

# The History and Impact of General-Purpose Technologies: From the Wheel to the Internet

## Introduction

General-purpose technologies (GPTs) are transformative innovations that drive broad economic and social changes across many sectors of society. Unlike narrow-use tools, GPTs have far-reaching effects on productivity and life, often inaugurating new eras (e.g. the Industrial Revolution or the Information Age) <sup>1</sup>. Archetypal examples include the steam engine, electricity, and the computer, each of which catalyzed waves of complementary innovations and reorganized economies on a large scale <sup>1</sup>. This report provides a comprehensive historical survey of GPTs – from the ancient technologies of the wheel and writing to modern advancements like electricity and the internet – examining their characteristics, diffusion, economic models of impact, case studies, and the downstream economic and political ramifications of their adoption. The analysis is global in scope, noting how different societies developed or adopted these technologies. In covering these themes, we will see **how and why GPTs are so disruptive and transformative**, and why economists call them the “engines of growth” <sup>2</sup>. Throughout, we ignore recent GPT candidates like advanced AI or robotics (as per the prompt) to focus on historical and modern pre-digital examples.

## What Are General-Purpose Technologies? Characteristics and Theoretical Perspectives

Economists formally define a *general-purpose technology* as an innovation with three key characteristics: **(1) Pervasiveness** – it spreads across many industries and becomes widely used as an essential input; **(2) Continuous Improvement** – it has the potential for ongoing technical enhancements, increasing in efficiency or capability over time; and **(3) Innovational Complementarities** – the technology makes it easier to invent and produce new products or processes in downstream sectors <sup>2</sup>. In other words, as a GPT improves, it boosts the productivity of R&D and innovation in other industries, spawning *complementary innovations* that further propel economic growth <sup>3</sup>. Because of these properties, GPTs tend to generate *increasing returns to scale*: their impact snowballs as they diffuse more widely and as complementary innovations accumulate <sup>4</sup>. Classic works by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) dubbed GPTs “Engines of growth,” noting that entire epochs of economic progress (e.g. the age of steam or of semiconductors) appear to be driven by such pivotal technologies <sup>5</sup>.

Economist Richard Lipsey and colleagues have identified only a few dozen true GPTs across all of human history <sup>6</sup>. By their criteria, a “transforming” GPT is a single recognizable technology that initially has much room for improvement, eventually becomes widely used across the economy for many different purposes, and creates significant spillover effects beyond its original domain <sup>7</sup>. Many innovations are important, but only a subset meet this high bar. For example, the internal combustion engine enabled automobiles, airplanes, and mechanized transportation generally – a broad impact classifying it as a GPT – whereas a more specific invention like the telegraph, though revolutionary for communication, was more limited in scope and eventually subsumed by broader ICT networks. GPTs can be products (e.g. the microprocessor

chip), processes (e.g. mass production assembly lines), or even organizational systems (e.g. the factory system or “lean” production methods) <sup>8</sup> .

**Productivity Impact and Diffusion:** A striking pattern with GPTs is that their full economic benefits often **take considerable time to materialize**. In some cases, the initial introduction of a GPT may **decrease measured productivity growth before boosting it**, as economies undergo adjustment <sup>9</sup> . New infrastructure must be built, workers must acquire new skills, organizations must restructure, and old technologies/skills become obsolete – all of which can create short-term inefficiencies or transitional costs. Brynjolfsson et al. (2021) describe this as a productivity “*J-curve*”: during the early diffusion phase, much investment in *intangible capital* (like business process reorganization and human capital) is required, causing an apparent slowdown, and only later does productivity surge once the GPT is fully integrated <sup>10</sup> . Historical examples abound. **Electricity**, often cited as a prototypical GPT, was first demonstrated with a practical dynamo in the 1870s, but its **impact on aggregate productivity took nearly five decades to be realized** <sup>11</sup> . One analysis notes that electricity’s boost to U.S. manufacturing productivity did not truly surge until the 1920s, after factories had been redesigned to exploit electric motors (replacing the earlier layouts built around steam power shafts) <sup>12</sup> <sup>13</sup> . Economist Paul David famously compared this lag to the earlier “Dynamo Revolution,” showing that firms needed time to reconfigure factories away from centralized steam engines to fully leverage distributed electric power – a process that delayed productivity gains <sup>13</sup> . Similarly, the **computer** encountered the “Solow Paradox” in the 1970s–1980s (Robert Solow quipped, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics”), reflecting the delay before IT investments translated into productivity growth in the 1990s. In general, **GPT diffusion is a gradual, S-curve process**: adoption starts slow, then accelerates as the technology improves and complementary innovations appear, and eventually reaches saturation. During the slow start, existing technologies may continue to dominate or even improve (the so-called “sailing ship effect” where old tech innovates in response to new competition). But as the GPT matures and costs drop, adoption accelerates and its economy-wide impacts become unmistakable.

**Economic Growth Models:** The introduction of GPTs has been modeled in growth theory as a source of *technological revolutions* that periodically drive surges in productivity and economic expansion. Importantly, because GPTs create spillovers and complementarities, there is a risk of underinvestment in a free market – Bresnahan and Trajtenberg note that a “decentralized economy” may invest “too little, too late” in both the GPT itself and the required co-inventions <sup>14</sup> . No single firm captures all the benefits of a new foundational technology (many accrue to other sectors or consumers), which can lead to under-provision of R&D without supportive policy or visionary entrepreneurship. Once a GPT is in place, however, it can enable *increasing returns*: as more people use it and invent with it, the marginal gains continue rising. Some macroeconomic models (e.g. Helpman & Trajtenberg’s models of GPT-driven growth) suggest that GPTs can cause alternating periods of slow growth (during adoption and adjustment) and fast growth (once the technology is fully exploited), contributing to observed historical cycles of growth. GPTs are also linked to *creative destruction* (in Schumpeter’s sense) – they make old skills and industries obsolete even as they create new opportunities. For instance, the printing press made medieval scribes redundant <sup>15</sup> , but spawned a booming new industry of printers and booksellers and dramatically expanded knowledge dissemination <sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> . Understanding GPTs thus requires both **microeconomic** insight (how they change production functions and innovation incentives) and **macroeconomic** perspective (how they drive long-term growth and structural change).

Finally, GPTs often have profound **social and political ramifications** because they disrupt existing economic structures and power balances. A new GPT can shift competitive advantage among firms and

even nations. History shows that countries leading in GPT adoption (or invention) often gained geopolitical power, while those slow to adapt fell behind <sup>18</sup> <sup>12</sup>. Paul Kennedy's analysis of great powers highlights how differential technological change (for example, Britain's industrial lead with steam power, or America's lead in the electrical and information age) translated into shifts in global economic and military strength <sup>18</sup>. We will discuss such ramifications for each major era of GPT-driven change. With this framework in mind, we now turn to the historical narrative: a tour of major GPTs through the ages – their origins, diffusion, and impacts.

