# Stanford University Department of Sociology

# Report for CloudResearch Pilot: study version 2022/08/02

n=300

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## 1 Data collection

#### 1.1 Attention check

The responses from the first n = 15 pilot were discarded because respondents saw a different version of the study, i.e. that with the longer videos. The remaining 304 respondents completed attention and manipulation checks at an acceptable level.

302 out of 304 (99.34%) respondents selected the correct answer.

The following analysis was conducted on 302 out of 304 initial observations.

#### 1.2 Completion Time

Table 1: Completion time

Study	Min	Median	Mean	Max	n
4_n300	$8\min 42s$	16min 11s	17 min  19 s	108min 41s	302

## 1.3 Treatment assignment

Table 2: Assignment of 302 participants to combinations of survey quota and conditions

		Mobility		Empath	y
Party	$\mathbf{n}$	Condition	n	Condition	n
		11	0.4	control	30
		high	61	treatment	31
Democrat	115			control	22
		low	54	treatment	32
		high		control	24
	95		47	treatment	23
Republican		low		control	24
			48	treatment	24
		high		control	29
			44	treatment	15
Independent	92			control	22
		low	48	treatment	26

#### 1.4 Mobility manipulation check

**Mobility manipulation**: 286 out of 304 (94.08%) respondents selected the correct answer when asked about the availability of opportunities according to the vignette.

Subjective Mobility Estimate: Respondents in the low mobility condition perceive mobility to be lower on average (29.9) than those in the high mobility condition (56.6) with p < 0.01.




Figure 1: Subjective mobility estimate




Figure 2: Quantitative mobility estimate

## 1.5 Empathy manipulation

• Empathy manipulation: In three survey items, respondents indicated on average more empathy towards the individuals in the homelessness videos when compared to those in the control videos with p < 0.01, p < 0.01, and p < 0.01 respectively.

## 1.6 Code book

#### 1.6.1 Question text

Table 3: Key to dependent variables

Variable	Question Text
dv_gen_welfare_1	Welfare programs by the government are necessary to ensure fairness in our society.
dv_gen_welfare_2	The United States federal government is spending too much money on welfare.
dv_welfare_poor_hard_1	We should increase funds for government programs designed to care for poor people.
dv_welfare_poor_hard_2	We should expand government programs that help poor people access the basic resources they need.
dv_welfare_poor_hard_13	We should increase funds for government programs designed to give hard-working people a chance to advance economically.
dv_welfare_poor_hard_14	We should expand government programs that help hard-working people to get ahead in society.
dv_spec_welfare_pol_1	expand access to food stamps.
dv_spec_welfare_pol_2	increase federal funding for food banks.
dv_spec_welfare_pol_13	invest more in the unemployment insurance (UI) system to help people who have lost their jobs.
$dv\_spec\_welfare\_pol\_14$	improve access to health care for poor people.
dv_mobility_pol_1	create a "baby bonds" program in which every American child receives a trust fund of \$50,000 for college tuition, buying a home, or starting a business.
dv_mobility_pol_2	increase financial aid so that more low-income students can attend college.
dv_mobility_pol_3	increase government-funds for preschool programs.
dv_mobility_pol_10	make public colleges and universities tuition-free.
dv_ineq_1	In your judgement, how large or small is the difference in income between the rich and the poor in the United States?

