CyStack

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# CYBERSECURITY AUDIT REPORT

## Version v1.1

*This document details the process and results of the smart contract audit performed by CyStack from 04/05/2022 to 03/06/2022.*

*Audited for*

**Coherence Finance**

*Audited by*

**Vietnam CyStack Joint Stock Company**

# Contents

## Disclaimer

Smart Contract Audit only provides findings and recommendations for an exact commitment of a smart contract codebase. The results, hence, are not guaranteed to be accurate outside of the commitment, or after any changes or modifications made to the codebase. The evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a comprehensive evaluation of all security controls, so this audit does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s). CyStack prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. We recommend Coherence Finance conducting similar assessments on an annual basis by internal, third-party assessors, or a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s).

This security audit should never be used as an investment advice.

## Version History

| Version | Date | Release notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 03/06/2022 | The first report is sent to the client.<br>All findings are in the open status. |
| 1.1 | 13/06/2022 | Only one issue is approved and resolved.<br>The other issue is rejected and omitted from the report.<br>Coherence Finance allowed CyStack to publish the audit report publicly. |

## Contact Information

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# Introduction

From 04/05/2022 to 03/06/2022, Coherence Finance engaged CyStack to evaluate the security posture of the BeamSplitter of their contract system. Our findings and recommendations are detailed here in this initial report.

## 1.1 Audit Details

### Audit Target

Coherence is a platform on Solana for buying, selling, and building crypto ETFs, which are bundles of many crypto assets. ETFs built on Coherence can contain tens of thousands of assets. These crypto bundles can be either sponsored by Coherence, built by other parties or customized by the platform's users. Especially, the Coherence platform allows ETF creators receive a portion of transaction fees as income. Also, they can pay a listing fee to have their ETF listed higher up on the public ETF list in order to to promote their ETF branding.

The flow for Coherence's fee scheme is illustrated in the following diagram:




*Flow for Coherence's Fee Structure*

All of the on-chain functionality for buying, selling, and creating ETFs are controlled by the BeamSplitter program. This program is built with Anchor, which is a framework that simplifies development on Solana.

The basic information of BeamSplitter is detailed in the following table:

| Item | Description |
|---|---|
| Project Name | BeamSplitter |
| Issuer | Coherence Finance |
| Website | https://coherence.finance/ |
| Platform | Solana Smart Contract |
| Language | Rust |
| Codebase | https://github.com/coherence-finance/beamsplitter/tree/master/programs/coherence-beamsplitter/src |
| Commit | c6e25f18da17c7a15aa84536bffe1cc58d803957 |
| Audit method | Whitebox |

From the whitepaper from Coherence, every ETF on this platform is backed 1:1. When a user invest in an ETF, they already have bought each asset in that ETF. The Coherence platform accepts USDC or SOL from users for ETF purchase. Received USDC and SOL are used as liquidity to purchase the underlying assets of the desired ETF through Jupiter Exchange. Hence, only the coins, which are available on Jupiter Exchange, are supported on the Coherence platform. After the demanded assets are successfully bought, an ETF SPL token is minted and transferred to that user. This token represents the exact amount of backing that a user is providing. Because Coherence ETFs are SPL tokens, users can make ETF transactions just like any other SPL tokens.




When a user wants to redeem back the original tokens defined in an ETF, or sell an ETF, it is burnt before its underlying assets are transferred to their wallet.

In this SCA, as requested by Coherence Finance, CyStack focuses only on finding security issues in the Solana programs written for BeamSplitter, which respectively are:

- **context.rs**: In this file, structs for PrismEtf initialization, finalization, Order start, state, close, Cohere, Decohere, Construction and Deconstruction settings are defined. Also, in context.rs structs for role assignments are defined.
- **enums.rs**: Status codes and types for built PrismEtf, Order and Schedule are defined in this file.
- **errors.rs**: Error codes are defined in this file.
- **lib.rs**: This is the main file, where the logical core of the program is written. This file will make calls to the other files when the program BeamSplitter runs. How PrismEtfs are initialized and finalized file were implemented in lib.rs. Besides, lib.rs decides how to construct and decontruct orders in BeamSplitter. The transaction fees are ruled by lib.rs. By lib.rs, BeamSplitter program is initialized with desired states. Weighted tokens will be set as assets of an ETF, and the ETF then will be minted for cho owners and managers.
- **state.rs**: The definition of basic objects in BeamSplitter are stated in this file.

