

# **Long Vol, Long BTC, Long Saylor**

Analyzing MicroStrategy's Reflexive Feedback Loop:  
Capital Structure, Convertible Arbitrage, and Bitcoin Acquisition Strategy

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## **Abstract**

This thesis investigates the self-reinforcing feedback loop between Strategy's (MSTR) financing strategy and Bitcoin acquisitions. As of January 2026, Strategy holds 713,502 BTC financed through \$7.4 billion in convertible debt and \$8.5 billion in preferred shares. Using an event study around capital raises (August 2020 to January 2026), I document patterns consistent with reflexive capital formation: Strategy systematically raises capital during elevated premium windows. I analyze the capital structure through scenario analysis and examine how convertible arbitrageurs profit from the structure at the expense of retail equity holders.

**Keywords:** Strategy, MicroStrategy, Bitcoin, Convertible Bonds, Reflexivity, Capital Structure

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# 1 Introduction

Strategy (formerly MicroStrategy, rebranded February 2025) announced its first Bitcoin purchase in August 2020: 21,454 BTC for roughly \$250 million. What began as an unconventional treasury allocation has since grown into the most aggressively leveraged cryptocurrency position ever assembled by a public company. By January 2026, Strategy held 713,502 Bitcoin with a cost basis of approximately \$54.3 billion, acquired through a financing strategy that would make most CFOs nervous and most academics skeptical.<sup>1</sup>

The conventional story treats MSTR as a simple Bitcoin proxy, a way for equity investors to gain exposure without holding the asset directly. This framing misses the more interesting dynamics at play. MSTR isn't just holding Bitcoin; it has engineered a capital structure designed to amplify returns in both directions while extracting value through financial engineering that rewards certain stakeholders at the expense of others.

I document conditional feedback dynamics consistent with what George Soros termed market reflexivity. The hypothesized loop works as follows: elevated stock prices enable cheap equity issuance; cheap equity funds Bitcoin purchases; Bitcoin purchases increase net asset value; higher NAV supports the stock price. The cycle persists as long as three conditions hold: access to capital markets, elevated implied volatility, and stable or rising Bitcoin prices. When any of these constants fails, the flywheel breaks. The empirical question is whether MSTR's behavior exhibits patterns consistent with this mechanism, and under what conditions the feedback operates.

This thesis examines four questions:

1. How has MicroStrategy's financing strategy created a self-reinforcing feedback loop between its stock price, volatility, and Bitcoin accumulation?
2. What is the quantitative relationship between MSTR's NAV premium and subsequent capital raising?
3. How do convertible bond arbitrageurs amplify the reflexivity mechanism, and what does this mean for different investor classes?
4. Under what conditions does the flywheel break, and who bears the losses when it does?

## 1.1 Hypotheses

**H1:** MicroStrategy's NAV premium exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with subsequent Bitcoin purchases, consistent with reflexive feedback.

**H2:** The self-reinforcing loop requires three conditions to persist: continuous capital raising capability, elevated implied volatility, and rising or stable Bitcoin prices.

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<sup>1</sup>All figures as of late January 2026 unless otherwise noted. The company trades under the ticker MSTR on NASDAQ. I use "Strategy" and "MSTR" interchangeably throughout.

**H3:** Retail equity investors face asymmetric downside risk compared to convertible arbitrageurs, who extract value through gamma scalping while maintaining hedged positions.

## 1.2 Contribution

The existing literature treats reflexivity as a qualitative concept, applies Merton models to traditional corporate assets, and examines convertible arbitrage in isolation. This thesis integrates all three frameworks to analyze a structure that didn't exist before 2020.

I contribute in three ways. First, I document patterns consistent with reflexive capital formation at the firm level using an event study around capital raises. While [Soros \(1987\)](#) offers theoretical insight without mathematical specification, I test whether MSTR's behavior exhibits observable patterns consistent with reflexive dynamics. The evidence shows that Strategy systematically raises capital during elevated premium windows, and that the premium exhibits extreme persistence rather than mean-reversion. Second, I frame MSTR equity as a call option on Bitcoin and analyze the capital structure through breakeven prices and asset/debt ratios rather than Merton model outputs that assume away Bitcoin's defining characteristics. Third, I describe how convertible arbitrageurs extract value from the structure through gamma scalping while retail equity holders bear leveraged directional risk.

The remainder of this section reviews the relevant literature. Subsequent sections cover capital structure analysis, methodology, results, discussion with comparative evidence from other Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCOs), and conclusion.

## 1.3 Literature Review

Three strands of academic work inform this analysis: market reflexivity, structural credit models, and convertible bond arbitrage. None adequately addresses the phenomenon MSTR represents, but together they provide the theoretical scaffolding for understanding what the company has built.

### 1.3.1 Market Reflexivity

George Soros introduced reflexivity in *The Alchemy of Finance* ([Soros, 1987](#)), arguing that market participants don't merely observe fundamentals but actively shape them. Prices reflect beliefs about value, and those beliefs influence the very fundamentals they purport to measure. Two functions operate simultaneously: a cognitive function where participants try to understand the world, and a participating function where their actions change it. When both functions interact, self-reinforcing cycles emerge that deviate from equilibrium predictions.

The standard critique of reflexivity is that it's unfalsifiable. If markets go up, reflexivity explains the feedback loop. If markets go down, reflexivity explains the reversal. Soros never provides a mathematical specification that would allow empirical testing. [Shiller \(2015\)](#) documents

feedback trading in equity markets and offers survey evidence of extrapolative expectations, but his work focuses on market-wide dynamics rather than firm-level mechanisms. [Brunnermeier and Sannikov \(2014\)](#) models amplification in credit markets through leverage constraints, showing how falling asset prices tighten funding conditions, which forces asset sales, which depresses prices further. Their framework is rigorous but operates at the macro level.

I contend that MSTR offers a unique laboratory for testing whether firm-level dynamics exhibit patterns consistent with reflexivity, where each link in the hypothesized chain is observable. The proposed mechanism operates through concrete channels: stock price determines equity issuance capacity; issuance capacity determines Bitcoin accumulation; Bitcoin holdings determine net asset value; NAV influences stock price. Each link can be measured:

1. High stock price  $\rightarrow$  cheap equity capital
2. Cheap capital  $\rightarrow$  more BTC purchases
3. More BTC  $\rightarrow$  higher NAV
4. Higher NAV  $\rightarrow$  higher stock price

Rather than claim to prove reflexivity exists, I test whether observable patterns are consistent with reflexive dynamics. The contribution is methodological: providing a framework for measuring feedback loops in corporate finance contexts, with MSTR as the test case. Whether these patterns constitute “reflexivity” in Soros’s philosophical sense is less important than whether they have predictive content for understanding MSTR’s capital formation behavior.

### 1.3.2 Merton Structural Credit Model

[Merton \(1974\)](#) transformed credit analysis by recognizing that equity is a call option on firm assets. Shareholders receive the residual after debt is paid:  $\max(V_T - D, 0)$  at maturity, where  $V_T$  is asset value and  $D$  is debt face value. Debt holders receive  $\min(V_T, D)$ . This insight allows Black-Scholes-Merton pricing:

$$E = V \cdot N(d_1) - D \cdot e^{-rT} \cdot N(d_2) \quad (1)$$

$$d_1 = \frac{\ln(V/D) + (r + \sigma^2/2)T}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \quad (2)$$

$$d_2 = d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T} \quad (3)$$

The distance to default measures how many standard deviations separate current asset value from the default threshold:

$$DD = \frac{\ln(V/D) + (\mu - \sigma^2/2)T}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \quad (4)$$



Critics note that Merton models systematically underpredict credit spreads (the “credit spread puzzle”), and that the lognormal assumption poorly captures fat-tailed asset distributions. [Leland \(1994\)](#) extends the framework to incorporate optimal capital structure, and [Collin-Dufresne et al. \(2001\)](#) applies it to spread prediction with mixed success.

