personal power to depart from their moral ideal, deepened and confirmed by habit may become an absolute final "election" to evil by themselves, which even Omnipotent God cannot overcome, consistent with the free personality of those who persist in keeping themselves undivine, is one conjecture¹. It involves the mystery of existence, in the Divine Universe, of innumerable persons increasing in number and becoming worse.² Another possible view is that such persons and their acts are capable of extinction by God and only morality progresses so that only the good are allowed to survive; those who persist in ungodliness being reduced to unconsciousness³. Perhaps, man's present moral education requires that this mystery should remain unsolved as a teleologically needed mystery" (p. 320-21) – Italics mine.

1. This answers to Madhva's view.

2. Cf. वैमुण्यमेव पश्यन्ति न गुणान्विनियुंजते ।

तेषां तमःशरीराणां तम एव परायणम् ॥ (Mbh. XII, q. by Madhva)

3. Tamoyogyas ?

Judged in the light of these weighty remarks of the Professor, it will be seen that the doctrine of innate distinctions of nature among souls, propounded by Madhva, will have to be recognized as the most necessary presupposition of the Hindu law of Karma which would become a vagarious principle, in the absence of such a basis of distinction of the character and behavior of souls. Sir P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer, in his *Kanala Lectures* (1935, p. 143) comes to very near conceding as much when he admits frankly that "tho' the doctrine of Karma professes to explain the origin of evil and suffering, *it does not really do so*, inasmuch as it involves an infinite regression as expressed in the doctrine that Karma is *anādi*". As for Traividya (threefold classification) of souls, it is only a comprehensive hypothesis based on the same premises. It may not be flattering to human complacency, as the doctrine of Sarvamukti may be; but no spurious or irrelevant considerations should be allowed to interfere with reasoned metaphysical investigations, which should be carried on in an atmosphere free from all passion and prejudice and from personal and sentimental predilections. "We want hard and straight thinking and not soft or emotional or sentimental thinking. Philosophy should say what is true. *It does not matter whether it pleases or irritates.* It must prove logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs, pious wishes and pleasing imaginings. It would be unphilosophical to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality"¹. If there is a possibility of moral and social paragons, it is equally possible to hold that there may be persons who act on the motto 'Evil, be thou my good' and such Satanic conduct could only merit eternal misery.

The doctrine of intrinsic gradation among souls would follow as a matter of course, once the principle of their plurality is admitted, as in the system of Rāmānuja. Much more so when the prerogatives of God are not claimed for the released souls and certain irrevocable limitations are set to their sovereignty in release and so long as God is put down as the inner guide (*Antaryāmī* and *Śesi*) of the souls, who are subject to His control (*niyāmya*). If the souls attain to a position of absolute equality with the Supreme, in release, it would be difficult to find a rational basis for the stupendous difference between them and God, when they, the souls, had still been in bondage, suffering the worst miseries, while the

1. Radhakrishnan, *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1920, pp. 13-14.

Supreme remains untouched by evil and suffering. The Rāmānujīyas, who posit a reciprocal dependence between the souls and God and claim that the joy of Brahman is enhanced every time a new soul, attains release and comes to It,¹ could hardly deny that the bliss of Brahman and of all the released souls, at any time, will be several times more than that of any of the souls still weltering in Samsāra. But what could be there to justify such a vast difference between them, if their original and basic nature are the same? Why should some souls alone get released *ages before the others* and enjoy communion with Brahman for a considerably longer period than the rest? Why should the others lag behind or be denied the opportunities and advantages, *so long*? If the fault be that of the later arrivals in Mokṣa, why should they have been delayed so long? All explanations of such difficulties, based on Karma would be unavailing in the absence of an ultimate appeal to the diversity and gradation of essence. Why should God alone be Independent and the souls dependent *for ever* on Him? Why should the Brahman be for ever exempt from the ills of Samsāra and the Jīvas alone consigned to suffering, at least for the time being? What law of nature could this be, if it is not one of Svarūpa-tāratamya between two sentient beings, God and the human soul? Why, again, should the Brahman alone be unlimited in space (*aparicchinna, vibhu*) and the Jīvas put down (in Rāmānuja's view) as essentially atomic in size (*aṇu*)? These and other essential distinctions between Jīva and Brahman, naturally, imply some kind of an intrinsic superiority of the One over the other, i. e. to say, Svarūpa-tāratamya. It would be preposterous to say that the Jīvas, who realize their essence by the grace of God, manage somehow to shoot up to a position of absolute equality with the Universal King, overnight. Such a position would be not only blasphemous but would offend all logic and common-sense. It will also be a betrayal of the spirit of religion inculcated by the Scriptures :

न ते विष्णो जायमानो न जातो देव महिम्नः परमन्तमाप।

(R. V. vii, 99, 2).

न तत्समोऽस्त्यभ्यधिकः कुतोऽन्यः (Gītā, xi 43).

न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दद्यते (Śvet Up. vi, 8).

1. Vide the passage from *Nītimālā* quoted on p. 17, fn.

The recognition of a special class of souls called "Nityasūris" who are *ex hypothesi* exempt from Samsāra, for ever, like God Himself, in the system of Rāmānuja, not to speak of the recognition of a class of "Nityasamsārins"¹ also, by a section of the followers of Rāmānuja, will be similarly inexplicable without the acceptance of an intrinsic gradation of souls into ordinary and "elect" and so on. The higher position of Sesītva to Śrī *vis a vis* the Nityasūris, would also point to a natural gradation among souls.

The classification of souls into human and divine (*deva*) in Hindu religious literature is no passing show based on Karmic disparities only. The *Brahmasūtras* recognize the gods as a set of specialized beings and discuss the question of their privileges. One Śruti text refers to the presence in the state of release of "earlier batches of Sādhyās (*muktas* ?) who are Devas"². As already mentioned, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins recognize the existence of Nityamuktas like Viśvaksena, Garuḍa, Ananta etc. who always remain free from Samsāra, that entangles other souls. The Vedic and Purāṇic literature assign to the four-faced Brahmā a very high place among the gods, not only as the Creator of all but as the first-born son of the Supreme Being and as the Saviour of mankind :

यो ब्रह्माण विदधाति पूर्वं यो वै वेदांथं प्राह्णोति तरम् (*Svet. Up.* vi, 18).

स एनस्माजजीवघनात् परात्परं पुण्यमिक्षते (*Praśna Up.* v, 2).

स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयन्ति (*Chān. Up.* iv, 15,6)

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुण्य उच्यते ।

आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्माप्ये समवर्तत ॥ (q. by Śāṅkara).

In the *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 1) the released souls are said to realize all their desires "in company with the wise Brahmā." This is supported by a Purāṇic text quoted by many commentators on *B. S.* iv, 3, 11 :

1. Cf. इह सदूय्याः परे च केचित् आहुः इतः पूर्वमिव पश्चादपि केचिच्च मोक्ष्यन्ते 'एकं पादं नोद्वरति' । 'क्षिपास्यजह्नमग्नान् । 'मामप्राप्यैव' इत्यादिभिरेतत् सिद्धम् । (*Tattvamuktāhalāpa*, *Vedānta Deśika*, *Medical Hall Press*, Banaras, p. 138).

2. यत्र पूर्वं साध्याः सन्ति देवाः ।

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्रोस प्रतिसंचरे ।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ॥

In this and in another text : 'स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति' the four-faced Brahmā is given a premier position as the Great Usher of the released souls into the presence of the Supreme, as their Saviour and Guide. In fact, all other souls, who have attained enlightenment in the course of a particular Brahmakalpa, are believed to bide their time and wait for the four-faced Brahmā to be released and to conduct them to the Kingdom of God. This role of Brahmā is a striking proof of his spiritual excellence and superiority over all other souls. Such a distinction in rank must necessarily confer on him some kind of extraordinary merit, not found in or attainable by the others. This pre-eminent position of Brahmā as the presiding deity of Mahat-tattva or the first evolute of Matter, is indisputable. We are told that such special merit of his lies in his being "intrinsically" endowed with four great excellences :

ज्ञानमप्रतिष्ठं यस्य वैरांश्च च जगत्पते ।
ऐश्वर्यं चैव धर्मश्च सहसिद्धं चतुष्प्रथम् ॥

Similar excellences possessed by other Devas of the Hindu pantheon and references to the marvels of spiritual discipline attained by them, oblige Madhva to formulate a comprehensive theory of intrinsic gradation in the entire Cosmos,¹ upon which the whole of reality is grounded in a scheme of graded and graduated order. This cosmic scheme of gradation is omnipenetrative, says Madhva, running up and down the scale from the highest of gods to the vilest of fiends :

अनादियोग्यतां चैव कलिवाणीश्वरावधिम् ।
को निवारयितुं शक्तो युक्त्यागमबलोद्भासु ? (AV. p. 48 b.).

Gods and men are not equal in their basic nature and powers or in the innate tendencies for good or bad, which determine their future development.² This doctrine of intrinsic gradation of souls is thus a reasonable hypothesis of human nature and destiny, suggested by the moral law and supported by reason, revelation and experience.

1. इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा हर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च पंरमनः (Katha Up.).

2. न ह वै देवान् पापं स्वृशाति (U.P.).

"Evolution is not only a movement forward. In many cases, we observe a marking of time and still more often, a deviation or turning back. It must be so".¹ Individual development, according to Madhva, is only an unfolding or an unwrapping. The progressive differentiation of selves into one or the other of the three classes is contained in the germ and embedded in the being of each. This reminds us of the Leibnizian theory of pre-established harmony. Taking a comprehensive view of human nature in all its aspects, we find that some men are intrinsically good and some are intrinsically bad and the rest,—perhaps the vast majority of us,—are midway between the two; tho' it would be impossible to assign any individual to a particular class without superhuman insight into his fundamental nature. We could however draw a generalization of the basis of the consolidated experience of humanity that all men are not alike and there are many orders of goodness, intelligence and ability among them, as also of evil, ignorance and weakness. We can't gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. Even so, every good tree brings forth good fruit and every corrupt tree brings forth evil fruit. Adam and Eve succumbed to the temptation of Satan; but Christ thrice said "no" to his Tempter. History and the national Epics of every land are replete with the records of the highest acts of purity, benevolence and self-sacrifice, of ordinary kindness and diabolical cruelty and fiendishness. We must, therefore, take a full view of human nature at its best and at its worst and adjudge its nature and destiny, uninfluenced by sentimental considerations. Taking, then, the immense and irreducible diversities of life into consideration, Madhva holds that we could not satisfactorily account for the presence and continuation of evil in a world created and ruled by a most perfect Being unless it is taken to be natural to some as goodness is to others. Without such a fundamental division of human nature, the disparities of life reflected in the seemingly unfair distribution of pleasure and pain and opportunities for moral growth are not satisfactorily explained. X is a millionaire's son who rides a Rolls Royce merrily, while Y the pauper scowls jealously at him as he flies past and grinds his teeth at the injustice of Fate. The light of law and religion

1, Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 109.

have not yet penetrated many dark corners of the world, inhabited by barbarous tribes, while they shine brightly on more fortunate beings elsewhere. Why? The law of Karma could not carry us very far, in the quest for an ultimate explanation of such bewildering inexplicabilities. It cannot explain why, given two alternatives of good or evil, certain persons show a marked tendency towards the one and others to its opposite. Moral worth, knowledge, works, experience, heredity, opportunities, culture,—none of these explanations of diversity solves the riddle pushed to its starting point. The final solution could only be found in the inherent nature of beings. It is the magnetic needle which attracts and deflects the Karma of souls according to its own currents and gives the first move to their career :

न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सज्जति प्रभुः ।

न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते ॥ (*Gitā*)

It would, therefore, be illogical to dismiss the theories of Svarūpabhedā, Tāratamya and Traividhya of Jīvas, on extra-philosophical and emotional grounds. Criticisms such as that “on this view of Predestination, the moral character of God is much compromised and the quality of divine love emptied of all meaning” and that “unless we believe in the spiritual possibility of everyone that bears the human form divine, we cannot have a really useful ethics” (*Radhakrishnan, I. Phil.* ii, p. 751.) not only betray the very weakness to indulge in “soft and emotional thinking” and to attempt to refute a hypothesis “by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality”¹; but also an incorrect understanding of the true nature and bearing of the doctrine of Traividhya of Jīvas taught by Madhvā and the premises on which it rests. After all, philosophy has to say what is true. It does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. The doctrine of Traividhya is no doubt an unpleasant truth, uncomfortable to some. That cannot be helped. As Prof. Thilly says: “The mere fact that a theory

1. Against which the Professor himself has spoken in his *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, quoted ante.

leaves no room for freewill, immortality or God, does not make it false, even tho' belief in such ideas should happen to help us over the dismal places in life¹. A gloomy truth is a better companion thro' life than a cheerful falsehood" (such as Sarvamukti?). It would be irrational to discredit the intellect because its conclusions are not flattering to the future of *homo sapiens*, in all cases or because it does "not give us the world we want, or the heaven we want or the God we want". "The diremost need", as Prof. Thilly has shown, "cannot make black white, tho' it may persuade us to paint it white"!

1. Quoted in the above-mentioned work, p. 14.

CHAPTER XXXV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE OF INTRINSIC GRADATION
AMONG SOULS

Madhva and his commentators have cited many texts from the Vedic and post-Vedic literature, in support of the acceptance of the Traividhya among Jivas. It will be enough to indicate only the most obvious and prominent of these, in which the doctrine is clearly discernible or has been expressly taught. The passages point clearly to the prevalence of a religious tradition in which the doctrine was accepted and handed down and which other currents of thoughts were unable to expurgate altogether.

Texts from Vedic Literature

1. खले न पर्षान् प्रतिहन्मि भूरि
कि मा निदन्ति शत्रवोऽनिन्द्राः । (R. V. X, 48,7)
2. शृण्वे वीरं उग्रसुग्रं दयायन्
अन्यमन्यमति नेनीयमानः ।
एषमानद्विलुभयस्य राजा
चोष्कूयते विश इन्द्रो मनुष्यान् ॥ (R. V. vi, 47, 16)
3. परा पूर्वेण सख्या वृणकित
वितर्तुराणो अपरेभिरेति ।
अनानुभूतीरवधून्वानः
पूर्वीरिन्द्र शरदस्तर्तीति ॥ (R. V. vi, 47, 17)
4. दिवे दिवे सदशीरन्यमध्यम् । (RV. vi, 47, 21)
5. अनारम्भणे तमसि प्रविष्यतम् । (R. V. i, 182, 6)
6. इन्द्रासोमा तपतं रक्ष उज्जतं
न्यपैयते वृषणा तमोवृद्धः ।
पराशृणीतमन्विते न्योषतं

हृतं नुदेथां निशिसीतमत्विणः ॥ (*R. V.* vii, 104,1)

7. इन्द्रासोमा वर्तयतं दिवस्परि

अभितसेभिर्युवमश्महन्माभिः ।

* * *

तपुर्वधेभिरज्जेभिरत्विणः ॥ (*R. V.* vii, 104,5)

8. असुर्या नाम ते लोका अन्येन तमसा वृताः (*Isā. Up.*)

9. सैषा आनन्दस्य भीमांसा भवति * * * ते ऐ शतं मातुषा आनन्दाः ।

स एको मनुष्यगन्धर्वाणामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य

चाकामहतस्य । * * * श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य * * (*Taitt. Up.* ii. 8).

10. एकं पादं नोद्धरति ।

Post-Vedic Literature

11. दैवी संपद्मोक्षाय निबन्धायासुरी मता (*Gītā.* xvi,5)

12. द्वौ भूतसर्गौ लोकेऽस्मिन् दैव आसुर एव च (xvi. 6)

13. मामप्राप्यैव कौन्तेय ततो यात्यधर्मा गतिम् (xvi, 20)

14. ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति सत्स्वस्था अधो गच्छन्ति तामसाः (xiv, 18)

15. त्रिविधा भवति श्रद्धा देहिनां सा स्वभावजा ।

सात्त्विकी राजसी चैव तामसी च ॥ (xvii, 2)

16. * * * यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः (xvi, 3)

17. मुक्तानामपि सिद्धानां नारथणपरायणः ।

सुदुर्लभः प्रशान्तात्मा कोटिष्वपि महासुने ॥ (*Bhāg.*)

18. दुङ्गेयं घोररूपस्य त्रैलोक्यच्छिनः प्रभोः ।

देवतैर्मुनिभिः सिद्धैः * * * ॥

19. एकात्मं नाम यदिदं केचिद्दूयुरनेपुणाः ।
शास्त्रतत्त्वमविज्ञाय शास्त्राणां शास्त्रदर्शवः ।
तेषां तमःशरीराणां तम एव परायणम् ॥ (*Mbh.* xii)
20. नित्यदुःखं सुसंपूर्णं निरस्तानन्दमव्ययम् ।
तमो यान्त्यन्यथाज्ञानात् द्वेषाद्वा हरितंश्रयात् ॥
(*Paramasamhitā* q. *BT.* x, p. 73 b)

21. नारायणप्रसादेन समिद्भजानचक्षुषा ।
अत्यन्तुःखसंलीनान् निःशेषसुखवर्जितान् ॥
नित्यमेव तथाभूतान् विमिश्रांश्च गणान् बहून् ।
निरस्तारोष्टुःखांश्च नित्यानन्दैकभौगिनः ।
अपश्यत्त्रिविधात् ब्रह्मा साक्षादेव चतुर्सुखः ॥
(*Pādma*, q. *Madhva, B. S. B.* iii, 1, 21)

22. जीवास्तु त्रिविधा राजन नानाकाराः स्वभावतः ।
सात्त्विका मुक्तिभाजः स्युस्तामसास्तु तमोऽनुगाः ।
मध्यमाः संसूतौ नित्यं ऊर्ध्वाधःपरिवर्तिनः ॥
(*Viṣṇu-Rahasya*, xxxiii)

23. एवं सात्त्विकमध्यस्थतामसान् त्रिविधानर्थः ।
सृजत्यर्थात् हन्तीशो लीलया भक्तवत्सलः ॥
(*Viṣṇu-Rahasya*, Ch. V)

The existence of a class of "Nityasamsārins", as already mentioned, has been accepted in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition¹ also and

1. See Pt 209, f. n. The "Sayuthyas" are most probably the Tengalai-Vaiśnavas. There is no reference in the writings of modern scholars on Indian Philosophy, to the acceptance of this peculiar position re. the classification of Souls, in the ancient tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school itself. Dr. Chandradhar Sharma's *A Critical Survey of I. Phil.* (London, 1960) is no exception to this.

by some early *Naiyāyikas* too, as indicated by Jayatīrtha in his *NS* : नियसंसारिणां केवाचित्सत्त्वस्य तैरपर्यग्नीकृतवात्, समर्थयेद्यमाणवाच् (*NS*. iii, 3, p. 547). जीवात्मपक्षीकारे संसार्यैकस्वभावानां जीवानां स्वयमेवोर्प्रीकृतव्येन, तत्र बाधात् (*NS*. p. 548 b). The references, according to the commentators, are to the view of Udayanācārya: संसार्यैकस्वभावाः केविदात्मानः । We also have it on the authority of Citsukha that certain Vaiśeṣika thinkers like Kandalikāra (i. e. Śrīdhara) and Līlavatikāra held the view of *nityasamsāra* for some souls : कन्दलीकारप्रभृतिभिः कैविद्वैशेषिकविशेषैः सर्वमुक्तोरनंगीकारात् ॥ (*Citsukhī*, p. 357).

The doctrine of Traividhya is *not thus an invention of Madhva*. It has the support of Vedic and post-Vedic tradition and is the natural corollary of the doctrine of Svarūpabhedā of souls without which the Hindu doctrine of Karma would have no force or meaning. It is not simply an extension of the Sāṃkhya theory of Traiguṇya or based upon it, as is sometimes *superficially assumed*¹. The three guṇas of Sāṃkhya metaphysics are but the modes of Prakṛti ; whereas the terms Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa applied to the Jivas in their tripartite classification, according to Madhva, have reference to their basic nature of Caitanya going beyond the play of Prakṛti and its gunas : यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः (*Gitā*, xvii, 3). This is clear from Madhva's comment on the above verse, where he interprets the term सत्त्वानुरूपा (सर्वस्य अद्वा) as चित्तानुरूपा which is further and more explicitly rendered by Jayatīrtha as चित्तं चैतन्यं, जीव इति यावत् ॥ (*G. B. Prameyadīpikā*, Xvii, 3).

1. See R. Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, pp. 174, 653 and 664. Cf. “ पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययान्तर्चैव ” (*Sāṃkhya Kārikā*)

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE SOULS' RELATION TO BRAHMAN

Several figures of speech and symbolic expressions have been used in the Sāstras to make clear the relation of metaphysical dependence between the Jivas and Brahman. Commentators have also added some more of their own choice, in interpreting these ideas. Terms like "Rupa-Pratirūpa", "Amsāmśi", "Chāyāpurusa", "Śarīraśarī", "Abhāsa", "Agnivisphulinga" occur in the original texts. The Advaita philosophy looks upon this relation as one of Adhiṣṭhānāropyabhāva (the substratum and the superimposed appearance) or (Bimba)-Pratibimbabhāva. Rāmānuja prefers to call it as Śarīra-śarīrbhāva, or Śeṣaśeṣibhāva. For reasons already set forth, Madhvā does not subscribe to any of the ideas underlying these terms as understood by Advaitins, Bhedābheda-vādins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins. He has therefore thought it fit to give a new and a deeper significance to the term Bimba-Pratibimba-bhāva, met with in the texts and use it in a symbolic sense of metaphysical dependence of the Jīva on Brahman. Along with it, he has also used the other terms used by the Sūtrakāra viz., Amśa-Amśi, Abhāsa-Abhāsaka, which he interprets in the same sense. We may now discuss the question fully.

The term "Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva" is derived by Madhvā from the significant passage in the *Rg Veda* :

रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वभूव ।

तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय । (vi. 47, 18).

The underlying idea in all these expressions is the same, viz., that Brahman is the One independent Source of all reality, consciousness and activity found in the individual selves and which cannot therefore be explained without reference to their dependence on Brahman for their being. As no creation of Jivas is admitted, the figure of Pratibimba should not be literally construed in the sense of the Jivas, being the actual reflections projected by Brahman like that of a concrete substance on a mirror. Madhvā warns his readers against taking the Scriptural descriptions of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of the Brahman, in its gross physical sense of an actual reflection. That is why he is so careful and particular to insist that there is no medium of reflection (*upādhi*) in this case. This would

at once bring out the difference between Madhva's and Śaṅkara's conception of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of Brahman. According to the latter, the Jīva is false appearance or projection of the Brahman on the screen of Avidyā. This relation therefore can be transcended : जीवत्वं च सूक्षा शेयं रज्ज्वां सपेप्रहो यथा ।

(*Aparokṣānubhuti*, 43).

But, to Madhva, the relation of Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva between God and the souls is a sacred and inviolable relation, which is true for all time and goes to the very core of the Jīva and constitutes his very essence and could never be annulled. Its full significance, missed in Samsāra, is realized in Mokṣa. Mokṣa, in fact, is the complete realization of this intrinsic relation of metaphysical dependence and similarity (in some respects) with the Supreme. Pratibimbatva, according to Madhva, is not a false relation, of which the Jīvas are to be ashamed and should try to shake off, as in Advaita. It is the truest and most beautiful permanent bond with the Supreme Being and the purpose of philosophy is its progressive realization, by the Jīva. The two doctrines are thus diametrically opposed !

Madhva brings out the idea of metaphysical dependence, contained in the various expressions, by a proper interpretation of them. There is first of all the idea of a man and his shadow, in one of the Upaniṣads : यथैषा पुरुषे छाया एतमित्येतदाततम् । (*Praśna Up.* iii, 3.) The point of this analogy is dependence and similarity :

छाया यथा पुंसदद्वी पुमधीना च दृश्यते ।

The two outstanding features of a shadow are its resemblance to the original object and its dependence upon it for its existence. The Jīvas, also to some extent, resemble Brahman (*B. S.* ii, 3, 29.) and are metaphysically dependent on It. Hence the figure. The terms “Aṁśa-Aṁśī” also, convey the same truth : जीवस्य परमेश्वरांशत्वं तु, तत्सादृशं तदधीनसत्तादिमत्त्वं चेत्यर्थः ॥ (*NS.* ii. p. 453 b). The analogy of छायापुरुष also conveys the idea that God is immeasurably more than and superior to the souls, as the substance is greater than its shadow. The shadow is there because of the Substance. It is bound to the substance ; but not vice versa. The dependence is thus unilateral and not reciprocal. The shadow is outwardly similar to the substance, in form. The souls have the same form of reality. consciousness and bliss, resembling Brahman's

It should always be remembered that analogies should not be stretched indefinitely. The point of the analogy is strictly confined to the ideas of dependence and similarity and nothing more. Satyanātha Tīrtha, in his *Abhinavacandrikā*, therefore rightly reminds us that the figure of Pratibimbatva of the Jīva is merely a technical figure (Pāribhāṣika and has nothing to do with the conventional sense of the term. Madhva also gives a similar warning : नातिसाम्यं निरक्षते (AV), that we should not stretch the analogy to the point of the lifelessness of the Pratibimba : जडत्वादिभिरपि नेत्यर्थः (NS. p. 505). It is the association of the ideas of physical reflection and the presence of an Upādhi, in the conventional usage of the term (as current in the Advaita) that cause an initial confusion in understanding clearly the nature and implications of the doctrine of Bimbapratibimbabhāva, according to Madhva. This should therefore be strictly guarded against. That is why Madhva draws special attention to the fact that the analogy of reflection (*pratibimba*) should not be taken to presuppose the existence of any reflecting medium between Jīva and Brahman. The reason is that such a medium would immediately render the reflection transient (*anitya*), impermanent and non-eternal. That would snap the relation of co-eternity between the two (द्वा चुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया), Commenting on B.S. iii, 2, 18, Madhva shows the significance of the emphatic particles “अत एव च” in drawing equal attention to the points of comparison and contrast in the employment of the simile : सूर्यकादिवत्. The points of contact are the possession, by the Jīva, of certain characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss *similar to those of Brahman* and depending upon It for them. The points of contrast from an ordinary reflection are (1) *not being conditioned by a medium* (*Upādhi*)(2) *not being liable to destruction by virtue of the destruction of Upādhi* and (3) *not being an insentient (lifeless) effect*. The full significance of the Sūtra, according to Madhva, lies in pointing out in what sense the Jīva is to be understood as a reflection of Brahman and *in what sense he is not to be understood as a reflection*. The emphasis laid by the Sūtrakāra on the two expressions ‘अत एव’ point unmistakably to the

reasons already stated by him, on which the Pratibimbatva of the Jivas rests. These have been rightly identified by Madhva as भिन्नत्वं, तदधीनत्वं and तत्सदृशत्वं taught in the preceding *Sutras* ii, 3, 28 ; iii, 1, 1; ii, 3, 29. It also implies a point of contrast which is again well brought out by Madhva by adding a rider : न तूपाभ्यधीनत्वादिना. If no point of contrast is intended by the Sūtrakāra, the suffix “वत्” in “अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्” would be pointless and redundant as pointed out by Jayatīrtha and the Sūtra could as well have been worded अत एव सूर्यकादिः उपमा ।

What is, therefore, sought to be emphasized by the figure of Bimbapratibimbabhāva is nothing more than an essential eternal metaphysical-dependence of the Jivas on Brahman. This relation is natural and intrinsic to them and is not conditioned by anything other than the nature of the Pratibimbas, such as Avidyā. This is achieved by making such Pratibimbatva an essential characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the Jivas, resting on an intrinsic relation (*nirupādhikasambandha*). Were it not so, the relation itself would be snapped, the moment the Upādhis or conditioning factors that have caused and sustained the relation cease to exist. *The Jiva would then be no more!* But since the Jivas and Brahman are both *ex hypothesi* eternal in the Vedānta,¹ their mutual relation, too, must be equally so. So, Bimbapratibimbabhāva must be eternal : (यावदात्मभावी). It is easy to see that any relation that is not grounded in the nature of Brahman and the Jivas themselves could not be eternal. Obviously, Avidyā is not, and cannot be, such a relation ! Hence, Madhva is justified in thinking of a fresh and more lasting relationship between the Jivas and Brahman, which would be true of them in bondage and in release. He finds such a relation in the symbolism of “Bimbapratibimbabhāva” which is actually foreshadowed in the Rg Vedic passage रुपं रुपं प्रतिलूपे बभूव ; which he quotes in his Bhāṣya. There is evidently a deep scientific idea behind this symbolism. The objection that all ordinary reflections are brought about by conditioning factors is met by pointing out that here we have a symbolism and not a prosaic analogy. Even otherwise, the point of the illustration could be understood in a deeper metaphysical sense (*alaukika*) than in a conventional sense (*laukika*).

1. Cf. नित्यो नित्यानाम् । नित्यसर्वगतस्थाणुः ।

If, however, in deference to the letter of the Sūtra, and the technical requirements of प्रतिबिंबत्वं, one *must* insist upon having some sort of a medium in the case of the Bimbapratibimba relation between Jīva and Brahman, *also*, Madhva has suggested that the Jīvasvarūpa itself could be treated as the Upādhi. This is called “Svarūpopādhi”. This is a complicated idea. On this view, the Jīva would constitute both the medium and the reflection, by the force of his own internal Viśeṣas. This point will be explained later. The introduction of the idea of Svarūpopādhi is for the purpose of denying the presence of any *external* Upādhis in the relation of the Jīva to Brahman (as there is in Advaita : ब्रह्मैवाविद्याप्रतिबिंबितं जीवः).

The same is the case with the other expression “Ābhāsa” used by the Sūtrakāra (*B. S.* ii, 3, 50). This term also signifies according to Madhva the ideas of dependence and similarity :

ब्रह्माभासत्त्वादिति हेतो ब्रह्माधीनत्वात् तत्सदशत्त्वाच्चे त्यर्थः न तु सूर्यकादिकरं प्रतिबिंबत्वादिति ।
(*NS.* p. 505).

It is needless to say that in dealing with such intricate problems, we should not vulgarise thought by the admixture of popular fancies and superficial associations of ideas. Madhva goes into the etymology of the term Ābhāsa to bring out the hidden sense of the term in which the Jīva is referred to as an Ābhāsa of the Brahman. Jayatirtha, explaining the point, writes that the Jīva is termed an Ābhāsa for two reasons (1) that his consciousness of himself and of others is entirely dependent on Brahman and (2) that he exists, like the Brahman.¹ The etymological basis of this explanation is thus set forth by him : भानं ज्ञानं अस्तित्वं सत्त्वम् । भा च सा च भासे आ सर्वकालवर्तिन्यौ भासे । आभासे परमात्माधीने आभासे यस्यासौ जीवः परमात्माभासः ॥ (*NS.* p. 505) Consistent with this interpretation of Ābhāsa, Jayatirtha has also given us a new interpretation of “Tattvam asi” in terms of the Bimba-pratibimbabhāva relation between Jīva and Brahman, in his commentary on Madhva’s *Tdy*.

Elsewhere, in his *Bhāṣya* on the *B. S.* Madhva has given us another illustration of a puppet in emphasizing the conative dependence on God :

1. तेन परमात्मना निर्मितेन आभासते, प्रतीतौ भवति इति प्रतीतौ तदधीनत्वसुच्यते । तद्वत् ब्रह्मवत् आभासत इत्यनेन तत्सदशत्त्वम् । (*MS.* p. 505)

यथा दास्मर्यो योषां नरः स्थिरसमाहितः ।

इदूग्रायत्यंगमज्ञानि तथा राजक्रिमाः प्रजाः ॥

It may be noted in this connection that the Sūtrakāra also ascribes the creative activity of Jīvas to the Supreme (ii, 3, 41). This is merely to emphasize their dependence. It is not as if, human beings are like puppets without life or initiative. The Pratibimba has no *independent* activity : न हि प्रतिविवस्य किञ्च । स हि विवक्षियैव किञ्चावान् (Madhva, G. B.) which should be carefully interpreted to signify विवाधीनक्रियैव किञ्चावान् as pointed out by Jayatīrtha (G. B. t. p. 83).

In his Bhāṣya on B. S. ii, 3, 50, Madhva brings out the implication of the figure of "Bimbapratibimbabhāvā" between Jīva and Brahman by drawing a clear distinction between ordinary reflections which are dependent on external media (*sopādhipratibimba*) and those which are not so dependent (*nirupādhipratibimba*) :

सोपाधिरत्नुपाधिश्च प्रतिविम्बो द्विधेयते ।

जीव ईशस्यात्नुपाधिः इन्द्रचापो यथा रवेः ॥

The image of the face reflected in the mirror is entirely dependent on the external medium of mirror and it is liable to disappear as soon as the mirror is removed from the range of the *bimba* or is destroyed. But as there is no destruction of the Jīva at any time¹ the mutual relation between the Brahman and the Jīvas cannot be attributed to the action of any Upādhis. Madhva cites a beautiful illustration of the rainbow as an instance of a Nirupādhi-pratibimba of the Sun's rays, to elucidate his conception of the Jīva as a Nirupādhipratibimba of Paramātman. As this is an unusual illustration, with a deep philosophical significance, which is not obvious on the surface of it, it requires further clarification to show in what sense the phenomenon of rainbow is to be understood as

1 Cf. अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छितिधर्मा (Brh. Up.)

सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च (Gītā)

जीवो नित्यो धातुरेत्य त्वानित्यः (Sanatsujātiya)

a Pratibimba without an external medium.¹ As everyone knows, the rainbow is caused by the Sun's rays falling on drops of rain water. The rays enter the drops and are refracted and again reflected and then broken into the components of "vibgyor" as they emerge out of the raindrops. The raindrops act exactly as the prism in the physical laboratory. We have to conceive the Jīva as the image and the medium at the same time. The mirror merely throws back the light falling upon it. The raindrops, however, receive the light and they let it traverse through them and let it emerge out of them again and in this process exhibit the glory of sunlight. The raindrops must be deemed to be active, unlike the mirror which is merely passive.

This beautiful simile of the Sun and the rainbow given by Madhva brings out the significance of the relationship between the Jīva and Brahman in a very impressive manner. The Jīva is the agent, the vehicle for the manifestation of the Divine. His Svarūpa has the potency which is activated and energized by the Divine light falling upon it. What we know now of God, of His love and goodness, His compassion and other auspicious attributes is from our association with godly men, His devotees, who, in their lives, manifest these virtues. They are the raindrops that reveal the majesty and the glory that lie concealed in the white rays of the Sun. By this analogy, Madhva wants to convey that every one of us is a tiny raindrop which still has the potency, the capacity to receive and manifest the divine light. The figure of Bimbapratibimba-bhāva thus gives meaning, expresses a great philosophical truth and value and establishes an intimacy of relationship between Man and God, which is the noblest truth of philosophy and religion, to be attained by us. The reader can see in this and in Madhva's equally beautiful interpretation

- That the rainbow is also popularly regarded as a Sopādhipratibimba will be clear from the *Bhāsyadīpikā* (p. 634) which dismisses such an interpretation of the above passage from the *Madhva-Bhāṣya* as untenable :
अत्र दृष्टान्ते विवातिरिक्तोपाध्यभावो दार्ढनिके तु प्रतिविवातिरिक्तोपाध्यभावः ।
अतिरिक्तोपाध्यभावस्तु उभयत्र सम हति ब्रह्मव्याप् । केविचु, सोपाधिप्रतिविवस्य इन्द्र-
चाप उदाहरणम् । तस्य मेघमण्डलं वा सूर्यतेजो वैपाधिः । उगदानं च तेऽव निशपाधि-
प्रतिविवस्य तु जीव उदाहरणम् । इति यथाशब्दावृत्या वाक्यद्यमपि द्वयान्तपरतया
योजयन्ति तत्तु चन्द्रिकाननुगुणत्वान्मूलाभावाचोपेक्ष्यम् ।

of the Sūtra *Ambuvat-agrahanāt* the poetic quality and mystic inwardness of his conception of the eternal and intimate relation that binds the Jīva to Brahman.

The conception of “*Svarūpopādhi*” may now be examined. Madhva clarifies the whole position in his *B. T.* iv, p. 42 :

जीवोपाधिर्द्विधा प्रोक्तः स्वरूपं वाच्यमेव च ॥

वाच्योपाधिर्लिङ् याति मुक्तावन्यस्य तु स्थितिः ।

सदोपाधिविनाशे हि प्रतिविम्बः कथं भवेत् ?

कथं चात्मविनाशाय प्रयत्नः सेत्यति क्वचित् ?

अपुमर्थता च मुक्तेः स्यादभावात्पुंस एव तु ॥

This “ internal medium ” is nothing more than the constituent elements of selfhood operating as “ Upādhis ” as it were, by the power of Viśeṣas, which are self-linking :

उपाध्युगाधिमद्भावो विशेषवलेनेत्यर्थः (G. B. t. p. 79)

There is no difficulty, says Madhva, in the Jīvasvarūpa operating as a medium, since it is essentially luminous : स्वयमेवात्र प्रदर्शकः । चित्त्वात् (G.B.)