## Early General-Purpose Technologies in Prehistory and Antiquity

Humanity's first transformative technologies date to prehistoric times and laid the groundwork for civilization. While the term "GPT" is modern, several ancient innovations clearly meet the criteria of broad and lasting impact:

- **Domestication of Plants and Animals (Neolithic Revolution, c. 10,000–8,000 BC):** The shift from hunter-gatherer societies to agriculture was arguably the first great economic revolution. By domesticating crop plants and farm animals, humans unlocked a massive increase in food productivity, which in turn allowed permanent settlements and population growth <sup>19</sup>. The Neolithic Agricultural Revolution created surplus food, enabling specialization of labor, the rise of artisan crafts, and the emergence of governing classes – essentially giving birth to organized society and the first cities <sup>19</sup>. Agriculture is considered "general-purpose" in that it underpins almost every aspect of later economic development: stable food supplies were a prerequisite for advancements in architecture, writing, commerce, and more. The global diffusion of farming occurred over millennia, independently in centers like the Fertile Crescent, East Asia, Mesoamerica, etc., and in each case led to profound social transformation. It also had downsides: sedentarism and higher population density brought new diseases and required new forms of social organization (property rights, etc.). But without agriculture's productivity, later GPTs would have had no stage to play on. In short, farming "paved the way for the innovations of the ensuing Bronze Age and Iron Age," enabling subsequent toolmaking advances and "bringing civilizations together through trade and conquest" <sup>19</sup>.
- **The Wheel (c. 3500 BC):** The invention of the wheel in Mesopotamia stands as one of humanity's seminal innovations. The wheel's obvious impact was in **transportation** – wheeled carts and chariots dramatically lowered the cost of moving goods and people, facilitating trade across greater distances and connecting cultures <sup>20</sup>. Less obviously, the wheel enabled **mechanical devices**: rotational motion is fundamental in machinery. Because the wheel made controlled rotary motion possible, it was "of decisive importance in machine design" <sup>21</sup>. Ancient potters used the wheel (potter's wheel) to vastly improve pottery production. Later, virtually all early machines (from grinding mills to textile devices) incorporated wheels, gears, or pulleys. Rotary motion provides continuous, smooth power transfer, unlike linear motion which is intermittent <sup>21</sup>. Indeed, the water wheel (developed in antiquity and widely used by the Middle Ages) and windmill applied the wheel to harness inanimate power for grinding grain, pumping water, and other tasks – early foreshadowings of industrial machinery <sup>22</sup>. In a real sense, the wheel *prefigured* the mechanical aspects of the Industrial Revolution. The importance of the wheel spans cultures: from wheeled wagons in Mesopotamia and Europe to chariots in China and India, it became ubiquitous. It is often called the most important invention ever <sup>23</sup>. As one source puts it, the wheel's utility "is still applied in multiple spheres of our daily life" even thousands of years later <sup>20</sup>. By enabling easier transport and early

machines, the wheel meets all GPT criteria – it spread everywhere, continually improved (from solid wood to spoked wheels with iron hubs, etc.), and generated countless complementary innovations (road networks, cavalry warfare, gear mechanisms, and so on).

- **Writing (c. 3400–3200 BC):** The invention of writing in Sumer (ancient Mesopotamia) revolutionized how humans record, transmit, and build upon knowledge. Writing began as a system of accounting and record-keeping – clay tablets tracked grain stores, taxes, and trade transactions that were too complex for memory <sup>24</sup> <sup>25</sup>. Over time, writing systems evolved to represent language phonetically and symbolically, allowing authors to preserve literature, laws, and scientific knowledge. The impact of writing on economic and social structures cannot be overstated: it **“vastly improved the efficiency of economies [and] the accountability of governments”**, as well as our understanding of history itself <sup>26</sup>. Written contracts and records enabled complex trade over long distances (credit, debt records, etc.), while bureaucratic states relied on archives and written laws to administer large territories. Culturally, writing allowed the accumulation of knowledge across generations, fueling advances in everything from mathematics to medicine. It is telling that the line between “prehistory” and “history” is conventionally defined by the presence of written records <sup>27</sup>. In economic terms, writing created the possibility of large-scale organizations (armies, tax systems, public works) and “knowledge economies” long before the modern era <sup>28</sup>. For example, ancient libraries (like Alexandria) and later medieval scriptoria concentrated knowledge that eventually spurred innovations. Though early literacy was limited to elites (scribes, priests, officials) <sup>29</sup>, the invention’s general-purpose nature is evident over the long run: alphabets and scripts spread to virtually all societies, and today literacy and economic development go hand in hand. Writing also complements other GPTs – e.g. the printing press (another GPT we will discuss) mass-produced writing, exponentially magnifying its impact.

- **Metallurgy: Bronze and Iron (c. 3000–1200 BC):** The development of metal smelting technology, first for copper and its alloy bronze and later for iron, transformed economies and warfare. Bronze tools and weapons were far superior to stone predecessors, improving agricultural productivity (plows, axes) and military power (stronger swords, armor) <sup>30</sup> <sup>31</sup>. The Bronze Age saw the growth of trade networks for tin and copper ores, indicating how a new technology can spur global commerce. Iron smelting (which began around 1200 BC) was even more consequential: iron ore was more abundant and iron tools enabled clearing forests, tilling harder soils, and equipping large armies at lower cost. These metals meet GPT criteria in that they had **multipurpose uses across many sectors** – from farming implements to building construction (nails, tools) to domestic goods – and they continually improved (from wrought iron to steel making over centuries). The **spillovers** were significant: metalworking led to advances in furnace technology, mining techniques, and even fostered specialization of labor in societies (blacksmithing as a profession, etc.). Notably, iron production was a key factor in ancient economic power. For instance, China’s economic strength in ancient times partly stemmed from early mass production of cast iron (by the Han dynasty), and similarly, medieval advances in steel in the Islamic world and later in Europe set the stage for industrial machinery. While bronze and iron themselves are materials, not a single device, they can be viewed as platform technologies that enabled myriad downstream innovations (e.g. the gears of clocks and machines, steam engine boilers, railway tracks – none possible without advanced metallurgy).

- **Money and Coinage (c. 7th century BC for coins; earlier forms of money much older):** The creation of money as a *universal medium of exchange* was “nothing short of a revolution” in economic

organization <sup>32</sup> . Before money, trade relied on barter or ad-hoc mediums like cowrie shells or livestock, which made complex trade cumbersome. The introduction of standardized **coinage** (first widely seen in Lydia, Anatolia ~600 BC, though informal money existed earlier) enabled efficient transactions across the economy. Money meets the GPT test by spreading to every sector – facilitating trade in goods, labor, and capital – and evolving over time (from coins to paper money to digital currency) with continuous improvement in financial technologies <sup>33</sup> <sup>34</sup> . The **economic spillover** of money was the development of markets and financial systems. As Investopedia notes, one of the greatest achievements of introducing money was the “*increased speed at which business... could be done*” <sup>35</sup> . A standardized currency greatly lowered transaction costs and allowed economies to scale up. For example, Lydian coinage helped that kingdom increase internal and external trade, making it “one of the richest empires” of its era <sup>33</sup> . Later, the Roman denarius, Chinese bronze coins, and Islamic gold dinars each underpinned vast trade networks. Money also required new institutions (mints, banks, contracts) which had political implications – e.g. coinage was often a state monopoly, contributing to centralization of power. In sum, while we take it for granted, **money is a foundational technology** for any advanced economy, enabling everything from daily commerce to complex financial instruments; its general-purpose nature is evidenced by its universal adoption and indispensable role in economic activity to this day.

