

Participatory Ownership Models in a Post-Labor Economy

As automation and capital increasingly dominate production, **participatory ownership models** offer ways to broadly share wealth beyond wage labor ¹ ². Over the last century, governments and communities worldwide have experimented with public, cooperative, and hybrid ownership structures that generate shared dividends or social benefits. This global survey spans national sovereign wealth funds and state policies down to municipal trusts, cooperatives, and community funds. Each example includes empirical outcomes – financial returns, distribution mechanisms, and social impacts – to illuminate best practices in different contexts.

National Wealth Funds and Sovereign Dividends

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) harness natural resource or public assets to benefit all citizens. A flagship example is the **Alaska Permanent Fund (APF)** in the United States. Established in 1976 to invest at least 25% of state oil royalties ³ ⁴, the APF has grown to over **\$64 billion**. Every Alaskan resident – man, woman, and child – receives an **annual dividend**, typically **\$1,000–\$2,000 per person** (e.g. **\$1,114 in 2021**; a family of four got \$4,456) ⁵. The largest payout was \$3,269 in 2008 ⁶. These oil-funded dividends have measurably reduced poverty and inequality: long-term studies show the APF lowered Alaskans in poverty by **20–40%** (with especially large gains for rural Indigenous households) ⁷ ⁸. Despite fears that free income could discourage work, research finds **no negative effect on employment** in Alaska ⁹. In fact, by providing a universal capital income, the fund made Alaska one of the most income-equal states ¹⁰. The dividend enjoys broad public support – **81% of Alaskans say** it improves their quality of life ¹¹ – illustrating how universal, transparent distribution builds political durability.

Another prominent SWF is **Norway's Government Pension Fund Global**, which invests the nation's oil revenues. As of 2025 it is the world's largest sovereign fund at **\$1.7–\$1.8 trillion** in assets ¹², equivalent to over \$300,000 per Norwegian. While Norway's fund doesn't pay checks to individuals, it follows a strict **"fiscal rule"**: the government may spend only around **3% of the fund's value** annually (roughly equal to the expected real return) on public services ¹³ ¹⁴. In 2025, this sustainable drawdown will provide about **\$50 billion** for Norway's national budget ¹⁵ – effectively a shared national dividend financing education, healthcare, and pensions for current and future generations. By investing abroad and limiting withdrawals, Norway has avoided the "resource curse," converting oil wealth into a perpetual endowment that upholds a generous welfare state.

Several countries have tried direct wealth-sharing with mixed results. **Macao (China)**, a casino-driven economy, has since 2008 run a **"Wealth Partaking Scheme"** that simply gives annual cash to all residents. In 2024, each permanent resident received **MOP 10,000** (about **\$1,250**) and others MOP 6,000 ¹⁶ ¹⁷. Covering ~748,000 people, the payout totaled MOP 7.36 billion (>\$900 million) ¹⁸. This scheme returns excess casino-tax revenue to the public, bolstering consumption and living standards. On a smaller scale, **Bolivia** uses resource dividends for social policy: its **Renta Dignidad** (started 2008) is a universal old-age pension funded largely by natural gas revenues. It pays every Bolivian over 60 about **\$50 per month**

(130 Bolivianos) ¹⁹ . This stipend – roughly 20% of minimum wage – has achieved **91% pension coverage** (versus ~14% before) ²⁰ and sharply cut poverty among the elderly, especially in rural areas ²¹ .

Not all experiments have endured. **Mongolia** briefly implemented a “resource dividend” during a mining boom. A **Human Development Fund** was set up in 2009 to share new mining wealth; from 2010–2012 it paid **monthly cash stipends to every citizen** ²² . At its peak, Mongolians received around **MNT 96,000** (~\$34) quarterly as dividends ²³ . The universal payments – totaling nearly 3% of GDP in social transfers ²⁴ – helped **cut poverty** even through economic downturns ²⁵ . However, when commodity prices fell, the government shifted to a targeted child benefit in 2012 ²⁶ , as the universal scheme became fiscally unsustainable ²⁷ . Similarly, **Iran’s “Justice Shares”** program (mid-2000s) distributed shares of state-owned companies to over **40 million citizens** to democratize privatization ²⁸ . Early on, dividends yielded about **\$80 per person** ²⁹ , and inequality dipped slightly ³⁰ . But many recipients lacked influence over corporate governance, and dividend payouts later stalled ³⁰ . The lesson is that **broad asset distribution alone isn’t enough** – robust institutions are needed to generate and sustain returns for citizens.

