

Stanford University
Department of Sociology

**Report for CloudResearch Pilot:
study version 2022/08/02**

n=512

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1 Data collection

1.1 Attention check

The responses from the first $n = 15$ pilot were discarded because respondents saw a different version of the study, i.e. that with the longer videos. The remaining 520 respondents completed attention and manipulation checks at an acceptable level.

518 out of 520 (99.62%) respondents selected the correct answer.

The following analysis was conducted on 518 out of 520 initial observations.

1.2 Completion Time

Table 1: Completion time

| Study | Min | Median | Mean | Max | n |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----|
| 2_n15 | 12min 21s | 17min 11s | 21min 38s | 40min 14s | 15 |
| 3_n200 | 8min 59s | 16min 8s | 17min 25s | 61min 58s | 201 |
| 4_n300 | 8min 42s | 16min 11s | 17min 19s | 108min 41s | 302 |

1.3 Treatment assignment

Table 2: Assignment of 518 participants to combinations of survey quota and conditions

| Party | n | Mobility | | Empathy | |
|-------------|-----|-----------|----|-----------|----|
| | | Condition | n | Condition | n |
| Democrat | 190 | high | 96 | control | 50 |
| | | | | treatment | 46 |
| | | low | 94 | control | 38 |
| | | | | treatment | 56 |
| Republican | 166 | high | 82 | control | 36 |
| | | | | treatment | 46 |
| | | low | 84 | control | 49 |
| | | | | treatment | 35 |
| Independent | 162 | high | 80 | control | 46 |
| | | | | treatment | 34 |
| | | low | 82 | control | 40 |
| | | | | treatment | 42 |

1.4 Mobility manipulation check

Mobility manipulation: 497 out of 520 (95.58%) respondents selected the correct answer when asked about the availability of opportunities according to the vignette.

Subjective Mobility Estimate: Respondents in the low mobility condition perceive mobility to be lower on average (30.7) than those in the high mobility condition (57.5) with $p < 0.01$.




Figure 1: Subjective mobility estimate




Figure 2: Quantitative mobility estimate

1.5 Empathy manipulation

- **Empathy manipulation:** In three survey items, respondents indicated on average more empathy towards the individuals in the homelessness videos when compared to those in the control videos with $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.01$ respectively.

1.6 Code book

1.6.1 Question text

Table 3: Key to dependent variables

| Variable | Question Text |
|-------------------------|--|
| dv_gen_welfare_1 | Welfare programs by the government are necessary to ensure fairness in our society. |
| dv_gen_welfare_2 | The United States federal government is spending too much money on welfare. |
| dv_welfare_poor_hard_1 | We should increase funds for government programs designed to care for poor people. |
| dv_welfare_poor_hard_2 | We should expand government programs that help poor people access the basic resources they need. |
| dv_welfare_poor_hard_13 | We should increase funds for government programs designed to give hard-working people a chance to advance economically. |
| dv_welfare_poor_hard_14 | We should expand government programs that help hard-working people to get ahead in society. |
| dv_spec_welfare_pol_1 | ...expand access to food stamps. |
| dv_spec_welfare_pol_2 | ...increase federal funding for food banks. |
| dv_spec_welfare_pol_13 | ...invest more in the unemployment insurance (UI) system to help people who have lost their jobs. |
| dv_spec_welfare_pol_14 | ...improve access to health care for poor people. |
| dv_mobility_pol_1 | ...create a "baby bonds" program in which every American child receives a trust fund of \$50,000 for college tuition, buying a home, or starting a business. |
| dv_mobility_pol_2 | ...increase financial aid so that more low-income students can attend college. |
| dv_mobility_pol_3 | ...increase government-funds for preschool programs. |
| dv_mobility_pol_10 | ...make public colleges and universities tuition-free. |
| dv_ineq_1 | In your judgement, how large or small is the difference in income between the rich and the poor in the United States? |

