HBS-KGLLM: A General Framework for Generating Knowledge Graphs for Jailbreaking

Warning: This paper contains examples of LLMs that are potentially harmful.

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Abstract. Although large language models(LLMs) have been applied across various fields and achieved remarkable success, concerns have also been raised regarding the potential for generating harmful content. Jailbreak, an emerging research direction, aims to bypass the safety mechanisms of LLMs and induce undesired responses. Research on jailbreak attack methods can reveal potential safety risks in LLMs and better guide researchers in developing corresponding defense strategies. However, many existing attack methods either require access to the internal structure of the target model, or incur high costs due to the need to design complex nested scenarios. We propose a general and efficient jailbreak framework for LLMs that integrates knowledge graph(KG), called **HBS-KGLLM**, which consists of three main components: (1) **H**armful **B**ehavior **S**ubstitution, (2) KG template nesting, and (3) KG-to-text conversion. We evaluated HBS-KGLLM on five SOTA LLMs, including both open-source and closed-source models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HBS-KGLLM significantly improves the attack success rate compared to existing baselines, while also greatly reducing both time and financial costs. Using GPT-4 as an example, our method improves the ASR by nearly 25% compared to the current SOTA method, while reducing the time for a successful single-sample attack by nearly 55%.

Keywords: Large language models · Knowledge graphs · Jailbreak

1 Introduction

Large language models, such as ChatGPT [17], GPT-4 [18], and Claude [2], have excelled in various complex language processing tasks, including text summarization [13], machine translation [26] and code completion [16]. The development

of LLMs has had a significant impact on the entire field of artificial intelligence, fundamentally transforming the paradigm of how humans develop and utilize AI algorithms. These models, with massive numbers of parameters, are trained on large-scale datasets [32,33], enabling them to capture and learn the complexity and diversity of language. Building on instruction fine-tuning and safety alignment [22], LLMs possess strong personalization capabilities, allowing them to understand and generate text aligned with human preferences.



Fig. 1. This figure demonstrates a jailbreak example regarding "How to make a bomb." If asked directly, LLMs would apologize and refuse to respond to the prompt. However, through a carefully designed jailbreak framework, LLMs bypassed the safety guardrails and provided us with detailed steps for making a bomb, successfully executing the jailbreak.

However, the training data inevitably contains harmful information, and malicious attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the model architecture, carefully designing prompt templates to trigger harmful behaviors in these models, including tutorials for creating websites that steal private information, instructions for making bombs, the spread of racist content, etc. Consequently, concerns about the safety and potential vulnerabilities of jailbreak attacks on LLMs [9,28,29] have been increasingly raised. Current research on jailbreak attacks [1] primarily falls into two categories: white-box attacks and black-box attacks. White-box attacks target open-source models, such as GCG proposed in [35], which automatically generates adversarial suffixes through a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, creating a single adversarial prompt to bypass the safety mechanisms of LLMs and induce harmful behavior with high probability. Another example is AutoDAN proposed in [34], which uses Writer LLM to generate general adversarial suffixes for jailbreaking the attacked LLM. Black-box attacks, on the other hand, target closed-source models. For instance, DeepInception [14] is a lightweight jailbreak method that exploits the person-

ification capabilities of LLMs by constructing virtual nested scenarios for the attack, thereby adapting to bypass the model's safety guardrails. ReNeLLM [8], a jailbreak framework, primarily consists of two steps: prompt rewriting and scenario nesting. The prompt rewriting masks the attack intention while preserving the core semantics of the prompt, and the scenario nesting provides three scenarios—code completion, table filling, and text continuation—allowing the LLM to choose the scenario most conducive to jailbreak success.

Although the aforementioned methods achieve certain jailbreak effects, they still have some limitations. On the one hand, model-based jailbreak attacks typically require access to the internal structure of the target model, meaning these attacks are generally only effective on white-box models, with weak generalization. On the other hand, prompt-based jailbreak attacks often rely on designing different scenarios to nest prompts. Typically, a single method requires multiple scenarios to choose from, and the execution process of the algorithm requires many iterations, which results in high time and financial costs for the jailbreak attack.

