



BREAKING ALL THE THINGS — A SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF FIRMWARE EXTRACTION TECHNIQUES FOR IOT DEVICES


SEBASTIAN VASILE, DAVID OSWALD, TOM CHOTHIA
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM


QUICK BREAKDOWN

- Purpose of firmware extraction
- Firmware extraction methods
- Survey results
- Countermeasures

WHY DOES IT MATTER?

- Analyze device functionality
- Find vulnerabilities
- Steal IP
- Supply chain attack





FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
- Hardware

FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
 - Check manufacturer's website
- Hardware

Firmware

A firmware update can resolve issues that the previous firmware version may have and improve its current performance.

To Upgrade

IMPORTANT: To prevent upgrade failures, please read the following before proceeding with the upgrade process

- Please upgrade firmware from the local TP-Link official website of the purchase location for your TP-Link device, otherwise it will be against the warranty. Please click [here](#) to change site if necessary.
- Please verify the hardware version of your device for the firmware version. Wrong firmware upgrade may damage your device and void the warranty. (Normally V1.x=V1)
[How to find the hardware version on a TP-Link device?](#)
- Do NOT turn off the power during the upgrade process, as it may cause permanent damage to the product.
- Do NOT upgrade the firmware through wireless connection unless there is no LAN/Ethernet port on the TP-link device. **For LTE-MiFi, it is recommended to upgrade via USB port.**
- It's recommended that users stop all Internet applications on the computer, or simply disconnect Internet line from the device before the upgrade.
- Use decompression software such as WinZIP or WinRAR to extract the file you download before the upgrade.

TL-WR841N(EU)_V13_180119

Published Date: 2018-02-24

Language: English

File Size: 4.73 MB

Modification and Bug Fixes:

1. Fixed WPA2 (KRACKs) vulnerability.
2. Fixed the bug that router cannot forward some specific DNS requests.
3. Shorten the interval time to reconnect to PPPoE server after disconnection.
4. Improved the stability of Quick Setup.

FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
 - Check manufacturer's website
 - Intercept firmware updates
- Hardware

echodot_setup_00001_20170217102227.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

ip.addr==10.0.1.101 && tcp.port==45243 && ip.addr==72.195.165.91 && tcp.port==80 Expression...

No.	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Time	Info
1563	10.0.1.101	72.195.165.91	TCP	45243	74 101.958440086	[SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=4294946638 TSecr=0 V
1568	72.195.165.91	10.0.1.101	TCP	45243	74 101.971696646	[SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=28960 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=214997005
1570	10.0.1.101	72.195.165.91	TCP	45243	66 101.975814578	[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=87616 Len=0 TSval=4294946639 TSecr=2149970056
1571	10.0.1.101	72.195.165.91	HTTP	344	101.977161589	GET /obfuscated-otav3-9/d764b52fbcff62904cdef78a951a5636/update-kindle-full_biscuit-272.5.6.7_user_567200820.bin HTTP/1.1\r\n
1573	72.195.165.91	10.0.1.101	TCP	45243	66 101.992658154	[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=279 Win=30048 Len=0 TSval=2149970076 TSecr=4294946639
1574	72.195.165.91	10.0.1.101	HTTP	344	101.994055389	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
1575	72.195.165.91	10.0.1.101	TCP	45243	13098 101.994108311	[ACK] Seq=1449 Ack=279 Win=30048 Len=13032 TSval=2149970077 TSecr=429494663

+ Frame 1571: 344 bytes on wire (2752 bits), 344 bytes captured (2752 bits) on interface 0

+ Ethernet II, Src: 40:b4:cd:cc:cb:f7 (40:b4:cd:cc:cb:f7), Dst: Apple_2c:cc:07 (88:1f:a1:2c:cc:07)

+ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.1.101, Dst: 72.195.165.91

+ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 45243 (45243), Dst Port: 80 (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 278

+ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

+ GET /obfuscated-otav3-9/d764b52fbcff62904cdef78a951a5636/update-kindle-full_biscuit-272.5.6.7_user_567200820.bin HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: amzdigitaldownloads.edgesuite.net\r\n

Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n

User-Agent: AndroidDownloadManager/5.1.1 (Linux; U; Android 5.1.1; AE0BC Build/LVY48F)\r\n

\r\n

[Full request URI: http://amzdigitaldownloads.edgesuite.net/obfuscated-otav3-9/d764b52fbcff62904cdef78a951a5636/update-kindle-full_biscuit-272.5.6.7_user_567200820.bin]

[HTTP request 1/1]

[Response in frame: 1574]

