

On the Design and Implementation of Structured P2P VPNs

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Abstract

Centralized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) when used in distributed systems have performance constraints as all traffic must traverse through a central server. In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift towards the use of P2P in VPNs to alleviate pressure placed upon the central server by allowing participants to communicate directly with each other, relegating the server to handling session management and supporting NAT traversal using relays when necessary. Other approaches seek to remove all centralization with a focus on unstructured P2P systems. These approaches currently lack the depth in security options provided by other VPN solutions, and their scalability constraints have not been well studied.

In this paper, we propose and implement a novel VPN architecture which uses a structured P2P system for peer discovery, session management, NAT traversal, and autonomic relay selection. We relegate the use of a central server as a partially-automated public key infrastructure (PKI) via a user-friendly web interface. Our model also provides the first design and implementation of a P2P VPN with full tunneling support, whereby all non-P2P based Internet traffic routes through a trusted third party and does so in a way that is more secure than existing full tunnel implementations. To verify our model, we evaluate reference implementation by comparing it quantitatively to other VPN technologies focusing on latency, bandwidth, and memory usage. We also discuss some of our experiences with developing, maintaining, and deploying such a system.

1 Introduction

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) provides the illusion of a Local Area Network (LAN) spanning a wide area network (WAN) infrastructure by creating secure and authenticated communication links amongst participants. Common uses of VPNs include secure access to enterprise network resources from remote/insecure locations, connecting distributed resources from multiple sites, and establishing virtual LANs for multiplayer video games over the Internet. In the context of this paper, we focus on VPNs that provide connectivity amongst individual resources each configured with VPN software. Our work is significantly different in scope from approaches that define VPNs “as the ‘emulation of a private Wide Area Network (WAN) facility using IP facilities’ (including the public Internet or private IP backbones).” [21].

The purpose of these VPNs is to connect large sets of machines through virtual routers to a virtual WAN environment.

The architecture described in this paper addresses a usage scenario where participants desire VPN connectivity without incurring the complexity or management cost of traditional VPNs. For instance, in a small/medium business (SMB) environment, it is often desirable to interconnect desktops and servers across distributed sites, provide authenticated access and encrypted traffic to enterprise networked resources, and secure Internet traffic from mobile users at untrusted locations. Another example in collaborative academic environments linking individuals belonging to a virtual organization spanning multiple institutions, where coordinated configuration of network infrastructure across different sites is often impractical. Existing approaches suffer from one or more limitations that hinder their applicability in these scenarios: centralized approaches (e.g. OpenVPN [43]) incur the management cost of dedicated infrastructures. Alternative P2P-based approaches (e.g. Hamachi [27]) are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if session management is handled by an external provider; furthermore, they lack the support to tunnel traffic to Internet hosts through the VPN.

Among existing VPN approaches [43, 27, 31, 20, 11, 37], there is not a single solution that provides the following in an integrated manner: no dependence on centralized server(s) for creation, maintenance and tear-down of VPN links; completely secure full tunneling of Internet traffic; decentralized relay selection, where any peer can potentially be a relay; and user-friendly, intuitive membership management in a VPN.

Our system supports the well-known PKI-based security model to secure VPN links; for improved usability, we employ a semi-automated PKI managed through a group-based web interface. The interface allows VPN group managers to review applications into the group and remove malicious users. Furthermore, we use the bootstrapping of a private P2P system off an existing public P2P system to create a trusted P2P system that spans only the members of a VPN group providing secure P2P routing and DHT storage. We explore the problem of providing full tunneling to P2P VPNs and provide a working solution that supports multiple gateways in a single VPN. We provide mechanisms that allow peers to establish NAT tunneling two-hop relay links based upon node stability (uptime) and proximity (latency) when direct connectivity is unavailable (e.g. due to NAT traversal).

sal constraints). The main contribution of this paper is the design and evaluation of a novel structured P2P VPN overlay architecture. While many of the individual components of our solution are not novel in and of themselves, the integration of these components and their interaction results in a unique system.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of current VPN technologies. Section 3 provides background on P2P systems. Section 4 describes the techniques used to create structured P2P VPNs. In Section 5, we present evaluation comparing our system with other VPNs. Our experience developing, using, and debugging the system is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 discusses related works, while Section 8 presents concluding remarks.