Table 4: Key to mediator variables

| Variable | Question Text |
|-----------------------|--|
| empa_conc_1 | Others' economic misfortunes do not disturb me that much. |
| empa_conc_2 | I feel great concern for Americans born in poverty. |
| empa_conc_3 | I don't feel very sorry for poor people. |
| empa_conc_4 | I feel a great deal of empathy for poor Americans. |
| me_persp_tak_1 | To really understand a poor person's situation, you need to "put yourself in their shoes." |
| me_persp_tak_2 | I find it difficult to see things from a poor person's point of view. |
| me_persp_tak_3 | Before judging someone in poverty, I think it is important to see things from their perspective. |
| me_situational_attr_1 | Failure of society to provide good schools for Americans |
| me_situational_attr_2 | Low wages in some businesses and industries |
| me_situational_attr_3 | Failure of private industry to provide enough jobs |
| me_situational_attr_4 | Prejudice and discrimination |
| me_dispos_attr_6 | Being taken advantage of by rich people |
| me_dispos_attr_7 | Lack of effort by the poor themselves |
| me_dispos_attr_8 | Lack of ability and talent |
| me_dispos_attr_10 | Lack of thrift and proper money management skills |
| me_trust_in_gov_5 | The US government does a good job of supporting the economy. |
| me_trust_in_gov_6 | The government deserves much of the credit for economic opportunities in the US. |

1.6.2 Composite items

Table 5: Key to composite dependent variables

| Composite | Items |
|----------------|---|
| GenWelfSupp | dv_gen_welfare_1, dv_gen_welfare_2rec |
| Welf4Poor | dv_welfare_poor_hard_1, dv_welfare_poor_hard_2 |
| Welf4HardWork | dv_welfare_poor_hard_13, dv_welfare_poor_hard_14 |
| SpecWelf4Mob | dv_mobility_pol_10, dv_mobility_pol_2, dv_mobility_pol_1, dv_mobility_pol_3 |
| SpecWelf4Poor | dv_spec_welfare_pol_1, dv_spec_welfare_pol_2, dv_spec_welfare_pol_13, dv_spec_welfare_pol_14 |
| AllWelfComp | dv_gen_welfare_1, dv_gen_welfare_2rec, dv_welfare_poor_hard_1, dv_welfare_poor_hard_2, dv_welfare_poor_hard_13, dv_welfare_poor_hard_14, dv_mobility_pol_10, dv_mobility_pol_2, dv_mobility_pol_1, dv_mobility_pol_3, dv_spec_welfare_pol_1, dv_spec_welfare_pol_2, dv_spec_welfare_pol_13, dv_spec_welfare_pol_14 |
| IneqMagnPercep | dv_ineq_1 |

Table 6: Key to composite mediators

| Composite | Items |
|-----------|--|
| Empathy | empa_conc_1rec, empa_conc_2, empa_conc_3rec, empa_conc_4 |
| PerspTak | me_persp_tak_1, me_persp_tak_2rec, me_persp_tak_3 |
| DisAttr | me_dispos_attr_10, me_dispos_attr_7, me_dispos_attr_8 |
| SitAttr | me_situational_attr_1, me_situational_attr_2, me_situational_attr_3, me_situational_attr_4, me_dispos_attr_6 |
| TrustGov | me_trust_in_gov_5, me_trust_in_gov_6 |

Note: me_dispos_attr_6 represents a situational attribution.

1.7 Reliability


Table 7: Reliability for each of the two items used to form the composite scales for welfare policy support

| | Composite | Cronbach's alpha | | Guttman's |
|--------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| | | raw | standardized | Lambda 6 |
| Moderator | GovEff | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.90 |
| | Empathy | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.89 |
| Mediator | PerspTak | 0.78 | 0.80 | 0.77 |
| | DisAttr | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.79 |
| | SitAttr | 0.78 | 0.78 | 0.77 |
| | TrustGov | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.78 |
| | GenWelfSupp | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.71 |
| Dependent variable | Welf4Poor | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.93 |
| | Welf4HardWork | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.92 |
| | SpecWelf4Mob | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.87 |
| | SpecWelf4Poor | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.93 |
| | AllWelfComp | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.98 |

2 Descriptive statistics

2.1 Moderators

2.1.1 Government efficacy (Mod)



Plot based on 302 out of n=518 observations.

Figure 3: Perceived government efficacy (measured pre-treatment)

2.1.2 Perceived relative income (Mod)




Figure 4: Perceived level of income when growing up versus current perceived income

2.1.3 Perceived mobility (Mod)




Figure 5: Number of respondents who experienced upward mobility, downward mobility, or no change in socioeconomic status

Table 8: Transition percentages from perceived past income (rows) to perceived current income (columns)

| | far below | below | average | above | far above |
|-----------|-----------|-------|---------|-------|-----------|
| far below | 2.51 | 2.51 | 2.12 | 1.35 | 0.19 |
| below | 3.47 | 8.11 | 9.46 | 3.47 | 0.19 |
| average | 4.44 | 11.97 | 25.87 | 6.95 | 0.00 |
| above | 1.54 | 3.09 | 5.98 | 4.63 | 0.58 |
| far above | 0.58 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.19 | 0.19 |

The upper triangle of the table indicates the percentage of respondents who experienced upward mobility (26.8% in total).

