## **Dynamic Programming and Applications**

Discrete Time Dynamics and Optimization

Lecture 2

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Last lecture, we introduced the Bellman equation:

$$V(k) = \max_{k'} \left\{ u \left( f(k) - k' \right) + \beta V(k') \right\}$$

- The value today is = flow payoff + continuation value
- This assumes there is no uncertainty: We can make perfect forecasts about the future Not how the world works!
- Suppose production also depends on productivity  $y_t = f(k_t, A_t)$  and  $A_{t+1}$  is uncertain

In an uncertain world, we care about the *expected* continuation value

$$V(k,A) = \max_{k'} \left\{ u \left( f(k,A) - k' \right) + \beta \mathbb{E} V(k',A') \right\}$$

- Now the only question is: How do we compute the expectation E?
- We have to study stochastic processes (and stochastic calculus) to answer this

## **Outline**

Part 1: Difference equations

- 1. Stochastic processes
- 2. Markov chains
- 3. Difference equations
- 4. Stochastic difference equations

Part 2: Stochastic dynamic programming

- 1. Stochastic dynamic programming
- 2. History notation
- 3. The stochastic neoclassical growth model

Part 3: Optimal stopping

## Part 1: Difference Equations

## 1. Stochastic processes

- Let X<sub>t</sub> be a random variable that is time t adapted
- Discrete time: We index time discretely  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, T \leq \infty$
- Stochastic process in discrete time: a sequence of random variables indexed by t,  $\{X_t\}_{t=0}^T$
- Continuous time: We index time continuously  $t \in [0, T]$  with  $T \leq \infty$
- Stochastic process in continuous time: a sequence of random variables indexed by t,  $\{X_t\}_{t\geq 0}$

## 2. Markov chains

• A stochastic process  $\{X_t\}$  has the *Markov property* if for all  $k \ge 1$  and all t:

$$\mathbb{P}(X_{t+1} = x \mid X_t, X_{t-1}, \dots, X_{t-k}) = \mathbb{P}(X_{t+1} = x \mid X_t)$$

- State space of the Markov process = set of events or states that it visits
- A Markov chain is a Markov process (stochastic process with Markov property) that visits a finite number of states (discrete state space)
- Simplest example: Individual i is randomly hit by earnings (employment) shocks and switches between  $X_t \in \{X^L, X^H\}$

- Markov chains have a *transition matrix* P that describes the probability of transitioning from state i to state j
- Simplest example with state space  $\{X^L, X^H\}$

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} 0.8 & 0.2 \\ 0.2 & 0.8 \end{pmatrix}$$

- This says: P of staying in employment state = 0.8, P of switching = 0.2
- $P_{ii}$  is the probability of switching from state i to state j (one period)
- $P^2$  characterizes transitions over two periods:  $(P^2)_{ij}$  is prob of going from i to j in two periods
- The rows of the transition matrix have to sum to 1 (definition of probability measure)

## 3. Difference equations

- We start with deterministic (non-random) dynamics and then conclude with stochastic (random) dynamics
- The first-order linear difference equation is defined by

$$x_{t+1} = bx_t + cz_t \tag{1}$$

where  $\{z_t\}$  is an exogenously given, bounded sequence

- For now, all objects are (real) scalars (easy to extend to vectors and matrices)
- Suppose we have an *initial condition* (i.e., given initial value)  $x_0$
- When c = 0, (1) is a *time-homogeneous* difference equation
- When  $cz_t$  is constant for all t, (1) is an *autonomous* difference equation

## **Autonomous equations**

- Consider the autonomous equation with  $z_t = 1$
- A particular solution is the constant solution with  $x_t = \frac{c}{1-b}$  when  $b \neq 1$
- Such a point is called a stationary point or steady state
- General solution of the autonomous equation (for some constant *x*):

$$x_t = (x_0 - x)b^t + x (2)$$

- Important question is long-run behavior (stability / convergence)
- When |b| < 1, (2) converges asymptotically to steady state x for any initial value  $x_0$  (steady state x is globally stable)
- If |b| > 1, (2) explodes and is not stable (except when  $x_0 = x$ )

## **Examples in macro**

## Capital accumulation:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t$$

- $\delta$  is depreciation and  $I_t$  is investment
- This is a *forward equation* and requires an initial condition  $K_0$
- If  $I_t = 0$  and  $0 < \delta < 1$ ,  $K_t \rightarrow 0$
- If  $I_t=c$  constant, then  $K_t$  converges to  $\frac{c}{\delta}$ :  $K_{t+1}=(1-\delta)\frac{c}{\delta}+c=\frac{c}{\delta}$