It may be objected that all this is highly confusing. Would not the idea of Jīvasvarūpa itself operating as its own medium of reflection be premature, in so far as the Jīvasvarūpa itself would be inconceivable without a Jīva already being there.¹ And if he should already be there, where is the need to reflect ? Again, whom is he to reflect ? Or whose reflection is he ? Not God or God's. Nor even of himself, as there is no point in it.

The correct answer to these and such other difficulties will be on the following lines. We must first of all try to understand the expression “*Svarūpopādhi*” clearly. That will give the right clue to the understanding of the matter without any confusion whatever. “*Svarūpopādhi*” then, means nothing more than the constituents of the Jīvasvarūpa viz. his

1. क्वचिच्चेतनेऽपि छायाशब्दप्रयोगः प्रतिबिवत्वसाम्यात् भवति (M. S. p. 68)
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difference from, dependence on and similarity with Brahman. These are his "Upādhīs"—i. e. the factors by which he is "conditioned" (for ever) or constituted and without whose aid we cannot have any clear idea of what a Jīva is. It would not give us any definite idea of the Jīva, to be told that he is simply as a being endowed with sentiency, bliss and reality.¹ How are we to distinguish him from Brahman which is also of like nature? But with the help of attributes like difference, likeness and dependence, we could get a clearer and more definite idea of the Jīva *vis à vis* Brahman. Since these ideas of difference, dependence and similarity help us to have a specific idea of the nature of the individual as a finite being, these may be regarded as the "Upādhiis" whereby we come to have a correct idea of a "Jīva". They thus help to throw light on the nature of the Jīva, to "reveal" him so to say. It is in this sense that these attributes are treated as the Svarūpopādhīs, i. e. as conditions that go to define his nature. As it is in virtue of these very attributes that the Jīva is regarded as a Pratibimba of Brahman and of no other, these are termed the "Upādhīs" by which his Pratibimbavatva is determined. As these Upādhīs are not, however, external or extrinsic to the Jīva, they are called "Svarūpopādhīs". True to their nature, they manifest the nature of the Jīva (and the extent, intensity, luminosity etc. of his consciousness, bliss and so on) to the full, in release.² As Bhakti grows in depth, intensity and maturity, the Jīva realizes more and more his metaphysical dependence, difference and similarity to the Supreme. And in Mokṣa also, where these conditions of dependence, difference and likeness to Brahman, which constitute the essence of Jīvas, persist, they continue to be the Pratibimbas of Brahman, with the fullest realization of that fact, unlike in Samsāra, where this truth of their real nature and relationship to Brahman is hidden by Ajñāna and other factors, by the will of God. True devotion and loving attachment to God are however capable of moving the Supreme to grace and realization of the true nature of one's own svarūpa by the Jīva (and of the nature of God) then becomes easy and possible. Such in fact is the place, function and role of Svarūpopādhīs, in the system of Madhva.

1. Cf. तत्र यदि विज्ञानानन्दघनः त्वमिति वृत्याचास्याहंकारशास्ति : स्यात् (*Tdyt*)

2. तत्र स्वरूपप्रतिभासहेतुराभ्यन्तरः (उपाधिः) (*NS*. p. 506)

The relation of part and whole (*Amsāmśibhāva*) also stands for the same idea of dependence and similarity. The *Jīva* is an *amsā* (fraction) of Brahman. This is a purely symbolic idea. He is the ectype of God, endowed with a smaller measure of resembling attributes of reality, consciousness and bliss. The figure has, no doubt, some association of part and whole and may imply some kind of identity-cum-difference as understood by Bhāskara and others. But Madhva rejects the relation of *bhedābheda* between *Jīva* and Brahman, accepts fundamental difference and substitutes *amśatva* for "identity": अतश्चाशत्वसुद्धिं भेदमेदौ न मुख्यतः¹ (*M.B.S.B.* ii, 3, 43). He distinguishes two kinds of *Amsas* viz., *Svarūpāmśa* and *bhinnāmśa*². The manifestations of God like Matsya and Kūrma (Avatars) are His *Svarūpāmśas*, identical with Him and possessing the same degree and extent of all powers. The *Jivas* are *Bhinnāmśas* (ectypes) with relatively lesser order of powers. The difference is one of both degree and order. It is innate and could not be transcended:

विभिन्नांशोऽल्पशक्तिः स्यालिङ्गचित्सादश्यमात्रयुक् ।

This relation of *Amsā* is also used by Madhva to reconcile the conflict of *Bheda* and *Abheda* Śrutis. He accepts difference as real and true and uses *amśatva* to convey the sense of identity: तत्संबन्धत्वमेव तदशत्वमिति वक्ष्यामः । श्रुतिद्वयान्यथानुपपत्य भेदमंगीकृत्य अभेदस्थाने अंशत्वं वक्तव्यमिति भावः (*TP.* ii, 3, 43). *Amsā* stands for likeness and dependence of being³. It does not denote any physical identity of part and whole. Its use in regard to the *Jīva* is purely symbolic,⁴ just to aid the understanding:

1. This passage does *not* mean "separateness and non-separateness ought not to be understood literally", as misconstrued by J. E. Carpenter (*Theism in Mediaeval India*, 1921, p. 411). We need not, therefore, deplore with him that "unhappily, Madhva did not adhere to this suggestion". See my *His. of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Lit.* i, p. 157. Unfortunately, H. N. Raghavendrachar, too, has similarly misunderstood and misrepresented the text, in his Kannada work: *Dvaita Vedānta*.
2. सांशाश्चाथ विभिन्नांश इति द्वेधांश इच्यते (*B. S. B.* ii, 3, 47).
3. तत्सादश्यं तदधीनसत्तादिमत्वम् (*NS.* p. 453)
4. मुख्याशसादश्यं तत्सत्यतयैव सत्तावलक्षणमेव जीवस्यांशत्वं । गौणोऽयं अंशशब्द इति यावत् ।

बुद्धयर्थः पादवत् (B. S. iii, 2, 14). Śamkara also interprets the term Amśa in the Sūtra ii, 3, 43, as "a part as it were" (अंश इवाचः). Amśa is thus a symbolic expression for dependence and presupposes difference as admitted by Śamkara himself. The latter half of the Sūtra refers to some kind of identity that would be compatible with Svarūpabhedā already accepted. Such an identity, then, could only be grounded on similarity and dependence.

Madhva concedes freely that there are points of contact between the Jīva and Brahman. Their distinction, however great and ineradicable, is yet one of order and degree and not of kind. The soul of man at its best possesses the characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss similar to the Brahman. It is in virtue of this that any relation with the Brahman is possible, and the Jīva is sometimes identified with the Brahman— तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्वयपदेशः (ii, 3, 29). The freed soul has a nature akin to God which enables it to be in harmony with the divine in Mokṣa:

मुक्तानां सत्यकामत्वं सामर्थ्यं च परस्य तु ।

कामात्मकूलकामत्वं नान्यतोषां विधीयते (B. S. B. iv, 2, 16)

It should be obvious then that Madhva is not for any irreconcilable opposition between the two. He allows even the most exaggerated and high-flown description of the affinity between the two in mystic or philosophical parlance, provided the modicum of difference between them, borne out by the authorities, is not tampered with. Absolute exclusiveness of the Jīva and Brahman is *not* thus a characteristic of Madhva's position. The Brahman is the Antaryāmī of the Ātman and as such could never be excluded from him. Some community of nature is certainly there and even with that it is possible to keep the position distinct from the complete merger of the Advaita. The intrinsic natures of the two are such that no merger is possible :

अल्पशक्तिरसार्वज्ञं पारतंत्र्यमपूर्णता ।

उपजीवकत्वं जीवत्वमीशत्वं तद्विपर्ययः ॥

(*Mahāviśṇupurāṇa* q. by *Vādaratnāvalī*)

The Mukta, too, does not bloom into a sovereign lord, overnight. The released are under an irrevocable limitation with regard to the exercise of cosmic functions of the Supreme, according to B. S. iv, 4, 17. These differences which persist in Mokṣa too, should thus be intrinsic (*svābhā-*

vika) and not brought about by Avidyā or association with the bodies. It is on these grounds that Madhva refuses to merge and absorb the soul in God.

At the same time, God and soul are not so utterly and irreconcilably opposed to each other as light and darkness. In the words of Jayatīrtha the difference is eternal but not absolute:

जीवात्मनः परमात्मना आत्यंतिकभेदः समर्थ्यते (NS. p. 435) परंतु, न जीवो ब्रह्मणो
घट इव पटादत्यन्तभिन्नः । तथात्वेऽभेदश्चित्य उपरुद्धेरन् (NS. p. 453b.) The identity-texts
are not flouted. They are explained in deeper and richer senses referring
to the transcendental oneness of Brahman :

सादृश्याच्च प्रधानत्वात् स्वार्तंच्यादपि वाभिदाम् ।

आहुरीशेन जीवस्य न स्वरूपाभिदां क्वचित् (AV),

VI. DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN

CHAPTER XXXVII

INDEPENDENCE OF BRAHMAN

The independence of Brahman is the most vital point in Madhva's conception of God. The twin principles of "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" constitute the pith of his philosophy. It is to this central ontological concept of his philosophy that the traditional name "Dvaita" given to his system has reference. It has been shown that Madhva has gone beyond all other Indian thinkers in emphasizing the absolute independence and unutterable majesty of Brahman. His conception of Svatantra rises above the dualism of Prakṛti and Puruṣas by denying them any kind of metaphysical independence or independent existence, (consciousness) or activity. We have seen how even the eternal entities have been brought by Madhva under the sway of Brahman by means of the doctrine of creation in terms of "Parādhiṇavīśeṣāpti". How keen and lively was Madhva's penetrative insight into the importance of this concept of the metaphysical independence of Brahman is shown by his unerring reference to the famous text of the Ṛg Veda x, 81, 2, in interpreting the term "*ārambhaṇa*" embodied in the crucial Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa ii, 1, 14 which has become 'the bone of contention' of commentators on the Sūtra, ancient and modern.¹

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1. Most of our modern writers on the *B.S.* have been content with accepting Śaṅkara's view that the keyword "*ārambhaṇa*" in this Sūtra refers to *Chāṇ*. *Up.* and interpreting the Sūtra on that assumption, in a manner that exposes their interpretation to *excessive redundancy*. J. A. B. Van Buitenen is the first modern scholar to have made a commendable departure from this beaten track. He proclaims boldly in his Introduction to his critical edn. and transl. of Rāmānuja's *Vedārthaśāṁgraha* (Deccan College Monograph Ser. no. 16, Poona, 1956), that "there can be little doubt that the term *ārambhaṇam* in (*B.S.* ii, 1, 14) is taken from or inspired by Ṛg Veda x, 87, 2" and that "with this connection in mind, Rāmānuja tries to show that the *Sadvidyā* by *advitiya* denies a separate *adhisthātṛ*" (*op. cit.* p. 11). He is also the first modern writer to approve

The majesty of Brahman is only imperfectly revealed by the eightfold cosmic determinations: निः सीमा: शक्तयोऽस्य हि ! This Universe is just one among the myriads pulsating in the pores of the Supreme Being : रोमकूपेष्वनन्तानि ब्रह्माण्डानि भवन्ति ते ।

Madhva is not very much enamoured of the teleological argument and knew its limitations long before Hume and other modern philosophers. It is only good enough so far as it goes. It cannot go the whole way, and yield complete knowledge of the Deity. It is all very well to argue that the entire Universe is a huge machine divided into infinite number of parts, these parts again, being subdivided to a degree beyond human comprehension and that all these are mutually adjusted with such consummate accuracy and provision as to wrest our admiration and worship of the Supreme Mind (Cf. वहुचित्रजगद् वहुधाकरणात् परशक्तिरमन्तर्गुणः परमः Madhva : *Dvādaśa-Stotra*) that should have designed and executed so stupendous a thing. But then, this sort of teleological argument could yield us nothing more than an " architect " of the Universe, a sort of Demiurge and not a Creator on whom all things will be metaphysically dependent.

Madhva raises another vital question : Does God have to work under a limitation ? Is He obliged to accept and adapt Himself to *conditions independent of His will* and attain His ends only by such arrangements as these will admit of ? His answer to this question has already been set forth in the chapter on Creation. It is obvious, from what has been stated there, that God is not merely an artificer of the Universe, a mere "Brahmāṇḍakulāla"; but the very source of its being and becoming, प्रकृत्यादिसत्ताप्रदत्तं चागीकृतामीथरस्य (*B. S. B.* ii, 2, 5). This is sufficient to show how particular Madhva is in maintaining the metaphysical independence of God. Save for the difference in terminology, his position is the nearest Hindu approach to the Christian standpoint. Of the two,

Continued—

of Madhva's "even more explicitly" referring to Rg Vedic verse as *Viṣaya-vākyā* of this Sūtra and disagree with V. S. Ghate's curt dismissal of Madhva's interpretation on the ground that "the topic is irrelevant". The relevance and the importance of the topic discussed by Madhva under this Sūtra have been conclusively established by me in my reply to V. S. Ghate's review of Madhva's *Sūtra Bhāṣya* (See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Lit.*, Vol. i, pp. 150-53). The interested reader should note the slight misquotation from Madhva which has crept into the text cited by Van Buitenen.

however, Madhva's is much more philosophical, as eternal creation is no creation at all; while creation *in time* has its insurmountable difficulties. The only sense in which the world can be said to be a creation of God is that of an *eternal dependence of one beginningless real on another and a more powerful One*. Madhva makes a concession, *in theory*, to Christian Theism by conceding that hypothetically God *can* reverse His present method or create from nothing. But for His own reasons, He has chosen to evolve a world from co-existent matter and souls, which co-existence, too, is as much at His will and pleasure (*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12). The Vedāntin if he can admit eternal and uncreated souls (See Śaṅkara *B. S. B.* ii, 2, 42) need not shy at the acceptance of equally uncreated Matter! No Indian philosopher has been able or temerarious enough to derive matter from God. It exists on the Advaitic view, also, as a force latent in Brahman¹. Madhva, therefore, adopts the only sensible and straightforward course by which the sovereignty of God can be made consistent with the existence of *such* matter and *such* souls, viz., by making them *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on God for their very being and becoming. This is substantially the view of the Visiṣṭādvaitins also.² It will also be seen that Madhva has done the right thing *in raising this important issue for Theism in general and Vedāntic Theism, in particular, in an appropriate context in the B. S.* (ii, 1, 15).³

The conception of omnipotence has been much misunderstood and abused by Theological Controversialists. Can God achieve contradictions is a dilemma to Theists. Mere power is the earliest and crudest predicate of Divinity. Primitive man, inured to the arbitrary despotism of a chief, who uses power and glory for his own ends and uses the subjects as feeders of his own pomp and glory, is most easily impressed by the idea of physical power and gigantic strength. In most religions the attitude of a proverbial "Oriental Ruler" is transferred unconsciously to the idea of God. Madhva therefore raises this familiar problem of Theism whether

1. परमात्मन्योतप्रोतभावेन समाप्तिं वटकणिकायामिव वटवीजशक्तिः ।
(Śaṅkara, *Kaṭha*, i, 3. 11).

Cf. "Māyā exists even in Pralaya, depending on the Supreme Lord"
(Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, 573).

2. See Desīka *Tattvamuktikālāpa*, p. 255.

3. See f. n. 1 on Page 157.

God or Brahman can do *anything whatever*; or whether there are things He cannot do and whether all existent reality other than Him has been created by Him or whether there are other beings, personal and impersonal, whose existence is as ultimate and uncaused as His own. If there are things whose existence is as ultimate, He could not have prevented their existence and to that extent His power over them is limited. An Omnipotent God could get the ends without the means, if He chooses to do so. *Ergo*, it must be inconsistent with His wisdom to use them since they are of no value to Him except to serve a purpose which He could as well have achieved without them, *as with them*. While conceding theoretically that God can do, undo and reverse his ways, Madhva and his Commentators remind us that *He has not chosen to do otherwise than what the established facts show*. Vijayindra Tirtha writes that even the omnipotence of God cannot achieve logical contradictions and absurdities: भगवदैश्वर्यमपि लोकमर्यादासु रोधीत्यंगीकारात् । नहीं श्वरोऽपि स्वस्यैश्वर्यविरोधिभूतमर्थं संकल्प्य करोति । तस्य प्रेक्षावत्वात् । (*Madhvādhvakaṇṭakoddhāra*, p. 58). As for the contention that it would have been better for God to have done without the accessories, as *with them*¹, Jayatīrtha observes that it enhances the greatness of God to make Him act utilizing the accessories that are metaphysically dependent on Him: निरपेक्षतया समृद्धस्य उभयपक्षसाम्बेन महिमोत्कर्षसाम्येऽपि, साधन-सत्ताभ्युपगमेन एकाकिनः सकाशात्सोपस्करस्याधिक्योत्कर्षलाभात् । (*TP.* ii, 1, 19). This partiality of the Vedāntin, for recognizing accessories in creation, is not a sentimental one. It is, as explained by Madhva due to the necessity of abiding by the facts vouched for by experience and scripture.²

It is difficult for any Theist to assert that all logical contradictions may be consistent with divine nature ! It has been asked, from the point of view of ethical Theism, if the moral law is so fundamental that it is meaningless to speak of a Being who is not bound by it. According to some, the reply is not that an omnipotent God is bound by it, but that God is *not* omnipotent. Madhva resolves the antinomy on the basis of self-limitation by God. The supreme criterion in all such cases, says he, is in consistency with the majesty of God,

1. तर्हि, उभयथापि महिमोत्कर्षसिद्धेः किं साधनापेक्षाग्रहणेनेति । (*TP.*)

2. Cf. आम्नायस्यैवार्थं वक्तुं प्रभवामो, नागमं पर्यनुयोक्तुम् ॥ (*Śaṅkara, B. S. B.*, i, 4, 3)

न युक्तमीशितुः किंचिदीशत्वविरोधि यत् ।

ईशत्वस्याविरोधेन योजयित्वाखिलाः प्रमाः ॥ (AV. p. 36 b)

Nothing can be accepted that will lower or abrogate this : यत्क्वचिद्विशद्भिर्व
प्रतीयमानमपि, ईर्ष्ये तद्वितरत्वं वा, प्रमाणसिद्धं ईश्वरैश्वर्यविरोधिं च न भवति, यथाणुब्महत्वयागैपद्यादि
तत्सर्वं ईश्वरैश्वर्यवलेन घटत इत्यर्थगीकार्यम् । न तु निराकार्यम् । यत्पुनरप्रभितं तदीश्वरैश्वर्यविशद्भमपि न
कल्पनीयम् । शशविषाणादिकल्पनापत्तेः । यन्च प्रभितममि ईश्वरैश्वर्यविरोधिं तच कल्पनीयमेव । कल्पक-
विधातकत्वात् । किन्तु, तस्य प्रमाणस्य यथायोगं आभासत्वं वर्णनीयम् ॥ (NS. p. 511). In the
present case, God's utilization of accessories that depend on Him does not
constitute any loss or abrogation of His majesty :

सहकारिभिरारंभे न स्वातंत्र्यं विहन्यते ।

तत्सद्गावप्रश्रुत्योश्च साधीनत्वव्यवस्थितेः ॥ (Vedānta Deśīka)

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN

Madhva's conception of God emphasizes two aspects of Divinity—the perfection of being (*sarvagupapūrṇatvam*) and freedom from all limitations (*sarvadoṣagandhavidhuratvam*). These two aspects cover and exhaust all that is great and good in the idea of God. We have an 'epistemological argument' for the perfection of God:

अतोऽशेषगुणोच्चां निर्दोषं यावदेव हि
तावदेवेश्वरो नाम * * (AV).

that God is the highest form of perfection conceivable by human intelligence. He is the *id quo maius cogitari non potest*: इत इदमधिकं इतोपीदमिति सर्वाधिकत्वेन, ततोऽधिकाभावेनावशेषिष्ठत्वेन ** (B.T. X. p. 71). The ideas of transcendence and infinite bliss of God are similarly brought out by Madhva in his interpretation of the Sūtra: भूया संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् (i, 3, 8). This perfection of the Divine is to be understood in terms of an unlimited pervasion in time, space and fulness of attributes :

देशातः कालतथैव गुणतत्त्वं निधा ततिः ।
सा समस्ता हरेरेव * * * ॥

According to Madhva, this threefold perfection is possessed by the Supreme alone. The whole of finite creation is limited, in one way or another. The Goddess Lakṣmī, for instance, presiding over Prakṛti, tho' unlimited by time and space, is limited in attributes (*gupair apūrṇā*) and therefore, dependent on Brahman. The souls are limited both by space and in attributes and possess only temporal pervasion (*kālato vyāpti*), in the sense of existing at all times.¹

The limitations of finite existence are the following:

अज्ञत्वं पारबश्यत्वं वेदभेदादिकं तथा ।
तथा प्राकृतदेहत्वं देहत्यागादिकं तथा ।
अनीशत्वं च दुःखित्वं साम्यमन्यैश्च हीनताम् ॥ (Mbh. T. N. p. 3)

I. Rāghavendra, *Gītāvivṛti*, ii, 18.

| Ignorance, dependence, liability to misery, material embodiment, and equality with or inferiority to others].

* * * पारतंच्यं जनिर्मृतिः ।

पराधीनपदप्राप्तिरज्ञत्वं प्रलयेऽभवः (AV. p. 26).

The Supreme is absolutely free from all these :

देशतः कालतो योऽसाक्षस्थातः स्वतोऽन्यतः ।

अविलुप्तोऽधात्मा * * * (Bhāg. iii, 7, 5).

The term Ātman itself, as applied to the Supreme, in its highest sense, signifies that which is all-pervasive (*a-tata*) :

आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मा हि परमो हरिः ।

The above texts emphasize the infinitude of God and His immutability. His nature remains the same at all times and in all places : (B.S. iii. 2, 11). He is above all change and limitations, loss or obscuration of His powers at all times : अविकारः सदा शुद्धः ! He is not subject to any variation of degrees of power or potency. Such limitations as are caused by external factors are powerless to affect His nature which is absolutely self-contained and He transcends all, having neither peer nor superior. He is not a Person in the sense of being just one among many or possessing any material form or measurable lineaments. His form is nothing more than that of reality, consciousness and bliss unlimited. We have an impressive enunciation of this in the following passages of Madhva's *Mbh. T.N.* (i, 10-12) :

एकः समोऽप्यखिलदोषसमुक्षितोऽपि सर्वत्र पूर्णगुणकोपि बहूपमोऽभूत् ।

निर्दोषपूर्णगुणविग्रह आत्मतंत्रो निश्चेतनात्मकशरीरगुणैश्च हीनः ।

आनन्दसात्रकरपादसुखोदरादिः सर्वत्र च स्वगतभेदविवर्जितात्मा ।

कालाच्च देशगुणतोऽस्य न चादिरन्तो वृद्धिक्षयौ न तु परस्य सदातनस्य ।

नैतात्माः क्वच च व्यभूत न चैव भाव्यो नास्त्युत्तरः किमु परात्परमस्य विष्णोः ।

सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरतमः स च सर्वशक्तिः पूर्णव्ययात्मबलचित्सुखवीर्यसारः ॥

It is this uncompromising faith in the spotless purity and perfection of God that is responsible for Madhva's determined resistance to the theories of Pantheism and Illusionism :

कर्तं मायाद्यवच्छिन्नः पूर्णो मुख्यतया भवेत् ? (*AV.*)

It is for the same reason that he refuses to invest the Avatars of popular theology with any material vesture. For, once the Monotheist grants the possibility of the unlimited becoming limited, it becomes immaterial if such a limitation takes place in one particular instance or more. *That is why Madhva stands valiantly for the Monotheistic unity of Godhead and its absolute freedom from material defilement and makes use of Puranic fictions and theodicies to justify their seemingly ungodly acts and career on earth :*

पूर्णमिदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।

पूर्णस्थं पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥ (*Bṛh. Up.* v, 1)

न च गर्भेऽवसद्वेवो न चापि वसुदेवतः ।

न चापि रात्रवाज्ञतो न चापि जमदग्नितः ॥

न वै स आत्मात्मवतामधीश्वरो ।

भुव्यन्ते हि दुःखं भगवान्नासुदेवः ।

स ब्रह्मवन्द्यचरणो जनमोहनाय ।

क्वीसंगिनासिति रतिं प्रथयन्श्वचार ॥ (*Bhāg.* v, 19, 6),

तथाप्यसुरमोहाय परेषां च क्वचित्क्वचित् ।

दुःखाज्ञानश्रमादीश्व दर्शयेच्छुद्गसदूगुणः ॥

The perfections of God are *ex hypothesi* infinite :

मम्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे (*Bhāg.* vi, 4, 48).

They are natural to His being and are *not*, as in Advaita, unreal projections brought about by contact with Avidyā. This is supported by the clear statement of the *Svetāśvatara* :

परास्य शक्तिर्विवैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलकियाच । (vi. 8).

In the light of such a large number of clearly worded statements, we cannot deny all attributes to the Supreme, on the strength of a solitary Nirguṇa text. Besides, as pointed out by Madhva, the Nirguṇa text itself (केवलोनिर्गुणश्च) posits a number of attributes such as oneness, divinity, transcendence, immanence and omniscience¹; so that the solitary term "Nirguṇa", occurring by the side of such an array of positive predication could only be taken in some restricted sense. The description of Brahman in several Upanisadic passages as 'unsullied by sin' (अपहृतपापा) and 'spotless' (निरव्य) gives us the proper clue to a consistent interpretation of the Nirguṇa texts in the sense of denying Prākṛtic or empirical attributes like grossness to Brahman. Such an interpretation has the support of the Purāṇic tradition also :

सत्त्वादयो न सन्तीशो न सन्ति प्राकृता गुणाः (Visṇu Pur. i, 9, 43)

ज्ञानशक्तिबलैश्वर्यवीर्येतजांस्यशेषतः ।

भगवच्छब्दवाच्यानि विनाहेयैर्युणादिभिः (op. cit. vi, 5, 79)

त्रैरुप्यवर्जितमजं विभुमायमीशम् (Mbh. i, 1, 1)

The plea that "when the Absolute is said to be Nirguṇa it only means that it is trans-empirical, as guṇas are products of Prākṛti and the Absolute is superior to it" (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 536) is quite acceptable to Madhva. In his latest work on the *Brahma-Sutras* (1960) Dr. Radhakrishnan comes out with a pronouncement : "The creative thought 'Let me be many' belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in Him. The energy that manifests itself in Brahman is one with and different from Brahman.

भेदभेदात्मिका शक्तिः ब्रह्मनिष्ठा सनातनी ।

The world should become an ordered beauty. If we do not accept such a subtle power, abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. He cannot move towards creation" (p. 142) - [Italics mine]. All this, however, is inconsistent with Śamkara's conception of Brahman as "Nirviśeṣa", - as a Being that is essentially and fundamentally devoid of any attribute whatever, whether such attributes qualify it or are separate from it, as in

१. एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

the Nyāya philosophy ; or are non-material and part and parcel of it, as in Madhva's view. Otherwise, Saṅkara could not have so vehemently denied and criticized the doctrine that " Brahman has in it elements of manifoldness " and that " unity and manifoldness are *both true*," as he has done in his c, on B, S, ii, 1, 14. The statements that " Brahman and Iśvara are not distinct entities but *different aspects* of the same Reality " and that " it is wrong to imagine that the absolutistic doctrine is for the philosophically initiated and the theistic doctrine for others " and that " the view that the representation of Brahman as Iśvara (i. e. " Saguṇa ") is a concession to the weakness of the human mind as some Advaitins hold is not supported by the *Brahmasutra* " (*op. cit.* p. 126-27) show a sense of intellectual dissatisfaction with " Nirviśeṣādvaita " as propounded by Śaṅkara in his accredited works¹ and a reluctance to accept it as the true interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Madhva's opposition to the concept of Nirguṇa Brahman is also based on precisely the same dissatisfaction with Nirviśeṣādvaita.

The question of Saguṇa vs. Nirguṇa Brahman has been fully discussed by Viṣṇudāsācārya in his *Vādaratnāvali* (Pariccheda, iv) and by Vyāsāraṇa in his *Nym.* (ii, 4). There is much confusion of thought, in the popular mind over the terms " Saguṇa " and " Nirguṇa ". Unfortunately, such loose ideas have sometimes a tendency to rear their heads even in the writings of experts on Indian philosophy. " When the Absolute becomes embodied as a personal God ", we have the Saguṇa is not a proper definition of " Saguṇa " as understood and debated in the original texts of the Vedāntic school. The " Saguṇa " of the Upaniṣads is certainly not what is endowed with empirical attributes. For the Śruti-s clearly refer to the Brahman endowed with attributes like Satyakāmatva as the transcendental Being (*Adityavarṇam tamasah parastād*). The *Chāndogya* and other texts also refer to the act of seeing (*īkṣāṇa*) on the part of Brahman prior to the emergence of antaḥkaraṇa and other Upādhis of the empirical creation.² It cannot also be argued that the texts

1. Cf. निविशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः ।

ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकम्प्यन्ते सविशेषनिस्पृणैः ॥ (*Kalpataru*)

2. Cf. " The creative thought, ' let me be many ' belongs to *Brahman*. It is not simply imagined in him " (Radhakrishnan, *Brahma Sūtra*, 1960, p. 142.) [Italics mine].

like “*Satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ* which speak of the various attributes of Brahman are merely intended for the purpose of meditation (*upāsanā*) without any implication of their being actually present in the Supreme Brahman. In the first place, there is no reference to Upāsanā in texts like “*Yas Sarvajñah sarvavid'* (*Svet. Up.*) and secondly there are texts like “*Ātmetyevopāsite*” etc. which refer to meditation on the attribute of identity, which is not an unreal one but is actually present (according to the Advaitin, in the self). Further, Śaṅkara himself in his *Bhāṣya* on *B. S.* (iii, 3, 11 ; 37) admits frankly that the quality of “*Ānanda*” etc. and the mutual identity of ātman and Iśvara should be *meditated upon*. This shows that the fact of *being prescribed for meditation* does not take away the ultimacy of the attributes in question. Nor can the Saguna texts be explained away as mere re-statements (of facts already known or established) to be set aside by the Nirguna texts. For, the very conception of Brahman as “*Sa-guṇa*” is derived *a priori* (from the Śruti themselves) by Dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇa. The Nirguna texts cannot, therefore, falsify those very attributes which the Śruti themselves have, on their own authority, given to the Brahman.¹ It is thus impossible to resolve the apparent conflict between Saguna and Nirguna texts of the Śruti on the basis of such fanciful and subjective criteria as the standpoints of Upāsanā and Anuvāda, put forward by Advaitins. The right way of resolving the conflict will be to apply to their harmonization such recognized principles of Mīmāṃsā exegesis as (i) the Upakrama-nyāya ; (ii) Śrutilinga-nyāya ; (iii) Viśeṣa-sāmānya-nyāya ; (iv) Niravakāśa-(Sāvakāśa)-nyāya ; (v) Bāhulya-nyāya ; (vi) Upajīvyopajīvaka-nyāya ; (vii) Saviśeṣa-nyāya and others, some of which have admittedly been followed by the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, himself, even according to Śaṅkara's showing.

The following is a brief elucidation of the application of some of these principles of interpretation, to the present question, based on the *Vādaratnāvali* of Viśnudāsācārya: (i) The Saguna texts should have precedence over the Nirguna as they are *prescriptive* in form and content, whereas the Nirguna texts are *proscriptive* ; and in cases of a conflict

1. तस्मात् सगुणत्वनिर्गुणत्वयोर्विरोधेन समुच्चयायोगात्, अनुष्टान इव च वस्तुनि विकल्पा-संभवात् एकेनान्यस्य प्रतीतार्थत्वाभासूपे वाचे वक्तव्ये, निर्गुणवाक्यस्यैव स युक्तः । न तु प्रब-लस्य सगुणवाक्यस्य (*Nym.* ii, 4).

between the initial and final statements (*upakrama* and *upasamhāra*) as in एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गृहः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा * * * * निर्गुणश्च ! the decision has been taken in the *Vedopakramādhikarana* of the *Pūrva-mīmāmsā* that the first part shall prevail over the last and determine the scope and meaning of the other. (ii) Texts which predicate certain auspicious attributes of Brahman cannot put up with any but their literal sense (*niravakāśa*) ; whereas the *Nirguna* texts can easily be accommodated in the sense of denying material or empirical attributes and so find their fulfilment of purpose. It will not be possible to establish an absolute negation of attributes as the very same text : एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गृहः * * lays down certain attributes like oneness (एकत्व), divinity (देवत्व) etc. in Brahman, in the first half (or major part of the text) and uses the term "Nirguna" at the tail end. It is, therefore, necessary to *restrict the scope of this negation* conveyed by the expression "निर्गुणश्च" to material attributes alone (त्रैगुण्यनिषेध) just as the prohibition of killing in the Vedic text : न हिंस्यात् सर्वं भूतानि, is restricted by the *Mīmāmsakas* to cases other than those statutorily recognized as in अमीषोर्मीर्यं पशुमालभेत्. If it is contended that the prohibition "न हिंस्यात्" refers only to injuries provoked by human passions (रागतः प्राप्त) and not to those enjoined by Vedic injunctions (वैध), it may be answered back that in the present case also the text "*Nirgunaśca*" does not negative the attributes duly predicated by *Śrutis* like यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् ! तस्य नाम महेशः etc. but only such attributes as are conceived or advanced by the empirical intellect or imperfect logic. Absolute and unqualified negation of attributes cannot, therefore, be accepted in any case, since both the predication of attributes and their denial have equal statutory recognition. It thus becomes necessary to interpret the denial in a way which will not annul the attributes solemnly predicated. If even statutory prescriptions can be totally set aside, there will be no need for recognizing *Vikalpa* (alternative or optional rule) provided in the *Mīmāmsā Śāstra*, in such cases as उदिते जुहोति ; अनुदिते जुहोति. The very conception of a *Vikalpa* (optional rule) is based on the presumption that what is laid down by law cannot be totally repudiated. (iii) The *Nirguna* texts are *general in scope* and cannot negative special attributes of Brahman expressly mentioned by the *Śruti* texts. But *specific*

negations like अस्त्वूलमनु can always be taken at their face value and made to deny material attributes like grossness, that may come to be suggested by spurious reasoning. After all, grossness and other attributes are *not laid down* in regard to Brahman in any Vedic text. Nor are they inherently auspicious attributes, tho' their opposites may be so. (iv) The Saguna texts are logically self-consistent; while the Nirguna texts bristle with contradictions¹. If the Nirguna-Brahman is endowed with the necessary attributes which justify its being characterized as "Nir-guṇa", it will not be really and wholly "Nir-guṇa" i. e. attributeless. If there is no such appellative basis in the Nirguna-Brahman, it cannot be regarded as "Nirguna" in the true sense of the term. (v) The Saguna texts should be regarded as "sustainers" (उपजीव्य) of the Nirguna texts. The sustainer, being independent of the sustained, will obviously be *more powerful* than the sustained, in the event of a conflict of interest or meaning between them. The latter, then, will have necessarily to submit to the former. This may be illustrated by the inference of fire being cold, which has absolutely no chance of survival, against the evidence of tactile perception of its heat. It cannot be argued that the Saguna texts are sustainers of the Nirguna texts *only to the extent of providing a subject for negation* (निषेच्यसमर्पकवेन उपजीव्यत्वम्) by the Nirguna texts. For, there are no texts, so far as we can see, which say that Brahman is *not Sarvajña, not Sarvaśaktimat* and so on. The omniscience of Brahman is, thus, gathered *only* on the evidence of the Śruti. Such an august truth cannot therefore be simply set aside. There is no force in the contention that the Nirguna texts depend on the Saguna and require their help only to the extent of requiring a "bare existence" (*svarūpamādīram*) of the thing to be divested of attributes and nothing more. Such a 'bare existence' can be found in many other things also besides the present subject (Brahman); so that the denial of attributes, in the circumstances, will not necessarily affect "Brahman" and deprive it of its attributes! It will be futile to argue further that the attributes of the subject of a proposition (*uddeśya*) have generally no syntactic value as in प्रहं सम्मार्थि and that therefore, the omniscience of the

1. Of. निविशेषविषयकज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारत्वे, तेन निविशेषत्वासिद्धशा तत्सिद्धयर्थमेव विशेषाभाव-रूपविशेषविषयकत्वस्य आवश्यकत्वाच्च। (NyM, ii, 5)

subject (*uddeśya*) in the present case, viz., Brahman is *not* to be taken into account. The Mīmāṃsā interpretation of “ यस्योभयं हविरार्तिमाच्छृङ् ” does not support this contention. Even in the Sammārgādhikarāṇa, it is seen that the specific attribute of “ प्रहत्प्रम् ” plays a decisive role in restricting the “ Sammārjana ” (cleaning) to the “ Grahas ” (cups) as against the other vessels like “ Camasas ”, by virtue of the distinctive attribute of “ Grahatva ” which is intended to be taken into syntactic account. It is only the *singular number* of “ Graha ” in प्रहं सम्मार्शि that is *not* taken into account, by reason of there being not *one but many* vessels (*grahāḥ*) to be cleaned with a piece of cloth : दशापवित्रेण प्रहं सम्मार्शि । But, so far as the distinctive attribute of “ Grahatva ” itself is concerned, *it is certainly taken into account*, lest the injunction (प्रहं सम्मार्शि) should apply to some other vessels also, used in that sacrifice. That is why Bhavānātha says : नो चेदुद्देश्यस्वरूपालभात् । उद्देश्यस्वरूपे लब्धे, यदधिकं तत् विशेषणं न विवक्षितम् । “ Else, we could not establish the distinctive essence of the “ *uddesya* ”. Once this has been achieved, other additional attributes of the *Uddeśya* are superfluous and need not be taken into account ”. Applying the same principle of interpretation to the present case, we have to accept that Brahman being inconceivable without the attribute of omniscience, it could become the subject of a proposition, affirmative or negative, only as characterized by the attribute of omniscience. In these circumstances, a conflict with the basic evidence of the subject (धर्मग्राहकप्रमाण) is bound to arise, if the Nirguṇa texts are taken to deny attributes to the Brahman, *absolutely*.

