

OLX

Second-hand Marketplace Simulation using MAS

Agents and Distributed Artificial Intelligence

2nd project - Final Delivery

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
Part I - Presentation

Problem Description

- The modelled multi-agent system represents a second-hand online marketplace with two types of agents: buyers and sellers;
- **Sellers** seek to maximize the selling price of the products while trying to stay competitive with other sellers;
- Buyers wish to spend the least cash possible while competing with other buyers and avoiding getting scammed* by sellers;
- This time, Buyers and Sellers may buy/sell different quantities of the same item;

^{*} When a buyer gets scammed, he loses the money without getting the product and the seller loses credibility (or reputation);

Global Schema



Agents Architecture and Strategies

Picking Price Strategies (Seller)

Counter Offer Strategies (Buyer)

Offer Strategies (Seller)

Naive:

- No sellers: % <u>original</u> cost
- With sellers: % min. seller offer

Relative / Random Absolute TFT:

- Counter-Price: increase last buyer offer by relative / constant amount.
- o Best Offer: only product price

Relative / Random Absolute TFT:

 Price: decrease last seller offer by relative / constant amount.

Smart:

- No sellers: % <u>original</u> cost
- With sellers: % weighted (cred.) ava

• Smart:

- Counter-Price: Last buyer bid + fraction of difference buyer and seller bids.
- With sellers: product <u>price</u>, seller <u>credibility</u> and <u>negotiation time</u>


• Smart:

 Price: Last seller bid - fraction of difference buyer and seller bids.


Controlled Variables


	System	Seller	Buyer
Independent	. Products. Seller count. Buyer count. Buyer waves. Wave period	. Product stock. Scam factor. Elasticity. Price picking strat.. Offer strat.	. To-Buy list . Patience . Picking strat Counter-offer strat.
Dependent	. Market prices	. Money earned . Credibility	. Money spent

Displays and Plots




- . **Sellers**: red nodes (credibility gradient)
- . **Buyers**: green/blue/purple nodes (color based on strategy)
- . **Trades**: green for success, orange for scam






- . **Sequence plots (money/time)**: counter-offer strategy, offer strategy, elasticity and scam-factor;
- . Histogram: credibility and market price;

Experiment #1 - "Does crime pay?"



- Goal: investigate if sellers with an high probability of scamming earn more money;
- Setup:
 - 20 sellers
 - 25 product-stock (original price 100\$)
 - SMART picking/offer strategy
 - 20 elasticity
 - Scam factors: 25/50/75/100 (%)
 - o 10 buyers (x 4 waves)
 - 5 product-stock
 - SMART counter-offer strategy
- Results: As we can see, seller return decreases with the scam factor. Due to buyers using SMART, they take seller credibility to account, and end up buying from no scammers (higher credibility)

Experiment #2 - "Is SMART actually smarter?" (Buyer)



- Goal: investigate if buyers with a SMART strategy spend less money on average than the TFT strats;
- Setup:
 - o 100 sellers:
 - 40 product-stock (original price 100\$)
 - SMART picking/offer
 - 20 elasticity
 - Scam factors: 25/50/75/100 (%)
 - o 99 buyers:
 - 20 product-stock
 - Counter-Offer: SMART/RELTFT/ABSTFT (33% each)

Results:


- SMARTs spend more money in the 1st phase
- SMARTs buy all the products needed first (better strategy if limited supply)
- Both **TFTs** strategies **overpay** for the product not taking credibility into account leads to being scammed more often
- Absolute TFT ends up being a better negotiator than Relative TFT (despite the slow start)

Experiment #3 - Seller price elasticity

 Goal: analyse the effect of the seller's elasticity in the amount of money they earn.

Setup:

- only one product (original price 100€)
- everyone uses the SMART strategy
- buyers looking for 5 items:
 - 40 in supply > demand
 - 90 in supply = demand
- o sellers:
 - 18 sellers each 25 stock each
 - 10/20/30(%) elasticities



Results:

- when **supply > demand**, sellers that **sell at a lower price earn more money** than their counterparts
- o in contrast, if there is **enough demand**, sellers with **lower elasticity tend to earn more** while selling less items, as we can see in the **supply = demand** plot
- we conclude that **predicting demand** is essential to know how low you can go when negotiating a product

Experiment #4 - "Is SMART actually smarter?" (Seller)



- Goals: investigate if sellers with a SMART strategy earn more money on average than the TFT strats;
- Setup:
 - o 18 sellers
 - 25 products (original price 100\$)
 - SMART/RELTFT/ABSTFT picking/offer (split equally)
 - 20 elasticity
 - Scam factors: 0%
 - 40 buyers
 - 5 products
 - SMART counter-offer strategy
- **Results**: From the results we can't conclude that the SMART strategy is better than the other ones, as the money earned follows a very similar evolution. In some experiments, SMART's performance was surpassed by the Relative TFT.