### Audit Service Provider

CyStack is a leading security company in Vietnam with the goal of building the next generation of cybersecurity solutions to protect businesses against threats from the Internet. CyStack is a member of Vietnam Information Security Association (VNISA) and Vietnam Alliance for Cybersecurity Products Development.

CyStack's researchers are known as regular speakers at well-known cybersecurity conferences such as BlackHat USA, BlackHat Asia, Xcon, T2FI, etc. and are talented bug hunters who discovered critical vulnerabilities in global products and acknowledged by their vendors.

## 1.2 Audit Goals

The focus of the audit was to verify that the smart contract system is secure, resilient and working according to its specifications. The audit activities can be grouped in the following three categories:

1. **Security:** Identifying security related issues within each contract and within the system of contracts.
2. **Sound Architecture:** Evaluation of the architecture of this system through the lens of established smart contract best practices and general software best practices.
3. **Code Correctness and Quality:** A full review of the contract source code. The primary areas of focus include:
   - Correctness
   - Readability
   - Sections of code with high complexity
   - Improving scalability
   - Quantity and quality of test coverage

## 1.3 Audit Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology:

- **Likelihood** represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- **Impact** measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- **Severity** demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: High, Medium and Low, i.e., H, M and L respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., Critical, Major, Medium, Minor and Informational (Info) as the table below:

| Impact | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *High* | Critical | Major | Medium |
| | *Medium* | Major | Medium | Minor |
| | *Low* | Medium | Minor | Informational |
| | | *High* | *Medium* | *Low* |
| | | | **Likelihood** | |

CyStack firstly analyses the smart contract with open-source and also our own security assessment tools to identify basic bugs related to general smart contracts. These tools include Slither, securify, Mythril, Sūrya, Solgraph, Truffle, Geth, Ganache, Mist, Metamask, solhint, mythx, etc. for contracts written in Solidity and libFuzzer, cargo-fuzz, cargo tarpaulin, cargo audit, cargo geiger, Clippy, prusti, etc. for contracts written in Rust. Then, our security specialists will verify the tool results manually, make a description and decide the severity for each of them.

After that, we go through a checklist of possible issues that could not be detected with automatic tools, conduct test cases for each and indicate the severity level for the results. If no issues are found after manual analysis, the contract can be considered safe within the test case. Else, if any issues are found, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. We would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation, if required or necessary.

The standard checklist, which applies for every SCA for Solidity smart contracts, strictly follows the Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry). SWC Registry is an implementation of the weakness classification scheme proposed in The Ethereum Improvement Proposal project under the code EIP-1470. The checklist of testing according to SWC Registry is shown in Appendix C.

Additionally, SCAs for smart contracts written in Rust are conducted, a following security checklist based on vulnerabilities and advisories gathered from RustSec Advisory Database, the article about Solana common pitfalls from Neodyme Audit Team and the repository Sealevel Attacks.

In general, the auditing process focuses on detecting and verifying the existence of the following issues:

- **Coding Specification Issues:** Focusing on identifying coding bugs related to general smart contract coding conventions and practices.
- **Design Defect Issues:** Reviewing the architecture design of the smart contract(s) and working on test cases, such as self-DoS attacks, incorrect inheritance implementations, etc.
- **Coding Security Issues:** Finding common security issues of the smart contract(s), for example integer overflows, insufficient verification of authenticity, improper use of cryptographic signature, etc.
- **Coding Design Issues:** Testing the code logic and error handlings in the smart contract code base, such as initializing contract variables, controlling the balance and flows of token transfers, verifying strong randomness, etc.
- **Coding Hidden Dangers:** Working on special issues, such as data privacy, data reliability, gas consumption optimization, special cases of authentication and owner permission, fallback functions, etc.

For better understanding of found issues' details and severity, each SWC ID is mapped to the most closely related Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID. CWE is a category system for software weaknesses and vulnerabilities to help identify weaknesses surrounding software jargon. The list in Appendix E provides an overview on specific similar software bugs that occur in Smart Contract coding.