2 Virtual Private Networks

There exist many different flavors of virtual networking. This paper focuses on those that are used to create or extend a virtual layer 3 network, of which there are many types as summarized in Table 1. A brief survey of popular VPNs comprising different configurations is summarized in Table 2. This section overviews core features of VPN designs, beginning with client configuration of VPNs, followed by an analysis of different VPN server configurations as highlighted in Table 1.

Type	Description
Centralized	Clients communicate through one or more servers which are statically configured
Centralized Servers / P2P Clients	Servers provide authentication, session management, and optionally relay traffic; peers may communicate directly with each other via P2P links if NAT traversal succeeds
Decentralized Servers and Clients	No distinction between clients and servers; each member in the system authenticates directly with each other; links between members must be explicitly defined
Unstructured P2P	No distinction between clients and servers; members either know the entire network or use broadcast to discover routes between each other
Structured P2P	No distinction between clients and servers; members are usually within $O(\log N)$ hops of each other via a greedy routing algorithm; use distributed data store for discovery

Table 1: VPN Classifications

2.1 Client VPN Configuration

In Figure 1, we abstract the common features of all VPNs clients. The key components of a client machine are 1) client software that communicates with the VPN overlay and 2) a virtual network (VN) device. During initialization, the VPN software starts by authenticating with an overlay or VPN agent. Then, optionally, it queries the agent for information about the network, such as the network address space, and finally the VN device is started enabling secure communication amongst participants.




Figure 1: A typical VPN client. The VPN uses a VN device to make interaction over the VPN transparent. Packets going to VPN destinations are directed towards the VN device, which interfaces the VPN client. The VPN client in turn sends and receives packets over the host's physical network device.

There are many different mechanisms for communicating with an overlay agent. For quick setup, a system may require no authentication or use a shared secret such as a key or password. Using accounts and passwords with or without a shared secret provides individualized authentication, allowing an administrator to block all users if the shared secret is compromised or individual users if they act maliciously. For the strongest level of security, each client can be configured to have a unique signed certificate that makes brute force attacks very difficult. The trade-offs come in terms of usability and management. While the use of signed certificates provides better security than shared secrets, it can be more difficult to set up and use. In a system comprising of non-experts, the typical setup includes the use of a shared secret and individual user accounts, where the shared secret is included with the installation of the VPN application which is distributed from a secured site.

To communicate over the VPN transparently, a system must have a VN device driver, which provides the mechanisms to inject incoming packets and retrieve outgoing packets from the networking stack, enabling the use of

common network APIs such as Berkeley Sockets allowing existing application to work over the VPN without modification. There are many different types of VN devices, though due to our focus on an open platform, we focus on TAP [25]. TAP allows the creation of one or more Virtual Ethernet and / or IP devices and is available for almost all modern operating systems including Windows, Linux, Mac OS/X, BSD, and Solaris. A TAP device presents itself as a character device providing read and write operations. Incoming packets from the VN are written to the TAP device and the networking stack in the OS delivers the packet to the appropriate socket. Outgoing packets from local sockets are read from the TAP device.

The VN device can be configured manually through static addressing or dynamically through dynamic host configuration process (DHCP) [12, 3]. Setting the IP address of the VN device causes the system to add a new routing rule to the routing table that directs all packets sent to the VPN address space to be sent to the VN device. Packets are read from the the TAP device, encrypted and sent to the overlay via the VPN client. The overlay delivers the packet to another client or a server with a VN stack enabled. Received packets are decrypted, verified for authenticity, and then written to the TAP device. In most cases, the IP layer header remains unchanged, while VPN configuration determines how the Ethernet header is handled.