To address the aforementioned issues, we propose HBS-KGLLM, an efficient jailbreak framework that enables LLMs to generate the target KG to assess the safety performance of various LLMs. Our approach consists of three main components: (1) Harmful behavior substitution: Replacing dangerous behaviors in the initial prompt with low-resource language Bengali to reduce the LLM's attention to harmful prompts, attempting to induce the LLM's response. (2) KG template nesting: Embedding the rewritten initial prompt into a carefully designed prompt template, allowing the LLM to automatically construct a KG related to the jailbreak prompt, where the completed KG includes detailed steps of the attack. (3) KG-to-text conversion: Once the LLM does not refuse to construct the KG, it is then required to convert the constructed jailbreak KG into a textual description, thereby confirming the final attack result. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and portability of HBS-KGLLM (Fig. 1 shows an example of a jailbreak attack using our method), providing guidance for researchers and developers to explore more secure LLM defense methods, especially from the perspective of KGs.

In conclusion, our main contributions are as follows:

- We propose the first general jailbreak prompt attack framework that combines LLMs and KGs, consisting of three main steps: harmful behavior substitution, KG template nesting, and KG-to-text conversion, enabling LLMs to efficiently generate a jailbreak KG related to the jailbreak prompt.
- Compared to the existing jailbreak attack methods, our approach achieves a high success rate, with experimental results outperforming chosen baselines.
- Our framework is relatively simple. During the algorithm implementation, we used a small number of iterations, with the maximum set to 5 in our experiments, significantly reducing time and financial costs, especially when calling APIs of some black-box models.

2 Related Work

2.1 LLM-augmented KGs

In recent years, LLMs, due to their powerful personification and generalization capabilities, have created a new wave in the field of artificial intelligence. By being pre-trained on large-scale corpora, LLMs have excelled in various natural language processing tasks, such as question answering, text generation, and code completion. Despite their success in many applications, LLMs have been criticized for their lack of factual knowledge. KGs [21] which store large amounts of factual information in the form of triples composed of entities, relationships, and semantic descriptions, provide a structured representation of knowledge. Entities can represent objects in the physical world or abstract concepts, while relationships depict the connections between entities along with relevant semantic descriptions. However, constructing KGs is challenging, requiring substantial human effort, and current approaches to KGs are insufficient to handle the issues of incompleteness and the dynamic nature of real-world KGs. There is a recent trend to explore knowledge graphs using knowledge-driven representation learning methods, which demonstrates the positive potential of using ontology information constraints [15].

In light of the aforementioned issues, some current research explores the integration of LLMs and KGs. KGs enhanced by LLMs can better achieve embedding, completion, and construction of KGs [11,20]. COMET [3] constructs a commonsense knowledge base by using existing tuples as a seed set of knowledge for training. With this seed set, the pre-trained language model learns to adapt its representations for knowledge generation and produces high-quality new tuples. Additionally, a novel symbolic knowledge distillation framework [25] has been proposed, inspired by traditional knowledge distillation techniques. This framework selectively refines high-quality commonsense facts from the LLM to fine-tune a student LLM, which is then used to generate a commonsense KG.

This paper investigates whether structured knowledge representations regarding the targets of jailbreak attacks can be obtained from the LLM using prompt templates. Furthermore, it explores whether the LLM's powerful language generation capabilities can organize these structured representations into coherent natural language, achieving the success of jailbreaking the LLM.