The final report will be sent to the smart contract issuer with an executive summary for overview and detailed results for acts of remediation.

## 1.4 Audit Scope

| Assessment | Target | Type |
|---|---|---|
| **Initial targets** | | |
| White-box testing | context.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | enums.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | errors.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | lib.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | state.rs | Rust code file |
| **Re-test targets** | | |
| White-box testing | context.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | enums.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | errors.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | lib.rs | Rust code file |
| White-box testing | state.rs | Rust code file |

# Executive Summary

## Security issues by severity




## Security issues related to Rust smart contracts

| | |
|---|---|
| Misuse of mathematical expressions | 1 |

## Security issues by CWE

| | |
|---|---|
| Improper Adherence to Coding Standards (CWE-703) | 1 |

## Table of security issues

| ID | Status | Vulnerability | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| #coherence-002 | Resolved | Absurd comparisons | INFO |

## Recommendations

Based on the results of this smart contract audit, CyStack has the following high-level key recommendations:

| Key recommendations | |
|---|---|
| Issues | CyStack conducted a re-assessment for BeamSplitter after BeamSplitter development team had committed new codebases with mitigation for every reported issue. Among the two found issues, only one issue is approved and resolved. The other issue is rejected and omitted from the report. |
| Recommendations | CyStack recommends Coherence Finance to evaluate the audit results with several different security audit third-parties for the most accurate conclusion. |
| References | • https://rustsec.org/<br>• https://blog.neodyme.io/posts/solana_common_pitfalls<br>• https://github.com/project-serum/sealevel-attacks |

# Detailed Results

## 1. Absurd comparisons

| | |
|---|---|
| **Issue ID** | #coherence-002 |
| **Category** | Misuse of mathematical expressions |
| **Description** | In the functions **push_tokens** and **start_order**, comparative operation "less or equal" (<=) to 0 is applied on 64-bit unsigned integer (u64) variables. This comparison involves a case that is always false. The whole expression might misleading imply that it is possible for the unsigned integer variables to be less than 0. |
| **Severity** | INFO |
| **Location(s)** | lib.rs: 146, 209 |
| **Status** | Resolved |
| **Reference** | CWE-703 - Improper Adherence to Coding Standards |
| **Remediation** | It is recommended to change these expression from **x <= 0** to **x==0**. |

### Description

The codelines where the issues occur are lied in the file **lib.rs**:

```
...
146             if weighted_token.weight <= 0 {
147                 return Err(BeamsplitterErrors::ZeroWeight.into());
148             }
...
209         if amount <= 0 {
210             return Err(BeamsplitterErrors::ZeroOrder.into());
211         }
...
```

The variable **amount** is defined in the function **start_over** in **lib.rs**:

```
...
188     pub fn start_order(ctx: Context<StartOrder>, order_type: OrderType, amount: u64)
        ↪   -> Result<()> {
...
```

The variable **weighted_token.weight** is the attribute **weight** in an instance of the struct **WeightedToken** defined in **state.rs**:

```
…
#[zero_copy]
#[derive(Debug, Default, AnchorDeserialize, AnchorSerialize)]
pub struct WeightedToken {
    pub mint: Pubkey,
    pub weight: u64,
}

```

It is recommended to change these expression to:

```
…
            if weighted_token.weight == 0 {
                return Err(BeamsplitterErrors::ZeroWeight.into());
            }
…
        if amount == 0 {
            return Err(BeamsplitterErrors::ZeroOrder.into());
        }
…
```

# Conclusion

CyStack had conducted a security audit for BeamSplitter Token. Total two issues were found, including a minor and an informational issues. Among these two issues, one was rejected. CyStack approved that this rejection is reasonable and it will not affect the security posture of the project. The other issue was approved and immediately addressed by BeamSplitter issuer. CyStack confirmed that all found issues were resolved. Overall, BeamSplitter has included the best practices for smart contract development and has passed our security assessment for smart contracts.