Table 4: Key to mediator variables

Variable	Question Text
empa_conc_1 empa_conc_2 empa_conc_3 empa_conc_4 me_persp_tak_1	Others' economic misfortunes do not disturb me that much.  I feel great concern for Americans born in poverty.  I don't feel very sorry for poor people.  I feel a great deal of empathy for poor Americans.  To really understand a poor person's situation, you need to "put yourself in their shoes."
me_persp_tak_2 me_persp_tak_3 me_situational_attr_1 me_situational_attr_2 me_situational_attr_3	I find it difficult to see things from a poor person's point of view.  Before judging someone in poverty, I think it is important to see things from their perspective.  Failure of society to provide good schools for Americans  Low wages in some businesses and industries  Failure of private industry to provide enough jobs
me_situational_attr_4 me_dispos_attr_6 me_dispos_attr_7 me_dispos_attr_8 me_dispos_attr_10	Prejudice and discrimination Being taken advantage of by rich people Lack of effort by the poor themselves Lack of ability and talent Lack of thrift and proper money management skills
me_trust_in_gov_5 me_trust_in_gov_6	The US government does a good job of supporting the economy.  The government deserves much of the credit for economic opportunities in the US.

## 1.6.2 Composite items

Table 5: Key to composite dependent variables

Composite	Items
GenWelfSupp	dv_gen_welfare_1, dv_gen_welfare_2rec
Welf4Poor	dv_welfare_poor_hard_1, dv_welfare_poor_hard_2
Welf4HardWork	dv_welfare_poor_hard_13, dv_welfare_poor_hard_14
SpecWelf4Mob	dv_mobility_pol_10, dv_mobility_pol_2,
	dv_mobility_pol_1, dv_mobility_pol_3
SpecWelf4Poor	dv_spec_welfare_pol_1, dv_spec_welfare_pol_2,
	dv_spec_welfare_pol_13, dv_spec_welfare_pol_14
AllWelfComp	dv_gen_welfare_1, dv_gen_welfare_2rec, dv_welfare_poor_hard_1, dv_welfare_poor_hard_2, dv_welfare_poor_hard_13, dv_welfare_poor_hard_14, dv_mobility_pol_10, dv_mobility_pol_2, dv_mobility_pol_1, dv_mobility_pol_3, dv_spec_welfare_pol_1, dv_spec_welfare_pol_2, dv_spec_welfare_pol_13, dv_spec_welfare_pol_14
IneqMagnPercep	dv_ineq_1

Table 6: Key to composite mediators

Composite	Items
Empathy	empa_conc_1rec, empa_conc_2,
	empa_conc_3rec, empa_conc_4
PerspTak	me_persp_tak_1, me_persp_tak_2rec,
	$me\_persp\_tak\_3$
DisAttr	me_dispos_attr_10, me_dispos_attr_7,
	$me\_dispos\_attr\_8$
SitAttr	me_situational_attr_1, me_situational_attr_2,
	me_situational_attr_3, me_situational_attr_4,
	me_dispos_attr_6
TrustGov	me_trust_in_gov_5, me_trust_in_gov_6
Note: me_	dispos_attr_6 represents a situational attribution.

## 1.7 Reliability

Table 7: Reliability for each of the two items used to form the composite scales for welfare policy support

		Cro	nbach's alpha	Guttman's
	Composite	raw	standardized	Lambda 6
Moderator	GovEff	0.95	0.95	0.90
	Empathy	0.88	0.89	0.89
	PerspTak	0.77	0.80	0.76
N.f. 1: 4	DisAttr	0.85	0.85	0.79
Mediator	SitAttr	0.84	0.84	0.81
	TrustGov	0.87	0.87	0.78
	GenWelfSupp	0.81	0.81	0.68
	Welf4Poor	0.95	0.95	0.91
	Welf4HardWork	0.94	0.94	0.89
Dependent variable	SpecWelf4Mob	0.88	0.88	0.86
-	SpecWelf4Poor	0.93	0.93	0.92
	AllWelfComp	0.97	0.97	0.97

## 2 Descriptive statistics

## 2.1 Moderators

## 2.1.1 Government efficacy (Mod)




Figure 3: Perceived government efficacy (measured pre-treatment)

## 2.1.2 Perceived relative income (Mod)




Figure 4: Perceived level of income when growing up versus current perceived income

## 2.1.3 Perceived mobility (Mod)




Figure 5: Number of respondents who experienced upward mobility, downward mobility, or no change in socioeconomic status

Table 8: Transition percentages from perceived past income (rows) to perceived current income (columns)

	far below	below	average	above	far above
far below	2.65	3.31	2.98	1.32	0.33
below	3.31	7.62	7.62	3.97	0.33
average	4.64	11.26	25.50	6.95	0.00
above	1.99	3.31	5.63	5.30	0.66
far above	0.66	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.33

The upper triangle of the table indicates the percentage of respondents who experienced upward mobility (27.5% in total).