The lower triangle of the table indicates the percentage of respondents who experienced downward mobility (31.9% in total).

2.2 Dependent variables

Note: The figures report the mean in the four groups and the associated standard error of the mean (se).

2.2.1 General welfare preferences (Dv)




Figure 6: General welfare preferences

2.2.2 Specific welfare preference (Dv)




Figure 7: Specific welfare preferences: Food stamps and food banks






Figure 8: Specific welfare preferences: Unemployment Insurance and health care

2.2.3 Support for the poor (Dv)



2.2.4 Support for hard-working people (Dv)



2.2.5 Social mobility policy (Dv)




Figure 9: Social mobility policy: Childhood education





Figure 10: Social mobility policy: College education

2.2.6 Inequality (Dv)



2.3 Mediators

2.3.1 Empathetic concern (Me)




Figure 11: Empathetic concern (1)




Figure 12: Empathetic concern (2)

2.3.2 Perspective taking (Me)




Figure 13: Perspective taking (1)






Figure 14: Perspective taking (2)

2.3.3 Situational attribution of poverty (Me)





2.3.4 Dispositional attribution of poverty (Me)





Figure 15: Dispositional attribution (1)



Plot based on n=518 observations.

Plot based on n=518 observations.

Empathy Condition

Figure 16: Dispositional attribution (2)

3 Composite

3.1 Moderators




Figure 17: Trust in government (measured pre-treatment)

3.2 Mediators




Figure 18: Plot of composites: Empathetic Concern and Perspective Taking




Figure 19: Plot of composites: Dispositional and Situational Attribution

3.3 Dependent variables




Figure 20: Plot of composites: GenWelfSupp and Welf4Poor





Figure 21: Plot of composites: Welf4HardWork and SpecWelf4Mob



Plot based on n=518 observations.

Plot based on n=518 observations.

Empathy Condition

Figure 22: Plot of composites: SpecWelf4Poor and IneqMagnPercept composite

4 Regression analysis

4.1 Mediators

4.1.1 Conditions (Me)




Table 9: Regression table for mediators

| | Dependent variables: | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Empathy | PerspTak | DisAttr | SitAttr | TrustGov |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Constant | 71.25*** (1.66) | 78.49*** (1.41) | 42.01*** (1.80) | 56.99*** (1.64) | 37.85*** (2.33) |
| Low Mobility | -0.23 (1.93) | -1.10 (1.64) | 0.61 (2.10) | -0.57 (1.90) | -1.15 (2.79) |
| Poverty | 7.57*** (1.93) | 4.53*** (1.64) | -4.46** (2.10) | 2.65 (1.90) | 1.88 (2.79) |
| Observations | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 302 |
| R ² | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.005 | 0.0000 | -0.005 |
| Residual Std. Error | 22.01 (df = 515) | 18.69 (df = 515) | 23.84 (df = 515) | 21.65 (df = 515) | 24.16 (df = 299) |
| F Statistic | 7.66*** (df = 2; 515) | 3.99** (df = 2; 515) | 2.30 (df = 2; 515) | 1.01 (df = 2; 515) | 0.29 (df = 2; 299) |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.1.2 Condition + Demographics (Me)




Figure 23: Effect plot for regression of mediators on conditions controlling for demographics

