

GENERAL MODELS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND CHOICE IN TYPE THEORY

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§1. Introduction. In [4] Alonzo Church introduced an elegant and expressive formulation of type theory with λ -conversion. In [8] Henkin introduced the concept of a general model for this system, such that a sentence A is a theorem if and only if it is true in all general models. The crucial clause in Henkin's definition of a general model \mathcal{M} is that for each assignment φ of values in \mathcal{M} to variables and for each wff A , there must be an appropriate value $\mathcal{V}_\varphi A$ of A in \mathcal{M} . Hintikka points out in [10, p. 3] that this constitutes a rather strong requirement concerning the structure of a general model. Henkin draws attention to the problem of constructing non-standard models for the theory of types in [9, p. 324].

We shall use a simple idea of combinatory logic to find a characterization of general models which does not directly refer to wffs, and which is easier to work with in certain contexts. This characterization can be applied, with appropriate minor and obvious modifications, to a variety of formulations of type theory with λ -conversion. We shall be concerned with a language \mathcal{L} with extensionality in which there is no description or selection operator, and in which (for convenience) the sole primitive logical constants are the equality symbols $Q_{\alpha\alpha}$ for each type α .

We shall give two applications of this characterization. First, we show that the Axiom of Descriptions (D) is independent of \mathcal{L} . This axiom is very natural since a general model for \mathcal{L} with a finite domain of individuals is standard if and only if D is true in it. Secondly, we show how the Fraenkel-Mostowski method [7], [11], [12] can be adapted to \mathcal{L} . We state our fundamental lemma concerning this method in fairly general form to facilitate possible future applications (analogous to those for axiomatic set theory mentioned in [11]), but confine ourselves here to simply showing that the Axiom of Choice is not derivable in \mathcal{L} , even if the Axiom of Descriptions is assumed.

When a description operator $\iota_{\iota(\alpha)}$ is included among the primitive symbols,² the Axiom of Descriptions may be taken in the form

$$\forall p_{\alpha}. \exists_1 x_i. p_{\alpha} x_i \supset p_{\alpha} [\iota_{\iota(\alpha)} p_{\alpha}],$$

so that $\iota_{\iota(\alpha)}[\lambda x_i. A_\alpha]$ (which is abbreviated $(\iota x_i. A_\alpha)$) denotes the unique x_i such that A_α , when there is such an x_i . Church showed in [4] that description operators for higher types can be introduced by definition, using the operators for lower types. Specifically, $\iota_{\alpha\beta(\alpha\beta)}$ may be defined as

$$[\lambda h_{\alpha\beta} \lambda x_\beta \iota_{\alpha(\alpha\beta)} \lambda y_\alpha \exists f_{\alpha\beta} h_{\alpha\beta} f_{\alpha\beta} \wedge y_\alpha = f_{\alpha\beta} x_\beta].$$

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² We follow the well established tradition of Church [4] in which the Greek letter ι is used as a type symbol for the type of individuals, and also, when given an appropriate type symbol subscript, as a primitive constant denoting a description operator. In practice this causes no confusion, since ι usually appears as a subscript in the former usage, but rarely in the latter.

R. O. Gandy has pointed out (in a private communication) that $\iota_{o\beta(o\alpha\beta)}$ can be defined as

$$[\lambda h_{o(o\beta)} \lambda x_\beta \exists f_{o\beta} h_{o(o\beta)} f_{o\beta} \wedge f_{o\beta} x_\beta],$$

so description operators for certain higher types can be defined without using those for any other type. Also, Henkin noted in [9] that $\iota_{o(o\alpha)}$ can be defined as

$$[\lambda h_{oo} h_{oo} = [\lambda x_o x_o]].$$

(A number of other definitions of $\iota_{o(o\alpha)}$ are also possible, of which the shortest is perhaps the closely related $Q_{o(o\alpha)(o\alpha)}[\lambda x_o x_o]$.) Thus it is seen that description operators for all types can be introduced once one has $\iota_{i(o\alpha)}$. The argument in [2, pp. 22–24] shows that the description operator $\iota_{i(o\alpha)}$ cannot be introduced by definition for the simple reason that there are no closed wffs of this type, and that the Axiom of Descriptions mentioned above is independent, since it is the sole axiom which describes the special characteristics of $\iota_{i(o\alpha)}$.

If no description operator is included in the list of primitive symbols, the Axiom of Descriptions may be taken in the form

$$\exists i_{i(o\alpha)} \forall p_{oi} \exists x_i p_{oi} x_i \supset p_{oi} [i_{i(o\alpha)} p_{oi}],$$

or equivalently

$$(D) \quad \exists i_{i(o\alpha)} \forall x_i i_{i(o\alpha)} [Q_{oi} x_i] = x_i.$$

(The equivalence results from the theorem $\exists x_i p_{oi} x_i = \exists x_i p_{oi} = .Q_{oi} x_i$.) Since in many logical systems descriptions can be eliminated, it is very natural to ask whether the wff D, which asserts the existence of a description operator, is in fact derivable. It will be seen that our independence proof below is conceptually very simple, and is compatible with any axioms concerning the cardinality of the domain of individuals which permit it to have at least two members.

Church mentions in [5] an unpublished proof by Lagerström of a closely related independence result using a complete nonatomic Boolean algebra for the domain of truth values. It seems unlikely that Lagerström's proof applies to \mathcal{L} , since in \mathcal{L} , unlike the system treated by Lagerström, there is a strong axiom of extensionality for type o (Axiom 1 below) which permits one to derive $[p_o \equiv q_o] \supset .p_o = q_o$.

§2. The language \mathcal{L} . The language \mathcal{L} is essentially the result of dropping the description operator from the language Q_o of [2], and is closely related to the system discussed in [9]. For the convenience of the reader we here provide a description of \mathcal{L} .