The described configuration so far creates what is known as a split tunnel: a VPN connection that handles *internal VPN traffic only and not Internet traffic*. VPNs can also support full tunneling, which allows a VPN client to securely forward *all their Internet traffic* through a VPN router. This provides network-layer privacy and authentication when a user is in an insecure environment, such as an open wireless network at a coffee shop, by securely proxying all Internet traffic through a trusted third party, the VPN gateway. Both models are illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: A VPN setup expressing both full and split tunnel modes. In both modes, packets for the server are sent directly to the server. In split tunnel mode, Internet packets bypass the VPN and are routed directly to the Internet. In full tunnel mode, Internet packets are first routed to the VPN server / gateway, and then to their Internet destination.

Most centralized VPNs implement full tunneling through a routing rule swap, which makes the default gateway an endpoint in the VPN subnet and traffic for the VPN server is routed explicitly to the LAN gateway. For example, in a typical home network, an Internet bound packet will be retrieved at the VN device, encrypted, and sent to the VPN gateway via the LAN’s gateway. At the VPN gateway, the packet is decrypted and delivered to the Internet. A P2P system encounters two challenges in supporting full tunnels: 1) P2P traffic must not be routed to the VPN gateway and 2) there may be more than one VPN gateway. We further discuss this issue and provide solutions to this problem in Section 4.3.

2.2 Centralized VPN Servers

OpenVPN is an open and well-documented platform for deploying centralized VPNs. Because it provides a representation of features found in most centralized VPNs, we use it as a basis for comparison with our approach. Centralized VPNs are responsible for authentication and routing between clients, providing a NAT to the servers local resources and Internet (full tunnel), and handling inter-server communication.

Central VPNs server operate at well-known endpoints consisting of a hostname or IP address and a port. In a system containing multiple servers, a client attempting to log in will randomly attempt to connect to one of the servers until successful, implementing a simple load balance. Once connected, clients obtain an address in the VPN address space. Depending on configuration this will allow a client to communicate with other clients, resources on the same network as the server, or Internet hosts via the VPN. In such situations, it is important that the client and server both authenticate with each other in using some formchallenge response protocol.

All inter-client packets flow through the central server. In the default configuration of OpenVPN, the clients encrypt the packet sending it to the server. The server receives the packet, decrypts it, determines where to relay it, and then encrypts and sends the packet to its destination. This model does not prevent a server from eavesdropping on such communication. While a second layer of encryption is possible through a shared secret, it requires out-of-band communication and is less secure than relying on a PKI.

To support full tunneling or allow the client to access the server’s resources, the server too must enable client-like features by becoming a VPN endpoint with a VN device. Depending on the configuration, the server can then configure traffic from the VPN to go through a NAT prior to routing it to the LAN and/or Internet.

OpenVPN allows a distribution of servers, so as to provide fault tolerance and to a lesser degree load balancing. Servers must be configured to know about each other in advance and need routing rules established to forward

	VPN Type	Authentication Method	Peer Discovery	NAT Traversal	Availability
OpenVPN [43]	Centralized	Certificates or passwords with a central server	Central server(s)	Relay through server(s)	Open Source
tinc [37]	Decentralized	PKI	Broadcast	Relay through mesh	Open Source
CloudVPN [13]	Decentralized	PKI	Broadcast	Relay through mesh	Open Source
Hamachi [27]	Centralized P2P	Password at central server	Central server	NAT traversal and centralized relay	limited free-use, limited Non-Windows clients, no private relays
GBridge [26]	Centralized P2P	Password at central server	Central server	NAT traversal, centralized relay	Windows only, free-ware, no private relays
Wippien [31]	Centralized P2P	Password at central server	Central server	NAT traversal, no relay support	Mixed Open / Closed source
N2N [11]	Unstructured P2P	Shared secret	Broadcast	NAT traversal, decentralized relay	Open Source
P2PVPN [20]	Unstructured P2P	Shared secret	Broadcast	No NAT traversal, decentralized relay	Open Source
IPOP	Structured P2P	PKI or pre-exchanged keys	DHT look up	NAT traversal and relay through physically close peers	Open Source

Table 2: VPN Comparison

packets. Load balancing exists only in the process of the client randomly connecting to different servers and potentially with a server refusing connection due to load. The current approach lacks a distributed load balancer.