Table 10: Regression table for mediators

| | Dependent variables: | | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Empathy | PerspTak | DisAttr | SitAttr | TrustGov |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Constant | -79.50 (160.68) | 146.26 (134.13) | 416.59** (173.78) | -392.68** (153.83) | -714.96*** (242.45) |
| Low Mobility | 0.19 (1.94) | -0.89 (1.62) | 0.39 (2.10) | 0.17 (1.86) | -0.95 (2.72) |
| Poverty | 7.68*** (1.94) | 4.47*** (1.62) | -4.62** (2.09) | 2.86 (1.85) | 2.04 (2.73) |
| College degree | 2.30 (2.94) | 0.55 (2.45) | -1.99 (3.18) | 0.89 (2.81) | 9.83** (4.04) |
| Postgraduate | -2.24 (3.96) | -4.52 (3.30) | -0.14 (4.28) | 1.17 (3.79) | 19.80*** (5.55) |
| Male | -5.36*** (1.99) | -3.86** (1.66) | 1.00 (2.15) | -5.16*** (1.90) | -4.43 (2.72) |
| Black | -0.39 (5.25) | 2.28 (4.38) | 0.43 (5.68) | 5.61 (5.03) | 20.57*** (7.90) |
| Hispanic | -3.45 (5.53) | 1.66 (4.62) | -6.82 (5.99) | 4.67 (5.30) | 16.65* (8.51) |
| Other | -4.08 (7.35) | 3.96 (6.13) | 4.81 (7.95) | 0.46 (7.03) | 21.47 (13.48) |
| White | -2.41 (4.24) | -0.74 (3.54) | -3.55 (4.58) | -4.57 (4.06) | 14.39** (6.94) |
| Year of Birth | 0.08 (0.08) | -0.03 (0.07) | -0.19** (0.09) | 0.23*** (0.08) | 0.37*** (0.12) |
| Income | -0.0000* (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | 0.0001** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Observations | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 299 |
| R ² | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Residual Std. Error | 21.88 (df = 502) | 18.26 (df = 502) | 23.66 (df = 502) | 20.94 (df = 502) | 23.22 (df = 287) |
| F Statistic | 2.94*** (df = 11; 502) | 3.95*** (df = 11; 502) | 1.82** (df = 11; 502) | 4.41*** (df = 11; 502) | 3.02*** (df = 11; 287) |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.1.3 Conditions + Interaction (Me)




Table 11: Regression table for mediators

| | Dependent variables: | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Empathy | PerspTak | DisAttr | SitAttr | TrustGov |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Constant | 71.94*** (1.92) | 78.64*** (1.63) | 40.49*** (2.07) | 58.73*** (1.88) | 38.08*** (2.66) |
| Low Mobility | -1.64 (2.74) | -1.41 (2.32) | 3.71 (2.96) | -4.12 (2.68) | -1.66 (3.96) |
| Poverty | 6.16** (2.74) | 4.22* (2.33) | -1.35 (2.97) | -0.92 (2.69) | 1.37 (3.94) |
| Low Mobility:Poverty | 2.82 (3.87) | 0.63 (3.29) | -6.20 (4.19) | 7.11* (3.80) | 1.02 (5.60) |
| Observations | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 302 |
| R ² | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.002 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.005 | -0.01 |
| Residual Std. Error | 22.02 (df = 514) | 18.70 (df = 514) | 23.81 (df = 514) | 21.59 (df = 514) | 24.20 (df = 298) |
| F Statistic | 5.28*** (df = 3; 514) | 2.67** (df = 3; 514) | 2.27* (df = 3; 514) | 1.84 (df = 3; 514) | 0.20 (df = 3; 298) |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.1.4 Conditions + Interaction + Demographics (Me)




Table 12: Regression table for mediators

| | Dependent variables: | | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Empathy | PerspTak | DisAttr | SitAttr | TrustGov |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Constant | -75.58 (160.92) | 145.44 (134.37) | 408.37** (173.88) | -385.96** (153.94) | -715.15*** (242.85) |
| Low Mobility | -0.96 (2.76) | -0.64 (2.31) | 2.82 (2.99) | -1.81 (2.64) | -0.36 (3.87) |
| Poverty | 6.51** (2.77) | 4.71** (2.32) | -2.17 (3.00) | 0.86 (2.65) | 2.62 (3.86) |
| College degree | 2.34 (2.94) | 0.55 (2.46) | -2.07 (3.18) | 0.96 (2.81) | 9.81** (4.05) |
| Postgraduate | -2.34 (3.96) | -4.49 (3.31) | 0.07 (4.28) | 1.00 (3.79) | 19.81*** (5.56) |
| Male | -5.33*** (1.99) | -3.87** (1.66) | 0.94 (2.15) | -5.10*** (1.90) | -4.47 (2.73) |
| Black | -0.64 (5.27) | 2.33 (4.40) | 0.95 (5.69) | 5.19 (5.04) | 20.65*** (7.92) |
| Hispanic | -3.81 (5.57) | 1.73 (4.65) | -6.07 (6.02) | 4.06 (5.33) | 16.72* (8.53) |
| Other | -4.06 (7.35) | 3.95 (6.14) | 4.75 (7.94) | 0.51 (7.03) | 21.77 (13.58) |
| White | -2.53 (4.24) | -0.71 (3.54) | -3.30 (4.59) | -4.77 (4.06) | 14.39** (6.95) |
| Year of Birth | 0.08 (0.08) | -0.03 (0.07) | -0.19** (0.09) | 0.23*** (0.08) | 0.37*** (0.12) |
| Income | -0.0000* (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | 0.0001** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Low Mobility:Poverty | 2.31 (3.93) | -0.48 (3.28) | -4.84 (4.24) | 3.96 (3.76) | -1.18 (5.49) |
| Observations | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 299 |
| R ² | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Residual Std. Error | 21.89 (df = 501) | 18.28 (df = 501) | 23.65 (df = 501) | 20.94 (df = 501) | 23.26 (df = 286) |
| F Statistic | 2.72*** (df = 12; 501) | 3.62*** (df = 12; 501) | 1.78** (df = 12; 501) | 4.13*** (df = 12; 501) | 2.76*** (df = 12; 286) |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2 Dependent variables