State and Regional Ownership Initiatives

Subnational governments have also created participatory ownership systems. In the United States, **North Dakota’s state-owned bank** stands out. The **Bank of North Dakota (BND)**, founded in 1919, is the only state bank in the country. Mandated to promote local commerce and agriculture, BND partners with community banks to expand credit and returns profits to the public ³¹ ³² . It has been remarkably successful: over 1996–2016, BND generated **\$1 billion in profits**, and contributed **nearly \$400 million** of that to North Dakota’s general budget (about **\$3,300 per household** in public revenues) ³³ . In recent years it earned record profits (e.g. **\$192.7 million in 2023**, an 18% return on investment) ³⁴ . These earnings help fund schools and infrastructure, essentially a shared dividend from a public financial enterprise. BND’s model – professional management with a public mandate – has also kept local banks robust (ND has the most local banks per capita in the U.S.) ³⁵ , illustrating how **public ownership can coexist with and bolster private sector partners**.

In **Switzerland**, each canton (state) often owns a **cantonal bank** that returns profits to citizens indirectly via government coffers. For example, the **Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB)** – 100% owned by Zurich’s cantonal government – reported a **CHF 1.29 billion pre-tax profit in 2024**. That year it distributed **CHF 562 million** (≈\$600 million) of its surplus to the canton and municipalities ³⁶ ³⁷ . This included a **CHF 361 million dividend to the canton** (supporting public services or tax relief) and CHF 170 million directly to local municipalities ³⁸ . ZKB has for over 150 years provided such payments, proving that **publicly owned banks can be both profitable and socially beneficial** ³⁹ ⁴⁰ . Across Switzerland, **24 cantonal banks** earned a combined **CHF 3.4 billion profit in 2021** ⁴¹ ; during COVID-19, cantons even pressed to continue bank dividends to support budgets ⁴² . This underscores a best practice: **diverse, locally controlled assets (like banks or utilities) can generate steady income streams for subnational governments**.

Public wealth funds exist at state/provincial levels too. Canada’s oil-rich Alberta created the **Heritage Fund** in 1976, which at times paid “prosperity bonuses” to residents, though it later focused on saving for government use. In contrast, Brazil offers a modern example of a **municipal sovereign fund** driving basic income. The city of **Maricá, Brazil** (pop. ~160,000) lies atop offshore oil fields and has earmarked royalties for a **local citizen’s income**. Since 2019, Maricá’s left-leaning government expanded a program called **Renda Básica da Cidadania** to reach **52,000 low-income residents** (about one-third of the city) ⁴³ ⁴⁴ . Each enrolled resident receives **130 reais per month** (≈\$64), roughly 75% of Brazil’s poverty line ⁴⁵ . A

family of four would get over half the minimum wage from this stipend ⁴⁶ . Crucially, Maricá's program is **permanent and funded by a dedicated revenue stream** – more than **60% of the city's budget comes from oil royalties** ⁴⁷ , enabling stable payments without new taxes ⁴⁸ . The city even created a **rainy-day fund** (reserving 5% of royalties) and a public **community bank** that issues the stipend in a local digital currency (the **Mumbuca**) to boost local commerce ⁴⁹ ⁴⁷ . While not yet universal, the plan is to gradually include all residents as the endowment grows ⁵⁰ . Maricá's ongoing evaluation (with 5,000 recipients in a study) is expected to yield insights on how a **municipal basic income affects inflation, employment, and well-being** in a middle-income city ⁵¹ .

Resource-producing regions often invest in **community trusts**. In the United States, several Native American tribal governments use communal ownership to share wealth. For instance, the **Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians** owns profitable casinos in North Carolina and distributes a large portion of gaming profits as **per-capita cash payments** to all tribal members. Approximately **16,000 Cherokee citizens receive around \$12,000 each per year** (split into semiannual checks) ⁵² . Such payments, ongoing since the late 1990s, have halved poverty rates and improved health and education outcomes in the community ⁵³ (notably, researchers observed that steady "casino dividends" for Cherokee families corresponded with better child development and lower crime in the region). Many other U.S. tribes and First Nations in Canada similarly issue per-capita dividends from tribe-owned enterprises (casinos, oil leases, etc.), demonstrating how **indigenous communities leverage collective assets to provide a basic income floor and social benefits**.