The lower triangle of the table indicates the percentage of respondents who experienced downward mobility (31.1% in total).

## 2.2 Dependent variables

**Note:** The figures report the mean in the four groups and the associated standard error of the mean (se).

#### 2.2.1 General welfare preferences (Dv)




Figure 6: General welfare preferences

#### 2.2.2 Specific welfare preference (Dv)




Figure 7: Specific welfare preferences: Food stamps and food banks






Figure 8: Specific welfare preferences: Unemployment Insurance and health care

#### 2.2.3 Support for the poor (Dv)



#### **Empathy Condition**

## 2.2.4 Support for hard-working people (Dv)



**Empathy Condition** 

#### 2.2.5 Social mobility policy (Dv)




Figure 9: Social mobility policy: Childhood education





Figure 10: Social mobility policy: College education


## 2.2.6 Inequality (Dv)



#### Plot based on n=302 observations.


#### 2.3 Mediators

#### 2.3.1 Empathetic concern (Me)



Empathy Condition


Figure 11: Empathetic concern (1)



**Empathy Condition** 


Figure 12: Empathetic concern (2)

#### 2.3.2 Perspective taking (Me)



**Empathy Condition** 


Figure 13: Perspective taking (1)



Plot based on n=302 observations.

Figure 14: Perspective taking (2)


## 2.3.3 Situational attribution of poverty (Me)



Plot based on n=302 observations.

Plot based on n=302 observations.

**Empathy Condition** 




Plot based on n=302 observations.

Plot based on n=302 observations.


**Empathy Condition** 

#### 2.3.4 Dipositional attribution of poverty (Me)



**Empathy Condition** 

Figure 15: Dispositional attribution (1)



**Empathy Condition** 

Figure 16: Dispositional attribution (2)

## 3 Composite

## 3.1 Moderators




Figure 17: Trust in government (measured pre-treatment)

#### 3.2 Mediators




Figure 18: Plot of composites: Empathetic Concern and Perspective Taking




Figure 19: Plot of composits: Dispositional and Situational Attribution

## 3.3 Dependent variables




Figure 20: Plot of composites: GenWelfSupp and Welf4Poor





Figure 21: Plot of composites: Welf4HardWork and SpecWelf4Mob



 $Figure\ 22:\ Plot\ of\ composites:\ SpecWelf4Poor\ and\ IneqMagnPercept\ composite$ 

## 4 Regression analysis

## 4.1 Mediators

## 4.1.1 Conditions (Me)




Table 9: Regression table for mediators  ${\cal P}$ 

	Dependent variables:							
	Empathy	PerspTak	DisAttr	SitAttr	TrustGov			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Constant	71.03***	77.38***	44.00***	55.45***	37.85***			
	(2.12)	(1.77)	(2.37)	(2.23)	(2.33)			
Low Mobility	1.22	1.11	-0.67	3.32	-1.15			
	(2.53)	(2.12)	(2.84)	(2.67)	(2.79)			
Poverty	8.02***	4.84**	-6.12**	5.51**	1.88			
	(2.53)	(2.12)	(2.84)	(2.67)	(2.79)			
Observations	302	302	302	302	302			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.002			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.005			
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 299$ )	21.91	18.34	24.58	23.08	24.16			
F Statistic (df = $2$ ; $299$ )	5.32***	$2.88^{*}$	$2.41^{*}$	3.18**	0.29			