4.2.1 Conditions (Dv)




Table 13: Regression table for welfare preferences

| | Dependent variables: | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | GenWelfSupp | Welf4Poor | Welf4HardWork | SpecWelf4Mob | SpecWelf4Poor | AllWelfComp | IneqMagnPercep |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Constant | 64.70*** (2.11) | 64.62*** (2.28) | 66.77*** (2.12) | 58.40*** (2.22) | 64.23*** (2.15) | 63.05*** (1.99) | 84.88*** (1.10) |
| Low Mobility | -1.23 (2.45) | -2.13 (2.65) | -1.12 (2.46) | -1.85 (2.58) | -1.73 (2.50) | -1.66 (2.31) | 2.07 (1.28) |
| Poverty | 4.15* (2.45) | 5.79** (2.65) | 4.01 (2.46) | 2.36 (2.58) | 6.70*** (2.50) | 4.58** (2.31) | 0.20 (1.28) |
| Observations | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 |
| R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.003 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.002 | 0.01 | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.01 | 0.005 | 0.001 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 515) | 27.85 | 30.15 | 27.99 | 29.41 | 28.48 | 26.32 | 14.52 |
| F Statistic (df = 2; 515) | 1.54 | 2.67* | 1.42 | 0.66 | 3.78** | 2.19 | 1.34 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2.2 Conditions + Demographics (Dv)




Figure 24: Effect plot for regression of dependent variables on conditions controlling for demographics

Table 14: Regression table for welfare preferences

| | Dependent variables: | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | GenWelfSupp | Welf4Poor | Welf4HardWorkSpec | Welf4MobSpec | Welf4Poor | AllWelfComp | IneqMagnPercep |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Constant | -254.74 (198.58) | -505.94** (214.46) | -313.86 (200.38) | -690.56*** (207.24) | -531.15*** (201.89) | -502.57*** (185.48) | 111.78 (106.80) |
| Low Mobility | -0.73 (2.40) | -1.37 (2.59) | -0.27 (2.42) | -0.62 (2.50) | -0.91 (2.44) | -0.78 (2.24) | 2.02 (1.29) |
| Poverty | 3.90 (2.39) | 5.67** (2.58) | 3.88 (2.42) | 2.42 (2.50) | 6.62*** (2.43) | 4.50** (2.24) | 0.08 (1.29) |
| College degree | 2.29 (3.63) | 3.81 (3.92) | 3.15 (3.67) | 3.21 (3.79) | 3.00 (3.69) | 3.10 (3.39) | 1.19 (1.95) |
| Postgraduate | 1.39 (4.89) | 4.91 (5.28) | 1.85 (4.93) | 3.10 (5.10) | 4.42 (4.97) | 3.31 (4.57) | 0.47 (2.63) |
| Male | -2.45 (2.46) | -5.29** (2.65) | -6.10** (2.48) | -7.17*** (2.56) | -6.14** (2.50) | -5.78** (2.29) | -0.21 (1.32) |
| Black | 4.48 (6.49) | 2.49 (7.01) | 1.77 (6.55) | 3.00 (6.77) | 1.91 (6.60) | 2.65 (6.06) | -2.88 (3.49) |
| Hispanic | 7.65 (6.84) | 3.49 (7.39) | -0.30 (6.90) | 0.63 (7.14) | 1.47 (6.95) | 2.15 (6.39) | 1.62 (3.68) |
| Other | 5.95 (9.08) | -3.70 (9.81) | 2.01 (9.16) | -10.52 (9.48) | -8.23 (9.23) | -4.75 (8.48) | -3.08 (4.88) |
| White | -1.76 (5.24) | -4.54 (5.66) | -7.04 (5.28) | -10.89** (5.47) | -6.45 (5.32) | -6.86 (4.89) | -1.00 (2.82) |
| Year of Birth | 0.17* (0.10) | 0.29*** (0.11) | 0.20** (0.10) | 0.39*** (0.10) | 0.31*** (0.10) | 0.29*** (0.09) | -0.01 (0.05) |
| Income | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0002*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0000** (0.0000) |
| Observations | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 |
| R ² | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.02 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.003 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 502) | 27.04 | 29.20 | 27.28 | 28.22 | 27.49 | 25.25 | 14.54 |
| F Statistic (df = 11; 502) | 3.88*** | 4.43*** | 3.56*** | 5.00*** | 5.09*** | 5.25*** | 1.13 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2.3 Conditions + Interaction (Dv)