- **Water Wheel (c. 1st century BC and widespread by Middle Ages):** The water wheel (and its cousin, the windmill) were among the first **prime movers** that converted natural energy into mechanical work (aside from human or animal muscle). Water wheels, appearing in the late Roman period and proliferating in medieval times, mechanized tasks like grain milling, sawmilling, and textile fulling. This technology was general-purpose in that once a wheel and gears were in place, many different machines could be attached to perform various tasks, foreshadowing the factory power sources of later eras <sup>36</sup> . By one estimate, a medieval watermill could free up dozens of laborers who would otherwise manually grind grain, thus massively boosting productivity. Some historians consider the widespread use of water power in medieval Europe as a precursor to industrialization. It certainly had broad economic impact: rivers became strategic sites of production, feudal lords and monasteries derived income from mills, and regions with more water-power saw faster growth. The innovation continued improving (e.g. the shift from undershot to more efficient overshot wheels, the development of turbines in the 19th century). The water wheel's complementary innovations included new gearing mechanisms and the concept of factories located based on energy sources (a concept later echoed when steam freed industry from river locations). In that sense, the water wheel began the process of using **inanimate energy at scale**, a crucial step toward the Industrial Revolution <sup>37</sup> .
- **Three-Masted Sailing Ships (15th century):** Naval technology might not immediately come to mind as “general purpose,” but the development of advanced oceangoing ships (like the caravels and galleons of the Age of Exploration) had economy-wide and global ramifications. Multi-masted ships with improved rigging (enabling sailing against the wind) appeared in the 1400s and allowed for long-distance voyages across the open oceans <sup>36</sup> . The downstream effects were immense: transoceanic ships facilitated the **Age of Discovery**, connecting continents. This led to the Columbian Exchange of crops and animals (transforming agriculture worldwide), the rise of colonial empires, and a massive expansion of global trade. Entire new sectors emerged (e.g. the global spice trade, Atlantic slave trade, etc.), and economies reorganized around maritime commerce. In essence, the three-masted ship was the GPT that unlocked globalization in the early modern era. Its uses were many – exploration, commerce, war – and its technical improvements continued (from caravels

to clippers to steamships later). The spillovers included advancements in navigation (e.g. development of accurate clocks for longitude), naval armaments, and finance (e.g. insurance and joint-stock companies like the Dutch East India Company were formed to exploit ocean trade). Politically, this technology shifted global power to coastal Atlantic states (Portugal, Spain, then the Netherlands and Britain) at the expense of inland or less maritime nations. Thus, the sailing ship illustrates how a key technology can restructure economies and geopolitics on a worldwide scale

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- **Printing Press (15th century Europe, with earlier Chinese and Korean precedents):** The invention of the mechanical movable-type printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in the 1440s was a pivotal moment in information technology. Printing is often cited as one of the **most transformative inventions in history**, on par with the wheel or computer, because it fundamentally changed how knowledge is reproduced and disseminated. Gutenberg's press could produce books and pamphlets *hundreds of times faster* than hand-copying, at much lower cost, making printed material available to far wider audiences <sup>16</sup> . The immediate result was an information explosion in Renaissance Europe: the number of books in circulation skyrocketed, and ideas could spread with unprecedented speed. According to one account, Gutenberg's adaptation (using a screw press and metal movable type) "placed revolutionary ideas and priceless ancient knowledge in the hands of every literate European, whose numbers doubled every century" after the press's introduction <sup>17</sup> . **Knowledge is power**, as the saying goes – and indeed, the press had powerful downstream impacts. It was instrumental in the Protestant Reformation (Martin Luther's tracts were printed and reprinted widely, breaking the Catholic Church's monopoly on scripture) <sup>39</sup> . It facilitated the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment by enabling scholarly journals, scientific treatises, and widespread debate. Politically, the rise of "**public opinion**" and mass political consciousness in early modern Europe can be traced to printed newspapers and pamphlets, which by the 18th century were fueling revolutions (e.g. Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* sold more copies than the population of the colonies, galvanizing the American Revolution <sup>40</sup> ). The press also had economic effects: it created a new printing industry, lowered the cost of education (books for schools), and increased literacy over time. In fact, between 1500 and 1800, European literacy rates steadily climbed as print became ubiquitous. By the 19th century, mass literacy and print capitalism were driving forces in nationalisms and the spread of modern administration. The **general-purpose nature** of printing is evident: it affected *religion, science, politics, education, literature, business* – virtually every domain of society. And it continually improved (from hand presses to rotary steam presses in the 19th c., to linotype, to digital publishing today). In short, the printing press exemplifies a GPT in that it "**helped disseminate knowledge wider and faster than ever before**", irreversibly changing the trajectory of human progress <sup>16</sup> .

These early and classical GPTs set the stage for the **Modern Industrial Era**, which can be seen as a sequence of GPT-driven industrial revolutions. We now turn to the era spanning roughly the late 18th through 19th centuries – the First and Second Industrial Revolutions – where a cluster of general-purpose technologies (steam, electricity, engines, etc.) utterly transformed economies from agrarian to industrial.

## The First Industrial Revolution: Steam Power and Mechanization (late 18th – early 19th Century)



*Illustration: James Watt working on his steam engine design (1760s). The steam engine was the iconic GPT of the First Industrial Revolution, ushering in an era of mechanized industry and transport.*

By the late 1700s, a convergence of new technologies in Britain launched what we now call the First Industrial Revolution. At the heart of this transformation was the **steam engine**, a general-purpose power source that liberated industry from the limits of muscle, wind, and water. Steam power (along with complementary innovations in machinery and metallurgy) enabled the rise of factories, railroads, and mechanized production, fundamentally altering economic structures and daily life.

**Steam Engine (1700s):** Early steam engines were developed to solve a specific problem – pumping water out of deep mines. Thomas Newcomen's atmospheric engine (1712) was the first practical steam pump used in coal mines <sup>41</sup> <sup>42</sup> . It was inefficient, but in coal mining the fuel (coal) was plentiful, so it found use. The breakthrough came with **James Watt's improvements (1760s–1770s)**: Watt introduced a separate condenser and other enhancements that dramatically improved efficiency, making steam power cost-effective well beyond mines <sup>43</sup> . Watt's engine (patented 1769) is often credited as *the* catalyst of industrialization. Indeed, the steam engine is “widely regarded as the icon of the Industrial Revolution and a prime example of a GPT,” though economists note its contribution to growth was gradual at first <sup>44</sup> .