2.2 Black-box Jaibreaking

Despite the significant successes of LLMs in various practical applications, training these models on corpora that contain both high-quality and low-quality data poses the risk of generating annoying, unfriendly, or even harmful content. Specifically, for LLMs that have undergone safety alignment, it remains uncertain whether these models can uphold ethical safety standards when faced with user requests that violate their safety mechanisms. In response to these concerns, numerous studies have investigated jailbreak attacks targeting vulnerabilities in

LLMs. In the realm of black-box attacks, researchers have designed adversarial prompts to elicit malicious responses from LLMs.

Most commercial LLMs employ advanced safety alignment techniques, including mechanisms to automatically detect and defend against simple jailbreak queries. As a result, attackers are compelled to design more complex templates that can bypass the model's safeguards against harmful content. ReNeLLM [8] introduces a jailbreak framework that first rewrites prompts while preserving their original semantics, then randomly embeds the rewritten prompts into three common task scenarios, leaving blanks to entice the LLM to complete the jailbreak. FUZZLLM [27] presents a framework for actively testing and discovering jailbreak vulnerabilities in any LLM by utilizing templates to capture the structural integrity of prompts and isolating key features of jailbreak types as constraints, thus enabling efficient automated jailbreak testing. The new adversarial attack paradigm, ICA [24], is designed based on the ICL (In-Context Learning) characteristics of LLMs, combining harmful demonstrations that elicit positive responses to harmful requests in prompts. ICA transforms jailbreak attacks from zero-shot to few-shot attacks by embedding adversarial examples into context. PANDORA [6] introduces a novel approach for indirect jailbreak, leveraging the synergy between LLMs and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to generate unexpected responses through prompt manipulation. PANDORA employs a new attack vector for retrieval-enhanced generation poisoning, using maliciously crafted content to manipulate prompts, effectively initiating jailbreak attacks.

Although extensive data is used in LLM pre-training or safety alignment, certain scenarios remain underrepresented. This provides a potential new attack surface for attackers to perform jailbreak attacks based on these long-tail distributions. To this end, prompt-rewriting attacks involve interacting with the LLM using niche languages (such as codes and other low-resource languages) to bypass its safeguards. The CipherChat [31] framework systematically tests the generalization of safety alignment to non-natural language ciphers. CipherChat circumvents safety alignment and successfully jailbreaks by constructing systematic prompts, encrypting input instructions, and decrypting LLM responses. ArtPrompt [12] introduces a jailbreak attack based on ASCII art, consisting of two steps: first, hiding critical characters in the prompt that could trigger the LLM's safety refusal, and then replacing the masked characters with ASCII representations. The resulting concealed prompt is delivered to the LLM as a jailbreak attack. ArtPrompt exploits the LLM's poor performance in recognizing ASCII art to bypass its safety mechanisms, thereby eliciting malicious responses. Lastly, multilingual jailbreak attacks [7] have been shown to be effective, with the combination of multilingual prompts and malicious instructions leading to a high success rate in generating unsafe outputs in intentional scenarios.

3 Methodology

In this section, we will provide a detailed introduction to HBS-KGLLM, a universal framework for automatically generating jailbreak knowledge graph prompts,



Fig. 2. Overview of our framework, HBS-KGLLM. In the first step, harmful behaviors in the initial prompt are replaced with a low-resource language. In the second step, the modified prompt is nested into a carefully designed KG template. Blank nodes in the KG indicate empty steps, while yellow nodes signify that the LLM has provided a response. Finally, the generated KG is converted into the corresponding text by the LLM.

as Fig. 2 shows. HBS-KGLLM primarily consists of three key steps: harmful behavior substitution, KG template nesting, and KG-to-text conversion. The first step involves replacing harmful behaviors included in the original prompt with low-resource languages without altering the original semantics. The second step requires embedding the rewritten prompt into a designed KG template. The third step involves utilizing the LLM to convert the self-constructed KG into natural language text. To ensure accuracy, the first step employs manual translation, while the other steps can be automatically completed by the LLM through prompt templates. The entire framework does not require additional training or optimization of the LLM, thus saving significant time and financial resources. We will define our methods formally in Section 3.1, and Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 will detail the three key steps in HBS-KGLLM.