Table 15: Regression table for welfare preferences

| | Dependent variables: | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | GenWelfSupp | Welf4Poor | Welf4HardWork | SpecWelf4Mob | SpecWelf4Poor | AllWelfComp | IneqMagnPercep |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Constant | 69.08*** (2.39) | 68.72*** (2.60) | 70.25*** (2.42) | 61.52*** (2.55) | 67.63*** (2.46) | 66.62*** (2.27) | 86.02*** (1.26) |
| Low Mobility | -10.17*** (3.42) | -10.50*** (3.71) | -8.21** (3.45) | -8.23** (3.64) | -8.66** (3.52) | -8.95*** (3.24) | -0.25 (1.80) |
| Poverty | -4.83 (3.43) | -2.61 (3.72) | -3.11 (3.46) | -4.04 (3.64) | -0.26 (3.52) | -2.74 (3.25) | -2.13 (1.80) |
| Low Mobility:Poverty | 17.88*** (4.84) | 16.74*** (5.25) | 14.19*** (4.88) | 12.75** (5.14) | 13.88*** (4.97) | 14.58*** (4.59) | 4.65* (2.55) |
| Observations | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 | 518 |
| R ² | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 514) | 27.51 | 29.88 | 27.79 | 29.26 | 28.30 | 26.09 | 14.48 |
| F Statistic (df = 3; 514) | 5.61*** | 5.20*** | 3.77** | 2.49* | 5.15*** | 4.85*** | 2.01 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2.4 Conditions + Interaction + Demographics (Dv)





Table 16: Regression table for welfare preferences

| | Dependent variables: | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | GenWelfSupp | Welf4Poor | Welf4HardWorkSpec | Welf4MobSpec | Welf4Poor | AllWelfComp | IneqMagnPercep |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Constant | -229.53 (197.08) | -483.65** (213.51) | -293.89 (199.60) | -675.03*** (206.95) | -513.63** (201.38) | -483.48*** (184.68) | 119.06 (106.71) |
| Low Mobility | -8.17** (3.38) | -7.96** (3.67) | -6.16* (3.43) | -5.21 (3.55) | -6.09* (3.46) | -6.41** (3.17) | -0.13 (1.83) |
| Poverty | -3.60 (3.40) | -0.97 (3.68) | -2.06 (3.44) | -2.20 (3.57) | 1.41 (3.47) | -1.17 (3.18) | -2.08 (1.84) |
| College degree | 2.54 (3.60) | 4.03 (3.90) | 3.34 (3.65) | 3.37 (3.78) | 3.17 (3.68) | 3.28 (3.38) | 1.27 (1.95) |
| Postgraduate | 0.75 (4.85) | 4.35 (5.26) | 1.34 (4.91) | 2.71 (5.10) | 3.98 (4.96) | 2.83 (4.55) | 0.29 (2.63) |
| Male | -2.25 (2.44) | -5.12* (2.64) | -5.94** (2.47) | -7.05*** (2.56) | -6.00** (2.49) | -5.63** (2.28) | -0.15 (1.32) |
| Black | 2.91 (6.45) | 1.11 (6.99) | 0.53 (6.54) | 2.03 (6.78) | 0.82 (6.59) | 1.47 (6.05) | -3.33 (3.49) |
| Hispanic | 5.37 (6.82) | 1.46 (7.39) | -2.12 (6.91) | -0.78 (7.16) | -0.12 (6.97) | 0.42 (6.39) | 0.96 (3.69) |
| Other | 6.13 (9.00) | -3.54 (9.75) | 2.16 (9.12) | -10.41 (9.46) | -8.11 (9.20) | -4.61 (8.44) | -3.03 (4.88) |
| White | -2.52 (5.20) | -5.21 (5.63) | -7.65 (5.26) | -11.37** (5.46) | -6.98 (5.31) | -7.44 (4.87) | -1.22 (2.81) |
| Year of Birth | 0.15 (0.10) | 0.28*** (0.11) | 0.19* (0.10) | 0.38*** (0.10) | 0.30*** (0.10) | 0.28*** (0.09) | -0.02 (0.05) |
| Income | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0001*** (0.0000) | -0.0000** (0.0000) |
| Low Mobility:Poverty | 14.86*** (4.81) | 13.14** (5.21) | 11.77** (4.87) | 9.16* (5.05) | 10.33** (4.92) | 11.25** (4.51) | 4.29 (2.60) |
| Observations | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 | 514 |
| R ² | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.03 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.01 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 501) | 26.81 | 29.04 | 27.15 | 28.15 | 27.39 | 25.12 | 14.52 |
| F Statistic (df = 12; 501) | 4.41*** | 4.63*** | 3.78*** | 4.88*** | 5.07*** | 5.38*** | 1.27 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5 Moderated Mediation: Path a and c



