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Is *Anubhava* a *Pramāṇa* According to Śaṅkara?

Arvind Sharma

I

The prevailing view in the study of Śaṅkara's Advaita seems to be that *anubhava* or experience is not a *pramāṇa* according to Śaṅkara. Eliot Deutsch remarks, for instance, that "Śaṅkara refers *only* to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* as *pramāṇas*."¹ In this he is preceded by S. Radhakrishnan, who seems to say the same thing by implication rather than emphasis. According to S. Radhakrishnan also, Śaṅkara "refers to three sources of knowledge: perception, inference and scriptural testimony."² Such emphasis as may be lacking in Radhakrishnan is supplied by K. Satchidananda Murty, who states categorically in the context of Śaṅkara that "*anubhava* is not an alternate *pramāṇa*."³

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II

In order to answer the question raised here, one must first clarify the usage of the words *pramāṇa* and *anubhava* by Śaṅkara. Unfortunately, however, "Śaṅkara . . . nowhere attempts to discuss the *pramāṇas* as an independent topic, and treats them throughout as well-known."⁴ According to N. K. Devaraja, his "failure to undertake systematic discussion of the *pramāṇas* is accounted for partly by the absence of any such texts he commented upon, and partly by his agreement with the exponents of the other systems, e.g., the Sāṅkhyas and the Naiyāyikas."⁵ In order to understand the usage of the word by Śaṅkara we must, therefore, identify the usage of the term as generally encountered in Hindu philosophical literature leading up to his time, especially as found in the schools of Nyāya and Sāṅkhya.

Fortunately such a survey of the use of the term *pramāṇa* has been carried out by M. Hiriyanna, and he presents the results of his survey as follows: "To sum up: The general term *pramāṇa* and the special ones also like *pratyakṣa* have three different, but closely connected meanings: They signify first, a source of knowledge, without reference to its being either true or false; secondly, a source of valid knowledge; and lastly, a means of scrutiny."⁶

Śaṅkara, therefore, had this range of semantic nuances at his disposal when he employed the word *pramāṇa*. It must be pointed out, however, that the primary connotation of the word *pramāṇa* has been the sense of source or means of valid knowledge. We may also note, at the same time, that Śaṅkara employs the word in all three senses.⁷ It is clear, therefore, that he can use the term either to mean "the means of *valid* knowledge" or "the *valid* means of knowledge."

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Śaṅkara uses the word *anubhava*—experience—also in three senses: (1) to refer to experience in its widest connotation,⁸ (2) to refer to empirical experience,⁹ and (3) to refer to nondual experience.¹⁰ It is clear that in the title of this essay the word is employed in the third sense. What remains to be determined is the sense or senses in which Śaṅkara uses the word *pramāṇa* in the context provided by the third sense of *anubhava*.

III

I propose, now, to examine the possibility whether Śaṅkara admits *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa* and to carry out that examination along textual and logical lines.

The presentation of textual evidence is complicated by the fact that Śaṅkara's authorship of many works attributed to him is considered doubtful. However, nobody so far has questioned his authorship of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. So, in order to avoid needless controversy, I shall restrict myself to that text.¹¹

Let us first consider Śaṅkara's gloss on *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.15. M. Hiriyanna remarks, while writing on the subject of *jīvanmukti*, that "it is interesting in this connection to refer to Śaṅkara's statement at the end of his commentary on V.S. IV.1.15, which tradition views as an allusion to his own direct experience of the ultimate truth."¹² The text runs as follows: *katham hy ekasya svahṛdaya-pratyayam brahmavedanam deha-dhāraṇam ca apareṇa pratikṣeptum śakyeta?* "How can one contest the heart felt cognition of another as possessing *brahman* knowledge even though bearing a body?"¹³ As against T. M. P. Mahadevan's translation cited above, S. Radhakrishnan offers the paraphrase: "How can one contest the truth of another possessing knowledge of *brahman*, vouched for as it is by his heart's conviction."¹⁴

This passage clearly seems to suggest *anubhava* as proof of the Advaitic experience, although several objections can be raised against it. How do we know that the statement is autobiographical rather than rhetorical? In any case, the word *pramāṇa* is not used in the context.¹⁵ So, interesting as this example is, one must look for other examples.