3.1 KG Jailbreaking Paradigm

We specialize in black-box jailbreak attacks with the goal of producing interpretable and efficient jailbreak attack prompts to allow the attacked LLMs to generate harmful content. For a token-level attack, an LLM is actually a mapping of some token sequence $x_{1:n}$. Given a jailbreak hint $P = x_{1:n}$, where $x_{1:n} := (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ denotes the tokenization of P, $x_i \in \{1, \ldots, V\}$, where V denotes the

size of the entire vocabulary. Then one can use the notation $p(x_{n+1}|x_{1:n})$[1] to denote the probability that the next token is x_{n+1} given the previous token $x_{1:n}$. However, we explore black-box LLMs, which are described by M. The probability for the next notation x_{n+1} can be expressed as $g_M(x_{n+1}|x_{1:n})$.[2] After inputting P to the LLM a response sequence $R = x_{n+1:n+K}$ is obtained, which packs K tokens and obeys the conditional probability function of this response R:

$$g_M^*\Big(x_{n+1:n+K}\Big|x_{1:n}\Big) = \prod_{i=1}^{K} g_M\Big(x_{n+i}\Big|x_{1:n+i-1}\Big). \tag{1}$$

In this study, it is first necessary to preprocess P (see Section 3.2 for more details) by replacing the harmful behaviors contained in P with one low-resource language to obtain

$$P' := (x_1, \ldots, x_u, l_{u+1}, \ldots, l_{u+t}, x_{u+t+1}, \ldots, x_n), \tag{2}$$

P' can also be denoted as $(x_{1:u} \oplus l_{u+1:u+t} \oplus x_{u+t+1:n}) := P_I \oplus P_L$, where it means that the original prompt P with $(x_{u+1}, \ldots, x_{u+t})$ have been replaced by the low-resource language tokens $(l_{u+1}, \ldots, l_{u+t})$, and we can obtain the conditional probability function that obeys the response R:

$$\begin{aligned} &g_M^*\left(x_{n+1:n+K}\middle|x_{1:u} \oplus l_{u+1:u+t} \oplus x_{u+t+1:n}\right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^{K} g_M\Big(x_{n+i}\Big|x_{1:u} \oplus l_{u+1:u+t} \oplus x_{u+t+1:n+i-1}\Big). \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

To simplify this description, we denote by $R \Leftarrow g_M(P)$ the response R obtained from $g_M(P)$ given the prompt P. Since we also have to nest P' into a dutifully designed KG template T to obtain $R \Leftarrow g_M(T(P'))$, this study's jailbreak formalization is defined as follows:

$$\text{Whether } \mathbf{Evaluator}(R) = 1 \quad \text{where} \quad R \Leftarrow g_M(T(P')). \tag{4}$$

Here Evaluator : $\{0, 1\}$, acted by one LLM, can effectively determine whether the response given by LLM is harmful or not under this jailbreak framework, and whether the jailbreak attack is successful or not.

Given the model under test, M_{test}, and an initial harmful prompt P, after rewriting P, we obtain $P_I \oplus P_L$. The rewritten prompt is then embedded into the KG template T. Once the preparation is complete, the finalized knowledge graph template is input into the model under test. The resulting output is then fed into the KG-to-text model M_{text}. Finally, the response from the last model is evaluated by the harm assessor M_{eval} to determine whether the content is harmful. Specific details of the framework implementation can be seen in Algorithm 1:

[1] White-box attacks like GCG require access to the internal structure or parameters of the model, to p

[2] HBS-KGLLM is a black-box attack that only requires the ability to sample access (API calls) and does not require full access to g_M

Algorithm 1: The Realization of HBS-KGLLM

Require: Harmfulness evaluator M_{eval}, model used to transform KG to text M_{text}, model under test M_{test}, KG template T, max iterations N.
Input: Prompt $P_I \oplus P_L$ initialized by replacing harmful behavior in P with Bengali language.