Two examples of systems that assist in distributing load in VPN systems are tinc [37] and CloudVPN [13]. Unlike the decentralized P2P systems, these decentralized systems lack the ability to self-organize the VPN and require explicit specification of which links to create. This means that, like OpenVPN, these systems can suffer VPN outages when nodes go offline. The difference being that OpenVPN makes it explicit who is a server and who is not, whereas in tinc and CloudVPN anyone can be a server or a client. In the typical tinc and CloudVPN setup, individual users share endpoints with each other out of band and then place them in the VPN configuration file. Due to the lack of self-configuration, members in the system will not replace links as members go offline.

2.3 Centralized P2P VPN Systems

Hamachi [27] began the advent of centralized VPNs that went with the ambiguous moniker “P2P VPN”. In reality, these systems would be best classified as centralized VPN servers with P2P clients. Specifically, the nature of P2P in these [31, 26] types of systems provides direct connectivity between clients once authenticated by a central server. While direct connection is desirable, it does not always happen due to firewalls or impenetrable NATs. When this happens, the central server either acts

as a relay, if not the two machines are unable to communicate. One concern is that each of these implementations use their own security protocols that involve using a server to verify the authenticity and setup secure connections between clients. Most of these projects are closed preventing users from hosting their own authentication servers and relays. This model forces users to trust the third-party server to not eavesdrop or perform other man-in-the-middle attacks. None of these provide support for full tunneling.

2.4 P2P VPN Client / Server Roles

Unlike centralized systems, pure (or decentralized) P2P systems have no concept of dedicated servers, though it is entirely possible to add reliability to the system by starting dedicated instances of the P2P VPN. In these systems, all participants are members of a collective known as an overlay. Current generation P2P decentralized VPNs use unstructured P2P networks, where there are no guarantees about distance and routability between peers. Two popular examples of unstructured P2P VPNs are N2N [11] and P2PVPN¹ [20]. As a result, participants tend to be connected to a random distribution of peers in the overlay. Finding a peer requires some form of broadcasting, either announcements or searches, to the entire overlay. While unstructured P2P systems have some scalability concerns, P2P systems in general

¹Due to the similarities between the name P2PVPN and focus of this paper, we use “P2PVPN” to refer only to [20] and “P2P VPN” to refer explicitly to our approach.

allow for server-less systems. In the realm of VPNs, all client VPNs are also servers with varying responsibilities depending on the VPN application, as we present in Table 2.

Typically, decentralized, P2P VPNs begin by attempting to connect with well-known endpoints running the P2P overlay software. A list of such end points can be maintained by occasionally querying the overlay for active participants on public IP addresses and distributing the list with the application or some other out-of-band mechanism. In the case of P2PVPN, this involves communication with one or more BitTorrent trackers to find other members of the P2PVPN group. N2N [11] requires knowledge of an existing peer in the system. It uses this endpoint to bootstrap more connections to other peers in the system, allowing the application to be an active participant in the overlay and potentially be a bootstrap connection for other peers attempting to connect.

3 Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems

Structured P2P systems provide distributed look up services with guaranteed search time in $O(\log N)$ to $O(\log_2 N)$ time, in contrast to unstructured systems, which rely on global knowledge/broadcasts, or stochastic techniques such as random walks [6]. Some examples of structured systems can be found in [35, 38, 28, 29, 32]. In general, structured systems are able to make these guarantees by self-organizing a structured topology such as a 2D ring or a hypercube.

The node ID, drawn from a large address space, must be unique to each peer, otherwise an address collision occurs which can prevent nodes from participating in the overlay. Furthermore, having the node IDs well distributed assist in providing better scalability as many algorithms for selection of shortcuts depend on having node IDs uniformly distributed across the entire address space. A simple mechanism to ensure this is to have each node use a cryptographically strong random number generator. Another mechanism for distributing node IDs involves the use of a trusted third party to generate node IDs and cryptographically sign them [7].

As with unstructured P2P systems, in order for an incoming node to connect with the system it must know of at least one active participant. A list of nodes that are running on public addresses should be maintained and distributed with the application, available through some out-of-band mechanism, or possibly using multicast to find pools [35].