Community Land Trusts and Local Asset Sharing

At the local level, **community land trusts (CLTs)** and similar vehicles allow collective ownership of land and real estate to serve community needs. A CLT is typically a nonprofit trust that holds land in perpetuity to ensure it's used for affordable housing or community development. The largest example is the **Champlain Housing Trust (CHT)** in Vermont, USA. Founded in 1984 in Burlington, CHT now **owns and manages ~2,400 rental apartments and 635 owner-occupied homes** that are kept permanently affordable ⁵⁴ . This portfolio houses about **7,000 people** across three counties ⁵⁵ . The trust retains ownership of land and uses resale restrictions so that when a family sells a CLT home, it gains some equity but the home remains below market price for the next buyer. **Empirical outcomes:** CHT's model has helped low-income families build modest wealth while **preventing gentrification** – over the decades, hundreds of homes that would have escalated in price instead stayed affordable for new buyers. Studies show CLT homeowners in Burlington gain equity (through paid-down mortgages and a portion of appreciation) yet the housing costs remain ~25% lower than market, **expanding homeownership access** without perpetual subsidies. By removing land from speculative markets, CLTs **stabilize neighborhoods and tax bases** long-term. Many U.S. cities (and UK communities) have replicated this model for housing, commercial spaces, and even local farms, using ground-leases and communal stewardship to generate **community "dividends" in the form of below-market rents, housing security, and retained local wealth**.

Communities have also pioneered **neighborhood-level investment trusts** akin to small-scale REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts). A notable case is the **East Portland Community Investment Trust (CIT)** in Oregon, USA – a project that allowed ordinary residents to collectively buy a commercial property in their neighborhood. In 2014, a nonprofit (Mercy Corps) acquired a blighted strip mall (Plaza 122) and then offered local low-income households the chance to **buy shares for \$10-\$100 per month**. Between 2017 and 2024, **328 residents became investor-owners** in this CIT ⁵⁶ . The trust used tenant rents to pay expenses and distribute returns. Over five years, the CIT paid **annual dividends averaging a 7.6% return**

to investors ⁵⁷ ⁵⁶ . By 2024 the **share value nearly doubled from \$10 to \$19.65** ⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ , helping families build savings. Investors could cash out for needs like home down-payments or education – indeed, 80 participants withdrew a total \$146,000 for such goals ⁵⁶ ⁶⁰ . Equally important, the once half-empty Plaza 122 was revitalized: the trust **upgraded the property and cut vacancy from 33% to under 10%**, attracting 26 local businesses (many minority-owned) ⁶¹ . The **social impact** has been profound: participants report feeling more empowered (“a wonderful way to feel connected to my community and to save money” says one investor) and **90% reinvested each year** ⁶² ⁶³ . This “**neighborhood REIT**” **model** is now being replicated in at least **19 other communities** with support from philanthropy ⁶⁴ . It shows that with the right legal structure and financial education (CIT required an investor course “Moving from Owing to Owning”), even families of modest means can become collective landlords – securing an **asset stake in their neighborhood’s future development** and sharing the profits.