We use α, β, γ , etc., as syntactical variables ranging over *type symbols*, which are defined inductively as follows:

- (a) o is a type symbol (denoting the type of truth values).
- (b) i is a type symbol (denoting the type of individuals).
- (c) $(\alpha\beta)$ is a type symbol (denoting the type of functions from elements of type β to elements of type α).

The *primitive symbols* of \mathcal{L} are the following:

- (a) Improper symbols: $[\] \ \lambda$.
- (b) For each α , a denumerable list of *variables* of type α :

$$f_\alpha g_\alpha h_\alpha \cdots x_\alpha y_\alpha z_\alpha f_\alpha^1 g_\alpha^1 \cdots z_\alpha^1 f_\alpha^2 \cdots$$

We shall use $f_\alpha, g_\alpha, \dots, x_\alpha, y_\alpha, z_\alpha$, etc., as syntactical variables for variables of type α .

(c) For each α , $Q_{((\alpha\alpha)\alpha)}$ is a *constant* of type $((\alpha\alpha)\alpha)$.

We write wff_α as an abbreviation for *wff of type α* , and use $A_\alpha, B_\alpha, C_\alpha$, etc., as syntactical variables ranging over wff_α , which are defined inductively as follows:

- (a) A primitive variable or constant of type α is a wff_α .
- (b) $[A_{\alpha\beta}B_\beta]$ is a wff_α .
- (c) $[\lambda x_\beta A_\alpha]$ is a $wff_{(\alpha\beta)}$.

An occurrence of x_α is *bound (free)* in B_β iff it is (is not) in a wf part of B_β of the form $[\lambda x_\alpha C_\alpha]$. A_α is *free for x_α* in B_β iff no free occurrence of x_α in B_β is in a wf part of B_β of the form $[\lambda y_\gamma C_\alpha]$ such that y_γ is a free variable of A_α .

Brackets, parentheses in type symbols, and type symbols may be omitted when no ambiguity is thereby introduced. A dot stands for a left bracket whose mate is as far to the right as is consistent with the pairing of brackets already present and with the formula being well formed. Otherwise brackets and parentheses are to be restored using the convention of association to the left.

We introduce the following definitions and abbreviations:

$[A_\alpha = B_\alpha]$	stands for	$[Q_{\alpha\alpha\alpha}A_\alpha B_\alpha]$.
T_o	stands for	$[Q_{ooo} = Q_{ooo}]$.
F_o	stands for	$[\lambda p_o p_o] = [\lambda p_o T_o]$.
$[\forall x_\alpha A_o]$	stands for	$[\lambda x_\alpha A_o] = [\lambda x_\alpha T_o]$.
\wedge_{ooo}	stands for	$[\lambda p_o \lambda q_o \cdot [\lambda g_{ooo} \cdot g_{ooo} p_o q_o] = [\lambda g_{ooo} \cdot g_{ooo} T_o T_o]]$.
$[A_o \wedge B_o]$	stands for	$[\wedge_{ooo} A_o B_o]$.
\supset_{ooo}	stands for	$[\lambda p_o \lambda q_o \cdot p_o \wedge q_o = p_o]$.
$[A_o \supset B_o]$	stands for	$[\supset_{ooo} A_o B_o]$.

Other connectives and quantifiers are introduced in familiar ways.

$K^{\alpha\beta}$ and $K_{\alpha\beta\alpha}$	stand for	$[\lambda x_\alpha \lambda y_\beta x_\alpha]$.
$S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $S_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)}$	stand for	$[\lambda x_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda y_{\beta\gamma} \lambda z_\gamma \cdot x_{\alpha\beta\gamma} z_\gamma y_{\beta\gamma} z_\gamma]$.
$B^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $B_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)}$	stand for	$[\lambda f_{\alpha\beta} \lambda g_{\beta\gamma} \lambda x_\gamma \cdot f_{\alpha\beta} g_{\beta\gamma} x_\gamma]$.
$C^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $C_{\alpha\gamma\beta(\alpha\beta\gamma)}$	stand for	$[\lambda f_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda x_\beta \lambda y_\gamma \cdot f_{\alpha\beta\gamma} y_\gamma x_\beta]$.
$W^{\alpha\beta}$ and $W_{\alpha\beta(\alpha\beta\beta)}$	stand for	$[\lambda f_{\alpha\beta\beta} \lambda x_\beta \cdot f_{\alpha\beta\beta} x_\beta x_\beta]$.
$\mathfrak{S}_{A_\alpha}^x B_\beta$	stands for	the result of substituting A_α for x_α at all free occurrences of x_α in B_β .

\mathcal{L} has a single rule of inference, which is the following:

Rule R. From C_o and $[A_\alpha = B_\alpha]$ to infer the result of replacing one occurrence of A_α (which is not an occurrence of a variable immediately preceded by λ) in C_o by an occurrence of B_α .

The axioms and axiom schemata for \mathcal{L} are the following:

- (1) $[g_{oo} T_o \wedge g_{oo} F_o] = \forall x_o \cdot g_{oo} x_o$.
- (2) $x_\alpha = y_\alpha \supset \cdot h_{o\alpha} x_\alpha = h_{o\alpha} y_\alpha$.
- (3) $f_{\alpha\beta} = g_{\alpha\beta} = \forall x_\beta \cdot f_{\alpha\beta} x_\beta = g_{\alpha\beta} x_\beta$.
- (4) $[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] A_\alpha = \mathfrak{S}_{A_\alpha}^x B_\beta$, where A_α is free for x_α in B_β .