MSTR presents an unusually clean test case for the Merton framework, cleaner than most corporate applications. The asset (Bitcoin) has continuous market prices with no estimation required. Volatility can be calculated directly from BTC returns rather than backed out from equity prices. The debt structure is publicly documented. And equity trades continuously, allowing real-time model validation. The challenge is that Bitcoin’s volatility exceeds anything Merton contemplated, raising questions about how the framework behaves at extreme parameter values.

### 1.3.3 Convertible Bond Arbitrage

Convertible bonds combine straight debt with an embedded equity call option. The classic arbitrage strategy, documented by [Agarwal et al. \(2011\)](#), involves buying the convertible, shorting the underlying equity to hedge delta, and profiting from volatility through gamma scalping. As the stock moves, the delta of the embedded option changes, requiring hedge rebalancing. This rebalancing generates trading profits proportional to realized volatility.

The relevant Greeks for convertible arbitrage are delta (sensitivity to underlying price), gamma (rate of delta change, determining rebalancing frequency), vega (sensitivity to implied volatility), and theta (time decay). [Choi et al. \(2009\)](#) show that convertible arb funds are net providers of delta hedging flow, and their activity can amplify rather than dampen stock volatility. When gamma is large (at-the-money converts), even small price moves trigger significant hedging trades.

[Shleifer and Vishny \(1997\)](#) complicate the arbitrage picture by demonstrating that capital constraints, agency problems, and noise trader risk prevent arbitrageurs from fully exploiting mispricings. Arbitrage isn’t frictionless. Positions require capital and entail risks beyond the textbook spread. In the MSTR context, this suggests that even sophisticated arb funds face constraints that may allow the NAV premium to persist longer than pure efficiency would predict.

MSTR amplifies convertible arb dynamics because the notional outstanding is large relative to equity float, underlying Bitcoin volatility exceeds typical equity vol by a factor of two or three, and the zero-coupon structure maximizes the embedded option component. These characteristics suggest that convertible arbitrageurs are well-positioned to extract value from the structure regardless of Bitcoin’s direction.

### 1.3.4 Cryptocurrency Markets and Corporate Adoption

The academic literature on crypto markets has grown rapidly since Bitcoin’s inception. [Liu and Tsyvinski \(2021\)](#) establish that cryptocurrency returns are driven by factors distinct from tra-

ditional asset pricing models; network effects and momentum dominate. [Makarov and Schoar \(2020\)](#) document substantial cross-exchange arbitrage opportunities, suggesting persistent inefficiencies. [Griffin and Shams \(2020\)](#) raise concerns about price manipulation, though the extent remains debated.

Corporate Bitcoin adoption is a newer phenomenon with limited academic coverage. MicroStrategy sits outside the scope of existing work: most corporate adopters allocated single-digit percentages of treasury to Bitcoin. MSTR made it the entire balance sheet. No framework exists for analyzing a company that has transformed itself from a software firm into a leveraged Bitcoin vehicle. Since 2024, a growing cohort of public companies have adopted variants of Strategy's model, collectively referred to as Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCOs). I examine these firms comparatively in Section 5.8.

### 1.3.5 Research Gap

The literatures on reflexivity, credit modeling, and convertible arbitrage developed independently and address different phenomena. Soros wrote about macro markets, Merton about corporate debt, and the arb literature about hedge fund strategies. No prior work has tested for reflexive dynamics in a single-issuer cryptocurrency context, applied structural credit models to crypto-backed liabilities, or modeled how convertible arbitrage interacts with firm-level feedback loops.

This thesis addresses that gap by integrating the three frameworks. The MSTR structure offers what approaches a natural experiment: a publicly traded company whose capital structure makes the hypothesized feedback mechanism observable and, within the limits of non-experimental data, testable.

## 2 Strategy's Capital Structure

Strategy has built something that resembles a synthetic collateralized debt obligation, except with a single underlying asset. Traditional CDOs derive whatever stability they have from pooling uncorrelated assets; MSTR offers only the appearance of diversification through seniority. Every tranche, from senior convertible debt to junior preferred shares to common equity, is backed by the same thing: Bitcoin. When BTC falls, everyone falls together. The seniority waterfall determines only the order in which different investors get wiped out, not whether they avoid exposure to the underlying risk.

Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy of claims as of January 2026.

# Strategy Capital Structure Waterfall

Claims Priority (Most Senior to Most Junior)




Figure 1: Strategy Capital Structure Waterfall. The figure shows the seniority hierarchy of MSTR’s financing instruments, from most senior (convertible debt) to most junior (common equity). Annual servicing costs total approximately \$890 million.

## 2.1 Convertible Debt

The convertible notes sit atop the capital structure and represent the most senior claim. Strategy has \$7.4 billion in convertible notes outstanding, with maturities staggered from 2028 to 2032. Most carry zero or minimal coupons, reducing annual cash servicing to roughly \$30 million on \$7.4 billion outstanding, a cheap cost of debt. The notes convert to MSTR shares at premiums to the issuance price, and in liquidation, convertible holders would be paid before anyone else.

The low-coupon structure is elegant from Strategy’s perspective: it minimizes cash outflows while the embedded call option provides upside to investors who care about that sort of thing. But the primary buyers aren’t playing for equity upside. Convertible arbitrage hedge funds buy these instruments for the volatility exposure. They don’t care whether MSTR stock goes up or down; they care that it moves. Strategy has captured roughly 30% of the U.S. convertible debt market in 2025 alone, reflecting insatiable arb fund demand for high-vol paper.

## 2.2 Preferred Share Instruments

Strategy has issued five distinct series of preferred shares, each designed to tap a different investor base. Table 1 summarizes the terms.

Table 1: Summary of Strategy Preferred Share Instruments (January 2026)

Ticker	Name	Notional	Annual Cost	Rate	Cumulative?
STRF	Strife	\$1.37B	\$137M	10% fixed	Yes (to 18%)
STRC	Stretch	\$3.38B	~\$372M	11% variable	Yes
STRE	Stream	\$0.80B	~\$80M	10% fixed	Yes
STRK	Strike	\$1.54B	\$123M	8% fixed	Yes
STRD	Stride	\$1.44B	\$144M	10% fixed	No
<b>Total Preferred</b>		<b>\$8.53B</b>	<b>~\$856M</b>		

Note: These figures represent current outstanding amounts, which continue to grow as Strategy executes its “42/42” capital plan targeting \$84 billion in total issuance by 2027.

Why preferreds rather than more debt? Several reasons. Preferred shares don’t count as debt for leverage ratios and covenants, preserving whatever financial flexibility Strategy claims to have. They’re perpetual, eliminating refinancing risk (though creating a permanent servicing burden). Missing a preferred dividend doesn’t trigger default the way missing bond interest would, though cumulative preferreds accrue unpaid dividends that eventually come due. And preferreds sit between debt and equity in the capital structure, avoiding the immediate dilution of ATM equity offerings while still accessing capital.

The different series target different appetites. STRF offers 10% fixed with cumulative compounding to 18% if dividends are missed (a punishing feature that incentivizes payment). STRC started at 9% and adjusts monthly to anchor the share price near par; by January 2026 it had reached 11%, making it the single largest servicing obligation. STRK converts to common equity at \$1,000 per MSTR share, providing upside exposure. STRE taps European investors through the Luxembourg Euro MTF exchange. STRD, the junior tranche, offers 10% on \$1.44 billion but non-cumulative dividends: if Strategy misses a payment, STRD holders have no legal claim to catch up.

## 2.3 Seniority Analysis

In distress, claims get paid in order: convertible debt first, then STRF, then STRC, then STRE, then STRK, then STRD, and finally common equity if anything remains. This waterfall creates synthetic subordination. The preferred layers provide a cushion that improves the credit quality of senior instruments, at the cost of concentrating risk in the junior tranches.