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.1.2 Condition + Demographics (Me)




Figure 23: Effect plot for regression of mediators on conditions controlling for demographics

Table 10: Regression table for mediators

		Dep	endent varial	oles:	
_	Empathy	PerspTak	DisAttr	SitAttr	TrustGov
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	-127.87	165.92	263.34	-540.33**	$-714.96^{***}$
	(228.56)	(190.76)	(256.53)	(233.99)	(242.45)
Low Mobility	1.23	0.82	-0.38	2.85	-0.95
	(2.56)	(2.14)	(2.87)	(2.62)	(2.72)
Poverty	8.09***	4.64**	-7.03**	5.88**	2.04
	(2.57)	(2.15)	(2.89)	(2.63)	(2.73)
College degree	$7.19^{*}$	2.55	-0.03	2.61	9.83**
	(3.81)	(3.18)	(4.28)	(3.90)	(4.04)
Postgraduate	0.90	-3.81	7.63	2.83	19.80***
	(5.23)	(4.37)	(5.87)	(5.36)	(5.55)
Male	-5.41**	-2.32	-2.09	-4.19	-4.43
	(2.56)	(2.14)	(2.88)	(2.63)	(2.72)
Black	4.52	[2.32]	-2.72	6.77	20.57***
	(7.45)	(6.22)	(8.36)	(7.62)	(7.90)
Hispanic	1.51	$0.55^{\circ}$	-7.81	10.58	$16.65^{*}$
	(8.02)	(6.69)	(9.00)	(8.21)	(8.51)
Other	5.61	$12.63^{'}$	$\hat{3.75}^{'}$	$16.91^{'}$	$21.47^{'}$
	(12.71)	(10.61)	(14.27)	(13.01)	(13.48)
White	1.86	$-1.42^{'}$	$-4.78^{'}$	$-1.80^{'}$	14.39**
	(6.54)	(5.46)	(7.34)	(6.70)	(6.94)
Year of Birth	0.10	$-0.04^{'}$	$-0.11^{'}$	0.30**	0.37***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Income	-0.0000	-0.0000*	0.0000	-0.0001**	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Observations	299	299	299	299	299
$R^2$	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.11	0.10
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.07
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 287$ )	21.89	18.27	24.57	22.41	23.22
F Statistic (df = $11$ ; $287$ )	2.01**	1.75*	1.34	3.23***	3.02***

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.1.3 Conditions + Interaction (Me)




Table 11: Regression table for mediators

	Dependent variables:							
	Empathy	PerspTak	DisAttr	SitAttr	TrustGov			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Constant	71.64***	77.39***	42.61***	56.49***	38.08***			
	(2.41)	(2.02)	(2.70)	(2.53)	(2.66)			
Low Mobility	-0.13	1.09	2.41	1.01	-1.66			
	(3.59)	(3.01)	(4.02)	(3.78)	(3.96)			
Poverty	$6.68^{*}$	4.81	-3.06	3.22	1.37			
	(3.57)	(2.99)	(4.00)	(3.76)	(3.94)			
Low Mobility:Poverty	2.71	0.05	-6.16	4.61	1.02			
	(5.07)	(4.25)	(5.68)	(5.34)	(5.60)			
Observations	302	302	302	302	302			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.002			
Adjusted $R^2$	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01			
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 298$ )	21.93	18.37	24.57	23.09	24.20			
F Statistic (df $= 3; 298$ )	3.63**	1.91	2.00	$2.36^{*}$	0.20			

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.1.4 Conditions + Interaction + Demographics (Me)