This is provided by Śaṅkara's gloss on *Brahmasūtra* I.1.4:

na dharma—jijñāsāyām-iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇam brahmajijñāsāyām. kimtu śrutyādayo 'nubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam. anubhava-avasānatvāt bhūta-vastu-visayatvāt ca brahmajijñāsasya. kartavye hi viṣaye na anubhava-apeksā asti iti śrutyādīnām eva prāmāṇyam syāt.

The passage is fairly explicit and George Thibaut translates it as follows:

—Scriptural text, &c., are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition, &c., on the

other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge.¹⁶

The force of the passage is clear from the fact that K. Satchidananda Murty, who does not accept the position that *anubhava* is a *pramāṇa* according to Śaṅkara, is *twice* compelled to admit that this passage does seem to indicate that it might be admissible.

The first admission can be identified in the following passage:

Śaṅkara says that as in the case of virtue and duty, scripture alone is not the source of knowledge regarding Brahman. To some extent *anubhava* as well as scripture, are sources of knowledge regarding Brahman, because Brahman is an existent thing, and the knowledge of Brahman must culminate in experience.

According to Śaṅkara, *anubhava* of Brahman means the realisation of oneself as Brahman (*brahmātmabhāva*). That *Brahman is oneself is not known except from scripture*.¹⁷

I do not know whether it is fair to say that Murty downplays the significance of the passage,¹⁸ but the last remark in italics seems to indicate a certain kind of nominalist defense of scripture—that it is a naming device, it identifies the experience.¹⁹ It amounts to saying that though one may know oneself through direct experience, what the *scriptures call* Brahman or Ātman can be known through scriptures alone. What is curious is that although Murty bases his remark also on the same gloss in which the *anubhava text* occurs, in that very gloss Śaṅkara proceeds to demonstrate the apparently contradictory position that Brahman is not an object even of spiritual knowledge (*na hi śāstram idantayā viṣayabhūtaṁ brahma pratipādayiṣyati*).²⁰

The second admission is encountered in the second part of the book, where Murty points out, referring back to the passage just cited, that “Śaṅkara and his followers do not rely on scripture and logic alone as proofs, but claim that intuition (*anubhava*) also is a proof of non-dual Brahman.”²¹ Here Murty does not challenge the fact that Śaṅkara does regard *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa* but tries to show that Śaṅkara is wrong in doing so. That discussion, although of great interest in itself, takes us beyond our present concern—which is to determine whether *anubhava* is admitted by Śaṅkara as a *pramāṇa* or not.

IV

If, then, Śaṅkara clearly states that *anubhava* is a *pramāṇa*, why is it that it is not usually admitted to be so? It could be argued that such outright acceptance of *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa* raises philosophical prob-

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lems within his system, and it is because of its problematic nature that attempts have been made to deny *anubhava* that status, despite textual testimony in its favor. The following objections could be raised against according *anubhava* the status of a *pramāṇa* in Śaṅkara's system.

(1) It has been argued that *anubhava* cannot be a *pramāṇa* because it is the result of the operation of a *pramāṇa*—namely, *śruti*—which leads to knowledge of Brahman through the steps of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana*. To call *anubhava* a *pramāṇa* is to confuse the effect with the cause.

This raises the question: why is it then called a *pramāṇa*? For Śaṅkara clearly states that “several means of knowledge are dominant in their own spheres (in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka sūtra bhāṣya* (II.1.20).”²² In other words, each *pramāṇa* must be an independent source of knowledge. That is the entire basis for *śrutipramāṇya*; *śruti* alone can tell us about *dharma* and *mokṣa*. “Every *pramāṇa* makes known only what is *not* an object of another *pramāṇa*.”²³ On the face of it, *anubhava* does not seem to offer anything new. A little reflection will reveal, however, that although *anubhava* may not add anything to our knowledge at the empirical level where *pratyakṣa* or perception plays this role, *anubhava* operates at the transcendental level. One should note that *śruti* deals with the transcendental realm but from the empirical level—hence the whole doctrine of the *mithyātva* of the Vedas. In the *actual* experience, Vedas cease to operate (*yatra vedā vedā*).²⁴

(2) It is sometimes argued that the “*pramāṇas* being dependent on the self for their employment, the self itself is established before the operation of the *pramāṇas*” and therefore cannot be established by the *pramāṇas*. This self, however, is the empirical self, and it is the *ātman* which has to be known.