It will be proper to hold that texts like “ *Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma* ” which posit certain attributes of Brahman should be taken in their *express sense*, which is also their *primary sense*. Resort to any *labored explanation* of such texts, in terms of the elimination of the opposite of the qualities named (तद्विरोध्यर्थसंत्यागः) resorted to by Advaitins, will naturally entail an abandonment of the primary sense of the texts. The text, on such a view, will not teach that Brahman is possessed of the characteristics of reality, consciousness etc. but that it is *devoid of*

unreality, ignorance, limitation etc. The Advaitin is thus fighting shy of the positive construction and running away from the express and primary sense of the terms “Satyam jñānam” and running after roundabout meanings and *distant echoes* resulting from the primary senses. But such roundabout explanations cannot be accepted as the *proper, legitimate or straightforward* meaning of the propositions. Such farfetched meanings extracted laboriously from the first sense of the words cannot be accepted as the import of Vedic propositions, as pointed out by the Mimāmsakas;

यक्षाधर्थत्वेण न स चोदनार्थः ।

Sureśvara himself has admitted that the roundabout explanation of “Satyam jñānam . . .” adopted by the Advaitin, in terms of the elimination of the opposite sense of the terms employed, is *not* derived from the actual expressions used, but from their ‘potential fitness’ : तद्विरोध्यवैराग्याणः सामर्थ्यात् न तु शब्दतः । It is thus clear that the primary sense of the texts “Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma” is maintainable only on the Saguna view. (vi) The Saguna texts, being *specific enunciations*: (विशेषविभायक) are more powerful in *their own right* than the Nirguna texts which only function in a *general way* and tell us that Brahman is (निर्गुण) ‘attributeless.’ They do not tell us what particular attributes it lacks. It is therefore open to us to interpret this *general statement* without prejudice to the specific enunciation of attributes like “Sarvajñatvam” and hold that the denial of attributes has reference to attributes *other than those specifically predicated*. That will be the right attitude to take. As the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali points out *exceptions only restrict the scope of the general principles*: अपवादैस्तस्गा बाध्यन्ते । The Nirguna texts are *general statements* and the Saguna texts are exceptions. The latter have therefore the right of *overriding* the former and laying down the law as to the sense in which they can and should be *restrictively interpreted*. This is based on the well-known principle of interpretation: सामान्यविहितस्य निषेधस्य विशेषविभायकेन बाधो युक्तः that a negative proposition in general terms should be modified and interpreted in the light of other categorical and affirmative statements about the same subject-matter embodying specific predi-

cations. The difficulty of how a prior fact or enunciation can override a subsequent one is easily met. We have in Pāṇinian grammar a prior enunciation मृद्मधुष *** (i, 2, 7) overriding the subsequent prohibition न कर्त्ता स्त्रे (i, 2, 18). It is clear, then, that mere posteriority or negativeness of content of one statement as against another is not sufficient ground to override the positive. We have, therefore, no reason to set aside the conception of Brahman as endowed with numerous trans-empirical attributes, taught by the Śrutiś.

CHAPTER XXXIX

KNOWABILITY OF BRAHMAN

There is difference of opinion between the views of Dvaitins and Advaitins about the knowability of Brahman. While both look upon Brahman as self-luminous, Advaitic dialecticians have denied the knowability of Brahman by defining self-luminosity in a manner that precludes its accessibility to knowledge :

अपेक्षये सति, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् (Citsukha).

Madhva, on the other hand, emphasizes the knowability of Brahman, tho' not to its fullest extent and in all its glory and completeness. However imperfect our knowledge of Brahman may be, it is still knowledge so far as it goes. Each one of us can know God and realize His majesty so far as lies in his power to do so :

पश्यन्तोऽपि न पश्यन्ति मेरो रूपं विपश्चितः (B. S. B).

Here again, the difference between the two schools is one of substance and *not of mere words*. They are as sharply divided as the views of Christian Mystics and Theists are from those of Spencerian Agnosticism. Pringle Pattison hits off this difference so well that it is worth while quoting him :- "Can't thou find out the Almighty unto Perfection ? If He is as high as Heaven, what can't thou do ? Deeper than hell, what can't thou know ? If to comprehend means to grasp as it were with one hand, to understand thoroughly, see all round an object, then unquestionably, the infinite must ever remain incompassable by the finite. So far as Agnosticism simply emphasizes the unfathomability of the Absolute by any human sounding-line and opposes the little we know to the vast unknown, it is a praiseworthy lesson in humility. Curiously, neither Hamilton nor Spencer seem to realize the fundamental difference between the two conceptions- that of the inherently unknowable and that of the unknown, the not-yet-known and doubtless *never-by-us-to-be-fully-known*, but still, the ever-to-be-better known " (*Idea of God*, p. 165).

These remarks apply *mutatis mutandis* to the views of Advaitic dialecticians as against that of Madhva, that God or the Absolute is neither absolutely unknowable nor fully knowable :

नातिवेदो न चावेदः तस्मात्स परमेश्वरः (Madhva).

Madhva says that partial knowability establishes at least partial characterisability : ईक्षणीयत्वाद्वाच्यमेव. The very possibility of Ignorance concealing *particular aspects* of Brahman, while disclosing it in its *general aspect* of pure consciousness (as admitted by Śaṅkara,¹⁾ is sufficient to prove that Brahman is not altogether un-aspected (*Nirviśeṣa*) or devoid of characteristics. It is philosophically impossible to speak of an absolutely featureless entity being obscured by partial ignorance, even for the nonce:

गिरिशेषे स्वयं भाने किमज्ञानाद्वतं भवेत् ? (AV).

Ignorance cannot spread over a blank and conceal it from anything. There can be no total eclipse of Brahman's reality, as it is admitted that the pure consciousness of being is manifested in the consciousness of the ego. An absolutely uncharacterizable entity is therefore a myth. It would be inaccessible to proofs and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of logical or metaphysical thinking.

1. Cf. Śaṅkara *B.S.B.* i. 1, 1, the passage beginning with तत्पुनवैद्या प्रसिद्धयुताप्रसिद्धं ** and his reply to it.

CHAPTER XL

BRAHMAN IS A SA-VIŠEŠA PERSONALITY.

Such an entity cannot be the object of any superimposition also:

सर्वधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोपः क्व दृश्यते ? (AV).

The assumption of a characterless entity on the ground of alleged absence of all terms or bases of reference is refuted by Trivikrama Pañdita who points out *inter alia* that it would be equally impossible, in that case, to connote such a reality even thro' secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*) as proposed by the Advaita. Immeasurable as are the attributes of divinity, the unity of God in and thro' all of them, is secured by Madhva thro' the mediation of Viſeſas. It is also possible to bring the numerous attributes under four leading ones (for meditation) as Sat, Cit, Ānanda and Ātmā.¹ Sat signifies absolute perfection and freedom from all defects and limitations (*nirdoṣa*). The term “*ātmā*” is explained as possessing pervasion and overlordship : आत्मात्, मातृत्वात्. From another point of view, the conception of God as “*Svatantra*”, in the sense of the definition of the term already indicated, will comprehend all the other attributes.

The Supreme Brahman is thus a Person in that He has a character of His own. The term personality as applied to Godhead denotes, according to Madhva, not merely the existence of self-consciousness so conceived, but also that the entire Universe is to be thought of as an experience and not as an abstract content,—not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary glimpses of this or that finite consciousness, but as embracing the whole life of the world in a way that is necessarily incomprehensible save by an absolute knowledge. The Divine personality constitutes such a centrality of reference, endowed with the faculties of cognition, conation and activity, as part of its being :

1. सर्वगुणानामपि गुणचतुष्प्रयविशेषत्वस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । (*TP*. iii, 3, 18).

2. *B. S.* iii, 3, 18.

इच्छाशक्तिज्ञानशक्तिः किणाशक्तिरिति त्रिधा ।

शक्तिशक्तिमतोश्चापि न भेदः कञ्चनेष्यते (B. T. 3 b.)

The term 'Person', as applied to Brahman, should, therefore, be distinguished carefully from the circumscribed connotation of the term as a spiritual being embodied in a psycho-physical tenement. Limitation is no essential constituent of personality. It all depends. We may understand God to be a great centre of consciousness, will, force and action,—as a unit whose strength and capacities are beyond measurement or conception: अतिपरिपूर्णतमज्ञानैश्वर्यानंदयशः श्रीशक्त्यादिमांथं भगवान् (M.G.B. p. 180) परो मात्र्या तन्वा वृथान् (R. V. vii, 99, 1) इति देशतः कालतो गुणतश्चापरिच्छत्वसुक्तम् । (N.S. p. 421). If the Supreme Reality is not to be a mere indeterminate mass of non-willing, non-thinking and non-acting being, described as Saccidānanda, just for courtesy's sake, we must recognize, with Madhva, that it is both knowledge and knower, bliss and the blissful. There is nothing anthropomorphic about Madhva's conception of God as a Person, everything about whom is non-material. He has, by definition no form of gross or subtle matter :

न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिमांसमेदोऽस्थिसंभवा (Varāha)

स्त्रीपुंलिंगाभियोगात्मा देहो विष्णोर्न जायते ।

किं तु निर्दोषचैतन्यसुखं नित्यं स्वकां तनुम् ॥

* * * (VTN. iii)

Madhva brings together a number of texts from the Upaniṣads and Purāṇas, in support of such a dynamic conception of the Divine personality : तस्यापि शरीरश्रवणात् । 'आनन्दरूपमसृतम्' (Mund. ii, 2, 7) 'सुवर्णज्योतिः' (Taitt.) 'दहरोऽस्मिजन्तराकाश' (Chān. Up. viii. 1, 1.) इत्यादिषु । यदि रूपं न स्यात्, आनन्दमित्येव स्यात्, नत्वानन्दरूपमिति । कथं सुवर्णरूपवं स्यादरूपस्य ? 'सहस्रशीर्षो पुरुषः', 'स्वभवर्णं कर्तारं', 'आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात्', 'सर्वतःपाणिपादं तत्', 'विश्वतश्वकुरुत विश्वतो-सुखं' इत्यादिवचनात् विश्वहृषाच्यायोक्तेष्व रूपवानवसीयते । 'परास्यशक्तिर्विविधैव शूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च', 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्', 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणः', 'मध्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽ-

नन्तविप्रहे (*Bhāg.* vi, 4, 48) ‘विज्ञानशक्तिरहमासमनन्तशक्तेः’ (*Bhāg.* iii, 44, 24). But then, these attributes are not separate from the essence of God. God is not a “bare something” qualified by or clothed with a number of attributes from without. We have seen that Madhva’s conception of substance as an identity-in-difference, maintained by the self-differentiating capacity of intrinsic *Viśeṣas*, enables him smoothly to preserve the integrality of being of the Supreme Person in and thro’ His numerous attributes, which are *an expression of His being* and not so many external trappings attached to Him. Madhva’s view of the attributes of God is the same as that of the great Christian thinker St. Thomas Aquinas that “in God, the distinction between existence and essence must fall away. God can have no nature or essence distinguishable from His actual existence. Here and here only, the distinction between existence and essence would have no meaning, and consequently *the distinction between an attribute and that which is subject of the attributes, would be meaningless also*. Of the Divine Being we can say, as of no other, that it is its own goodness. Its goodness is not adjectival to It; because, in it, it is all one, *to be and to be good*.” (quoted from Dawes Hicks, *Philosophical Bases of Theism*, 1937).

The statement that God has His own body and limbs :

बुद्धिमनोऽप्त्यगवत्तां भगवतो लक्षयामहे बुद्धिमान् मनोवान् अंगवान् * * इति only means that He has His own instruments of knowledge and activity which is all one of knowledge and bliss : यदात्मको भगवान् तदात्मिका व्यक्तिः । किमात्मको भगवान्? ज्ञानात्मक ऐश्वर्यात्मकः शक्त्यात्मक इति ।

सदैः सुखगन्धश्च ज्ञानभाः सत्पराक्रमः ।

ज्ञानज्ञानः सुखसुखः स विष्णुः परमोऽक्षरः ॥ (*Paingi*)

In so far, then, as the several attributes partake of the nature of Brahman, they are also inseparable :

तानि सर्वाण्यन्योन्यानन्यस्पाणि (*G. B.* ii. 72)

So far as it is necessary to concede that the Supreme Reality has a profound character of its own and is by no means an utter blank, it

would be unphilosophical to limit the attributes to six or eight, as the Naiyāyikas have done. Madhva quotes the Śvetāśvatara text : परास्य शक्तिर्विवैव श्रूयते (vi, 8) and that of *Bhāgavata* मध्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते * * (vi, 4, 48) to refute such a narrow view. Jayatīrtha points out that the six qualities commonly associated with the epithet " Bhagavān ", are capable of subsuming the countless other attributes : पाङ्गुण्यमित्युपलक्षणं षाङ्गुण्ये सर्वगुणान्तर्भावो वा (G. B. t. ii, 72). The term " *guṇa* " is understood in the sense of an attribute (*dharma*), and the qualities of knowledge, power and activity spoken of in the Śvetāśvatara and other texts would naturally be seen to posit a variety of them (*vividha*). In the light of the clear statement of Śvet. Up. vi, 8, that the attributes are "intrinsic" (*svābhāvī*), the plea of Ānandabodha and others that even the omniscience of Brahman actually *presupposes, rather than opposes, the presence of ignorance in Brahman* : सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यविद्यावत्त्वमाक्षिपति, न तु प्रतिक्षिप्ति can only be characterized as *audacious*.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the knowledge, activity and other attributes of God are abstract objectless wholes (*akhanda*). Such a position would render the conception of omniscience etc. meaningless. Omniscience is knowledge of all that exists. Creative and other powers also would similarly have reference to relevant objects. No knowledge or activity can thus be conceived as objectless. The eternity or non-ternality of objects has nothing to do with the question.

In the absence of something like an internal Viśeṣa to demarcate the distinctive terms of reference, it would be rationally impossible to define the limits of the creative and destructive activities in God and explain the orderly arrangement of the evolution and involution of the world and the succession of events. In other words, God must be accepted as " Saviśeṣa ". Tho' Madhva admits with the Naiyāyikas that divine knowledge is eternal and all-embracing, it is not, on that account, undiversified. It

is multi-colored (*anantavīśeṣātmatkam*) and adjusted to the different exigencies of creation, dissolution etc. by the agency of Viśeṣas. There are two aspects of the Divine Will the latent (*śakti*) and the patent (*vyakti*), which operate in pre-established harmony, preventing overlapping and encroachment. (See page 152).

The Divine nature is not only all-knowing but also self-luminous. God not only knows everything but also that His knowledge is all-embracing. The question of Divine omniscience in respect of human illusions has been raised by some writers. Does God know our illusions also ? If not, He is not omniscient. If He does, He would be as much subject to them as we are. Jayatīrtha disposes of this dilemma by pointing out that God only perceives every thing *as it is in reality*. When we perceive silver in nacre, God sees that we have fallen into a delusion : न चेष्ट्रप्रमा शुक्तिरजतादिविधरूपा । किंतु, भान्तोऽयं शुक्तिकाशकलं कल्यौततया कल्यतीत्यनुवादस्तैव (*TVt.* p. 1).¹

Madhva also takes special pains to point out that tho' the attributes of God are *transcendental* and *trans-empirical*, they are nevertheless designated by the same terms as are applied to corresponding empirical qualities. This is merely symbolic and intended to give us some idea of them, however limited and inadequate (*B. S. B.* iii, 2, 32-34). The tran-

1. Cf. तथापीश्वरज्ञानं न प्रमा, विपर्ययत्वात् । यदा खल्वेतदस्मदादिविभ्रमानालंबते तदा एतस्य विषयमस्युक्तो न ज्ञानावगाहनसंभव इति तदर्थोप्यालंबनमभ्युपेयं । तथाच तदपि विपर्ययः * * * न । विभ्रमस्याप्रामाण्येऽपि तद्विषयस्य तत्त्वमुलिखतोऽप्रान्तत्वात् । एतदालं- बनस्य चैवमुलिखतः सर्वत्र यथार्थत्वात् । नहि न तद्रजतं, नापि तत्रासत, नापि तज्जावगतमिति ॥ (*Udayana, Kusumāñjali*, iv)

scendental cannot be fully made known or represented by empirical categories and epithets :

“ अलौकिकोऽपि ज्ञानादिस्तच्छब्दैरेव भण्यते ।

ज्ञापनाश्र्वयं लोकस्य यथा राजेव देवराट् ॥ ” इति पादे

लोकविलक्षणेऽप्यानन्दादौ तत्पदप्रयोगो युज्यते । तस्याचुकूलवेद्यतादिज्ञापनार्थत्वात् । ज्ञाततावन्मा-
त्रस्य श्रुत्यन्तरबलेन अलौकिकत्वबुद्धिश्च भवतीति (*TP.* iii, 2, 34).

This is a remarkable anticipation of St. Thomas Aquinas's famous doctrine of 'analogical senses' underlying all human concepts of God.

CHAPTER XLI

COSMIC ACTIVITIES OF BRAHMAN

The cosmic powers of the Supreme are eight in number : creation, preservation, dissolution, control, enlightenment, obscuration, bondage and release.¹ It is the sole and ultimate source of every one of these determinations. The accounts in the Epics and Purāṇas dividing these activities among the members of the popular Hindū trinity are taken by Madhvā in a deeper Monotheistic sense. He holds that the Supreme Being itself (identified with Viṣṇu) acts thro' the instrumentality of the other gods :

निमित्तमात्रभीशस्य विश्वर्गनिरोधयोः ।

हिरण्यगर्भः शर्वश्च कालाख्यास्पिणस्तत्र (*Bhāg.* x, 71, 8)

तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्ततच्छक्तिः प्रबोधयन् ।

एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमज्जसा (*Q. B. S. B.* ii, 8, 11)

This applies to the processes of nature also :

मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमयोहनं च (*Gītā*, X, 8)

खण्डनी पाचिनी शक्तिः * * *

नैव राजन् रवेः शक्तिः शक्तिर्ज्ञानरायणस्य सा ॥

(*Pādma* q. by Madhvā).

This is how Madhvā reconciles the apparent polytheism of the Vedic and post-Vedic sources with the Monotheistic idea of the One Supreme : एकः शास्ता न द्वितीयोऽस्ति शास्ता (*Mbh*). But Madhvā finds for the popular gods (Devas) of Hinduism a place in his theosophy and regards their limited jurisdiction over particular aspects of cosmic determination as a delega-

1. Cf. "Madhvā believes that the characteristics mentioned *belong to the nature of Brahman*. Creative activity is an essential defining quality of Brahman" (Radhakrishnan, *Brahma Sūtra*, p. 237) and his own remark (in regard to Śamkara) : " If we do not accept such a subtle power *abiding in God*, *God cannot be a Creator*. He cannot move towards creation " (Op. cit. p. 142), [Italics mine].

tion of powers or as an *imperium in imperia*.¹ This overcomes the limitation of a plurality of causes, by making the Supreme Brahman alone the ultimate and independent source in every act of emergent evolution. This point has been explained by Madhva in his comments on *B.S.* i, 4, 15 and ii, 3, 11. In this sense, God is called "Kāraṇa-kāraṇa" (cause of all causes) working in and thro' each of them :

ब्रह्मविष्वीशरूपाणि श्रीणि विष्णोर्महात्मनः ।

ब्रह्मणि ब्रह्मरूपोऽसौ शिवरूपी शिवे स्थितः ।

पृथगेव स्थितो देवो विष्णुरूपी जनार्दनः ॥ (*B. T.* p. 4)

It is the same Brahman that sustains the selves in and thro' every one of their five states of life : Jāgrat, Svapna, Suṣupti, Mūrcchā and Marañam. So too, in the states of dissolution and release. The dependence of souls on God in the state of dissolution is obvious enough. Dependence in release, too, is clearly taught in the Scripture: उत्तमूष्टतत्त्वस्येशानः (*RV.* x. 90,2) मुक्तानां परमागतिः (*Mbh.* xii. 254, 17) मुक्तोपस्थ्यव्यपेदत् (*B. S.*) जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (*B.S.* iv, 4, 17).

The *Visṇupurahasya* puts the idea tellingly :

सर्ववस्तुषु या शक्तिः सा मदीयैव नान्यथा ।

मयैव दत्तं स्वातंत्र्यं केवलेष्वपि वस्तुषु ।

तावन्मात्रेण मोमुगधाः स्वातन्त्र्यं मन्यते निजम् ।

स्वातंत्र्येऽपहृते पश्चाजानन्ति परतंतताम् । (XII, 22-23)

The *B. T.* states that both intrinsic and empirical forms of knowledge of selves are dependent on God :

स्वरूपभूतं ज्ञानं तु सदा जीवस्य विष्णुना ।

नियतं ; प्राकृतं ज्ञानं भक्त्या तेनैव दीयते ॥

1. खण्डाधीशाः सार्वभौमस्य यद्वत्
ब्रह्मोशाद्याः कुर्वते ते ऽनुशास्तिम् (*B. T.* X, 74).

The Supreme is thus the ultimate source of every one of the sixfold determinations of organized matter and the eightfold determinations of the lives of thinking beings. Of these, release from bondage is the most cherished ambition of man. No conception of God can therefore be complete without making room for its fulfilment by the Supreme. God, then, is the ultimate source of redemption of the world : संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः (Śvet. Up. vi, 16) ; and no definition of Brahman that does not embody this idea will be complete or proper. That is why Madhva goes beyond every other commentator on B. S. i, 1,2, and interprets “*ādi*” there to include a pointed reference to the redemptive function and some others also. The very need for an inquiry into Brahman arises because of the desire for redemption, which cannot be achieved without the grace of God ; which is facilitated by knowledge : यतो नारायणप्रसादमृते न मोक्षो न च ज्ञानं विनायथप्रसादः अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या ॥ (B. S. B.)

Philosophical reason bids us assume that God should be the ultimate ‘cause’ of bondage, if He is to be the source of our redemption. There is no escaping this. Madhva accepts this position, with the SŪtrakāra (B. S. iii, 1, 5). The logic of this is confirmed by the following texts :

सतां विमुक्तिदादिष्णोर्मुक्तिर्थवभ्युपेयते ।

बन्धोऽपि तत एत्र स्याद्यस्मादेकस्तयोः प्रभुः (B. T. p. 74)

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः ।

कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सनातनः ॥

(*Skānda*, q. by Śrīdhara Svāmin)

Madhva carries the point further and shows how even *in* release the full manifestation of intrinsic bliss of the selves is brought about by the grace of God Himself, thus making the soul’s dependence on God complete and literally true in every respect :

अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः ।

आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जनार्दनः ॥ (AV)

The giver of Moksha should *ex hypothesi* be Independent and Self-determined (Svatantra) and Pūrṇa. God, then, as the great Redeemer of our selves, stands out as the One Independent Transcendent Being of metaphysics :

मोक्षदो हि स्वतन्त्रः स्यात् परतन्त्रः स्वयं स्तौ ।

वर्तमानः कथं शक्तः परमोक्षाय केवलम् ? (AV. p. 33)

CHAPTER XLII

MANIFESTATIONS OF BRAHMAN.

The Supreme Lord of all creation remains wrapped up in His glory and bliss at a time when the entire Universe is in a state of nebulous chaos (*R. V.* x, 129, 2-3). Later, He puts on a multiplicity of forms to evolve the universe thro' different stages. These forms, tho' innumerable, are nevertheless identical with one another, save for their numerical distinction. The first in the order of Divine manifestations is the quarternity of Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha and Samkarṣana, popularly known as the (Catur)-*Vyūha*, credited with redemptive, creative, sustaining and destructive functions. The Supreme further differentiates itself into ten (familiar Avatars) or twelve, hundred, thousand and so on (*G.T.* ix; *Mbh. T. N.* i, 10). These personal manifestations of the Lord are spoken of as Śuddha-*Sṛṣṭi*, in *Pañcarātra* terminology. They are also designated as *Vyūhas* (groups) in a general sense. The Rāmānuja school recognizes five kinds of manifestations of God: (1) Images (2) Avatāras (3) *Vyūhas* (4) the Transcendent and (5) the Immanent.¹ Madhva accepts all but the first one, tho' he does not use this nomenclature. But there is one important difference that in Madhva's view, these various manifestations are absolutely on a par with one another. There is no gradation among them in respect of powers or potentialities. Madhva is vehemently opposed to the idea of making any invidious distinctions among these manifestations of God or putting some on a higher pedestal than others. *There is no room for Svagatabheda in the Supreme (Neha nānāsti kiñcana).* It is the same Infinite in every manifestation. This rigorous note of Monotheistic puritanism is absent in Rāmānuja's system, wherein the Para-

1. Cf. स्वलीलावशात् अर्चाविभवव्यूहपरान्तर्यामिभेदेन पञ्चधाऽवतिष्ठते ॥

Vāsudeva (or Transcendental Brahman) alone is credited with *all the six qualities* of godliness ; while the members of the Vyūha : Vāsudeva, Pradyumna etc. are assigned *less* number of attributes ! The "Bimbarūpa" of Madhva may be taken to correspond with the Antaryāmī of Rāmānuja. The "Bimbarūpas" have a special place in Madhva's system in that they constitute the archetype of each soul, a vision of which is the *sine qua non* of liberation (B. S. iii, 3, 53). The Avatāras are on a different footing and are concerned with specific functions like *balakārya*, *jñānakārya* etc. Their number exceeds ten as commonly recognized. There are other Avatars like Hamsa, Datta and Hari, not included in the popular list of ten. Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja seems to have been inclined to treat Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa as a full-fledged Avatar of the Supreme ; tho' the latter's commentator Sudarśana Sūri is prepared to follow Madhva's lead that Vyāsa is a real full-fledged Avatar of Viṣṇu. But his younger contemporary, Vedānta Deśika, thinks otherwise and treats Vyāsa as subject to the influence of Prārabdhakarma, as an ordinary human soul (R. G. B. t. iv, 9) ! This will be nothing short of a sacrilege, according to Madhva. To him, all Avatāras are of equal merit and status. There is no question of degrees of fulness among them, no "partial" and "complete Avatāras".¹ He takes his uncompromising stand on the authority of the Upaniṣadic and other Pāñcarātrika texts and rejects the commonly accepted interpretation of the *Bhāgavata* text :

* * * * * * कृष्णस्तु भगवान् स्वयम् (i. 3. 23)

as inappropriate on philosophical and syntactic grounds. He has thus no partiality or preference for any particular Avatar of God and treats *all of them as equal in rank, attributes and powers.*

1. पूर्णमदः पूर्णभिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते । उदरमन्तरं कुरुते ।

वासुदेवा एवैते सर्वे * * (Ś. B. S. B. ii, 2, 44)

Śaṅkara holds the bodies of Avatars to be Māyic and material in stuff. The Rāmānuja school regards them as essentially non-material: दिव्यमप्राकृतम् (R. G. B. iv, 9) and formed out of the transcendental form of the Lord, residing in His highest Heaven : अवतारविग्रहस्यापि अप्राकृतपरमपद-निलयविग्रहांशविशेषत्वम् । (R. G. B. Deśika, p. 13). Deśika also quotes *the same authority as Madhya* :

न तस्य प्राकृता मूर्तिमांसमेदोऽस्थिसंभवा (Varāha xxxiv, 40).

But the Rāmānujīyas seem to regard the Avatāra forms as non-eternal. This is not acceptable to Madhya : सर्वे नित्याः शाश्वताऽथ देहास्तस्य * * । (B. T. p. 5 b).

VII. SADHANA-VICARA

CHAPTER XLIII

FREEDOM AND FREEWILL IN MADHVA'S PHILOSOPHY

The question of human freedom and Divine control assumes great importance in philosophy and ethics. Madhva emphasizes both and maintains that they are mutually consistent. In the first place, it is man himself and not God that is responsible for the evil and suffering in the world. This is the corollary of the *Svarūpabhedavāda* of Madhva. In the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, which regards the ātman as essentially *nirviśea*, the self is not really an agent. All activity is due to the play of *Avidyā* or ignorance and is essentially the result of a superimposition on the ātman. Since *Mokṣa*, in this school, is understood in terms of identity with Brahman, it is not something to be achieved afresh, but is the essence of the ātman himself, tho' seemingly obscured and hidden. Hence, on this view, even the spiritual effort cannot be regarded as a true purposive activity of the self in all seriousness. Madhva is unable to accept such a position which reduces all activity on the part of the self, whether hedonistic, or ethical, secular or spiritual to a mere make-believe. It is therefore necessary to ascribe real activity to the self. If, as is contended by the Advaita school, the *kartṛtva* of the ātman is merely due to a superimposition of the *kartṛtva* that really belongs to the mind, just as the redness of the *japā* flower is superimposed on the crystal that is placed by its side, then just as one has both the kinds of experience in a case of *Sopādhikabhrāma* viz., that (i) the crystal is red and at other times (outside the *bhrāma*) that (ii) the *japā* flower is red, even so, one should have the distinctive experiences : that the 'ātman is the doer', 'the mind is the doer'. Since the mind is also open to the perception of the *Sākṣi*, the doership that is said to belong in reality to the mind (or *buddhi*) cannot possibly fall outside the perception of the *Sākṣi*.

Following the *Sūtrakāra* (कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्वात् ii, 3, 33) and consistent with his ethical realism, Madhva maintains the human soul is a rea-

agent in all its actions. If we do not admit this, the Śāstra which lays down injunctions and prohibitions with reference to the achievement of specific results and the moral law on which these are ultimately grounded would lose all significance and lapse into a cry in the wilderness. The Śāstra cannot be addressed to the insentient or to God. The Jaḍa is incapable of responding to any mandate¹ and God is above the purview of commandments. They cannot, therefore, have reference to any but the souls.

The means of realization of Brahman, such as *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, prescribed in the Śāstras, clearly imply that they are to be carried out by a real agent. If the activities in respect of these are only a matter of superimposed assumption, there is no possibility of the fruits of such Sādhanas practised being realized by the aspirants. The Advaitin is hardly justified in denying *kartṛtva* to the ātman and relegating it to *buddhi*, inasmuch as Śaṅkara himself, in his *Bhāṣya* on *B. S.* ii, 3, 36, has categorically rejected the view of the Sāṃkhya that *kartṛtva* pertains to *buddhi* and has upheld the view that it belongs really to the Jīva, as the Siddhānta view. The absence of discrimination (*vivekāgraha*) between *buddhi* and ātman has been alleged by the Sāṃkhyas also. Hence, the position of the Advaitin would be hardly different from the Sāṃkhya view if he were to reject the view that *kartṛtva* does really belong to ātman. Moreover, if bondage, in the form of doership, enjoyment etc. viewed as an undesirable state (*anartha*), were to be regarded as belonging only to the *buddhi*, then deliverance from such bondage also should logically be for the benefit of the *buddhi* alone, and not for the benefit of the Jīva. Even *ajñāna* which is regarded by the Advaitin as pertaining to the Jīva is a source of misery to the Jīva, by giving rise to enjoyment and sufferings. So, then, unless such *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* brought about by *ajñāna* are really accepted in the Jīvas, they need on no account bother about deliverance from them.

1. जडं हि परकृतेन नोदनादिना क्रियावद्भवति । न त्वागन्तुककारणमन्तरेण स्वेच्छया ।

जीवस्तु * * * । (*Jayatirtha*, *G. B.* t. p. 897).

Whatever may be the aim of spiritual effort, —whether to achieve something new, or to discover a forgotten state, the effort in that direction must be a very real serious effort on the part of a true and a real agent. It is for this reason that Albert Schweitzer argues that the doctrine of reincarnation cannot accept the hypothesis that the soul's contact with the bodily experiences is not real. His contention is the same as Madhva's that " if moral conduct is to play any part in the liberation of the soul from the cycle of rebirth, the soul must, in some way, participate in the corporeal and be affected by the human experience and actions. So the doctrine of reincarnation can in no sense agree to the assertion that the Universe is not real, but must hold fast to its reality " (*Op. cit.* p. 62).

The acceptance of real *kartṛtva* to the soul does not however make the Jīva an absolute and independent agent. He is circumscribed by factors like the physical body, the sensory apparatus etc. which are the " gifts " of God. As Rāmānuja points out, under *Gītā* xviii, 16, where the activity of the soul is said to be *not* independent but dependent on the five determining factors of the body, an agent, organization, bodily functions and the direction of the Lord : परमात्मदत्तैः तदाधारैश्च करणकलेवरादिभिः तदाहितशक्तिभिः स्वयं च जीवात्मा तदाधारस्तदाहितशक्तिमान् * * * * the ultimate power of direction is vested in God. The Jīva pursues of his freewill a course of action that is determined mostly by his own deep-rooted nature inclinations and past Karma. But even this is possible because God has given him the power to do things in conformity with his own innate goodness or its reverse. He is not, therefore, a mere puppet in the hands of God. The right to choose between right and wrong is his own and the choice is his own, made on his own responsibility and at his own risk (*Yathecchasi tathā kuru*).

It may, therefore, be stated that the Jīva is both a doer and a non-doer from different points of view, like a carpenter in the service of a building-architect. He works with his own hands and tools ; but looks up to the architect for direction. The skill of the carpenter is his own. He does not owe it to the other. But not so in the case of the Jīva. He

has derived even his ability to do things, metaphysically, from the Creator. (*B.S.* ii, 3, 41). But for God, he cannot move an inch (*R. V.* x, 112, 9). This does not, however, involve God in the meshes of action and make Him responsible ultimately for the behavior of souls. For, God merely *enables* the Jīva to pursue a course of action, not arbitrarily, but in relation to his former life and deserts (कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षः *B. S.* ii, 3, 42).¹ He does not *interfere* with the Jīva's decision in any way. He sustains but never constrains (*Gītā* xviii, 63). The Jīva chooses, out of his freewill, a particular line of action for good or for bad, with sufficient foreknowledge of its moral worth and has himself to thank for the consequences. He cannot, therefore, blame any one, least of all God, for the unpleasant consequences of his acts, should he have chosen wrongly. He has freedom of choice within the realm of works.² God does not throw the creatures blindfolded into an unknown region or set them adrift, chartless on the high seas. Each is provided with a chart, a book of instructions of where lies the haven and how to reach it. This book is the Śāstra (*vidhiṇiṣedhātmakam*).