Cooperative Enterprises and Employee Ownership

Cooperatives – enterprises owned and governed by their members – are a long-standing participatory ownership form, spanning worker-owned firms, consumer co-ops, producer co-ops, and mutuals. One of the world’s most celebrated examples is Spain’s **Mondragón Corporation**, a federation of worker cooperatives in the Basque region. Founded in 1956 in a poor rural area, Mondragón has grown into a diversified group of **81 cooperatives** with over **70,000 employee-owners** ⁶⁵ . Its companies span manufacturing, retail, finance, and R&D, collectively generating **€10.6 billion in annual revenue** ⁶⁶ . Mondragón’s governance embodies one-person-one-vote democracy and a solidarity ethos. The **pay scale is kept very equitable**: the ratio between the highest and lowest salary is about **6:1** (versus **272:1** in large US corporations) ⁶⁷ . At year-end, worker-members vote on profit distribution – typically allocating part to **worker bonuses** (profit shares) and part to collective reserves ⁶⁸ . Mondragón coop members receive a base pay about **40% above Spain’s minimum wage** on average ⁶⁸ , plus annual profit dividends when business is good. In hard times, they have innovated ways to save jobs – for example, cooperatives can redeploy workers among sister firms or tap a mutual support fund. This was tested in 2013 when Mondragón’s large appliance coop **Fagor** went bankrupt; most displaced members were absorbed by other coops, cushioning the blow. Mondragón’s mix of **social responsibility and competitiveness** shows in its global operations: it runs international factories and research centers, yet reinvests surpluses locally to create jobs and fund education (it even started a cooperative **university** that co-trains students and workers) ⁶⁹ ⁷⁰ . The co-op also contributes to regional development – members routinely approve allocations for community projects, charities, and preserving Basque culture ⁷¹ . **Empirically**, Mondragón has proven that large industrial firms can be worker-owned and still thrive in global markets. Its resilience is notable: even amid Spain’s past recessions, Mondragón’s co-ops had significantly lower failure rates and more stable employment than comparable conventional firms, thanks to flexible wages and internal solidarity mechanisms. Key best practices include **transparent participatory governance, capped pay inequality, reinvestment of profits, and cooperative networks for scale and innovation** – all of which have sustained Mondragón for nearly 70 years.

Cooperative ownership can also succeed at **regional economy scale**. In Italy’s **Emilia-Romagna** region, a rich cooperative ecosystem has evolved over a century. Today about **8,100 cooperatives** operate in this region of 4.5 million people ⁷² , ranging from agriculture and retail co-ops to manufacturing and social cooperatives. They account for roughly **30% of Emilia-Romagna’s GDP** ⁷³ ⁷⁴ – one of the highest co-op densities in the world. In the city of Bologna, *two out of three residents* are co-op members and cooperatives produce an estimated 40% of local GDP ⁷⁵ . This extensive network (including large consumer co-ops that dominate grocery retail, and construction co-ops that rebuilt cities after WWII) correlates with **better**

economic outcomes: Emilia-Romagna has **lower unemployment and higher small-business growth** than most other Italian regions ⁷⁶. Co-ops in the region often federate into consortia for financing or marketing, and Italian law (since the Marcora Act of 1985) even supports worker buyouts of failing firms by forming cooperatives. The **Emilia-Romagna experience** highlights how **policy support and cooperative culture can mainstream participatory ownership** – spreading risk and reward among many stakeholders and anchoring wealth locally.

Employee ownership is not confined to formally cooperative companies. Many private firms use **Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)** or similar schemes to share equity with workers. In the United States, ESOPs have expanded considerably: over **6,400 companies** have ESOP plans, covering **10.1 million employees** with **\$1.8 trillion in assets** ⁷⁷. The average ESOP participant holds **\$180,000** in stock wealth in their company's ESOP trust ⁷⁷ – a substantial nest egg that is on top of wages. Studies show ESOP workers typically enjoy **equal or higher pay** than peers at non-ESOP firms, and often get **additional benefits** like profit-sharing and better retirement plans ⁷⁸. ESOP companies also appear to be more stable in downturns; for example, during the 2008–09 recession, ESOP firms laid off employees at **1/3 to 1/2** the rate of other firms, on average. This stability is attributed to higher employee engagement and the firms' longer-term outlook. However, ESOP adoption has grown only modestly (roughly 200–300 new plans per year in the US ⁷⁹), partly due to complex regulations. Still, **18% of U.S. workers now have some ownership stake in their employer** via ESOPs, stock grants, or cooperatives ⁸⁰ – indicating a significant shift toward democratizing capital. In other countries like the UK, employee ownership trusts (EOTs) have similarly enabled company founders to transfer ownership to employees (the John Lewis Partnership, a major UK retailer with ~80,000 employees, has been employee-owned since 1929 and historically shared annual profits as employee bonuses, though its payouts vary with performance). **Best practices for employee ownership** include providing workers with real decision-making power (not just stock), education on financial literacy, and mechanisms to prevent excessive concentration of risk in workers' portfolios.