Table 12: Regression table for mediators

		Dep	endent varial	oles:	
_	Empathy	PerspTak	DisAttr	SitAttr	TrustGov
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	-127.60	165.61	262.32	-540.24**	-715.15***
	(228.92)	(191.03)	(256.47)	(234.40)	(242.85)
Low Mobility	0.42	1.77	2.73	2.58	-0.36
	(3.64)	(3.04)	(4.08)	(3.73)	(3.87)
Poverty	7.28**	$5.58^{*}$	-3.96	5.61	2.62
	(3.63)	(3.03)	(4.07)	(3.72)	(3.86)
College degree	$7.23^{*}$	2.50	-0.18	2.62	9.81**
	(3.82)	(3.19)	(4.28)	(3.91)	(4.05)
Postgraduate	0.88	-3.79	7.69	2.83	19.81***
	(5.24)	(4.37)	(5.87)	(5.37)	(5.56)
Male	-5.36**	-2.38	-2.30	-4.17	-4.47
	(2.57)	(2.15)	(2.88)	(2.64)	(2.73)
Black	4.40	2.46	-2.27	6.73	20.65***
	(7.47)	(6.23)	(8.37)	(7.65)	(7.92)
Hispanic	1.41	0.66	-7.44	10.55	$16.72^*$
	(8.04)	(6.71)	(9.00)	(8.23)	(8.53)
Other	5.19	13.12	5.35	16.77	21.77
	(12.80)	(10.68)	(14.34)	(13.11)	(13.58)
White	1.86	-1.42	-4.77	-1.80	14.39**
	(6.55)	(5.47)	(7.34)	(6.71)	(6.95)
Year of Birth	0.10	-0.04	-0.11	$0.30^{**}$	$0.37^{***}$
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Income	-0.0000	$-0.0000^*$	0.0000	-0.0001**	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Low Mobility:Poverty	1.63	-1.90	-6.21	0.54	-1.18
	(5.17)	(4.32)	(5.80)	(5.30)	(5.49)
Observations	299	299	299	299	299
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.11	0.10
Adjusted $R^2$	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.07
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 286$ )	21.92	18.30	24.56	22.45	23.26
F Statistic (df = $12$ ; $286$ )	1.85**	$1.62^{*}$	1.32	2.95***	2.76***

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.2 Dependent variables

## 4.2.1 Conditions (Dv)




Table 13: Regression table for welfare preferences

_	Dependent variables:									
	$Gen Welf Supp\ Welf 4 Poor\ Welf 4 Hard Work\ Spec Welf 4 Mob\ Spec\ Welf 4 Poor\ All Welf\ Comp\ Ineq Magn\ Perconstruction and the property of the propert$									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
Constant	61.91***	62.42***	65.92***	55.51***	62.45***	60.88***	83.26***			
	(2.66)	(2.84)	(2.65)	(2.81)	(2.66)	(2.49)	(1.37)			
Low Mobility	2.30	2.75	2.12	3.89	2.59	2.87	5.06***			
	(3.18)	(3.39)	(3.17)	(3.36)	(3.18)	(2.98)	(1.64)			
Poverty	$5.50^{*}$	8.16**	$5.37^{*}$	4.65	8.73***	$6.54^{**}$	0.94			
	(3.18)	(3.39)	(3.17)	(3.36)	(3.18)	(2.98)	(1.64)			
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	302			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03			
Residual Std. Error $(df = 299)$	27.55	29.36	27.47	29.04	27.54	25.80	14.21			
F Statistic (df = $2$ ; $299$ )	1.89	3.43**	1.77	1.79	4.34**	3.09**	5.10***			

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.2.2 Conditions + Demographics (Dv)




Figure 24: Effect plot for regression of dependent variables on conditions controlling for demographics

