



BECOMING A DARK KNIGHT

ADVERSARY EMULATION DEMONSTRATION FOR ATT&CK EVALUATIONS

Cat Self

Principal Adversary Emulation Engineer

Kate Esprit

Senior Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst



CAT SELF

- ▶ Artist
- ▶ Military Intelligence Veteran
- ▶ Dev, Red Teamer, Threat Hunter @ Target
- ▶ Now Principal Adversary Engineer & Lead macOS & Linux **ATT&CK** @MITRE



KATE ESPRIT

- ▶ Embedded Intel Analyst @ Meta
- ▶ Latin America SME
- ▶ Cyber Blogger @ Phishing for Answers
- ▶ Senior CTI Analyst @ MITRE

EMULATION VS. SIMULATION



Source: Alpha Coders ([Alpha Coders](#))

Cat [@coolestcatiknow](#)

Kate [@phish4answers](#)

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

WHAT IS MITRE ATT&CK?

- ▶ A knowledge base of adversary behavior
- ▶ Based on real-world observations
- ▶ Free, open, and globally accessible
- ▶ A common language
- ▶ Community-driven

WHAT IS ATT&CK EVALUATIONS?

- ▶ Based on MITRE ATT&CK®
- ▶ Detections/Protections products OR Managed Services-focused
- ▶ **Empower** end-users, our community
- ▶ **Provide Transparency** around the true capabilities
- ▶ **Drive** the cybersecurity vendor community forward for *baseline* offerings


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WHAT MAKES A GOOD VILLAIN?

First, **establish** the end goals of the emulation.

Next, **determine** your villains...

- ▶ Is there sufficient, recent CTI reporting?
- ▶ Are the TTPs relevant to the emulation objectives?
- ▶ Is there enough variety of TTPs to create multiple emulation plans?
- ▶ What is unique about this villain?

OUR VILLAIN: BLIND EAGLE (AKA APT-C-36)

Key considerations

- ▶ Based in Latin America - Targets: Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Spain
- ▶ “Straightforward” but highly relevant TTPs
- ▶ Dev feasibility

TTPs of interest

- ▶ Domain fronting
- ▶ Process hollowing
- ▶ Abuse of legitimate Windows utilities



Source: Digital Arts by Albertbs ([Artmajeur](#))

EVALUATING CTI REPORTS


EXPLICIT: "THE GOOD"

- ▶ Code/scripts
- ▶ C2 communication analysis
- ▶ Other artifacts (file paths, registry keys, etc.)

IMPLICIT: "THE GREAT"

- ▶ Lateral Movement
- ▶ Adversary actions on objectives
- ▶ Environment details

EXAMPLE REPORTS – EXPLICIT EVIDENCE



EXAMPLE REPORTS – IMPLICIT EVIDENCE

[Check Point Research \(5 Jan 2023\)](#)

```

▲ { } xClient.Core.Commands
  ▲ CommandHandler @020000DA
    ▶ Base Type and Interfaces
    ▶ Derived Types
    ▶ .cctor() : void @0600063C
      ▶ CaptionVIEW() : void @06000615
      ▶ CarpChrome() : string @06000629
      ▶ cIE() : void @06000626
      ▶ CloseShell() : void @0600063B
      ▶ cmd(string, string) : void @06000624
      ▶ cmd2(string, string) : void @06000625
      ▶ CopyDirectory(DirectoryInfo, DirectoryInfo) : void @06000627
      ▶ CreateShortcut(string, string, string, string) : void @06000628
  
```

Some extra features added to Quasar by this group are a function named "ActivarRDP" (activate RDP) and two more to activate and deactivate the system Proxy:

[Check Point Research \(5 Jan 2023\)](#)

```

ic static void ActivarRDP()

Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp").SetValue("UserAuthentication", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa").SetValue("LimitBlankPasswordUse", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server").SetValue("fSingleSessionPerUser", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp").SetValue("SecurityLayer", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe").SetValue("Debugger", "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe",
  
```



CTI DELIVERABLES

Emulation Plan

- Step-by-step plan with cited research

Software Flow Diagram

- Technical Diagram used by devs & Infrastructure team

Attacker Lifecycle Diagram

- Provide pivot points for development team

EMULATION PLAN

Steps	User Story	Software/Infrastructure	Key Reporting
1 – Initial Compromise	Blind Eagle gains an initial foothold into the victim's system via spearphishing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Browser-based Outlook instance • Adobe Acrobat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BlackBerry (2023) • Check Point (2023) • QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center (2019)
2- Establish Foothold	The user clicks a link in the PDF, is redirected to a malicious site, and downloads AsyncRAT.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • WinRAR • wscript.exe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SCI Labs (2022) • BlackBerry (2023) • Check Point (2023) • Lab52 (2023)
3 – C2 Communication	AsyncRAT communicates with the C2 over port 1523 via RSA cryptography.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • C2 server 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lab52 (2020) • GitHub – AsyncRAT • SCI Labs (2022) • BlackBerry (2023) • Lab52 (2023)
4 – Privilege Escalation	The attackers use AsyncRAT to create a Windows registry key and temporary .bat file.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat Mon (2023) • DCiber (2022) • BlackBerry (2023) • SCI Labs (2022)
5 – Actions on Objectives	Blind Eagle steals browser cookies and intercepts access to online banking portals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • Chrome Browser 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DCiber (2023) • Check Point (2023) • QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center (2019)

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SOFTWARE FLOW

Big Bad World



Company Network



1



Windows 10 Workstation

User Privileges: Non-admin


Initial Access: Spearphishing




Blind Eagle C2 Server

What's happening under this monitor?

