

PUBLIC ACCESS

CYBERSECURITY AUDIT REPORT

Version v1.2

This document details the process and results of the smart contract audit performed by CyStack from 20/04/2022 to 23/04/2022.

Audited for

ONUS

Audited by

Vietnam CyStack Joint Stock Company

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Contents

1	Introduction	4
1.1	Audit Details	4
1.2	Audit Goals	8
1.3	Audit Methodology	8
1.4	Audit Scope	10
2	Executive Summary	11
3	Detailed Results	13
4	Conclusion	16
5	Appendices	17
	Appendix A – Security Issue Status Definitions	17
	Appendix B – Severity Explanation	18
	Appendix C – Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry)	19
	Appendix D – Related Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)	24

Disclaimer

Smart Contract Audit only provides findings and recommendations for an exact commitment of a smart contract codebase. The results, hence, are not guaranteed to be accurate outside of the commitment, or after any changes or modifications made to the codebase. The evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a comprehensive evaluation of all security controls, so this audit does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s). CyStack prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. We recommend ONUS conducting similar assessments on an annual basis by internal, third-party assessors, or a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s).

This security audit should never be used as an investment advice.

Version History

Version	Date	Release notes
1.0	25/04/2022	The first report was sent to the client. All findings were in the open status.
1.1	26/04/2022	All issues were accepted and completely resolved.
1.2	04/05/2022	ONUS allows to publish the report publicly.

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Introduction

From 20/04/2022 to 23/04/2022, ONUS engaged CyStack to evaluate the security posture of the ONUS Launchpad and Lazy Mint ERC1155. Our findings and recommendations are detailed here in this initial report.

1.1 Audit Details

Audit Target

ONUS, formerly known as VNDC Wallet, was first launched on March 23, 2020, on both Android & iOS. After 18 months of deployment and improvement, ONUS is now one of the most used cryptocurrency investment applications in Vietnam, and a complete ecosystem of investment products, including 04 main groups: Custodial, Investing, Earning, Borrowing.

The basic information of this project is detailed in the following table:

Item	Description
Project Name	ONUS Launchpad and Lazy Mint ERC1155
Issuer	ONUS
Website	https://goonus.io/
Platform	Binance Smart Contract
Language	Solidity
Codebase	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ONUS Launchpad: ONUS-launchpad-v2.sol• Token Test: TokenTest.sol• Lazy Mint ERC1155: LazyMintERC1155.sol• Lazy Mint ERC1155 Interface: ILazyMintERC1155.sol• WETH Interface: IWETH.sol
MD5 hash	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ONUS Launchpad: 4db8d4652e9bb719719cf962db058e42• Token Test: cb82e95ae3ae990da2a831a9fa1deea7• Lazy Mint ERC1155: 5464a586d23f68cff94ec8b9f4cedded• Lazy Mint ERC1155 Interface: 1ec6c79c6c484a385529209a50987ad5• WETH Interface: 148026c1608edb9be8766070f7e82954
Audit method	Whitebox


In the scope of this security assessment, CyStack evaluated the security posture of only two features: **ONUS Launchpad** and **Lazy Mint ERC1155**. Two main contracts were implemented in ONUS platform for these features:

- ONUS-launchpad-v2.sol;
- LazyMintERC1155.sol.


ONUS Launchpad provides the right to participate in other project's tokens by spending ONUS Tokens to gain access. With ONUS Launchpad, ONUS can open arbitrary token sale projects (*saleToken*). In order to join a project, users have to stake an certain amount of *stakeToken*. In order to register for purchasing tokens, users have to top up an amount of *currencyToken*. The more *currencyToken* is topped up, the more *saleToken* received. Users claim their token in stages, depending on each project declaration (TGE and the following stages). Only the contract owner can create new projects. Owner can define *saleToken*, *stakeToken*, *currencyToken*, the unit price for *saleToken*, minimum or maximum quantity that users can purchase, the due time and the amount of tokens that will be paid in TGE and other following stages.