Depending on the protocol, a node must be connected to either the closest neighbor smaller, larger, or both. Optimizations for fault tolerance suggest that it should be between 2 to $\log(N)$ on both sides. If a peer does not know the address of its immediate predecessor or suc-

sor and a message is routed through it destined for them, depending on the message type, it may either be locally consumed or thrown away, never arriving at its appropriate destination. Thus having multiple peers on both sides assist in stabilizing when the experiencing churn, particularly when peers leave without warning.

Overlay shortcuts are key to efficient routing in ring-structured P2P systems. The different shortcut selection methods include: maintaining large tables without using connections and only verifying usability when routing messages [35, 29], maintaining a connection with a peer every set distance in the P2P address space [38], or using locations drawn from a harmonic distribution in the node address space [28].

4 Components of a P2P VPN

Before presenting our contributions, we first review our current work as it provides the basis for our P2P VPN. At the heart of our system lies a P2P system similar to Symphony [28] named Brunet [5]. The specific components of the system that make it interesting for use in a P2P VPN system include: STUN NAT traversal [34], system stability when two nodes next to each other in address space cannot directly connect [18], proximity-based selection of shortcuts [18], a distributed data store based upon a distributed hash table [19], and self-optimizing shortcuts to support single-hop connectivity between peers when virtual IP traffic is detected between endpoints [17].

We have implemented a VN on top of the Brunet P2P library with the following features: self-configuring, low overhead use [42, 16], address configuration through a virtual DHCP server using DHT [42, 19], ability to behave as a VN interface or router [42], and secure end-to-end (EtE) and point-to-point (PtP) links. Our implementation is portable to any system that supports Tap and a C# run-time (e.g. Mono, .Net), and has been used in grid computing for over 3 years [15, 40, 39, 41].

While this framework provides the basis for our design and implementation, we will show in this paper that our approach generalizes to other structured P2P systems.

4.1 Automating security configuration

Our VPN supports the PKI model, where a centralized CA signs all client certificates and clients can verify each other without CA interaction by using the CA's public certificate. However, setting up, deploying, and then maintaining security credentials can easily become a non-negligible task, especially for non-experts. Most PKI-enabled VPN systems require the use of command-line utilities, setting up your own methods of securely deploying certificates and policing users. All these techniques can be applied in the P2P VPN of this paper, but our experience with real deployments of our system in-

dicates that usability is very important, which is why we sought a model with easy to user interfaces. In this section, we present our solution, a partially automated PKI reliant on a redistributable group based web interface. Although this does not preclude other methods of CA interaction, our experience has shown that it provides a model that is satisfactory for many use cases.

In order to obtain certificates, a user creates an account and joins a group through a Web interface, providing relevant information as to the reason for joining the group. Users can also create VPN groups of their own through the interface, in effect becoming the administrator of the VPN group. One or more group VPN administrators can verify this information and approve or deny the user access into the group. If a user is granted access, they are then able to download a configuration blob. The blob contains VPN network configuration and a shared key that uniquely identifies the user and allowing them to automatically retrieve signed certificates in the future. The user configures the VPN client with the blob. Upon starting, the VPN client queries the group server using the information in the blob to authenticate the server and itself to the server. After which, the user provides the group server a certificate request containing the VPN client's node ID, which the server signs and returns. At which point, the VPN client can connect to the VPN pool and communicate securely with others in the group. It is imperative that any operations that involve the exchanging of secret information, such as the shared secret, be performed over a secure transport, such as HTTPS, which can be done with no user intervention.

Unlike decentralized systems that use shared secrets, in which the creator of the VPN becomes powerless to control malicious users, a PKI enables the creator to effectively remove malicious users. The methods that we have incorporated include: use of a certificate revocation list (CRL) hosted on the group server, DHT events requesting notification of peer removal from the group, and broadcasting to the entire P2P system the revocation of the peer.

A CRL offers an out of band mechanism for distributing user revocations. The CRL assist in cases where a malicious user can use common P2P attacks to prevent notification of certificate revocations transmitted via the overlay, as it is significantly more difficult to prevent the retrieval of a CRL.