Common equity holders bear first losses. This isn't a bug; it's the design. MSTR equity behaves like a leveraged call option on Bitcoin, with the aggregate claims of senior instruments serving as the strike price. In a rising BTC environment, equity captures amplified upside. In a declining environment, equity absorbs amplified losses until it's wiped out, at which point the pain starts moving up the capital structure.

## **2.4 The USD Reserve**

Strategy maintains a dedicated USD reserve for preferred dividend payments and debt service. As of January 2026, this reserve stood at \$2.25 billion, funded entirely from ATM equity proceeds, making it contingent on the same capital market access the broader strategy requires. At current servicing costs of approximately \$890 million annually, the reserve covers roughly 2.5 years of obligations, but the legacy analytics business generated minimal and recently slightly negative operating cash flow, so the reserve is the primary liquidity buffer. Each new preferred issuance increases the servicing burden proportionally. The contingency is real but tied to the reflexive loop: in a drawdown scenario where equity issuance shuts down, the reserve cannot be replenished.

## **2.5 Implications**

The capital structure reveals several dynamics relevant to the rest of this analysis. Strategy has constructed a synthetic credit hierarchy where every tranche bears the same underlying Bitcoin risk; seniority determines loss allocation, not loss avoidance. The ~\$890 million annual servicing cost creates a breakeven requirement that constrains the scenario analysis in Section 4. Common equity holders are effectively long a leveraged call option on Bitcoin, with senior claims acting as the strike. And the Merton model in Section 3 can formalize this option-like payoff structure mathematically.

# **3 Data and Methodology**

## **3.1 Data Sources**

Price data comes from Yahoo Finance for the period August 11, 2020 (MSTR's first Bitcoin announcement) through January 31, 2026. I collect daily closing prices for BTC-USD, MSTR (adjusted for splits), and SPY as a market benchmark. Corporate data on Bitcoin holdings, convertible issuances, preferred share terms, and ATM equity sales comes from SEC EDGAR filings and company press releases.

From these sources I construct the variables in Table 2.

Table 2: Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition
$NAV_t$	Net Asset Value = BTC Holdings $\times$ BTC Price <sub><i>t</i></sub>
$Premium_t$	(Market Cap <sub><i>t</i></sub> - NAV <sub><i>t</i></sub> ) / NAV <sub><i>t</i></sub>
$r_t^{BTC}$	Daily log return on Bitcoin
$r_t^{MSTR}$	Daily log return on MSTR
$CapRaise_t$	Indicator for capital raise event in period <i>t</i>

### 3.2 Credit Risk Framework

I frame MSTR equity as a call option on its Bitcoin holdings. This isn't a novel insight; it follows directly from [Merton \(1974\)](#)'s observation that equity holders receive the residual after debt is paid:  $\max(V_T - D, 0)$  at maturity. When a company's only asset is Bitcoin, the analogy becomes literal rather than metaphorical.

The key metric is the asset-to-debt ratio:

$$\text{Asset/Debt} = \frac{\text{BTC Holdings} \times \text{BTC Price}}{\text{Total Claims}} \quad (5)$$

At current prices (\$95,000 BTC), Strategy's 713,502 BTC are worth \$67.8 billion against \$15.9 billion in total claims, yielding a  $4.25\times$  asset/debt ratio. This ratio tells you how much cushion exists before creditors face impairment.

The breakeven BTC price for each capital layer is simply:

$$\text{Breakeven}_i = \frac{\text{Cumulative Claims}_i}{\text{BTC Holdings}} \quad (6)$$

For common equity, the breakeven is  $\$15.9\text{B} / 713,502 \approx \$22,300$  per BTC. Below that price, equity is worthless. Senior claims have lower breakevens because fewer dollars sit ahead of them in the waterfall.

I don't report implied default probabilities or credit spreads from the Merton model. The framework assumes lognormal returns and constant volatility, neither of which describes Bitcoin. Model-implied spreads of 1-2 basis points bear no resemblance to the 150-250 bps at which MSTR converts actually trade. The value of the framework lies in comparative statics: how do asset/debt ratios and breakevens shift as BTC price changes?

### 3.3 Reflexivity Analysis

#### 3.3.1 NAV Premium Persistence

I estimate a simple autoregressive model to test whether the NAV premium mean-reverts or persists:

$$Premium_t = \alpha + \beta \cdot Premium_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \quad (7)$$

A coefficient near 1.0 suggests that premium states are sticky: once MSTR trades at a premium (or discount), it tends to stay there. A coefficient near 0 would suggest rapid mean-reversion.

#### 3.3.2 Event Study Around Capital Raises

The core mechanistic claim is that MSTR times capital raises to premium windows. I test this directly by identifying 23 capital raise events from SEC filings (ATM announcements, convertible offerings, preferred issuances) and measuring the NAV premium in windows around each announcement:

$$\overline{Premium}_{[-k,-1]} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{t=-k}^{-1} Premium_t \quad (8)$$

I compare pre-event premiums ( $k = 5, 10, 20$  trading days) against the unconditional sample mean using a one-sample t-test. If MSTR systematically raises capital during elevated premium windows, we should observe:

$$H_0 : \overline{Premium}_{pre-event} = \overline{Premium}_{sample} \quad \text{vs.} \quad H_1 : \overline{Premium}_{pre-event} > \overline{Premium}_{sample} \quad (9)$$

A statistically significant positive differential provides direct evidence for the mechanistic link: management exploits premium windows to raise capital cheaply.

### 3.4 Scenario Analysis

I stress-test the capital structure under alternative BTC price assumptions. Table 3 defines the scenarios.

Table 3: Scenario Definitions

Scenario	BTC Price Change
Base Case	0%
Moderate Drawdown	−30%
Severe Drawdown	−50%
Prolonged Bear	−70%

For each scenario I calculate NAV, asset/debt ratio, and equity value. The scenarios correspond roughly to historical Bitcoin drawdowns: 30% corrections happen multiple times per cycle, 50% drawdowns have occurred in every major cycle, and 70%+ drawdowns occurred in 2014, 2018, and 2022.

### 3.5 Convertible Arbitrage Dynamics

Strategy’s \$7.4 billion convertible book is held primarily by arbitrage hedge funds who profit from volatility rather than directional exposure. The mechanism is straightforward: arb funds buy the convertible, short MSTR stock to hedge the embedded option’s delta, and rebalance as the stock moves. This “gamma scalping” generates trading profits proportional to realized volatility.

The implication is that MSTR’s volatility benefits a specific class of investors (arb funds) while creating risk for others (retail equity holders). I don’t attempt to quantify gamma exposure precisely; the converts are substantially out of the money, which limits gamma regardless of notional. The qualitative point matters more than the exact number: sophisticated investors extract value from the structure in ways that retail participants don’t.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4 reports summary statistics for the key variables.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (August 2020 – January 2026)

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
BTC Price (\$)	51,647	30,235	10,132	124,753
MSTR Price (\$)	116.55	121.29	13.49	473.83
NAV Premium (%)	196.0	230.3	−40.6	1,501.6
BTC 30d Vol (%)	45.58	16.48	14.11	98.91
MSTR 30d Vol (%)	88.38	31.23	35.95	183.97

The average NAV premium of 196% reflects the fact that MSTR has traded at a persistent premium to its Bitcoin holdings throughout most of the sample period. The premium exhibits enormous volatility (standard deviation of 230 percentage points), ranging from −41% to over 1,500%. The extreme upper values reflect the early period (2020–2021) when BTC holdings were small relative to the legacy software business valuation. The median premium of 131% is more representative of typical conditions.



## 4.2 Stress Testing the Capital Structure

### 4.2.1 Sensitivity to BTC Price

Table 5 shows how Strategy's capital structure metrics change with BTC price.