Consumer cooperatives and credit unions demonstrate participatory ownership for customers. Globally, the cooperative movement counts over **1 billion members** across all types of co-ops. In finance alone, **credit unions worldwide now serve 411 million members** and hold **\$3.7 trillion in assets** ⁸¹. Because they are member-owned, credit unions typically offer better rates or patronage dividends. For example, Canadian credit unions return profits to members as lower loan interest and annual rebate checks; in the U.S., credit union members saw an average of \$85 per capita in direct financial benefits in 2022 through lower fees and higher savings yields. Likewise, large consumer co-ops (like Coop Switzerland or Japan's Co-op Kobe) distribute year-end patronage dividends proportional to members' purchases. These models don't usually provide a livable income by themselves, but they **recycle surplus value back to the community of users**, effectively raising disposable income and aligning services with community needs. **Mutual insurance companies** follow a similar model, often refunding premiums to policyholders when claims are lower than expected.

Resource Commons and Environmental Trusts

Innovative ownership models are emerging to manage **natural commons** – from land and forests to carbon emissions – for shared benefit. A contemporary example can be seen in community-managed carbon offset projects that generate revenue through **carbon credits** and share it locally. In **Kenya**, the small towns of Gazi Bay and Makongeni created **Mikoko Pamoja** (Swahili for “Mangroves Together”), the world's first **community-led blue carbon project**. Established in 2013, Mikoko Pamoja protects **615 hectares of mangrove forest** and sells the carbon sequestration as offsets on the voluntary market

⁸² ⁸³ . Each year it generates about **3,000 carbon credits** ($\approx 2,500$ tons CO₂) for sale ⁸⁴ . **Income from these credit sales – over \$25,000 per year – flows directly back to the two villages** ⁸⁵ . Rather than individual payouts, the community collectively decides on local development projects. Thus far, Mikoko Pamoja funds have built **clean water wells (boreholes)** serving hundreds of schoolchildren, improved school facilities, and supported fishing livelihoods ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ . This model effectively turns global carbon finance into a **local shared dividend** for conservation: villagers earn community-wide benefits (water infrastructure, education, jobs) as a reward for stewarding the carbon-rich mangroves. It has also bolstered local incomes (through paid roles in replanting and monitoring) and won international acclaim as a best-practice in equitable climate action ⁸⁸ . Similar **carbon benefit-sharing schemes** are underway elsewhere – e.g. indigenous forest communities in the Amazon and Congo basins receive portions of REDD+ carbon payments, often via community trust funds for health and education projects. The key lesson is that when **local stakeholders have ownership stakes in environmental assets**, they become partners in sustainability. Ensuring transparent benefit-sharing (whether via cash stipends, community services, or resource rights) is crucial to align economic incentives with conservation.

Communities have also organized to own **renewable energy assets** together. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Germany's **Energiewende (energy transition)**. Policy enabled citizens, co-ops, and farmers to invest in solar panels, wind turbines, and bioenergy – often collectively. By 2016, **private individuals owned 31.5% of Germany's renewable power capacity** (the single largest ownership group), with farmers owning another 10.5% ⁸⁹ ⁹⁰ . In other words, **over 42% of Germany's 100 GW of renewables was community-owned** ⁹¹ ⁹² . In wind energy specifically, local citizen cooperatives and partnerships owned an estimated **39% of wind capacity** ⁹⁰ . Tens of thousands of Germans joined **energy cooperatives (Energiegenossenschaften)** – over **1,000 such co-ops** had formed by 2016, counting **180,000+ members** who pooled capital for wind farms, solar parks, or district heating networks ⁹³ ⁹⁴ . These energy co-ops typically offer modest but reliable returns: a survey of 850 co-ops found an average annual **dividend of 3.4%** to members ⁹⁵ , with many co-ops reinvesting profits in new projects. The average citizen investor put in about €3,700, with minimum shares as low as €10–€100 so that even those of limited means could participate ⁹⁶ . Besides direct dividends, the **social dividends** have been substantial – local ownership built public support for renewables (“Not in my backyard” turned into “build it in our backyard, we’ll profit”) and kept economic benefits local. Studies show regions with cooperatively owned wind projects see **higher local acceptance and more spending retained in the community**, compared to developer-owned projects. Denmark saw a similar phenomenon: in the 1980s–90s, government required new wind turbines to offer shares to local residents, resulting in thousands of Danish families co-owning windmills. By 2001, an estimated **86% of Denmark's wind capacity was locally owned**, often via co-ops, which greatly normalized wind farms in the landscape. Although the energy industry has since consolidated (Germany's citizen share has declined from ~47% in 2012 as utilities and funds invest more ⁹⁷ ⁹⁸), the **early majority-citizen ownership of renewables** in Germany and Denmark demonstrates how participatory models can rapidly scale a new technology while spreading its financial gains widely.

