

Runtime Verification of Hash Code in Mutable Classes

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Outline



1 Object equality and hash code

2 Runtime Verification and RML

3 Specification of safe hash sets





Features of most object-oriented languages

- two different notions of equality
 - by reference, predefined (==)
 - weaker equality, user-defined (equals)
- hash code associated with an object

General contract in java.lang.Object

If two objects are equal, then the same hash code must be computed for them

Reason

Classes as HashSet or HashMap rely on equals and hashCode:

- hashCode is used to identify a bucket
- equals is used to find an element in a bucket identified by hashCode





A stricter contract in java.util.Set

Great care must be exercised if mutable objects are used as set elements.

The behavior of a set is not specified if the value of an object is changed in a way that affects equals comparisons while the object is an element in the set.

A special case of this prohibition is that it is not permissible for a set to contain itself as an element.

Comments

- rather vague and imprecise specification
 - affected only sets and maps implemented with hash tables
 - no problem if hashCode is not redefined
 - mutable objects must not be modified while in a hash table





A simple example

```
var sset = new HashSet<Set<Integer>>();
var s = new HashSet<>(asList(1)); // s is {1}
sset.add(s); // sset is {{1}}
assert sset.contains(s);
s.remove(1);
assert sset.contains(s);
s.add(1);
assert sset.contains(s);
```





A simple example

```
var sset = new HashSet<Set<Integer\gg(); var s = new HashSet<>(asList(1)); // s is {1} sset.add(s); // sset is {{1}} assert sset.contains(s); // success s.remove(1); assert sset.contains(s); // failure s.add(1); assert sset.contains(s); // success
```





Another example

```
var sset = new HashSet<Set<Integer>>();
var s = new HashSet<>(asList(0)); // s is {0}
sset.add(s); // sset is {{0}}
assert sset.contains(s);
s.remove(0);
assert sset.contains(s);
s.add(0);
assert sset.contains(s);
```





Another example

```
var sset = new HashSet<Set<Integer>>();
var s = new HashSet<>(asList(0)); // s is {0}
sset.add(s); // sset is {{0}}
assert sset.contains(s); // success
s.remove(0);
assert sset.contains(s); // success!
s.add(0);
assert sset.contains(s); // success
```

Issues

- almost unpredictable code behavior
- non-deterministic behavior if hashCode depends on object references
 - object references may change from one execution to another
 - hash code needs not remain consistent from one execution to another



Theory versus practice



Theory

- mutable classes should not redefine equals
- weaker contract: hashCode should not depend on "mutable" fields

Practice

- mutable classes of Collection do not satisfy such a contract
- same problem in Kotlin and Scala, but not in C#

Aims

- verify that Collection objects are not modified while in a hash table
- proposed solution: Runtime Verification (RV)
- related work: study of Collection contracts in Java collections [NelsonPearceNoble@TOOLS2010]



Runtime verification



Definition

Runtime Verification (RV) is a verification technique that allows for checking whether a run of the program to be verified satisfies a given correctness property.


Main ingredients

- run = possibly infinite event trace
- instrumentation = generates the relevant events
- formal specification = a set of event traces
- monitor = generated from a specification, dynamically checks finite prefixes of a run



Runtime verification







Why RV?



RV bridges the gap between formal verification and testing

- as in formal verification
 - properties defined with a formalism
 - runs abstracted by event traces
- as in testing
 - scalable solution although non exhaustive
 - exploitation of information available only at runtime
- other features
 - error recovery, self-adaptation, cast-iron guarantees
 - runtime verification of control-oriented properties



RML





RML Web page: https://rmlatdibris.github.io/



RML



Main features of RML

- inspired by global session types
- based on formal languages: extension of deterministic CF grammars
- usability: developers are familiar with regular expressions and grammars
- expressive power: more expressive than deterministic CF grammars
- interoperability: separation between specification and instrumentation



Structure of RML specifications



Four layers

- event types: relevant events
- trace expressions: primitive and derived operators on sets of traces
- parametricity: existential quantification w.r.t. data carried by events
- genericity: enhanced modularity, reuse and expressive power



Events and event types in RML



An event trace

```
{"event":"func_pre", "name":"add", "targetId":5, "argIds":[13]}
{"event":"func_post", "name":"add", "res":true, "targetId":5, "argIds":[13]}
{"event":"func_pre", "name":"remove", "targetId":5, "argIds":[9]}
{"event":"func_post", "name":"remove", "res":true, "targetId":5, "argIds":[9]}
...
```