Let us denote by \mathcal{T}^e the system obtained when the axioms of extensionality (6.1.1 of [3]) are added to the list of axioms of the system \mathcal{T} of [3]. This is essentially the system of [8] or [4] using axioms 1–6, 10^o , $10^{\alpha\beta}$, and with the selection operators

deleted. $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$ differs from \mathcal{L} in having primitive constants \sim_{00} , \vee_{000} , and $\Pi_{0(0\alpha)}$ instead of $Q_{0\alpha\alpha}$. There are natural translations Δ from \mathcal{L} into $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$ and ∇ from $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$ into \mathcal{L} which involve replacing the primitive constants of one language by appropriate closed wffs of the other language. For example, if A_α is a wff of \mathcal{L} , ΔA_α is the result of replacing each occurrence of $Q_{0\beta\beta}$ in A_α by the wff

$$[\lambda x_\beta \lambda y_\beta \forall f_{0\beta} f_{0\beta} x_\beta \supset f_{0\beta} y_\beta]$$

of $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$. It is easy to establish that \mathcal{L} and $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$ are equivalent in the sense that for each wff A_0 of \mathcal{L} and B_0 of $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$, $\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} A_0$ iff $\vdash_{\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}} \Delta A_0$, and $\vdash_{\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}} B_0$ iff $\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} \nabla B_0$; moreover, $\vdash_{\mathcal{L}} A_0 = \nabla \Delta A_0$ and $\vdash_{\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}} B_0 = \Delta \nabla B_0$. Hence our independence proofs below apply also to $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{E}$.

DEFINITION. C_γ is *contractible* to D_γ (C_γ *contr* D_γ) iff D_γ can be obtained from C_γ by a sequence of zero or more applications of the following two rules of λ -conversion:

- I. (Alphabetic change of bound variables.) To replace any wf part $[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta]$ of a wff by $[\lambda y_\alpha \mathcal{S}^{\gamma\alpha}_{\gamma\alpha} B_\beta]$, provided that y_α is not free in B_β and y_α is free for x_α in B_β .
- II. (λ -contraction.) To replace any wf part $[[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] A_\alpha]$ of a wff by $\mathcal{S}^{\gamma\alpha}_{\gamma\alpha} B_\beta$, provided that A_α is free for x_α in B_β .

DEFINITION. E_δ is a *KS-combinatorial wff* iff every occurrence of λ in E_δ is in a wf part of E_δ of the form $K^{\alpha\beta}$ or $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$.

E_δ is a *KBCW-combinatorial wff* iff every occurrence of λ in E_δ is in a wf part of E_δ of the form $K^{\alpha\beta}$, $B^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, $C^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, or $W^{\alpha\beta}$.

Clearly $K^{\alpha\beta}$, $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, and all primitive constants and variables are *KS-combinatorial wffs*. Also, $[A_{\alpha\beta} B_\beta]$ is such a wff iff $A_{\alpha\beta}$ and B_β are.

We next show that every wff of \mathcal{L} is convertible to a *KS-combinatorial wff*, and to a *KBCW-combinatorial wff*. This requires only a simple translation into the present context of familiar facts about combinatory logic (see [6], [13], for example).

LEMMA 1. *For any KS-combinatorial wff B_β and variable x_γ there is a KS-combinatorial wff $P_{\beta\gamma}$ such that $P_{\beta\gamma}$ contr $[\lambda x_\gamma B_\beta]$.*

PROOF. By induction on the number of occurrences of $[$ in B_β .

Case a. B_β is x_γ . Let $P_{\gamma\gamma}$ be $S^{\gamma(\gamma\gamma)\gamma} K^{\gamma(\gamma\gamma)} K^{\gamma\gamma}$. Thus $P_{\gamma\gamma}$ contr $[\lambda z_\gamma K^{\gamma(\gamma\gamma)} z_\gamma K^{\gamma\gamma} z_\gamma]$ contr $[\lambda z_\gamma z_\gamma]$ contr $[\lambda x_\gamma B_\beta]$.

Case b. B_β does not contain x_γ free. Let $P_{\beta\gamma}$ be $K^{\beta\gamma} B_\beta$. Then $P_{\beta\gamma}$ contr $[\lambda x_\gamma B_\beta]$.

Case c. B_β has the form $[D_{\beta\delta} E_\delta]$. By inductive hypothesis there are *KS-combinatorial wffs* $G_{\beta\delta\gamma}$ and $H_{\delta\gamma}$ such that $G_{\beta\delta\gamma}$ contr $[\lambda x_\gamma D_{\beta\delta}]$ and $H_{\delta\gamma}$ contr $[\lambda x_\gamma E_\delta]$. Let $P_{\beta\gamma}$ be $[S^{\beta\delta\gamma} G_{\beta\delta\gamma} H_{\delta\gamma}]$. Thus

$$P_{\beta\gamma} \text{ contr } [S^{\beta\delta\gamma} [\lambda x_\gamma D_{\beta\delta}] [\lambda x_\gamma E_\delta]] \text{ contr } [\lambda x_\gamma [\lambda x_\gamma D_{\beta\delta}] x_\gamma [\lambda x_\gamma E_\delta] x_\delta] \text{ contr } [\lambda x_\gamma B_\beta].$$

Since every *KS-combinatorial wff* B_β falls under at least one of these three cases, this completes the proof of the lemma. \square

PROPOSITION 1. *For every wff A_δ of \mathcal{L} there is a KS-combinatorial wff P_δ such that P_δ contr A_δ .*

PROOF. By induction on the number of occurrences of $[$ in A_δ .

Case a. A_δ is a primitive constant or variable. Let P_δ be A_δ .

Case b. A_δ has the form $[D'_{\delta\beta} E'_\beta]$. By inductive hypothesis there are *KS-combinatorial wffs* $D'_{\delta\beta}$ and E'_β such that $D'_{\delta\beta}$ contr $D_{\delta\beta}$ and E'_β contr E_β . Let P_δ be $[D'_{\delta\beta} E'_\beta]$.

Case c. A_δ has the form $[\lambda x_\gamma B_\beta]$.

