Software Security & Secure Programming

Lab session 1 : language security weaknesses

Before you start:

- You can work either on your own laptop or on an Ensimag (Ubuntu) machine ...
- Copy the tar file
 - https://im2ag-moodle.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/mod/resource/view.php?id=31988 and untar it into a directory of your choice: tar -xvf Lab_session1.tar
- There are numerous exercices, you are expected to do at least 3 exercises and to write a report for them including both:
 - your **detailed answerse** for these **two exercices** (excluding exercise 1, already discussed during the course);
 - a **short explanation** about the problem raised and the solution proposed for one of the sub-rules of rules 04, 06, 08 of 12 from the web site
 - https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
- This report should be **uploaded** on the Moodle course page ¹ before **October the 23rd**. It **should be** written by **group** of 2 students ("binôme").
- Parts of this lab consist in discovering security features (vulnerabilities, protections, tools) which have not yet been seen during the course. This is a deliberate choice, we will came back to that in the next lectures . . .

^{1.} https://im2ag-moodle.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/mod/assign/view.php?id=31986

Exercise 1 Optimise (arithmetic overflow)

Look at the source code of optimise.c.

1. Compile it, execute it and explain the result obtained in each following case:

```
no option:

gcc -o optimise1 optimise.c

optimisation option:

gcc -02 -o optimise2 optimise.c

overflow detection option:

gcc -fno-strict-overflow -o optimise3 optimise.c

optimisation and overflow detection option:

gcc -02 -fno-strict-overflow -o optimise4 optimise.c

(Look at the gcc manual to know the meaning of -02 and -fno-strict-overflow 3 ...).
```

2. Propose a solution to make this code *secure* whatever are the options used to compile it. You can use the following rule: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/INT32-C.+Ensure+that+operations+on+signed+integers+do+not+result+in+overflow

Exercise 2 WinLoose (buffer overflow)

Look at the source code of the C program winloose.c. This program takes as input two integer arguments on the command line (argv[1] and argv[2]).

1. Compile this programm with gcc using the following command:

```
gcc -fno-stack-protector -o winloose winloose.c (Have a look at the gcc manual to know the meaning of -fno-stack-protector ...).
```

Execute it with some random arguments:

```
./winloose 5 10
./winloose 2 17
etc.
```

This program may leed to several possible results:

- print "You loose"
- infinite loop
- crash
- -- etc.
- 2. Explain each different result you get, "guessing" the execution stack layout. In particular try to find a program input allowing to print "You win"!

^{2.} if you see the same behavior than in the previous case you should add -fstrict-overflow to this command

^{3.} and -fstrict-overflow in case you used it

- 3. You can confirm and/or complete your results for the previous question by retrieving the actual stack layout from the executable code produced by the compiler. This can be done in several ways, e.g.:
 - using a *decompiler*, like **Ghidra** (available on the Ensimag machine, instructions are available here)
 - using a disassembler, like objdump
 - using a *debugger*, like gdb
- 4. You can have a look to the file DemoDisassembling.pdf to see a concrete example ...
- 5. Compile now the C program winloose.c with and without the "stack protection" enabled:

 gcc -fstack-protector -o winloose-protected winloose.c

 gcc -fno-stack-protector -o winloose-unprotected winloose.c

What do you obtain now when running these executable codes with the inputs you provided for question 1?

6. Disassemble or decompile the protected program using objdump or Ghidra.

Look at the assembly (or decompiled) code of function <main> to retrieve how the stack protection mechanism is implemented.

Exercise 3 isPasswordOK? (use-after-free)

1. Look at the specification of function fgets:

```
http://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/fgets/
```

What are the possible behaviors of this function?

- 2. Compile and test the program is Password OK.c and try to find an attack allowing a user:
 - either to **crash** the execution (if possible?);
 - or to get authenticated **without entering twice** the correct password.

Remind that in xterm the end-of-file is encoded as CTRL-D.

Explain how do these attacks work?

3. Correct the program by properly taking into account the NULL returned value of fgets in case of error. You can have a look to the following page :

https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/c/ERR33-C.+Detect+and+handle+standard+library+errors

- 4. A good security advice is to "clean" the memory space containing sensitive values after a function execution (like the buffers storing passwords ...). Check that this advice allows to get rid of the attack. Is it still the case when using optimization options?
- 5. We consider the program exploit2-fixed-fgets.c which calls function IsPassword. Show that this code is vulnerable by changing the value of size.

Hint: You can have a look to the following (french) URL:

https://openclassrooms.com/fr/courses/19980-apprenez-a-programmer-en-c/16993-securisez-l or to the following (english) one:

https://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2036582&seqNum=5

Exercise 4 ExecShell (input sanitization, use-after-free)

Look at the source code of the C program exec_shell.c. This program takes as input one directory name and prints its content (like the ls command).

