OS SECURITY:


Operating systems

- ► An OS provides the interface between the users of a computer and that computer's hardware.
- ► The OS handles the management of low-level hardware resources:
 - disk drives.
 - CPU.
 - RAM,
 - I/O devices, and
 - network interfaces

OS provides a IVI. of abstraction for developers to write programs w/o having to handle low-IVI. details

Multi-tasking 2

OSes must allow multiple application programs to run at the same time.



Hence the OS needs to ensure tht. the execution of one process must not be able to alter the exec. of another process

User

Application

Operating system


Hardware

2 REASONS WHY WE NEED OS SECURITY:



Multi-users

OSes must allow for multiple users with potentially different levels of access to the same computer.



The OS needs to have a mechanism to isolate users from one another


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Essential Unix architecture

Execution modes:

- resources through syscall to kernel
- Kernel mode direct access to resources

System calls are usually contained in a collection of programs, eg. a library such as the C library libc




-P allow apps. to request the the kernel performs actions on their behalf

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Processes and process management

- A process is an instance of a program that is currently executing.
- ► To actually be executed the program must be loaded into RAM and (uniquely identified.)
- ▶ Each process running is identified by a unique process ID (pid).
- ▶ To a pid, we can associate its CPU time, memory usage, user ID (uid), program name, etc.
- ► A process might control other processes (fork).
- ► Child process inherits context from parent process.




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x86 registers

- ► Temporary registers: \%eax, %ebx, %ecx, %edx, %edi, %esi
 - These registers are like variables built in the processor
 - Most of the instructions perform on these registers
- Extended stack pointer: %esp
 - Points at the top of the stack
- ▶ Extended base pointer: %ebp
 - Points to the base of the stack frame of the current function call

x86 CPU/Memory



Pointer to the current Instruction

- To actually be executed the program must be loaded into RAM and uniquely identified
- The RAM memory allocated to a process is its address space
- It contains both the code for the running program, its input data, and its working memory
- Memory stores instructions and data
- CPU interprets instructions


void main() {

function(1,2,3);


- %eip points to next instruction
- %eip incremented after each instruction
- %eip modified by call, ret, jmp, and conditional jmp

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
x86 process memory layout (simplified) FOF A PROCESS:



Stack frame



x86 runtime memory - an example



5 CORE SECURITY PRINCIPLES



Defence-in-depth

Stack and functions: Summary

Calling function

- 1. Push arguments onto the stack (in reverse)
- 2. Push the return address, i.e., the address of the instruction to run after control returns
- 3. Jump to the function's address

Called function

- 4. Push the old frame pointer onto the stack (%ebp)
- Set frame pointer (%ebp) to where the end of the stack is right now (%esp)
- 6. Push local variables onto the stack


Returning function

- 7. Reset the previous stack frame: %esp = %ebp, %ebp = (%ebp)
- 8. Jump back to return address: %eip = 4(%ebp)

- Security protections built in multiple layers of the system: if one mechanism fails, another steps up immediately behind to thwart attacks
- Firewalls, intrusion detection and protection systems, network segmentation, anti-virus, least privilege, strong passwords, patch management




► Users and programs should only access the data and resources required to perform its function



RESTRICT , ACCESSES

► A torch application does not need access to your location, photos, camera, microphone, wifi, device id, to perform its intended task!

Privilege separation



This will allow you to implement the least privilege

- ► Segment the system into components to which we can limit access Princple
- ▶ Will limit the damage caused by a security break of any individual component

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Open design (Kerckhoff's principle)

- ▶ The security of a mechanism should not depend on its secrecy
- ▶ The design and implementation details always get leaked (!)

Economy of mechanism

When designing a security mechanism keep it simple!

It will facilitate the job of security researchers and allow verification

It will facilitate the task of developers and avoid bugs

It will facilitate the life of users and avoid misuses