Hex	Dec	Text
0000	88 1f a1 2c cc 07 40 b4 cd cc cb f7 08 00 45 00@.E.
0010	01 4a fd ce 40 00 40 06 42 5c 0a 00 01 65 48 c3	.J..@. B\...eH.
0020	a5 5b b0 bb 00 50 cc 15 52 83 7d 08 f4 c4 80 18	.[...P.. R.]....
0030	05 59 86 87 00 00 01 01 08 0a ff ff af 4f 80 25	.Y.....0.%
0040	f0 88 47 45 54 20 2f 6f 62 66 75 73 63 61 74 65	..GET /o bfuscate
0050	64 2d 6f 74 61 76 33 2d 39 2f 64 37 36 34 62 35	d-otav3- 9/d764b5
0060	32 66 62 63 66 66 36 32 39 30 34 63 64 65 66 37	2fbcff62 904cdef7
0070	38 61 39 35 31 61 35 36 33 36 2f 75 70 64 61 74	8a951a56 36/updat
0080	65 2d 6b 69 6e 64 6c 65 2d 66 75 6c 6c 5f 62 69	e-kindle -full_bi
0090	73 63 75 69 74 2d 32 37 32 2e 35 2e 36 2e 37 5f	scuit-27 2.5.6.7_
00a0	75 73 65 72 5f 35 36 37 32 30 30 38 32 30 2e 62	user_567 200820.b
00b0	69 6e 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 6f 73	in HTTP/ 1.1..Hos
00c0	74 3a 20 61 6d 7a 64 69 67 69 74 61 6c 64 6f 77	t: amzdi gitaldow
00d0	6e 6c 6f 61 64 73 2e 65 64 67 65 73 75 69 74 65	nloads.e dgesuite
00e0	2e 6e 65 74 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e	.net..Co nnection
00f0	3a 20 4b 65 65 70 2d 41 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a 55 73	: Keep-A live..Us
0100	65 72 2d 41 67 65 6e 74 3a 20 41 6e 64 72 6f 69	er-Agent : Androi
0110	64 44 6f 77 6e 6c 6f 61 64 4d 61 6e 61 67 65 72	dDownloa dManager
0120	2f 35 2e 31 2e 31 20 28 4c 69 6e 75 78 3b 20 55	/5.1.1 (Linux; U
0130	3b 20 41 6e 64 72 6f 69 64 20 35 2e 31 2e 31 3b	; Androi d 5.1.1;
0140	20 41 45 4f 42 43 20 42 75 69 6c 64 2f 4c 56 59	AE0BC B uild/LVY
0150	34 38 46 29 0d 0a 0d 0a	48F)....

echodot_setup_00001_20170217102227

Packets: 137930 · Displayed: 132159 (95.8%) · Load time: 0:3.13 · Profile: Default

FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
 - Check manufacturer's website
 - Intercept firmware updates
 - Leverage/exploit running services (Telnet, SSH, FTP, etc.)
- Hardware



Home



Users



Shares



Apps



Cloud Access



Backups



Settings

Settings

General

Network

Media

Utilities

Notifications

Firmware Update

Network Profile

Status No Internet access

Mac Address 00:14:EE:06:25:CA

IPv4 IP Address 10.42.0.113

IPv4 DNS Server 10.42.0.1

Network Services

IPv4 Network Mode

FTP Access

SSH [Configure>>](#)

Windows Services

Workgroup WORKGROUP


Local Master Browser

Max SMB Protocol SMB 3

FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
- Hardware
 - UART


UART



- Serial comms interface
- Used for debugging
- 3 pins: GND, RX, TX + VCC



UART



```
[ 14.170000] PPP generic driver version 2.4.2
[ 14.180000] NET: Registered protocol family 24
[ 14.250000] cfg80211: Calling CRDA for country: US
[ 14.250000] cfg80211: Regulatory domain changed to country: US
[ 14.260000] cfg80211: DFS Master region: FCC
[ 14.270000] cfg80211: (start_freq - end_freq @ bandwidth), (max_antenna_gain, max_eirp), (dfs_cac)
[ 14.280000] cfg80211: (2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ 40000 KHz), (N/A, 3000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 14.280000] cfg80211: (5170000 KHz - 5250000 KHz @ 80000 KHz, 160000 KHz AUTO), (N/A, 1700 mBm),
[ 14.290000] cfg80211: (5250000 KHz - 5330000 KHz @ 80000 KHz, 160000 KHz AUTO), (N/A, 2400 mBm),
[ 14.300000] cfg80211: (5490000 KHz - 5730000 KHz @ 160000 KHz), (N/A, 2400 mBm), (0 s)
[ 14.310000] cfg80211: (5735000 KHz - 5835000 KHz @ 80000 KHz), (N/A, 3000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 14.320000] cfg80211: (57240000 KHz - 63720000 KHz @ 2160000 KHz), (N/A, 4000 mBm), (N/A)
[ 14.330000] ieee80211 phy0: Atheros AR9531 Rev:2 mem=0xb8100000, irq=47
```

```
Philips-hue login: root
Password:
```

```
BusyBox v1.19.4 (2015-12-16 12:35:48 CET) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
```

```
[ 23.220000] random: nonblocking pool is initialized
```