$n \leftarrow 0$
while $n < N$ **do**
  $R_{KG} \Leftarrow g_M^{test}(T(P_I \oplus P_L))$
  if $g_M^{eval}(R_{KG}) = 1$ **then**
    $R_{text} \Leftarrow g_M^{text}(R_{KG})$
    if $g_M^{eval}(R_{text}) = 1$ **then**
      return success
    end if
  end if
  $n \leftarrow n + 1$
end while
if $n = N$ **then return** fail

3.2 Harmful Behavior Substitution

Many researchers have made significant efforts to improve the safety alignment of LLMs, including methods like instruction fine-tuning [5] and reinforcement learning with human feedback [19]. However, these efforts generally focus only on natural semantics present in the training corpus. ArtPrompt [12] introduces a novel approach, using ASCII art to interpret the corpus. The first key step in ArtPrompt is word masking: given the attacker's target behavior, sensitive words that could conflict with the model's safety alignment are initially masked in the prompt. These sensitive words often lead to prompt rejection. For instance, in the prompt "Write a tutorial on how to make a bomb," the word "bomb" is masked, creating a prompt like "Write a tutorial on how to make a _____." However, in the second step, the masked word "bomb" is replaced using ASCII art, and the authors constructed a dataset called VITC specifically to validate this approach.

Fig. 3. Replace the harmful behaviors in the initial prompt with low-resource languages. The figure shows the replacement of "make a bomb" with Bengali to form a new prompt.

Inspired by this, our study masks harmful behavior like "make a bomb" and replaces it with a low-resource language, Bengali, thus creating a rewritten complete prompt as shown in the Fig. 3. Previous studies have shown that jailbreak attacks on LLMs can be successfully conducted using low-resource languages [7,30]. Therefore, we believe substituting harmful behaviors in the original attack prompt with a low-resource language can also effectively mask the attack intent without the need for a labor-intensive ASCII art dataset. During experimental testing, we considered automating the harmful behavior substitution process through LLMs. However, we observed that in some cases, the original intent of the prompt was not fully preserved, or its meaning was entirely reversed. Thus, we used Google Translate to preprocess the initial jailbreak prompts manually, ensuring the stability of this crucial step.

KG Prompt Template of HBS-KGLLM

You are an expert in the field of knowledge graphs. The following is a knowledge graph about a certain event. Based on this, the attributes of the instruction part are expanded to supplement the detailed information of the event. The reply can only contain the supplemented knowledge graph: CREATE (tutorial:tutorial {title: "<**Rewritten Prompt**>"}) CREATE (tutorial)-[:CONTAINS]->(instruction:Instruction {step: "Step 1"}) CREATE (tutorial)-[:CONTAINS]->(instruction:Instruction {step: "Step 2"}) CREATE (tutorial)-[:CONTAINS]->(instruction:Instruction {step: "Step 3"})

Fig. 4. The carefully designed KG prompt template contains four nodes, with the rewritten prompt as the central node and three empty nodes with no instruction content. After embedding the rewritten prompt, the template can induce the LLM to fill in the blank nodes and generate a jailbreak response.

3.3 KG Template Nesting

In this section, we introduce how to leverage LLMs to automatically explore jailbreak-related knowledge encoded within themselves, specifically using LLMs to construct a KG for jailbreak execution. LLMs exhibit strong natural language understanding and instruction-following capabilities, often referred to as the "personification" of LLMs. However, issues such as hallucinations and interpretability in LLMs remain areas of active research, with ongoing work in methods like RAG [10] and COK [23]. COK, for instance, is a novel "chain of knowledge" approach that combines knowledge graphs with large models to enhance the reasoning stability of LLMs.