Another overriding consideration why the individual should be regarded as a dependent agent is set out, according to Madhva, in *B. S.* ii, 1, 26 : कर्त्तव्यसक्तिर्निरवयवत्सब्दकोपो वा। For, any theory that makes the Jīva the sole initiator of his actions, will have to face a dilemma sooner or later. The creative energy of the Jīva (*sāmarthyā or prayatna*) is not something that can be treated as different from his essence. That being so, every time any task is to be accomplished, the individual would have to throw in the optimum of his creative energy into it, irrespective of the magnitude of the task. That will hardly be wise or fair. Nor can we

1. तदन्तरवस्थितः परमात्मा स्वातुमतिदानेन तं प्रवर्तयतीति जीवस्य स्वभुद्दैव प्रश्निहेतुत्वम्।

(*M. G. B.* xviii. 15)

2. स्यादिदं प्रश्निविधिवैयर्थ्यं यदि जीवस्य क्रियास्वातंच्यलक्षणं कर्तुत्वं सर्वथा न।

(*NS.* 327)

create internal parts into the Jīva's personality to get over this difficulty. That will destroy the unity of his being, by introducing an element of multiplicity. We cannot take the help of Viśeṣas also at this stage, as they are not known to possess anything more than a capacity to render internal distinctions possible in an identity of essence. But what we require here is something more than that—a power to regulate the proportion of effort to the given task, which is *not* a normal power or Viśeṣas, such as we find in other places,—say in an insentient object. Someone is, therefore, required to put such a power into the Viśeṣas. It is not in the competence of the Jīva himself to confer such a new power on the Viśeṣas, which is not found elsewhere. The only *deus ex machina* who can do this would be God. By His mysterious power of accomplishing the seemingly impossible (अविटितघटनापटीयसी शक्तिः), He could very well do what the Jīva cannot do and set the Viśeṣas in motion investing them with the capacity to secure proportional adjustment of effort and creative energy of the Jīva to carry out different tasks. In this way, the Jīva cannot do without the regulating control of God in his actions. *This is, indeed, a very remarkable point made by Madhva, in support of the Jīva's dependence on God, in putting his creative energy to use.*

There is still another difficulty. "If God's inexorable impartiality is secured by the doctrine that He renders unto every man according to his work, the other view in the '*Kauśitaki Upaniṣad*' (iii, 8) that He himself is the one who causes man to do right and wrong, according to His pleasure (*B. S.* iii, 2, 41) remains unexplained. If God pulls the strings for every kind of action, He is the agent as well as the patient. Here, the Sūtrakāra resorts to Śruti; but he does not attempt to remove the contradiction". (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p, 441). The contradiction can only be removed by accepting Madhva's interpretation of the Sūtra : उपद्यते चायुपलभ्यते च (ii, 1, 37) ;

वैषम्यं निर्दृष्टत्वं च वेदाप्रामाण्यकारकम् ।

नाज्ञीकार्यमतोऽन्यतु न वैषम्यादिनामकम् ॥ (AV).

A partiality that interferes with right and wrong is a blemish. Hence it has been rejected in the Sūtras. The proper control of right and wrong by meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with them is not a fault. It is an asset. Hence, it is acceptable to the Sūtrakāra. As Jayatīrtha explains : There are two kinds of partiality and pitilessness. One results from disregard of individual Karma and deserts. The other lies in depending on them in so far as they are themselves subject to God. Of these, the first one must be rejected as it impairs the validity of the Vedas. For, the Veda prescribes right as the means of achieving happiness and warns us against unrighteousness as it brings on misery. Such being the case, if God should act in a partial and pitiless way in utter disregard of individual karma, it would mean that the law of right and wrong taught in the Vedas would be rendered meaningless. They would then lose their validity. Therefore, the Sūtrakāra, while admitting the view of God's acting in accordance with Karma, has set at rest the possibility of partiality and pitilessness in the divine dispensations. The sort of 'partiality and pitilessness' in meting out punishment and rewards in accordance with one's deserts is not, strictly speaking, a foible. It does not amount to a defect.¹

This solution of the conflict between the seemingly fatalistic determinism of the *Kauśītaki* and the rationalism of the Karma theory of the Vedānta lies, as pointed by Madhva, in the doctrine of "Svarūpabhedā" of souls. Most Indian commentators would rather take shelter under

1. द्विविधं खलिवदं वैषम्यं निर्वृणत्वं च । एकं कर्माद्यनपेक्षताप्रयुक्तम् । तत्रादृं वेदाप्रामाण्यकारकं तेन दृष्टगत्वा आंगीकरुं मुचितम् । वेदो हि धर्मं सुखसाधनमधर्मं दुःखसाधनमाह । तत्र, यदीश्वरो धर्माधिमविनपेश्य विषमो निर्वृणश्च स्यात्, तदा वेदोदितधर्माधिर्मयोः सुखदुःखकारणत्वमस्त स्यात् । तथाच, कर्त्तं तस्य प्रामाण्यं स्यात् ? अतः सूत्रकारेण कर्मादिसापेक्षतापक्षमुररीकृत्य तत्र परिहृतम् । अतोऽस्यात् द्वितीयं वैषम्यं निर्वृण्यं च, न वैषम्यादिनामक्रम् । दोषरूपं न भवतीति यावत् (*NS.* p. 312 b).

the inexorable law of Karma to reconcile the presence of evil and inequalities in this world with the goodness of God. Madhva has been *the only one to push the question to its logical extremity*. *Karma implies freedom and freedom implies a choice. But it does not explain why a particular choice is made.* Even a chain of beginningless Karma could not explain why all souls are not equally good or bad, as all of them are equally eternal and their Karmas too were equally beginningless and the start simultaneous. The only possible explanation is that offered by Madhva' viz. that the Karma itself is the result of the distinctive nature of each soul (हठ) which is intrinsic to it. (*Svarupa-yogyatā*). This point is elaborated by Madhva in his *Mbh. T. N.* (xxii, 184-88):

स्वभावात्या योग्यता या हठात्या
 या अनादिसिद्धा सर्वजीवेषु नित्या ।
 सा कारणं प्रथमं तु; द्वितीय—
 मनादिकर्मैव ; तथा तृतीयः ॥
 जीवप्रयत्नः पौरुषात्यस्तदेतत
 त्रयं विष्णोर्वर्षशं सर्वदैव ।
 हठाच्च कर्माणि भवन्ति कर्मजो
 यत्तो यतो हठकर्मप्रयोक्ता ।
 विना न यत्तं न हठे नापि कर्म
 फलप्रदो वासुदेवोऽखिलस्य ॥
 स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तोर्विनियामको हि
 तथाप्येतान् सोऽप्यपेक्ष्यैव युजेत् ।
 एतानपेक्ष्यैव फलं ददानी —
 त्यर्थैव संकल्प इति स्वतन्त्रता ॥

This takes us one step *definitely beyond* the stage of *anādikarma* of Jīvas and traces it to the intrinsic nature (*anādi-svabhāva*) or fitness (*svarūpa-yogyatā*) of individual selves. Madhva gives it the name of "Haṭha". From this "Haṭha" Karma flows as its outward expression in terms of good or bad actions, thro' volitional activity (*Puruṣaprayatna*), without which the Svabhāva cannot be developed to its full stature : स्वभावस्य बाह्यप्रयत्नसचिवत्यैव कार्यकारित्वात् (NS. p. 816). All these factors are however *ex hypothesi* dependent on the will of God, for their *sattā*, (existence) and *pravṛtti* (functioning). In allowing this basic nature of the souls to develop without detriment to the moral law, God is not open to any charges to partiality or cruelty; for there is no violation or flouting of the moral law, which is God's own law. He allows it to have its course. He does not interfere in its working and change the nature of beings. *Theoretically, He may have the power to do whatever He pleases;* but the fact remains that *He does not choose to upset the moral law or change the nature of beings.*

And facts matter more than vague musings and conjectures of what may be possible for God. The evidence of Scripture and level-headed reason uphold the supremacy of the moral law as an expression of the Divine will itself.¹ "The ghost of Darius moralizes on the Persian downfall : "When, of our own free will, we rush to sin, God Himself becomes our ally" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 419 f. n). The nature of the soul is allowed to have its course, whatever it may be. There is no fear of the sovereignty of God being compromised on this view. The moral character of God is not also challenged on this view. For, one can accuse God of partiality and cruelty only when He changes the nature of some in preference to others. Moreover, to change the Svarūpa of the Jīvas would be to destroy, to annihilate, the Jīvas; for, the "Svarūpa" is the essence of Jīvahood and any change of "Svarūpa" would be tantamount to a destruction of individuality.

1. Cf. न च, प्रकृतेः संसाराभावादिना, ईश्वरणाप्यन्यथाकर्तुमशक्यत्वेन, सुदृढतात्, सर्वसाम्यमेव ईश्वरेण, इति युक्तम् । ईशस्य महामहिमत्वात् नित्यसंसारित्वस्य नित्ये तदनुप्रहणौपपत्तौः (Nyāya Vivarana, iv. 2, 6).

The theory of Svarūpabhedā and Svarūpayogyatā elaborated by Madhvā is thus the most *far-reaching* and at the same time highly *suggestive solution* of the problem of plurality of selves and their freedom and freewill and of the presence of evil and suffering in a moral Universe under the government of a moral and merciful God. Questions like the following have been asked all the world over :— The Jīva was not created out of a void, at a particular time. But he is, none the less, an expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect, while his archetype is also the type of perfection? St. Augustine's agony of soul was still more poignant. “Who made me? Did not God who is not only good, but goodness itself? Whence, then, came I to will evil and nill good so that I am thus justly punished? Who set this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was wholly formed of my most sweet God?” (*Confessions*, Bk. VII. 4–5). The answer to these questions is found by Madhvā in *B. S.* ii, 3, 51 (अद्वानियमात्) in the intrinsic diversity of human nature (*adṛṣṭāniyama*). It has been shown earlier that this “*adṛṣṭa*” is another name for the “*anādi-svarūpayogyatā*” of the individual souls. Rāghavendra Tīrtha brings out this point, very clearly, in his gloss *Bhāvadīpa* on Jayatīrtha's *TP.* : स्वरूपोपाधिवैचित्यस्यैव अद्वानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात् विवृतमेतत् चन्द्रिकायाम् (*Bhāvadīpa*, ii.3, 53).

CHAPTER XLIV

PROBLEM OF EVIL IN RELATION TO ETHICAL ADVANCEMENT

The problem of Evil and suffering in the world is the most difficult one in Theism. We have explained Madhva's attitude to the allied problem of freedom and freewill, on the basis of the doctrine of natural selection (*anādisvarūpayogyatā*) of good or bad and of the tripartite classification of souls. It is not therefore necessary for Madhva to answer the question of the consistency of evil with Divine goodness. This question has also been touched upon in the *Vaisamyanairghṛṇyādhikarapa* of the *B. S.* It is possible to hold, on the traividhya view also, that the presence of evil is an incentive to the better class of souls, to keep off from its temptation :

* * * ततोप्यन्यान् जीवान्मध्यमतामसान् ।

सुज्यवति हन्तीशो भक्तानां भक्तिवृद्धये ॥ (*Viṣṇurahasya*, V, 12).

There are many worshippers of Satan and his ways and they have no moral code or spiritual values. They are unmitigatedly anti-social in their outlook. Their type is outlined in the Scriptures¹ :

Any thoroughgoing theory of man's spiritual destiny must therefore take note of the irreducible distinctions of human nature and formulate a theory that would cover the diverse aspects of its character as a whole. If reason and experience are any guide in such matters, Sarvamukti or universal salvation would appear to be a day dream. Bondage is not only real, but it may be absolutely irremediable for some. It all depends on the basic nature of free beings. It is futile to throw up our hands and exclaim that we cannot have a really useful ethics unless we believe in the spiritual possibility of every one " who bears the human form divine ". Why forget the animal and other forms divine ? Ethical systems all over the world have been devised only for the benefit of those who may care to profit by them. The ethicization of the entire cosmos is no practical politics. The utmost that any useful system of ethics can

1. Cf. *Gītā*, xvi. 16-20; *R. V.* निरामिणो रिप्वो येऽनेषु जागृषुः ॥ and अथ ज्ञानोपसर्गः—
ये चान्ये मिथ्यावादैः कुहकेन्द्रजालैवैदिकेषु परिस्थातुमिच्छन्ति तैः सह न संवर्तेत् * * *
(*Maitri Up.* vii, 8).

do is to show the ways and means of advance. Whether particular ethical doctrines will be accepted by all sections of humanity, and acted up to, is more than any ethical system can predict or guarantee. Believers in I. C. B. M. as a means of banishing capitalistic ideology from the world as well as those who believe in peaceful co-existence of nations with different ideologies will always be there. With due deference to those "who bear the human form divine", Madhva maintains that their future is unpredictable. The diversity of human nature is such that we cannot shut our eyes to it, or squeeze every one into the same mould. An ethical system would be of no use if people are indifferent to it or are not prepared to abide by it नहि सर्वाधिकारिकं शास्त्रम्. Some are bound to look askance at the most perfect system of ethics or scoff at it. The existence of professional liars does not invalidate the noble commandment of Christ and the Upanisads, to speak the truth. It is hardly necessary, then, to shed sentimental tears over the doom of Satan, Beelzebub, Balial, Kali, or Kālanemi. They have their reward, each according to his own deserts. As men and women are not machine-made, they will and must differ from one another in most minute respects. Difference of character and temperament is the law of the Universe :

अनादियोग्यतां चैवं कलिवाणीश्वरावधिम् ।

को निवारयितुं शक्तो युक्त्यागमबलोद्धताम् ? (AV).

Experience shows that all men are not moved by the same considerations or values of ethical conduct. Some are frank Hedonists to the core, who not only take delight in their hedonism, but are proud of it. Philosophy or no philosophy, they won't care. You may call them "philosophical swines", but they will treat your condemnations as those of babes and imbeciles who run away from the charms and pleasures of life unfit constitutionally to enjoy the gifts of nature.

Cf. यथा यूनः परमरमणीयापि रमणी

कुमारणामन्तःकरणहरणं नैव कुरते (Naisadha).

It is quite possible that, say what you will, this type of men and women which may presumably form the majority of the race, may go on content with its philosophical hedonism. The Omar Khayyam type is by no means a hypothetical monstrosity. Below this self-complacent,

pleasure-loving type in creation, is the wicked and un-moral type of the most devilish propensities for destruction, vice and moral degradation. Such a type is typified by the demons and Asuras of the Purāṇas and its counterpart is not difficult to recognize in our own times of atomic and ballistic warfare. It is unphilosophical to close our eyes to the darker sides of life and dismiss them as mere illusions or passing shadows. We must find a place for the best and the worst of natures in our philosophy of life. Madhva has had the boldness to look at it from the practical point of view. There is no need for the philosopher to be a moral Alchemist and seek to convert base metals into gold. As a practical philosopher, Madhva refuses to coquet with the idea of Sarvamukti. Man will be served according to his deserts,— neither more nor less. Mukti is not a prize for good conduct to be conferred from without. It is nothing but the realization of our being by each one of us:

मुक्तिहिंचान्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितः (Bhāg. ii, 10, 6)

Nature will find its expression in any one of the three patterns indicated already. We need not fight shy of nature's laws.

The question why there is evil and suffering in this world is thus as profitless as it is illegitimate. It is there and cannot be driven out of existence on any ground of alleged incompatibility with the moral perfection of God and His government. We have to reckon with it and fight against it, if we can; or else go under its weight. Such has been the history of man, all thro'. And philosophy proposes to show us how to rise above the influence of evil and attain goodness. And it stands to reason that while many may falter on the way and fail to reach the goal, others may struggle on and on till they reach the summit; while some others may not even care to think of the goal.

Attention to the baneful effects of evil helps to cleanse the personality of all dross. It hastens Vairāgya which strengthens devotion to a life of purity and godliness : साधनेषु वैराग्यमेवादौ अपेक्षितम् । तदर्थं गत्यागातिस्वर्गं-नरकवासादिस्वरूपत्रं निरूप्यते । गत्यादेः खलु दुःखरूपतां श्रुत्वा यतोऽधिकारिणः स्वर्गादिष्वपि रागे विच्छिन्नते (TP. iii, 1, 1). It is to draw attention to the miseries of Samsāra that the Śāstras describe at some length the souls' sojourn thro' heaven

and hell and their sufferings in the womb (*B. S.* iii, 1). The desire for release is in proportion to the intensity of suffering and the keenness of its realization.

The reality of experience is thus the strongest driving force behind all efforts to attain spiritual perfection. Many and untold are the cares and anxieties to which human beings are exposed in the cycle of transmigration. We are groping in the dark for the light of knowledge and struggling every minute of our lives to find peace and happiness that eludes us all the while.¹ Since we cannot extricate ourselves from this net of bondage save by the grace of God, we must naturally turn to the schemes of discipline by which release is possible to be attained.

1. Cf. इह खल्वविद्यानिरन्तरे संसारकान्तारे परिखिज्ञानामल्पास्थिरसुखस्वयोतिकाषु विद्योतमाना-
स्वपि मनःप्रसादमनासादयतां देहिनाम् * * * (*Tdy. t*)

CHAPTER XLV.

CLASSIFICATION OF ADHIKĀRIS

The scheme of Sādhanas embraces the entire field of man's spiritual uplift comprising the physical, moral and spiritual perfection of the individual. The paths of Karma Bhakti and Jñāna of the Śāstras pertain roughly to the physical, emotional and intellectual aspects of Sādhana. The scheme of Sādhanas is set out by Madhva with reference to different orders of aspirants (Adhikāris) based partly on generic distinctions (to be acquired). The former class of Adhikāris is distinguished into (1) the highest (2) middling and (3) lowest type of souls, comprising respectively, the gods, Ṛṣi-Gandharvas and the best among men (*manuṣyottama*). It is pointed out that the human souls can only realize the Supreme from without (*bahihprakāśa*) the Ṛṣis inwardly (*antahprakāśa*) and that the gods can intuit Brahman as omnipresent (स्वप्रकाशः) — (Madhva, *B. S. B.* iv. 3, 16).

A different classification of souls is made in an ascending order of spiritual merit into (1) devoted, (2) purified and (3) enlightened. Such of the human beings as are fit for nothing more than a ceaseless cycle of transmigration and those who are 'damnable' are ranked below the "best of men". The term "Manuṣyottama" does not, however, involve any distinction of caste or sex, tho' each group of Adhikāris may have its own distinctive way of approach to spiritual progress. As faithful followers of the Sūtrakāra, and believers in the Smārta code, all commentators on the Vedānta have, however, maintained that the attainment of philosophical wisdom thro' Śāstrik investigation is open only to the Traivarṇikas, qualified for Vedic study, (*B.S. i. 3, 36-38*) while the women and Śūdras are given access to the saving knowledge only thro' the literature of the Epics and Purāṇas and Pañcarātra. A faithful adherence to the duties of Varṇāśrama is naturally insisted upon. But Madhva does not make a fetish of entering the fourth order of life as an external condition precedent to the attain-

ment of wisdom (as in the Advaita)¹. At the same time, he concedes the obvious advantages of the Sannyāsa order over other āśramas, on account of the increased opportunities therein, for one-pointed devotion and purity². He is the *only Bhāsyakāra* who has recognized the existence of women of the highest spiritual attainments, eligible for Brahmacicāra thro' the Vedānta³.

1. Cf. the practice of 'Āpatsannyāsa' current in this school.

2. यत्याश्रमस्तु प्रायत्यार्थौ भगवतोषणार्थश्च । अप्रायत्यमेव हि प्रायो गृहस्थादीनाम्
(*B. G. B.* iii. 4)

3. आहुरप्युत्तमस्त्रीणामधिकारं तु वैदिके । (*B. S. B.* i, 1, 1)

CHAPTER XLVI

GENERAL SCHEME OF SĀDHANAS

The aim of metaphysical inquiry is the attainment of release thro' Divine grace. One has naturally to think of the means of earning it. The Śāstras describe them as leading to one another, in the following order : freedom from worldly attachment (Vairāgya), devotion to God (Bhakti), Śravaṇa (study) Manana (reflection), Nididhyāsana (meditation) and Sākṣātkāra (direct realization) :

वैराग्यमन्तिश्रुतिमातिनिष्ठतयानजज्ञानयोगात् (*TP*)

तस्मान्मोक्षाय श्रवणादिसाध्यनिदिथ्यासनजन्यसाक्षात्कारेण ईश्वरः प्रसन्नीकरणीयः || (*Nym* 629 b)

Dispassion or Vairāgya is the first step or primary requisite of a true aspirant. The spirit of detachment and freedom from passions is indeed the most valuable discipline and preparation for a life of genuine godliness and spirituality. It constitutes the essence of spiritual life :

नाविरतो दुश्चरिताशाशांतो नासमाहितः ।

नाशन्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानैनमाप्नुयात् । (*Kaṭha Up*)

शान्तो दान्तं उपरतस्तितिष्ठः समाहितो भूत्वा *****

परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वदमायात्

(*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4, 23)

Attachment to sensuous life is the greatest impediment to devotion to God. One cannot serve two masters. One must choose sooner or later between the two. Attachment to the flesh includes the misplaced notion of possession and independence :

ते वै विदन्यतिरन्ति च देवमायां

नैषां ममाहमिति धीः क्षश्वगालभक्ष्ये (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*)

Steadiness of attention and exclusive contemplation of the Supreme can only be achieved thro' deep-rooted love of God. The intimate

relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva, subsisting between God and souls, gives such devotion an element of naturalness and spontaneity that is needed to make it an ideal one. The worship of the Supreme, under such favorable conditions, earns the grace of God, who is pleased to reveal Himself to the seeker. This conviction of the comparative evanescence of wordly goods and the perishability of all material attractions, so necessary for the birth of Vairāgya, is to be acquired by Karma, patient study and reflection.

The knowledge thus acquired is seen to bear fruit in respect of persons who have done good deeds in former lives and who, as a result, are placed in this life in a congenial atmosphere, for spiritual advancement and whose temperaments are properly attuned to spirituality. Śravaṇa supplies the basic materials for philosophical thought and Manana (reflection) is needed to give it definiteness of content and freedom from doubts.¹ They are both preliminaries to contemplation which leads to direct vision :—

श्रवणस्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारा, मननस्य तु संशयविपर्ययनिवृत्तिद्वारा परोक्षतत्त्वनिश्चयसाध्ये साक्षात्कारफलके
निदिध्यासने अंगता सिद्धा ।

श्रवणं शब्दजं ज्ञानमुपपत्त्यनुचिन्तनम् ।

मतिः ; निरन्तरा चिन्ता निदिध्यासनमुच्यते ॥ (*Nym*).

Śravaṇa is defined as the acquisition of the sense of the sacred texts under the instruction of competent teachers. It dispels ignorance about the subject-matter (ज्ञाननिवृत्ति) ; Manana is the systematic employment of the canons of textual interpretation and logical examination with a view to arriving at a firm conviction that the final interpretation of the Śāstras thus arrived at is alone the correct and unimpeachable one. Manana removes doubts (*samsaya*) and misapprehension (*viparyaya*) and confirms the true import of the Śāstras (*parokṣatattvaniscaya*). Then comes *nididhyāsana* or *dhyāna* (continuous meditation). *Dhyāna* leads to direct realization (*darśana*). *Śravaṇa* and *manana* are thus subsidiary

1. मननं च वेदार्थनिर्णयं कुर्वत् संशयविपर्ययौ निवारयति (*TP*. iii, 3, 43).

(*aṅgabhūta*) to *nididhyāsana*, which is the chief means (*aṅgi*) of Śāksatkāra. The Vivarana school of Advaita, on the other hand, gives the place of honor among Śādhanas to Śravaṇa (fixation of the import of the Sāstras) and relegates *manana* and *nididhyāsana* to a secondary position as contributory factors (फलेपकायर्थगम्). As against this, Madhva and his commentators accept all the statements: श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः as primary injunctions (*apūrvavidhi*). These three, according to Madhva, represent the authoritarian, critical and contemplative approach to philosophical truth.

Rāmānuja dismisses श्रोतव्यः and मन्तव्यः in the text: आत्मा वा अे दृष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः, as mere restatements (अनुशासनं) and accepts only Nididhyāsana as being actually enjoined by the Śruti. As for direct vision of Brahman (*darśana*) enjoined in “दृष्टव्यः”, he is not prepared to give it any independent position over and above Dhyāna or meditation (*nididhyāsana*) which he regards as the ultimate means of Brahmic realization. He holds that intensified meditation practised without interruption attains the character of a direct perception: (सा च स्मृतिः दर्शनसमानाकारा). But then, Rāmānuja admits also that from the time a Seeker comes to accept Brahman as the sole and only means (*upāya*) of deliverance, his knowledge of Brahman becomes transfigured into a deep attachment for Brahman. In these circumstances, just as one may naturally be expected to go on thinking constantly of a person to whom one has become deeply attached, without the necessity for any special injunction to do so, similarly one can dispense with the necessity for any injunction with regard to Nididhyāsana also. If the injunction is felt to be necessary in the interest of laying down a constant and uninterrupted flow of it, similar injunctions with regard to Śravaṇa to be practised under a proper Guru may also be considered necessary.

In his commentary on *B. S.* iii, 3, 44–46, Madhva discusses the place and importance of the ideal Guru and the importance of his grace in the final flowering of the spiritual personality of the aspirant (Sādhaka).¹

1. Similar emphasis is laid in the Haridāsa literature of the Mādhva tradition :

“ गुरुविन् गुलामनागुव तनक दोरेयदण्ण मुकुति ” (*Kannada*)

‘Not until one becomes the slave of his Guru, dear brother,
Can Mokṣa be attained.’

He emphasizes the point that the instruction and guidance of a competent Guru and his grace (*prasāda*) are absolutely necessary for Śravaṇa and Manana to bear fruit: आचार्यशान् पुरुषो वैद (*Chān. Up.*). This is in keeping with the esoteric tradition of the Upaniṣads, so well exemplified in the story of Satyakāma in the *Chān. Up.* iv, 9, where the young Brahma-cārin, Satyakāma, after receiving instruction from the Devatās still begs to be initiated and instructed finally by his own Guru. Madhvā says that the grace of the Guru is part of the *modus operandi* (इतिकर्तव्यता) of the means of jñāna, viz., Śravaṇa, Manana etc. It is therefore a necessary complement of Jñānasādhanā. He further says that of the two viz., individual effort and the grace of the Guru, the latter is to be deemed the more powerful factor and therefore indispensable for one's spiritual realization. *The importance of Guru Bhakti has not been so well brought out as an integral part of the Theism of the Brahma Sūtras by any other Bhāsyakāra than Madhvā.* The emphasis on Guru-prasāda does not mean that individual effort and the deserts of the aspirant do not count. They are the foundations of one's spiritual progress ; but Guruprasāda is the crowning point of this development. *There is, undoubtedly, an element of deep religious mysticism in the special significance which Madhvā attaches to the role of the Guru and his grace in regard to the subject of Sādhanas and their fulfilment.* It is to be noted that this represents a completely new and different interpretation of *B.S.* iii, 3, 44–46, as compared with those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others. It is an interpretation which has the most vital and intimate bearing on the question of spiritual Sādhanas and therefore quite a relevant topic to be considered in the Sādhanādhyāya and one which has the full support of the Upaniṣadic traditions and teaching :

अस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्थं देवे तथा गुरौ ।

तस्यैते कथिता ह्यर्थः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥

A seeker is allowed to change his Guru if he secures another with a superior spiritual illumination, provided the latter is able and inclined to impart the full measure of grace and illumination that may be required for the self-realization of the disciple. Where both the Gurus happen to be of equal merit and disposition to grant the full measure of their grace qualifying for illumination to the aspirant, the permission of the earlier Guru shall have to be obtained before receiving instruction from the other one.

Madhva has given a higher place to be Nididhyāsana or Dhyāna than to Śravaṇa and Manana, which are put down by him as *aṅgas* to Dhyāna.¹ This is because his conception of Dhyāna or Upāsanā is radically different from that of Saṃkara to whom all Upāsanā as such is based on superimposition as will be made clear. He does'nt agree to the doctrine of Śabdāparokṣa of Maṇḍana and other Advaitic writers, according to which Śravaṇa alone is the true and ultimate source of illumination in respect of Brahman, Manana and Nididhyāsana acting merely as accessories to it by removing obstacles to steadiness, such as mistrust and misunderstanding. But to Madhva, they are both subsidiary to Nididhyāsanā. They merely help to establish the nature of the philosophical truth (*tattvanirṇaya*). Then comes prolonged meditation of particular attributes of Divinity, which is known as Upāsanā.

There is an intimate and balanced relation between Sādhana and Sādhyā on Madhva's view. He maintains the position that there should be a gradation of spiritual joy in Mokṣa, commensurate with the amount, quality and intensity of Sādhanas or spiritual effort of different levels and orders of Adhikārins :

“ दशकल्पं तपश्चीर्ण रुद्रेण लवणार्णवे ।
त्यक्त्वा सुखानि सर्वाणि क्लिष्टेन लवणाम्भसा ॥
शक्तेण वर्षकोटीश्च धूमः पीतो ऽतिदुःखतः ।
वर्षायुतं तु सूर्येण तपोऽवार्कशिरसा कृतम् ॥
सुदुर्खेन सुखं त्यक्त्वा धर्मेणाकाशशायिना ।
पीता मरीचयो वर्षसहस्रमतिसादरम् ॥
अतिकृच्छ्रेण कुर्वन्ति यत्नं ब्रह्मविदोऽपि च । ”
इत्येतदशिलं मोक्षे विशेषाभावतः कथम् ?
युक्तं च साधनाधिक्यात् साच्चाधिक्यं सुरादिभु ।
नाधिक्यं यदि साध्ये स्यात्, प्रयत्नः साधने कुतः ?

(AV. iii, pp. 45-46).

1. समस्तगुणपरिपूर्णे नारायण इत्ययमेव वेदार्थः इति ज्ञानं वेदार्थनियमः । उपनिष एवंभाव इत्याधिगमः तत्त्वनिश्चयः । तौ ब्रह्माद्येः पृथगेव । तत्साधनोपासनापूर्वभाविनौ (TD.)

A comprehensive scheme of spiritual discipline is thus the very foundation of all spiritual progress. The importance of ethics to philosophy has been accepted by all philosophers, who look upon it as a system of Sādhanas for the achievement of the highest good (*nīhśreyasa*). A complete theory of the Universe must necessarily include ethical judgments on the value or worthlessness of objects and thereby secure an influence over our conduct. Since philosophy, in India, owes its inspiration to the deep yearning for the realization of the religious purpose of life, rather than the satisfaction of the speculative instinct, it is natural to expect a remarkable affinity amongst the various systems of Indian philosophy in the postulates and conditions for such a realization. They are agreed on certain general principles of ethical conduct and Sādhanas tho' there are many differences of emphasis, divergence of detail or technical terminology and the relative position and value of certain forms and items of the discipline. The goal of life, the attitude to the world and, above all, the means of attaining the goal, tho' broadly the same, are still marked by certain fundamental differences in philosophic theory. The special features of Madhva's scheme of ethics relate to the following points : the place of (1) Vicāra or reasoned thought and philosophic inquiry in the scheme of Sādhanas; (2) of Karma in the triple scheme of Karma, Bhakti and Jñāna Mārgas; (3) the nature and importance of Bhakti and Upāsanā and (4) the importance of Aparokṣajñāna as the final means of deliverance and (5) the ethical responsibilities of the Aparokṣajñānin.

CHAPTER XLVII.

KARMA-YOGA AND JÑĀNA-YOGA.

The most prominent forms of spiritual discipline are those going by the names of Karmamārga, Jñānamārga and Bhaktimārga. Of these, Karmayoga or the path of Works is generally believed to constitute the first rung of the ladder. The term Karmayoga is however understood in most schools of Vedānta in the *narrow sense* of *Pravṛtti-Mārga*, as defined by the Mīmāṃsakas, consisting of a faithful performance of the round of Vedic sacrifices and ritualistic rites prescribed by the Sūtras and Smṛtis, with the expectation of their rewards in this or in the next world and the adherence to the duties of Varṇa and āśrama. Throughout his commentary on the *Gītā*, Śaṅkara denounces the possibility of effecting any synthesis (*samuuccaya*) between Karma and Jñāna, all the while defining the Karma in question, to himself, as Kāmyakarma. But he hardly ever envisages the possibility of a *true Samuccaya* between "Niṣkāma karma and ātma-jñāna. Indeed, he seems to deny even the name Karma to be given to the works performed by the enlightened soul as Lokasamgraha or the work of Kṛṣṇa himself as a Kṣatriya in upholding Dharma. But the whole emphasis of the Karma-Yoga of the *Gītā* is on recognizing the need for giving a reorientation to the concept of "Karma" and redeeming it from the spell of rewards and fruits, and making it possible for blending such exalted form of Karma with Jñāna. Śaṅkara is hardly fair to the spirit of the *Gītā* in denying the possibility of the synthesis of even such exalted form of "Niṣkāmakarma" with "Ātmajñāna",¹ of which Kṛṣṇa himself and persons like Janaka and Priyavrata were standing examples. Madhva's point in not accepting Jñānakarmasamuccaya is not due to any under-estimation of Niṣkāma-Karma as such; but to

1. सांख्यानां पृथक्करणात् अज्ञानामेव हि कर्मयोगः न ज्ञानिनाम् । ज्ञानिनां तु, गुणैरचाल्यमानानां स्वतश्चलनाभावात् कर्मयोगो नोपपद्यते (Śaṅkara G. B. iii, 5)

the unique place which Aparokṣa-Jñāna or direct vision of God occupies in his philosophy. The case is different with Rāmānuja to whom Dhyanā marks the highest stage of Sādhana which is but a mere approximation to direct vision; but is *not* actually a direct vision of the Lord. It is obviously for this reason that Rāmānuja pleads for a Samuccaya of Jñāna and Karma as Mokṣasādhanā. Among older Vedāntins, Bhāskara and Brahmaṇḍattha too are known to have supported the Jñānakarma-samuccayavāda.

Madhva resolves this apparent conflict between the so-called Karma and Jñāna Mārgas by enlarging the scope of Karma-Yoga as understood by Śāmkara and raising it to the level of a way of enlightened action (*niṣkāmam jñānaparvam karma*). He makes a vigorous plea¹ for enlightened spiritual activity *by all*, which cannot be binding in its consequences. There can be no true wisdom without such activity, at least for all of us, mortals, and no true Karma without enlightenment and devotion to God :

तत्कर्म हरितोषं यत् (*Bhāg.* iv, 29, 49)

यज्ञार्थात्कर्मणोऽन्यत्र लोकोऽयं कर्मवन्धनः (*Gītā*)

Madhva interprets the statement of the *Gītā* that there are two different groups of Adhikāris in the world, called Sāṃkhyas and Yogas, to mean that there are two *orders of beings* among the wise and eligible souls (i) the select 'few' (*Jñānanīṣṭhāḥ*) like Sanaka and other born-Yogins who pursue the path of knowledge to the exclusion of all Karma (in its external form): यहस्थाद्विकर्मयोगेन ज्ञाननिष्ठाः सनकादिकृत (*G. B.*) and (ii) all other enlightened beings, including some of the divinely appointed leaders of society like King Janaka, Priyavrata and others, who tho' highly enlightened, have been "commissioned by the Divine will to follow the path of active Karma² and serve as an example of disinterested

1. For an exposition of this topic, according to Madhva, see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 53-58.
2. King Priyavrata the God-intoxicated King had made up his mind to retire to the forest. Brahmadeva himself comes down to persuade the King to give up his resolution to renounce the world. He is charged by Brahmadeva to stick to his duties and responsibilities as a King, even tho' he is a highly enlightened Jñānin. The story of Priyavrata is given in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* Sk. V. 1). The relevant passage from the *Bhāg.* has been cited by Madhva, in his *G. B.* iii, 4.

action to their fellowmen and guide them (*lokasaṁgraha*).¹ The average run of humanity has, therefore, necessarily to work thro' Karma: कर्मणा ज्ञानमातनोति । ज्ञानेनासृतीभवति । But this Karma is not to be viewed in the narrow hedonistic or ritualistic sense of the Mimāmsakas. Madhva cuts the Gordian knot here, by distinguishing the Karma-Yoga of the *Gitā* from what the other philosophers call the Pravṛttimārga of the Vedas. He points out, on sound textual authority,² that the latter is deservedly censured in the *Gitā* and other Śastras and that true Nivṛtti-Mārga is *not* what the other commentators think it to be viz., the abandonment of all Karma, but its active performance in a spirit of devotion and dispassion :

निष्कामं ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निश्चलमिह चोच्यते (*Vyāsa-Smṛti*)

This is indeed the true spirit of "Sannyāsa" and Naishkarmya, inculcated in the *Gitā*. Hence it is that Madhva propounds a new theory of typical Vedic injunctions which are almost invariably followed by goodly promise of attractive rewards to come : ज्योतिष्ठेमेन स्वर्णकामो यजेत् । He suggests that the purpose of these prescriptions is, paradoxically enough, to wean us away from the attractions of perishable rewards and pull us up, gradually to a life of disinterested action (Niskāma Karma), even as a child is induced by its mother to take a medicinal dose of castor oil, by the tempting offer of sweets in reward.³ Jayatīrtha puts the case admirably: अनादिविषयवासनावासितान्तःकर्मणा न सहसा ज्ञानसाधने कर्मणि, प्रवर्तयितुं शक्यन्ते । अतस्तेषां

1. गृहस्थादिर्धर्मस्था एव ज्ञाननिष्ठाश्च । जनकादिवत् ज्ञाननिष्ठा अपि आधिकारिकत्वादी श्वेरच्छया लोकसंग्रहार्थत्वाच्च ये कर्मयोगा भवन्ति, तेऽपि योगिनः । त्वं तु, जनकादिवत् सकैमैव ज्ञानयोगः न तु तत्यागेनेत्यर्थः । सन्ति हीश्वरेच्छया कर्मकृतः प्रियब्रताद्ययोऽपि ज्ञानिनः । तथा ह्यकृतम्— “हीश्वरेच्छया विनिवेशितकर्माधिकारः” (*Bhāg v.* 1.23) इति ॥ (*M. G. B.* iii, 4)

2. Cf. passage from *Vyāsa Smṛti* cited by Madhva. The same passage occurs in the *Manu Smṛti* also. The *Kūrma Purāṇa* (i, 2, 64) also defines Nivṛtti Karma in the same terms and Rāmānuja in his *Śribhāṣya* has cited a similar passage from a Pañcarātra text :

“तस्मात्सम्भव्यक् पंखद्वया वासुदेवाख्यमव्ययम् । ”

अस्मादवाप्यते शास्त्रात् ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणा ॥

3. रोचनार्था फलश्रुतिः (*Bhāg*, xi, 3, 43).