ATTACKER LIFECYCLE



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IN THE BEGINNING...


- ▶ Programming language used
- ▶ Operating System
- ▶ Level of technical difficulty
- ▶ Timeline to develop... timeline to debug
- ▶ What does "done" look like?
- ▶ Building the team




TRANSLATION FROM TEXT TO DEV REQUIREMENTS

Steps	User Story	Software/Infrastructure	
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3 – C2 Communication	AsyncRAT communicates with the C2 over port 1523 via RSA cryptography.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • C2 server 	
4 – Privilege Escalation	The attackers use AsyncRAT to create a Windows registry key and temporary .bat file.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) 	
5 – Actions on Objectives	Blind Eagle steals browser cookies and intercepts access to online banking portals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • Chrome Browser 	<p>What involves other teams?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Detective mode: Look for gaps in the user story ▶ Infrastructure requirements (i.e. email server) ▶ Utilities (licenses needed) ▶ Software dependencies

TRANSLATE CTI TO JIRA – A MALWARE DEVELOPERS GUIDE TO...




BREAKING DOWN EACH STEP AKA RABBIT HOLE PROCESS



EXAMPLE: BLIND EAGLE PROCESS HOLLOWING

Our lil Jira Story

PROCESS HOLLOWING

Step 2 - Infection 	<p>Once the user manually executes the VBScript, a series of automatic actions will occur. Specifically, the infection chain executes the following process tree:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. WScript.exe > powershell.exe 2. powershell.exe > Conhost.exe 3. powershell.exe > Conhost.exe > RegSvcs.exe <p>The final payload masquerades as powershell.exe. Next, the adversary will use</p>	<p>System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm (T1218.009)</p> <p>Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)</p> <p>Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)</p> <p>Process Injection: Process Hollowing (T1055.012)</p> <p>Proxy: Domain Fronting (T1090.004)</p> <p>Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • Powershell • Visual Basic • Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) • Windows .NET Services Installation Tool (RegSvcs.exe) • Fsociety.dll (or equivalent) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BlackBerry - Feb 2023 • DCiber - Jun 2022 - "Analizando AsyncRAT distribuído na Colômbia" • Lab52 - Mar 2023 - "APT-C-36: from NjRAT to LimeRAT" • EcuCERT - 2022 - "Campaña de Amenaza Avanzada Persistente APT-C-36 podría estar presente en Ecuador" • GitHub - AsyncRAT
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Actively read the reports:

Outline - Compare - Repeat

EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING - UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNIQUE

General Understanding

The screenshot shows the MITRE ATT&CK website. The top navigation bar has 'MITRE | ATT&CK' on the left and a menu icon on the right. Below it, a secondary navigation bar has 'TECHNIQUES' on the left and a three-line menu icon on the right. The main content area shows a breadcrumb trail: Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Process Injection > Process Hollowing. The title 'Process Injection: Process Hollowing' is displayed. A dropdown menu titled 'Other sub-techniques of Process Injection (12)' is open. Below the title, a paragraph explains that adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes to evade defenses. It notes that process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. A smaller text block at the bottom states that process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its

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A Common Method


Step 1:- Create a new target process in suspended state by passing Create_Suspended value in dwCreateSuspended parameter of **CreateProcess** Windows API.

Step 2 :- Once the process is created in suspended state, it won't have any executable section. It won't be bound to any page table entries. We can map executable pages using **ZwCreateSection** function.

Step 3 :- We need to locate the base address of the target process by querying the target process using **ZwQueryInformationProcess** function. Once we find the address of the process environment block, we can use **ReadProcessMemory** function to read the target process environment block and **WriteProcessMemory** function to write our own environment block.