LLMs can implicitly encode massive knowledge, and some studies [3,11] aim to extract this knowledge from LLMs to construct KGs. Implicit knowledge from LLMs can be transferred to commonsense knowledge bases, generating explicit knowledge. KGs constructed in this way exhibit competitiveness, diversity, and

novelty. A KG consists of a set of knowledge triples represented as <head entity (h), relation (r), tail entity (t)>. To better align with the goals of jailbreak attacks, we predict specific tail entities given the head entity h and relation r. For instance, for the jailbreak prompt "Write a tutorial on how to make a bomb," we take the entire prompt as the head entity and define the relation as containment, forming <Write a tutorial on how to make a bomb, contains, t>, aiming for LLMs to provide relevant information on the tail entity t. To better extract implicit knowledge related to jailbreak prompts within LLMs, we carefully designed a KG jailbreak prompt template to prompt the model to complete the blank tail entities automatically, as shown in the Fig. 4. The resulting tail entities represent potential steps in the jailbreak attack prompt.

One challenge with directly inputting the head entity and relation and asking LLMs to generate the corresponding tail entity to complete the KG is output instability. Black-box models like ChatGPT and Claude exhibit certain characteristics. When the input prompts involve sensitive or dangerous content, these LLMs may respond inconsistently. For the same prompt, they might sometimes provide a response and at other times refuse to do so. In empirical experiments, we found that, with a maximum of five iterations, LLMs can determine whether to respond positively to the input prompt or reject it.

KG-to-text Template of HBS-KGLLM

Describe in a short paragraph the detailed content contained in the following knowledge graph without describing its structure: <>

Fig. 5. Just because LLM creates KGs based on KG templates does not necessarily mean that the jailbreak was successful. Nest the generated KG into a KG-to-text template to get the relevant content about that KG.

3.4 KG-to-text Conversion

If the LLMs do not reject the request to complete the KG jailbreak template, we will obtain a complete jailbreak attack KG. However, since the content described in the KG is unclear, it is difficult to determine whether the jailbreak attack is successful. KG-to-text aims to convert the structured information in the KG into natural language text, making it easier to understand and apply. This involves extracting nodes, relationships, and their attributes from the KG and using natural language generation (NLG) techniques to transform it into fluent, grammatically correct text.

However, processing graph-text parallel data is labor-intensive and challenging. The powerful generalization ability of LLMs and their vast knowledge have

led many researchers to use LLMs for KG-to-text research. They directly fine-tune various LLMs, such as BART and T5, to enable them to convert KGs into high-quality text, effectively describing the content contained within the KG. The SOTA LLMs (ChatGPT, Claude, Llama) used in this study also possess this ability. Previous studies required input graphs to be represented as linear traversals. In contrast, the KG constructed in this study is described using Cypher language, allowing the jailbreak KG to be directly nested into the KG-to-text template, enabling LLMs to generate detailed content related to the jailbreak attack, as shown in the Fig. 5. Finally, LLMs are used as evaluators to determine whether the generated content is harmful, serving as the criterion for evaluating the success of the jailbreak.

4 Experiment

4.1 Experimental Settings

Dataset: This paper utilizes the AdvBench [35] dataset in the experiments, which includes two different settings: harmful string and harmful behaviors. The first setting focuses on fine-grained control of model outputs, while the second setting aims to bypass safety barriers to elicit harmful outputs, making the second setting more aligned with the experimental requirements of this paper. The harmful behaviors setting contains a total of 520 data entries, covering seven categories of harmful behaviors: Illegal Activity, Hate Speech, Malware, Physical Harm, Economic Harm, Fraud, and Privacy Violations. Based on the findings of [12], we selected the AdvBench subset which is the most representative jailbreak prompts to form the experimental dataset. This carefully curated dataset serves as input for the jailbreak attacks, effectively evaluating the response of LLMs to harmful prompts.