Table 5: Capital Structure Sensitivity to BTC Price

BTC Price	NAV	Asset/Debt	Equity Value
\$120,000 (+26%)	\$85.6B	5.37×	\$69.7B
\$95,000 (Base)	\$67.8B	4.25×	\$51.8B
\$75,000 (−21%)	\$53.5B	3.36×	\$37.6B
\$55,000 (−42%)	\$39.2B	2.46×	\$23.3B
\$35,000 (−63%)	\$25.0B	1.57×	\$9.0B
\$22,346 (−76%)	\$15.9B	1.00×	\$0

The key insight is leverage. A 50% BTC decline doesn't produce a 50% equity decline; it produces a 65% decline (from \$51.8B to \$17.9B at \$47,500 BTC). As BTC falls, equity absorbs losses first, amplifying percentage moves in both directions. At \$35,000 BTC, equity has fallen 83% while BTC is down 63%. At \$22,346, equity is worthless.

Strategy's current position provides substantial cushion. The 4.25× asset/debt ratio means Bitcoin would need to fall 76% before equity faces complete wipeout. This is healthier than earlier in the company's history, when smaller BTC holdings meant tighter breakevens.

### 4.2.2 Breakeven Analysis

Table 6 reports the BTC price at which each capital layer faces impairment.

Table 6: Breakeven BTC Prices by Capital Layer

Capital Layer	Claim Amount	Breakeven BTC
Convertible Debt	\$7.41B	\$10,391
STRF (Senior Preferred)	\$1.37B	\$12,311
STRC (Variable Preferred)	\$3.38B	\$17,048
STRE (Euro Preferred)	\$0.80B	\$18,170
STRK (Convert Preferred)	\$1.54B	\$20,328
STRD (Junior Preferred)	\$1.44B	\$22,346
Common Equity	—	\$22,346

Common equity gets wiped out at approximately \$22,346 BTC (a 76% decline). Senior convertible debt doesn't face impairment until \$10,391 (an 89% decline). The capital structure provides meaningful cushion for senior claims.

### 4.2.3 Critical Thresholds

Three thresholds matter for understanding how the strategy unravels:

**Threshold 1: Capital Market Access** ( $\sim \$35,000$  BTC). At this level, equity has declined 83% and the asset/debt ratio compresses to  $1.57\times$ . Strategy likely loses the ability to issue ATM equity at attractive terms. The reflexive loop weakens.

**Threshold 2: Preferred Dividend Strain** ( $\sim \$28,000$  BTC). NAV falls to approximately \$20.0 billion against \$15.9 billion in claims. The  $\sim \$890$ M annual servicing burden represents roughly 22% of remaining equity value. The USD reserve becomes critical.

**Threshold 3: Equity Wipeout** ( $\sim \$22,350$  BTC). Asset value equals total claims. Common equity is worthless. Preferred dividends are at risk.

## 4.3 NAV Premium Persistence

Table 7 reports the autoregressive results.

Table 7: NAV Premium Persistence

Variable	Coefficient
$Premium_{t-1}$	1.002*** (0.006)
Constant	-0.003 (0.009)
Observations	1,059
$R^2$	0.994
*** p<0.01	

The lagged premium coefficient of 1.002 with an  $R^2$  of 0.994 tells a simple story: premium states are sticky. Once MSTR trades at a premium (or discount), it tends to stay there. The coefficient near unity indicates a near-unit-root process — the premium drifts in prolonged regimes rather than mean-reverting. This persistence is what allows Strategy to exploit premium windows for extended capital raising campaigns rather than racing to issue before the window closes.

## 4.4 Event Study: Capital Raises and Premium Windows

Table 8 reports average NAV premiums in the windows around capital raise announcements.

Table 8: NAV Premium Around Capital Raise Events

Window	Average NAV Premium
20 days pre-event	134.3%
10 days pre-event	129.3%
5 days pre-event	127.4%
5 days post-event	125.3%
10 days post-event	121.9%

N = 23 capital raise events (Oct 2024 – Nov 2025).

Strategy raises capital at substantial premiums to NAV. In the 5 trading days before announcements, the stock trades at an average 127% premium — roughly  $2.3\times$  NAV. Premiums decline in the days following issuance, falling to 122% at 10 days post-event, consistent with the market pricing in dilution from new share issuance.

Figure 2 visualizes the pattern.




Figure 2: Average NAV premium around capital raise announcements ( $N = 23$ ). Day 0 is the announcement date.

## 4.5 Scenario Analysis

Table 9 presents the capital structure under stress scenarios.

Table 9: Scenario Analysis

Scenario	BTC Price	NAV	Asset/Debt	Equity Value
Base Case	\$95,000	\$67.8B	$4.25\times$	\$51.8B
Moderate ( $-30\%$ )	\$66,500	\$47.4B	$2.98\times$	\$31.5B
Severe ( $-50\%$ )	\$47,500	\$33.9B	$2.13\times$	\$17.9B
Prolonged ( $-70\%$ )	\$28,500	\$20.3B	$1.28\times$	\$4.4B

A 50% BTC drawdown (which has occurred in every historical cycle) compresses equity value from \$51.8 billion to \$17.9 billion, a 65% decline. The asset/debt ratio falls from  $4.25\times$  to  $2.13\times$ , still above the  $1.0\times$  threshold but with less cushion.

The prolonged bear scenario ( $-70\%$  BTC) pushes equity to roughly \$4.4 billion (a 92% decline). At that level, preferred dividends consume a meaningful fraction of remaining equity value, and continued servicing depends on the USD reserve and capital market access.

## 5 Discussion

### 5.1 What the Evidence Shows

The event study is the core finding. MSTR systematically raises capital at substantial premiums to NAV: the average pre-event premium is 127%, meaning the stock trades at roughly  $2.3\times$  the value of underlying Bitcoin holdings. Premiums decline in the days following issuance, falling from 127% to 122% within 10 trading days as the market prices in dilution. Management issues equity or converts when the spread between market valuation and NAV is wide enough to generate accretive BTC accumulation.

The premium persistence result ( $\beta = 1.002$ ) explains why this works. Once MSTR trades at a premium, it tends to stay at a premium. Once it trades at a discount, it stays at a discount. This stickiness gives management time to execute capital raises during favorable windows rather than racing against mean-reversion.

Together, these findings describe a conditional feedback loop. When BTC prices rise, NAV increases, the premium often expands, and Strategy can raise capital cheaply to buy more Bitcoin. When BTC falls, the premium compresses or goes negative, and the capital formation engine stalls. The loop operates at the firm level; Granger causality tests (reported in the appendix) show that MSTR's premium doesn't predict Bitcoin returns, indicating the company is a price-taker in Bitcoin markets, not a price-maker.

### 5.2 Credit Risk: Simple Math

The credit story is straightforward once you accept that MSTR equity is a call option on Bitcoin with the debt burden as the strike price.

At \$95,000 BTC, Strategy holds \$67.8 billion in assets against \$15.9 billion in claims: a  $4.25\times$  asset/debt ratio. Equity is worth \$51.8 billion. This cushion is substantial. Bitcoin would need to fall 76% before equity is wiped out.

At \$35,000 BTC (a 63% decline), asset/debt compresses to  $1.57\times$ . Equity falls 83% to \$9.0 billion. Strategy likely loses access to ATM equity issuance at attractive terms. The reflexive loop breaks or at least weakens severely.

At \$22,346 BTC, assets equal claims and equity is worthless. The preferred dividends become at risk. Below that level, losses start moving up the capital structure through the preferred tranches toward the convertible debt.

### 5.3 Who Wins, Who Loses

The capital structure creates asymmetric exposures across investor classes.

**Convertible arbitrageurs** profit from volatility regardless of direction. They buy the convert, short MSTR stock to hedge delta, and rebalance as the stock moves. This gamma scalping extracts value from price swings. The zero-coupon structure is particularly attractive because it maximizes the option component relative to bond value. Arb funds are the sophisticated players in this structure; they understood what they were buying.