Steam engines provided, for the first time, **reliable, year-round power that was location-agnostic** – factories no longer had to sit on riverbanks for water power <sup>37</sup> . As one analysis describes, steam “offered the possibility of relaxing [the] severe constraint” of geography, allowing industry to locate near inputs, markets, or labor supply rather than near water sources <sup>37</sup> . This drove a massive **relocation of industry** from rural water-powered sites to growing urban centers, fueling urbanization and “agglomeration economies” (industrial districts) in 19th-century Britain and the U.S. <sup>45</sup> <sup>46</sup> . For example, New England textile mills initially clustered on rivers, but once high-pressure steam engines (like the **Corliss engine** in the

1850s) became available, mills could move to bigger cities or wherever advantageous. Rosenberg & Trajtenberg's study of the Corliss engine finds that its adoption "*served as a catalyst for the massive relocation of industry... into large urban centers,*" illustrating how GPTs restructure economic geography <sup>45</sup>. Steam engines were applied in **countless ways**: they powered textile factory machinery (spinning mules, power looms), drove the bellows of iron furnaces, pumped city water supplies, and, importantly, propelled vehicles – **steam locomotives and ships**.

By the early 1800s, steam-powered **railroads** and **steamships** began to shrink distances dramatically. The first commercial railroad (Stockton & Darlington, 1825 in England) and the first successful steamboat (Robert Fulton's *Clermont*, 1807 in the U.S.) signaled a new age of **transportation GPTs**. Railroads, in particular, had far-reaching economic impact: they "*lowered the cost of transporting many kinds of goods*" once the network was established <sup>47</sup>, slashing freight costs by an order of magnitude compared to wagons <sup>48</sup> <sup>49</sup>. This enabled regional and national markets to integrate – for instance, in the U.S., the expansion of rail from 9,000 miles of track in 1850 to 50,000 miles by 1870 linked previously isolated areas <sup>50</sup> <sup>51</sup>. Counties with rail access could import and export more cheaply, raising productivity and even affecting social outcomes (some research shows areas that gained railroad connections saw higher incomes but also rising inequality as markets widened) <sup>48</sup> <sup>52</sup>. Globally, railroads allowed resource-rich interior lands (like the American Midwest, Siberia, or the Indian subcontinent) to be settled and economically exploited, whereas previously they were limited by transport costs. Likewise, steamships turned oceans into highways: by the 1850s, iron-hulled steamships (many built with **British iron and coal, leveraging steam GPT**) cut travel times and enabled regular transoceanic shipping schedules, boosting global trade. As a spillover effect, cheaper transport drove demand for heavy industries (iron, steel) and stimulated **standardization** (rail gauges, time zones, etc. had to be standardized, an institutional innovation prompted by the tech).

Another key innovation of this era was the **factory system** itself (late 18th century), which can be viewed as an organizational GPT. The factory, epitomized by Arkwright's cotton mills in the 1770s, brought workers and machines together under one roof in a coordinated, disciplined process – a sharp break from cottage industry. The factory system enabled **mass production** on a scale previously unknown (initially of textiles, but later other goods) <sup>53</sup>. It also involved practices like **interchangeable parts** manufacturing, pioneered slightly later (early 19th century) by inventors like Eli Whitney and perfected in American armories. Interchangeable parts and mechanized assembly of products were general techniques that later spread to many industries (sewing machines, bicycles, etc.). This concept was recognized as a GPT by military economist Vernon Ruttan, who noted that **interchangeable parts and mass production** were heavily driven by military procurement but had broad commercial impact as well <sup>54</sup> <sup>55</sup>.

It's important to note that, consistent with GPT theory, the **diffusion of steam was gradual** and its direct contribution to growth was initially modest. In Britain, Watt's engine came in the 1770s, but **even by 1830 steam power still generated only about half the mechanical work** in the economy (the rest was from water wheels); it wasn't until after mid-19th century that steam truly dominated power supply <sup>56</sup> <sup>57</sup>. Early steam engines were simply not efficient enough to displace all watermills immediately. Over time, however, continuous improvements (higher-pressure engines by Trevithick and others, the Corliss engine's efficiency, compound engines, etc.) greatly increased steam's performance <sup>58</sup> <sup>59</sup>. The "upshot" was that steam's biggest punch to productivity came in the late 19th century, rather than at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution <sup>60</sup> <sup>61</sup>. Crafts (2004) estimated that steam power contributed only about 0.3% per year to British labor productivity growth up to 1830, but closer to 1% per year by the late 1800s as it diffused widely



<sup>62</sup> <sup>63</sup> . Similarly, in the U.S., the transformative impact of steam is evident by the late 1800s: factories and railroads powered by steam drove the U.S. industrial output to overtake Britain's.

**Economic and Social Impacts:** The First Industrial Revolution's GPTs had profound downstream impacts. Steam-powered mechanization meant one machine could do the work of many artisans or laborers, leading to massive increases in output but also displacement of traditional crafts. This fueled the first debates about technology displacing labor – exemplified by the **Luddite movement** (textile workers destroying machines around 1811–1813). Indeed, one could say the idea of machines “stealing jobs” began with the printing press and continued with textile machines and steam power <sup>15</sup> . In the long run, industrialization created far more jobs and higher incomes, but the transition was tumultuous. Urbanization led to overcrowded cities, new social classes (industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie), and eventually political reform movements (e.g. labor unions, Marxist socialism) reacting to the new industrial order.

Politically, nations that embraced these GPTs surged ahead. Britain, the pioneer of steam and industry, became the “workshop of the world” in the 19th century, producing cheap industrial goods that undercut traditional artisans globally. Its economic power, backed by steamships and railways, facilitated a vast colonial empire. Countries that lagged in industrialization found themselves at a disadvantage economically and militarily (e.g. Qing Dynasty China's defeat by industrialized powers in the Opium Wars highlighted the new tech gap). This era thus saw a **Great Divergence**: Western Europe (and later the U.S.) leapfrogged in wealth and power, partly due to faster adoption of these GPTs, while other regions industrialized later or under colonial constraints.

In summary, the First Industrial Revolution was driven by **steam power and mechanization** as GPTs. Steam engines and factory organization spread to most sectors: manufacturing (textiles, metallurgy), transportation (rail, ships), agriculture (steam tractors in late 19th c.), and even early electrical power generation (steam-driven dynamos). They improved continuously and enabled complementary innovations (rail networks, standardized machine parts, etc.). The result was a quantum leap in productive capacity: as one source notes, by **1907 Britain had over 9.5 million steam-powered machines in operation** <sup>64</sup> , a testament to the pervasiveness of steam. These technologies dramatically increased income levels in industrializing nations (though not without harsh working conditions early on) and set the stage for the next wave of GPTs at the turn of the 20th century.