Best Practices and Governance Insights

Across these diverse cases – from national wealth funds to neighborhood trusts – several **common principles** emerge for effective participatory ownership:

- **Clear Purpose and Rules:** Successful models have well-defined missions and legal frameworks that prioritize long-term common benefit. Alaska's fund enshrined a permanent mineral revenue share for citizens ³ , and Norway's fund set strict caps on spending ¹⁴ . This guards against political

whims or elite capture. Clarity that assets are held **in trust for future generations or community welfare** builds legitimacy.

- **Professional Management, Democratic Oversight:** The most resilient examples blend strong governance with popular participation. Norway's and Alaska's funds are managed by investment professionals at arm's length from politicians, but their payouts (or spending rules) are set by democratic mandate. Mondragón's co-ops compete in markets with professional management, but strategic decisions and profit allocations are voted on by worker-members ⁶⁸. This balance ensures both **efficiency and accountability**.
- **Broad Inclusion:** The impact on equity and social cohesion is greatest when participation is broad-based. Universal or wide eligibility (all residents, all workers, etc.) avoids stigmatizing beneficiaries and secures broad buy-in. The APF dividend's universality is key to its 80%+ approval ¹¹. Emilia-Romagna's co-op sector involves two-thirds of citizens ⁷³. Inclusive models also tend to have more **staying power** (it's hard to retract benefits that most people receive).
- **Reinvestment and Education:** Many participatory ventures devote part of returns to capacity-building. Co-ops often reinvest profits in expansion or community education (Mondragón runs its own university; German energy co-ops reinvested to grow 2.5 GW of projects by 2017 ⁹⁹). Programs like the Portland CIT provided mandatory financial education, empowering participants to make the most of their ownership ¹⁰⁰. **Human capital and financial literacy** are crucial to maximize the social impact of shared ownership.
- **Shielding Wealth for Public Benefit:** A frequent challenge is preventing the privatization or dissipation of the common asset. Best practices include legal locks or incentives to keep assets in trust. Community land trusts employ ground leases to retain land ownership. Many co-ops (e.g. in Italy) have "indivisible reserves" that can't be cashed out if the co-op dissolves – they must transfer to another co-op, preserving cooperative capital for public good. Alaska's constitution bars spending the Permanent Fund principal, allowing only earnings as dividends. These mechanisms ensure the **wealth fund or common asset remains intact** to serve multiple generations.
- **Fair Distribution Mechanisms:** Whether distributing cash or services, transparent formulas build trust. Alaska's dividend is a simple equal per-person payout – seen as fair and easy to administer. Cherokee casino payments are equal per capita (with minors' shares held in trust). In co-ops, patronage dividends proportional to one's transactions or labor contribution are common, perceived as just. **Transparency** in accounting and distribution prevents perceptions of favoritism and secures long-term support.
- **Complementary Institutions:** Participatory ownership works best within a supportive ecosystem of policies and institutions. Germany's citizen energy boom was enabled by **feed-in tariffs** (guaranteed payment for renewable generation) ¹⁰¹ and accessible cooperative legal forms ¹⁰². ESOPs thrive with tax incentives and employee training programs. In Preston, UK, a recent "community wealth building" initiative saw the city government prioritize procurement from co-ops and local ESOP firms, boosting their success. In short, aligning public policy (tax, subsidy, procurement, legal codes) with participatory ownership amplifies its impact.

- **Adaptability and Risk Management:** Some experiments failed or needed adjustments – providing lessons in what to avoid. Mongolia’s universal dividends proved unsustainable when they outpaced resource revenues ²⁵, highlighting the need for prudent reserve management. Iran’s Justice Shares showed that simply handing out shares without giving new owners voice or liquidity can limit impact ^{103 29}. Modern proposals for “social wealth funds” suggest giving citizens not just assets but also representation in fund governance to avoid such pitfalls. Many co-ops have stumbled when expanding beyond their participatory culture (e.g. some demutualized, like the UK’s building societies in the 1980s, which led to short-term windfalls but long-term loss of member control). **Governance structures must evolve** as scale grows – for example, Mondragón had to institute complex federation rules and secondary co-ops (for finance, R&D, social security) to manage an enterprise of 70,000 worker-owners.