## Wealth dynamics:

$$a_{t+1} = R_t a_t + y_t - c_t$$

- $R_t$  is the gross real interest rate,  $y_t$  is income,  $c_t$  is consumption
- This is a *forward equation* and requires an initial condition  $a_0$
- We will study this as a *controlled* process because  $c_t$  will be chosen optimally
- Work out the following:  $R_t = R$  and  $y_t = y$  constant, and

$$c_t = \left(1 - \frac{1}{R}\right) \left(a_t + \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} R^{-(s-t)} y\right)$$

What are the dynamics of  $a_t$ ?

## **Consumption Euler equation:**

$$\frac{1}{C_t} = \beta R_t \frac{1}{C_{t+1}}$$

- $\frac{1}{C_t} = u'(C_t)$  is marginal utility with log preferences
- This is a *backward equation* and requires a terminal condition or transversality condition, i.e.,  $c_T$  must converge to something
- Suppose there exists time T s.t. for all  $t \geq T$ ,  $C_t = C$
- Then solve backwards from:  $\frac{1}{C_{T-1}} = \beta R_{T-1} \frac{1}{C_T}$  or expressed as time-homogeneous first-order linear difference equation

$$C_{T-1} = \frac{1}{\beta R_{T-1}} C_T$$

• Difference between *forward* and *backward* equations is critical! This is closely related to the idea of *boundary conditions* (much more to come)

## 4. Stochastic difference equations

• Consider the process  $\{X_t\}$  with

$$X_{t+1} = AX_t + Cw_{t+1} (3)$$

where  $w_{t+1}$  is an iid. process with  $w_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0,1)$ 

- Equation (3) is a first-order, linear stochastic difference equation
- Let  $\mathbb{E}_t$  the *conditional expectation* operator (conditional on time t information)
- For example:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}(X_{t+1}) = \mathbb{E}(X_{t+1} \mid X_{t}) = \mathbb{E}(AX_{t} + Cw_{t+1} \mid X_{t})$$
$$= AX_{t} + C\mathbb{E}(w_{t+1} \mid X_{t}) = AX_{t} + C\mathbb{E}(w_{t+1}) = AX_{t}$$

- Rational expectations: agents' beliefs about stochastic processes are consistent with the true distribution of the process
- Key equation: wealth dynamics with income fluctuations:

$$a_{t+1} = R_t a_t + y_t - c_t,$$

where  $y_t$  is a stochastic process

• Consumption Euler equation with uncertainty (e.g., stochastic income):

$$u'(C_t) = \beta R \mathbb{E}_t \Big[ u'(C_{t+1}) \Big]$$

# Part 2: Stochastic Dynamic Programming

## 1. Stochastic dynamic programming

- Follow Ljungqvist-Sargent notation, Chapter 3.2
- Under uncertainty, household problem takes the form

$$\max_{\{c_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to  $k_{t+1} = g(k_t, c_t, \epsilon_{t+1})$  (first-order stochastic difference equation)

- Notice:  $\{c_t\}$  now denotes a stochastic process, no longer simple sequence!
- $\{\epsilon_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  is sequence of iid random variables (*stochastic process*)
- Initial condition  $x_0$  given

- Usually best to start with sequence problem, then derive recursive representation
- To derive recursive representation, your first question must be:
  - Recursive representation means we go from thinking about sequences (stochastic processes) to thinking about functions
  - But functions of what? I.e., what is the domain of the functions we're interested in?
  - Answer: functions of the state variables
- What are state variables?
  - In the (deterministic) neoclassical growth model: just k
  - Generally: state variables = set of information you need today to compute the continuation value for tomorrow
  - That's why they're called "states"

- Dynamic programming: look for recursive representation with state variable *k*
- Q: Why is k the state variable here, not  $(k, \epsilon)$ ? (Think about structure of  $g(\cdot)$ .)
- The problem is to look for a *policy function* c(k) that solves

$$V(k) = \max_{c} \bigg\{ u(c) + \beta \mathbb{E} \bigg[ V \Big( g(k,c,\epsilon) \Big) \, \Big| \, k \bigg] \bigg\}, \quad \text{ where } \mathbb{E}[V(\cdot) \mid k] = \int V(\cdot) dF(\epsilon)$$