By inductive hypothesis there is a *KS-combinatorial* wff B'_β such that $B'_\beta \text{ contr } B_\beta$. Then by Lemma 1 there is a *KS-combinatorial* wff $P_{\beta\gamma}$ such that $P_{\beta\gamma} \text{ contr } [\lambda x_\gamma B'_\beta]$. Thus $P_{\beta\gamma} \text{ contr } A_\delta$. \square

PROPOSITION 2. *For every wff A_δ of \mathcal{L} there is a KBCW-combinatorial wff D_δ such that $D_\delta \text{ contr } A_\delta$.*

PROOF. It can be verified that

$$B^{(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)} [B^{(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)} [B^{(\alpha\gamma)(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)} W^{\alpha\gamma}] C^{(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)\gamma}][B^{(\alpha\gamma)(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta)\gamma} B^{\alpha\beta\gamma}]$$

contr $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$. If one replaces $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ by this wff everywhere in the wff P_δ of Proposition 1, one obtains the desired wff D_δ . \square

§3. General models for \mathcal{L} . We next define the general models for \mathcal{L} by modifying appropriately the definition in [8].

DEFINITION. A *frame* is a collection $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ of nonempty domains (sets), one for each type symbol α , such that $\mathcal{D}_o = \{t, f\}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ is a collection of functions mapping \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α . The members of \mathcal{D}_o are called *truth values* and the members of \mathcal{D}_i are called *individuals*.

DEFINITION. Given a frame $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$, an *assignment* (of values in the frame to variables) is a function φ defined on the set of variables of \mathcal{L} such that for each variable x_α , $\varphi x_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$. Given an assignment φ , a variable x_α , and an element $\delta \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$, let $(\varphi: x_\alpha/\delta)$ be that assignment ψ such that $\psi x_\alpha = \delta$ and $\psi y_\beta = \varphi y_\beta$ if $y_\beta \neq x_\alpha$.

If h is a function of which x is an argument, we write the value of h at x as hx or (hx) . If hx is itself a function of which y is an argument, we may write $(hx)y$ simply as hxy , using the convention of association to the left in our meta-language. We shall use dots to denote parentheses in our meta-language in the manner of our convention for brackets in \mathcal{L} . We shall also use λ -notation informally in our meta-language. Thus when \mathcal{A} is an expression of our meta-language involving a variable x of our meta-language, then $(\lambda x \mathcal{A})$ shall serve as a name for the function whose domain is the range of the variable x and whose value at each argument x is \mathcal{A} . In contexts where a frame has been specified, if α is a type symbol it will be understood that $x_\alpha, y_\alpha, \delta_\alpha$, etc., range over the domain \mathcal{D}_α of the frame. However, we reserve $q_{o\alpha\alpha}$ as a name for the identity relation over \mathcal{D}_α ; i.e., $q_{o\alpha\alpha}x_\alpha y_\alpha = t$ if $x_\alpha = y_\alpha$, and $q_{o\alpha\alpha}x_\alpha y_\alpha = f$ if $x_\alpha \neq y_\alpha$. We note for future reference that if $x_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$, then $q_{o\alpha\alpha}x_\alpha$ is $\{x_\alpha\}$, the unit set whose only member is x_α .

DEFINITION. A frame $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ is a *general model* for \mathcal{L} iff there is a binary function \mathcal{V} such that for each assignment φ and wff A_α , $\mathcal{V}_\varphi A_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$ and the following conditions are satisfied for all assignments φ and all wffs:

- (a) $\mathcal{V}_\varphi x_\alpha = \varphi x_\alpha$;
- (b) $\mathcal{V}_\varphi q_{o\alpha\alpha} = q_{o\alpha\alpha}$;
- (c) $\mathcal{V}_\varphi [A_{\alpha\beta} B_\beta] = (\mathcal{V}_\varphi A_{\alpha\beta})(\mathcal{V}_\varphi B_\beta)$;
- (d) $\mathcal{V}_\varphi [\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] = (\lambda y_\alpha \mathcal{V}_{\varphi: x_\alpha/y_\alpha} B_\beta)$.

Remark. Clearly the crucial requirement above is that $\mathcal{V}_\varphi [\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\alpha}$. Note that in a general model the function \mathcal{V} is uniquely determined.

DEFINITION. A frame $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ is a *standard model* for \mathcal{L} iff for all α and β , $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ is the set of all functions from \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α .

Clearly a standard model is a general model, and is uniquely determined by \mathcal{D}_ι .

A wff A_α is *valid* in a general model iff $\mathcal{V}_\varphi A_\alpha = t$ for all assignments φ . It can be shown by an easy modification of the argument in [8] that a wff A_α is a theorem of \mathcal{L} iff it is valid in every general model. Also, the rule of inference of \mathcal{L} preserves validity in a general model.

DEFINITION. A wff A_α is *significant* in a frame $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ iff there is a function \mathcal{V} such that for every assignment φ and for every wf part B_β of A_α (including A_α itself), $\mathcal{V}_\varphi B_\beta \in \mathcal{D}_\beta$, and \mathcal{V} satisfies conditions (a)–(d) (in the definition of general model).

Thus a frame is a general model iff every wff is significant in it.

Before proving the next proposition we state the following lemmas, which can be proved by straightforward induction on the construction of B_β .

LEMMA 2. If B_β is significant in a frame and φ and ψ are assignments which agree on the free variables of B_β , then $\mathcal{V}_\varphi B_\beta = \mathcal{V}_\psi B_\beta$.

LEMMA 3. If A_α and B_β are significant in a frame and A_α is free for x_α in B_β , then $\mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{x_\alpha} B_\beta$ is significant and for any assignment φ , $\mathcal{V}_\varphi \mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{x_\alpha} B_\beta = \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: x_\alpha \mapsto \mathcal{V}_\varphi A_\alpha)} B_\beta$.

PROPOSITION 3. If C_γ is significant in a frame and C_γ contr D_γ , then D_γ is significant, and for any assignment φ , $\mathcal{V}_\varphi C_\gamma = \mathcal{V}_\varphi D_\gamma$.

PROOF. Clearly it suffices to prove this proposition for the case where D_γ is obtained from C_γ by a single application of Rule I or II of λ -conversion. In either case the proposition follows easily by induction on the construction of C_γ , once one establishes it for the wf part of C_γ to which the rule is actually applied.