Table 14: Regression table for welfare preferences

	Dependent variables:								
(	GenWelfSupp	Welf4Poor V	Velf4HardWork	SpecWelf4Mo <b>B</b>	pecWelf4Poor	AllWelfCompin	eqMagnPercep		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
Constant	-304.76	-627.76**	-450.41	$-904.62^{***}$	-628.70**	-635.65**	175.28		
	(281.42)	(297.90)	(280.37)	(292.41)	(279.63)	(260.44)	(149.53)		
Low Mobility	1.80	2.40	1.70	3.59	2.22	2.50	4.86***		
	(3.15)	(3.34)	(3.14)	(3.28)	(3.13)	(2.92)	(1.68)		
Poverty	$5.60^{*}$	$8.17^{**}$	$5.44^{*}$	$5.49^{*}$	8.84***	6.84**	0.87		
	(3.17)	(3.35)	(3.16)	(3.29)	(3.15)	(2.93)	(1.68)		
College degree	3.81	5.35	4.67	6.86	5.47	5.50	-0.53		
	(4.69)	(4.97)	(4.67)	(4.88)	(4.66)	(4.34)	(2.49)		
Postgraduate	0.87	4.61	1.22	4.17	5.30	3.66	-4.21		
	(6.44)	(6.82)	(6.42)	(6.69)	(6.40)	(5.96)	(3.42)		
Male	-3.77	-7.34**	-4.63	-5.15	-7.26**	-5.79**	-1.02		
	(3.16)	(3.34)	(3.15)	(3.28)	(3.14)	(2.92)	(1.68)		
Black	$16.79^*$	12.17	3.82	10.01	10.98	10.68	-6.66		
	(9.17)	(9.71)	(9.13)	(9.53)	(9.11)	(8.49)	(4.87)		
Hispanic	13.09	7.08	0.91	8.91	8.35	7.94	-2.57		
	(9.87)	(10.45)	(9.84)	(10.26)	(9.81)	(9.14)	(5.25)		
Other	38.00**	$28.36^{*}$	23.05	-3.13	22.93	18.43	-2.62		
	(15.65)	(16.57)	(15.59)	(16.26)	(15.55)	(14.48)	(8.32)		
White	6.83	1.02	-8.23	-4.34	-0.65	-1.48	-4.44		
	(8.05)	(8.52)	(8.02)	(8.37)	(8.00)	(7.45)	(4.28)		
Year of Birth	0.18	$0.35^{**}$	$0.26^{*}$	$0.49^{***}$	$0.35^{**}$	$0.35^{***}$	-0.04		
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.08)		
Income	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001	$-0.0001^*$	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0000		
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)		
Observations	299	299	299	299	299	299	299		
$R^2$	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.06		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.02		
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 287$ )	26.95	28.53	26.85	28.01	26.78	24.94	14.32		
F Statistic (df = $11$ ; $287$ )	2.36***	3.12***	$2.47^{***}$	3.35***	3.36***	3.40***	1.55		

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 4.2.3 Conditions + Interaction (Dv)




Table 15: Regression table for welfare preferences

	Dependent variables:									
	$Gen Welf Supp\ Welf 4 Poor\ Welf 4 Hard Work\ Spec Welf 4 Mob\ Spec\ Welf 4 Poor\ All Welf\ Comp\ Ineq Magn Perconstruction and the property of the property$									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
Constant	65.20***	64.22***	68.16***	57.17***	63.72***	62.77***	83.83***			
	(3.00)	(3.22)	(3.01)	(3.19)	(3.02)	(2.83)	(1.56)			
Low Mobility	-5.02	$-1.24^{'}$	-2.86	0.21	-0.23	-1.31	[3.79]			
	(4.47)	(4.80)	(4.48)	(4.75)	(4.51)	(4.21)	(2.33)			
Poverty	-1.76	4.20	0.42	1.01	5.94	2.39	-0.32			
	(4.46)	(4.78)	(4.46)	(4.73)	(4.49)	(4.20)	(2.32)			
Low Mobility:Poverty	14.63**	7.97	9.95	7.34	5.63	8.35	2.54			
	(6.32)	(6.78)	(6.33)	(6.71)	(6.37)	(5.96)	(3.29)			
Observations	302	302	302	302	302	302	302			
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03			
Residual Std. Error $(df = 298)$	27.35	29.34	27.40	29.03	27.55	25.76	14.22			
F Statistic ( $df = 3; 298$ )	3.06**	2.75**	2.01	1.60	3.15**	2.72**	3.60**			

