
# μProxy

A Hardware Relay for Anonymous and Secure Internet Access

#### David Cox & David Oswald

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### Connections, Proxies, and IPs

User connects to server via a WiFi hotspot (e.g. in café)

Hotspot uses an external IP to communicate with the server

External IP gives a real-time approximation of user's location

Leak of information

Privacy and anonymity concein Local IP

VPNs don't help

Same building

### What is µProxy?

A secure internet relay

Using low-cost WiFi microcontrollers (32-bit, 80 MHz, *not* ARM)


Allows to connect to a WiFi from a distance in order to ...

... access a network without revealing physical location

Covert, secure, anonymous and affordable




### What is $\mu$ Proxy?



Relay formed of hidden wifi networks

Fully encrypted

Each hop up to ~150m (under ideal conditions)



Not one building, but hundreds

#### Meet the ESP8266

WiFi microcontroller

Billed as the 'go to' IoT board

Station, Access Point or both

Software defined

\$3.50 price point

Previous relay cost < \$50

Dimensions 24mm - 16mm

Can be hidden



### Cryptography on IoT Devices


Huge security issues in the IoT (cf. recent DDoS attacks)

ESP8266 standard mechanisms have Questionable security (ESPnow)

But encryption is key to µProxy, so we added some of our own


NaCL (C crypto lib) ported to ESP8266

μProxy uses:



Curve25519 for the initial key exchange

#### Robustness: Protocol State Machine




### Protocol Design


Initial key exchange between endpoint nodes using Curve25519

Hardcoded public keys

Afterwards: authenticated encryption channel between local and remote endpoint (symmetric crypto only, using crypto\_box\_afternm())



### μProxy Packet




#### Performance Evaluation

Measured: time for encryption E = 1.9 ms, for decryption D = 2.3 ms (done only at endpoints)

N nodes in the relay

Estimated latency per node W = 20.4 ms



### Security Evaluation

Aim to achieve security equal to typical connections with added location privacy

#### Assumptions:

Local endpoint is secure

All nodes are initially secure

#### Only endpoints need keys

leaves us with one vulnerable node

If an adversary reaches the remote endpoint you're already in trouble

#### Conclusions

Low-cost WiFi relay

Can have other uses apart from location privacy

Open-source project soon available at: <a href="https://github.com/david-oswald/microproxy">https://github.com/david-oswald/microproxy</a>

Possible extensions:

More automation


Period re-keying

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## Thank you, any questions?

github.com/david-oswald/microproxy

#### Firmware architecture



### DEMO???