Lazy Mint ERC1155 helps mint, transfer and burn ERC1155 tokens. There are three roles in this contract: `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE` and `TRANSFER_ROLE`. Only module admins (`DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`) can update mint conditions without resetting the restrictions, set mint conditions, set the default recipient of all primary sales, set the recipient of all primary sales for a given token ID, restrict token transfers, set a new owner for the contract (must be a module admin). Only `MINTER_ROLE` holders can lazy mint NFTs (i.e. can call functions prefixed with `lazyMint`). Only `TRANSFER_ROLE` holders can have tokens transferred from or to them, during restricted transfers. Token owners can burn the the tokens they own, either single or multiple of types.

The function calls in of ONUS Launchpad is illustrated in the following graph:



The function calls in of Lazy Mint ERC1155 is illustrated in the following graph:



Audit Service Provider

CyStack is a leading security company in Vietnam with the goal of building the next generation of cybersecurity solutions to protect businesses against threats from the Internet. CyStack is a member of Vietnam Information Security Association (VNISA) and Vietnam Alliance for Cybersecurity Products Development.

CyStack's researchers are known as regular speakers at well-known cybersecurity conferences such as BlackHat USA, BlackHat Asia, Xcon, T2FI, etc. and are talented bug hunters who discovered critical vulnerabilities in global products and acknowledged by their vendors.

1.2 Audit Goals

The focus of the audit was to verify that the smart contract system is secure, resilient and working according to its specifications. The audit activities can be grouped in the following three categories:

1. **Security:** Identifying security related issues within each contract and within the system of contracts.
2. **Sound Architecture:** Evaluation of the architecture of this system through the lens of established smart contract best practices and general software best practices.
3. **Code Correctness and Quality:** A full review of the contract source code. The primary areas of focus include:
 - Correctness
 - Readability
 - Sections of code with high complexity
 - Improving scalability
 - Quantity and quality of test coverage

1.3 Audit Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology:

- **Likelihood** represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- **Impact** measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- **Severity** demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: High, Medium and Low, i.e., H, M and L respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., Critical, Major, Medium, Minor and Informational (Info) as the table below:

Impact	High	Critical	Major	Medium
	Medium	Major	Medium	Minor
	Low	Medium	Minor	Informational
		High	Medium	Low
		Likelihood		

CyStack firstly analyses the smart contract with open-source and also our own security assessment tools to identify basic bugs related to general smart contracts. These tools include Slither, securify, Mythril, Sūrya, Solgraph, Truffle, Geth, Ganache, Mist, Metamask, solhint, mythx, etc. Then, our security specialists will verify the tool results manually, make a description and decide the severity for each of them.

After that, we go through a checklist of possible issues that could not be detected with automatic tools, conduct test cases for each and indicate the severity level for the results. If no issues are found after manual analysis, the contract can be considered safe within the test case. Else, if any issues are found, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. We would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation, if required or necessary.

The standard checklist, which applies for every SCA, strictly follows the Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry). SWC Registry is an implementation of the weakness classification scheme proposed in The Ethereum Improvement Proposal project under the code EIP-1470. The checklist of testing according to SWC Registry is shown in Appendix C.

In general, the auditing process focuses on detecting and verifying the existence of the following issues:

- **Coding Specification Issues:** Focusing on identifying coding bugs related to general smart contract coding conventions and practices.
- **Design Defect Issues:** Reviewing the architecture design of the smart contract(s) and working on test cases, such as self-DoS attacks, incorrect inheritance implementations, etc.
- **Coding Security Issues:** Finding common security issues of the smart contract(s), for example integer overflows, insufficient verification of authenticity, improper use of cryptographic signature, etc.
- **Coding Design Issues:** Testing the code logic and error handlings in the smart contract code base, such as initializing contract variables, controlling the balance and flows of token transfers, verifying strong randomness, etc.
- **Coding Hidden Dangers:** Working on special issues, such as data privacy, data reliability, gas consumption optimization, special cases of authentication and owner permission, fallback functions, etc.