UART

- Most embedded devices run some form of busybox
- What if netcat is not available?
- All you really need is a shell and printf/echo
- Transfer missing binaries by printing binary data to file
- <https://github.com/c0mpute/serial-transfer>

FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS

- Software
- Hardware
 - UART
 - JTAG

JTAG

ARM 10-PIN Interface

VCC	1	□ □	2 TMS
GND	3	□ □	4 TCLK
GND	5	□ □	6 TDO
RTCK	7	□ □	8 TDI
GND	9	□ □	10 RESET


ST 14-PIN Interface

/JEN	1	□ □	2 /TRST
GND	3	□ □	4 N/C
TDI	5	□ □	6 TSTAT
VCC	7	□ □	8 /RST
TMS	9	□ □	10 GND
TCLK	11	□ □	12 GND
TDO	13	□ □	14 /TERR

OCDS 16-PIN Interface

TMS	1	□ □	2 VCC (optional)	VCC	1	□ □	2 VCC (optional)
TDO	3	□ □	4 GND	TRST	3	□ □	4 GND
CPUCLK	5	□ □	6 GND	TDI	5	□ □	6 GND
TDI	7	□ □	8 RESET	TMS	7	□ □	8 GND
TRST	9	□ □	10 BRKOUT	TCLK	9	□ □	10 GND
TCLK	11	□ □	12 GND	RTCK	11	□ □	12 GND
BRKIN	13	□ □	14 OCDSE	TDO	13	□ □	14 GND
TRAP	15	□ □	16 GND	RESET	15	□ □	16 GND
				N/C	17	□ □	18 GND
				N/C	19	□ □	20 GND


- Debugging and programming interface
- Many different pinout variations
- Official standard - 4 pins + 1 optional
- TCK, TMS, TDI, TDO + TRST



FIRMWARE EXTRACTION METHODS


- Software
- Hardware
 - UART
 - JTAG
 - Direct flash chip memory dump (eMMC)


eMMC




- 3 pins: DAT0, CLK, CMD + GND
- Standard package - BGA
- In-Circuit vs External dump
- In-Circuit - Identify pins with oscilloscope
- External - Look up flash chip number and datasheet









Survey results



Software Methods (20.83%)



JTAG (12.5%)



Other (12.5%)



UART (45.83%)



eMMC Dump (29.16%)

Root

- Got root on 75% of devices
- Some devices were not tested (monolithic OS, Windows CE, etc.)
- Only case of root failure - Amazon Echo Plus (but see related Defcon talk by Huiyu/Wenxiang)
- Best defense against root seen in this survey - Verified Boot, SELinux (Android) on Amazon Echo Plus

Countermeasures

- Software Methods
 - No telnet / SSH - Very widespread
 - Encrypt firmware updates & TLS - Very widespread
 - Unique device passwords - Uncommon
- UART/JTAG
 - Disable or protect UART/JTAG - Uncommon
 - Anti-tamper measures - Very uncommon
- eMMC Dump
 - Flash storage encryption - Very uncommon
 - Route flash connections on PCB inner layers - Very uncommon
 - Cover PCB with epoxy - Very uncommon



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Questions?

<https://github.com/david-oswald/iot-fw-extraction>

sxv512@cs.bham.ac.uk

Additional material for our paper "Breaking all the Things --- A Systematic Survey of Firmware Extraction Techniques for IoT Devices"

3 commits 1 branch 0 releases 1 contributor

Branch: master ▾ New pull request Find file Clone or download ▾

David Oswald Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering Latest commit 7470931 on Oct 3

accuchek	Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering	a month ago
amazon_echo	Initial commit of photos and documentation	a month ago
amazon_echo_dot	Initial commit of photos and documentation	a month ago
amazon_echo_plus	Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering	a month ago
droibox	Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering	a month ago
hive	Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering	a month ago
konx/photos	Initial commit of photos and documentation	a month ago
phillips_hue	Added missing pictures, updated READMEs, re-ordering	a month ago