The DHT method acts as a event notification. Upon a revocation, the CA retrieves the values at a DHT key specific to the revoked peer. The values contain node IDs of nodes who want to know of the revocation. The problem with a DHT is that it can be easily compromised if they have not been implemented with significant measures to protect against maliciousness.

The most rudimentary mechanism is broadcasting the certificate revocation over the entire P2P overlay. In small networks, the cost of such a broadcast may be negligible, but as a network grows, such a broadcast may become prohibitively expensive.

4.2 Bootstrapping Private Overlays

In P2P systems, distributed security may not provide the same level of security as centralized or managed security. A starting point to secure an overlay is to use well-known security concepts such as PKI and SSL to encourage wider adoption of P2P systems. One problem with this approach though is that users who want a private overlay may not have the resources, i.e. public addresses, to host their own overlays. To address this, we suggest bootstrapping a private overlay from an existing public overlay [8]. Communication within the private overlay is completely encrypted and authenticated with only members of the VPN allowed access.

In this approach, members of the VPN are the only participants of the private overlay, providing a model that is synergistic with the group VPN interface described earlier. This prevents malicious users outside of the VPN from attacking it, and facilitates the removal of misbehaving peers, primarily rooted in the fact that the use of a broadcast to signal a certificate revocation is within the scope of the private overlay.

The process for bootstrapping a private overlay is as follows. Once the VPN software begins, it starts by connecting with the public overlay. It queries the public overlay's DHT at the key "private:groupname", where groupname is the GroupVPN's name. The values stored at the key are the public overlay node IDs of the private overlays active members. The joining VPN software will attempt to form private overlay bootstrap connections with members of this list using the public overlay. During this process, both peers verify each other's authenticity and form a secure connection. This connection is then used to bootstrap direct connections with members of the private overlay. The reason why the public overlay node IDs are stored at the public overlay's DHT key and for using private overlay bootstrap connections over the public overlay is to support NAT traversal. This model supports reusing Brunet's underlying NAT traversal techniques. As a member of a private overlay, a VPN node can elect to store information relevant to the VPN in the private overlay's DHT, relegating the public overlay for private overlay discovery. VPN traffic can then be kept to the private overlay only or the public overlay can be used for relaying, when direct connectivity is not possible, though this has not been looked into yet.

4.3 Full Tunneling over P2P

In full tunnel mode, all traffic to both VPN and Internet hosts with the exception of VPN "control" messages route over the VPN, as shown in Figure 2. In a central-

ized VPN, these “control” messages consist of communication with the VPN server and full tunnel gateway. In a P2P VPN, “control” messages consists of communication between Using full tunneling ensures that a malicious user cannot easily eavesdrop into what would otherwise be public communication by forwarding all non-VPN related traffic securely to a third party who resides in a more trusted environment. There are two key components to this scheme, a gateway / server or traffic re-layer and a client or a traffic forwarder. In the following sections, we present methods for implementing gateways and clients.

4.3.1 The Gateway

Configuring a machine as a gateway can be done with NAT software or using IPOP’s built-in NAT stack. For example, in Linux this is possible through masquerading in iptables, which automatically handles forwarding packets received on one interface to the next hop as well as receiving packets from the Internet and forwarding them back to the appropriate client, transparently taking care of NAT.

With a gateway intact, the VPN software can now announce that it provides full tunneling. For that purpose, we added an enable flag into the VPN configuration to specify that a machine is a full tunnel gateway. When the VPN software starts, it will automatically append itself to the list of known gateways for the VPN group in the DHT.

The only remaining difference in VPN gateway is the state machine used in processing packets coming from the VPN. Rather than rejecting packets if the destination is not in the VPN subnet, they are only rejected if gateway mode is disabled. If it is enabled, all Internet packets are written to the TAP device with the destination Ethernet address being that of the TAP device. The remaining configuration is identical to other members of the system as packets from the Internet to the client will automatically have the clients IP as the destination as a product of the NAT.