In a *post-labor* future – where capital ownership may matter more for distribution than jobs – these models provide **proven architectures for shared prosperity**. From Alaska to Maricá, Basel to Kerala (where India’s largest co-op bank and worker collectives flourish), communities have shown that democratizing ownership can reduce inequality, strengthen social cohesion, and give people a stake in the economy’s future. **Participatory ownership models work at all scales:** national funds can endow every citizen with a basic dividend, while neighborhood co-ops can anchor wealth on a single block. The **most effective systems blend public and private ingenuity** – for instance, a public trust fund investing in private markets but paying a social dividend, or a hybrid public-coop partnership (as seen when German municipalities partner with citizen co-ops on energy projects ¹⁰⁴).

As we plan for a century in which labor’s share may continue to shrink ^{105 106}, scaling up these participatory ownership mechanisms will be critical. They offer a path to **“widely shared and democratically governed” wealth** ², mitigating the risks of automation and inequality by ensuring everyone – workers, residents, and future generations – **owns a piece of the value created**. The rich global experience of the last 100 years suggests that with prudent governance, transparency, and inclusive design, participatory ownership can deliver not only economic dividends, but also greater civic engagement and resilience in the face of economic change. It is a promising foundation on which to build a more equitable post-labor economy.

Sources: The analysis above integrates data and findings from a broad range of case studies and reports, including government and academic evaluations of the Alaska Permanent Fund ^{5 10}, Norway’s sovereign fund disclosures ¹³, Latin American basic income programs ^{45 44}, tribal revenue distribution reports ⁵², community land trust statistics ⁵⁴, community investment trust outcomes ^{57 56}, cooperative sector research from Spain, Italy, and the U.S. ^{68 77}, and energy/community ownership studies from Germany, Kenya, and beyond ^{90 85}. These sources are cited inline to substantiate the empirical claims and provide further reading on each example.

1 2 105 106 labour.org.uk

<https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Alternative-Models-of-Ownership.pdf>

3 4 5 6 9 10 11 The Alaska Permanent Fund: A model for a Universal Basic Dividend? - Earth4All

<https://earth4all.life/views/the-alaska-permanent-fund/>

7 A rising tide that lifts all boats: Long-term effects of the Alaska ...

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pop4.398>

8 Long-term effects of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend on poverty

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380920911_A_rising_tide_that_lifts_all_boats_Long-term_effects_of_the_Alaska_Permanent_Fund_Dividend_on_poverty

12 Government Pension Fund of Norway - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Pension_Fund_of_Norway

13 How should Norway spend its cash? Solve global problems, says ...

<https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/how-should-norway-spend-its-cash-solve-global-problems-says-citizen-panel-2025-05-13/>

14 Norway rethinks €1.7 trillion sovereign fund to boost support for ...

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/norway-rethinks-e1-7-trillion-sovereign-fund-to-boost-support-for-ukraine/>

15 Norway to raise 2025 wealth fund spending to \$52 bln - Reuters

<https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/norway-raise-2025-wealth-fund-spending-52-bln-2025-05-15/>

16 Cash handouts continue in 2025 budget - Macau Daily Times

<https://macaudailytimes.com.mo/cash-handouts-continue-in-2025-budget.html>

17 Got your cash handout yet? - Macao News

<https://macaonews.org/news/city/macau-wealth-partaking-scheme-cash-handouts-macao/>

18 Low-income earners deserve greater cash handout: observer

<https://www.macaubusiness.com/low-income-earners-deserve-greater-cash-handout-observer/>

19 The unintended effects of a noncontributory pension program during ...

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9188659/>

20 [PDF] Redistribution of wealth and old age social protection in Bolivia

<https://www.helppage.org/silo/files/redistribution-of-wealth-and-old-age-social-protection-in-bolivia.pdf>

21 Intended and Unintended Effects of Unconditional Cash Transfers

<https://publications.iadb.org/en/intended-and-unintended-effects-unconditional-cash-transfers-case-bolivas-renta-dignidad>

22 24 25 26 Mongolia: The Hidden Welfare Champion? - BTI Blog

<https://blog.bti-project.org/2016/08/09/mongolia-hidden-welfare-champion/>

23 Mongolia's resource-to-cash transfers | BIEN

<https://basicincome.org/news/2020/09/mongolias-resource-to-cash-transfers/>

27 [PDF] Resources-to-cash: a cautionary tale from Mongolia

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2661202_code1669161.pdf?abstractid=2661202&mirid=1

28 Islamic Republic of Iran in: IMF Staff Country Reports Volume 2011 ...

<https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2011/242/article-A001-en.xml>

29 Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic: Beyond the Headlines ...