**Retail equity holders** bear leveraged directional risk. MSTR equity runs about 2× the volatility of Bitcoin. In bull markets, this amplification is attractive. In bear markets, it's devastating. Retail investors are effectively long a call option on Bitcoin, which sounds fine until you realize that call options can expire worthless.

**Preferred shareholders** occupy middle ground. They collect 8-10% yields and sit above common equity in the capital structure. But they're still exposed to Bitcoin: in severe scenarios, even senior preferreds face impairment. STRD holders (the junior non-cumulative preferred) have the worst risk-reward. If Strategy suspends their dividend, they have no legal claim to catch up. They bear meaningful downside without the upside optionality of equity.

### 5.4 What Breaks the Loop

The reflexive mechanism requires three conditions: capital market access, elevated volatility, and Bitcoin prices that don't collapse. When any condition fails, the flywheel slows or stops.

**Bitcoin drawdown.** A 50% or greater decline compresses the loop. NAV falls, the premium compresses sharply (as it did in 2022), and equity issuance becomes dilutive or impossible. Strategy's current position is more resilient than before: with \$2.25 billion in USD reserves and ~\$890 million annual servicing, the company has roughly 2.5 years of runway without selling Bitcoin or accessing capital markets. But this buffer is finite and funded by ATM equity proceeds; in a drawdown where equity issuance shuts down, the reserve cannot be replenished. A prolonged bear market would eventually force either asset sales or debt restructuring.

**Volatility compression.** If Bitcoin matures into a lower-volatility asset class (from current 45-50% to something closer to gold's 15-20%), the convertible financing advantage evaporates. Arb funds would demand coupons rather than accepting zero-coupon paper. Strategy's cost of capital increases, potentially by 3-5 percentage points on new issuances. The vol compression scenario is insidious because it can occur even with stable or rising Bitcoin prices.

**Index exclusion.** MSTR's inclusion in major indices creates passive demand. MSCI is reportedly reviewing the company's classification. Reclassification as a financial rather than

technology company could trigger removal from tech indices and forced selling by passive funds. This wouldn't affect the underlying business but could compress the premium.

**Regulatory action.** If MSTR's primary business is deemed to be "investing in securities," the SEC could require registration under the Investment Company Act. This would impose leverage limits and operational constraints incompatible with the current strategy. The company's legal position rests on arguing that Bitcoin is not a security and that Strategy remains an operating software business. Both claims are contestable.

## 5.5 The Preferred Stack as Buffer

The preferred share structure serves a subtle function beyond capital raising: it acts as a release valve that delays forced Bitcoin liquidation during drawdowns.

Consider STRD, the non-cumulative junior preferred. Unlike cumulative preferreds, missed STRD dividends don't accrue. If Strategy suspends the \$144 million annual STRD dividend, it faces no legal obligation to catch up. This creates optionality. In a severe drawdown, management can preserve cash by cutting STRD first, reducing annual servicing from approximately \$890 million to roughly \$746 million.

Even among cumulative preferreds, the structure provides flexibility. STRK could be restructured if the conversion option becomes worthless. STRE might be renegotiated separately. Each layer is a potential negotiation point that wouldn't exist in a pure debt structure.

The net effect is that the preferred stack delays forced BTC liquidation by 12-24 months relative to what a debt-only structure would allow. This matters because Bitcoin has historically recovered from drawdowns. If MSTR can survive the trough, the reflexive loop can restart.

## 5.6 Is It Sustainable?

Short term (1-2 years): yes, given the USD reserve, continued market access, and BTC prices well above breakeven levels.

Medium term (3-5 years): depends on BTC staying above roughly \$35,000 (where capital market access becomes strained), volatility staying elevated (for convertible financing), and servicing costs remaining manageable. The servicing burden is currently ~\$890 million annually and grows with each new preferred issue.

Long term (5+ years): the compounding dividend burden creates a growing fixed cost base. Unless BTC appreciation outpaces servicing costs, the strategy eventually becomes constrained. The operating business generates minimal or slightly negative cash flow; the gap between operating cash flow and servicing must be closed through capital appreciation or new issuance.

## 5.7 Limitations

The event study sample is small (23 events). The premium persistence regression documents correlation, not causation. The breakeven analysis assumes orderly liquidation at market prices, which may not hold in distress. And the entire analysis is conducted during a period that, while including the 2022 bear market, is dominated by a Bitcoin bull run. How the structure performs through a prolonged multi-year bear market remains untested.

## 5.8 Comparative Evidence: The DATCO Landscape

The preceding analysis treats Strategy as a unique case study. It isn't. Between 2024 and 2025, dozens of public companies adopted variants of the same model: issue equity or debt, buy Bitcoin, hold it on the balance sheet. By October 2025, CoinGecko counted 142 DATCOs, 76 of which formed in 2025 alone ([CoinGecko Research, 2025](#)). Collectively, they held over \$137 billion in cryptocurrency, though Strategy alone accounted for roughly half that figure.

This proliferation matters for two reasons. First, it provides a natural experiment: the same reflexive model replicated at different scales, with different balance sheets, across different market conditions. If the fragilities identified in Sections 4 and 5 are structural rather than idiosyncratic, they should be amplified in weaker firms. They are. Second, the sheer number of DATCOs creates systemic risks that didn't exist when Strategy was operating alone. Correlated forced selling by overleveraged treasury companies could amplify Bitcoin drawdowns beyond what fundamentals would suggest.

The Bitcoin drawdown from approximately \$126,000 in October 2025 to \$60,000 by early February 2026 has stress-tested the entire cohort. Galaxy Digital warned that at least five DATCOs face asset sales or closure in 2026 ([Galaxy Digital Research, 2025](#)). NYDIG characterized the sector as exhibiting failure modes analogous to closed-end fund discount spirals ([NYDIG Research, 2025a](#)). What follows is a comparative look at the firms worst positioned to survive.

### 5.8.1 Taxonomy and Scale

DATCOs vary along two dimensions: the scale of their Bitcoin holdings and whether they have a revenue-generating core business. Table 10 classifies the principal firms.

Table 10: DATCO Classification by Scale and Operational Foundation (February 2026)

Company	Ticker	BTC	Avg Cost (\$)	Core Business
Strategy	MSTR	713,502	76,052	Software (legacy)
MARA Holdings	MARA	53,250	–	Bitcoin mining
Twenty One Capital	XXI	43,514	87,280	None (pre-revenue)
Metaplanet	3350	35,102	107,606	None (ex-hotel)
Semler Scientific	SMLR	5,048	55,550	Med. devices (declining)
Genius Group	GNS	84	–	Education (collapsing)
Solidion Technology	STI	Negl.	–	Battery tech (pre-rev.)

The pattern is clear. Strategy accumulated the bulk of its Bitcoin at prices between \$10,000 and \$75,000, giving it a blended average cost of approximately \$76,052 per coin. Most imitators entered near cycle highs. Metaplanet’s average cost of \$107,606 is 41% above Strategy’s; Twenty One Capital’s \$87,280 is 15% above. At \$60,000 BTC, Strategy is modestly underwater on its blended cost basis. Its imitators face unrealized losses ranging from severe to existential.

### 5.8.2 Case Studies

**Metaplanet (TSE: 3350)** Metaplanet is Japan’s largest publicly listed Bitcoin treasury company and the closest international analogue to Strategy. Originally a hotel operator, the company pivoted entirely to a Bitcoin treasury strategy in April 2024, abandoning its hospitality business. Fidelity became its largest institutional shareholder.

The accumulation has been aggressive. Holdings grew from 1,762 BTC at the start of 2025 to 35,102 BTC by year-end, funded through a ¥116 billion moving-strike warrant program (the largest in Japanese history), a \$1.4 billion international share offering, and Bitcoin-backed loans. Management targets 210,000 BTC by 2027, approximately 1% of total supply.