कर्मप्यभिरुचिजननार्थं, 'स्वर्गकामः' इत्यादिभूतिः प्रवृत्ता । कर्मणि प्रवृत्तांरतु शनैः कामं त्याजयामी-त्यभिप्रायवती (G. B. i. p. 139). Madhva thus makes out that Scripture only enjoins *acts* but not also the pursuit of their rewards: अत एव कामी यजेतेत्यर्थः । न तु कामी भूत्वेत्यर्थः (G. B. ii, 47). Jayatīrtha brings out the technical point of the argument that it is only a *viśeṣyavidhi* and not a *Viśiṣṭavidhi*. The mandate is only with reference to the performance of the act but not also with reference to desire for the fruit thereof. The latter is mentioned in the *Vidhi* only by way of *anuyāda* or an allusion to what is even otherwise established and is not therefore intended to be specially enjoined: कामानुवादेन यजनं विवीथत इति यावत् । कामविशिष्टयजनविधाने तु नेत्यर्थः । We have bare injunctions in Scripture without any reference to the usual statement of rewards, as in वस्ते वस्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत् । विक्षेपिता यजेत् । which show that Scripture is not necessarily interested in the pursuit of rewards as the invariable objective of the performance of sacrifices enjoined by it. This line of interpretation (adopted by Madhva) has the support of the Advaitic commentator Śridhara Svāmin himself, who is much influenced by Madhva's views in this and in some other respects.

Even this *Niskāma Karma* which is, strictly speaking, the only kind of Karma that is philosophically admissible or effective — is not to be admitted as anything more than an accessory to spiritual realization. It is to be pursued for the purpose of acquiring the necessary mental purification: अकामकर्मणामन्तःकरणशुद्धया, ज्ञानान्मोक्षो भवति (G. B. iii, 4). The reason why Karma cannot be treated as an independent means of release is that it is by nature, irrepressibly found to be inexhaustible by the enjoyment of fruits. It breeds like bacteria. It is estimated that on an average, it takes at least ten future births for an individual to work out the amount of Karma accumulated by him from the fourteenth year of his life, in one birth:

आ चर्तुदशमाद्वर्षात् पुरुषो नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करोत्यग्म ।
स्त्रीवाप्यनूनदशकं देहं मानुषमाजयेत् ।
अतः कर्मक्षयान्मुक्तिः कुत एव भविष्यति । (B. S. B. iii, 1, 8)

1. See his C. on *Bhāg* (xi, 3, 45).

It would be a vain hope, then, to expect to work it out by enjoyment. The help of Jñāna is, therefore, indispensable to destroy or neutralize the latent effects of past Karma. Such a power of destroying the accumulated load of past Karma, or rendering it nugatory, is ascribed to the actual vision (*aparokṣajñāna*)¹ of God, thro' meditation (*dhyāna*). Madhva, therefore, regards enlightened activity (*Niśkāmakarma*) merely as contributing to such knowledge thro' Vairāgya, अकामकर्मभिरन्तःकरणशुद्धिद्वारा ज्ञानान्मोक्षो जायते (G. B. t. p. 200) [कर्म] योगस्तु अदृष्टद्वारा सत्कृद्धिमुम्पाद्य थवणादीनामुपकरोति (G. B. t. ii, 52). Karmayoga, then, is not at all a stumbling block to spiritual progress. It is not, by itself, binding in its effects as it depends on the motive behind it and the end in view with which it is performed. That is why Madhva maintains that *every approved activity after the dawn of Aparokṣa has its reward in the form of a welling up of spiritual bliss* (*ānandodreka*) and never goes in vain: 'न हास्य कर्मं क्षीयते' (Bṛh. Up. i, 4, 15) इति ज्ञानोत्तरमनुष्ठितेन निवृत्तकर्मणा प्रसन्नः परमात्मा मुक्तो ज्ञानान्विव्यक्तमपि सुखं व्यक्तीकरोति (G. B. t. p. 104).

Madhva is, thus, quite clear that disinterested activity, carried on in a spirit of devotion to God, is a powerful incentive to the acquisition of knowledge, which alone is the highest means of release. Karma and Dhyāna and others are just accessories to it: अतो अपरोक्षज्ञानादेव मोक्षः । कर्मं तु तत्साधनमेव ॥ (G. B. iii, 20) सर्वं निवृत्यादिकमन्तरा मध्ये ज्ञानमाधाय, मुक्तेः साधनं भवति । (G. B. t. iii, 31). There is no place, then, for the theory of Jñānakarmasamuccaya :

अत एव समुच्चयनियमो निराकृतः (G. B. iii, 32)

1. ज्ञानान्विः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुर्लोऽर्जुन (iv, 37). This applies only to such Karma as has not begun to bear fruit (*aprārabdha*).

CHAPTER XLVIII

CONCEPTION OF BHAKTI, ITS ORDERS AND KINDS.

*Madhya has given a unique place to Divine grace in his system, in making it the ultimate cause of self-realization and God-realization. But, then, the Deity has got to be moved to graciousness (*savyāpārikarā-pīyah*). This can only be done by Bhakti as the deepest attachment to the Lord, deeprooted and based on a clear understanding of His greatness and majesty, Jayatirtha has given us the most comprehensive definition of Bhakti, based on the above, in which the religious, philosophical and emotional aspects of devotion are beautifully integrated : परमेश्वरसक्तिनाम निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणतत्त्वानपूर्वकः स्वात्मसीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽनन्तगुणाधिकोऽन्तरायसह-
क्लेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धः निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाहः || (NS.)*

Bhakti is, thus, the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to God, impregnable by any amount of impediments and transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin, cherished belongings etc. and fortified by a firm conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and by an unshakable conviction of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon Him. *This definition can be accepted as a classical definition of Bhakti.*

Such Bhakti is necessary to manifest the natural and intrinsic relationship of Pratibimbatva of the souls to God, which lies dormant in the state of bondage. *Madhya has been the only Bhāṣyakāra on the Vedānta Sūtras, who has thought it fit to give Bhakti a locus standi in the Sūtras.* This is as it should be if the *Brahmasūtras* are to be a complete and self-contained exposition of Badarāyaṇa's philosophical system, embodying all the principal aspects of his thought, derived from the Upaniṣadic and other sources. In view of the clear and significant contribution that the early metrical Upaniṣads like the *Kaṭha* and *Svetāśvatara* had made to the doctrine of Bhakti in the Upaniṣads, it would be impossible to brush aside the concept of Bhakti as something either unknown to the Sūtrakāra or as a topic that he did not consider such an important Sādhana of Mokṣa, in

1. माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वस्तु भुद्दः सर्वतोऽधिकः ।

स्नेहो भक्तिरिति प्रोक्तः तथा सुकितर्न चान्यथा ॥

(*Mbh. T. N. i. 86.*)

his philosophy of Theism ! The only rightful place for dealing with the topic will be in the third or *Sādhana-Adhyāya*. That earlier commentators on the Sūtras like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja have not been able to find a place for Bhakti within the body of the Sūtras shows nothing more than a defect in their inherited traditions of interpretation or in their way of approach to the Sūtras: व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिः नहि सन्देहादलक्षणम् ! There is bound to be general agreement that Bādarāyana is presenting a philosophy of Theism in his Sūtras. It will be a strange type of Indian Theism, indeed, that he will have expounded in his work on the basis of the Hindu Scriptures, if he had decided to ignore the doctrine of Bhakti altogether in his chapter on Sādhanas, in his great work ! Even the Saguṇa-Brahmavāda accommodated by Śaṅkara, in his interpretation of the Sūtra cannot afford to ignore the doctrine of Bhakti as a major Sādhana. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the failure of the Pre-Madhva commentators to find a right and rightful place for introducing the topic of Bhakti within the Sādhanā dhyāya must be accepted as a serious omission and Madhva must be given special credit for having made good this omission and filled this gap in the Theistic philosophy of the Sūtras.

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1. The argument that, as Bhakti has been fully elucidated in the *Gītā*, it need not be dealt with in the Sūtras would be of no avail when it is remembered that the Sūtras are anterior to the *Gītā* (xiii, 4). As for the Pañcārātras, one would expect the Sūtrakāra who feels called upon to discuss its Vyūha doctrine in the Sūtras (according to Śaṅkara and Rāmānnja) to be equally solicitous of the claims of Bhakti vs. Jñāna. It would be very strange, indeed, if the Sūtras should leave out "Bhakti" while discussing so many sundry and comparatively less important topics of Sādhana and Upāsanā, besides many topics dealt with threadbare in the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā* itself, — such as the ways of exit. Nothing but a sort of prejudice against Madhva can be responsible for the general reluctance of many scholars still to give proper credit to Madhva where his interpretations are decidedly better than those of his predecessors. (See for e.g. some remarks of Svami Adidevananda in his review of my *History of Dvaita School of Ved. and Its Lit.*, Vol. I, in the *Prabuddha-Bhārata* (May, 1961).

The point in Madhva's insistence on माहात्म्यज्ञान as one of the constituents of Bhakti is that a blind and ignorant devotion is of no philosophical worth. Since the function of Bhakti is to manifest the true relation of Jiva to Brahman, it must naturally be properly informed about that true relation, which presupposes a right knowledge of the majesty and greatness of God as the One Svatantra. Hence, Bhakti has to be enriched by study, reflection and concentration :

पानेन ते देव कथासुधारायाः प्रदृढभक्त्या विशदासाया ये ।
वैराग्यसारं प्रतिलभ्य बोधं यथांजसा त्वापुरकुण्ठधिष्यम् ॥
(*Bhāg.* iii, 5, 45)

We must, therefore, first of all, enlarge the horizon of our knowledge of God thro' a wide range of study¹ (*śravāna*) : शुद्धभावं गतो भक्त्या शास्त्राद्वेद्यि जनार्दनम् (*Mbh.* iv.) Bhakti is, thus, not a mere wave of sentimentalism or Emotionalism, to Madhva. It is the outcome of patient study and deep reflection : ज्ञानधारानुगृहीतम् as Rāmānuja (*G. B.* ix. p. 65) puts it. It presupposes a certain amount of knowledge in the same way as the pursuit of knowledge needs the urge of devotion : विना ज्ञानं कुतो भक्तिः कुतो भावित विना च तत् (*G. B.* ix, 31). Madhva also demands a high degree of moral perfection from the true devotee of God. He affirms that there can be no true devotion to God without a real sense of moral purity, sincerity of purpose and detachment to worldly pleasures. One cannot serve two masters. True devotion to God would be impossible without the cultivation of a natural distaste for the pleasures of the world. It is one of the constitutive elements of true devotion :

भक्तिः परे स्वेऽनुभवो विरक्तिः—
रन्यत्र चैष त्रिक एककाळः (*Bhāg.* xi, 2, 42).
स शठमतिस्मयाति योऽर्थतृष्णां
तमधमचेष्टमवेहि नास्य भक्तम् । (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* iii, 7, 30)
सा श्रद्धानस्य विवर्धमाना।
विरक्तिमन्यत्र करोति पुंसः ॥

1. नावेदविन्मनुते तं बहन्तम् (*T. B.* iii, 12, 9, 7)

ओपनिषदः पुरुषः (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 9, 26.)

Ācāra or purity of life, in all its aspects, is thus the *sine qua non* of true devotion and knowledge. Devotion without such purity will be a travesty: अतोऽन्यः कथिद्भवति चेत् दांभिकत्वेन सोऽनुमेयः । (G. B. ix, 31). Complete control of the passions of the flesh, calmness of mind, impartiality of conduct and love of God are emphasized by Madhva as the pre-requisites of devotion and knowledge :

गुणानि चत्वारि यथागमं मे शत्रौ च मित्रै च समोऽस्मि नित्यम् ।

तं चापि देवं शरणं प्रपञ्च एकान्तभावेन भजाम्यजस्मम् ॥

एतैविशेषैः परिशुद्धसत्त्वः कस्माच्च पश्येयमनन्तमेनम् ?

(*Mbh.* xii, 343, 3, Q. Madhva, G.B.).

He emphasizes two aspects of devotion : the positive and the negative. The positive has been dealt with by Jayatīrtha in the definition of Bhakti quoted before. It is worthy of note that the theory and practice of Bhakti, as taught by Madhva and his followers, are free from all traces of erotic manifestations, which dominate or at least color the conception of Bhakti in certain forms of North Indian Vaiṣṇavism, like those of Jayadeva, Caitanya and Vallabha. This sensuous and passionate side of it is first to be met with in the writings of the Tamil Vaiṣṇavas (Ālvārs) who preceded Rāmānuja, in the South ; wherein the love of God is placed on terms of the tender quality softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love and wherein we come across most of those pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been systematically reviewed and vividly described in the works of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. But Madhva's conception of Bhakti avoids these emotional excesses and identifications and remains at its exalted intellectual and spiritual level of firm philosophic devotion to the Supreme Lord of the Universe who is to be worshipped with loving attachment as the Bimba of all Pratibimbas (Jīvas). But it is not, on that account, lacking in intensity of fervor and feeling. For, Madhva has recognized, in the clearest terms, that Bhakti is in essence an ineffable blending of the emotion and the intellect, He gives expression to the intensity of his love God in its sublime and raptu-

rous aspects in the benedictory and concluding stanzas of his works. This abiding aspect of his teaching found fuller expression in the writings of his great followers in the Haridāsa Kūṭa such as Śrīpādarāja, Vyāsārāya, Purandara Dāsa, Vijayadāsa and others. The following verse from the *Harikathāmṛtasāra* of Jagannātha Dāsa furnishes a fine example of how readily God responds to the call of the heart :

“मलगि परमादरादि पाडलु
 कुळितु केलुव, कुळितु पाडलु
 निलुव, निन्तरे नलिव, नलिदरे ओलिवे निमगेम्ब ।
 सुलभनो हरि तश्वरनरे-
 घलिगे बिद्धगलनु रमाधव-
 नोलिसलरियेद पामररु बळ्लुवरु भवदोळगे । ” (*Kannada*)

“ God listens seated, to the Bhakta
 That sings to Him in ecstasy, lying down.
 He stands and listens to the one
 Who sings to Him, seated comfortably.
 He comes dancing unto him that sings standing.
 To him that dances and sings,
 God says ‘ I'll show Myself to him’
 Verily, Hari is most accessible to his own
 Never for a moment does He stay away from them.
 But fools caught in Samsāra
 Know not how to make Him their Own. ”

(*Harikathāmṛtasāra*, ii, 5)

But the possibilities of erotic devotion, as a means of contacting the Divine, are not unknown to him. Madhva's peculiar doctrine of intrinsic gradation of fitness among various orders of souls enables him to correlate the different forms of devotion to different orders of selves. In his view, Kāma-Bhakti or erotic devotion is the special privilege of Apsarases and ought not to be practised by others. He indicates a variety of stand-points of devotion with reference to different orders of Jīvas and harmonizes the various accounts on the basis of *adhikāras*:

(1) स्नेहभक्ताः सदा देवाः कामित्वेनाप्सरःस्त्रियः ।

काश्चिक्ताश्चिच्छ कामेन भक्त्या केवलयैव तु ।

मोक्षमायान्ति नान्येन भवित योग्यां विना क्वचित् ॥ (*Pādma*)

(2) भक्त्या वा कामभक्त्या वा मोक्षो नान्येन केनचित् ।

कामभक्त्याप्सरःस्त्रीणामन्येषां नैव कामतः ।

उपास्यः श्वशुरत्वेन देवस्त्रीणां जनार्दनः ।

जारत्वेनाप्सरःस्त्रीणां कासांचिदिति योग्यता ।

योग्योपासां विना नैव मोक्षः कस्यापि सेत्याति ।

अयोग्योपासनाकर्तुर्निरयश्च भविष्यति ।

तस्मात् योग्यतां ज्ञात्वा हरेःकार्यमुपासनम् ॥ (*Bhadrikā*)

(3) पतित्वेन श्रियोपास्यो ब्रह्मणा मे पितोति च ।

पितामहतयान्येषां त्रिदशानां जनार्दनः ।

प्रपितामहो मे भगवानिति सर्वजनस्य तु ।

गुरुः श्रीब्रैह्मणो विष्णुः सुराणां च गुरोर्गुरुः ।

मूलभूतो गुरुः सर्वजनानां पुरुषोत्तमः ।

गुरुलीङ्गास्य जगतो दैवं विष्णुः सनातनः ।

इत्येवोपासनं कार्यं नान्यथा तु कथंचन ॥ (*Vāraha*)

(*Madhva, B. T. X, 17, 28-36*)

Devotion being a state of loving attachment: माहात्म्यज्ञानस्नेहसमुदायो हि भक्तिरित्युक्तम् (*N.S*) born of knowledge and regard for the object of devotion¹, it will be obvious that no contrary emotion of positive dislike or hatred of God could be taken to help in the attainment of *Mokṣa*, notwithstanding the presence of certain stray passages in the *Purāṇas* stating that certain persons had reached God even thro' aversion and hate:

गोप्यः कामाद्वयात्कंसो द्वेषाच्छ्रव्यादयो चृपाः

संबन्धाद्वृष्ट्यायः सख्याद्यूयं भक्त्या वयं विभोः ॥

(*Bhāg. VII, 1, 30*)

दैरेण यं तृपतयः शिशुपालपौण्ड्र—

साल्वादयो गतिविलासविलोकनादैः ।

भ्यायत्त आकृताधियः शयनासनादौ

तत्साम्यमीमुकुरकृताधियः पुनः किम् ॥ (*Bhāg. xi, 5, 48.*).

कामाद्वेषाद्वयात्स्नेहाद्यथा भक्त्येष्वरं मनः ।

आविश्य तदव्यं हित्वा बहवस्तद्रत्तिं गताः ॥ (*Bhāg. vii, 1, 29*).

कामं कोवे भयं स्नेहं मैत्रीं सौहृदमेव च ।

नित्यं हरौ विदधते यान्ति तन्मयतां हि ते ॥ ()

1. Cf. ‘स्नेहपूर्वमनुध्यानं भक्तिरित्याभिधीयते’। महनीशविषये प्रीतिरेव हि भक्तिरिति भावः। अन्यथा, स्नेहपूर्वप्रियतमानुध्यानस्यापि भक्तित्वप्रसंगात् ।

(*R. G. B. t. vii, 1*)

Such passages ought to be treated as *arthavāda*, says Madhva :

द्वेषाद्यन्मुक्तिकथनं श्रुतिवाक्यविरोधि तत् ॥ (AV).

They are meant to emphasize that God should somehow be kept in mind, always. “द्वेषाच्चैवादयो नृगः * * * इति भक्तप्रियतनशापनार्थं नित्यायानस्तुत्यं च, स्वभक्तनस्य कदाचिन्द्यापवलात् द्वेषिणोऽपि भक्तिकलमेव भगवान् ददातीति । भक्ता एव हि ते पूर्वं शिष्यापालादयः शापवलात् द्वेषिणः * * * (M. G. B. ix 12). The acceptance of “Dvesha Bhakti” (hatred of God) as a possible means of salvation¹ will be quite inconsistent with the prevailing spirit of the Śāstras which is to bring out the majesty of God. If the Scriptures meant to teach that God can be reached by cultivating hatred against Him they should have expatiated upon His demerits and imperfections instead of on His great and infinite perfections, as they do. Madhva, therefore, strongly disapproves of “द्वेषभक्ति”. The *NS* and the *Sannyāyaratnāvali* undertake to show that none of the contexts and instances cited above is able to contradict the fundamental position of the Vedas that Mokṣa could not be obtained save by loving devotion.

Devotion, then, to be meaningful and justifiable must be founded upon a firm and adequate knowledge of the merits of the object of such devotion :

ज्ञानपूर्वः परः स्नेहो नित्यो भक्तिरितीर्थते (*Mbh. T.N.* p. 5).

Madhva speaks of three different types of devotees (1) Uttama-Bhaktas (2) Madhyama and (3) Adhama, according to the nature and intensity

1. *Contrast:* तैसा चि गोपीर्सीं सकामें । तेया कंसा भयसंब्रमें ।

एरा धातके मनोधर्में शिशुपाळां ॥

आगा भी एकु लाणिचें खागें । मज एउटो ये भलेतेणे मारें ।

भक्ती कां विषयवैरागें । अथवा वैरें ॥

म्हणौनि पाईं । प्रवेशावेया माझां ठाईं ।

उपायाची नाहिं । केणि एथें ॥ (*Jñāneśvari* ix, 465-67)

of devotion characteristic of them. (*B.T.* XI, 2, 42-45). He insists further that devotion, to be impregnable, must be guarded against the insidious influences of various forms of anti-theistic tendencies :

जीवाभेदो निर्गुणत्वं अपूर्णगुणता तथा ।
साम्याधिकेये तदन्येषां भेदस्तद्रत्त एव च ॥
प्रादुर्भावविपर्यासः तद्वक्तव्येष एव च ।
तत्प्रमाणस्य निन्दा च द्वेषा एतेऽखिला मताः ।
एतैर्विहीना या भक्तिः सा भक्तिरिति निश्चिता ॥

(*Mbh. T. N. i*, 113-15).

Bhakti, then, is the outcome of a profound admiration for Divine majesty coupled with a spontaneous love and regard for the Supreme. It cannot be dissociated from knowledge. *But this knowledge of God is not the cold intellectual apprehension of Reality.* It is a vivid perception of the Supreme Reality as the pivot of one's own reality, consciousness and bliss (सत्ताप्रतीतिप्रश्नतिनिमित्तम्), with the *utmost warmth of love and attraction for one's own Bimba that the soul is capable of.*

Bhakti of the right kind is thus a *blend* of both knowledge and love :

ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभागत्वात् भक्तिर्ज्ञानभितीर्थते ।
ज्ञानस्यैव विशेषो यत् भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥
परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वे विशेषौ ज्ञानगौ यथा (*AV*)

Jñāna is a constituent of Bhakti. For this reason, the latter is very often referred to as "Jñāna" itself, in the Śāstras. Where, however, the distinctive aspect of attachment is sought to be emphasized, their fusion is designated by the term "Bhakti" but they are basically aspects of the same thing; even as mediacy and immediacy are but the integral aspects of knowledge. Texts in Scripture which refer to Jñāna as the means of release have therefore to be interpreted as inclusive of the aspect of Bhakti also and *vice versa*. If this basic

affinity between the two is properly understood and kept in mind, much of the controversy regarding the claims of Bhakti and Jñāna to be regarded as the immediate means of release would vanish. *Madhva has shown ably that they are but different aspects of the same approach with more or less an interpenetrative content.*

Madhva insists, further, that due regard must be paid to the principles of Tāratamya in respect of the nature and extent of devotion to be shown to the hierarchy of devotees (of the Supreme) among the gods and men :

तारतम्येन तद्वक्तेष्वपि भक्तिविनिश्चयात् ।

कर्णवैष्णवपि तद्वक्तिर्लोकवेदानुसारतः ॥

तस्मात् पूज्याश्च नम्याश्च अद्येश्च परितो हरिम् ॥ (*AV.* p. 52)

अतो विष्णौ पराभाक्तिः तद्वक्तेषु रमादिपु ।

तारतम्येन कर्तव्या पुरुषार्थमभीप्सता ।

समेषु स्वात्मवत् स्नेहः सत्सन्ध्यन् ततो दया ।

कार्यैवमापरोक्षेण दद्यते क्षिप्रमीश्वरः ॥ (*AV.* p. 41)

He also distinguishes three stages of Bhakti (1) that *precedes* Parokṣajñāna ; (2) one that *follows* it ; and (3) a third that comes *after* direct realization (*Aparokṣajñāna*) and wins the absolute grace (*atyarthaprasāda*) of God. It is this final stage of Bhakti that fully manifests, by the grace of God, the true relationship between the Jīva and Brahman and completes the aim of realization, viz. the manifestation of intrinsic bliss. These three stages are designated by Jayatīrtha as *Bhakti*, *Pakvabhakti* and *Paripakvabhakti*. The last one is an end in itself (*NS.* p.605). It is most impressively described by Madhva himself as :

भक्त्या ज्ञानं ततो भक्तिः ततो दण्डिस्ततश्च सा ।

ततो मुक्तिस्ततो भक्तिः सैव स्यात् सुखरूपिणी ॥

(*AV.* p. 41).

Here is a very striking and an almost unique feature of Madhva's philosophy of Bhakti, whose inspiration may be traced in the writings of the Mystics of Mahārāshtra and the Gosvāmis of the Caitanya school. It views sublime Bhakti, not as a means to an end, but *as an end in itself*. The light of Bhakti shines brightly, not only on this side of release ; but on the other shore of Mokṣa as well. *For the relation between the individual soul and the Supreme Being is not something that is snapped in release.* For, this relation is not something that is extrinsic to the nature of the soul and imposed from outside by Upādhis, as in the Advaita system. It is, to Madhva, a sacred relation that holds good for all time ; something that is rooted in the very nature and being (*svarūpa*) of the soul. Its destruction would mean the destruction of the Jīva. It is a unique relation, a spiritual bond which is indestructible. It is the relation which the great Tamil poet-Saint Tāyumānavar so well puts it as:

Enru nān anru nī ; un ađimai allavo¹

Mukti is merely the shaking off of what is extrinsic to one's nature and reposing in one's own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic spiritual relation between the human spirit and God is so dynamic in its magnetism that the attraction of the latter becomes more fully manifested in release than in Samsāra. Indeed, it breaks thro' and finds expression there, in a thousand ways, which are beyond our understanding and analysis from here ! Surely, it is not open to us, in Samsāra, to peep into the released state and try to describe in detail the behavior of the blessed ones in release, towards the Lord or towards one another. That state of blessedness is obviously something beyond our comprehension in its richness and glory.

It is what the *Bhāgavāta Purāna* refers to as the intrinsic devotion of God-intoxicated souls like Sanaka, who feel a natural bond of attraction to the Lord and go on practising Bhakti even after *Siddhi* (Mokṣa) :

1. Cf. "I and Thou are coeval

But then am I not your slave ?"

नित्यो नित्याना चेतनश्चेतनानामेको वहूना यो विद्धाति कामान् ।

तमात्मस्थे ये उपश्यन्ति धीराः तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् (*Kaṭha Up.*)

आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्गीन्या अप्युरुषमे ।

कुर्वन्त्यहैतुकीं भक्तिं इत्थंभूतशुणो हरिः ॥ (i. 7, 10)

and who decline even the special status of Sayujya and other forms of Mukti and are quite content with their joy of devotional surrender (*ātmanivedana*).

नैकात्म्यतां मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित् (*Bhāg.* iii, 25, 34)

* * * * एकत्वमप्युत ।

दीयमानं न गृणहन्ति * * * * ॥ (*Op. cit.* iii, 29, 13)

Madhva himself, in the supreme mood of his ecstatic devotion of this kind, gives expression to this same exalted feeling, at the conclusion of his *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, thereby giving us a glimpse of the ripe maturity of his true devotion to the Lord :

यः सर्वशुणसंपूर्णः सर्वदोषविवर्जितः ।

प्रीयतां प्रीत एवालं विष्णुर्मे परमः सुहृत् ॥

CHAPTER XLIX

DHYANA AND ITS PLACE.

Madhva accepts the position of many Scriptural texts that direct perception of God (Aparoksadarśana) alone is the proximate cause of release from Samsāra : Cf. 'दृष्ट्वैव ते मुच्यते' ; 'यदा पश्यः पश्यते स्कमर्णम्' ; 'भक्त्या त्वनन्यथा ग्राह्य अहमेवंविद्धो * * * * ; द्रष्टु च तत्त्वेन * * * * But inasmuch as God is essentially incomprehensible (*avyakta*) in the fulness of His majesty, He cannot be visualized save by His favor (B.S. iii, 2, 23-27). Once favorably inclined, He reveals Himself (*vivṛpate tanūn svām*), in any subtle form. The grace of God, which is the ultimate means of realizing Him, can only be obtained by prolonged contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) of His perfections, with steadiness and devotion, to the best of one's capacity. Such contemplation of the Divine presupposes a preliminary study of the Scriptures (*Śravaṇa*), which has then to be supplemented by deep thinking or reflection (*manana*), in order to clear the mind of all uncertainty and misconceptions that may be lurking there from time immemorial and whose presence will retard the constancy and flow of devotion. Hence the need for systematic philosophic inquiry and logical ascertainment of truth (*jijñāsā* or *vicāra*). The special attention given by Mādhva philosophers to dialectic establishment of their Siddhānta and the refutation of rival theories has, thus, to be understood in the light of an indispensable necessity imposed by the very conditions of philosophic inquiry. It is not inspired by a love of controversy as such or a desire to find fault with others.

The knowledge acquired by study and stabilized by *manana* is then made the basis of steady contemplation :

श्रुत्वा मत्वा तथा आत्मा तदज्ञानविपर्ययौ ।

संशयं च पराण्य लभते ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥

This combination of Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana is termed

"Jijñāsā." The last stage of the inquiry may take the form of Dhyāna or contemplation: अविच्छिन्नपरोक्षज्ञानसंतातिः (*TP.* iii, 3, 52), of certain chosen attributes of God or a profound rumination over the truths of Śāstras (Śāstrābhāṣa) whose import has been definitely settled: (निर्णीतस्य श्रवणादिकं समाचरेत् *NS.* 536 b) The contemplation of Śāstrārtha is thus treated by Madhva as an independent form of Upāsanā, taught by the Upaniṣads: स्वाध्यायप्रवचने एवेति नाको मौद्रल्पः । तद्दि तपः (*Taitt. Up.* i, 9). It is pointed out that such study and reflection should be continued till all doubts are set at rest. The chosen Guru alone would be competent to fix the time-limit up to which they should be carried on. (*NS.* p. 535) Where such a perfect Guru is not available, one may study the original Śāstras whose import has been fixed by authentic persons.

The study of Śāstras is partly also an aid to contemplation. The other forms of spiritual discipline are Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Prāṇāyāma, Pratyāhāra and Dhāraṇa taught by the Yoga Śāstra. These are to be treated as accessories to Dhyāna.

Dhyāna, defined as अविच्छिन्नपरोक्षज्ञानसंतातिः, is virtually the same as the state of Samādhi or introspection taught by the Yoga system. These three stages of spiritual advance of Śravana, Manana and Dhyāna correspond to the stages of learning (*pāṇḍitya*), reflection (*mauna*) and introspection (*brāhmaṇya*) referred to in the famous Upaniṣadic text: तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य¹ बाल्येन तिष्ठेत् । बाल्ये च पाण्डित्ये च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरसौनं च मौनं चाथ निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः * * * (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 5, 1)

1. Madhva has pointedly rejected the view accepted by most of the modern scholars and translators of the Upaniṣad, that "a Brahmin should become disgusted with learning" (*Hume, Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 112). He points out (*G.B.* ii, 52) that if a turning away in mental aversion (*vairāgya*) from पाण्डित्य, बाल्य and मौन had been intended to be conveyed by the text, it would have used the proper grammatical case: पाण्डित्यात् निर्विद्य

CHAPTER L

PRATIKOPĀSANĀ

There are numerous texts in the *Āranyakas* and *Upaniṣads* which prescribe, almost at random, the meditation of any physical, adhidaiva or other principles as *Brahman* : नाम ब्रह्मोत्युपासीत । उदरं ब्रह्मोत्युपासते शार्कराक्ष्याः । आदित्यो ब्रह्मोत्यादेशः । अधिदैवतं आकाशो ब्रह्मेति । ओमित्येतदक्षरसुदीथमुपासीत । मनो ब्रह्मोत्युपासीत । अब्रं ब्रह्मोति व्यजानात् । These numerous identifications of the *adhibhautika*, *adhyātma* and other essences with *Brahman* thro' *vibhakti-sāmānādhikaranya* (case-apposition) very naturally raises the question : whether they are meant to be taken as a meditation of their identity (*abhedopāsanā*). The usual answer given to this question is that such texts are to be taken as prescribing " *Pratikopāsanā*" or symbolic meditation. For the sake of efficacy of meditation, these various objects of meditation are to be ' *treated*' as *Brahman*, for the nonce. In other words, the idea of *Brahman* is to be mentally *superimposed* on them, so that they could be viewed and meditated upon in an enhanced status. This is Śāṅkara's explanation of what constitutes *Pratikopāsanā* : ईर्दृशं चात्र ब्रह्मण उपास्यत्वं, यत्प्रतीकेषु तददृश्यव्यारोपणम् । प्रतिमादिव्यव विष्वादीनाम् ॥ Rāmānuja also agrees with Śāṅkara's interpretation of *Pratikopāsanās* that in respect of such *Upāsanās* as मनो ब्रह्मोत्युपासीत it is not *Brahman* that is the true object of meditation, but only the mind and other objects and that as it is conducive to prosperity to look upon and treat the inferior as superior, as in looking upon the King's servant as the King, even so,

Contd.—

(*Pān.* ii, 3, 28). That apart, it is absurd to suggest that true Jñānins ever get tired of or fed up with hearing, knowing and reflecting more and more about God : न हि तत्रैव वैराग्यमुपश्यते । न च ज्ञानिनां भगवन्महिमादिश्रवणे विरक्तिभवति । अतुष्टानाच्च शुकादीनाम् । न च तेषां तत्कर्णं सुखं नास्ति । तत्यैव महत्पुष्पत्वात् ॥ It is interesting to note that Śāṅkara also in his *G.B.* (ii, 11) has cited the *Bṛh Up.* text in a sense which is fully in agreement with Madhva's. See Śāṅkara *B.S.B.* iii., 4, 47. (Cf. also : पाण्डित्यं पण्डितभावमात्मज्ञानं निर्विद्यं निश्चयेन लब्ध्वा (Ānandagiri on above).

for purposes of meditation, the mind and other objects are to be meditated upon as Brahman.¹

Madhva's views are quite different here. He refuses to countenance the idea of any superimposition of *Brahma-dṛṣṭi* on any Pratika, however sacred or exalted it may be: न प्रतीके न हि सः । 'नाम ब्रह्मेयुपासीत' इत्यादिना शब्दभारत्या न प्रतीके ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कार्या । (B.S.B. iv, 1, 4.) The proper way of Upāsanā of any Pratika is to meditate on Brahman as being present *in it*: किन्तु, तत्स्थलवै उपासनं कार्यम् ॥ (B.S. iv, 1, 4). It is but natural to expect the mystic way of speaking in regard to so profound a subject-matter as God-realization and the means thereof, in the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* which are noted for their love of secrecy and esotericism :

परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः प्रत्यक्षद्विषः ॥

Even in the writings of modern mystics, the tendency to resort to mystic modes of expression is not rare. Madhva derives the key to the proper interpretation of the subject of Pratikopāsanā in Vedānta from the famous passage of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (iii, 2, 3) which he quotes in his works : एतं द्येव बहुचा महत्युक्ते मीमांसन्ते, एतमग्नौ अश्वर्णवः, एतं महावते छद्मोगाः, एतमस्यामेत दिवि, एतमाकाशे, एतमाग्ने, एतमोषधीषु, सर्वेषु भूतोच्चेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते ॥² It is interesting to note that the expression मीमांसन्ते occurring in the above passage has been explained by Śaṅkara also in his commentary on B.S. i, 1, 15 as "Upāsanā." This shows that *Madhva represents correctly and faithfully the genuine tradition of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic Seers in regard to the principles and technique of Brahmopāsanā.*

While repudiating the view that the Pratika should be meditated upon as "Ātman" Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are ready not only to condone but to approve of a conscious superimposition of the idea of the Upāsya (Brahman) on the object chosen for meditation on the ground that it

1. ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या मन आदिस्पास्यः । अपकुट्टे उत्कृष्टद्विरभ्युदयाय भवति । यथा भूत्यादौ राजहष्टिः ।

(Vedāntadīpa, iv, 1, 5).

2. 'It is this Paramātman indeed that the votaries of Ṛg Veda meditate upon in the great Ukttha, the Adhvaryus in the fire, the Chaudogas in the Mahāvrata; Him in Heaven, in the Ākāśa, in the waters; in the oṣadhīs and in all beings'.

would serve to enhance the status of the Pratīka. But while such meditation may enhance the status of the Pratīka, it would almost certainly lower the status of Brahman; for in allowing ourselves to think of and meditate on a limited object or symbol as God, there is a great danger of *spiritual fall*. There will be no escaping the fact that when one meditates upon one thing as another, the identity will apply both ways. It is therefore flimsy to talk of meditating upon any Pratīka whatsoever as Brahman :

ध्याते त्वेकस्य तद्भावे, तद्भावोऽन्यस्य किं न तत्?