(3) It may be argued that an individual's experience or *anubhava* cannot be a *pramāṇa* in Advaita because this is the Advaitin critique of schools founded on the experience of a single individual.

Here the issue is not *pramāṇa* any more but its dependability and intersubjective verifiability. M. Hiriyanna points out that “apart from direct revelation, the Upaniṣads also should be, in the last resort, regarded as recording only such intuitional knowledge of ancient sages.”²⁵ Moreover, typically the Advaitic *anubhava* confirms the tradition rather than serving to start a new tradition.

(4) Has not Śaṅkara fixed the number of *pramāṇas* at three? If so, we are presented with another problem; for *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, and *śruti* exhaust this list.

Although Śaṅkara enumerates *only* three sources at *some places* as in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakasūtrabhāṣya*, on III.2.1, in his other works he “refers to at least five sources of knowledge—perception, inference, analogy (*Upamāna*), implication (*Arthāpatti*), and scriptural statement (*Śabda*).”²⁶

Even more significant is the fact that Śaṅkara “is not so much interested in enumerating the possible sources of knowledge as in determining the *pramāṇa* on which there is ‘any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities,’ ‘the natural means of knowledge’ by making a ‘right use’ of which metaphysics can attain its content.”

V

Now that the philosophical deck has been cleared, one may revert to the textual issue.

Much depends on the way the expression *yathāsambhavam* is interpreted in the key passage cited earlier. Murty takes it to mean “to some extent” and Thibaut “according to occasion.” Karl H. Potter translates the relevant text as follows:

Scripture (*śruti*) as well as immediate awareness (*anubhava*), etc., are both to be used in appropriate ways in the inquiry into Brahman, unlike the inquiry into *dharma* in which only scripture is pertinent.²⁷

The word *yathāsambhavam* literally means “as far as possible.”²⁸ Two points thus become clear from the use of this expression here: (1) *anubhava* can act as a *pramāṇa* in the matters pertaining to *brahman* in a way that it cannot in matters pertaining to *dharma*, in which it has no role, and (2) although this possibility is opened up, it can only go so far, “as far as possible” and *not* all the way. The first point opens up a new avenue, a new means of valid knowledge in relation to *brahman* which is not available in relation to *dharma*, but the second point indicates that the avenue is subject to some kind of constriction. The point is important to recognize because some scholars may have interpreted the opening provided by Śaṅkara here rather too widely. For instance, S. Radhakrishnan declares: “Śaṅkara admits that, while *anubhava* is open to all, few attain to it.”²⁹ It is possible, even plausible that Śaṅkara says this in so many words, but Radhakrishnan, somewhat unaccountably, does not cite the proof text.³⁰ Similarly, William Cenkner states: “one can attain knowledge by oneself only after long and arduous effort, according to Śaṅkara; he therefore urges constant reliance upon the guru.”³¹ The fact that Śaṅkara might concede that one may make it on one’s own is again significant, but no proof text is cited. It is easy to see how both of these remarks have a bearing on *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa* and could possibly lead one into overinterpreting the intention of Śaṅkara *here*.

It seems to me that all these are inadequate explanations in the light of this passage cited. The first explanation took *anubhava-avasānatvāt* (on account of it culminating in experience) into account, but not enough attention seems to have been paid to *bhūtaviśayatvāt* (on account of it being an existent). To see its force one must recognize that all the *pramāṇas* operate in the reach of *avidyā*, including the Vedas, hence

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the doctrine, already alluded to, of the *mithyātva* of the Vedajñāna in Advaita.