## The Second Industrial Revolution: Electricity, Internal Combustion, and Mass Production (late 19th – early 20th Century)

If steam and coal powered the 19th century's first industrial wave, the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a **second industrial revolution** characterized by **electric power, petroleum and the internal combustion engine**, and new processes like **mass production and scientific management**. These developments are often considered GPTs in their own right, or at least closely linked clusters of GPTs, which further transformed the economy and society. The Second Industrial Revolution roughly spans from the 1870s through World War I (1914), with continued diffusion into the mid-20th century.

**Electricity (Late 1800s):** The harnessing of electricity for practical power is a textbook example of a general-purpose technology. Early electrical inventions (telegraph in 1840s, arc lighting in 1870s) were important, but the breakthrough for widespread use was the development of efficient generators (dynamos) and motors in the late 19th century. By the 1880s, Thomas Edison and others had built electric power stations

(e.g. Pearl Street Station in 1882 New York) and electrical distribution networks. Electricity had **extraordinary versatility**: it could provide lighting, motive power for machines, and later information transmission (telephone, radio). As a GPT, it was *widely applied across industries*: factories converted from steam to electric motor drives, homes and streets were lit, trams and subways electrified urban transport, and new appliances (electric refrigerators, etc.) emerged in the early 20th century <sup>62</sup> <sup>65</sup> . Moreover, electricity kept improving in cost and efficiency (generators grew larger and more efficient; AC transmission allowed long-distance power delivery thanks to Tesla and Westinghouse in the 1890s; the cost per kWh plummeted).

However – echoing the diffusion theme – **the productivity gains from electrification took time to realize**, much like with steam. It wasn't simply swapping a steam engine for an electric motor; factories had to redesign workflows. For instance, under steam power, factories typically had one big engine driving a system of belts and shafts throughout the building, so machines had to be clustered and factories built vertically. With electric motors, each machine could be powered individually and layout became far more flexible (one could rearrange machines for flow or even build single-story wide plants). This led to the modern assembly line layout and much more efficient manufacturing by the 1910s–1920s. Economic studies (by Paul David, Warren Devine, etc.) found that U.S. manufacturing productivity surged only after about 25–30 years of electrification, corresponding to when roughly half of machinery had been converted and factories were re-architected <sup>13</sup> <sup>66</sup> . Indeed, one source notes that in the U.S., it was around 1929 that electrification's adoption reached a plateau – indicating full diffusion by that point <sup>67</sup> . Once realized, the impact was enormous: electricity contributed an estimated **0.6% per year to U.S. labor productivity growth in 1920s** (some estimates) and utterly transformed daily life (night-time lighting, radio communication, etc.) <sup>68</sup> .

Electricity also directly enabled new complementary technologies: the **telegraph and telephone** were early electric communication networks (telegraph from 1840s, telephone from 1876) that shrank communication time from days to minutes or seconds – a profound change for commerce and coordination. By late 19th century, **telegraphic communication** was listed as a spillover of electricity as a GPT <sup>69</sup> . The telephone, initially seen as a luxury, by mid-20th century became a general communication utility in advanced economies. These networks had their own spillover effects (e.g. more integrated financial markets, quicker management of far-flung business operations). In sum, **electric power stands as a core GPT of the modern era**, underpinning almost every sector: industrial motors, transportation (electric trains, later electric cars), communications, and the entire consumer electronics revolution.

**Internal Combustion Engine (Late 1800s):** Whereas steam engines were powered by external combustion of coal (boilers), the internal combustion engine (ICE) used gasoline or diesel fuel ignited within cylinders. Innovators like Nikolaus Otto (four-stroke engine, 1876) and later Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz (1880s, automobiles) pioneered this technology. The ICE's hallmark application was the **automobile** – a new GPT-level innovation in personal and cargo transport. Early cars in the 1890s were expensive curiosities, but Henry Ford's Model T (1908) and the advent of assembly line production made automobiles accessible to the masses. By the 1920s, motor vehicles were transforming mobility in the U.S. and Europe. The automobile meets GPT criteria by spawning countless changes: **urban geography** changed (rise of suburbs, commuting) <sup>70</sup> <sup>71</sup> , retail patterns shifted (shopping centers accessible by car) <sup>71</sup> , and supporting industries boomed (steel, rubber, oil, road construction). It fundamentally altered daily life and social customs (more travel, new concept of privacy/freedom of movement). The ICE was also applied to **airplanes** (with the Wright brothers' flight in 1903, and rapid development of aviation technology through WWI and beyond) <sup>72</sup> . Air travel, while not mass-market until later, eventually became another pillar of

globalization (shrinking travel times across continents). The engine also mechanized agriculture (tractors, harvesters) and warfare (tanks, trucks, aircraft) <sup>73</sup> <sup>72</sup> . The petroleum-fueled economy rose in this era: oil discoveries and the refining industry grew to supply kerosene and then gasoline; by the mid-20th century, oil was arguably a GPT-like resource fueling many sectors and central to geopolitics.

**Mass Production and Scientific Management:** A critical process innovation of the early 20th century was the development of mass production techniques. **Assembly line production**, famously implemented by Ford Motor Company in 1913–1914, drastically cut manufacturing costs and time. This method – breaking production into standardized, repetitive tasks and using conveyor belts to move products – can be considered an *organizational GPT* because it was soon applied beyond automobiles to everything from appliances to cigarettes. Productivity soared: Ford’s Model T output went from 12 hours of assembly time to 1.5 hours after the moving assembly line <sup>55</sup> . The concept of **interchangeable parts**, earlier pioneered in gun manufacturing, was a prerequisite. Together, these methods ushered in the age of “**Fordist**” **mass production** – producing huge quantities of identical goods at low unit cost. This enabled the rise of **consumerism**: as goods became cheap, mass markets for cars, radios, furniture, etc., took off, especially in the booming 1920s <sup>55</sup> . One spillover was the growth of the advertising and marketing industries to stimulate demand for mass-produced goods. Another was the emergence of large corporations with unprecedented scales of output, requiring new management techniques (Alfred Sloan’s multidivisional structure at GM, for example). Vernon Ruttan identified **mass production** as a key 20th-century GPT facilitated by both organizational innovation and government/military procurement (e.g. the techniques refined in WWII for munitions and vehicles production later diffused to civilian industry) <sup>74</sup> <sup>75</sup> . Indeed, Ruttan lists “interchangeable parts and mass production” among GPTs strongly accelerated by military funding <sup>74</sup> .

Alongside, the field of **scientific management (Taylorism)** emerged (~1900), aiming to optimize workflows and labor performance – another complement to mass production. By measuring tasks and timing workers with stopwatches, efficiency experts sought to squeeze more output from each worker. While dehumanizing in some ways, these practices did boost productivity and were adopted widely in factories. Over time, production technology would continue to evolve (later giving way to automation and robotics in late 20th century), but the principle of systematic process innovation is itself a general capability.