<https://mronline.org/2010/12/21/pseudo-privatization-in-the-islamic-republic-beyond-the-headlines-on-irans-economic-transformation/>

30 103 Is it possible? (The Justice Shares Mass Privatisation Case of Iran)

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2202/1944-2858.1210/pdf>

31 32 33 35 Measuring the Impact of the Bank of North Dakota (Graphs) - Institute for Local Self-Reliance

<https://ilsr.org/articles/charts-bank-north-dakota/>

34 Bank of North Dakota Releases 2023 Annual Report

<https://bnd.nd.gov/bank-of-north-dakota-releases-2023-annual-report/>

36 37 38 39 40 Profit distribution of Zürcher Kantonalbank.

<https://www.zkb.ch/en/home/investor-relations/profit-distribution.html>

41 42 Swiss Cantonal Banks are on the Rise

<https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/51861-cantonalbanks-gkb-bz-bank-investment>

43 45 46 48 Marica, Brazil, is making basic income a reality | Vox

<https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/10/30/20938236/basic-income-brazil-marica-supply-workers-party>

44 47 49 50 51 The Brazilian Town (Quietly) Experimenting with Basic Income

<https://americasquarterly.org/article/brazils-hidden-basic-income-experiment/>

52 Big Money - Tribal Government Gaming

<https://tribalgovernmentgaming.com/article/big-money/>

53 Positive income shocks and accidental deaths among Cherokee ...

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3156370/>

54 55 Housing is Healthcare

<https://nhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Champlain-Housing-Trust.pdf>

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 100 Community... | Results for America - Economic Mobility Catalog

<https://catalog.results4america.org/case-studies/community-investment-trust-portland-or>

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 'In the US they think we're communists!' The 70,000 workers showing the world another way to earn a living | Spain | The Guardian

<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2024/apr/24/in-the-us-they-think-were-communists-the-70000-workers-showing-the-world-another-way-to-earn-a-living>

72 EMILIA-ROMAGNA - Economy - CIRCABC

https://circabc.europa.eu/webdav/CircaBC/ESTAT/regportraits/Information/itd5_eco.htm

73 The Italian Region Where Co-ops Produce a Third of Its GDP

<https://www.yesmagazine.org/economy/2016/07/05/the-italian-place-where-co-ops-drive-the-economy-and-most-people-are-members>

74 The Italian region where 30% of GDP comes from cooperatives

<https://apolitical.co/solution-articles/en/italian-region-30-gdp-comes-cooperatives>

75 Italy's Emilia Romagna | Cooperative Grocer Archives

<https://archives.grocer.coop/articles/italys-emilia-romagna>

76 Co-ops in Emilia Romagna - Lowimpact.org

<https://www.lowimpact.org/posts/why-is-the-co-operative-movement-so-successful-in-emilia-romagna-with-matt-hancock-no-not-that-one/>

77 78 79 80 Employee Ownership and ESOPs: What We Know from Recent Research - The Aspen Institute

<https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/employee-ownership-and-esops-what-we-know-from-recent-research-2/>

81 Report Finds Global CU Membership Showing Strong Growth

<https://www.cutimes.com/2024/10/17/report-finds-global-cu-membership-showing-strong-growth/>

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 Kenya's Mikoko Pamoja: A Blueprint for Blue Carbon and Coastal Conservation -

<https://cbei.blog/kenyas-mikoko-pamoja-a-blueprint-for-blue-carbon-and-coastal-conservation/>

89 90 Citizens own one third of German renewables capacity | Clean Energy Wire

<https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/coalition-transport-agreement-citizens-own-one-third-renewables/citizens-own-one-third-german-renewables-capacity>

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 101 102 104 Citizens' participation in the Energiewende | Clean Energy Wire

<https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/citizens-participation-energiewende>