Thus in the case of Rule I one may suppose C_γ is $[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta]$ and D_γ is $[\lambda y_\alpha \mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{y_\alpha} B_\beta]$, where y_α is not free in B_β and y_α is free for x_α in B_β . We may assume that $y_\alpha \neq x_\alpha$. B_β is significant since C_γ is, so by Lemma 3, $\mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{y_\alpha} B_\beta$ is significant.

Note that for any $\delta_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$ we have $\mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: y_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} y_\alpha = \delta_\alpha$ so

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: y_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} \mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{y_\alpha} B_\beta &= \mathcal{V}_{((\varphi: y_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha): x_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} B_\beta && \text{(by Lemma 3)} \\ &= \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: x_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} B_\beta && \text{(by Lemma 2).} \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\mathcal{V}_\varphi C_\gamma = (\lambda \delta_\alpha \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: x_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} B_\beta) = (\lambda \delta_\alpha \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: y_\alpha \mapsto \delta_\alpha)} \mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{y_\alpha} B_\beta),$$

which is the desired value for $\mathcal{V}_\varphi D_\gamma$, so D_γ is significant and $\mathcal{V}_\varphi C_\gamma = \mathcal{V}_\varphi D_\gamma$.

In the case of Rule II one may suppose that C_γ is $[[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] A_\alpha]$ and D_γ is $\mathcal{S}_{A_\alpha}^{x_\alpha} B_\beta$, where A_α is free for x_α in B_β . Since C_γ is significant, A_α and B_β are, so by Lemma 3, D_γ is significant. Also $\mathcal{V}_\varphi C_\gamma = (\mathcal{V}_\varphi [[\lambda x_\alpha B_\beta] A_\alpha]) \mathcal{V}_\varphi A_\alpha = \mathcal{V}_{(\varphi: x_\alpha \mapsto \mathcal{V}_\varphi A_\alpha)} B_\beta = \mathcal{V}_\varphi D_\gamma$ by Lemma 3. \square

Remark. It is not true that if C_γ is significant in a frame and D_γ contr C_γ , then D_γ must be significant. For x_i is always significant, but $[[\lambda x_i x_i] x_i]$ might not be.

PROPOSITION 4. For any frame \mathcal{M} , the following conditions are equivalent:

- \mathcal{M} is a general model for \mathcal{L} .
- every KS-combinatorial wff of \mathcal{L} is significant in \mathcal{M} .
- Every KBCW-combinatorial wff of \mathcal{L} is significant in \mathcal{M} .

PROOF. By Propositions 1, 2, and 3. \square

We now rephrase condition (b) to obtain a simple criterion for a frame to be a general model.

THEOREM 1. *A frame $\{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ is a general model for \mathcal{L} iff it satisfies all of the following conditions (for all type symbols α, β, γ):*

- (a) $q_{o\alpha\alpha} \in \mathcal{D}_{o\alpha\alpha}$.
- (b) For all $r_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$, $(\lambda y_\beta r_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$.
- (c) $(\lambda r_\alpha \lambda y_\beta r_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\alpha}$.
- (d) For all $r_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $y_{\beta\gamma} \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\gamma}$, $(\lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y_{\beta\gamma} \delta_\gamma) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma}$.
- (e) For all $r_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, $(\lambda y_{\beta\gamma} \lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y_{\beta\gamma} \delta_\gamma) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)}$.
- (f) $(\lambda r_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda y_{\beta\gamma} \lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y_{\beta\gamma} \delta_\gamma) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)}$.

PROOF. Clearly if the frame is a general model, the conditions (a)–(f) must be satisfied. To show they are sufficient, we show they imply condition (b) of Proposition 4. Since every variable is significant in every frame, and a wff $[A_{\alpha\beta} B_\beta]$ is significant in a frame iff $A_{\alpha\beta}$ and B_β are, it suffices to show that the wffs $Q_{o\alpha\alpha}$, $K^{\alpha\beta}$, and $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ are significant in the frame. This is assured by conditions (a)–(f). (We note that condition (a) implies that for all $r_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$, $(q_{o\alpha\alpha} r_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{o\alpha}$.) \square

Remark. We leave it to the reader to state the analogous theorem using $B^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, $C^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, and $W^{\alpha\beta}$ in place of $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$. Such a theorem may be useful since $B^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, $C^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, and $W^{\alpha\beta}$ are each conceptually simpler than $S^{\alpha\beta\gamma}$.

§4. The Axiom of Descriptions. We remind the reader that the Axiom of Descriptions is

$$(D) \quad \exists i_{(o\alpha)} \forall x_i \cdot i_{(o\alpha)}[Q_{o\alpha} x_i] = x_i.$$

THEOREM 2. *D is not a theorem of \mathcal{L} .*

PROOF. We partition the type symbols into two sets, \mathcal{T}_o and \mathcal{T}_i as follows: $o \in \mathcal{T}_o$ but $o \notin \mathcal{T}_i$; $i \in \mathcal{T}_i$ but $i \notin \mathcal{T}_o$; $(\alpha\beta)$ is in whichever set contains α . We then let $\mathcal{C} = \{(\alpha\beta) \mid \alpha \in \mathcal{T}_i \text{ and } \beta \in \mathcal{T}_o\}$.

We next define a frame $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ by induction on α . $\mathcal{D}_o = \{t, f\}$. $\mathcal{D}_i = \{m, n\}$, where m and n are distinct individuals. (Actually \mathcal{D}_i may be taken to have any cardinality greater than one.) If $(\alpha\beta) \in \mathcal{C}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ is the set of all constant functions (i.e., functions with the same value for all arguments) from \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α . If $(\alpha\beta) \notin \mathcal{C}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ is the set of all functions from \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α .

We next use Theorem 1 to verify that \mathcal{M} is a general model for \mathcal{L} .