But with respect to Brahman, as Ātman, the situation is different. It must be remembered that here Brahman is being referred to in its transcendental dimension. Once it is known as such, one falls outside the domain of *avidyā* and the operation of *pramāṇas* as such. Karl H. Potter sums up the situation thus:

As Śaṅkara views self-knowledge it is not given by any *pramāṇa* at all. It is true that self-knowledge is immediate intuition (*anubhava*), but that is quite different from perception. The difference ... is between two kinds of awareness; perception involves instruments and objects and distinctions, whereas self-knowledge does not. *And in some pickwickian sense anubhava may constitute a "proof", but it is not a proof that will ever be used.* When one has self-knowledge one no longer has doubts or needs proof, and when one needs proof one is not in a position to have self-knowledge, since one is under the sway of ignorance.³²

It seems that the crux of the matter lies in drawing a distinction between (1) *pramāṇa* as a means of *valid knowledge* and (2) *pramāṇa* as a *valid means* of knowledge. By the expression "valid knowledge" in (1) is meant empirical knowledge characterized by the distinction between the subject and the object. By "knowledge" in (2) is meant the whole range of knowledge, empirical and transcendental, *jñāna* as well as *vijñāna*. As this distinction is not clearly drawn in this passage, Śaṅkara seems to equivocate, for *śruti* is a valid means of knowledge about Brahman in the *vyāvahārika* realm, and *anubhava* is a means of valid *pāramārthika* knowledge. In the case of *śruti* by itself, one 'knows' about Brahman because one cites the scriptures; in the case of *anubhava*, one cites the scriptures because one knows. Śaṅkara is caught here in an epistemological equivocation on account of his ontological classification but is able to cover it because the word *pramāṇa* allows enough semantic room for such equivocation. *Anubhava*, then, is a *pramāṇa* according to Śaṅkara but not in the usual sense—just as in the fact that, say, after an accident, the awareness that one is alive may be enough evidence *for oneself* that one is alive, but the *doctor* needs the evidence of vital signs to know that one is alive.

Notes

1 – Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969), p. 69 n. 6, emphasis added.

2 – S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923, 1962), vol. 2, p. 488.

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- 3 – K. Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p. 118. Even those who wish to emphasize the role of experience in Advaita or religious life in general do not state that Śaṅkara regards *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa*, even when they acknowledge its role in Śaṅkara's *advaita*. T. M. Mahadevan remarks that in Śaṅkara the "ultimate court of appeal is plenary experience (*anubhava*). Scripture is valid because it reveals the nature of that experience. The end or goal of Scriptural inquiry, says Śaṅkara, is experience." (*Outlines of Hinduism* [Bombay: Chetana, 1971], p. 144). Mahadevan cites the *Bramasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, on II.1.4, in support. A more recent example of the same tendency is provided by Karel Werner. He quotes from A. J. Alston's "Śaṅkara on the Absolute" to the effect: *atra pramānam vedānta-guravo 'nubhavaśca tathā*, translating it as '... the evidence of it is *vedānta* (Upaniṣads) gurus as well as direct experience', as proof of "an undisputed tenet of Śaṅkara's school for centuries that this world of diversity is false, reality, myself included, is non-dual *brahman*" ("Mysticism and Indian Spirituality," in *The Yogi and the Mystic*, ed. Karel Werner [London: Curzon Press, 1989], p. 30. Also see page 32). He goes on to add "I think we have here an almost inextricable symbiosis of doctrine and experience, but what is most important is that Śaṅkara most emphatically insisted on the actual realization of the personal experience without which doctrine means nothing" (*ibid.*, p. 30).
- 4 – N. K. Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), p. 36.
- 5 – *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 6 – M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Philosophical Studies* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957), p. 69. The rest of the passage also bears citing:

The distinction between the first two of these meanings is clear; but the same cannot, perhaps, be said of that between the last two. So a word of explanation may be necessary about it. *Pramāṇas*, in the second sense, are thought of as simply revealing truth. In the third sense also, their aim is taken to be the revelation of truth; but they are regarded as always presupposing doubt, and reaching truth after the discovery of the logical grounds for believing in one and not believing in the other of the two alternatives involved in doubt. If the emphasis in the one case is on the cognitive side, it is on the probative side in the other. We may add that we have cited in the course of this paper only the authority of *Nyāya* teachers, because the *Nyāya* is preeminently a *pramāṇaśāstra*, and not because the imperfect terminology referred to (so far as it is imperfect) is peculiar to that system.