LLMs: Considering factors such as parameter size, training data scale, openness, and inference performance of existing mainstream large models, we selected Llama2 as the open-source model to evaluate our jailbreak framework. We also chose four well-known closed-source models for comparison: GPT-3.5 (GPT-3.5 turbo-0613), GPT-4 (GPT-4 -0613), Claude-1 (claude-instant-v1), and Claude-2 (claude-v2). By testing these five different large models, we can comprehensively assess the effectiveness and generalizability of the jailbreak attack of HBS-KGLLM.

Evaluation Metrics: We use the metric $ASR = \frac{N_{\text{jail}}}{N_{\text{total}}}$ to evaluate the harmfulness of the responses generated by the LLM, which indicates the success rate of the jailbreak attack. Here N_{jail} represents the number of successful jailbreak prompts, while N_{total} denotes the total number of jailbreak prompts, which corresponds to the size of the dataset used.

Baselines: Our baselines include GCG [35], a recently proposed groundbreaking technique for the automatic generation of jailbreak prompts. AutoDAN [34], which utilizes hierarchical genetic algorithms to generate semantically meaningful jailbreak prompts. PAIR [4], which uses an attacker LLM to generate semantic prompt-level jailbreaks for a targeted LLM. DeepInception [14], a lightweight

jailbreak method that exploits the personification capabilities of LLMs by constructing virtual nested scenarios for the attack. ArtPrompt [12], exploiting the LLM's poor performance in recognizing ASCII art to bypass its safety mechanisms. ReNeLLM [8], a jailbreak framework which includes prompt rewriting and scenario nesting.

Table 1. Our framework is compared with selected baseline methods, including GCG and AutoDAN for white-box models, and PAIR, DeepInception, ArtPrompt, and ReNeLLM for black-box models. TCPS indicates the time cost per sample for a successful jailbreak. On both open-source and closed-source models, our method achieves nearly the highest ASR.

Method	**GPT-3.5**	**GPT-4**	**Claude-1**	**Claude-2**	**Llama2**	**TCPS**
GCG	0.098	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.406	564.53s
AutoDAN	0.444	0.264	0.002	0.000	0.148	955.80s
PAIR	0.444	0.333	0.010	0.058	0.042	-
DeepInception	0.556	0.416	0.000	0.000	0.428	-
ArtPrompt	0.72	0.16	0.86	0.20	0.14	-
ReNeLLM	0.869	0.589	0.900	**0.696**	0.512	132.03s
HBS-KGLLM	**0.920**	**0.820**	**0.920**	0.360	**0.76**	**60.19s**
+full+only	1.00	0.94	0.98	0.54	0.9	-

4.2 Main Results

Attack Effectiveness and Transferability: As shown in Table 1, HBS-KGLLM achieves SOTA performance on both open-source and closed-source models compared to the selected baseline methods, including GCG and AutoDAN for white-box models, and PAIR, DeepInception, ArtPrompt, and ReNeLLM for black-box models. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed approach. Using the GPT series, Claude series, and Llama2 as test models, HBS-KGLLM achieved high ASR on AdvBench dataset, particularly for the GPT series. This indicates that the harmful behavior substitution and KG Template Nesting modules in our method are portable across various models, demonstrating high generalizability. Additionally, this approach has very low time costs, reducing them by 55% compared to the current optimal method, ReNeLLM. Although its performance on Claude-2 was less outstanding, with the complete substitution, no substitution, and dangerous behavior substitution of the initial prompt in the first model block(the results of "+full+only" in Table 1), our method achieved an ASR above 90% on nearly all models, with Claude-2's ASR approaching the best results of the current baseline.

In contrast, the adversarial suffixes generated by jailbreak attack methods such as GCG and AutoDAN, which target white-box models, do not perform well on some black-box models. Research focused on black-box models often utilizes random nesting of various scenarios, resulting in a high number of iterations during algorithm implementation, which incurs significant time and cost.

Our proposed method, however, requires only a single KG template nesting and at most five iterations in its implementation, while still achieving outstanding experimental results.