**Chemical and Materials Innovations:** The second industrial revolution also saw GPT-like advances in materials and chemicals. **Cheap steel production** by the Bessemer process (1850s) and then open-hearth and basic oxygen processes made steel (the “backbone” of modern industry) abundant and low-cost. Steel in turn was used everywhere: rail tracks, bridges, ships, buildings (skyscrapers), machines, tools – you name it. Some historians count steel-making technology as a GPT because of its economy-wide applications. Similarly, the advent of **synthetic chemicals** (dyes, fertilizers, later plastics) from the late 19th century created whole new sectors. For instance, the Haber-Bosch process (1909) for synthetic ammonia fertilizer hugely increased agricultural yields globally (arguably a GPT-level impact on food production). These might be considered enabling technologies feeding into the main GPTs (e.g. without cheap steel, there’s no mass-produced car; without fertilizer, feeding the urban industrial workforce would be harder), so at least they are critical complementary innovations.

**Communication and Information:** We touched on the telegraph and telephone as enabled by electricity. By the early 20th century, communication tech leapt further with **wireless radio** (Marconi’s broadcasts from 1901 onward) and later **television** (developed in the 1920s–30s). While these might be considered specific innovations, they had broad cultural and economic effects (e.g. radio became a mass entertainment and

news medium in the 1920s, transforming advertising and creating national “imagined communities” tuned to the same broadcasts). These laid foundations for the information society and can be seen as part of the ICT lineage of GPTs.

**Economic Impacts:** The GPTs of the second industrial revolution led to the **fastest growth rates in history up to that point**. Many advanced economies saw a late-19th century acceleration in productivity. For example, U.S. GDP growth was very high in the early 20th century as it adopted electricity and mass production. Crafts and others have estimated that **electricity contributed about 0.3–0.4% to British economic growth in the early 20th c.** and likely higher in the U.S., while **internal combustion and related oil technologies contributed as well (cars/trucks boosting transportation productivity)** <sup>68</sup>. The period 1870–1914 also saw global trade boom under the gold standard and relative peace (the first era of globalization), facilitated by steamships, railways, and telegraph – all GPT-driven.

Socially, the second industrial revolution brought the age of the **automobile and electrical appliances** to consumers, raising living standards dramatically (at least in developed countries). Electric lighting extended productive hours and improved quality of life. Urban electrification enabled the modern city nightlife and safer streets. Automobiles gave individuals freedom to travel and changed settlement patterns (the birth of suburbs, especially in the U.S. after WWII when cars became truly dominant). However, these changes also had unintended consequences: the car introduced pollution and traffic, and oil became a strategic resource, fueling geopolitical conflicts (from securing colonies with oil to the oil-driven conflicts of the late 20th century).

Politically, the leading industrial powers of this era – the U.S. and Germany overtaking Britain by early 20th century – used these new technologies to build military might (e.g. internal combustion led to tanks and aircraft in WWI; chemistry led to explosives and poison gas). The World Wars themselves accelerated some GPT diffusion (mass production was pushed to new heights, and technologies like radar and jet engines were developed). One can argue that WWII’s aftermath set the stage for the **third industrial revolution** by catalyzing advances in electronics and computation (for instance, wartime research led to early computers like ENIAC in 1945, and to the Internet’s precursor ARPANET decades later via defense funding).

By mid-20th century, in the Western world, the combination of electricity, engines, and industrial organization meant that the average person enjoyed a standard of living unthinkable a century prior (e.g. owning a car, having electric appliances, etc.). Economic historians like Robert Gordon highlight 1870–1970 as a special century of rapid growth due to these clustered GPTs (he notes that many transformative inventions – electricity, car, plane, modern communications, medicine, etc. – happened in that span). After 1970, some argue, the pace slowed until the computer era. We now turn to that digital era – the late 20th century – often termed the Third Industrial Revolution or Digital Revolution, powered by electronics and information technology.

## The Information Age: Computing and the Internet (Mid/Late 20th Century)

The mid-20th century onward introduced **digital General-Purpose Technologies** that have reshaped the global economy in the past few decades. The development of the electronic computer, and later the semiconductor, software, and the Internet, represent a wave of GPTs that ushered in the *Information Age*. We will examine how these technologies fit the GPT framework, their diffusion, and impacts.

**Computers and Semiconductors (1940s–1960s):** The invention of electronic computing in the 1940s (e.g. the ENIAC in 1945) was initially a niche solution for codebreaking, artillery calculations, etc., but it laid the groundwork for an entirely new paradigm of programmable machines. Early computers were large, vacuum-tube based and extremely expensive, but with the invention of the **transistor (1947)** and the integrated circuit (1958), computing power began to follow an exponential improvement path (famously described by Moore’s Law from 1965 – computing power per dollar doubling roughly every 18-24 months). The microprocessor (early 1970s) truly **democratized computing**, eventually making it pervasive from mainframes to personal computers to embedded devices. As a GPT, the **computer (or more broadly, the semiconductor)** is characterized by precisely the hallmarks of pervasiveness, improvement, and complementary innovation. By the 1980s–2000s, microchips were in *every* industry: they controlled manufacturing robots, ran financial models, managed logistics, enabled new products (digital cameras, smartphones), and so on. The continuous improvement is obvious – computing performance and storage have improved by orders of magnitude over decades, enabling applications that were once science fiction (from real-time global telecommunications to AI). The **spillover innovations** are countless: virtually every field has been transformed by computing power, from biotech (genomic sequencing) to media (digital content creation) to science (simulation and data analysis).

Economically, the computer’s impact became significantly felt starting in the 1990s, aligning with the broad diffusion of PCs and enterprise software. This corresponds to the period when economists observed a revival in productivity statistics, particularly in the U.S., often credited to **Information and Communication Technology (ICT)** investments. One study reconfirmed ICT as a GPT, noting its significant productivity contribution in the late 1990s after initial slow uptake <sup>76</sup>. As with past GPTs, there was an initial paradox: in the 1970s–80s, despite heavy spending on IT, productivity grew slowly (Solow’s paradox). But eventually, as complementary changes took hold (workers gained computer skills, business processes re-engineered for IT, network infrastructure built out), computers delivered substantial gains in efficiency and spawned entirely new industries (software, online services). For example, **enterprise resource planning (ERP)** software and computer-controlled automation in factories allowed leaner inventories and faster production – a major factor in the productivity surge of 1995–2005 in developed economies <sup>68</sup>. It’s estimated that ICT capital deepening contributed several tenths of a percent to annual GDP growth in that period for the U.S.

<sup>68</sup> .

**The Internet (1960s–1990s):** The internet began as a network (ARPANET, 1969) connecting a handful of research computers for packet-switching experiments <sup>77</sup>. Over the next two decades, it grew within academia and the military, and then exploded into public consciousness in the mid-1990s with the World Wide Web. The Internet is clearly a GPT by any definition: it has affected essentially **the entire economy and society**, altering pre-existing structures of communication, media, commerce, and social interaction <sup>1</sup>. The Internet’s key characteristic is enabling instantaneous, low-cost communication and data exchange globally. This has led to a host of complementary innovations: e.g. **electronic business (e-commerce)**, which has transformed retail and services <sup>78</sup>; **crowdsourcing and online platforms** (think Wikipedia, Uber, etc.) which create new business models <sup>78</sup>; **social networking** connecting people in novel ways <sup>78</sup>; and even new forms of conflict like cyber warfare <sup>79</sup>. Downstream, the Internet gave rise to today’s digital giants and the knowledge economy, where information (rather than physical goods) is central.