तस्मादपश्च सर्वमन्यस्य ब्रह्मतावचः ॥ (AV. p. 55 b.)

As a true Theist, Madhva feels that he cannot be a party to any interpretation of the Sūtra : ब्रह्मदृष्टिस्तकर्षीत् (iv, 1, 5), which will either condone or approve of any conscious superimposition of the idea of Brahman on any symbol or Pratīka used in meditations. That will, he feels, be a virtual sanction of idolatry :

तस्मादतत्त्वं नोपास्यमिति वेदविदां मतम् (AV).

No Christian missionary could have been more critical of the profanity of idol worship than Madhva has been, here. If one should plead that in such meditations we tend to annihilate the Pratīka as such, we have only to say that it is hardly a fact. For, if we really do so, there would be no talk of Pratīkopāsanā as such, as the Pratīka itself would not be there, any longer: स्वरूपोपमदेच नामादीनां, कुतः प्रतीकत्वम्? For these and other reasons, Madhva discards the interpretation given by Śamkara and Rāmānuja for this Sūtra (iv, 1, 5) and finds a better interpretation for it by treating it as constituting a new *adhikarana*. According to his interpretation, the Supreme Being should always be meditated upon as BRAHMAN i.e. as being endowed with infinite attributes and as transcending all.

In meditating on Brahman, the devotee may concentrate on one or more attributes of divinity according to his spiritual fitness and capa-

city. The highest number of attributes open to human comprehension are four,¹ tho' the Scriptures posit an infinite number of attributes of the Supreme Being (Human) souls that can *not* concentrate on more than one attribute are termed "Tr̥pa-Jīvas" by Madhva. The range of attributes upon which superhuman souls like the gods² and the R̥ṣis can meditate is much wider and only the four-faced Brahmā can meditate on most of them :

सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति मातुरैषु ; स्तेष्वरैः ।

यथाक्रमं बहुगुणैः ब्रह्मणा त्वदिलैर्गुणैः ॥

उपास्यः * * * * * (*Apu-Bhāṣya*)

This sort of contemplative correlation and sublimation of both positive and negative attributes of the Divine Being is known as "Guṇopasamhāra" :

एवं गुणान् सर्वदोषाभावांश्च यत्नतः ।

योजयित्वैव भगवानुपास्यः * * * ॥ (*Madhva, B. S. B.*)

Madhva says further that among all the attributes of Brahman, to be meditated upon, the attribute of "Bhūmatva", infinitude, is the chief one which is to be meditated upon in unison with the other attributes like ānanda. In other words, each one of the attributes of Brahman, chosen for meditation is to be viewed as *infinite* in range and content. The Upanisads represent Brahman as Bhūma, and Pūrṇa in every

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1. Of, "There are only two attributes of God of which we, humans, have any knowledge at all. The being of God is *not* however confined within the limits of human experience. Our knowledge of God is real so far as it goes. But reality is beyond us. There are an infinite number of other aspects of the Deity along which we cannot travel, since we are restricted to two lines of approach only, viz., mind and matter." W. G. Bond. *Three Things That Matter-Religion, Philosophy and Science*, p. 73, Watts, London,
 2. According to Madhva, the *Brahmasūtras* as "Para-Vidyā" are meant for the benefit of the gods also. Hence, the details therein, of Guṇopasamhāra by them also, Reference to the mode of Laya of the gods preparatory to their release (*B. S.* iv, 2, 1-16) as interpreted by Madhva, which V. S. Ghate finds unaccountable, is also to be similarly understood. As the *B. S.* discuss the fitness and the right of the "gods" to Brahnavidya, these other questions concerning their Sādhana and goal, raised by Madhva, should cause no surprise !

respect and emphasize the contemplation of this distinctive aspect as the source of the highest spiritual realization : यो वै भूमा तत्त्वं नात्ये सुखमस्ति । भूमैव सुखम् । (*Chān. Up.* vii, 23). Human intelligence may be unable to form a precise idea of the infiniteness of any attribute of God. The conception of such infinitude may also differ according to different levels of comprehension. There is however nothing to feel absolutely sceptic about forming some idea of what it would be like, within the limits of our own understanding. Jayatīrtha gives us a good example. Tho' infinite is the number of years and the number of months that must have gone by since the beginning of time, we are still able to conceive of some difference in the infinitude of these two ideas of infinitude. The same is the case with the different conceptions of the infinite attributes of God which different Adhikārins are able to form.

CHAPTER LI

BIMBOPĀSANĀ

As already pointed out, the eternal and intimate relation in which individual souls stand to the Paramātman is conceived by Madhva as a peculiar metaphysical relation of constant dependence of the Jivas on Brahman, not merely in respect of their external outfit of body and senses etc., but even in regard to their very being and becoming. This relation, it has been stated already, is something that is intrinsic to the very nature of the souls and has nothing physical about it. It is difficult to express it in terms of any other relation within our empirical grasp. The term "Bimbapratibimbabhāva (Original and Reflection) which has been suggested for it, by Madhva, is to be taken as the nearest parallel to it in our experience. It is not, however, to be taken literally as depending on any external factor or condition (Upādhi), as in the Advaita school, which would at once render it a conditioned relation and therefore terminable. It is, to Madhva, an indissoluble and perpetual relation (Svarūpasambandha). It is a relation of intrinsic dependence of the Jiva and his essential characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss. It is coeval with the Jiva (यावदात्मभावित) and becomes fully manifested in release. The bondage of Samsāra is itself due to this relation being missed by the Jiva and becoming obscured by a false sense of independence in respect of his *Sattā, pratīti and pravṛtti*. No wonder that among the various forms of Upāsanā, the meditation on the Bimba-aspect of the Lord has been stressed by Madhva as the *sine qua non* of Aparokṣa :

समोऽपि भगवान् स्वाबिम्बदर्शनं एवैनं मोक्षयति (NV. iii, 3).

Madhva's commentator gives an example. Mokṣa is attainable only after 'death'. But that does not mean that one gets Mokṣa at the time of *any death at random* from among the innumerable ones thro' which one has to pass, in the course of one's transmigratory career. The same is the case with Bimbopāsanā, as the requisite of Mokṣa. The conception of Bimbopāsanā and Bimbāparokṣa may well be considered to fall under the domain of *mystic communion* between God and soul in Madhva's religious philosophy. By its very nature, it is a consummation which is beyond discursive thought, for elucidation.

CHAPTER LII.

PLACE OF GRACE IN REDEMPTION

According to Madhva, this knowledge of God is not a mere intellectual realization of the Deity. It is more a feeling of deep attraction and attachment arising from the knowledge of Bimbapratibimbabhbāva between God and soul and sustained by a sense of spontaneous affection flowing from it. Hence, in Bhakti, there is the element of knowledge and attachment combined. In the last analysis, then, it is not pure knowledge that puts an end to the bondage of souls, but the grace of God, in spontaneous appreciation of the soul's *surrender*. *It is Divine grace that plays the most decisive role in the final deliverance of the souls, according to Madhva.* On this point, he differs considerably from other Vedāntins, particularly Absolutists, to whom it is knowledge *per se* that constitutes the highest means of release. Madhva derives his idea from the Śruti, which emphasizes, in addition to knowledge, the importance of "vision" and "grace of God falling on the individual" :

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ।

The difference is due to the difference in the conception of the origin of bondage. The Advaitic conception of bondage as the outcome of a mysterious ignorance concealing the nature of *Brahman*, which is automatically destroyed by the dawn of knowledge, of the ātman and its essential identity with the Brahman : ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्, leaves no room for any kind of personal intervention of a Deity or its grace, in the termination of this ignorance. It is within the power and competence of knowledge (alone) to destroy ignorance, just as it is within the competence of light to destroy darkness. Once this ignorance is destroyed, the spirit of man shines forth in its pristine form as a matter of course : आत्मैवाज्ञानहानिः । (Śriharsa). निवृत्तिरात्मा मोहस्य ज्ञातत्वेनोपलक्षितः । There is, thus, no scope for the intervention of Divine grace in the accomplishment of Avidyānivṛtti, as such : तथा च, ज्ञानस्वभावलभ्यायां मुक्तौ किमीश्वरप्रसादेन ? न

ह्यन्धकारनिवन्धनदुःखनिवृतये प्रदीपमुपाददानाः कस्यचित् प्रभोः प्रसादमपेक्षन्ते । स्वभावो हि प्रदीपस्यां अन्धकारनिवर्तकत्वम् (*NS.* p. 18).

This is the strict metaphysical position of the Advaita, accepted by the older writers. But later writers have been obliged to relax its uncompromising rigidity and make a compromise with Theistic tendencies by conceding some sort of a remote connection of knowledge with grace. Accordingly, grace is required to create a “ taste for Advaita ”:

इश्वरानुग्रहादेव पुंसामद्वैतवासना (*Khaṇḍana*).

This is a very unsatisfactory position. As a Theist, Madhva naturally opposes such devious pleas. The theory of Brahmajñānavāda has got to be abandoned as metaphysically untenable. And with it goes the dogma ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्. We come back to the position that the vision of God and His grace are both necessary : ‘ दृष्टैव तं सुन्ध्यते ’ ; ‘ जुष्टस्तर्सेनामृतत्वमेति ’ ‘ यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तर्यैष आत्मा विशृणुते तर्नु स्वाम् ’ , ‘ नायमात्मा *** न मेधया (लभ्यः) ’ ‘ ज्ञात्वा देवम् * * * * A proper harmonization of these Śruti-s will lead to the acceptance of grace as the most potent factor in achieving deliverance. Taking his stand on both the groups of texts, Madhva argues a strong case for the necessity of Divine grace. No man, says he, can be saved by the sheer force of his knowledge :

* * * * * इत्यादेवं हरिं विना ।

ज्ञानस्वभावतोऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्थापि हि क्वचित् (*AV*)

Jayatirtha throws great light on this point नास्माभिः केवलविद्यया मोक्ष उच्यते; येन, ध्यानाभाव आपद्येत । किंतु, भगवत्साक्षात्कारादपि ॥ (*TP.* iii, 3, 49) : जिज्ञासा तावद्वा साक्षात्मोक्षसाधनत्वेनास्माकमभिमता । किंतु प्रसन्नो भगवानेव ॥ (*NS.* 527).

All this is because the Divine will itself and *not merely* a beginning-less ignorance is or can be the ultimate explanation of bondage, as has already been explained. This idea finds expression in Śaiva philosophy also and is supported by the *B. S.* iii, 2, 5 and *Svet Up.* vi, 16. Rāmānuja under *B. S.* iii, 2, 4, comes to very near the same position as Madhva on

the question of what causes the bondage of souls. But his theory does not take us beyond the stage of “*anādikarmaparamparā*”; which we shall see, will not be a final explanation of God’s concealing or obscuring the self-luminosity of the Jivas.

According to Madhva, the Sūtra ; अस्तुवदग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् (iii, 2, 19), emphasizes the role of Bhakti in finally manifesting to the Jiva his natural and innate affinity with Brahman as Its Pratibimba. Such knowledge of his true relation to Brahman lies hidden from the understanding of the Jiva, by the will of God Himself, (B.S. iii, 2, 5) in the state of bondage when he is encrusted by Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc. It is by the quality of Bhakti (devotion) that the Jiva can rise above these impediments and obscurations of his real personality and realize his true relationship to God. Madhva understands the simile of water, (*ambuvat*) employed by the Sūtrakāra here, as an allusion to the *quality of clinging consistence of devotion* (like that of water), which alone will enable the soul to know, realize and *adhere* closely and intimately to God, forever, in the final realization of his intimate and inseparable relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva to Him. Bearing in mind the keynote of the Sādhanādhyāya in which this Sūtra is placed, every thoughtful student of the Sūtras will be impressed by this original and felicitous interpretation of the keywords of the Sūtra: *ambuvat* and *grahaṇam*. *It is also the best mystic interpretation of this remarkable Sutra.* If, as Radhakrishnan says, “all signs indicate that it (Mysticism) is likely to be the religion of the future”, *the world's unborn soul also will find in Madhva's interpretation of the Sutra*: अस्तुवत् अग्रहणात् न तथात्वम् the very core of Mysticism. However, one can hardly expect a dry critic like V. S. Ghate, who seems to have started with a preconceived notion against Madhva that “*the very fantastic and forced way in which Madhva interprets many of the Sutras leaves no doubt that he would even have set aside the Sutras themselves; but that their uncontested authoritativeness prevented him from doing so*” to understand and appreciate

the great poetic beauty and deep philosophical suggestiveness of this interpretation concerning so refined and deep-seated a spiritual emotion of the human breast as Bhakti or to pronounce any other judgment upon it than that it is a " very fantastic " one.¹ In the light of what has been stated above, it will be seen that it is not merely a bold and original interpretation, but contextually the most appropriate one. The topic of Bhakti is quite in order, here, in Pāda ii, after the discourse on " Vairāgya " in the previous pāda.² Even according to Śaṅkara, the topic here relates to the Bimbapratibimbabhāva between Brahman and Jīvas.³ But in so far as such a relation is a purely fictitious one according to Śaṅkara, its relevance to Sādhanādhyāya would be open to question, as such knowledge (of their Bimbapratibimbabhāva, brought about by Upādhis, as between the Sun and its reflection, supposed to be established here as a Siddhānta view) would be a hindrance to realization, rather than a help, inasmuch as true realization, according to Śaṅkara, would consist in *shaking off the idea of Bimbapratibimbabhāva caused by Upādhis*. The use of the *double negative construction* in Sūtra iii, 2, 19, is also a strong indication that it is a *Siddhānta-Sūtra*, as taken by Madhva.

Vādirāja, in his gloss on the TP. of Jayatīrtha, has done a great service to Madhva's philosophy by bringing out the full beauty and depth of thought and feeling that are hidden behind Madhva's original interpretation of the Sūtra in question. It is worthwhile quoting his explanation :

अल्पाक्षरवलाभाय 'भक्त्यभावात्' इति वक्तव्ये, यत् 'अम्बुदग्रहणात्' * * * * *,
इति सूत्रं,

-
1. For a refutation of V. S. Ghate's criticisms of Madhva's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra* see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature*, Vol. I. pp. 181-59.
 2. Cf. तत्र, प्रथमे पादे संसारगतिप्रभेदः प्रदर्शयते वैराग्याय ॥ (Śaṅkara, B.S. iii, 1, 1).
 3. Rāmānuja's interpretation of this *adhikarana* as intended to show that Brahman is not vitiated by the imperfections of the world, tho' immanent in it is, besides being unconnected with the subject of Sādhanavicāra, not entirely free from redundancy (See his commentary on i, 2, 8).

तत् भक्तेः स्वरूपनिरूपणार्थमिति भावेनोक्तम्—“अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन, प्रहणं ज्ञानम्” इति । माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकः स्नेहो हि भक्तिः । तर्हि, ‘स्नेहेनाज्ञानात्’ इति कुरो नोक्तमिति चेत्; सत्यम् । अम्बुनि चिकित्सातर्थ्यः स्नेहो यथा आज्ञानज्ञवात् अतिसुदृढः, तथा अतिसुदृढत्वलाभाय ‘अम्बुवत्’ इत्युक्तम् । अतः प्रौढशिरोमणिः सूत्रकार इति क्षेयम् ॥

(*TP. Gurvarthadipikā*, Udupi 1954 p. 139).

[Even tho' for brevity's sake, the Sūtrakāra should have used the expression “on account of lack of Bhakti (the real nature of the soul's relation to God is not revealed to him),” yet, it should be borne in mind that he has chosen to use the words “Ambuvat” (like water) in order to embody a succinct definition of Bhakti at the same time. Keeping this intention of the Sūtrakāra in mind, the commentator, Madhva, has accordingly rendered the word “Ambuvat” by the word “Snehena” (with loving attachment) and the word “Grahana” by the word “Jñāna” (understanding or grasping). For, Bhakti is the same as love of God lighted by a full knowledge of His majesty. It is true the Sūtrakāra could have written “स्नेहेनाज्ञानात्” (because He is not known thro' love) to convey his meaning, explicitly. But there is a special purpose in introducing a metaphor here. It is well known that viscosity is an inborn and deep-rooted quality of water. Man's love of God (Bhakti) should have this quality of clinging firmly to God at all costs. It is only such a love that is capable of revealing to the soul his true relation to God, as His Pratibimba. It is to convey so much deep meaning that the Sūtrakāra, who is a master of language and thought, has used a telling metaphor here to emphasize the greatness of the quality of Bhakti and its place among Sādhanas].

Jayatīrtha brings out the *rationale* of Madhva's position with his characteristic brilliance and clarity of thought. We cannot attribute the condition of bondage, ultimately, to any of the familiar causes of Kāma, Karma etc., each of which has a beginning. Even supposing that each previous stage of Kāma, Karma etc., begets the next one and so on, it should be open to the soul to get back its original and essential charac-

teristic of self-luminosity, in the states of deep sleep and universal dissolution, when there is no play of any kind of desire or activity. But this is *not* found to be the case. Hence, there must be something above and beyond our actions and desires (however beginningless), which must be regarded as having cast a veil of ignorance on our essential self-luminosity, from time immemorial. This original substance may therefore be identified with what the Śāstras speak of under different names as “Māyā”, “Avidyā”, and “Prakṛti”, obscuring the self-luminous soul (which is finite). For, it is in the nature of “Māyā” or “Prakṛti” to act as an obscuring agency. But then, as this “Māyā” or “Prakṛti” is only an insentient principle, it cannot be said to function independently and of its own freewill. In this way, we are led to accept the position that *ultimately it is God Himself that obscures the Svarūpa-Caitanya (self-luminosity) of the Jivas*, by means of (1) the above-mentioned principle of Prakṛti endowed with the three Guṇas (of *Sattva, rajas, and tamas*) and which in the Śāstras is also known as “Avidyā” because it acts as an obstacle to the soul’s attaining its self-luminosity and knowledge of its true nature; and (2) by His own wonderful and inscrutable power (*acintyādbhuta-sakti*).¹

As the ultimate cause of the bondage of the Souls, in this sense, God is also the source of their release :

बन्धको भवपाशेन भवयाशाच्च मोचकः ।

कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सनातनः ॥ (*Skānda, q. by Śrīdhara*)

1. न चाजानमात्रनिबन्धनोऽयं बन्धो जीवस्य । श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादियु परमेश्वरेच्छानिमि-
त्तवागमात् । ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपो ह्ययं जीवः । तद्वावानुपलब्धशानुभवसिद्धा । तेनावगम्यते
—अस्ति किमप्यावरकं, येनावृतः स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यरूपोऽपि नात्मनस्तत्त्वं वेद । न च,
कामकर्मादिकमेव तथा भवितुमर्हति । तस्यापि सादिनः कारणपेक्षत्वात् । न च पूर्वपूर्वस्मा-
दुत्तरोत्तरमिति युक्तम् । सुप्तिप्रलययोः तदवृत्त्यभावेन, निष्कलंकचैतन्यबलात् स्वरूपावभास-
प्रसक्तेः । अतः, कामकर्मादितिरिक्तं मायाविद्याप्रवृत्त्यादिशब्दभिद्येयं अनादेव विम्नपि इव्यं
[आवरकं] अंगीकार्यम् । न च, मायापि कथं स्वप्रकाशमावृणोतीति युक्तम् । आवरक-

This mysterious power or will of God also is known by the names of "Prakṛti" "Māyā".¹ These two different senses in which the terms are used in the Śāstras should be carefully noted to avoid confusion.

This "Māyic" power of God also has two aspects, one that obscures the soul from comprehending its own essence in full and another which precludes the vision of the Lord to the fullest possible extent :

अथान्ये प्रकृती दुष्टे नृषु प्रातिस्विकं स्थिते ।

स्वगुणाच्छादिका लेका परमाच्छादिकाऽपरा ॥

स्वगुणाच्छादिकां हत्वा परमाच्छादिकां परः ।

व्याधुट्य मोक्षपदवीं ददाति पुरुषोत्तमः ॥ (B. T. X, 87, 13-15).

It is only the grace of God that can raise these last veils of bondage and uncover the true nature of the self to itself and reveal the true nature of the Lord to it :

हिरण्यमेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।

तत् त्वं पूषन् अपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृश्ये ॥ (iśa Up.)

Contd. -

तैयैव तस्याः प्रसिद्धत्वात् । वक्ष्यते चात्रोपपत्तिः । न च, जडस्य स्वतःकिञ्चिदावरकल्पं युक्तम् । अतः परमेश्वर एव स्वाधीनया प्रकृत्या सत्त्वादिगुणमय्या विद्या-विरोधित्वैनावद्याया, अचिन्त्यादभुतया स्वशक्त्या च, जीवस्य स्वप्रकाशमपि स्वरूपचैतन्यमाच्छादयतीति युक्तम् ॥ (NS. p. 19b).

Dasgupta *I. Phil.* iv. p. 159 fn. 3) has unhappily misquoted the last sentence in the above passage from the NS, and misinterpreted it, as a consequence. He has also, on this account, drawn the erroneous conclusion that "Ignorance" in Madhva's philosophy is a "negative substance." The fact is that it is a positive substance (भावरूप) in Madhva's system. Cf. न चयं भावरूप-ज्ञानस्य परिपन्थिनः; किं नाम, परपक्षे तत्र संभवतीति ब्रूमः । (NS. p. 64b).

1. Cf. महामोयत्याक्षियेति नियतिमोहनीति च ।

प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तवेच्छानन्तकथ्यते ॥" (Madhva, BSB. i, 4, 25).

Not all our Karma, or Jñāna or even Bhakti can achieve this without the grace of the Lord to withdraw this obscuration from the Jīva :
 भक्तिरेवैनं नयति भक्तिरेवैनं दर्शयति * * इति भक्तेरेव पृथग् मोचकत्वान्नेष्वरस्य कृत्यमिति
 मन्त्रम् —

अनादितो गुणः सन्तो भक्त्याद्या न ह्यमुच्चन् ।

जीवं तद्गुणसुव्यक्तिं कृत्वैनं मोचयेद्द्विरः ।

कांश्चित्र भोक्षयेद्वासौ स्वातंत्र्यं तेन तस्य हि ॥

इत्यनादिगुणविस्तरे सत्यपि, अव्यक्त्यादिना तदिच्छां विना मोक्षाप्राप्तेः ॥ (Madhva, N. V. iii, 3, 33). Such is the *raison d' etre* of Divine grace, according to Madhva.

CHAPTER LIII

APAROKṢA-JÑĀNA OR GOD-REALIZATION.

Madhva distinguishes carefully and sharply between Dhyāna and Aparokṣa. This is clear from his definition of the former as continuous flow of mediate knowledge (अविनिष्टिक्षेपोक्षशानसंततिः); while the latter is, as its names Aparokṣa and Sākṣatkāra show, a *direct vision* of the Supreme Being, in its “Bimba-form”. The form revealed in Dhyāna is therefore regarded as just a mental picture of the Yogi's own construction, while the one visualized in Aparokṣa, is the *actual* revelation of God in His Bimba-form, as He is :

रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूत्

तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय । (R. V. vi, 47, 18).

जीवस्मुदायः परमेश्वरस्य रूपं प्रतिरूपो भूत्वा वर्तते । तत् विवरूपं अस्य सुकृत्यर्थं साक्षात्कारविषयो भवति । (TP. ii, 3. 50).

What is presented in Dhyāna is thus only an image constructed by the impressions of the mind. It is just a substitute and not the original form of God : तथा न्यत् प्रतिषेधात् (B. S. iii, 2, 37) यथा जीवानं दादेरन्यत् व्रह्म । तथोपासाङ्कुतादपि । ‘नेदं यदिद्भुपासते’ इति प्रतिषेधात् ॥ (B. S. B). This is still more clearly explained by Trivikrama Panditācārya : उपास्तिस्फुरितदाकारादन्यत् व्रह्म । अन्तःकरणप्रविष्टपदार्थाकारस्फुरणं हि स्मृतिः । न च तत्र पदार्थो दद्यते । तदाकारस्फुरणमेव तत्स्मृतिरित्युच्यते । यथा प्रतिमायाम् । (Tattvapradīpa).

The highest stage is, therefore, one in which the Yogi or Sādhaka is *face to face* with the object of his meditation and intuits the Divine Form, which is his archetype (Bimba). This is technically termed Bimbāparokṣa, which is the highest form of spiritual perception, without which no one can hope to be released (B. S. iii, 3, 53) : न च परमात्मनः सर्वत्र गुणसाम्यादस्य कस्यापि रूपस्य दर्शनात्सर्वेषां मुक्तिः । समोऽपि भगवान् स्वविवदर्शनं एवैनं मोचयति ॥ (Nyāya-Vivaraṇa)

This vivid flash-like intuitive perception of one's own Bimba marks the journey's end. It is the fulfilment and culmination of all Sādhanas. It is what is known as Aparokṣajñāna, which is the penultimate state of final release.

Its intensity and vividness vary according to the innate capacity of the selves. In the case of human beings, it is said to be like a lightning-flash; in respect to Devas like the blaze of the Sun. The gods Garuḍa and Rudra visualize it like a reflection of their own faces in a mirror and the four-faced Brahmā sees it in clear outlines (*Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya*).

Tho' the Supreme Being is *ex hypothesi* unmanifest (*avyakta*) it is possible, says Madhva, to visualize it thro' grace :

नित्याव्यक्तोऽपि भगवानीश्यते निजशक्तिः ।

तम्रेते परमात्मानं कः पश्येतामितं प्रसुम् ?

(*Nārāyanādhyātma*, q. B. S. B. iii, 2, 27).

The Supreme is pleased to reveal itself to the devotees thro' sheer grace :

यमैवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः

तस्यैष आत्मा विश्वृणुते तनूं स्वाम् (*Kaṭha Up.*)

But for this condescension on the part of Brahman, it can never be visualized by any finite being, however much one may try :

परमात्मापरोद्द्यं तत्प्रसाददेव । न जीवशक्त्या ।

(*B.S.B.* iii, 2, 23)

Brahman is essentially unmanifest and formless. Unlike the elements of fire etc. which are insensible in their subtle (*tanmātrā*) form, but visible and manifest in their gross form, Brahman has no such diversity of aspects as gross and subtle. Hence, it is always and essentially *avyakta* (unmanifest). But tho' it is essentially *avyakta*, it reveals itself to the

Upāsaka, by its own grace and inscrutable power. Without Brahman's choosing to reveal itself, in this way, no one can ever visualize the limitless one.

Aparokṣajñāna, then, is something which, by its very nature, defies any more explicit description. It is to be experienced and felt. Words are hardly adequate to describe it. It is a flash-like revelation of the Supreme, at the fruition of a long and arduous process of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, in the fulness of absolute self-surrendering devotion to God, as our Bimba. Ultimately, it is He that must choose to reveal Himself pleased by the hungering love of the soul. The Pratibimba (soul) must turn in and seek and *see his Bimba in himself*. That is Aparokṣajñāna : आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् ।

Such direct perception of God is attainable only when the mind is specially attuned to the Supreme by full discipline of *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna*. Such a perception is immediate and achieved thro' the mind specially perfected for the task : मनसैवेदमासव्यम् । (*Katha Up.*)

निदिव्यासनसंस्कृतमनसा अपरोक्षधीसंभवात् ॥ (*Nym.* p. 629).

Vyāsāraja explains further that texts like 'यन्मनसा न मनुते', which deny the power of the mind to reveal Brahman have reference to minds not properly trained ; because there are other texts which establish the capacity of the 'ripe and disciplined mind' to do so. Texts like 'यन्मनसा न मनुते' do not however conflict with the ability of the mind to reveal the Brahman. Such texts merely show that the mind should be perfected and disciplined by *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna*, before it can be made to visualize the Brahman when such direct revelation is given to it by the grace of God Himself. Aparokṣajñāna is believed to confer marvellous powers of eight-fold Siddhis etc.

The Rāmānuja school does not recognize Aparokṣajñāna as constituting a distinctive stage in spiritual realization. According to this school, the highest stage of spiritual attainment open to the Sādhaka is that of *nididhyāsana* itself and the highest personal impression of the Supreme

Being that one can have in this world does not rise above one's own mental image of the Supreme formed thro' constant flow of thought and meditation :

(i) उपासनं च स्मृतिसंतानरूपं दर्शनसमानाकारं ध्यानोपासनाशब्दवाच्यम् । (R.G.B. vii, 1).

(ii) ध्यानं च तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसन्तानरूपम् । सा च स्मृतिः दर्शनसमानाकारा, 'भियो हृदयग्रन्थिः छियन्ते सर्वसंशयाः । क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्मणि तस्मिन् हृषे परावरे' इत्यनेन-कार्यात् । एवं च सति, निदध्यासनस्य दर्शनरूपता विधीयते । भवति च स्मृतेभावना-प्रकर्षाद् दर्शनरूपता । वाक्यकारैतत्सर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् * * * * * ' उपासनं स्थात् ध्रुवानुस्मृतिः, दर्शनाक्रियैच्चनाच्च ' इति । तस्यव वेदनस्य उपासनारूपरथासङ्कदाइत्तस्य ध्रुवानु-स्मृतिलम्पवर्णितम् । सेयं स्मृतिर्दर्शनरूपा प्रतिपादिता । दर्शनरूपा च प्रत्यक्षतापश्च अप-वर्गसाधनभूतां स्मृतिं विशिनाइ ॥ (Rāmānuja, Śribhāṣya i, 1, 1)

This means that there is no room in the Rāmānuja school for a distinctive state of Brahmāparokṣa or direct vision or immediate intuitive perception of God, *in this life*, other than the mental image conjured up by the devotee thro' constant flow of meditative recollection : 'ध्यानं च तैलधारावद-विच्छिन्नस्मृतिसन्तानरूपम्' (Vedānta Deśika on R.G.B. vii, 1). This means that the highest kind of direct experience of God open to man as a seeker is but *mediate* (Parokṣavṛtti). Such an experience will be no better than a mental construct and, therefore, in the final analysis, not the same as a direct immediate perception of the Lord. Rāmānuja says that the experience of Dhyāna, *tho' mediate, can be so clear and vivid as to be almost immediate* (दर्शनसमानाकार) which is thus explained by Deśika : (स्मृतेऽथ दर्शनसमानत्वं नाम, विशदात्मतया दर्शनसमानाकारत्वमेव), that the mental impression of the Lord achieves a vividness that is almost equal to a direct presentation. Deśika proceeds further to illustrate his point by the examples of the extravagant fancies of a person deeply in love with a woman and the obsessions of those seized by a sense of fear and so on :

भवति च स्मृतेभावनाप्रकर्षवशात् दर्शनसमानाकारता भीरुकासुकादीनाम् ।

यथा — ‘लीनेव प्रतिबिम्बितेव लिखितेवोत्कीर्णहृषेव च

प्रस्तुतेव च वज्रलेपथटितेवान्तर्निर्यातेव च ।

सा नश्चेतसि कीलितेव विशिष्यैष्येतेमुवः पञ्चमि-

श्चिन्तासन्ततितन्तु जालनिविडस्यूतेव लग्ना प्रिया ॥ इति ।

(Bhavabharti, *Mālatīmūḍhaya*, v, 10,) — Quoted by Vedānta Desīka on *R.G.B.* p. 415, Ānanda Press Edn. Madras.

Such a view is not acceptable to Madhva, as it reduces Aparokṣajñāna to the level of a pure fancy. That will be hardly in keeping with the profound reality, dignity and supreme significance attached to Brahmasāksatkāra in Indian philosophical tradition as the highest and the most desirable state consummation of man's philosophical quest:

दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्धया सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः (*Kaṭha Up.* i, 3, 12).

हृषा मनीषा मनसाभिकृष्टः य एताद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति (*Op. cit.* ii, 3, 9)

दिव्यं ददामि ते चक्षुः पश्य मे योगमैधरम् (*Gītā*, ix, 8)

* * * * बुद्धिमात्रामतीनिदिग्यम् (vi, 2.)

यदा पश्यः पश्यते सूक्ष्मवर्णम् (*Mund Up.* iii, 1, 3)

आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4, 23)

एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः (*Mund.* iii, 1, 9)

परात्परं पुरुषमीक्षते (*Praśna Up.*)

As Vyāsaraṇa points out, in his *Nyāyāmrta*, Rāmānuja's view reduces the texts, which refer to the direct visualization of the Lord by the great Seers and mystics as the highest means of deliverance, to a figurative level. Apart from that, it is difficult to see how a meditative cognition can be said to attain a vividness of presentation (विशदात्मनावभासः) equal to that of an actual immediate presentation (दर्शनसमानाकार).

It cannot be in the sense of its acquiring a deeper content and a wider range of details than a mere remembrance-series. For, a recollective experience cannot possess a wider range or deeper content than the original experience from which it is derived or the memory image from which it flows. As for actual identity, with immediate perception, it is out of the question. It is, no doubt, possible to *imagine* that there is an immediacy of experience in such cases by auto-suggestion or under abnormal psychological conditions. But that will not alter the hard facts of reality and, in any case, it will be too much to expect deliverance by such means!

VIII. DOCTRINE OF MUKTI

CHAPTER LIV

NATURE OF THE RELEASED STATE AND ITS STAGES

In each system of thought, the doctrine of Salvation is determined by the conception of the nature of souls and God. The Buddhists believe in Nirvāṇa or utter annihilation of personality as the highest end and aim of life. The reason is simple. They don't recognize, even in Samsāra, a permanent self other than the five skandhas, as a transmigrating spirit. Hence, the question of the survival of any such non-material principle after the achievement of release does not arise ! Some modern apologists of Buddhism, who try to argue that Nirvāṇa is not extinction of self-consciousness, or of the Ātman, know not what they are talking about. Buddhism is a frank and fearless Nairātmyavāda and that is that. The Monists hold the absorption of the individual self in Brahman to be the highest form of realization, as individuality is merely the result of a pluralization by Avidyā and is not an intrinsic fact. Madhva's conception of the metaphysical dependence of souls on God as His Pratibimbas, not in the sense of a false reflection, but as coeval and co-eternal but dependent and finite beings controlled by God as their *antaryāmi* and his acceptance of intrinsic difference and gradation of fitness (*yogyatā*) among them, as individuals, lead naturally to the persistence of an irreducible distinction among these and from God, in respect not only of the quality and degree of intrinsic bliss enjoyed by them but also in their capacities for such enjoyment. The final state, according to Madhva, is marked by a complete absence of all traces of pain, evil and suffering, coupled with a positive enjoyment of inherent spiritual *ānanda*. This bliss has nothing material about it and is not conditioned by the possession or enjoyment of material objects. *Ergo*, there is no fear of its being ever diminished or tainted by evil or otherwise becoming tiresome:

विरजो ब्रह्मलोको न येषु जिह्वं अनुतं न माया चेति ।

(*Praśna Up.* i, 16).