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## ${\bf 4.2.4 \quad Conditions + Interaction + Demographics \ (Dv)}$





Table 16: Regression table for welfare preferences

	Dependent variables:							
	GenWelfSupp	Welf4Poor W	Velf4HardWork	SpecWelf4Mo <b>B</b>	pecWelf4Poor	AllWelfCompin	eqMagnPercep	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
Constant	-303.14	-627.35**	-449.54	-904.03***	-628.59**	-635.04**	175.67	
	(280.73)	(298.35)	(280.52)	(292.77)	(280.12)	(260.71)	(149.67)	
Low Mobility	-3.14	1.15	-0.97	1.80	1.88	0.63	3.68	
-	(4.47)	(4.75)	(4.47)	(4.66)	(4.46)	(4.15)	(2.38)	
Poverty	$0.72^{'}$	6.94	2.80	$3.71^{'}$	8.50 <sup>*</sup>	4.98	$-0.30^{'}$	
Ü	(4.46)	(4.74)	(4.45)	(4.65)	(4.45)	(4.14)	(2.38)	
College degree	$4.05^{'}$	$5.41^{'}$	4.80	$6.95^{'}$	5.48	$5.59^{\circ}$	$-0.47^{'}$	
	(4.68)	(4.98)	(4.68)	(4.88)	(4.67)	(4.35)	(2.50)	
Postgraduate	$0.76^{'}$	4.58	$\stackrel{\backprime}{1.17}^{\prime}$	4.13	$5.29^{'}$	$3.62^{'}$	$-4.24^{'}$	
3	(6.43)	(6.83)	(6.42)	(6.70)	(6.41)	(5.97)	(3.43)	
Male	$-3.45^{'}$	$-7.26^{**}$	$-4.46^{'}$	$-5.03^{'}$	$-7.23^{**}$	$-5.67^{*}$	$-0.94^{'}$	
	(3.16)	(3.35)	(3.15)	(3.29)	(3.15)	(2.93)	(1.68)	
Black	$16.07^{*}$	11.99	3.43	$9.75^{'}$	10.93	10.41	$-6.83^{'}$	
	(9.16)	(9.73)	(9.15)	(9.55)	(9.14)	(8.50)	(4.88)	
Hispanic	$\hat{1}2.50^{'}$	6.93	0.59	8.70	8.31	$7.72^{'}$	$-2.71^{'}$	
1	(9.86)	(10.48)	(9.85)	(10.28)	(9.83)	(9.15)	(5.25)	
Other	35.45**	27.71*	21.67	-4.06	22.75	17.46	$-3.23^{'}$	
	(15.70)	(16.68)	(15.69)	(16.37)	(15.66)	(14.58)	(8.37)	
White	6.81	1.02	-8.24	-4.35	-0.66	-1.49	-4.44	
	(8.03)	(8.54)	(8.03)	(8.38)	(8.02)	(7.46)	(4.28)	
Year of Birth	0.18	0.35**	0.26*	0.49***	0.35**	0.35***	-0.04	
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.08)	
Income	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001	$-0.0001^*$	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0000	
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	
Low Mobility:Poverty	9.87	2.50	5.34	3.59	0.67	3.75	2.36	
	(6.35)	(6.74)	(6.34)	(6.62)	(6.33)	(5.89)	(3.38)	
Observations	299	299	299	299	299	299	299	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.06	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.02	
Residual Std. Error ( $df = 286$ )	26.89	28.57	26.87	28.04	26.83	24.97	14.33	
F Statistic (df = $12$ ; $286$ )	2.37***	2.86***	2.33***	3.09***	3.07***	3.14***	1.46	

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 5 Moderated Mediation: Path a and c



Does mediation of the effect of exposure to poverty on welfare policy support exist at high and low levels of mobility? The mobility condition is believed to alter the effect of exposure to poverty on both the mediator and welfare policy support:

- a: Exposure to poverty elicits more empathy in the low mobility condition.
- c': Exposure to poverty leads to stronger welfare support in the low mobility condition.