- (a) Since $(o\alpha) \notin \mathcal{C}$ and $(o\alpha\alpha) \notin \mathcal{C}$, $q_{o\alpha\alpha} \in \mathcal{D}_{o\alpha\alpha}$.
- (b) $(\lambda y_\beta r_\alpha)$ is a constant function, and so is in $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$.
- (c) $(\alpha\beta\alpha) \notin \mathcal{C}$ whether $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_i$ or $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_o$. Hence $(\lambda r_\alpha \lambda y_\beta r_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\alpha}$.
- (d) We need consider only the case where $(\alpha\gamma) \in \mathcal{C}$.

We must show that if $r \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $y \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\gamma}$, then $(\lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y_{\beta\gamma} \delta_\gamma)$ is a constant function. So we let $\beta^1, \beta^2 \in \mathcal{D}_\gamma$ and show that $(r_{\beta^1} y_{\beta^1}) = (r_{\beta^2} y_{\beta^2})$. Since $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_i$ and $\gamma \in \mathcal{T}_o$, $(\alpha\beta\gamma) \in \mathcal{C}$ so $r_{\beta^1} = r_{\beta^2}$.

Case 1. $\beta \in \mathcal{T}_i$. Then $(\beta\gamma) \in \mathcal{C}$ so $y_{\beta^1} = y_{\beta^2}$ so $(r_{\beta^1} y_{\beta^1}) = (r_{\beta^2} y_{\beta^2})$.

Case 2. $\beta \in \mathcal{T}_o$. Then $(\alpha\beta) \in \mathcal{C}$. Since $r_{\beta^1} = r_{\beta^2} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$, $r_{\beta^1}(y_{\beta^1}) = r_{\beta^2}(y_{\beta^2})$.

- (e) Suppose $(\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)) \in \mathcal{C}$ and $r \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$.

We must show that $(\lambda y_{\beta\gamma} \lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y_{\beta\gamma} \delta_\gamma) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)}$. So suppose $y^1, y^2 \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\gamma}$. We must show that $(\lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y^1 \delta_\gamma) = (\lambda \delta_\gamma r_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta_\gamma} y^2 \delta_\gamma)$. To do this we show that for an arbitrary $\beta \in \mathcal{D}_\gamma$, $(r_{\beta} y^1 \beta) = (r_{\beta} y^2 \beta)$. But $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_i$ and $\beta \in \mathcal{T}_o$ so $(\alpha\beta) \in \mathcal{C}$ and $r_\beta \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$, which contains only constant functions. Hence $r_\beta(y^1 \beta) = r_\beta(y^2 \beta)$.

(f) $(\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)) \notin \mathcal{C}$ whether $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_i$ or $\alpha \in \mathcal{T}_o$, so

$$(\lambda x_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda y_{\beta\gamma} \lambda \delta_{\gamma\alpha} \lambda \epsilon_{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta\gamma\epsilon} \lambda \zeta_{\beta\gamma\delta\gamma}) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)}.$$

Now q_{oi}, m and q_{oi}, n are elements of \mathcal{D}_{oi} , so in order that D be valid in \mathcal{M} there must be a function $h \in \mathcal{D}_{i(oi)}$ such that $h(q_{oi}, m) = m$ and $h(q_{oi}, n) = n$. However, $(i(oi)) \in \mathcal{C}$, so there is no such function in $\mathcal{D}_{i(oi)}$. Thus D is not valid in the general model \mathcal{M} , and so is not a theorem of \mathcal{L} . \square

The idea behind the following theorem is contained in [9], but the proof is short, so we give it here.

THEOREM 3. *Let $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ be a general model for \mathcal{L} in which \mathcal{D}_i is finite. Then \mathcal{M} is a standard model iff D is valid in \mathcal{M} .*

PROOF: The domains \mathcal{D}_α must, of course, all be finite. If \mathcal{M} is standard one can enumerate the elements in $\mathcal{D}_{i(oi)}$ to see that D is valid in \mathcal{M} .

Suppose D is valid in \mathcal{M} . We show that $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ must contain all functions from \mathcal{D}_β to \mathcal{D}_α . So let g be any such function. Let $\mathcal{D}_\beta = \{m_\beta^1, \dots, m_\beta^k\}$. By the methods mentioned in §1 one sees that there must be a description operator $h_{\alpha(o\alpha)} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha(o\alpha)}$ such that for each $n_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$, $h_{\alpha(o\alpha)}[q_{o\alpha\alpha} n_\alpha] = n_\alpha$. Let φ be an assignment with values on the variables $i_{\alpha(o\alpha)}, w_\beta^1, \dots, w_\beta^k, z_\alpha^1, \dots, z_\alpha^k$ as follows: $\varphi i_{\alpha(o\alpha)} = h_{\alpha(o\alpha)}$, $\varphi w_\beta^1 = m_\beta^1, \dots, \varphi w_\beta^k = m_\beta^k$, $\varphi z_\alpha^1 = g m_\beta^1, \dots$, and $\varphi z_\alpha^k = g m_\beta^k$. Then

$$g = \mathcal{V}_\varphi[\lambda x_\beta \cdot i_{\alpha(o\alpha)} \lambda y_\alpha \cdot [x_\beta = w_\beta^1 \wedge y_\alpha = z_\alpha^1] \vee \dots \vee [x_\beta = w_\beta^k \wedge y_\alpha = z_\alpha^k]],$$

so g must be in $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ since \mathcal{M} is a general model. \square

Remark. Theorem 3 provides a strong argument for always assuming the Axiom of Descriptions. If one does this by introducing a description operator $i_{i(oi)}$ and modifies the definition of general model in the natural way by introducing an appropriate requirement for $\mathcal{V}_{\varphi i_{i(oi)}}$ (thus getting closer to the definition in [8]), one can again prove that the theorems are precisely the wffs valid in all general models. Thus it appears that the language \mathcal{Q}_o of [2] is more natural than \mathcal{L} .

