



# Secure Sockets

## Part 3 – Certificates

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# Part 3 – Certificates

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- ▶ Certificate Authority
- ▶ Certificate Chain
- ▶ Certificate Types
- ▶ Certificate Revocation
  - OCSP



# Authentication by Certificates

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
## Public Key Infrastructure

- Client
- Server
- Certificate Authority



# Certificate Authority – CA


- ▶ Anchor of trust between clients and servers
- ▶ Five companies manage majority of Internet certificates
- ▶ Their public keys are in the browsers' code
  - Certmgr.msc
- ▶ Look for Root CA's in your PC's table
  - “Friendly name” field
  - Who signs the root CAs certificates?



# Certificate Signing Request

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
- ▶ Server sends a CSR to the CA:
  - Server’s domain name (“common name”)
  - The public key of the domain
  - Hash of the CSR, signed with the domain’s private key



# Certificate

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- ▶ The CA responds with a certificate:
  - Server's domain name
  - Server's public key
  - Digital signature- hash with the CA's private key
- ▶ Browsers have the CA public key pre-installed, so the digital signature can be verified



# Certificate Types


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- ▶ DV- Domain Validation
  - Approves the domain name belongs to the certificate holder
- ▶ OV - Organization Validation
  - Approves the certificate holder is a real institute. Tax records, company records
- ▶ EV – Extended Validation
  - Approves the certificate holder has physical offices, company history
  - Not an attempt of an internal employee to conduct fraud

# Certificate Chain

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- ▶ If the CA's private key is detected, a browser software update is required.
- ▶ We would like the CA to sign as little as possible.
- ▶ We will create an "intermediary" – Intermediate CA.
  - The ICA will receive a signature from the Root CA,
  - The ICA will sign the Certificates itself,
- ▶ If the ICA key is discovered, it will be replaced and receive a new certificate.



# Certificate Chain- cont.

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- ▶ Problem – anyone with a certificate, can start signing certificates
- ▶ Solution:
  - Authorization as signing authority is part of the certificate
  - If a signing authority is credited, decreasing level counter is included

Server	Signing Authority	Level Counter
Root CA	Yes	1
ICA	Yes	0
Example.com	No	-

# Certificate Authority Authorization

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- ▶ How can we prevent an imposter from getting a real certificate from an ICA to our domain?
- ▶ Solution – CAA record in the DNS
  - Linux (or WSL on Windows): *dig domain caa*

# Viewing a Certificate

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## ▶ WSL

- `openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 | openssl x509 -text -noout`

## ▶ Browser

## ▶ RSA reminder:

- $\text{Cipher} = (\text{Plain}^E \bmod N)$
- $\text{Plain} = (\text{Cipher}^D \bmod N)$
- The other side is given:
  - N (“Modulus”)
  - E (“Exponent”)
  - To find the private key, N must be decomposed to PxQ