For better understanding of found issues' details and severity, each SWC ID is mapped to the most closely related Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID. CWE is a category system for software weaknesses and vulnerabilities to help identify weaknesses surrounding software jargon. The list in Appendix D provides an overview on specific similar software bugs that occur in Smart Contract coding.

The final report will be sent to the smart contract issuer with an executive summary for overview and detailed results for acts of remediation.



1.4 Audit Scope

Assessment	Target	Type
Original target		
White-box testing	ONUS-launchpad-v2.sol (MD5: 4db8d4652e9bb719719cf962db058e42)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	TokenTest.sol (MD5: cb82e95ae3ae990da2a831a9fa1deea7)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	LazyMintERC1155.sol (MD5: 5464a586d23f68cff94ec8b9f4cedded)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	ILazyMintERC1155.sol (MD5: 1ec6c79c6c484a385529209a50987ad5)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	IWETH.sol (MD5: 148026c1608edb9be8766070f7e82954)	Solidity code file
Last revision		
White-box testing	ONUS-launchpad-v2.sol (MD5: 1f3b18aef8c14a3763dabf267125b6ac)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	TokenTest.sol (MD5: cb82e95ae3ae990da2a831a9fa1deea7)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	LazyMintERC1155.sol (MD5: 5464a586d23f68cff94ec8b9f4cedded)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	ILazyMintERC1155.sol (MD5: 1d9ebaf6ab51b4e065bda10e995a93be)	Solidity code file
White-box testing	IWETH.sol (MD5: 148026c1608edb9be8766070f7e82954)	Solidity code file

Executive Summary

Security issues by severity

Legend



Security issues by SWC

Function Default Visibility (SWC-100)	1	■
State Variable Default Visibility (SWC-108)	1	■
Requirement Violation (SWC-123)	1	■

Security issues by CWE

Improper Following of Specification by Caller (CWE-573)	1	■
Improper Adherence to Coding Standards (CWE-710)	2	■ ■

Table of security issues

ID	Status	Vulnerability	Severity
#onus-001	Resolved	Code optimization	INFO
#onus-002	Resolved	Inefficient function declaration	INFO
#onus-003	Resolved	Missing zero address validation	INFO

Recommendations

Based on the results of this smart contract audit, CyStack has the following high-level key recommendations:

Key recommendations	
Issues	CyStack had completed the smart contract audit for ONUS Launchpad and Lazy Mint ERC1155. Only 3 informational issues were found. All issues were addressed immediately by ONUS.
Recommendations	CyStack recommends ONUS to evaluate the audit results with several different security audit third-parties for the most accurate conclusion.
References	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/known_attacks• https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/recommendations/• https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/ethereum-smart-contract-audit-checklist-ba9d1159b901

Detailed Results

1. Code optimization

Issue ID	#onus-001
Category	SWC-108 - State Variable Default Visibility
Description	In functions <i>deposit</i> , <i>withdraw</i> , <i>claimTGE</i> , <i>claimStage</i> and <i>setTGE</i> , the struct <i>Project</i> is called to multiple times by mapping with <i>projectAtId</i> . This might raise the gas consumption when any of these functions is called to.
Severity	INFO
Location(s)	ONUS-launchpad-v2.sol: 133-163, 165-192, 202-245, 248-280, 297-319
Status	Resolved
Reference	CWE-710 - Improper Adherence to Coding Standard
Remediation	Optimize gas consumption by declare a memory Project variable at the beginning of the function, then use this variable instead. This variable should be used only for any statements that get data, and should not use for statements that update existed data.