Compile this program with gcc: gcc -o exec_shell exec_shell.c

Run it: ./exec_shell /tmp

If the argument string is too long, then an error message is printed and the user is requested to enter a character string.

- 1. Explain why this program is vulnerable.
- 2. Find how you can use this program to execute any shell command of your choice (e.g, /bin/sh, xcalc, etc.) using the two following attack patterns:
 - 1. shell command injection
 - 2. use-after-free vulnerability

Exercise 5 Path traversal (input sanitization)

The file path_traversal.java contains a Java program allowing to print the content of a user profil file on a (fictive) Linux filesystem those root is myroot.

Compile this program (javac path_traversal.java)

We assume the following attacker model:

- myroot is **remote** and can only be accessed by users through this Java program;
- the source code of path_traversal.java is not available to users, and it cannot neither be easily reversed.
- 1. As an "attacker", run java path_traversal
 - first, without argument;
 - then, with a random argument (for instance your login name).

What do you learn?

2. According to the structure of a Linux filesystem you know that the "password file" is stored in /etc/passwd. How can you use path_traversal.class to print the content of this file?

Have a look at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/34.html ...

3. As a developper, how could you improve the code of path_traversal.java in order to prevent this attack? Several solutions can be considered:

- define bounds for expected string (like OVH and free for accounts' password on their manager) so the number of check to do on the input string could be easily defined (have a look at filesystems constants for this)
- (properly) sanitize input string
- have a look at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directory_traversal_attack

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html

Exercise 6 A DoS attack! (input sanitization)

The (simple!) program integers-sum.c expects a sequence of integer values from the user (ending by -1) and prints the sum of the received input (expected -1). However, there is a (simple!) way as a regular user - to make it entering an **infinite loop**, leading to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.

- 1. compile and run this code with regular input sequences to check that it works well under nominal conditions.
- 2. find the way to trigger this attack (**clue**: you simply need to enter some simple unexpected input, using a very basic *fuzzing* technique).
- 3. explain the vulnerability, and where it does come from.
- 4. propose a more secure version of this code, preventing the former attack.

Exercise 7 Exploiting a Use-After-Free (use-after-free)

The objective of this exercise is to show how a use-after-free vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to get an *arbitrary code execution*. The commands to be executed in the following questions can be copy-pasted from the file exploit-uaf2.txt.

1. Have a look at the file uaf2.c to spot the use-after-free.

Compile this file using option -z execstack to set the stack as "executable" (which is not a default option).

```
gcc -z execstack -o uaf2 uaf2.c
```

- 2. What do you obtain when executing the following command: ./uaf2 foo Explain why you get this result ...
- 3. Execution of uaf2 can be hijacked by an attacker and may lead to an arbitrary code execution by giving as input a sequence of processor instructions (called a *shellcode*). An example of such a shellcode allowing to **open a shell** under Linux x86/64 is given for instance here: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46907.

Run uaf2 with this shellcode a command line argument (see file exploit-uaf2.txt).

4. Re-compile now your code using Adress-Sanitizer in order to enforce memory safety:

```
gcc -g -fsanitize=address -z execstack -o uaf2 uaf2.c
```

Check that the previous "exploit" does not work anymore ...

Category 4: other vulnerabilities ...

Exercise 8 Disclose and corupt a secret data (format string)

The program format-string.c uses a function fmstr() which stores as local variables both some input buffer and a variable var supposed to contain a confidential/sensitive value (a crypto key, a password, etc.).

Function fmstr() contains a so-called string format vulnerability, namely a C language weakness which may allow a user to read and/or write arbitrary data on the execuction stack thanks to the use of functions with a variable number of parameters (like printf).

To learn more about this vulnerability you can have a look to this web page: https://web.ecs.syr.edu/~wedu/Teaching/cis643/LectureNotes_New/Format_String.pdf

1. Compile the program format-string.c in 32 bits machine code (to simplify the exercise):

```
gcc -m32 -o format-string format-string.c
```

You should get a warning telling that this program is suspicious, but let us ignore it for now. Run this program with regular inputs (a basic string) and observe that everything goes well (no possible buffer overflow!).

- 2. Try to exploit this vulnerability by producing a crash, namely by accessing non valid addresses on the stack, for instance by making this program printing a string with more format specifiers than arguments. This can be done simply by entering a well chosen input.
- 3. Try know to produce some information leakage, by making this program printing the (secret!) value of variable var, still by entering a well chosen input.
- 4. Finally, try know to change the value of var (data corruption), still by entering a well chosen input.

Clue:

- The %n format specifier allows to **write in memory** the number of characters printed so far. For instance, "printf("%n", &i);" prints at address &i the number of characters printed so far.
- The address of var is (regularly) printed by the program, and hence supposed to be known.
- to make this address always the same, you need to de-activate the ASLR protection. You can probably do that on yor own (Linux) machine using the following command:

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```