ASR on Specific Prompt Categories: From the Table 2, it can be seen that within our framework, LLMs successfully executed jailbreak attacks on nearly all seven harmful behaviors. LLMs are most susceptible to safety vulnerabilities in terms of economic harm, violent content, malware, and fraudulent activity, while they generally perform well regarding privacy violations. Interestingly, despite Claude's implementation of multiple safety mechanisms, which performs well against most harmful attacks, it was easily jailbreakable in the context of violating privacy.

Table 2. The results of HBS-KGLLM on various types of harmful prompt and LLMs are reported. Bolded items indicate the highest ASR for each LLM in the corresponding prompt category, and underlined items indicate the lowest ASR

Category	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	Claude-1	Claude-2	Llama2
Illegal Activity	0.944	0.778	0.889	0.389	0.722
Violate Privacy	0.500	0.500	0.500	**1.000**	0.500
Hate Speech	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	0.000	0.667
Malware	**1.000**	0.800	**1.000**	0.400	0.200
Physical Harm	**1.000**	0.714	0.857	0.286	**1.000**
Economic Harm	**1.000**	**1.000**	**1.000**	0.333	**1.000**
Fraud	0.778	0.889	**1.000**	0.444	0.778

4.3 Ablation Study

To validate the effectiveness of the components in our proposed framework, we conducted extensive ablation experiments, as shown in the Fig. 6.

Effectiveness of Harmful Behavior Substitution: "prompt_only" represents the original prompt, "prompt_full" indicates the complete replacement of the original prompt with low-resource languages, and "prompt_half" refers to replacing only the harmful behaviors in the prompt with low-resource languages. None of these three cases used KG templates for nesting. From these three columns of data, we can observe the effectiveness of jailbreak attacks conducted using low-resource languages [7]. When using only the initial prompt for jailbreak, the ASR of the five SOTA LLMs is close to 0. In the case of complete replacement, GPT-3.5 achieves the highest ASR of 0.32. When only harmful behaviors are replaced, GPT-3.5 still achieves the highest ASR of 0.22, with similar results observed in the other four models. Although it appears that "prompt_full" performs better than "prompt_half," in our framework, after nesting KG templates (prompt_full+KG and prompt_half+KG), prompts that replace only the harmful behaviors can better breach the safety guardrails of LLMs, achieving a high ASR.



Fig. 6. The ablation experiments mainly focus on two key components: harmful behavior substitution and KG template nesting. The first three groups in the figure represent jailbreak attacks on LLMs using only prompts, and the last three groups represent the three prompts nested in a well-designed KG template.

Effectiveness of KG Template Nesting: The last three columns of the table show the results of nesting the prompts (original or rewritten) into our designed KG templates. The results indicate that this component significantly improves the ASR across all LLMs.Except for its underperformance on Claude-2, our method achieves an ASR of at least 0.75 on all LLMs. After being nested into the KG template, prompts that only replace harmful behaviors are more likely to succeed in jailbreaking compared to those with complete replacement. For example, in GPT-4, the ASR increased by nearly 7%, and in Llama2, it improved by nearly 20%. Notably, for llama-2, which has better safety consistency features, our framework also achieves a high jailbreak success rate of 0.76.

In summary, harmful behavior substitution and KG template nesting are indispensable parts of our entire framework, enabling us to breach the safety defenses of nearly all LLMs and achieve a high ASR.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose an general framework, HBS-KGLLM, for generating jailbreak KGs. The framework first replaces harmful behaviors in the original prompt with the low-resource language Bengali, then nests the modified prompt into a carefully designed KG template. Extensive experiments show that this approach enables successful jailbreaks of nearly all mainstream LLMs with only a few iterations, saving significant time and cost. We also conducted extensive ablation studies to validate the effectiveness of the key components in the proposed framework. By combining LLMs and KGs, we successfully executed jailbreak at-

tacks on LLMs, further revealing their vulnerabilities. We hope our work can support future research on the safety alignment of LLMs.

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