The criticism that in such a description of the released state we are only transferring the distinctions and values of this life to a world beyond loses its point when it is remembered that the bliss in question is not at all dependent on the presence of external material objects and that it is something welling up from the nature of the selves themselves. Else, any dynamic conception of release would be liable to the facile criticism that it involves a transference of values of this life to the beyond. Is release a state of blissful existence ? If so, we are hankering after a certain value of life and seeking it there ! Is it a state of absolute freedom from all pain and shortcomings? Even so, we are simply transferring what we regard as valuable here, to a life beyond ! The charge of transference of values is thus a game at which two can play. Madhva maintains that the realization of truth does not mean the abolition of the plurality of life or the personality of selves; but only the removal of the false sense of separateness and independence, which is at the root of Samsāra. There is no question of transference of values, when it is stated that the bliss of Mukti is not an external possession of souls but an essential characteristic of their being that manifests itself completely, there. That these released souls do not get themselves dissolved in the Absolute is clear from texts like : आणि न रथ्यममृताधि तस्युः (R. V. i, 35.6) उत्तमृतत्वस्येशानः (R. V. x, 90, 2) मुक्तानां परमा गतिः (Mbh. xii), which attribute to the Supreme Being the same kind of sovereignty over the world of the released, as in respect of this one. The text : न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति (Brh. Up. iv, 5, 13) has reference only to the termination of empirical consciousness, even as interpreted by Śaṅkara : न तत्र प्रेत्य विशेषसंज्ञास्ति कार्यकारणसंधातेभ्यो विमुक्तस्य । It cannot, therefore, be cited as evidence against the persistence of Svarūpajñāna of souls, claimed by Dvaitins. Passages like अविनाशी वा अयमात्मा अनुच्छितिधर्मी (Brh. Up. iv, 5, 14) have been cited by Madhva, in support of the persistence of personality in release, in its refined state. This text of the Brh. Up. makes two significant statements 1) that the Ātman is indestructible (avināśī) and (2) that his *attributes also are inviolable* (anucchitti-dharmā). The former carries an implied refutation of Buddhist Nairātmyavāda and the latter of the Nirviśesa-

Cinmātravāda of Advaita by insisting on the indestructibility of both the Ātman and his attributes. This means that the self is not conceived, even in the highest state of Mokṣa, as a mere abstraction or a yawning void. It is to be noted that Saṅkara and his commentators, here, have tried to escape the implications of the term *anuccittidharma* by treating it as a paraphrase of the first predication itself viz., " *avindāśi* " which makes it redundant.¹ Jayatīrtha points out in his commentary on Madhva's *VTN* that the difficulty felt by Maitreyī was not at all in respect of any supposed contradiction between the earlier and latter declarations of her husband : (1) विज्ञानधन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय ताम्येवातुविनश्यति and (2) न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति which may be looked upon as having been set at rest by his explaining the difference between " the human and the Ātmic levels of experience ".² Jayatīrtha rightly points out that Maitreyī's difficulty was in accepting her husband's statement that there was no consciousness after death (न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति) as that would make the goal of Mokṣa unfit to be sought as a Puruṣārtha : मोक्षस्य अपुरुषार्थत्वप्रसंगे हि मैत्रेयीचाक्यार्थः । यदि चोत्तरवाक्ये मुक्तस्य ज्ञानाभाव एव सिद्धान्तः स्यातदा मैत्रेययुक्तप्रसंगस्योत्तरं वक्तव्यं । न चोक्तम् । तेन ज्ञायते मुक्तस्य ज्ञानाभावो नोत्तरवाक्येऽभिप्रेत इति ॥ For, as Rāmānuja rightly points out, in his *Sribhāṣya*, unless the survival of the human personality in Mokṣa is accepted, the whole spiritual programme calculated to help the individual self to get rid of his bondage (whether actually existing or merely taken to be real due to the nuisance of Avidyā, and attain to a state of unalloyed bliss for ever afterwards), would cease to have any

1. Cf. नतु, उच्छितिर्थमौ यस्यासाहुच्छितिर्थमा नोच्छितिर्थमा अनुच्छितिर्थमा इति स्वरूपा-विनाश एवोच्यते, न तु धर्मानुच्छितिरिति चेत् ; न । स्वरूपविनाशस्य अविनाशीत्यनेनैवो-क्तत्वात् । निर्विकारत्वं तेनोक्तमिति चेत् ; तथापि अनुच्छितिरिति वहुत्रीहिपैव पूर्णत्वात् धर्मपदवैयर्थ्यम् ॥ (*VTNt.*)

2. See his ' Yajñavalkyan Fiction ' (*Essays*, Jamakhandi, 56) and my criticism in *Tattvavāda*, Bangalore.

meaning. If all that the Vedānta has to tell the earnest seeker is that he himself will *cease to be* at the end of all his efforts, he would bid an eternal goodbye to Vedānta. Surely, it would be no consolation to him to be told that even tho' he himself as a self-conscious personality may cease to be, some *bare* or rarefied consciousness will survive. For no reasonable person would take the trouble of undergoing all the rigors of spiritual discipline with the fond hope that even when he is lost there will be left some pure consciousness of no particular content. Apart from that, Jayatīrtha points out that if Maitreyi's difficulty was in understanding how the Ātman, who was earlier described as a mass of consciousness (*Vijñānaghana*) could subsequently be said to lose all consciousness after death, as contended by Śaṅkara, and if the said difficulty was resolved by pointing out to her the difference between the empirical and the trans-empirical levels of consciousness, we should expect to find Maitreyi referring to *the two specific statements of her husband and mention their mutual contradiction*, as it appeared to her. But, she does nothing of the kind. She merely refers to *only one text* : न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति and says to her husband : अत्रैव मा भगवान् मोहान्तमापित् - न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति इति ॥ that she could not understand how there is no consciousness after 'death', for the individual. This conclusively establishes the point that Maitreyi's difficulty had nothing whatever to do with "the human and the Ātmic levels of experience" as Prof. R. D. Ranade has tried to explain it, in defence of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the text. It plainly shows that her difficulty was concerned *only* with the denial of the survival of consciousness in the released state which was apparently what Yājñavalkya's words *seemed* to suggest: ननु, 'अत्रैव मा भगवान्' इति न मोक्षस्य अपुरुषार्थतं प्रसंगाभिप्रायः किंतु, 'विज्ञानधन' इत्युक्त्वा, पुनः 'न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति' इत्युक्ते, व्याहृत्यभिप्रायेण अत्रैवेत्युक्तम् । तत्र संसारे विज्ञानधनो मोक्षे तु, केन कं पश्येत् इति परिहारः संगत एवेति ॥ मैवम् । तथा सति, अत्रैव मा भगवान् मोहान्तमापित् यत् विज्ञानधन इति, न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति च, इति वाक्यद्वयोपादानप्रसंगात् ; व्याधातस्य उभयाश्रितत्वात् एकस्यैव तु वाक्यस्योपादानात् तद्विषयमेव दोषेद्वाचनमिति ज्ञायते ॥ (*VTN!* .)

This crucial point, raised by Jayatīrtha, is of the utmost importance in assessing the relative merits of the different interpretations put upon the famous Yājñavalkyan dictum. It shows the complete inconsistency of Śaṅkara's interpretation about the nature of the Ātman, with the context. It would follow from this that we cannot take the statements made by Yājñavalkya in reply to his wife's objection, beginning with the words : यत्र तु सर्वमात्मैवाभूत तकेन कं पश्येत् ** as a statement of facts (वस्तुस्थितिकथनम्) but as a vigorous plea for the survival of self-consciousness in Mokṣa, by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Such is precisely the stand taken by Madhva.¹ It may be noted that such an interpretation is clearly supported by the two categorical assertions of Yājñavalkya in his clarification that both the Ātman and his attributes are alike indestructible :

अविनाशी वा अरे अथमात्मा अनुच्छितिधर्मा ।

which establishes beyond doubt Yājñavalkya's anxiety to emphasize not merely the survival of the Ātman in Mokṣa, but also *the survival of his attributes of consciousness, bliss etc.*

The distinction drawn by the Advaitin between the Ātman as the 'pure self' and our 'ego-personality' (*aham-aritha*) is unsustainable. For, even the deepest experiences of the self in our dreamless sleep (which according to Śaṅkara himself reveals the Ātman in his pure state. See *B. S. B.* iv, 4. 16) establishes the identity of the 'ego-self' (*ahamartha*) with the witness-self of dreamless sleep. The evidence of this identity is furnished by the reference to the experience of the happy repose of dreamless sleep made by us in recalling the experience immediately on waking up : एतावर्त्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् । If the ego-self who

1. In his *VTN*, Madhva has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the passage from the *Brh. Up.* embodying Yājñavalkya's harangue to his wife. Jayatīrtha in his c. on the *VTN*, has gone into the details of the interpretations of Madhva and Śaṅkara and shown that the latter's interpretation cannot be sustained.

recollects himself after waking from the Suṣupti state is not the true inner reality (*pratyagartha*) that stands distinguished from all external reality (*parāg-artha*), one should expect the ego-self, sometimes on waking up from his deep sleep to entertain a doubt whether it was his own self or some one else's that had undergone the happy repose of sleep! Here is sufficient evidence that it is the inner self (*pratyagātmā*) himself that is the subject of the recollection of the happy repose of sleep and that it is that same *pratyagātman* that is referred to by the term "Aham" when he recalls his own earlier expericnce. It is no use to contend against this that tho' it is only the pure self that is really the subject of the recollective judgment, still, as there is no activity of the *antaḥkarana* (mind) in Suṣupti, the Ātman who is revealed in Suṣupti gets himself fused with *antaḥkarana* on waking up from the Suṣupti state and in virtue of this contact with the mind he gets the "ego-feeling" and that this accounts for the configuration of the recollective judgment (*parāmarśa*) in the words : अहमस्ताप्स्तु। The explanation, no doubt, is ingenuity itself. But it creates a more serious diffculty to the Advaitin. For, it is admitted in Advaita that Avidyā or Bhāvarūpājñāna is present in Suṣupti and is there intuited by the pure self. Now, according, again, to the Advaita, *ahamkāra* is completely merged in Susupti and only pure ātman is left there. In these circumstances, the intuition of *avīdyā*, in Suṣupti, by the pure self, cannot be recollected by the ego-self (*ahamartha*) later on thro' a recollective judgment (*sauṣuptikānubhavaparāmarśa*) as *its own former personal intuition*: न किञ्चिद्दह्मतेदिष्म्। In other words, as the ego-self (*ahamartha*), was *not* the actual witness of Ajñāna in dreamless sleep (according to Advaita), it could not give expression to any re-collecction about it as its own. *This is sufficient to establish that the ego-self and the witness self of Ajñāna in dreamless sleep are one and the same being, and that the attempt to distinguish them is a failure.*

The *Chāndogya* text, जक्षकीडन् रममाणः refers clearly and admittedly to the sportive activities of *Muktas* (Cf. *B. S.* iv, 4,2). There is no mistaking the context here, which is one of final release as can be seen from

the opening words of the section: परं ज्योतिस्पसंप्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पयते । The *Vedānta Sūtra* sets an insurmountable barrier between Brahman and the released souls, by prescribing a limit to the sovereignty of the latter by excluding cosmic responsibilities (जगद्व्यापारवर्ज्म् iv, 4, 17) from their province.¹ This sūtra is the rock on which Vedāntic Monism has been shipwrecked everytime its ships have attempted to cross over to a haven of safety. Its remarkable significance to a pukka Dualistic interpretation of the Sūtras has been brought out by Thibaut and it is not possible to add anything to his weighty remarks on the point. Without such persistence of personality, the game will not be worth the candle. The ideal of Mokṣa will not be worthy of pursuit without the guaranteed persistence and survival of the self that can be assured of its deep sense of repose and happiness earned after so much effort and suffering :

मग्नस्य हि परेऽज्ञाने किं न दुःखतरं भवेत् ? (*Mbh.* xii)

संज्ञानाशो यदि भवेत् किं मुक्त्या नः प्रयोजनम् ?

‘अहमर्थविनाशश्वेत्मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्थाति ।

अपसर्पेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावमात्रतः ॥’ (*Yāmuna Siddhitraya*).

That is why Madhva holds that the released retain their individual consciousness as *released* and rest in the full knowledge of their deliverance from all misery :

आजन्ममरणं स्मृत्वा मुक्ता हर्षमवाप्नुयः ।

According to Madhva, Aparokṣajñāna or direct vision of God in His aspect of one's Bimba, opens the door to spiritual redemption. It is the dawn of Mukti and carries with it all the promise and potency of the ineffa-

1. P. M. Modi in his '*A Critique of the Brahmasūtra*' p.448, tries to give a new explanation of " jagadvyāpāra ", which is redundant in the light of the last sūtra and is at variance with the sense of 'vyāpāra ' used in an earlier sūtra (iii, 1, 16).

ble and endless bliss of complete self-realization and God-realization, to come. It is the foretaste of the bliss of Mokṣa :

शान्तिं निर्वाणपरमां मत्संस्थामधिगच्छति ।

सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत् बुद्धिग्राह्यमर्तीं द्रियम् (Gītā).

It is natural that close on the heels of Brahmāparokṣa, the shackles of material bondage should begin to fall off, one by one, and that Aparokṣa should usher in a state of increased blessedness at every one of its successive stages. Madhva distinguishes four stages of the fruits of Aparokṣa: (1) Karma-nāśa (2) Utkrānti (3) Laya and (4) Bhoga. The third one has reference of the gods,¹ who have no “ utkrānti ” as such : देवानां स्वोत्तमप्रवेशेन तत्र देहलयः । अन्यैषां तु ब्रह्मनाड्या देहोत्कान्तिः (TP.).

Of the three kinds of Karma that clog the way and dog the steps of the Jiva from time immemorial, Sañcita or the accumulated heap is consumed by the fire of Aparokṣajñāna: यस्य पापस्य कार्यं दुर्खं भोक्तुमारब्धं तस्यैव ज्ञानेन नाशः । यस्य पुण्यस्य कार्यं सुखं भोक्तुं नारब्धं तस्यैव नाशः । (TP. iv, 1, 15). Madhva distinguishes between two kinds of *anārabdha-karma* (Karma that has not begun to bear fruit) viz., “ इष ” and अनिष्ट (the agreeable and the disagreeable). The latter is destroyed and the former is “ credited ” to the account of the released in Mokṣa. *The 'Prārabdha' alone remains to be worked out.* This is a fixed

1. V. S. Ghate (*The Vedānta*) has confused these two aspects of Utkrānti and Laya and speaks of the *utkrānti* of the gods (misunderstanding the opening sentence in Madhva's bhāṣya : देवानां मोक्ष उत्कान्तिश्चास्मिन्याद उच्यते ।, iv, 2).

He is also puzzled why the gods should at all be introduced in this context. Well, the gods also are recognized as adhikārins for Brahmaavidyā both in the *Upaniṣads* and in the *B.S.* The question of their release would not, therefore, be irrelevant in the Sūtras. Hence, Madhva allots some space to them (iv, 2, I-16). In Mundaka iii, 2, 7, we actually read of the entry of the gods in their archetypes and ‘merging’ into them,—a clear case of Laya preparatory to Mokṣa.

quantity, the sources of fresh accumulation having been cut off. Even in regard to Prārabda Karma, reductions and concessions are possible (*B.S.* iii, 4, 16). The Karmas performed by Aparokṣa-Jñānins after the dawn of Aparokṣa has the effect of enhancing the spiritual bliss in Mokṣa. Knowledge by itself confers release from pain and misery of Samsāra ; but the welling up of the intrinsic spiritual bliss is possible only by good Karma, Jñāna, Upāsanā or Bhakti :

सर्वदुःखनिवृत्तिश्च ज्ञानिनो निश्चितैव हि ।

उपासया कर्मभिश्च भक्त्या चानन्दचित्रता ॥ (*B. S. B.* iii, 4, 38)

The Aparokṣajñānin is also known as Jivanmukta.¹ He continues in his physical frame as long as the arrears of *prārabdha* continue to exact their debt : अपरोक्षज्ञानिनोऽपि स्वयोरप्यरमानन्दहेतुपरमकाशपत्रभक्त्यभावे तत्साध्यस्य मोचकर्त्ते-श्रवणसादस्याभावेन, प्रारब्धकर्मणा संसारानुवृत्या जीवन्मुक्तिः । (*Nym.*, iv, 4). The destruction of his Linga-śarīra takes place along with the four-faced Brahman's :

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्रोते प्रतिसंचरे ।

परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ।²

It should be noted that there are two distinctive aspects of realization according to Madhya, the negative and the positive phases of the attainment of freedom. The negative aspect consists in riddance of all obscurations of personality by the crust and consequences of past Karma etc. and the destruction of all suffering and the Lingaśarīra. दुःखाभाव and लिङ्गाभेद, as they are briefly referred to, constitute the negative side. The positive aspect is the enjoyment of intrinsic bliss of selfhood. Jayatīrtha accordingly defines Mokṣa in its dual aspect (*dvidalātmaka*) :

आत्मनितिकदुःखनिवृत्ति and परमानन्दवापि (*VTNt.* p. 117).

1. The term is used by Vyāsarāya in his *Nym.* (iv, 4).

2. Text cited by Śamkara in his *B.S.B.* iv, 3, 11.

The system of Madhva accepts also the four-fold distinction of Mokṣa into Sālokya, Sāmipyā, Sārūpya and Sāyujya, (see *M. BSB.* iv, 4, 19) taught in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.¹ Vyāsarāya, in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, mentions that these represent *an ascending order of blessedness*. The nature of Bhoga in release will be dealt with in Chapter LVI.

1. M. Nandi, in his doctoral thesis at the Bomhay Uni. on "the Philosophy of Baladeva", (1955,) is quite mistaken in assuming that Madhva does *not* recognize these four kinds of Mukti and making it an argument for his supposition that Baladeva, who recognizes them, could not have been a follower of Madhva out and out (*Op. cit.* p. 453). These and other contentions of M. Nandi have been refuted in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* Vol. ii. pp. 385-37.

CHAPTER LV

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA
IN OTHER SYSTEMS.

Madhva and his commentators have briefly reviewed the conception of release according to the other systems, in order to bring out the distinctive features of their own conception of it and its superiority.

The Jain theory of Mokṣa as a ceaseless upward flight in Alokākāśa has nothing spiritual or divine about it, says Madhva, to kindle the heart of the seeker and make it glow.

Entry into Mahāśūnya, advocated by the Buddhist, is equally forbidding in its prospect. The Buddhists are frank Nairātmyavādins. There is no Ātman or Self, on their view, which can be said to coordinate the fleeting experiences of moments into a meaningful whole. Reduction to nullity may thus be said to be achieved, every moment of time. From this point of view, there will be nothing to distinguish the reduction of a pot or something else to such a state of disintegration to the limit of Śūnyatā, from the other Śūnyatā arising from the annihilation of a *so called* "individual". The Void being absolutely characterless, there is nothing to mark off one phase or aspect of Śūnyatā from another.

The Advaitic view of absorption into Brahman is hardly different from the Buddhist ideal, save for the difference in terminology : ब्रह्मावश्च न शून्यभावात् भियते इत्युपपादितम् । (NS. p. 633). The spiritual volatilization of the human personality into the colorless and featureless Absolute is quite as bleak and dreary a prospect as its nullification. It could never touch the heart and make it glow to be told that some spiritual spark will continue to be, even after we ourselves or what we hold dearest viz.. our self is destroyed in the process of realization : मोक्षे अहमर्थाभावे, आत्मनाशे मोक्ष इति बाह्यमतापत्तिः । प्रेमास्पदस्याहमर्थस्य च त्वन्मतेऽपि नाशात् तदन्यस्य शून्यादेः तमतेऽप्यनाशात् । 'अहं सुखो स्याम्' इतीच्छावत् 'चिन्मात्रं मुक्तं स्यात्' इतीच्छाया : क्वाप्यदर्शनेन मुक्तेरनिष्टलापाताच्च । 'यः कश्चिदात्मा मुक्तः स्या' दितीच्छ्या च न मुमुक्षुप्रवृत्तिः । 'भग्मात्मा मुक्तः स्या' दितीच्छा तु अहमर्थस्यैव मुक्तीच्छा (Nym. p. 383). It cannot be argued that the aim of life is not so much to 'be happy' as 'to become

happiness itself'. Philosophers have to respect the law of life. They cannot change the aim of life to their whims and dictates. Otherwise, the Buddhists and the Nyāya philosopher may as well get away with their dogma that the extinction of the Ātman or the extinction of all happiness is the aim of life.

In the absence of the survival of personality and full scope for the enjoyment of the innate bliss of selfhood, it would be a misuse of language to call the condition of Mokṣa promised by the Advaita a state of bliss :

आनन्दरूपता च वाङ्मात्रमित्युक्तमेव (*NS.* p. 534).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya account of Mokṣa is purely negative. Pleasure unmixed with pain or unattended by it, they argue, is unknown in the world. If, then, one should be so sentimental as to insist upon the enjoyment of happiness in release, one should, by the force of the same logic, admit the possibility of some measure of pain and suffering also, therein. But that would be ridiculous. It would make release as good or as bad as *Samsāra*. The only rational course would therefore be to accept Mokṣa as a state of complete absence of any kind of pain coupled with the absence of any kind of pleasure or 'joy' so called. Madhva contends that such a purely negative ideal of Mokṣa could not supply the necessary dynamism and motive force for any fruitful spiritual effort to achieve release, on the part of the aspirant. Jayatīrtha points out that a positive hankering after happiness could be seen to lie at the back of attempts of persons suffering from incurable maladies to put an end to their lives by suicide :

रोगादिपीडिता उद्ववन्धादिनात्मविनाशं कुर्वन्तोऽपि दृश्यन्ते इति चेत्रा । रोगाद्यायतनदेहपरित्यागेन
आत्मानं निदुःखीकर्तुमेव तेषां प्रवृत्तिः । 'निदुःखी भूयासम्' इति हि सर्वस्याशीः । न तु 'भूयासम्'

1. Cf. "A tendency to escape from oneself into God may have been the central motive of some sects of the *Upaniṣads*, the Orphic brotherhood in ancient Greece and some Christian and Sufi Mystics. But there is no evidence that any Mystic achieved such a goal. In the nature of things, evidence of such absorption is impossible. He who has become God cannot return to tell of his experience and he who narrates the story has not become God," (*Radhakrishnan, I. Phil.*, ii, p. 712).

इति । (NS. pp. 632-33).

The doctrine of absorption, in Advaita, cuts at the very root of the idea of self. The self, as we all understand it, is the deepest spring of personality. It is what is revealed and implicated in all our experience as "Aham" ("I"). It is the basic principle of life, the *elan vital*, which possesses an inalienable and incommunicable individuality of its own, which furnishes the basis of the self-conscious psycho-physical mechanism of life carried on thro' a series of transmigrations. It is this underlying principle that is the most cherished possessions of man : तदेतत् प्रेयः पुत्रात् प्रेयो वित्तात् प्रेयः सर्वस्मादन्तर यदयमात्मा (Brh. Up.). There is no place in the consolidated experience of humanity for a deeper or a more fundamental essence of the self of man,—the one to which he clings with desperate tenacity throughout life and into which we enter in the inmost experiences of our lives. This self must therefore survive in the released state, if that state should have any meaning and reality for us. A self devoid of such a living content and a link with what it was in the state of bondage would be but an empty abstraction and a spectre of the absolutist fancy. Even supposing that such an abstraction is possible, we cannot be persuaded to love and cherish it above all things in life and hold fast to it, as we do the self we know in the purest moments of our bliss, or go through a lot of trouble to help some 'pure consciousness' that will rise on the ashes of our own self, to manifest itself; न हेतस्मादपाद्विवक्तं किमपि निराकारं सूपमनुसन्धाय, मा न भूव, भूयासे, इति लोकं आशास्ते । चक्षुषी निमील्य तथेति वदतस्तु कः प्रतिमलः? (NS. p. 633)

In any case, it would be little more than a verbal jugglery to say that the absolutist goal is essentially 'blissful'. It is the capacity to feel and enjoy the bliss and the presence of one who enjoys, that makes happiness meaningful and worth striving for and not the bare presence of happiness, much less our 'identification' with it : तत्र, न तावत् सुखात्मता पुरुषार्थः । सुखी स्यामितीच्छावत् 'सुखं स्याम्' इतीच्छाया अदर्शनात् । (Nym. pp. 635-36). On the absolutist view, however, there can be no question of enjoying the

bliss of selfhood, in view of the avowed difficulty of 'Kartṛkarmabhāva.' Moreover, one may ask the Advaitin : how is the Ātman to be conceived in Mokṣa ? If simply as a *bare consciousness*, then, there will be no room left for any realization of bliss (in the Ātman). If he is to be conceived as the essence of bliss alone, there will be no *consciousness* or *realization* of that bliss ! If he is to be conceived as both of the nature of *bliss and consciousness*, the thesis of Ātman as a *differenceless oneness* is shattered. Without the acceptance of an internal Viśesa, in the Ātman, it will be impossible to have the "aspects" of bliss and its consciousness (or revelation) *integrated* in the being of Ātman : अपि चात्मनः सुखमात्रत्वे, प्रकाशमात्रत्वे च, सुखप्रकाशभावेन, अपुर्यत्वम् । उभयात्मकत्वे च अखण्डत्वहानिः । (Nym. p. 627 b). Apart from this, the bliss of Ātman, being always self-subsistent, will always be there and it cannot therefore be made an object of spiritual pursuit. It is no use contending that this bliss has been obscured by nescience in the state of Samsāra (bondage) and comes to be realized only after the obscuration has been removed. For, according to the Advaitin, this bliss is *ex hypothesi* self-luminous and indistinguishable from the self and identical with it. It should, therefore, be capable of being fully revealed along with the revelation of the self all along. It cannot be held to be vaguely or partly and imperfectly revealed or felt in the state of bondage and fully manifested in release. For, such ideas of partial and full manifestations, clarity and obscurity of revelations etc., imply and presuppose the presence of aspects or Viśesas or a diversity of features in the subject or a principle of identity-in-difference, in the essence of the Śuddhacaitanya, by which the hidden shades come to be progressively realized. But all this is impossible in a theory of Nirviśeṣādvaita or Nirviśeṣa-cinmātravāda or Akhaṇḍa-Caitanyavāda, such as has been sponsored by Śaṅkara and his followers. There can be no talk of Sāmānya and Viśesa, general and particular, in the "Nirviśeṣa". There is no place for any such inner shades of being or diversity of content or aspects or by whatever name one may choose to call it, in the conception of the Ātman as a *bare consciousness*, without aspects (*miraṣṭa-*

samastaviveśam) adumbrated by Śaṅkara. There can be no new or fuller stages of bliss of being *yet to be intuited* or rediscovered in a pure being that is *ex hypothesi* colorless, shadeless and aspectless:

निविशेषत्वादात्मनो नानधिगतो विशेषः (Madhva)

This criticism is not only hard to rebut; but has not been rebutted convincingly.¹

1. प्रकाशमानोऽप्यानन्दो न विशदः प्रकाशत इति चेत् । निविशेषत्वात् ।
वैश्वावैश्वयोथ विशेषलिबन्धनत्वात् । यद्द्वं सह विशेषः प्रकाशते तद्विशदमुच्यते । यत्तु साधारणधर्मैः सह, तदविशदमिति ॥ अविद्यावरणापापमे प्रकाशत इति च कोऽर्थः ? किं प्रतीयत इति; उत्त प्रत्येतीति ? नोभावपि; अनङ्गीकारात् ॥ प्रदीपः प्रकाशत इति कोऽर्थ इति चेत् । भास्वररूपवान् वर्तत इति न किञ्चिदेतत् ॥ (N.S. p. 634b)

CHAPTER LVI

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MUKTI

Madhva, therefore, lays great stress on the survival of every individual personality, as such, in release. This is the corollary of his belief in the distinctiveness of the Svārūpa of each Jīva. As release is the realization of the intrinsic bliss of selfhood by each one of us, it must be a positive experience, to be felt and be realized by each and at the same time, incommunicable to others. We cannot, obviously, press the point further and ask *how* the blissful experience of one self differs from that of another. It is purely a matter of intuitive experience of each individual and we have to leave it at that. As Rāmānuja says :

जीवात्मस्वरूपं * * * * ज्ञानानन्दैकगुणम् । तस्यैतस्य * * *

स्वरूपभेदो वाचामगोचरः स्वसंवेद्यः ज्ञानस्वरूपमित्येतावदेव निर्देश्यम् ।

(*Vedārtha-Samgraha*)

Hence, it will be presumptuous on the part of anyone to attempt to define in clear and precise terms what exactly the released state would be like, *from this side of release* ! Nevertheless, man is irrepressibly curious and inquisitive about what lies in store for him in the great beyond. People expect the philosopher to throw some light on these questions. As an interpreter and an expositor of the traditions of the Vedaśāstra, on this point, Madhva bases his account of the released state on a coordinated interpretation of the Scriptural facts and evidences. He also adduces his *reasons* in support of these interpretations. He gives a thoroughly consistent picture of the released state, harmonizing the *realistic and idealistic* accounts of Mokṣa found in the Vedic, Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic sources. It must be said that *his is a distinctive view of Mokṣa rich in its details, uncompromising in principles, trenchant in its logic and full of mystic inwardness, in some respects.*

The first and foremost fact about *Mokṣa* emphasized by Madhva is its *positive aspect*. He opposes the purely negative view of *Mokṣa*, held by the Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas. To be a “*Puruṣārtha*” and the highest one at that, it must be a state of supreme bliss. This bliss must be fully manifested, i. e., capable of being actually *felt and enjoyed with a full consciousness that it is being enjoyed*. This would naturally presuppose the survival of the one who is to enjoy the experiences of this blessed state. In this connection, Madhva discusses the famous text of the *Chāndogya* : अशरीरं ता व सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्मृशतः and shows that the juxtaposition of the words : न ह वै सशरीरस्य प्रियाप्रियोरपहतिः establishes clearly that it is only the material joys and pleasures that are regarded as disagreeable to the Mukta and therefore ruled out ; while the intrinsic bliss of selfhood and its enjoyment are accepted without reserve. Similarly, another Śruti which speaks of the destruction of all desires of the heart (यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि स्थिताः) has reference only to the material longings of the *antahkaraṇa*: सर्वथापि कामाभावपरेति व्याख्याने ‘हृदि अत्रिता’ इति कामानां विशेषणं व्यर्थं स्यात् । व्यावर्त्याभावात् । अन्तःकरणपरिणतीनां कामानामेव मुक्ताक्षाबावः । न तु स्वरूपभूतानाम् । (*NS.* p. 573), because other Śruti texts, connected with the Mukti state, do speak of the fulfilment of every spiritual desire in *Mokṣa*— भवेदेतत् । यदीदि विशेषणं स्यात् । न चैव; व्यावर्त्याभावात् । सर्वेषामपि कामानां मनः-परिणामवत्वमेव, न त्वात्मधर्मः कामोऽस्तीत्याशंक्य निषेधति । ‘मुक्तानां कामितामाह पृथक्षाखासु च श्रुतिः’ । कामश्रुतिस्तु आवचिकाशा । तदभावश्रुतिस्तु सावकाशा । ‘एतत्सर्वं मन एव’त्यपि सावकाश-श्रुतिरिति सांख्याधिकरणेऽभिहितम् । कामश्रुतिस्तु सर्वात्मपि शाखास्वास्ति । तदभावश्रुतिस्तु क्वचिद्देवेति कथं न बाध्यबाधकभावः ? (*NS.* p. 573). The *Vedānta Sūtras* specially discuss the question of how the released spirits enjoy themselves at all, as they have transcended the material plane and have no physical bodies or sense organs and answer the question (iv. 4, 10-16) from different standpoints, consistent with the trans-empirical character of the released state. The *Sūtrakāra* says, for instance, that the released can fashion, at their will, (which is also *satyasamkalpa* in conformity with God's will) suitable bodies out of *Suddhasattva* or enjoy themselves with their own

spiritual bodies composed of *Cit*, *ānanda* etc. These answers are merely intended to show that we cannot judge the state of Mokṣa from our own limited range and angle and conclude that no kind of enjoyment of bliss is possible for these Muktas, because they have no material bodies like ours and that therefore, the state of Mukti should be one of utter inactivity and inertia for the souls. This is an unfair view to take of a state of supreme felicity according to all accounts. There is nothing to prevent the Muktas from enjoying themselves in their state of blessedness, in ways which human imagination can hardly comprehend. Man has hardly yet fathomed the mysteries of nature. He has just begun to coquet with outer space. We may wish him Godspeed; but it will do him good to remember that there are still many things which are beyond his understanding and are bound to remain so :

अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।

प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यत्तु तदचिन्त्यस्य वैभवम् ॥

Mbh. () q. by Śaṅkara (*BSB*. ii, 1, 6).

अनिन्द्रिया अनाहारा अनिष्टद्वाः सुगन्धिनः । (*Mbh.* xii. 337,29)

देहेन्द्रियासुहीनानां वैकुण्ठपुरवासिनाभ् ॥ (*Bhāg.* vii, 1, 34)

Realization, then, makes it possible for the souls to have a sense of realization of something and rest on their oars and taste the unalloyed bliss of their pure being, which has so long been obscured by the encrustation of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc. There is no difficulty of manifestation of the full-fledged personality of the self, in all its richness and entirety of aspects in the state of release, on the Dvaita view, as the self there is admitted to be a unity-in-diversity (*Savīśeṣa-svarūpa* and not *Nir-viśeṣa*, as in Advaita), some of whose aspects have been obscured by the will of God and the influence of Prākṛtic bonds. There is no impediment therefore to these essential aspects becoming *fully manifested* and realized in Mokṣa, when the Lord is pleased to lift the veil of His ‘Māyā’ and manifest the

true and essential nature of the soul to it, in full. The so-called Kartṛkarmavirodha is therefore an untenable objection since it is the very negation of the idea of self to deny self-consciousness to it¹.

Madhva, therefore, regards Mukti as a complete self-expression, self-manifestation and self-realization, in short, a complete unfolding of the self in all its promise and potency :

परंज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पयते (Chān. Up.)

मुक्तिहित्वान्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितिः (Bhāg. ii, 10, 6).

The realization of the truth does not mean the abolition of the plurality of the world ; but only a removal of the false sense of separateness and independence.² It is a new insight that changes the face of the world and makes all things new. The Mukta sees everything thro' the eyes of God,³ as dependent on God, in their proper perspective, which he has failed to do in Samsāra.

The pleasures of the highest state, described in some of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic passages, are not the last word on the subject. They are only broad indications of what the supreme state of felicity may be like :

प्रत्ययार्थं च मोक्षस्य सिद्धयः संप्रकीर्तिः ।

(Sāttvata q. by Desīka, B.G.t. xviii, 32).

Consequently, then, we need neither take them *too literally*, nor dismiss them as garish *fancies*. Madhva has left us in no doubt as to the manner

1. तदात्मानमेवावैदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति । आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् ॥ (Brh. Up.).

2. यो हि ब्रह्मश्चनादिकं जगदात्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातंश्येण लब्धसद्ग्रावं पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं जगत्पराकरोति ॥ (Śamkara, B. S. B. I, 4, 19)

3. स ब्रह्मणा पश्यति, ब्रह्मणा शृणोति ब्रह्मणैदं सर्वमनुभवति ।

(Śruti, Madhva B. S. B. iv, 4, 5),

of life led by the freed souls in release. Like the Lord, they are for ever *contented*. They don't have to *seek* satisfaction ; for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven. Wisdom and enjoyment of perfect bliss are their *own nature*. With all that, there is no *fear* that their condition would be one of stagnation all round. *A Theistic account of Mokṣa cannot, any day, make conditions there more stagnant than an Advaitic view of it!* Madhva is satisfied that there is scope for activity and full play of capacities for every one of us, there, according to his or her abilities. The released may rest in the contemplation of their own blessedness, like the Advaitic Brahman. They may contrast their present with their past and feel thankful for their deliverance. They may adore the majesty of God and sing His praises or worship Him in a thousand ways :

ज्ञात्वा पि भम माहात्म्यं ततोत्सुकतया पुनः ।

विशेषाच्च विशेषेण ज्ञात्वा मामश्रुतेऽधिकम् ॥

(*Vijñāna*, q. B.T. p. 89).

They may offer sacrifices, if they wish to, — the only difference being that *nothing is obligatory there*.

There is no *prescribed round of activities* or code of conduct in Mokṣa, which means there is unlimited scope for spontaneous, creative work of every kind, — Karma,¹ Jñāna, and Bhakti.² There is no call for activity in that there is no one to *call upon you* to do this or that. The urge is from within, entirely :

कदाचित्कर्म कुर्वन्ति कदाचिनैव कुर्वते ।

नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वाच्चित्यं ध्यायन्ति केशवम् ॥ (*B. S. B.* iii, 3, 30,).

1. कृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोहैः । (*Mbh.* xiii. 18, 16).

2. आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्मे ।

कुर्वन्त्यहृतुकीं भवितमित्यभूतगुणो हरिः ॥ (*Bhāg.* i, 7, 10).

The worship and activity in Mokṣa, such as they are, are *an end in themselves*. They are *not means to an end*:

साध्यानंदस्वरूपैव भक्तिर्नैवात्र साधनम् । (*GT.* p. 663)
 हरेखपासना चात्र सदैव सुखरूपिणी ।
 न तु साधनभूता सा सिद्धिरेवात्र सा यतः ॥

(*B. S. B.* iv, 4, 21).

The assumption of activities cannot reduce the released state to the level of this world as these are no longer determined by injunctions and prohibitions; or attended by unpleasant consequences in the event of non-performance. It is this freedom from all conditions that distinguishes the life in Mokṣa from ordinary life. Madhva's point : बन्धप्रत्यवायाभावे हि मोक्षसार्थवत्त्वं । अन्यथा मोक्षत्वमेव न स्पात् (*B.S.B.* iii, 3, 30) is really unexceptionable. Unless some kind of activity is recognized, it will be difficult to differentiate the liberated souls from stones and sticks, despite the reputed possession by them of "consciousness". Such service as the freed render to God is purely voluntary and an end in itself :

भक्तिर्णानं तथा ध्यानं सुकृतानामपि सर्वशः ।
 साधनानि तु सर्वाणि भक्तिज्ञानप्रवृद्धये ।
 नैवान्यसाधनं भक्तिः फलरूपा हि सा यतः ॥

(*Madhva, Brh. Up. C.*)

Madhva has brought together certain texts,¹ bearing on the nature of life in the released state and these have been elucidated by the author of the *Madhyasiddhāntasāra*.