Metaplanet exploits a structural carry trade that Strategy cannot access: borrowing in yen, acquiring Bitcoin that appreciates against fiat, and servicing coupons in a depreciating currency. This reduces effective financing costs relative to USD-denominated peers. The advantage reverses sharply if the yen strengthens or Bitcoin falls. Both materialized in early 2026.

The stress indicators are severe. Metaplanet’s stock price collapsed from a peak of approximately ¥1,930 (June 2025) to ¥340 by February 2026, a decline of 82%.<sup>2</sup> The company recorded a non-operating impairment loss of ¥104.6 billion (approximately \$680 million) on its Bitcoin holdings. Most critically, Metaplanet’s mNAV (the ratio of enterprise value to net Bitcoin holdings) dropped below 1.0 for the first time, meaning the market valued the company at less than its Bitcoin.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>All Metaplanet price data from TSE. The company also trades on OTCQX under the ticker MTPPLF.

<sup>3</sup>mNAV data from The Block. An mNAV below 1.0 implies that investors would be better served by a simple Bitcoin ETF, eliminating the rationale for the DATCO structure entirely.



The comparison to Strategy is instructive. Metaplanet replicates the playbook almost exactly but lacks three buffers: a legacy business generating operating cash flow, deep U.S. capital markets access, and a multi-year track record that provides market confidence. Its yen carry trade adds a second layer of reflexivity on top of the BTC/equity feedback loop documented in Section 5. When both Bitcoin and the carry trade move adversely, the losses compound.

**Twenty One Capital (NYSE: XXI)** Twenty One Capital emerged from a business combination between Cantor Equity Partners (a SPAC) and a Bitcoin vehicle backed by Tether, SoftBank, and Cantor Fitzgerald. CEO Jack Mallers positioned the firm as more than a treasury play, announcing plans for Bitcoin-native financial services including lending, brokerage, and capital markets advisory. It began trading on the NYSE on 9 December 2025.

XXI shares fell 20% on their first day of trading, opening at \$10.74 versus the SPAC's prior close of \$14.27. By February 2026, the stock had declined to approximately \$5.83, down 90% from its 52-week high of \$59.75. The company's mNAV stood at approximately 0.75, a 25% discount to the spot value of its 43,514 Bitcoin.<sup>4</sup>

Several factors make XXI's position worse than Strategy's. Twenty One acquired its Bitcoin at a blended average of \$87,280 per coin, implying unrealized losses exceeding \$1 billion at \$60,000 spot prices. Strategy's lower cost basis provides a larger cushion. The SPAC structure creates lock-up expirations that generate periodic selling pressure absent from Strategy's capital structure. And Twenty One had two employees as of February 2026; the planned financial services business is essentially pre-revenue. Unlike Strategy, which generates \$40–50 million annually from its legacy software operations, XXI has no operating cash flow to service its \$385 million in convertible senior secured notes.

The XXI case illustrates a specific DATCO failure mode: entering at cycle highs with no operational cushion. Strategy built its position gradually from August 2020, with early tranches acquired at \$10,000–\$30,000. This dollar-cost averaging created resilience. XXI materialized near the peak and immediately faced adverse price action. The reflexive loop requires entry at favorable prices; entering at the top inverts the mechanism.

**Semler Scientific (NASDAQ: SMLR)** Semler Scientific adopted Bitcoin as its primary treasury reserve asset in May 2024. Unlike the pure-play DATCOs, Semler had a real operating business: QuantaFlo, a peripheral arterial disease (PAD) diagnostic product used by Medicare providers. Holdings reached approximately 5,048 BTC by mid-2025, funded through a \$500 million ATM equity offering and convertible note issuances.

Semler faces a predicament that Strategy does not: its core business is simultaneously deteriorating. Revenue fell 44% year-over-year in Q1 2025, driven by CMS reimbursement changes that undermined QuantaFlo's economics. The company recorded a net loss of \$64.7 million

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<sup>4</sup>mNAV data from BitcoinTreasuries.NET. The precise figure fluctuates with BTC price and share count; the 0.75 reading is approximate as of early February 2026.

and agreed to pay \$29.75 million to the Department of Justice to settle fraud claims related to QuantaFlo marketing, funding the settlement through a Bitcoin-collateralized loan from Coinbase.<sup>5</sup> By late 2025, over 80% of Semler’s enterprise value was attributable to its Bitcoin holdings.

I call this the “double deterioration” problem. Declining operations reduce the equity cushion, making ATM issuance more dilutive per BTC acquired, which compresses BTC per share, which depresses the stock price, which makes the next ATM raise worse. Each iteration of the loop destroys value rather than creating it. In January 2026, shareholders approved Semler’s acquisition by Strive, Inc. (ASST), a Vivek Ramaswamy-founded firm. The combined entity holds approximately 13,131 BTC and has retired \$110 million of Semler’s legacy debt. Whether consolidation provides a viable escape from the deterioration spiral remains to be seen.

**Genius Group (NYSE American: GNS)** Genius Group, an AI education company, announced a Bitcoin treasury strategy in late 2024, committing 90% of reserves to BTC. This case is the clearest illustration of what happens when the reflexive loop runs in reverse.

In February 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a temporary restraining order blocking Genius Group from selling shares, raising funds, or purchasing Bitcoin. A preliminary injunction followed in March 2025. The dispute originated from a failed asset purchase agreement with Fatbrain AI, with officers accused of fraud. The court order forced Genius to liquidate Bitcoin to fund operations, since all other fundraising channels were blocked. Holdings fell from 440 BTC to approximately 60 coins, a forced sale of 86% of the very asset the company was designed to hold.

After a favorable U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in May 2025, Genius resumed purchasing, rebuilding to 180 BTC by December 2025. But the damage was cumulative. Between late December 2025 and early February 2026, the company sold a further 96 BTC at an average of approximately \$73,000 to service a \$3.3 million Bitcoin-backed loan, reducing holdings to 84 BTC. Revenue had collapsed 66% to \$7.9 million in 2024. The stock traded at roughly \$0.50.

GNS illustrates the endgame of the DATCO model when it fails: negligible revenue, a court-ordered inability to execute its stated strategy, forced liquidation of its treasury asset, and a stock price approaching zero. Every forced sale reduces NAV, which compresses the stock price, which eliminates the ability to raise equity, which forces further sales.

**The Micro-Cap Fringe** Below the firms discussed above sits a tier of micro-cap companies whose Bitcoin treasury announcements appear to have been motivated less by strategic conviction than by desperation.

Solidion Technology (NASDAQ: STI), a pre-revenue battery technology firm, announced in November 2024 that it would allocate 60% of excess cash to Bitcoin purchases. At the time, the stock had already declined 95% year-to-date. The company reported net sales of \$4,000 for

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<sup>5</sup>DOJ settlement announced April 2025. See United States Department of Justice press release, 15 April 2025.

the first half of 2025 and cash on hand of \$114,652, raising the question of what “excess cash” existed to allocate. Solidion received a NASDAQ delisting notice for failing continued listing standards and disclosed “substantial doubt” about its ability to continue as a going concern.<sup>6</sup>

ETHZilla (NASDAQ: ETHZ), formerly 180 Life Sciences, pivoted from biotech to an Ethereum treasury strategy in August 2025 with \$425 million raised from approximately 60 investors. The stock subsequently collapsed 96%. The company sold 24,291 ETH (\$74.5 million) to repay senior secured convertible notes and is now pivoting away from cryptocurrency entirely, toward real-world asset tokenization and aeronautics. The pivot suggests the treasury strategy was opportunistic rather than foundational.