- V(k) is (lifetime) value that agent obtains from solving this problem starting from k
- FOC that characterizes the consumption policy function c(k) is

$$0 = u'(c(k)) + \beta \mathbb{E} \left\{ \partial_k V \left( g(k, c(k), \epsilon) \right) \cdot \partial_c g(k, c(k), \epsilon) \mid k \right\} = 0$$

## 2. History notation

- A very popular approach to deal with uncertainty in macro is to use history notation (Ljungqvist-Sarget, e.g., chapters 8, 12)
- Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, ...
- At every t, there is a realization of a stochastic event  $s_t \in \mathcal{S}$
- We denote the **history** of such events up to t by  $s^t = \{s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t\}$
- The unconditional probability of history  $s^t$  is given by  $\pi_t(s^t \mid s_0)$
- If Markov,  $\pi_t(s^t \mid s_0) = \pi(s_t \mid s_{t-1}) \pi(s_{t-1} \mid s_{t-2}) \dots \pi(s_0)$

- Crucial to understand notation:
  - $\{c_t\}_{t>0}$  is the stochastic process
  - $-c_t$  is the random variable
  - $-c_t(s^t)$  is the realization of the random variable at date t in history  $s^t$
- The lifetime value of representative household is then defined as

$$V(s_0) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^t \sum_{s^t} \pi_t \left( s^t \mid s_0 \right) u \left( c_t \left( s^t \right), \ell_t \left( s^t \right) \right)$$

- Here we also allow household to choose labor supply  $\ell_t$
- *Generalizations*: heterogeneous beliefs, general preferences (Epstein-Zin), recursive formulation, multiple commodities, intergenerational considerations

## 3. Stochastic Growth Model

- Discrete time:  $t \in \{0, 1, ..., T\}$ , where  $T \leq \infty$
- At t, event  $s_t \in \mathcal{S}$  is realized; history  $s^t = (s_0, \dots, s_t)$  has probability  $\pi_t(s^t)$
- Representative household has preferences over consumption  $c_t(s^t)$  and labor  $\ell_t(s^t)$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \sum_{s^t} \pi_t \left( s^t \right) u \left( c_t(s^t), \ell_t(s^t) \right)$$

- Inada conditions  $\lim_{c\to 0} u_c(c,\ell) = \lim_{\ell\to 0} u_\ell(c,\ell) = \infty$
- At t = 0, household endowed with  $k_0$

Technology, capital accumulation, and budget / resource constraint:

$$c_t(s^t) + i_t(s^t) = A_t(s^t)F(k_t(s^{t-1}), \ell_t(s^t))$$
$$k_{t+1}(s^t) = (1 - \delta)k_t(s^{t-1}) + i_t(s^t)$$

- $F(\cdot)$  is twice continuously differentiable and constant returns to scale
- Source of uncertainty is stochastic process for TFP  $A_t(s^t)$
- Standard regularity conditions on  $F(\cdot)$  (see LS)

## Lagrangian approach to sequence problem

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t \pi_t(s^t) \left\{ u(c_t(s^t), l_t(s^t)) + \lambda_t(s^t) \left[ A_t(s^t) F(k_t(s^{t-1}), \ell_t(s^t)) - c_t(s^t) + (1 - \delta) k_t(s^{t-1}) - k_{t+1}(s^t) \right] \right\}$$

• FOCs for  $c_t(s^t)$ ,  $\ell_t(s^t)$  and  $k_{t+1}(s^t)$  are given by

$$u_c(s^t) = \lambda_t(s^t)$$

$$u_\ell(s^t) = u_c(s^t)A_t(s^t)F_\ell(s^t)$$

$$u_c(s^t)\pi_t(s^t) = \beta \sum_{s^{t+1}|s^t} u_c(s^{t+1})\pi_{t+1}(s^{t+1}) \left[ A_{t+1}(s^{t+1})F_k(s^{t+1}) + (1-\delta) \right]$$

• Summation over  $(s^{t+1}\mid s^t)$  is like conditional expectation summing over histories that branch out from  $s^t$ 

## Dynamic programming approach

· Assume time-homogeneous Markov process:

$$\mathbb{E}_t(A_{t+1}) = \mathbb{E}\left[A(s^{t+1}) \mid s^t\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[A(s_{t+1}) \mid s_t\right] = \sum_{s'} \pi(s' \mid s_t) A(s')$$

- Drop t subscripts: s is current state, s' denotes next period's draw
- Denote by  $X_t$  endogenous state (assume for now there is such a representation)
- Intuitively: s is the exogenous state and X is the endogenous state