- 7 – See Śaṅkara, *Bramasūtra* II.2.31, I.1.4, and II.1.20.

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- 8 – Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtra* II.2.29.
- 9 – See Śaṅkara's Introduction to the *Brahmasūtra*.
- 10 – Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtra* I.1.2.
- 11 – The case for the acceptance of *anubhava* as a *pramāṇa* by Śaṅkara receives support from these other texts not considered here. One of them, the *Aparokṣānubhūti*, states that "direct (*aparokṣa*) experience (*anubhūti*) is here explained as a means of liberation" (Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981], vol. 3, p. 320). However, Śaṅkara's authorship of this text is considered doubtful (*ibid.*) and the statement is not explicit in terms of *pramāṇa*. But the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, which is accepted by Eliot Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen as Śaṅkara's work (*A Source Book of Advaita Vedānta* [Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971], p. 314), provides stronger evidence on this point. Verse 474 of this text states that in the matter of self-realization (*ātmalabdhi*): *śāstram yuktiḥ deśikoktiḥ pramāṇam, cāntaḥsiddhā svānubhūtiḥ pramaṇam*. Madhavananda translates: "[In the realization of the Ātman] ... The scriptures, reasoning, and the words of the guru are proofs, while one's own experience earned by concentrating the mind is another proof" (*Vivekachudamani of Shri Shankaracharya* [Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1966], p. 182). Also see verses 475–477.
- 12 – M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932), p. 381 n. 2.
- 13 – T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Outlines of Hinduism*, p. 143.
- 14 – *The Brahma Sūtra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life*, trans. S. Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 243–244. How true is it in the light of this to claim that Śaṅkara "does not base Advaita on his personal experience or on the experience of others"? (K. Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 254). S. Radhakrishnan notes: "another view of the Veda as *āpta-vacana* or sayings of the wise, those who had attained to a realisation of *brahman*, *brahma-prāpti*. This view is supported by Śaṅkara who makes out that the *śruti* or scripture is *pratyakṣa* or records of the direct experiences of the seers, which are of a self-certifying character" (*ibid.*, p. 243).
- 15 – The following observations by N. K. Devaraja on Śaṅkara's understanding of the *pramāṇas* are relevant here.

In his introduction to the *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara makes some ominous remarks about the *pramāṇas* and their authority. By an elaborate process of reasoning he comes to the conclusion that what the *pramāṇas* (perception, inference etc.) and the Scriptures deal with are merely the

products of nescience. For the operation of the *pramāṇas* presupposes the existence of a knowing personality which latter depends upon the self's erroneous identification of itself with body, senses, etc. The statement seems to destroy the very foundations of metaphysical enquiry. If all the available avenues of knowledge lead, ultimately, to the unreal, where is the fun of conducting an enquiry into the nature of the Real? As, however, we pursue our study further into the interior of the *Bhāṣya*, the attitude of Śaṅkara towards the *pramāṇas* becomes more positive and re-assuring. "The enquiry into Brahman", he points out, "unlike the enquiry into *dharma*, admits of other *pramāṇas* besides the Scripture. Here Scripture, intuition etc. all are to be used according to the occasion". (*An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory*, pp. 67–68)

N. K. Devaraja goes on to point out:

In his ultra-orthodox moods, however, Śaṅkara insists that *Brahman* can be known only through Scripture, and through no other *pramāṇa* i.e., perception, inference, etc. "The statement that, *because* Brahman is something existent, other *pramāṇas* may apply to it, is gratuitous. For, being devoid of colour, form etc., it cannot become an object of perception; and having no characteristic mark etc., it is not amendable to inference and other *pramāṇas*. Like duty, it is to be known solely through the Scripture". In yet other places he points out that *Brahman* is not an *object* even of scriptural knowledge. "The aim of the *Śāstra* is the removal of all distinctions created by *Avidyā* or nescience; its purport is not to represent the *Brahman* as 'this' or 'that' object". "The sole fruit of knowledge is the removal of the obstacles lying in the way of release". How can these conflicting statements be reconciled? (*Ibid.*, pp. 68–69)