§5. The Axiom of Choice. The Axiom of Choice (for individuals) is

$$(E) \quad \exists i_{i(oi)} \forall p_{oi} \cdot \exists x_i p_{oi} x_i \supset p_{oi} i_{i(oi)} p_{oi}.$$

Clearly $[E \supset D]$ is a theorem of \mathcal{L} . We use the Fraenkel-Mostowski method to show that its converse is not. Thus E is not provable in \mathcal{L} , even if D is added to the list of axioms.

We first establish the following lemma, which is fundamental for applications of the Fraenkel-Mostowski method to \mathcal{L} . The lemma is true but trivial if \mathcal{D}_i is finite, since in this case the conditions on \mathcal{F} assure that \mathcal{M} will be the standard model over \mathcal{D}_i . We use \circ to denote the composition of functions.

LEMMA 4. *Let \mathcal{D}_i be an infinite set of individuals and P a set of permutations σ of \mathcal{D}_i such that $\sigma \circ \sigma = (\lambda x, x)$. Let \mathcal{F} be a family of subsets of P such that*

(a) *for each $m \in \mathcal{D}_i$, there is a set $K \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\sigma m = m$ for all $\sigma \in K$, and*

(b) *for all $H, K \in \mathcal{F}$ there is a set $J \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $J \subseteq H \cap K$.*

Let the frame $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{D}_\alpha\}_\alpha$ be defined, and each permutation $\sigma \in P$ be extended to a permutation of \mathcal{D}_α (which we may denote by σ^α) such that $\sigma^\alpha \circ \sigma^\alpha = (\lambda x_\alpha x_\alpha)$ for each α , as follows by induction on α :

$$\mathcal{D}_o = \{t, f\}; \quad \sigma^o = (\lambda x_o x_o) \text{ for all } \sigma \in P.$$

Given \mathcal{D}_α and \mathcal{D}_β and any function \mathfrak{h} from \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α , let $\sigma\mathfrak{h} = \sigma^\alpha \circ \mathfrak{h} \circ \sigma^\beta$, and let $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ be the set of all functions \mathfrak{h} from \mathcal{D}_β into \mathcal{D}_α such that there is some $K \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\sigma\mathfrak{h} = \mathfrak{h}$ for all $\sigma \in K$.

Then \mathcal{M} is a general model for \mathcal{L} in which D is valid.

PROOF. For notational convenience, if $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_\gamma$ we let $K_\mathfrak{h}$ denote some $K \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\sigma\mathfrak{h} = \mathfrak{h}$ for all $\sigma \in K$. Clearly such a set $K_\mathfrak{h}$ always exists. Note that if $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$ and $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathcal{D}_\beta$, then $(\sigma^{\alpha\beta}\mathfrak{h})(\sigma^\beta\mathfrak{x}) = \sigma^\alpha(\mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{x})$.

We use Theorem 1 to verify that \mathcal{M} is a general model.

(a) If $\mathfrak{x}, \mathfrak{y} \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$ and $\sigma \in K_\mathfrak{x}$ then $(\sigma^{\alpha\alpha} \cdot q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}})\mathfrak{y} = \sigma^\alpha(q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}\mathfrak{y}) = q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}(\sigma\mathfrak{y})$, which is t iff $\sigma\mathfrak{y} = \mathfrak{x} = \sigma\mathfrak{x}$ iff $\mathfrak{x} = \mathfrak{y}$, so $(\sigma^{\alpha\alpha} \cdot q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}})\mathfrak{y} = (q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}\mathfrak{x})\mathfrak{y}$ for all $\mathfrak{y} \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$ so $\sigma(q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}\mathfrak{x}) = q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}\mathfrak{x}$. Thus $(q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}\mathfrak{x}) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\alpha}$, and $q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}$ at least maps \mathcal{D}_α into $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\alpha}$. Also, for any $\sigma \in P$, $(\sigma q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}})\mathfrak{x} = (\sigma^{\alpha\alpha} \cdot q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}} \cdot \sigma^\alpha\mathfrak{x})\mathfrak{y} = q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}(\sigma^\alpha\mathfrak{x})(\sigma^\alpha\mathfrak{y})$, which is t iff $\sigma\mathfrak{x} = \sigma\mathfrak{y}$ iff $\mathfrak{x} = \mathfrak{y}$, so $\sigma q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}} = q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}}$ and $q_{\alpha\alpha\mathfrak{x}} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\alpha\alpha}$.

(b) For any $\mathfrak{x}_\alpha \in \mathcal{D}_\alpha$ and $\sigma \in K_\mathfrak{x}$, $\sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) = (\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\sigma\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) = (\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha)$, so $(\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta}$.

(c) For any $\sigma \in P$, $\sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{x}_\alpha\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) = (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_\alpha\sigma\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\sigma\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) = (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_\alpha\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\sigma\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) = (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_\alpha\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha)$, so $(\lambda\mathfrak{x}_\alpha\lambda\mathfrak{y}_\beta\mathfrak{x}_\alpha) \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\alpha}$.

Before checking (d)–(f) we observe that if $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, $\mathfrak{y} \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\gamma}$, and $\mathfrak{z} \in \mathcal{D}_\gamma$, then $\sigma^\alpha(\sigma\mathfrak{x})(\sigma\mathfrak{z}) \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y}) \cdot \sigma\mathfrak{z} = \sigma^\alpha(\sigma^{\alpha\beta} \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z}) \cdot \sigma^\beta \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z} = \sigma^\alpha \cdot \sigma^\alpha \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z} = \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}$.

(d) Suppose $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $\mathfrak{y} \in \mathcal{D}_{\beta\gamma}$. Let J be a member of \mathcal{F} such that $J \subseteq K_\mathfrak{x} \cap K_\mathfrak{y}$. For any $\sigma \in J$, $\sigma\mathfrak{x} = \mathfrak{x}$ and $\sigma\mathfrak{y} = \mathfrak{y}$ so $\sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}) = \sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})\mathfrak{z} \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y})\mathfrak{z}) = (\lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \sigma^\alpha \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})(\sigma\mathfrak{z}) \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y}) \cdot \sigma\mathfrak{z}) = (\lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z})$, which must therefore be in $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma}$.