$$P = 17$$

$$Q = 23$$

$$N = 391 \quad (P \times Q)$$

$$T = 352 \quad (P-1)(Q-1)$$

$$E = 113 \quad (\text{Public})$$

$$D = 81 \quad (\text{Private})$$


```
guys@LAPTOP-SFOC9S2J:~ x + v
guys@LAPTOP-SFOC9S2J:~$ openssl s_client -connect jct.ac.il:443 | openssl x509 -text -noout
depth=2 C = US, O = Internet Security Research Group, CN = ISRG Root X1
verify return:1
depth=1 C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = jct.ac.il
verify return:1
Certificate:
Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
        03:d1:d7:a8:29:d4:6a:f8:8d:01:64:ee:08:81:54:ec:c6:63
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
    Validity
        Not Before: Oct  9 16:37:17 2023 GMT
        Not After : Jan  7 16:37:16 2024 GMT
    Subject: CN = jct.ac.il
    Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
        Public-Key: (2048 bit)
            Modulus:
                00:a2:40:04:d5:d4:bb:e6:96:95:ba:ae:e8:9d:96:
                b5:10:1e:2b:d3:9a:f1:46:d1:37:c2:de:5d:a1:cd:
                9c:d4:1d:ba:e1:04:18:de:93:36:5b:ef:27:7d:90:
                26:98:0f:63:e5:f3:ad:dc:9b:77:b6:4a:05:04:77:
                a9:6a:09:6e:7e:5b:b5:2b:95:7c:94:1f:a6:5d:55:
                8f:a3:d6:35:b0:3d:fd:65:be:b3:a5:b8:48:17:47:
                18:d3:55:01:e6:31:10:ae:91:88:60:87:4d:2b:d8:
                ee:be:75:74:b4:37:b8:71:75:b5:52:92:31:48:d3:
                61:7a:ca:77:26:34:e4:c8:2b:38:84:97:e0:37:cb:
                1a:32:10:f8:30:99:56:f2:99:a3:9f:66:ed:d3:7a:
                0c:8d:ea:82:6e:6f:79:39:2b:34:86:88:4f:14:ab:
                17:84:32:2b:79:db:88:84:8b:5f:3a:f6:c9:3a:ef:
                12:cd:35:9f:59:88:15:6e:37:ad:d3:0e:e8:a5:20:
                d6:f4:5f:f0:3f:93:07:06:10:e1:16:6b:b3:c5:fb:
                56:7f:5c:14:03:24:a6:15:be:d7:1f:4d:f7:57:e8:
                7b:9f:c9:7e:39:34:21:26:41:7b:f5:67:f8:6b:d0:
                7b:0e:e6:1e:b8:97:0a:95:3f:92:a1:19:5d:69:28:
                0e:2b
            Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
```

# Certificate Revocation Status

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- ▶ Certificates might need to be revoked
  - Private key compromised or domain closed
- ▶ How can one tell if a certificate is valid?
  - CRL – Certificate Revocation List
  - OCSP – Online Certificate Status Protocol
  - OCSP Stapling

# Certificate Revocation Status



# CRL

Certificate Viewer: twitter.com

General Details

Certificate Hierarchy

- DigiCert Global Root G2
  - DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1
    - twitter.com

Certificate Fields

- Authority Information Access
- Certificate Basic Constraints
- Signed Certificate Timestamp List
- Certificate Signature Algorithm
- Certificate Signature Value
- SHA-256 Fingerprints
  - Certificate
  - Public Key

Field Value

Not Critical

URI: <http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertGlobalG2TLSRSASHA2562020CA1-1.crl>  
URI: <http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertGlobalG2TLSRSASHA2562020CA1-1.crl>

Export...

Certificate Revocation List

General Revocation List

**Certificate Revocation List Information**

Field	Value
Version	V2
Issuer	DigiCert Global G2 TLS RSA SHA25...
Effective date	Sunday, 4 February 2024 09:46:54
Next update	Sunday, 11 February 2024 09:46:54
Signature algorithm	sha256RSA
Signature hash alg...	sha256
Authority Key Iden...	KeyID=748580c066c7df37decfb...
CRL Number	040c
Issuing Distribution ...	Distribution Point Name:Full Name:...

Value:

OK

# OCSP Stapling

```
▼ Transport Layer Security
  ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Status
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    Length: 479
  ▼ Handshake Protocol: Certificate Status
    Handshake Type: Certificate Status (22)
    Length: 475
    Certificate Status Type: OCSP (1)
    OCSP Response Length: 471
  ▼ OCSP Response
    responseStatus: successful (0)
  ▼ responseBytes
    ResponseType Id: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.1 (id-pkix-ocsp-basic)
    ▼ BasicOCSPResponse
      ▼ tbsResponseData
        > responderID: byKey (2)
        producedAt: Jan 30, 2024 15:01:06.000000000 Jerusalem Standard Time
        ▼ responses: 1 item
          ▼ SingleResponse
            ▼ certID
              > hashAlgorithm (SHA-1)
              issuerNameHash: a7c4b8b3dc5bb5581ea7d7f13ac569f56f48d789
              issuerKeyHash: 748580c066c7df37decfb2937aa031dbeecd17
              serialNumber: 0x04c4f06b1afde95aefdb027063ea6a1d
            > certStatus: good (0)
              thisUpdate: Jan 30, 2024 14:45:02.000000000 Jerusalem Standard Time
              nextUpdate: Feb 6, 2024 13:45:02.000000000 Jerusalem Standard Time
            > signatureAlgorithm (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
            Padding: 0
            signature: 0d364ee20e60a6e0e99ccb7a4db0af5db97e6317fc97d617a3da71582cc495f003eedb02...
```