[3xpl01tc0d3r Process Injection - Part II](#)

EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING – WHAT THE RABBIT HOLE LOOKS LIKE



EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING – FINDING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES



- ▶ Fsociety.dll referenced as Process Hollowing (BlackBerry, Lab52)

	02/12/22	05/12/22	23/01/23	02/02/23	20/02/23	
Stage 1	WSF	-	DOCX	.UUE		
Stage 2	VBS					
Stage 3	Fiber.dll					
Stage 4	Rump.xls (Fsociety.dll)					
Stage 5	NjRAT		AsyncRAT			

FILEHASH - SHA256
03b7d19202f596fe4dc556b7da818f0f76195912e29d728b14863dda7... [Add to Pulse](#)

has_pdb This executable has a PDB path Low

Decompiled Code

```

1047 namespace Fsociety
1048 {
1049     // Token: 0x020000A RID: 10
1050     public class Tools
1051     {
1052         // Token: 0x0600002A RID: 42
1053         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1054         // Starts process
1055         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, EntryPoint = "CreateProcess")]
1056         private static extern bool CreateProcess_API(string applicationName, string commandLine, IntPtr processAttributes, IntPtr
1057 threadAttributes, bool inheritHandles, uint creationFlags, IntPtr environment, string currentDirectory, ref Tools.STARTUP_INFORM
1058 startupInfo, ref Tools.PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation);

1059         // Token: 0x0600002B RID: 43
1060         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1061         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "GetThreadContext")]
1062         private static extern bool GetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);

1063         // Token: 0x0600002C RID: 44
1064         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1065         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "Wow64GetThreadContext")]
1066         private static extern bool Wow64GetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);

1067         // Token: 0x0600002D RID: 45
1068         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1069         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "SetThreadContext")]
1070         private static extern bool SetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);
1071

```



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EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING - FOLLOWING THE THREAD



Pinned

AsyncRAT-C-Sharp Public
Open-Source Remote Administration Tool For Windows C# (RAT)
C# 1.8k 666

Lime-Crypter Public
Simple File Encryption Tool
C# 401 194


master Lime-Crypter / Lime-Crypter / Resources / Stub.cs

Code Blame 371 lines (343 loc) 10 KB

```
227     private static bool HandleRun(string path, byte[] data, bool protect)
}
private static bool HandleRun(string path, byte[] data, bool protect)
{
    int readWrite = 0;
    string quotedPath = "#cmd";
```

```
// Token: 0x06000079 RID: 53 RVA: 0x00002444 File
private static bool HandleRun(object path, object data, object protect)
{
    int num = 1;
    int num2 = num;
    checked
    {
        bool result;
```

Decompiled Code

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COMMUNITY (ONE COMMON METHOD)

- ▶ Use ZwQueryInformationProcess function
- ▶ Read the process base address (peb) from the struct of the target process
- ▶ Unmap -> remap their payload
- ▶ Stomp on the code of the current running process (aka no unmapping)

VILLAIN

- ▶ Uses the ReadProcessMemory function
- ▶ + getThreadContext - array containing the ebx base pointer
- ▶ + 8 == base address of the victim process
- ▶ Unmap -> remap their payload
- ▶ Kindly removes the current running code.



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EMULATING PERSISTENCE

- ▶ Fun fact: Blind Eagle never loads the Async RAT to disk.
- ▶ Since Async RAT is never downloaded to disk, the “installed” service loads the legitimate RegSvcs.exe


```
AsyncRAT Ports: 1543
AsyncRAT Hosts: asy1543.duckdns.org
AsyncRAT Version: 0.5.7B
AsyncRAT Install: false
AsyncRAT MTX: AsyncRATex_6SI80kPnk
AsyncRAT Anti: false
AsyncRAT Pastebin: null
AsyncRAT BDOS: false
AsyncRAT Group: New25
:
```



[BlackBerry \(27 Feb 2023\)](#)

No schedule task or registry entry

EMULATING PERSISTENCE



Disclaimer: Using our code as an example because their code is .net style obfuscated....AKA 2k lines of case statements

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ADDRESSING GAPS IN REPORTING

ATT&CK EVALUATIONS

Is the proposed alternative represented in ATT&CK?

Review other campaigns from the same villain?

Open-source frameworks used by villain?

CTI team gets final say

Common practices


Pull a sample and analyze from [VXUnderground](#)

Pull a sample and analyze from [Alien Vault](#)

Pull a sample and analyze from Twitter

Pull a sample and analyze from [MalwareBazaar](#)

ATTACKER LIFECYCLE



LESSONS LEARNED

- ▶ Early collaboration across the teams when developing the emulation plan
- ▶ Prototype range - for testing the scenario from end2end
- ▶ Creating tests provides quicker trouble shooting
- ▶ Robust logging capabilities - especially when working in memory



RED DEV DELIVERABLES


Emulation Plan

- Operator & Setting up Env Instructions
- Commands to run the Emulation Plan
- Embedded References: CTI & Coding references

Source Code

- Organized for scale & repeatability
- In-line MITRE ATT&CK documentation inside source code for Blue-team

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
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KEY TAKEAWAYS

- ▶ Provide transparency into our emulation development process
- ▶ Provide our solution for CTI & Red Development collaboration
- ▶ Lower the bar of entry to learning how to build emulation plans
- ▶ Public Release: Blind Eagle scenario coming soon!

Q&A

THIS PRESENTATION IS BROUGHT TO YOU BY...

Thank you!

Ashwin
Radhakrishnan

Molly & Justin



Thank you!

Cory
Goodspeed

MANAGED SERVICES

ATT&CK
EVALUATIONS

CFP Closes 18 August 2023

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