NYDIG documented the failure pattern clearly. In its research note “How DATs Die,” NYDIG showed that DATCOs fail when they cannot generate sufficient “memetic premium,” meaning narrative-driven valuation above NAV, typically tied to a charismatic CEO or a compelling story (NYDIG Research, 2025a). Most DATCOs sell 95% or more of their stock as freely tradeable shares at listing, creating immediate selling pressure that overwhelms any initial premium. Without a premium, the model cannot function: equity issuance at or below NAV is dilutive to existing holders, breaking the accumulation flywheel before it begins.

### 5.8.3 The Reflexivity Gradient

The comparative evidence reveals a pattern that strengthens the theoretical framework: the reflexive feedback loop intensifies as firm size decreases. The mechanism is scale-dependent.

Larger firms can issue equity representing a small fraction of their market capitalization to acquire meaningful quantities of Bitcoin. Strategy’s \$2 billion ATM offering in late 2024 represented roughly 3% of its market cap at the time, yet funded the acquisition of over 20,000 BTC. Dilution per coin acquired was modest. For mid-tier firms like Metaplanet or Semler, the same BTC accumulation requires proportionally larger issuances relative to market cap, creating faster dilution and greater downward pressure on BTC per share. For micro-caps, the math becomes prohibitive: even small purchases require equity issuances so large relative to the float that dilution overwhelms any NAV accretion.

Table 11 illustrates this gradient.

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<sup>6</sup>Solidion Technology Form 10-Q/A, filed October 2025. The company subsequently announced it had regained NASDAQ compliance.

Table 11: mNAV and Peak-to-Trough Stock Price Declines by DATCO Scale (February 2026)

<b>Tier</b>	<b>Company</b>	<b>BTC Held</b>	<b>mNAV</b>	<b>Peak-to-Trough</b>
Large	Strategy (MSTR)	713,502	~1.0	−65%
Mid	MARA Holdings	53,250	~1.2	−70%
Mid	Twenty One Capital	43,514	~0.75	−90%
Mid	Metaplanet	35,102	~1.0	−82%
Small	Semler Scientific	5,048	—	Acquired
Micro	Genius Group	84	—	−89%
Micro	Solidion	Negligible	—	−95%
Micro	ETHZilla	Liquidated	—	−96%

The gradient is monotonic. Strategy, the largest DATCO, experienced the mildest peak-to-trough decline and maintained an mNAV near par. Progressively smaller firms experienced progressively worse outcomes: deeper stock price declines, lower mNAVs, and in the extreme cases, forced liquidation of their treasury assets. This suggests the reflexive capital formation model has a minimum viable scale below which the feedback loops become destabilizing rather than accretive.

The intuition is straightforward. The reflexive loop requires that equity issuance at a premium funds BTC acquisition that increases NAV per share. This holds only when the premium is large enough, and the issuance small enough relative to shares outstanding, that NAV accretion from new BTC exceeds dilution from new shares. Larger firms satisfy this condition more easily because their market capitalization provides a larger base over which to spread dilution. As the firm shrinks, the margin of safety narrows until the loop inverts: issuance dilutes faster than BTC accumulates, NAV per share falls, the premium compresses, and the flywheel reverses.

[Papadogiannis \(2025\)](#) formalizes this insight, showing that DATCOs behave like leveraged ETFs: crypto per share expands more than proportionally in bull markets but contracts more sharply in downturns. The leverage effect is inversely proportional to firm size, which explains why the smallest DATCOs experienced the most violent declines.

#### 5.8.4 NAV Premium Compression

Section 4 documents Strategy’s NAV premium compression from approximately  $4\times$  in late 2024 to roughly  $1.3\times$  by October 2025, eventually touching a discount in November 2025. This compression is not idiosyncratic. It reflects a sector-wide phenomenon driven by two forces.

First, the proliferation of DATCOs has arbitrated away the premium. When Strategy was the only publicly traded vehicle offering leveraged Bitcoin exposure, investors paid a substantial premium for the access. With 142 competitors offering the same exposure, plus spot Bitcoin ETFs approved in January 2024, the scarcity premium has evaporated. NYDIG made this point

explicitly: the only defensible rationale for an mNAV above 1.0 is capital structure leverage (convertible notes, preferred stock), not narrative or brand ([NYDIG Research, 2025b](#)). As the premium compresses, the reflexive loop weakens, because issuing equity near or below NAV is dilutive rather than accretive.

Second, the Bitcoin drawdown from \$126,000 to \$60,000 between October 2025 and February 2026 compressed NAVs mechanically. DATCOs that entered near cycle highs (Metaplanet at \$107,600, Twenty One Capital at \$87,280) now sit on substantial unrealized losses. For these firms, the mNAV question is academic: the market correctly prices them at or below NAV because their Bitcoin is worth less than they paid for it.

As of February 2026, nearly 40% of DATCOs trade below NAV. Galaxy Digital compared the situation to the 1920s investment trust boom, where closed-end funds proliferated, competed away each other's premiums, and collapsed when sentiment reversed ([Galaxy Digital Research, 2025](#)). The analogy is apt. Investment trusts of the 1920s relied on a premium to NAV to justify their existence. When the premium disappeared, so did the rationale for the vehicle.

### 5.8.5 Systemic Implications

The DATCO phenomenon creates potential systemic risks for Bitcoin markets that extend beyond the individual firm analysis.

**Correlated forced selling.** If multiple DATCOs face margin calls, debt maturities, or operational cash shortfalls simultaneously, their collective Bitcoin liquidation could amplify downward price pressure. DATCOs collectively hold over one million BTC, representing more than 5% of total supply ([CoinGecko Research, 2025](#)). The Genius Group case demonstrates that forced selling is not hypothetical. A scenario in which several mid-tier DATCOs liquidate simultaneously would resemble the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (GBTC) premium collapse of 2022, where a closed-end vehicle's discount to NAV triggered a cascade of redemptions and forced sales.

**Convertible note maturity clustering.** Many DATCOs issued convertible notes in 2024–2025 with three- to five-year maturities. A cluster of maturities in 2027–2029 could create refinancing stress if Bitcoin remains below issuance-era prices. Strategy's own convertible maturities are staggered from 2028 to 2032 (Section 2), but smaller DATCOs with less diversified capital structures face binary refinancing outcomes.

**Index and regulatory risk.** In January 2026, MSCI launched a consultation on whether to exclude companies with over 50% of assets in digital currencies from its flagship equity indices. JPMorgan estimated that exclusion could trigger up to \$8.8 billion in forced sales from institutional passive funds. MSCI ultimately paused the exclusion, but the consultation signals that index providers view DATCOs as sufficiently distinct from operating companies to warrant separate classification.<sup>7</sup> The SEC's potential application of the Investment Company Act remains

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<sup>7</sup>MSCI consultation announced January 2026; decision to pause exclusion issued 15 January 2026.

an overhang (as discussed in Section 5).

**Contagion through pension exposure.** Strategy's inclusion in major equity indices means that passive funds, including public pension plans, hold meaningful MSTR positions. Strategy's Q4 2025 decline alone erased approximately \$337 million from U.S. public pension fund portfolios. If the broader DATCO cohort enters distress, the resulting index volatility could prompt institutional investors to reduce digital asset exposure across the board, dampening capital flows into the sector.

### 5.8.6 What the Comparative Evidence Shows

The proliferation and subsequent stress-testing of DATCOs strengthens three conclusions from the main analysis.

First, the reflexive mechanism documented in Section 4 is structural, not idiosyncratic to Strategy. Every DATCO that attempted to replicate the model encountered the same feedback dynamics: premium-dependent equity issuance, BTC accumulation, NAV sensitivity, and the risk of loop reversal. The fact that smaller firms experienced amplified versions of these dynamics confirms that the mechanism operates through the channels I identify in this thesis.

Second, the DATCO model has a minimum viable scale. Below a certain threshold of market capitalization, BTC holdings, and capital markets access, the reflexive loop becomes destabilizing rather than accretive. The micro-cap failures (Genius Group, Solidion, ETHZilla) represent firms that fell below this threshold. Strategy's survival, so far, reflects its scale advantages, not the absence of structural risk.