To improve the quality for this report, and for CyStack's Smart Contract Audit report in general, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedback or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

# Appendices

## Appendix A – Security Issue Status Definitions

| Status | Definition |
|---|---|
| Open | The issue has been reported and currently being review by the smart contract developers/issuer. |
| Unresolved | The issue is acknowledged and planned to be addressed in future. At the time of the corresponding report version, the issue has not been fixed. |
| Resolved | The issue is acknowledged and has been fully fixed by the smart contract developers/issuer. |
| Rejected | The issue is considered to have no security implications or to make only little security impacts, so it is not planned to be addressed and won't be fixed. |

# Appendix B – Severity Explanation

| Severity | Definition |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Issues, considered as critical, are straightforwardly exploitable bugs and security vulnerabilities.<br>It is advised to immediately resolve these issues in order to prevent major problems or a full failure during contract system operation. |
| MAJOR | Major issues are bugs and vulnerabilities, which cannot be exploited directly without certain conditions.<br>It is advised to patch the codebase of the smart contract as soon as possible, since these issues, with a high degree of probability, can cause certain problems for operation of the smart contract or severe security impacts on the system in some way. |
| MEDIUM | In terms of medium issues, bugs and vulnerabilities exist but cannot be exploited without extra steps such as social engineering.<br>It is advised to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority issues have been resolved. |
| MINOR | Minor issues are generally objective in nature but do not represent actual bugs or security problems.<br>It is advised to address these issues, unless there is a clear reason not to. |
| INFO | Issues, regarded as informational (info), possibly relate to "guides for the best practices" or "readability". Generally, these issues are not actual bugs or vulnerabilities. It is recommended to address these issues, if it makes effective and secure improvements to the smart contract codebase. |

# Appendix C – Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry)

| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| | **Coding Specification Issues** | |
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | It is recommended to make a conscious decision on which visibility type (*external*, *public*, *internal* or *private*) is appropriate for a function. By default, functions without concrete specifiers are *public*. |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler to avoid publicly disclosed bugs and issues in outdated versions. |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | It is recommended to lock the pragma to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using a vulnerable version. |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Variables can be specified as being *public*, *internal* or *private*. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables. |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Solidity provides alternatives to the deprecated constructions, the use of which might reduce code quality. Most of them are aliases, thus replacing old constructions will not break current behavior. |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | It is therefore recommended to upgrade the contract to a recent version of the Solidity compiler and change to the new constructor declaration (the keyword *constructor*). |
| | **Design Defect Issues** | |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | External calls can fail accidentally or deliberately, which can cause a DoS condition in the contract. It is better to isolate each external call into its own transaction and implement the contract logic to handle failed calls. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Review storage variable layouts for your contract systems carefully and remove any ambiguities. Always check for compiler warnings as they can flag the issue within a single contract. |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order (from more /general/ to more /specific/). |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Modifying an array of unknown size, that increases in size over time, can lead to such a Denial of Service condition. Actions that require looping across the entire data structure should be avoided. |
| | **Coding Security Issues** | |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | It is recommended to use safe math libraries for arithmetic operations throughout the smart contract system to avoid integer overflows and underflows. |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | Make sure all internal state changes are performed before the call is executed or use a reentrancy lock. |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | Use *delegatecall* with caution and make sure to never call into untrusted contracts. If the target address is derived from user input ensure to check it against a whitelist of trusted contracts. |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | A signature should never be included into a signed message hash to check if previously messages have been processed by the contract. |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | In order to protect against signature replay attacks, store every message hash that has been processed by the smart contract, include the address of the contract that processes the message and never generate the message hash including the signature. |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | It is not recommended to use alternate verification schemes that do not require proper signature verification through *ecrecover()*. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | The character *U+202E* should not appear in the source code of a smart contract. |
| | **Coding Design Issues** | |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | If you choose to use low-level call methods (e.g. *call()*), make sure to handle the possibility that the call fails by checking the return value. |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Implement controls so withdrawals can only be triggered by authorized parties or according to the specs of the smart contract system. |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Consider removing the self-destruct functionality. If absolutely required, it is recommended to implement a multisig scheme so that multiple parties must approve the self-destruct action. |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | Consider whether the condition checked in the *assert()* is actually an invariant. If not, replace the *assert()* statement with a *require()* statement. |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | Developers should write smart contracts with the notion that block values are not precise, and the use of them can lead to unexpected effects. Alternatively, they may make use oracles. |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | To avoid weak sources of randomness, use commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO, external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize, or Bitcoin block hashes. |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | If the required logical condition is too strong, it should be weakened to allow all valid external inputs. Otherwise, make sure no invalid inputs are provided. |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | As a general advice, given that all data structures share the same storage (address) space, one should make sure that writes to one data structure cannot inadvertently overwrite entries of another data structure. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Avoid strict equality checks for the Ether balance in a contract. |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | When using *abi.encodePacked()*, it's crucial to ensure that a matching signature cannot be achieved using different parameters. Alternatively, you can simply use *abi.encode()* instead. It is also recommended to use replay protection. |
| | **Coding Hidden Dangers** | |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract. If a local variable is sufficient, mark it with *memory*, else *storage* upon declaration. As of compiler version 0.5.0 and higher this issue has been systematically resolved. |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | A possible way to remedy for race conditions in submission of information in exchange for a reward is called a commit reveal hash scheme. The best fix for the ERC20 race condition is to add a field to the inputs of approve which is the expected current value and to have approve revert or add a safe approve function. |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | *tx.origin* should not be used for authorization. Use *msg.sender* instead. |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract. To avoid them, only allow trusted users to relay transactions and require that the forwarder provides enough gas. |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | The use of assembly should be minimal. A developer should not allow a user to assign arbitrary values to function type variables. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | The weakness can be avoided by performing pre-condition checks on any math operation or using a vetted library for arithmetic calculations such as SafeMath developed by OpenZeppelin. |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | Remove all unused variables from the code base. |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | Avoid the use of *transfer()* and *send()* and do not otherwise specify a fixed amount of gas when performing calls. Use *.call.value(...)("")* instead. |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects | It's important to carefully ensure that your contract works as intended. Write unit tests to verify correct behaviour of the code. |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Any private data should either be stored off-chain, or carefully encrypted. |