The diffusion of the Internet was notably faster than earlier GPTs – it went from invention to 50% world penetration in just a few decades. For instance, in the U.S., Internet usage went from virtually zero in 1990 to roughly 50% of households by 2000, and over 90% by the 2010s. Globally, as of 2025, about 5 billion

people (over 60% of the world) use the Internet in some form. This rapid spread can be attributed to the groundwork laid by computing (cheap devices) and its high value proposition of connectivity. The **economic impacts** are multifaceted: reduced transaction costs (one can find information or buy products online in seconds), disintermediation of traditional industries (e.g. decline of brick-and-mortar bookstores in favor of Amazon), creation of new markets (digital advertising, app economies), and productivity enhancements through better coordination and information access. Some studies in the 2000s tried to quantify the Internet's contribution to productivity and found significant effects especially in information-intensive sectors. However, measuring its full impact is tricky, especially as many benefits (like consumer surplus from free search engines or social media) aren't captured in GDP. Nonetheless, it's evident that the Internet has drastically altered business models: companies like Google, Amazon, and others simply could not exist without it, and now rank among the largest firms globally.

Socially and politically, the Internet has been a double-edged sword. It democratized publishing and information (anyone can broadcast to the world), which has positive effects (access to knowledge, coordination of social movements) but also negative ones (spread of misinformation, new avenues for surveillance or cyber attacks). Politically, we've seen social media influence elections and public opinion, the emergence of issues around data privacy, and even the use of Internet shutdowns or censorship by states trying to control this GPT's influence.

We should also mention **mobile technology** (the smartphone) as a continuation of the ICT revolution. The smartphone (mass adoption from mid-2000s) combined computing and internet in a handheld device, further deepening the GPT's reach – now billions carry a powerful computer and network node in their pocket, enabling real-time location-based services, mobile banking (with big impacts in developing countries), and more. While part of the broader computing/Internet complex, the mobile revolution has arguably made the ICT GPT even more pervasive.

**Case Study – Productivity J-Curve Revisited:** Brynjolfsson, Rock, and Syverson (2021) discussed how the adoption of AI (another GPT) is showing the same pattern of delayed productivity as intangible investments accumulate <sup>9</sup>. We see similar patterns historically: for example, U.S. productivity saw a slowdown in the 1970s (early IT era) and a pick-up in the 1990s (once the IT intangible capital – skills, reorganization – had built up) <sup>9</sup>. This underscores that GPTs often require complementary **“co-inventions”** – new processes, human capital, and organizational changes – to fully exploit them. In the case of the Internet, we saw entire industries adapt (e.g. media companies learned to distribute online; retailers built e-commerce logistics; advertisers shifted to online platforms). Those that adapted thrived, while those that didn't often declined (e.g. newspapers that failed to move online). This creative destruction is inherent to GPTs.

It's worth noting that, by the late 20th century, economists explicitly recognized computers and the Internet as GPTs. For example, Helpman (1998) edited a book on *General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth* largely focusing on computers. Tim Bresnahan wrote about the computer as a GPT that enabled complementary software innovations, etc. So unlike in earlier eras, policymakers and businesses had some awareness of the need to adapt – though that didn't necessarily make it easier.

As of 2025, the digital GPT revolution is ongoing, with emerging areas like **biotechnology**, **nanotechnology**, and **artificial intelligence** often being cited as “next GPTs.” Biotechnology (the use of recombinant DNA, CRISPR gene editing, etc.) has already had broad impact on medicine and agriculture (e.g. genetically modified crops), and could be viewed as a GPT starting in late 20th century <sup>80</sup>. Nanotechnology is still in earlier stages but has promise in materials and medicine <sup>80</sup>. Artificial

Intelligence, especially machine learning and generative AI, is frequently called a GPT of our time – though the user asked us to ignore AI for now, it's worth mentioning that AI exhibits the GPT traits (applicable to many industries, improves with data/compute, enables other innovations). Indeed, **AI and robotics** are seen as core of a potential “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” These would continue the pattern we’ve observed: initial hype, some lag in realized productivity, then transformation of workflows and creation of new applications across the board.

## Patterns of GPT-driven Transformation: Diffusion, Economic Growth, and Political Dynamics

Having surveyed the major historical GPTs across eras, we can distill some common themes about how and why GPTs are so disruptive and transformative:

- **Wide Scope and Complementarity:** By definition, GPTs are not one-trick ponies; they find uses in many sectors. This means their adoption can lead to economy-wide productivity boosts, unlike localized inventions. For example, steam power affected manufacturing, mining, transportation, even agriculture (steam tractors) – thus its contribution aggregated to a substantial share of GDP growth once fully diffused <sup>62</sup> <sup>63</sup>. Additionally, GPTs often *create opportunities* for complementary innovations. The value of the GPT increases as those complements emerge (e.g. more software makes computers more useful; more apps make the Internet more valuable; more electric appliances made electrification worthwhile). This complementarity also means **network effects** or increasing returns – e.g. as more locations got electric power, appliance makers had larger markets and innovated more, which made electricity even more useful to adopt, in a virtuous cycle.
- **Diffusion Lags and Transition Costs:** We observed for multiple GPTs (steam, electricity, computers) that there is a lag between invention and widespread impact – often on the order of decades. During that time, productivity growth can even slow as resources are reallocated and old systems are dismantled. This **transitional friction** is a crucial aspect of GPTs, explaining phenomena like the productivity paradox. It also implies that **patience and investment in complementary assets** are required to unlock a GPT's benefits. For businesses, this means initial adopters might not see immediate ROI until the whole ecosystem catches up. For economies, it means training, infrastructure, and institutional changes (e.g. regulations) must accompany the tech. Countries that navigated these transitions effectively (through education, flexible institutions, access to capital) reaped big rewards; those that didn't could stagnate despite technology being available.
- **Creative Destruction and Disruption:** GPTs are disruptive by nature – they obsolete prior technologies and the skills associated with them. We saw this with the Luddites (handweavers displaced by power looms) <sup>15</sup>, with scribes displaced by printing, with lamp lighters made redundant by electric street lamps, with telephone operators largely replaced by automated exchanges, and so on. GPTs can eliminate entire job categories while creating new ones. Over time, employment shifts from sectors that shrink (e.g. agriculture's share of workforce plummeted in industrial revolutions) to new sectors (manufacturing, services, IT, etc.). This process can be painful for those affected, contributing to social tensions and the need for new social safety nets or job training programs.