Third, the sector-wide premium compression confirms that competition erodes the reflexive flywheel. When Strategy operated alone, it could capture outsized premiums. With 142 competitors and spot Bitcoin ETFs, the premium has been arbitrated to near zero across the sector. This doesn't mean Strategy's model is broken, but it does mean the conditions that enabled the most aggressive phase of capital formation (Q4 2024, when premiums exceeded 100%) are unlikely to recur.

## 6 Conclusion

Strategy has built a capital structure without historical precedent: a synthetic credit hierarchy where every tranche, from senior convertible debt to junior preferred shares to common equity, is backed by a single volatile asset. The structure creates the appearance of diversification through seniority while offering none of its substance. When Bitcoin falls, everyone falls together; seniority determines only the order of losses.

## 6.1 Key Findings

The event study provides the central result. MSTR raises capital at an average NAV premium of 127% — roughly  $2.3\times$  the value of its Bitcoin holdings. Premiums decline post-issuance as the market prices in dilution. This timing behavior is the operational signature of reflexive capital formation. The premium persistence result ( $\beta = 1.002$ ) explains why it works: premium states are sticky, giving management time to execute raises during favorable conditions.

The credit analysis is simple arithmetic. At \$95,000 BTC, Strategy has a  $4.25\times$  asset/debt ratio. Bitcoin would need to fall 76% before equity is wiped out. This is healthier than earlier periods in the company's history. But the leverage works both ways: a 50% BTC decline produces a 65% equity decline.

Different stakeholders have asymmetric exposures. Convertible arbitrageurs profit from volatility through gamma scalping. Retail equity holders bear leveraged directional risk. Preferred shareholders collect yield but face impairment in severe scenarios, with STRD holders (non-cumulative) bearing the worst risk-reward.

## 6.2 What I Contribute

This thesis documents reflexive capital formation at the firm level using a straightforward event study methodology. The finding that MSTR systematically times capital raises to premium windows transforms the reflexivity claim from theoretical to observable.

I analyze the capital structure using asset/debt ratios and breakeven prices rather than Merton model outputs that assume away Bitcoin's defining characteristics. The resulting analysis is simpler and more defensible.

I describe how convertible arbitrage creates value extraction opportunities for sophisticated investors at the expense of retail equity holders, without attempting to quantify the exact magnitude.

## 6.3 Practical Implications

For investors: understand the option-like payoff before taking positions. MSTR equity offers leveraged exposure to Bitcoin, which is attractive in bull markets and devastating in bear markets. Preferred holders should assess cumulative versus non-cumulative features. Convertible arbitrageurs are positioned to profit regardless of direction.

For corporate treasurers: MSTR demonstrates creative use of zero-coupon converts and preferred shares, but single-asset concentration creates risks most firms would find unacceptable.

For regulators: the case raises questions about investment company classification and retail investor protection in structures where sophisticated participants extract value through mechanisms retail investors may not understand.



## 6.4 Limitations and Future Research

The event study sample is small. The analysis period is dominated by a bull market. The breakeven calculations assume orderly liquidation. How the structure performs through a prolonged multi-year bear market remains untested.

The comparative analysis in Section 5.8 confirms that these fragilities are structural rather than idiosyncratic: smaller DATCOs experience amplified versions of the same reflexive dynamics, with several facing forced liquidation or closure. Future research could use higher-frequency data to better capture arbitrage effects, model the systemic risk posed by correlated DATCO liquidations, and assess regulatory frameworks for crypto-backed corporate structures.

## 6.5 Closing

Strategy's approach represents an extreme point in corporate capital structure design. By holding 713,502 BTC against \$15.9 billion in claims, management has created a mechanism that generates value when conditions are favorable and risk when they're not. Whether the reflexive loop proves durable depends on Bitcoin prices cooperating, volatility staying elevated, and capital markets staying open. History suggests all three conditions fail periodically.



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## A Data Sources

Table 12: Data Sources and Descriptions

Data	Source	Description
BTC/USD Price	Yahoo Finance	Daily closing prices
MSTR Price	Yahoo Finance	Daily adjusted closing prices
BTC Holdings	SEC Filings	Quarterly 10-Q/10-K disclosures
Convertible Terms	SEC Filings	Prospectus supplements
Preferred Terms	SEC Filings	8-K announcements

## B Python Code

Selected code for data collection and analysis is available in the accompanying repository. The `data_collection.py` script downloads price data from Yahoo Finance. The `reflexivity_analysis.py` script runs premium persistence and event study analysis.

## C Convertible Note Details

Table 13: Strategy Convertible Note Issues (January 2026)

Issue	Principal	Coupon	Maturity	Conv Price	Status
Dec 2020	\$650M	0.75%	Dec 2025	\$39.80	Called Jul 2024
Feb 2021	\$1.05B	0.00%	Feb 2027	\$143.20	Called Feb 2025
Mar 2024	\$604M	0.875%	Mar 2031	\$232.72	Outstanding
Jun 2024	\$800M	2.25%	Jun 2032	\$204.33	Outstanding
Sep 2024	\$1.01B	0.625%	Sep 2028	\$183.19	Outstanding
Nov 2024	\$3.0B	0.00%	Dec 2029	\$672.40	Outstanding
Feb 2025	\$2.0B	0.00%	Mar 2030	\$433.43	Outstanding
<b>Outstanding</b>	<b>\$7.4B</b>				

Note: Conversion prices are post-split (10:1, Aug 2024). Maturities are staggered from 2028 to 2032, with weighted average maturity of approximately 4.5 years. Two earlier issues (Dec 2020 and Feb 2021) were called and no longer outstanding.

## D Granger Causality Tests

The Granger causality tests examine whether the NAV premium predicts BTC returns or vice versa. If both directions are significant, it suggests bidirectional feedback. If only one is significant, it indicates the predominant direction of causation.

Table 14: Granger Causality Test Results

Null Hypothesis	Lags	F-stat	p-value	Conclusion
Premium $\nrightarrow$ BTC	5	0.90	0.479	Fail to reject
BTC $\nrightarrow$ Premium	5	1.90	0.092	Marginal

The results show suggestive asymmetric causality. BTC returns marginally Granger-cause the NAV premium ( $p = 0.092$ ), while the premium doesn't predict future BTC returns ( $p = 0.479$ ). This is consistent with MSTR being a price-taker in Bitcoin markets, not a price-maker. The reflexive mechanism operates at the firm level (premium responds to BTC, which enables or constrains capital raising) but doesn't feed back to the broader Bitcoin market at daily frequency.

## E Extended Sensitivity Analysis

Table 15 provides capital structure metrics across a wider range of BTC prices, based on 713,502 BTC holdings and \$15.9B in total claims.

Table 15: Extended Capital Structure Sensitivity

BTC Price	NAV (\$B)	Asset/Debt	Equity (\$B)
\$150,000	107.0	6.71×	91.1
\$120,000	85.6	5.37×	69.7
\$95,000	67.8	4.25×	51.8
\$70,000	49.9	3.13×	34.0
\$50,000	35.7	2.24×	19.7
\$35,000	25.0	1.57×	9.0
\$22,346	15.9	1.00×	0

## F Robustness Checks

The main findings are stable across alternative specifications:

**Premium persistence.** Using 5, 10, or 20 lags in the autoregressive specification yields coefficients between 0.97 and 1.00, all indicating high persistence.

**Event study windows.** Testing alternative windows (3, 7, 15 days) produces qualitatively similar results: pre-event premiums are consistently elevated, and the post-event decline pattern is robust across window specifications.

**Sample splits.** Dividing the sample into pre-2024 (initial accumulation) and post-2024 (aggressive expansion) periods yields consistent patterns in both subsamples.

**Control variables.** Including VIX and S&P 500 returns as controls in the premium regression does not materially affect the persistence coefficient.