N. K. Devaraja attempts the following reconciliation, which takes a different tack from the one chosen in this essay:

The apparent contradiction in Śaṅkara's position, of which he himself is by no means unconscious, can be got over only if we remember that for Śaṅkara self-knowledge is of an entirely different character from the knowledge of the empirical world. The latter knowledge is what following Kant we may call the *categorised* knowledge; it corresponds to Bertrand Russell's knowledge *by description* or knowledge *about*. Self-knowledge, on the contrary, is knowledge by acquaintance or by direct intuition. The peculiar epistemological contribution of Śaṅkara consists in the conception that knowledge of the former kind leads to the knowledge of the latter type. The work of the *pramāṇas* is done as soon as they have brought about a direct self-vision on the part of the embodied soul. The *pramāṇas* fulfil themselves by generating a knowledge which involves their negation of annulment. We shall have occasion to illustrate these remarks by actual quotations later. Meanwhile, we must remember that the *Brahman* of Śaṅkara, while it transcends the *pramāṇas*, does not transcend *experience* itself. The word "experience" here must of course be understood in a wider sense than perceptual experience. Perceptual

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knowledge is not the highest type of direct knowledge. *Anubhava* or direct experience which is yet not of the type of perceptual experience, remains, according to Śaṅkara, the goal of knowledge. All the *pramāṇas* play their part in bringing about the final intuition, and if Śaṅkara is at moments inclined to assign a higher place to *Śruti*, it is probably because he feels that the utterances of the *Upaniṣads*, being vital poetic records of spiritual experience, can induce that intuition earlier than the mere negative operations of the logical understanding. Or, if we are unkind critics, we may say that, occasionally, the orthodox in Śaṅkara overwhelms the empiricist and the rationalist in him. The truth is that Śaṅkara has mostly to deal with opponents who were believers in *Śruti*; it was only rarely that he had to face the heretics or the non-believers (*Ibid.*, pp. 69–70)

- 16 – *The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with the Commentary of Śaṅkara*, trans. George Thibaut (1890; New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pt. 1, p. 17.
- 17 – Murty, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 112.
- 18 – *Ibid.*, p. 343. The passage is not cited in its entirety.
- 19 – *Ibid.*, *Brahmātmabhāvasya śāstram antareṇa anavagamyanāt*.
- 20 – Devaraja, *An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory*, p. 59.
- 21 – Murty, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 254.
- 22 – Ram Pratap Singh, *The Vedānta of Śaṅkara: A Metaphysics of Value* (Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House, 1949), p. 185.
- 23 – Devaraja, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 59.
- 24 – *Ātmānubhavamāśritya pratyakṣādi prasiddhyati, anubhūteh svataḥ-siddheḥ kāpekṣā ātmasiddhaye?* See Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra* (cited n. 14 above), p. 242 n. 3.
- 25 – Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (cited n. 12 above), p. 381 n. 1.
- 26 – Singh, *The Vedānta of Śaṅkara*, p. 185.
- 27 – Devaraja, *Revelation and Reason*, p. 59.
- 28 – Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 3, p. 123.
- 29 – Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (cited n. 2 above), vol. 2, p. 513.
- 30 – When, in his book *Brahma Sūtra*, Radhakrishnan asserts that the knowledge of Brahman “is by nature attained by all,” he cites *nityāpta-svarūpatvāt* (p. 249). In *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśūtrabhāṣya* IV.4.8, Śaṅkara does declare that the knowledge of Brahman is accessible to all (*sarvārtha*).
- 31 – William Cenkner, *A Tradition of Teachers: Śaṅkara and the Jagad-gurus Today* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), p. 32.

Philosophy East & West 32 – Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 3, p. 98.