Event type declarations



RML specifications



```
Kleene star

Main = not_new_hash*
{let hash_id; new_hash (hash_id) (SafeHashSet < hash_id > \ Main) }?;

existential quantification concatenation intersection

SafeHashTable < hash_id > = ...

parametric specification
```



RML semantics



In a nutshell

- based on the notion of Brzozowski derivative
- defined by a labeled transition systems with rewriting rules
- labels are the events
- the initial state is the specification of the property



RML semantics



$$(\text{par-l}) = \frac{t \stackrel{e}{\sim} t'; \sigma}{(\text{let } x; t) \stackrel{e}{\sim} |_{t} t'; \sigma} \times \text{sodom}(\sigma)$$

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$$(\text{app}) = \frac{t \stackrel{e}{\sim} t'; \sigma'}{\sigma'} \times \text{spdom}(\sigma)$$

$$(\text{app}) = \frac{t \stackrel{e}{\sim} t'; \sigma'}{((x_{1}, \dots, x_{n}), t)(d_{1}, \dots, d_{n}) \stackrel{e}{\sim} t'; \sigma'}{\sigma'} \times \sigma'$$

$$(\text{cond-l}) = \frac{t_{1} \stackrel{e}{\sim} t; \sigma}{(d) t_{1} |_{t} \text{else } t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} t; \sigma} \times \sigma' \text{ord-sinke}$$

$$(\text{cond-l}) = \frac{t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} t; \sigma}{(d) t_{1} |_{t} \text{else } t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} t; \sigma} \times \sigma' \text{ord-sinke}$$

$$(\text{n-app}) = \frac{\tau \stackrel{e}{\sim} t}{((x_{1}, \dots, x_{n}), t)(d_{1}, \dots, d_{n}) \stackrel{e}{\sim} \sigma' \text{end-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-sinke}$$

$$(\text{n-cond-l}) = \frac{\tau \stackrel{e}{\sim} t}{\text{if } (d) t_{1} |_{t} \text{else } t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} \tau' \text{ord-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-sinke}$$

$$(\text{n-cond-l}) = \frac{t_{1} \stackrel{e}{\sim} t}{\text{if } (d) t_{1} |_{t} \text{else } t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} \tau' \text{ord-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-sinke}$$

$$(\text{e-app}) = \frac{t(t)}{E(\text{if } (d) t_{1} |_{t} \text{else } t_{2} \stackrel{e}{\sim} \tau' \text{ord-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-sinke}} \times \sigma' \text{end-$$



Specification of safe hash sets



Declaration of event types

```
new hash (hash id) matches
  {event: 'func post', name: 'HashSet', resultId: hash id};
not_new_hash not matches new_hash(_);
add(hash id, elem id) matches
  {event: 'func post', targetId: hash id, name: 'add',
   argIds: [elem id], res:true};
not add(hash id) not matches add(hash id, );
remove (hash_id, elem_id) matches
  {event: 'func_post', targetId: hash_id, name: 'remove',
   argIds:[elem_id], res:true};
modify(targ id) matches add(targ id, ) | remove(targ id, );
not modify remove(hash id, elem id) not matches
  modify(elem id) | remove(hash id, elem id);
op (hash id, elem id) matches
  {targetId:hash_id} | {targetId:elem_id};
```



Specification of safe hash sets



Whole specification



Monitor at work



Events

- new hash set with id 5
- new hash set with id 9
- insertion of set with id 9 into set with id 5

Reached state

```
(SafeHashElem<5,9> \( \) SafeHashSet<5>) \( \) (SafeHashSet<9> \( \) Main);
```



Monitor at work



Preliminary experiments

- aim: validation of the specification
- on event traces that simulate the execution of simple Java programs



Monitor at work



Preliminary experiments: example

```
var sset = new HashSet<Set<Integer≫();
var s1 = new HashSet<Integer>();
var s2 = new HashSet<Integer>();
s1.add(1);
s2.add(2);
sset.add(s1):
sl.contains(1);
s1.add(1);
sset.add(s2);
sset.remove(s1);
s1.remove(1);
s2.remove(1);
sset.remove(s2);
s1.add(1);
s2.add(2);
```



Generalization of the specification



Extension to other methods and classes

Remark:

- with put and clear is not possible to monitor modification accurately false positives are possible
- the same specification can be reused for Kotlin and Scala



Assessment of the approach



Experiments with real Java applications

- scalability
- effective bug detection



Q&A time



Thank you!