Does mediation of the effect of exposure to poverty on welfare policy support exist at high and low levels of mobility? The mobility condition is believed to alter the effect of exposure to poverty on both the mediator and welfare policy support:

- a: Exposure to poverty elicits more empathy in the low mobility condition.
- c': Exposure to poverty leads to stronger welfare support in the low mobility condition.

To test these hypotheses, I estimate the following equations where X is exposure to poverty condition, W is the mobility condition, M is the mediator_i, and Y represents support for welfare policies.

$$M = \alpha_M + a_1X + a_2W + a_3XW + \epsilon_M \quad (1)$$

$$Y = \alpha_Y + c'_1X + c'_2W + c'_3XW + bM + \epsilon_Y \quad (2)$$

$$Y = \alpha_T + c_1X + c_2W + c_3XW + \epsilon_T \quad (3)$$




Figure 25: Direct, indirect, and total effects in the low mobility condition with % explained by mediator




Figure 26: Direct, indirect, and total effects in the high mobility condition with % explained by mediator

6 Effect of low mobility on attributions mediated through subjective mobility

RW: “It might make sense to look at whether the effect of the mobility manipulation on the “situational attributions minus dispositional attributions” variable (in just the no empathy video conditions) is mediated by the mobility manipulation manipulation check. I.e., is this weird effect of low mobility treatment on attributions driven by those low mobility folks who really did get treated the most?”

```
df1 <- df %>% filter(empathy_condition == "control") %>%
  mutate(mobility_condition = factor(mobility_condition, levels = c("high","low")))
fitM <- lm(sub_effort_1 ~ mobility_condition,df1)
fitY <- lm(SitMinDis ~ mobility_condition + sub_effort_1,df1)
fitMed <- mediation::mediate(fitM, fitY, boot=TRUE, sims=2000,boot.ci.type = "bca", treat="mobility_condit.
```

```
## Warning in mediation::mediate(fitM, fitY, boot = TRUE, sims = 2000, boot.ci.type
## = "bca", : treatment and control values do not match factor levels; using high
## and low as control and treatment, respectively
```

```
## Running nonparametric bootstrap
```

```
summary(fitMed)
```

```
##
## Causal Mediation Analysis
##
## Nonparametric Bootstrap Confidence Intervals with the BCa Method
##
##           Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper           p-value
## ACME           17.55      12.38      24.34 <0.0000000000000002 ***
## ADE            -25.38     -33.13     -16.95 <0.0000000000000002 ***
## Total Effect    -7.83     -16.25       0.91         0.076 .
## Prop. Mediated  -2.24     -34.08     -0.60         0.076 .
## ---
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## Sample Size Used: 259
##
##
## Simulations: 2000
```

The opposite signs of the indirect and the total effect indicate that the mediator does not explain the effect of the low mobility condition on attributions. Instead, there is evidence of a suppression effect since including the mediator increases the direct effect in absolute terms - i.e. it became “more negative” than the negative total effect.