### Bellman equation becomes:

$$V(X,s) = \max_{c,\ell} \left\{ u(c,\ell) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi(s' \mid s) V(X',s') \right\} \quad \text{ where } X' = g(X,c,\ell,s,s')$$

## Part 3: Optimal Stopping

## **Application: optimal stopping problem**

**Problem**: Every period t, an agent draws an offer x from a uniform distributon over the unit interval [0,1]. The agent can accept the offer, in which case her payoff is x, and the game ends, or the agent can reject the offer and draw again a period later. Draws are independent. Rejections are costly because the agent discounts the future at  $\beta$ . The game continues until the agent receives an offer she accepts.

Many applications (problems in life) look like this:

- buying a house
- searching for a partner
- closing a production plant
- · exercising an option
- · adopting a new technology

What is recursive / dynamic programming representation of optimal stopping problem?

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Agent's dynamic optimization problem given recursively by Bellman equation

$$V(x) = \max \{x, \beta \mathbb{E} V(x')\}$$

where the expectation (operator)  $\mathbb E$  is taken over the next draw x'

Our problem is to find the value function V(x) that solves the Bellman equation. We'll also want to find the associated policy rule.

**Definition:** A policy is a function that maps every point in state space [0,1] to an action There are 2 actions: ACCEPT and REJECT

**Definition:** An optimal policy achieves payoff V(x) for all feasible  $x \in [0,1]$ 

## Let's try to understand the shape of V(x) intuitively:

- For large values  $\hat{x}$  where you ACCEPT, what's the value  $V(\hat{x})$ ?
- For small values  $\tilde{x}$  where you REJECT and instead choose the continuation value,  $\beta \mathbb{E} V(x') > \tilde{x}$ , does the continuation value depend on  $\tilde{x}$ ? Why not?

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Shape of V(x) must therefore be:

$$V(x) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x \ge x^* \\ x^* & \text{if } x < x^* \end{cases}$$

- Solution to the problem: there is be threshold  $x^* \in [0,1]$  s.t. agent accepts for  $x \ge x^*$
- Also called **free boundary problem** (have to find endogenous boundary  $x^*$ )

**Lemma**: In the optimal stopping problem, a policy is a best response to a continuation value function  $\widehat{v}(x)$  if and only if the policy is a threshold rule with cutoff

$$x^* \equiv \beta \mathbb{E}[\widehat{v}(x')]$$

**Proof:** Show by contradiction that optimization must imply

ACCEPT if 
$$x > \beta \mathbb{E}[\widehat{v}(x')] \equiv x^*$$
  
REJECT if  $x < \beta \mathbb{E}[\widehat{v}(x')] \equiv x^*$ 

If  $x = \beta \mathbb{E}[\widehat{v}(x')]$ , then ACCEPT and REJECT generate the same payoff.

- Why no jump in V(x) at  $x^*$ ? (lim from RHS must be  $x^*$ , from LHS by contradiction)
- Continuation value must be V(x') because problem tmr is repeat of today

- We just concluded: at  $x = x^*$ , indifferent between ACCEPT and REJECT
- · This is enough information to solve the problem!

$$\begin{split} V(x^*) &= x^* \\ &= \beta \mathbb{E} V(x') \\ &= \beta \int_0^{x^*} x^* f(x) dx + \beta \int_{x^*}^1 x f(x) dx \\ &= \beta x^* [x]_0^{x^*} + \beta \frac{1}{2} [x^2]_{x^*}^1 \\ &= \beta (x^*)^2 + \beta \frac{1}{2} [1 - (x^*)^2] \end{split}$$

## Solution:

$$x^* = \frac{1}{\beta}(1 - \sqrt{1 - \beta^2})$$

Always sanity-check comparative statics: What happens as  $\beta \to 0$  and  $\beta \to 1$ ?

Why is this threshold rule a *solution to the Bellman Equation*? If you REJECT, your continuation payoff is

$$x^* = \beta \mathbb{E} V(x') = \beta \int_0^{x^*} x^* f(x) dx + \beta \int_{x^*}^1 x f(x) dx.$$

So it's optimal to REJECT if  $x \le x^*$  and it's optimal to ACCEPT if  $x \ge x^*$ . Hence, for all values of x

$$V(x) = \max\{x, x^*\} = \max\{x, \beta \mathbb{E}[V(x')]\}$$