Description

An example of using a memory Project variable named **project_detail** in the function **deposit**:

```
...
133     function deposit(uint256 _projectId, uint256 _amount) external nonReentrant {
134         Project memory project_detail = projectAtId[_projectId];
135         require(
136             block.timestamp >= project_detail.depositCondition.startTimestampDeposit,
137             "Deposit time does not start"
138         );
139         require(
140             block.timestamp <= project_detail.depositCondition.endTimestampDeposit,
141             "Deposit time is ended"
142         );
143         require(
144             userStakeRequirementAtId[_projectId][msg.sender]
145             >=project_detail.minStakedToken,
146             "Staked token amount do not meet requirement"
147         );
148         require(
```

```

149         _amount.add(userDepositAtId[_projectId][msg.sender]) >=
            ↪ project_detail.minCurrencyPerUser,
150         "User amount below minimum"
151     );
152     require(
153         _amount.add(userDepositAtId[_projectId][msg.sender]) <=
            ↪ project_detail.maxCurrencyPerUser,
154         "User amount above maximum"
155     );
156
157     if (_amount > 0) {
158         userDepositAtId[_projectId][msg.sender] += _amount;
159         project_detail.currencyToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),
            ↪ address(this), _amount);
160         projectAtId[_projectId].totalUserDeposit += _amount;
161     }
162
163     emit Deposit(_projectId, msg.sender, _amount);
164 ... }
165
166

```

2. Ineffiecient function declaration

Issue ID	#onus-002
Category	SWC-100 - Function Default Visibility
Description	<i>public</i> functions that are never called by the contract should be declared <i>external</i> to save gas.
Severity	INFO
Location(s)	LazyMintERC1155.sol: 452-463, 466-477
Status	Resolved
Reference	CWE-710 - Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
Remediation	<p>Declare the following functions as <i>external</i> to improve the codebase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LazyMintERC1155.burn(address,uint256,uint256) • LazyMintERC1155.burnBatch(address,uint256[],uint256[])

3. Missing zero address validation

Issue ID	#onus-003
Category	SWC-123 - Requirement Violation
Description	In the function <i>LazyMintERC1155.setDefaultSaleRecipient(address),</i> <i>_saleRecipient</i> is not validated. A recipient address cannot be zero address.
Severity	INFO
Location(s)	LazyMintERC1155: 202
Status	Resolved
Reference	CWE-573 - Improper Following of Specification by Caller
Remediation	Check the value of <i>_saleRecipient</i> before performing any operations.

Description

The codelines where the issue occurs:

```
...
201     function setDefaultSaleRecipient(address _saleRecipient) external onlyModuleAdmin
        ↪ {
202         defaultSaleRecipient = _saleRecipient;
203         emit NewSaleRecipient(_saleRecipient, type(uint256).max, true);
204     }
...
```

The codebase can be improved as following:

```
...
201     function setDefaultSaleRecipient(address _saleRecipient) external onlyModuleAdmin
        ↪ {
202         require(_saleRecipient != address(0), "Recipient address cannot be
        ↪ address(0).")
203         defaultSaleRecipient = _saleRecipient;
204         emit NewSaleRecipient(_saleRecipient, type(uint256).max, true);
205     }
...
```


Conclusion

CyStack had conducted a security audit for ONUS's smart contracts. Total 3 issues were found, but none of these issues represented actual bugs or security problems. After a re-test on the new codebase for ONUS's smart contracts, CyStack confirmed that all accepted issues were resolved. No new issues were found for the additional functions in the smart contracts. Overall, the audited smart contracts have included the best practices for smart contract development and has passed our security assessment for smart contracts.

To improve the quality for this report, and for CyStack's Smart Contract Audit report in general, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedback or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

Appendices

Appendix A - Security Issue Status Definitions

Status	Definition
Open	The issue has been reported and currently being review by the smart contract developers/issuer.
Unresolved	The issue is acknowledged and planned to be addressed in future. At the time of the corresponding report version, the issue has not been fixed.
Resolved	The issue is acknowledged and has been fully fixed by the smart contract developers/issuer.
Rejected	The issue is considered to have no security implications or to make only little security impacts, so it is not planned to be addressed and won't be fixed.