## Appendix D – Related Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

The SWC Registry loosely aligned to the terminologies and structure used in the CWE while overlaying a wide range of weakness variants that are specific to smart contracts.

CWE IDs *, to which SWC Registry is related, are listed in the following table:

| CWE ID | Name | Related SWC IDs |
|---|---|---|
| **CWE-284** | **Improper Access Control** | SWC-105, SWC-106 |
| CWE-294 | Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | SWC-133 |
| **CWE-664** | **Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime** | SWC-103 |
| CWE-123 | Write-what-where Condition | SWC-124 |
| CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | SWC-128 |
| CWE-451 | User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | SWC-130 |
| CWE-665 | Improper Initialization | SWC-118, SWC-134 |
| CWE-767 | Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | SWC-136 |
| CWE-824 | Access of Uninitialized Pointer | SWC-109 |
| CWE-829 | Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | SWC-112, SWC-116 |
| **CWE-682** | **Incorrect Calculation** | SWC-101 |
| **CWE-691** | **Insufficient Control Flow Management** | SWC-126 |
| CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (“Race Condition”) | SWC-114 |
| CWE-480 | Use of Incorrect Operator | SWC-129 |
| CWE-667 | Improper Locking | SWC-132 |
| CWE-670 | Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | SWC-110 |
| CWE-696 | Incorrect Behavior Order | SWC-125 |
| CWE-841 | Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | SWC-107 |
| **CWE-693** | **Protection Mechanism Failure** | |

  

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-330 | Use of Insufficiently Random Values | SWC-120 |
| CWE-345 | Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | SWC-122 |
| CWE-347 | Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | SWC-117, SWC-121 |
| **CWE-703** | **Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions** | SWC-113 |
| CWE-252 | Unchecked Return Value | SWC-104 |
| **CWE-710** | **Improper Adherence to Coding Standards** | SWC-100, SWC-108, SWC-119 |
| CWE-477 | Use of Obsolete Function | SWC-111, SWC-115 |
| CWE-573 | Improper Following of Specification by Caller | SWC-123 |
| CWE-695 | Use of Low-Level Functionality | SWC-127 |
| CWE-1164 | Irrelevant Code | SWC-131, SWC-135 |
| **CWE-937** | **Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities** | SWC-102 |

** CWE IDs, which are presented in bold, are the greatest parent nodes of those nodes following it.*
*All IDs in the CWE list above are relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000), except for CWE-937, which is relevant to the "Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2013)" (CWE-928).*