- **Economic Growth spurts:** Each major GPT wave has coincided with periods of accelerated economic growth and increases in productivity. For instance, during the steam/railroad age (roughly 1820–1870 in Britain), and then the electricity/engine age (1890–1970 globally), and then the ICT age (1990s–present in many countries), growth rates were higher than in the intervening periods. GPTs are often singled out in growth accounting as key contributors to the Solow residual (TFP). They can also extend the frontier of growth by enabling entirely new outputs (e.g., the digital economy adds things like software and digital services that didn't exist before). Some growth modelers suggest that without new GPTs appearing periodically, economies would settle to a lower growth path once diminishing returns set in on existing tech. Historically, new GPTs have emerged just as older engines of growth began to taper – for example, as steam's impact plateaued, electricity and the engine rose; as those plateaued by mid-20th century, the digital revolution began. This sequential overlap has maintained overall growth momentum (though there were slowdowns in between, like the 1970s).
- **Global Power Shifts:** The ability to adopt and diffuse GPTs has often determined which nations lead economically. Britain's early industrialization gave it a century of dominance. The U.S.'s rapid adoption of second-wave GPTs (electricity, mass production, automobiles) in the early 20th century helped it overtake Britain and Europe. In the late 20th century, countries like Japan and Germany, which quickly rebuilt and invested in modern production (including electronics), surged. Today, questions are asked about AI and other tech in the U.S.-China context – which country will leverage the next GPT for growth <sup>81</sup> <sup>12</sup> . The **diffusion theory of GPT and power** argues that it's not just inventing a GPT, but effectively adopting it across industries that yields broad-based growth <sup>82</sup> <sup>83</sup> . No country monopolizes all innovations; instead, those with institutions and policies that facilitate widespread diffusion (education systems, capital markets, entrepreneurial culture, government support for infrastructure) tend to gain the most. We saw this with the spread of electricity – the U.S. and Germany quickly built electric grids and factories, whereas some less-developed regions got electricity much later or only in limited enclaves, contributing to divergent productivity levels.
- **Unintended Consequences and Challenges:** GPT-driven transformations often create new challenges. Industrialization brought urban crowding, pollution, and the need for labor reforms (e.g. limiting child labor, instituting safety regulations). The automobile brought traffic accidents and air pollution, requiring new laws, road rules, and environmental regulations. The Internet brought cybersecurity risks, privacy concerns, and social upheaval in information ecosystems. In each case, society has had to adapt norms and policies to manage the GPT's disruptive side-effects. For example, in the late 19th century, workers began to unionize and demand rights in response to industrial factory conditions, reshaping politics (the rise of labor parties, socialist movements). In the early 21st century, issues like data protection (GDPR in Europe) or antitrust action against tech monopolies are responses to the power of Internet GPT firms. Thus, GPTs not only transform economies but also force evolution in social and political institutions.
- **Long-Term Increase in Living Standards:** Despite the upheavals, the long-run trend from GPTs has been vastly positive for human living standards. Consider that prior to the agricultural revolution, human populations were small and living at subsistence. Each major GPT since has supported larger populations and higher per-capita incomes. The wheel and writing enabled ancient civilizations; steam and industry broke the Malthusian trap and led to sustained per-capita growth for the first time in history; electricity and modern medicine doubled life expectancies and made comforts like lighting and transportation ubiquitous; digital tech is now extending knowledge and connectivity to



billions. Globally, the gap between rich and poor nations often correlates with the timing and extent of GPT adoption (with horrible historical caveats like colonialism affecting that). One encouraging pattern is that diffusion *eventually* becomes global – even if sub-Saharan Africa industrialized later than Europe, eventually many industrial GPTs did reach those societies (e.g. mobile phones diffused extremely fast even where landlines never penetrated). This means late adopters can sometimes “leapfrog” older tech (like skipping wired phones and going straight to mobile). Over centuries, what begins as a disruptive novelty becomes a standard utility. For example, electricity was once revolutionary; today it’s part of the basic infrastructure. Likewise, the Internet is heading toward being considered a basic utility in many countries.

In closing, general-purpose technologies are the transformative engines that periodically revolutionize the economic landscape. From the wheel to the internet, each GPT introduced new possibilities for humans to produce, communicate, and live – often rendering the previous ways of life obsolete. They are characterized by **extensive applicability, continuous improvement**, and the generation of cascading innovations beyond their immediate uses <sup>2</sup>. Their disruptive power comes from breaking constraints that previously limited growth: the wheel overcame the limits of human transport; steam engines broke the energy constraints of muscle and water; electricity decoupled power from place and time of use; digital computers removed many limits of information processing and knowledge access. Each time, societies have had to adapt economically (shifting industries, retraining workers), structurally (building new infrastructure like railroads or fiber optic cables), and institutionally (new laws, education focus, etc.). Those adaptations, while often difficult, have resulted in large boosts in productivity and often entirely new realms of human endeavor.

Looking at historical case studies reinforces a key lesson: **it is not just the invention of a technology, but how widely and wisely it is deployed, that determines its ultimate impact**. General-purpose technologies truly earn the title “general-purpose” only when they permeate throughout the economy and society. That requires not just inventors, but also entrepreneurs, policymakers, and consumers to embrace change.

From prehistory to the present, GPTs have been the main drivers of what economists call *total factor productivity* – the portion of output growth not explained by more inputs but by better ways of doing things. As such, they are central to economic growth theory and to practical development strategies. Countries today strive to foster or acquire the next GPT (whether AI or green energy technologies) because history shows the enormous advantages conferred by being at the forefront of a GPT wave <sup>18</sup>.

In summary, **GPTs are disruptive and transformative because they are fundamental capability-leveraging innovations**: they make it possible to do many things more efficiently or to do entirely new things, and these possibilities extend across the entire economy. Their downstream impacts include leaps in productivity, the rise and fall of industries and occupations, improved standards of living, and shifts in global economic leadership. They often bring about *general-purpose change*: changing not one sector in isolation, but many aspects of life at once (economic, social, political). As we have seen from the wheel to electricity to the internet, harnessing a GPT can unleash waves of progress – making these technologies truly the pivotal turning points of history.

**Sources:** The analysis above is supported by a range of historical and economic studies. Key characteristics of GPTs are summarized from Bresnahan & Trajtenberg <sup>2</sup>. Historical examples and their impacts are drawn from scholarly works and historical data: for instance, the importance of the wheel in machinery <sup>21</sup>;

the role of writing in economic administration <sup>26</sup> ; the printing press in disseminating knowledge <sup>17</sup> ; steam power's diffusion and constraints <sup>37</sup> and its iconic status in the Industrial Revolution <sup>44</sup> ; statistics on steam engine adoption and impact <sup>84</sup> <sup>64</sup> ; railroads reducing trade costs and integrating markets <sup>48</sup> ; electricity's slow-burn impact taking 50 years to show up <sup>13</sup> ; and the internet's pervasive influence <sup>1</sup> . These and other references are cited throughout the text to provide evidence for the claims made.

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