Appendix B - Severity Explanation

Severity	Definition
CRITICAL	<p>Issues, considered as critical, are straightforwardly exploitable bugs and security vulnerabilities.</p> <p>It is advised to immediately resolve these issues in order to prevent major problems or a full failure during contract system operation.</p>
MAJOR	<p>Major issues are bugs and vulnerabilities, which cannot be exploited directly without certain conditions.</p> <p>It is advised to patch the codebase of the smart contract as soon as possible, since these issues, with a high degree of probability, can cause certain problems for operation of the smart contract or severe security impacts on the system in some way.</p>
MEDIUM	<p>In terms of medium issues, bugs and vulnerabilities exist but cannot be exploited without extra steps such as social engineering.</p> <p>It is advised to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority issues have been resolved.</p>
MINOR	<p>Minor issues are generally objective in nature but do not represent actual bugs or security problems.</p> <p>It is advised to address these issues, unless there is a clear reason not to.</p>
INFO	<p>Issues, regarded as informational (info), possibly relate to "guides for the best practices" or "readability". Generally, these issues are not actual bugs or vulnerabilities. It is recommended to address these issues, if it makes effective and secure improvements to the smart contract codebase.</p>

Appendix C - Smart Contract Weakness Classification Registry (SWC Registry)

ID	Name	Description
	Coding Specification Issues	
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	It is recommended to make a conscious decision on which visibility type (<i>external</i> , <i>public</i> , <i>internal</i> or <i>private</i>) is appropriate for a function. By default, functions without concrete specifiers are <i>public</i> .
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler to avoid publicly disclosed bugs and issues in outdated versions.
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	It is recommended to lock the pragma to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using a vulnerable version.
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Variables can be specified as being <i>public</i> , <i>internal</i> or <i>private</i> . Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Solidity provides alternatives to the deprecated constructions, the use of which might reduce code quality. Most of them are aliases, thus replacing old constructions will not break current behavior.
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	It is therefore recommended to upgrade the contract to a recent version of the Solidity compiler and change to the new constructor declaration (the keyword <i>constructor</i>).
	Design Defect Issues	
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	External calls can fail accidentally or deliberately, which can cause a DoS condition in the contract. It is better to isolate each external call into its own transaction and implement the contract logic to handle failed calls.

SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Review storage variable layouts for your contract systems carefully and remove any ambiguities. Always check for compiler warnings as they can flag the issue within a single contract.
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	When inheriting multiple contracts, especially if they have identical functions, a developer should carefully specify inheritance in the correct order (from more /general/ to more /specific/).
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Modifying an array of unknown size, that increases in size over time, can lead to such a Denial of Service condition. Actions that require looping across the entire data structure should be avoided.
	Coding Security Issues	
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	It is recommended to use safe math libraries for arithmetic operations throughout the smart contract system to avoid integer overflows and underflows.
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Make sure all internal state changes are performed before the call is executed or use a reentrancy lock.
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Use <i>delegatecall</i> with caution and make sure to never call into untrusted contracts. If the target address is derived from user input ensure to check it against a whitelist of trusted contracts.
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	A signature should never be included into a signed message hash to check if previously messages have been processed by the contract.
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	In order to protect against signature replay attacks, store every message hash that has been processed by the smart contract, include the address of the contract that processes the message and never generate the message hash including the signature.
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	It is not recommended to use alternate verification schemes that do not require proper signature verification through <i>ecrecover()</i> .

SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	The character <i>U+202E</i> should not appear in the source code of a smart contract.
	Coding Design Issues	
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	If you choose to use low-level call methods (e.g. <i>call()</i>), make sure to handle the possibility that the call fails by checking the return value.
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Implement controls so withdrawals can only be triggered by authorized parties or according to the specs of the smart contract system.
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Consider removing the self-destruct functionality. If absolutely required, it is recommended to implement a multisig scheme so that multiple parties must approve the self-destruct action.
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Consider whether the condition checked in the <i>assert()</i> is actually an invariant. If not, replace the <i>assert()</i> statement with a <i>require()</i> statement.
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Developers should write smart contracts with the notion that block values are not precise, and the use of them can lead to unexpected effects. Alternatively, they may make use oracles.
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	To avoid weak sources of randomness, use commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO, external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize, or Bitcoin block hashes.
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	If the required logical condition is too strong, it should be weakened to allow all valid external inputs. Otherwise, make sure no invalid inputs are provided.
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	As a general advice, given that all data structures share the same storage (address) space, one should make sure that writes to one data structure cannot inadvertently overwrite entries of another data structure.

SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Avoid strict equality checks for the Ether balance in a contract.
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	When using <code>abi.encodePacked()</code> , it's crucial to ensure that a matching signature cannot be achieved using different parameters. Alternatively, you can simply use <code>abi.encode()</code> instead. It is also recommended to use replay protection.
	Coding Hidden Dangers	
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to unexpected storage locations in the contract. If a local variable is sufficient, mark it with <i>memory</i> , else <i>storage</i> upon declaration. As of compiler version 0.5.0 and higher this issue has been systematically resolved.
SWC-114	Transaction Dependence Order	A possible way to remedy for race conditions in submission of information in exchange for a reward is called a commit reveal hash scheme. The best fix for the ERC20 race condition is to add a field to the inputs of <code>approve</code> which is the expected current value and to have <code>approve revert</code> or add a safe <code>approve</code> function.
SWC-115	Authorization through <code>tx.origin</code>	<code>tx.origin</code> should not be used for authorization. Use <code>msg.sender</code> instead.
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Insufficient gas griefing attacks can be performed on contracts which accept data and use it in a sub-call on another contract. To avoid them, only allow trusted users to relay transactions and require that the forwarder provides enough gas.
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	The use of assembly should be minimal. A developer should not allow a user to assign arbitrary values to function type variables.

SWC-129	Typographical Error	The weakness can be avoided by performing pre-condition checks on any math operation or using a vetted library for arithmetic calculations such as SafeMath developed by OpenZeppelin.
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Remove all unused variables from the code base.
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Avoid the use of <i>transfer()</i> and <i>send()</i> and do not otherwise specify a fixed amount of gas when performing calls. Use <i>.call.value(...)(<i>""</i>)</i> instead.
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	It's important to carefully ensure that your contract works as intended. Write unit tests to verify correct behaviour of the code.
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Any private data should either be stored off-chain, or carefully encrypted.

Appendix D - Related Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

The SWC Registry loosely aligned to the terminologies and structure used in the CWE while overlaying a wide range of weakness variants that are specific to smart contracts.

CWE IDs *, to which SWC Registry is related, are listed in the following table:

CWE ID	Name	Related SWC IDs
CWE-284	Improper Access Control	SWC-105, SWC-106
CWE-294	Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	SWC-133
CWE-664	Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	SWC-103
CWE-123	Write-what-where Condition	SWC-124
CWE-400	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	SWC-128
CWE-451	User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	SWC-130
CWE-665	Improper Initialization	SWC-118, SWC-134
CWE-767	Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	SWC-136
CWE-824	Access of Uninitialized Pointer	SWC-109
CWE-829	Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	SWC-112, SWC-116
CWE-682	Incorrect Calculation	SWC-101
CWE-691	Insufficient Control Flow Management	SWC-126
CWE-362	Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ("Race Condition")	SWC-114
CWE-480	Use of Incorrect Operator	SWC-129
CWE-667	Improper Locking	SWC-132
CWE-670	Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	SWC-110
CWE-696	Incorrect Behavior Order	SWC-125
CWE-841	Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	SWC-107
CWE-693	Protection Mechanism Failure	

CWE-330	Use of Insufficiently Random Values	SWC-120
CWE-345	Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	SWC-122
CWE-347	Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	SWC-117, SWC-121
CWE-703	Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	SWC-113
CWE-252	Unchecked Return Value	SWC-104
CWE-710	Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	SWC-100, SWC-108, SWC-119
CWE-477	Use of Obsolete Function	SWC-111, SWC-115
CWE-573	Improper Following of Specification by Caller	SWC-123
CWE-695	Use of Low-Level Functionality	SWC-127
CWE-1164	Irrelevant Code	SWC-131, SWC-135
CWE-937	Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	SWC-102

* CWE IDs, which are presented in bold, are the greatest parent nodes of those nodes following it.

All IDs in the CWE list above are relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000), except for CWE-937, which is relevant to the "Weaknesses in OWASP Top Ten (2013)" (CWE-928).