Conclusions and Future work

- Using Repast allowed us to streamline the development of test scenarios for the
 Olx framework, which was a critical point of the first assignment;
- The experiment results were coherent with real-world assumptions which corroborates the applicability of the system;
- In the future, we see the system being extended with:
 - Prediction methods on the outcome of a negotiation to better estimate its utility;
 - Machine Learning based strategies;
 - Model second hand market for rare items;
 - Model scalpers;

Part II - Additional Information


Run Program

- Execute:
 - java -jar olx.jar <cli_args>
 - ./gradlew run --args="<cli_args>" in the root directory
- Command line arguments (<cli_args>):

```
-h, --help
-k, --kill
-c, --config CONFIG*
-g, --generator CONFIG*
-b, --batch BATCH NUM<sup>†</sup>
-cl, --clean
-l, --logger
-s, --scam,
-bs, --bstrat,
-ss, --sstrat,
-e, --elasticity,
-p, --price
-cr, --credibility,
-nn, --nonet
```

shows help message and exit platform is shutdown after last buyer exits file (YAML or JSON) with buyers and sellers configuration file (YAML or JSON) with buyers and sellers generation params exec in batch mode with BATCH NUM runs keep only the last 4 buyer-trades in the negotiation network activate logging per agent perform a scam analysis perform a buyer strategy analysis perform a seller strategy analysis perform an elasticity analysis perform a product price analysis perform a credibility distribution analysis don't show the buyer/seller network

Non-batch mode



- Set parameters using interface
- The following params receive a list of values:
 - Elasticities
 - Scam factors
 - Offer strats
 - Counter-offer strats
 - Picking strats
- List values create a partition in the sellers/buyers:
 - o SCAM_FACTORS = [75, 75, 100, 25]:
 - First half of sellers will have scam factor of 75
 - Third quarter will have scam factor of 100
 - Last quarter will have scam factor of 25

Implemented Classes

Main Classes:

- OLX main class responsible for initialization and agents creation
- Buyer agent that represents a buyer
- **Seller** agent that represents a seller
- Buyer Launcher agent that periodically launches new buyers

Models:

- OfferInfo contains the product and offered price
- Product contains the name and its original price
- Scam contains the OfferInfo scammed
- SellerOfferInfo OfferInfo with seller credibility
- Stock wrapper for representing quantities of the same product

Utils:

- Config helper class that parses the config files
 - JsonConfig
 - GeneratorConfig
- CoolFormatter custom log formatter
- Stats responsible for calculating the statistics of the platform

Detailed Agents - Buyer Launcher

Attributes:

- timeout milliseconds between buyer waves
- **nWaves** number of buyer waves to create
- FIRST_TIMEOUT time before the first wave is launched (not configurable)

Behaviors:

CreateBuyersBehaviour - extend
 WakerBehaviour to periodically (see timeout) launch buyers in the Olx platform;

Buyer waves can be configured using the "wavesBuyers" and "periodBuyers" fields of the generator file (also using Repast interface).

Implemented Classes - Repast Related

MyAverageSequence

 AverageSequence overload that returns 0 when the List is empty instead of throwing exception and breaking the program

MyDisplaySurface

 Extends <u>DisplaySurface</u> and overloads its <u>removeDisplay</u> method, avoiding NPE when the network is refreshed (due to null item in the "Options" default menu)

MyHistogram

 Extends <u>Histogram</u> and implements <u>writeToFile</u> and <u>renameFile</u> methods, allowing to write the histogram to a CSV file

Edge

 Extends <u>DefaultEdge</u> and implements <u>DrawableEdge</u> creating a convex undirected link between to nodes, avoiding edge overlap

*Plot / *Histogram


Wrapper classes for the different plots and displays mentioned below


Plots and data

- Money earned grouped by scam factor (--scam)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/scam (line chart)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/scam

- Money earned grouped by elasticity (--elasticity)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/elasticity (line chart)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/elasticity

- Money earned grouped by seller offer strategy (--sstrat)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/seller_strat (line chart)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/seller_strat









Plots and data (cont.)

- Money spent grouped by buyer offer strategy (--bstrat)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/buyer_strat (line chart)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/buyer_strat

- Absolute frequency distribution of the sellers' credibility (--credibility)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/credibility (histogram)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/credibility
- Distribution of the products price in the simulated market (--price)
 - Plot in analysis/snapshots/product/{product_name} (histogram)
 - CSV data in analysis/csv/product/{product_name}





Initial configuration file - YAML*

Products:

```
products:
  - name: pc
   price: 800
  - name: skate
   price: 150
  - ...
```

General:

```
wavesBuyers: 2
periodBuyers: 8000
```

Sellers:

```
sellers:
  - scamFactor: 68
   elasticity: 14
   offerStrategy: SMART
   pickingStrategy: NAIVE
   products:
        - pc
        - skate
        - ...
```

Buyers:

```
buyers:
    - products:
        - pc
      counterOfferStrategy: ABSTFT
    patience: 80
- products:
        - skate
      counterOfferStrategy: RELTFT
    patience: 63
```

 Defined offer/counter-offer strategies are ABSTFT (random absolute TFT), RELTFT (relative TFT) and SMART. Picking strategies are SMART and NAIVE.

Initial generation file - YAML

```
price: 100
periodBuyers: 8000
```

```
scamFactors:
```

```
- NAIVE
- ABSTFT
counterOfferStrategies:
- ABSTFT
```

 Defined offer/counter-offer strategies are ABSTFT (random absolute TFT), RELTFT (relative TFT) and SMART. Picking strategies are SMART and NAIVE.

Used libraries

- Repast v. 3.1 (and included auxiliary libraries)
- SAJas v. 0.92b
- Jade v. 4.5.0
- argparse4j v. 0.8.1
- jackson-dataformat-yaml v. 2.9.7
- jackson-databind v. 2.9.7