To test these hypotheses, I estimate the following equations where X is exposure to poverty condition, W is the mobility condition, M is the mediator<sub>i</sub>, and Y represents support for welfare policies.

$$M = \alpha_M + a_1 X + a_2 W + a_3 X W + \epsilon_M \tag{1}$$

$$Y = \alpha_Y + c_1'X + c_2'W + c_3'XW + bM + \epsilon_Y$$
 (2)

$$Y = \alpha_T + c_1 X + c_2 W + c_3 X W + \epsilon_T \tag{3}$$

#### Effects in the low mobility condition TrustGov SitMinDis **Empathy** PerspTak DisAttr SitAttr 55% 30.6% I 42.1% 43.1% 1.5% 70.8% GenWelfSupp 54% 28.4% 30.1% 58.1% 73.8% 5% Welf4Poor 54.1% 30.7% 24% 56.8% 4.6% 67.7% Welf4HardWork 59.8% 35.3% 39.7% 86.8% 7.3% 106% SpecWelf4Mob 54.5% 28.4% 33.2% 57% 4.4% 75.4% SpecWelf4Poor 55.6% 30.6% 34.4% 61.4% 4.7% 80.1% AllWelfComp 56.7% 60.3% 76.6% 85.2% -11.4% 134.6% IneqMagnPercep 10 10 20 Estimate with 95% confidence interval

Figure 25: Direct, indirect, and total effects in the low mobility condition with % explained by mediator

Effect → direct → indirect → total




Figure 26: Direct, indirect, and total effects in the high mobility condition with % explained by mediator

# 6 Effect of low mobility on attributions mediated through subjective mobility

RW: "It might make sense to look at whether the effect of the mobility manipulation on the "situational attributions minus dispositional attributions" variable (in just the no empathy video conditions) is mediated by the mobility manipulation manipulation check. I.e., is this weird effect of low mobility treatment on attributions driven by those low mobility folks who really did get treated the most?"

```
df1 <- df %>% filter(empathy_condition == "control") %>%
  mutate(mobility_condition = factor(mobility_condition, levels = c("high","low")))
fitM <- lm(sub effort 1 ~ mobility condition,df1)</pre>
fitY <- lm(SitMinDis ~ mobility_condition + sub_effort_1,df1)</pre>
fitMed <- mediation::mediate(fitM, fitY, boot=TRUE, sims=2000,boot.ci.type = "bca", treat="mobility_condit
## Warning in mediation::mediate(fitM, fitY, boot = TRUE, sims = 2000, boot.ci.type
## = "bca", : treatment and control values do not match factor levels; using high
## and low as control and treatment, respectively
## Running nonparametric bootstrap
summary(fitMed)
##
## Causal Mediation Analysis
##
## Nonparametric Bootstrap Confidence Intervals with the BCa Method
##
##
                  Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper
                                                                 p-value
## ACME
                      19.8
                                   12.8
                                               29.51 < 0.0000000000000000 ***
## ADE
                     -21.2
                                  -33.4
                                              ## Total Effect
                      -1.4
                                  -13.1
                                                9.95
                                                                     0.8
                                 -284.7
                                                8.89
                                                                     0.8
## Prop. Mediated
                     -14.2
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Sample Size Used: 151
##
```

The opposite signs of the indirect and the total effect indicate that the mediator does not explain the effect of the low mobility condition on attributions. Instead, there is evidence of a suppression effect since including the mediator increases the direct effect in absolute terms - i.e. it became "more negative" than the negative total effect.

##

## Simulations: 2000