(e) If $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$ and $\sigma \in K_\mathfrak{x}$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}) &= \sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})\mathfrak{z} \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y})\mathfrak{z}) \\ &= (\lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \cdot \sigma \cdot \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})\mathfrak{z} \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y})\mathfrak{z}) \\ &= (\lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \sigma^\alpha \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})(\sigma\mathfrak{z}) \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y}) \cdot \sigma\mathfrak{z}) \\ &= (\lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}), \end{aligned}$$

which must therefore be in $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)}$.

(f) For any $\sigma \in P$,

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(\lambda\mathfrak{x}_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}) &= (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \sigma^\alpha \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{x})(\sigma\mathfrak{z}) \cdot (\sigma\mathfrak{y}) \cdot \sigma\mathfrak{z}) \\ &= (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_{\alpha\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{y}_{\beta\gamma} \lambda\mathfrak{z}_\gamma \cdot \mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{z} \cdot \mathfrak{y}\mathfrak{z}), \end{aligned}$$

which must therefore be in $\mathcal{D}_{\alpha\gamma(\beta\gamma)(\alpha\beta\gamma)}$. Thus \mathcal{M} is a general model for \mathcal{L} .

We next verify that D is valid in \mathcal{M} . Let $\mathfrak{n} \in \mathcal{D}_i$. We shall construct a description operator \mathfrak{h} mapping \mathcal{D}_{oi} to \mathcal{D}_i as follows. For each unit set $q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i$, we let $\mathfrak{h}(q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i) = \mathfrak{x}_i$. If $\mathfrak{g} \in \mathcal{D}_{oi}$ is not a unit set, let $\mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{g} = \mathfrak{n}$. Now we verify that $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_{i(oi)}$. Let $\sigma \in K_\mathfrak{n}$. For each unit set $q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i$, $\sigma(q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i) = (q_{oi}\sigma\mathfrak{x}_i) = q_{oi}(\sigma\mathfrak{x}_i)$, so $(\sigma\mathfrak{h})(q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i) = \sigma(\mathfrak{h} \cdot \sigma \cdot q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i) = \sigma(\mathfrak{h} \cdot q_{oi}\sigma\mathfrak{x}_i) = \sigma\sigma\mathfrak{x}_i = \mathfrak{x}_i = \mathfrak{h}(q_{oi}\mathfrak{x}_i)$. If \mathfrak{g}_{oi} is not a unit set, then $\sigma\mathfrak{g}_{oi}$ (i.e. $\mathfrak{g}_{oi} \circ \sigma'$) is not either, so $(\sigma\mathfrak{h})\mathfrak{g}_{oi} = \sigma(\mathfrak{h}\sigma\mathfrak{g}_{oi}) = \sigma\mathfrak{n} = \mathfrak{n} = \mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{g}_{oi}$. Thus $\sigma\mathfrak{h} = \mathfrak{h}$, and $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_{i(oi)}$. It is now easy to see that D is valid in \mathcal{M} . \square

THEOREM 4. $[D \supset E]$ is not a theorem of \mathcal{L} .

PROOF. Let \mathcal{J} be an infinite index set and for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$ let \mathfrak{m}^j and \mathfrak{n}^j be distinct individuals, so chosen that $\mathfrak{m}^j \neq \mathfrak{m}^i$ and $\mathfrak{n}^j \neq \mathfrak{n}^i$ if $j \neq i$. Let $\mathcal{D}_i = \{\mathfrak{m}^j \mid j \in \mathcal{J}\} \cup \{\mathfrak{n}^j \mid j \in \mathcal{J}\}$. Let P be the set of all mappings σ from \mathcal{D}_i to \mathcal{D}_i such that for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$, $\sigma\mathfrak{m}^j = \mathfrak{m}^j$ and $\sigma\mathfrak{n}^j = \mathfrak{n}^j$, or $\sigma\mathfrak{m}^j = \mathfrak{n}^j$ and $\sigma\mathfrak{n}^j = \mathfrak{m}^j$. Thus for each $\sigma \in P$ we have $\sigma \circ \sigma = (\lambda\mathfrak{x}_i.\mathfrak{x}_i)$. Let \mathcal{F} be the family of all subsets K of P such that there is a

finite subset \mathcal{J} of \mathcal{J} such that $K = \{\sigma \in P \mid \text{for all } j \in \mathcal{J}, \sigma m^j = m^j \text{ and } \sigma n^j = n^j\}$. It is easily checked that \mathcal{F} satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4, so let \mathcal{M} be the general model constructed as in Lemma 4.

We must see that E is false in \mathcal{M} . Suppose it were true. Then there would be a choice function $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_{i(o_i)}$ such that for every nonempty set $g \in \mathcal{D}_{o_i}$, $\mathfrak{h}g$ is in g , i.e., $g(\mathfrak{h}g) = t$. For each $j \in \mathcal{J}$, let $g^j = (\lambda x_i. x_i = m^j \text{ or } x_i = n^j)$, i.e., $g^j = \{m^j, n^j\}$. It is easy to see that $\sigma g^j = g^j$ for all $\sigma \in P$, so each $g^j \in \mathcal{D}_{o_i}$. Now for any $K \in \mathcal{F}$ there is some $j \in \mathcal{J}$ which is not in the finite subset of \mathcal{J} which determines K , and hence some $\sigma \in K$ such that $\sigma m^j = n^j$ and $\sigma n^j = m^j$. Then $(\sigma \mathfrak{h})g^j = \sigma(\mathfrak{h}. \sigma g^j) = \sigma(\mathfrak{h}g^j) \neq \mathfrak{h}g^j$, so $\sigma \mathfrak{h} \neq \mathfrak{h}$. Thus there can be no choice function $\mathfrak{h} \in \mathcal{D}_{i(o_i)}$, so E is false in \mathcal{M} .

Thus $[D \supset E]$ is not valid in the general model \mathcal{M} and so is not a theorem of \mathcal{L} . \square

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