1. The most important of these are :

सर्वे नन्दन्ति यशसा गतेन सभासाहेन सख्या सखायः (*RV. X. 71,10*)

अक्षण्वन्तः कर्णवन्तः सखाशो मनोजवेष्वसमा बभूतुः (*RV. X. 71, 7*)

1. केनित्स्वीभोगं कुर्वन्ति (Cf. *Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 2)
2. केनित्तु रथगजतुरगादीन् धावयन्ति (*ibid*).
3. केचनं ऋगादिवेदोच्चारणेन भगवन्तं स्तुवन्ति (Cf. *RV.* X, 72, 11)
4. केचन सुखोद्रेकेण ‘हातु, हातु,’ इत्यादिशब्दान् उच्चारयन्ति
(*Taitt. Up.* iii, 10, 5)
5. केचन पूर्वाभ्यासवेन यज्ञादिकं कुर्वन्ति (Cf. *Mbh.* xiii, 18, 6)

contd.—

एतत्साम गायज्ञास्ते हातु हातु हातु (*Taitt. Up.* iii, 10, 5).

तस्य मध्ये वेतसः पुण्यगन्धो सहस्रशाखो विमले विभाति ।

तस्य मूलात्सरितः प्रस्तवन्ति मधूकप्रस्तवणा रमण्यः (Q. *S.N.R.*)

‘आचक्षव मे परं मोक्षं धीरा यं प्रवदन्ति तम् ।

इत्युक्त आह वाप्देवी परं मोक्षं प्रजापतेः ।

शाखां शाखां महानयः संयान्ति परितःस्वाः ।

धानापूपा मासकामाः सदा पायसकर्दमाः ।

यस्मिन्ब्रह्मसुखा देवाः सेन्द्राः सह मरुदणाः ।

ईंजिरे क्रतुभिः श्रेष्ठस्तदक्षरमुपासते ।

प्रविशन्ति परं देवं मुक्तात्सत्त्वैव भोगिनः ।

निर्गच्छन्ति यथाकामं परेशेनैव चोदिताः ॥’

(*Mbh. Udyoga Parva*, Q. *Madhva A.V.* ii, 3, p. 29 b.)

यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुदः प्रमुद आसते ।

देवैः सुकृतकर्मभिस्तत्र माममृतं कृथि ॥ (*RV.* IX, 113, 1)

6. केचन “ आजन्ममरणं स्मृत्वा मुक्ता हृष्मवानुयुः” ॥
7. केचनेच्छामात्रेण पित्रादिदर्शनवन्तो भवन्ति ।
(*Chān. Up.* viii, 2, 1-10 and *Śamkara BSB* iv, 4, 8)
8. केचन सर्वलोकचारिणः (*Chān. Up.* viii, 25,2)
9. केचन शुद्धसत्त्वनिर्मितलीलाशरीराण्यादाय कीडन्ते
(*BS.* iv, 4, 12, and *Śamkara's Com.* thereon.)
10. केचन नृत्यन्ति ।
11. केचन वायानि वादयन्ति ॥

As individuality persists in *Mokṣa*,¹ there must be some outlet for the energies of the freed. Scripture does not deny desires to the released. It is the desires of a worldly nature and born of the mind that are denied:

* * * * कामा येऽस्य हृदि स्थिताः ।²

इत्यन्तःकरणस्थानां कामानां मोक्षमेव हि ।

प्राह श्रुतिर्हृदीत्येव न चेद्ग्रथर्थविशेषणम् (*AV.* p. 45).

1. Cf. अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छितिधर्मा (*Bṛh. Up.*)

2. Madhva points out that the term “ *Hṛdi* ” in the *Up.* text shows that only the desires arising in the mind are intended.

CHAPTER LVII

RATIONALE OF ĀNANDA-TĀRATAMYA IN MOKṢA

All Theists recognize the persistence of personality in release. Since the souls are many, their plurality must survive there. But as multiplicity without distinctions and gradations is inconceivable among thinking selves as we know them, Madhva finds it necessary to maintain that there are distinctions in the quality, intensity, range etc. of the Svarūpānanda enjoyed by them, in the released state, according to their capacities and intrinsic fitness (*svarūpayogyatā*). Rāmānuja, in his theory of selves, is inclined to put down the difference among the different classes of souls, such as gods and human beings, as the outcome of Karma and other Prākṛtic accretions and therefore not touching their essence, which he regards as equal, in all; tho' there is numerical distinction. This is not acceptable to Madhva, who finds sufficient evidence in the Śāstras to accept the differences between the gods and the other classes of souls as inherent distinctions among different orders of beings—not traceable to Karmic or other causes. As a matter of fact, Rāmānuja is not quite consistent in not accepting intrinsic gradation among the souls in his general theory; tho' the tradition of Vaiṣṇava theology which he inherits from the Ālvārs is committed to the existence of a special class of Nityasūris among the (released) souls as distinguished from the ordinary Muktas, who have attained release *after bondage*. This inner inconsistency in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position has been taken note of by Vyāsārāya in his *Nyāyāmṛta* in support of Madhva's theory of Ānandatāratamya in Mokṣa, as against the Sāmya theory of Rāmānuja, as will be shown presently.

Madhva's theory of Ānanda-tāratamya, in Mokṣa, is a logical conclusion from the hypothesis of Svarūpabhedā and Tāratamya (gradation) among souls. It is one of the main points of disagreement between the schools of Madhva and Rāmānuja; tho' both are schools of staunch and uncompromising Vaiṣṇava Theism and show many other points of mutual agreement in doctrine and theology. Much contro-

versy as raged between these two schools over this issue from the days of Vyāsarāya and some controversial works written on the subject by champions of the respective schools are actually in existence.¹

It should be borne in mind that a theory of possible difference and gradation in the qualitative enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa has meaning only in a system of thought in which the difference among the souls is accepted as a fact. It has no place in a monistic system like Śāṅkara's where all difference among souls (ātmabheda) even in Samsāra is merely due to false Upādhis and is utterly wiped out in release for an Advaitin. It has significance and bearing only in Theistic systems like those of Rāmānuja and Madhva wherein the plurality of souls is admitted as an ultimate fact. Of course, as against Śāṅkara and his school, Madhva and his commentators have, as we have seen, tried to establish the thesis of plurality of Ātmans as a fundamental fact, on strong grounds including textual evidences. Acceptance of the doctrine of plurality of Ātmans is the same as accepting "Svarūpabhedā" among Ātmans and rejecting the view of "Ekātmavāda" that there is, in reality, only one Ātman, who *appears* as many on account of Upādhis. Once "Svarūpabhedavāda" among Ātmans is accepted as a philosophical fact, it will be easy enough to establish "Svarūpā-Tāratamya" also among such Ātmans which will logically lead up to Svarūpānandatāratamya among them, in Mokṣa. The latter is the inevitable logical corollary of the former. Madhva and his commentators feel strongly that the Rāmānuja school is *not* justified in accepting Svarūpabhedā of Ātmans warmly but in refusing to subscribe to the doctrine of Ānanda-Tāratamya among them, in Mokṣa, which will be the most natural deduction from it. As for the main arguments in favor of Madhva's theory, they will be dealt with, presently.

Since Mokṣa is only the discovery and enjoyment of one's own selfhood, in its pristine purity and bliss, there is no possibility of exchanging one's experiences of bliss with another's, or of its transference to another, whether wholly or in part. Each soul rests fully satisfied and immersed in the enjoyment of its "Svarūpānanda", *to saturation point, so to say*. Many weighty arguments have been urged by Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya, in their works, in support of this important doctrine of Theism. As the subject of Mokṣānanda and Svarūpānanda

1. For details see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* Vol. II.

pertain largely to the domain of Mysticism, students and critics of Madhva's doctrine of Svarūpānanda-Tāratamya of souls, in Mokṣa, should *not fail to take due note of the mystic inwardness of this doctrine*, however strange and unfamiliar it may seem to them, at first sight. Viewed in the light of an expression and an interpretation of the mystic joy of self-realization, in Mokṣa, *its contribution to the philosophy of Mysticism itself will be seen to be quite remarkable.*

All souls could not have put forth the same quality or quantity of effort of the same intensity or duration. It thus stands to reason that there must be a proportionate difference in the nature of the reward reaped by them. This is one other ground of Tāratamya (gradation) of ānanda (bliss) in Mokṣa. There are highly evolved souls like those of Brahmā and the other gods, whose spiritual perfection *must* certainly be greater than that of us mortals. And it cannot go in vain. The evidence of Scripture tells us of superhuman Sādhanas practised by some of the gods and the wide difference in their quality, quantity, duration etc. which are beyond human conception. These could not all be treated on the same par :

‘ दशकल्पं तपश्रीर्णि रुद्रेण लवणार्णवे ।
त्यक्त्वा सुखानि सर्वाणि क्लिष्टेन लवणांभसा ।
शक्तेण वर्षकोटीश्च धूमः पीतोऽतिदुःखतः ।
वर्षायुतं तु सूर्येण तपोऽवृक्षशिरसा कृतम् ।
सुदुःखेन सुखं त्यक्त्वा धर्मेणाकाशशायिना ।
पीता मरीचयो वर्षसहस्रमतिसादरम् ।
अतिकृच्छ्रेण कुर्वन्ति यत्नं ब्रह्मविदोऽपि च ।’
इत्येतदखिलं मोक्षे विशेषाभावतः कथम् ?
युक्तं च साधनाधिक्यात् साध्याधिक्यं सुरादिषु ।
नाधिक्यं यदि साध्ये स्यात् प्रयत्नः साधने कुतः ?

(AV. iii, p. 45-46)

Again, the Śāstras tell us that there are persons who work deliberately for their salvation as well as great souls like Sanaka (Ekāntabhartas) who love God for His own sake (and not for their salvation) and decline the prospect of unity with Him. Surely, any theory of Mokṣa, if it is to be balanced, must take note of these intrinsic differences and give a proper place for Ekāntabhartas and others, according to their worth. Madhva bases one of his arguments for accepting Tāratamya in Mokṣa on this point also : यदि तारतम्ये न स्यात्—

‘नात्यन्तिकं विगणयन्त्यपि ते प्रसादम्’ (Bhāg. iii. 15, 48)

‘नैकात्म्यतां मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित्’ (iii, 25, 34)

‘* * * एकत्वमप्युत् ।

दीयमानं न गृण्हन्ति * * *’ ॥ (iii, 29, 13) इति

मुक्तिमनिच्छतामपि मोक्ष एव फलं, तमिच्छतामपि शुश्रीकादीनामिति कथमनिच्छतां सुतिरूपता स्यात् ? (G. B. ii, 52).

Vyāsārāya, in his *Nyāyāmrta*, has given us the best critical exposition of Madhva's doctrine of Ānandatāratamya, in its logical and textual aspects. Some of his arguments have been specially directed against the school of Rāmānuja. This school accepts Svarūpabhedā between God and the souls and among the Mukta-Jīvas themselves. But, it is not prepared to go further and accept, with Madhva, any *Svarūpa-vaidicitya* (distinguishing characteristics) among the souls or any gradation in their Svarūpānanda, in Mokṣa. Vyāsārāya shows how it has accepted Svarūpa tāratamya, *in principle, not only between Brahman and the Mukta-Jīvas but among the Mukta-Jīvas as well*, at least *in a few cases*. If, then, Svarūpatāratamya can be accepted among Jīvas, *in principle*, there is no reason to shy at the acceptance of Svarūpānanda-Tāratamya *also*. For, in the last analysis, Svarūpānanda of each individual and of Brahman is nothing but *the expression of their own nature*. Madhva and his commentators do not also accept the position of Rāmānuja that the differences between the Devas (including Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the goddesses) and other souls referred to in the Śāstras are not Svābhāvika but are the result of bodily and other Karmic Upādhis alone. Madhva is not prepared to endorse such an extreme view; which, he feels, will be *out of tune with the spiritual traditions of the Śāstras*.

Anyway, the principle of Svarūpatāratamya is accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin in respect of the Jivas and Brahman. Brahman here is conceived as Vibhu, Śeṣi and Svatantra; while the Jivas are all Aṇu, Śesa and Paratantra. In this circumstance, complete equality between such widely differing natures is out of the question. It will lead to multiplicity of Iśvaras, if pressed further.

The Sūtra : जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (iv, 4, 17) denies cosmic functions to the released souls. Such cosmic activities of Brahman are obviously and admittedly an expression of His own inner joy. (Cf. को हेतुवान्यात् कः प्राण्यादेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात् (Taitt. Up.). Rāmānuja himself admits that the Muktas owe the very manifestation of their Svarūpa to the eternal will (saṃkalpa) of Brahman : मुक्तस्य सत्यसंकल्पतादिपूर्वकस्यानन्दस्य परमपुरुष एव हेतुरिति श्रुतिस्मृती दर्शयतः । एष हेतुवानन्दयाति * * * इति । (R. B. S.B. iv, 20). Thus, he accepts the relation of Niyama-niyāmakabhāva (controller and controlled), between them, to be intrinsic to their natures. This should lead to the legitimate conclusion that the bliss of the Niyāmaka (controller) must be greater, wider and more intense than that of the controlled :

ईश्वरानन्दः जीवानन्दादुत्कृष्टः तदवश्यतचिन्त्यमकानन्दत्वात् । यदेवं तदेवं, यथा सेवका नन्दात् सेव्यमानानन्दः ॥ (Nym). Since Brahman is capable of enjoying an order of bliss superior to that of the Jīvas under its control, in release, there is no reason why it should not do so.

The Sūtra भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च (iv, 4, 21) will not conflict with this position. For, according to Rāmānuja, this Sūtra is not an independent one ; but one that is syntactically connected with जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्* * * * (iv, 4, 17).¹ The term *mātra* in *bhogamātra* here, has been explained by him, not in the sense of the entirety of the *bhoga* (काल्पन्यर्थ) but in the sense of emphasis (अवधारणार्थ) intended to restrict the equality with Brahman (ब्रह्मसाम्य) to the aspect of *bhoga* or *ānanda* alone and prevent its extension to the cosmic activities (जगद्व्यापार) of Brahman and Its other characteristics. On the basis of this Sūtra भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च, then, as interpreted by Rāmānuja, it cannot therefore be decided whether

1. ब्रह्मायाथात्म्यानुभवरूपभोगमात्रे मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मसाम्यप्रतिपादनाच्च लिङ्गात् जगद्व्यापारवर्ज-मित्यवगम्यते (R. B.S.B.)

the equality in the enjoyment of bliss between the Jivas and Brahman is just in respect of its general aspect of *bhoga* (भोगसामान्य एव) ; or whether it applies to each and every aspect of Brahman's enjoyment (भोगविशेष.) The same suffix *mātra* in *bhogamātra* cannot bear two separate senses of emphasis and entirety ; nor has Rāmānuja made any such suggestion, in his commentary. Hence, the Sūtra भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गान्वच will be of no use to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin in establishing the thesis of complete equality of Mukta-Jivas with Brahman, in the enjoyment of all its *bhogas*, extending to each and every aspect of it.

The cosmic activities of Brahman are indeed an expression of its inner joy (जगद्धशापारस्यापीश्वरत्भोगत्वेन) and it must stand to reason that the Mukta-Jivas who do not engage in such activities, cannot be enjoying the bliss of Brahman associated with such activities.

The Rāmānuja school recognizes further that the Goddess Lakṣmī also occupies the position of शेषि to all the Jivas (including the Mukta Jivas) and also that certain superior souls like Viśvaksena, who are given the special status of " Nityasūris ", exercise control over the other Jivas in release. This is a clear and unambiguous acceptance of the principle of *Jivasvarūpa-tāratamya* in the Rāmānuja school, notwithstanding its supposed denial on the ground that all difference among Jivas is due to Karma alone. This special status given to Lakṣmī and the " Nityasūris ", in the Viśiṣṭādvaita hierarchy, gives solid support to Madhva's doctrine of *Svarūpa-Tāratamya* among Muktas. From *Svarūpa-tāratamya* to " *Svarūpānanda-tāratamya* " it is but a single logical step, forward.

The Hindu Scriptures refer to an ascending order of Mukti : Sālokya, Sāmīpya, Sārūpya and Sāyujya, in which each succeeding stage includes the joy of the preceding one. This would certainly imply an intrinsic gradation of bliss in Mokṣa. As Sāyujya carries with it an element of Sarūpya also, it cannot be equated with ऐक्यम् or identity of being. This is evident from the Upaniṣadic text : चन्द्रमसः सायुज्यं सलोकतामाप्नोति where the knower who has attained Sāyujya with the moon is again referred to as enjoying the benefits of Salokatā. The etymology of the word Sāyujya सायुज्येर्भावः सायुज्यम् also disproves the sense of " identity ". The gradations of the four kinds of Mukti accepted by the Rāmānuja school also, makes it incumbent upon it to accept the principle of Tāratamya in Mokṣa.

Tho' the Svarūpānanda of each individual Mukta-Jīva is a single unit of atomic dimensions, it is conceivable that there can be gradations in their Svarūpānanda, in regard to their quality, range, intensity etc. Since Mokṣānanda is *ex hypothesi* trans-empirical, it will be difficult to clarify the exact nature of its inner gradations in clear and precise terms *from the empirical level*. We can only say, in the words of Rāmānuja, that the Svarūpānanda of the Jīvas, in Mokṣa is, like the very Svarūpa of the Jīvas, “*Svasamvedya*” and “*Vācām agocarāḥ*” *sui generis* and that, *their gradations too are स्वसंवेद्य and वाचामगोचरः*। Vyāsārāya has made the point clear by means of an analogy, — the different levels of joy and satisfaction derived from the tasting of water and nectar.¹

Vyāsārāya has also argued in his *Nyāyāmrta* that the principle of parity between means and ends, if applied to the two different types of Sādhanas accepted by the Rāmānuja school, viz. Bhakti and Prapatti, will inevitably lead to the acceptance of gradation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa among the released souls. The validity of the principle of parity of means and ends is not weakened, as Sādhanas in both the systems merely help to manifest (*abhivyakti*) the Svarūpānanda of the Muktas and *not to* produce it (*janaka*).

Prapatti is trustful surrender of self to God (*bhara-nyāsa*)² and Bhakti is continuous flow of contemplative thinking of God, without break.³ These two are conceived as independent means of release ; and not as complementary. According to the Rāmānuja school, the way of Bhakti calls for the faithful performance of the duties of Varṇāśrama and Śrauta-Smārta dharmas,⁴ in order to fit the mind for *nididhyāsana*. It

1. स्वरूपसुखानां प्रत्येकमेकत्वेनाणुत्वेन च संख्यापरिमाणकृतवैष्मयाभावेषि जलसुधापानसुखयो-
रिव मधुरमधुरतरत्वादिवत् स्वरूपकृतवैष्मयं युक्तम् । (*Nym.* p. 642)

2. अनन्यसाध्ये स्वाभीष्टे महाविश्वासपूर्वकम् ।

तदेकोपायतायाच्चा प्रभातिः शरणागतिः ॥ (Q. Desika, *R. G. B.* xviii 66)

3. अथानं च तैलधारावदविल्लिङ्गस्मृतिसन्तानरूपं । वश्यति च—‘आचृतिरसकृदुपदेशा’दिति । तस्यैव
वेदनस्योपासनारूपस्यासकृदावृत्तस्य ध्रुवानुस्मृतित्वम् । (*Śrīvīhāsyā* 1, 1, 1)

4. एवंरूपाया ध्रुवानुस्मृते: साधनानि यज्ञादिकर्माणि (*ibid*)

is such Upāsanā of God with the help of any one of the Vidyās taught in the Śrutiś that earns the love and grace of God on oneself.¹

The two ways of Bhakti and Prapatti are thus different.² Bhakti needs repetition of Upāsanā and requires adherence to the Śrauta and Smārtā Karmas and Varṇāśramā dharmas. Prapatti, on the other hand, is free from the obligations of such Karma and needs no repetition (*dvṛtti*). It is enough to offer Prapatti but once with all one's heart. *The way of Bhakti is thus the more arduous one and long drawn out.* It is also burdened with the obligations of Sāstrik Karma.³ In view of this *structural and other differences between them*, as Sādhanas, one will have to accept a corresponding difference in the nature of the ānanda which they will help to manifest in release.⁴

Vyāsārāya argues that they cannot be equalized in respect of their final fruit, by our proposing to invest Prapatti with a greater measure of trust in God (*viśvāsādhikya*) and attributing less of such trust in God to the discipline of Bhakti.⁵ On the contrary, there would seem to be a

1. उपासनापर्यायत्वात् भक्तिशब्दस्य (*ibid*)
2. "Prapatti is an old doctrine in Southern Vaiśnavism. In the *Nyāsatilakā-Vyākhyā* great emphasis is laid on the fact that Prapatti as a path of approach to God is different from the path of Bhakti and superior to it. (Dasgupta, *I. Phil.* iii, p. 380, fn. 2).
3. "In the *Nyāsatilakāvyākhyā* it is said that the chief difference between Bhakti and Prapatti is (i) that the former is of the nature of unbroken meditation while the latter has to be done *once for all*; (ii) the former needs varying accessory methods of worship and continual action, whereas in the latter we have *excessive faith*" (*ibid*). (Italics mine).
4. तवशीत्या प्रत्येकं मोक्षहेत्योः निरन्तराचिन्ताभरन्न्याससूप्योः भक्तिप्रपत्योः स्वरूपतः कर्मपैक्षान-पैक्षाभ्यामावृत्यनावृत्तिभ्यां च विषमत्वात् । (*Nym.* iv, 5)
5. न च तयोरुक्तरीत्या अधिकात्पत्वेऽपि, विश्वासात्पत्वाविकल्पाभ्यां साम्यमिति बाच्यम् ।

(*Nym.* p. 644 b.).

better case for holding that there will be a greater measure of trust in God created by Bhakti, on account of constant and repeated practice of Upāsanā, which is defined as :

वेदनस्योपासनारूपस्य असकुदावृत्तस्य * * *

than in Prapatti, which it is enough to offer once. It would lead to the fallacy of interdependence, if one should still disregard the disparity between the two Sādhanas and assert that they are both on a par and that their results also would be the same. For, unless their parity as Sādhanas is first established on satisfactory grounds, the equality of their fruits cannot be taken for granted ; and unless the equality of fruit is first proved, the equality as Sādhanas cannot also be established.

It is, therefore, futile to *deny* that Bhakti and Prapatti are *not* on the same par, as Sādhanas. The former must be accepted as the more arduous one and the latter as the easier one. The Śāstras would be violating the principle of equity, if they allow the same fruit as is attained by those who practise the more arduous means. A God who rewards the different types of Sādhakas, who seek Him thro' such admittedly unequal means, to the same extent and degree would also be liable to the charge of partiality and cruelty. The principle of equity in regard to efforts and results established in *B.S.* ii, 1, 34, would also be flouted on such a view.¹

In his commentary on Rāmānuja's *G.B.* (xviii, 66) Vedānta Deśika, introducing an alternative explanation of the verse given by Rāmānuja, refers to Prapatti Mārga as intended for the benefit of those who, for social and other disabilities, are unable or incompetent to follow the more arduous course of Bhakti coupled with Upāsanā and the Varnāśrama and

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1. विश्वासस्यावर्तनीयायां भक्तावेव यावदान्त्यपेक्षितलेन, अनावर्तनीयप्रपत्तितोऽधिकत्वात् । यदि च, फलसाम्येन साधनसाम्यार्थं प्रपत्तावधिकविश्वासःकल्प्येत, तर्ह्यन्योन्याश्रयः । साधनवैषम्येऽपि साध्यसाम्ये च, अधिकविधात्र्याः श्रुतेरनुपादेयत्वं फलदातुरीश्वरस्य वैषम्यादिकं च स्यात् ।

other Karmas.¹ In other words, the disparity of the Sādhanas is to be reconciled with the final result achieved by both the Mārgas and types of Adhikārins being the same, on account of the difference in the competence and capacity of the Adhikārins.² But then, it appears from Deśika's further comments in this connection, that he is viewing "Prapatti" not so much as an independent means on a par with the Vedic Upāsanā Mārga based on Karma and Bhakti, but as an aid to overcome the obstacles and 'sins' which come in the way of one's putting the regular Bhakti-Yoga into practice : एवं सकलाभिमतसाधनतया भगवच्छास्त्रादिषु प्रसिद्धं भगवत्प्रपदनमिह प्रकृतभक्तियोगारम्भविरोधिषापनिवर्हणरूपोदाहरणविशेषे प्रदर्शितम् । 'सुदुष्करेण शोचेयो येन येनेष्टहेतुना । स स तस्याहमेवेति चरमश्लोकसंग्रहः ॥ अत एवात्यभाव्य-ग्रन्थस्य गद्यस्तुतेश्च अविरोधः ॥ (*ibid.*)

The view referred to by Vyāsārāya, in his *Nyāyāmṛta* very probably represents the position of the *Tēngalai school of Śrīvaiśpava thought*, which has given *special prominence to Prapatti as an independent Sādhana of Mokṣa* which can be practised by all without social and other restrictions, i. e. to say as an alternative to Bhakti in its Vedic aspect.³

1. 'सर्वधर्मीन् परियज्य' इति स्वरूपयाग एवास्या योजनायाम् । न च तावता नित्यनैमितिक-लोपप्रसंगः । दुरुष्ठानप्रायश्चित्तादिविषयत्वोक्तेः । तुत्यन्यायतया, तु, नित्यनैमितिकेवपि, यानि दुरुष्ठेयानि तत्रैव स्यात् । शक्तसमधिकृतैव शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेः । अशक्त्या अकरणे दोषाभावात् ।

(Deśika, *R. G. B.* xviii, 66)

2. इह च मुख्याशक्तस्य सर्वप्रकारसुख्यानुकल्पतया एकत्रैव भगवत्प्रपदनस्य विधानात् शक्ता-शक्ताधिकारिभेदात् च, मुख्यानुकल्पयोः सर्वत्र फलाविशेषोपपत्तेः ॥
3. "The older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of Prapatti should give up all Scriptural duties assigned to the different stages of life (*āśrama*) ; for it is well evidenced in the *Gītā* text that one should give up at one's religious duties and surrender oneself to God ". (Dasgupta, *His. of I. Phil.*, iii, p. 91.) See in this connection the views of the Tēngalai sect such as Pillai Lokācārya and Alagiya Maṇavāla Muni.

Vyāsārāya says that there is no warrant in the Sāstras for making any such distinction or dichotomy in the field of Sādhanas. Even conceding that there are two different levels of Sādhanas viz., Bhakti and Prapatti, suited to different levels of Sādhakas, they must necessarily involve a corresponding difference in the nature of the result achieved by them. The principle of parity of means and ends can, on no account, be set aside. That is why Kumārila Bhaṭṭa himself, in his *Vārtika* recognizes :

कर्मणामत्यमहतां फलानां च स्वगोचरे ।

विभागः स्थानसामान्यादविशेषेऽपि चोदिते ॥

that even tho' there are no express statements to the effect, in the Śrutis it is accepted on principle, that lesser rites have lesser fruits and bigger rites have higher fruits.

Vyāsārāya further points out that the religious duties, meditations and other spiritual activities performed by Aparokṣa Jñānins like Śuka, who may be Bhaktas or Prapannas, cannot be regarded as accessories to the acquisition of Jñāna, as in the case of unenlightened Adhikārins, by way of creating a zest for knowledge in them ; or by way of putting an end to their sins arising in the event of non-performance of those duties, because persons like Śuka are already Aparokṣajñānins. Such religious activities carried out by them, cannot also be taken to contribute directly to the fruit of Mokṣa, as that would entail the acceptance of the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. If the Samuccaya of Jñāna and Karma is admitted, then the diversity of Karmas after Jñāna is attained would have to be accepted as producing a diversity in the result, to that extent, which would not be acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. Such activities in which Jñānins, Bhaktas and Prapannas engage in (after attaining Jñāna) can, obviously, have no other goal except Mokṣa, because they would care for no other fruit. Their activities cannot be explained away merely as activities performed for the benefit of the world or its improvement (*lokasaṅgraha*) or as commandments of God. None of

these can be ends in themselves. If it is supposed that they are performed by them merely to earn the love of God for themselves, we will have to point that they have already earned such love of God by rising to the level of Jñānins, Bhaktas and Prapannas. If they wish to achieve a greater measure of God's love upon themselves by such activities, there will be no point in striving for it, if by such a fresh measure of God's love being showered on them, their joy in Mokṣa is not enhanced to any appreciable extent. Nor can their activities be mere sportive activities as in the case of God Himself. For, the Śruti-s do enjoin upon the Aparokṣa Jñānins, such performance of actions, in all seriousness :

‘आचार्याद्विद्यामवाच्यैतमात्मानमभिपश्य शान्तो भवेद्वान्तो भवेत् ।’

‘मत्कर्मकृन्तपरो मद्भक्तः संगवर्जितः ।’

‘मन्मना भव मद्भक्तो मद्याजी मां नमस्कुरु ।’

इत्यादिना भक्तिप्रपातिमतश्च तद्विधानात् (Nym.)

We cannot therefore escape from the conclusion that all spiritual activities of Aparokṣa Jñānins, whether they take the form of Karma, Bhakti or Prapatti, *must have their own rewards in Mokṣa*. As there is no possibility of any other kind of reward in Mokṣa than realizing and enjoying one's own innate bliss, some kind of a fresh welling up of this Svarūpānanda will have to be admitted as an indisputable certainty. There is thus a very strong case for accepting the thesis of Svarūpānanda-Tāratamya in Mokṣa.

The nature and degree of bliss enjoyed by each soul should thus be in proportion to its natural fitness (yogyatā) and amount of preparation (sādhana) including its qualitative and other differences. As, between them and God, there is already this wide difference that they could not take part in the cosmic functions of the Supreme (B. S. iv, 4, 17), there must be a wide difference in the bliss of the Supreme and that of the released. This is accepted by the Śruti text :

एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रासुपर्जीवन्ति । whose implications need not necessarily be restricted to the state of bondage. This limitation between the Supreme Being and the Jivas is not impracticable in Moksha, as there is a God to control the latter. It is of course, needless for Him to issue a command to the effect, for His wish is law unto them¹. परमेश्वरकामाद्य-विभागेनैव तेषां सत्यकामत्वम् : —

‘ कामेन मे काम आगात् ’ (T.A. iii, 15, 2 a) [B.S.B. iv, 2, 26]

As in an ideally Communistic State, the released can be expected to know what is good and best for them and they can be trusted to carry on their way, without encroaching upon one another's province or liberties of God. They neither do nor *can* will what is impossible of achievement or beyond their deserts. While it remains true that all their desires come true, Madhva would explain, that on no occasion would they entertain a low and unholy desire or one beyond their powers of achievement or jurisdiction :

स्वाधिकानन्दसंप्राप्तौ सद्यादिव्यापृतिष्ठपि ।

मुक्तानां नैव कामः स्यादन्यान्कामांस्तु भुजते ॥

तथोभ्यता नैव तेषां कदाचित्क्वापि विवरते ।

न चायोग्यं विमुक्तोऽपि प्राप्णुयाचैव कामयेत् ॥ (B.S.B. iv, 4, 18).

न च, संकल्पादेव समस्तसंभवात्तुष्यादिसमस्तकार्यसंभवः

न हि सुवर्णं शुद्धमपि वन्हिकार्यकरं भवेत् ।

अयोग्यशक्तितस्त्वेव नाधिकानन्दसंभवः ॥

न हि कथित्युशक्तोपि चकाराचेतनं चितिम् ।

न च कामस्तथा भूयात् ततः स्यात्सत्यकामता ॥ (NV. iv, 4, 9)

The rights and liberties of the freed are thus constitutionally defined and properly safeguarded by the principle of undictated harmony (*satyakāmatā*) of their nature. There is no room for discord or jealousy there. Each one has his reward and each feels happy and full to the brim :

1. Of. “ Thy Will be done on Earth, as it is in Heaven.”

यथोदचनकुंभादः सरित्सागरयोरपि ।

अल्पेन महता वापि पूर्तिर्योग्यतया भवेत् ॥

(q. Brh. Up. C. iii, 4, 10).

Each is so much absorbed in his own contentment and has no thoughts to give to the disparity between him and the others. He sees nothing more than that every other person, also, is likewise happy and contended and full to the brim : भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच (B.S. iv, 4, 22). Madhva's Mokṣa is, thus, a philosophical Communism come true.

One of the familiar objections to the admission of multiplicity with difference (Tāratamya) in Mokṣa is that if there are differences and inequalities there, they would inevitably lead to jealousy and strife among the released and reduce the released state to the level of our own world.

An obvious reply to this is that difference is consistent and compatible with cooperation and goodwill also, — not necessarily with conflict. Madhva goes a step further and argues that inequality by itself cannot lead to strife. It is the feelings of jealousy and other bad passions that are ultimately responsible for it ; and as these are *ruled out* in Mokṣa, differences, or inequalities, by themselves cannot do any harm.

For, there is no assurance that such discord will be completely eliminated, if absolute 'equality' is accepted ! Instances are not wanting, within our own experience (at the domestic, national and even international levels) of persons, communities and nations harbouring jealousy, hatred and evil designs against their own equals :

भवेयुर्यदि चेष्ट्यायाः समेष्टपि कुतो न ते ?

तप्यमानाः समान् द्वया द्वेष्ट्यादियुता आपि ।

दृश्यते बहवो लोके; दोषा एवात्र कारणम् ।

यदि निर्दोषता तत्र, किमाधिक्येन दूष्यते ? (AV).

Such tendencies, in the last analysis, should be traced to defects in the human character. But inasmuch as Mokṣa is, by definition, a state of blessedness free from all such imperfections and bad passions of embodied existence, there can be no possibility of any strife or discord arising among the released souls. Hence, the presence of gradation in the Svarūpa and Svarūpānanda of Jīvas in Mokṣa would not, in any way, disturb the peace and harmony of the released state.

Precisely the same line of argument has been adopted by Aristotle in defence of private property against the alluring pleas in favor of community of property:

“ Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence. Men readily listen to it and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner, everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in the States (suits about contracts etc.), which are said to arise out of possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause, — *the wickedness of human nature*. Indeed, we see that there is much *more* quarrelling among those who have all things in common— tho' there are not many of them, when compared with the vast number who have private property ”. (Aristotle's *Politics*, Tr. Jowett, Oxford, 1931, p. 63). [Italics mine].

Madhva silences such frivolous objections against the presence of difference and gradation in Mokṣa by quoting the words of the Sūtrakāra: अक्षरविद्यां लविरोधः¹ सामान्यतद्वावभ्यां औपसद्वत् तदुक्तम् । (B. S, iii, 3, 34).

1. Madhva reads अविरोधः as against अवरोधः of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, here. Their interpretation of the term “ *aupasada* ” also, is different.

The released souls are fully attuned to the Imperishable Brahman (*akṣara-dhī*). They are, as such, absolutely free from all evil and other disturbing passions of embodied existence. Hence, they will all be mutually well-disposed to one another. Those in a higher status will be extending their help and friendship to others below them. The humbler among them would look upon those above them with love and reverence like true disciples (*aupasada*) looking upon their Gurus with unbounded love and regard. This is indeed a refreshingly new and original interpretation of this important Sūtra from the Sādhanādhyaāya of the Brahmasūtras. It completely disarms all objections to the doctrine of Ānanda-tāratamya among souls, in Mokṣa.

Such is the beautiful picture of complete mutual harmony and goodwill prevailing in Mokṣa, according to Madhva. It shows how absurd and ridiculous it would be to judge the trans-empirical state from the standpoint of the passions and prejudices of our earthly life. The state of Mokṣa, as a state of blessedness, precludes by its very nature, all disturbing passions and psychological complexes. The freed souls there lead a life of unalloyed happiness in blissful mutual fellowship and communion with the Lord. It is a state above strife and disharmony, which are left behind, once for all.¹

Thus does Madhva conclude his exposition of the subject of Mokṣa, with a beautiful and spirited defence of the concept of *Svarūpānanda-tāratamya* therein. Every released soul is perfect in its own way; but the perfection (*pūrṇatva*) of each is distinctive *sui generis*. *It is an expression of its own selfhood.* The significance

1. Cf. अश्व इव रोमाणि विघूय पापं, चन्द्र इव राहोमुखात् प्रसुच्य धूता शरीरमकृतं कृतात्मा
ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामीति ॥ (*Chān. Up.* viii, 13.)

of this unique doctrine lies as much in its logical trenchancy as in its unfathomable mystic inwardness. It is a conception which applies to spiritual life, the principle of peaceful co-existence and fellowship to the whole community of the released souls and guarantees to each one of them the fundamental right to exist *sui juris* and be in a position to have the complete and distinctive enjoyment of its own selfhood and Svarūpā-nanda, in communion with Brahman.

भाष्यदीक्षादिसदूग्रन्थानुपजीव्य मया कृतम् ।

प्रबन्धमेनं सुधियो विमृशन्तु सकौतुकम् ॥



॥ श्रीहृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥

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