4.3.2 The Client

VPN Clients wishing to use full tunnel must redirect their default traffic to their VN device. In our VPN model, we use a virtual address for the purpose of providing distributed VN services DHCP and DNS. This same address can be used as the VPN gateway, which works fine because as shown in Figure 3, only the Ethernet header contains information about the gateway. Packets retrieved in the VPN software can then forward the Internet packet to any machine in the VPN, providing gateway services without changing IP or higher OSI layer changes.

The VPN’s state machine has to be slightly modified to handle outgoing packets not destined for a remote VPN end point. Incoming packets destined for a subnet out-

side of the VPN address space are rejected, unless full tunnel client mode is enabled. If it is enabled, the VPN software finds a remote peer to act as a full tunnel gateway and then sends the packet to the remote peer.

Ethernet Header	Src: Host PN	Dst: LAN Gateway
IP Header	Src: Host PN	Dst: VPN Gateway
	Src: Host VN	Dst: Internet
Data	Data	

Figure 3: The contents of a full tunnel Ethernet packet. PN and VN are defined as physical and virtual network, respectively. 1) the destination Ethernet address is the LAN gateway, 2) the destination IP address is the VPN gateway, and 3) the IP payload contains another IP packet whose source IP is the VN device and destination is the Internet.

The pathway for packets coming from the overlay needs to support full tunneling. The source IP address will not match the VPN gateways IP but will be an Internet address. Thus the VPN client must confirm that the source is a VPN gateway, otherwise the packet is thrown away. Upon writing a packet to the VN device, the user application will receive a packet from the Internet.

This leads to two issues: how to select the machine to use as a gateway and how to configure a network stack to properly route packets and not direct all packets to the VPN gateway. Our model uses a simple mechanism for determining which gateway to choose: query the DHT for a list of potential gateways, select a random one from the list, and verify liveness via periodic ping messages. For handling faults, we take a pessimistic approach, that is, if a server is lost, we take note of it and only query the DHT again upon the next outgoing Internet packet.

In this paper, we focus on the second issue: handling P2P-routed packets. In the centralized VPN case, a client communicates directly with a single point in the VPN, which is known ahead of time and can be implemented by a simple routing rule swap prior to starting the VPN. The same cannot be done for a P2P system. Due to the dynamic, self-configuring nature of P2P systems, ensuring that all P2P overlay messages are routed directly becomes a non-trivial issue as there will be many such routes, most of which will not be known ahead of time. If we applied the same model used by centralized VPNs, the client would end up routing both Internet and P2P traffic through the gateway machine, creating a central point of failure. We have considered two approaches, as outlined below.

4.3.3 The Client – Approach 1 – Adding Routes

The first approach is similar to the centralized version: for each P2P link, we add an explicit rule in the routing table so that packets destined for those endpoints are

routed directly to them via the LAN’s default gateway. In order to ensure this, we added a feature to the socket handling code that would, prior to the first outgoing packet, indirectly add a routing rule to direct packets for the remote node’s public address to the LAN gateway. The rule would remain in effect until the VPN closed down or the link was closed. This model requires unique code for each OS platform, though supporting Linux and Windows was quite trivial. Because outgoing packets bear the source address of the physical network, incoming packets will be delivered normally.

This method has two major shortcomings. Common to all VPNs that employ the standard route switch technique, all communication, not just VPN, is routed directly to the server insecurely. So while the VPN traffic is most likely encrypted, if the server also hosts a website, that traffic will be potentially unencrypted. Another issue that arises in the P2P case is that malicious users can send spoofed initiation packets which will add extra routes to the routing table, resulting in a similar situation as the first, unencrypted communication visible to eavesdroppers. This led to a second approach described below.

4.3.4 The Client – Approach 2 – Ethernet Frames

This solution attempts to solve the problem introduced by the first solution, removing any potential for eavesdropping. In this solution all Internet packets with no exception are directed to the VN device. The VN is then responsible for filtering P2P traffic, encapsulating them into Ethernet packets, and sending to the LAN’s gateway.

In the VPN application, Incoming IP packets’ source ports are compared to VPN application’s source ports. Upon a match, the VPN application must direct it to the LAN’s gateway. The three steps involved in this process are 1) translating the source IP address to match the physical Ethernet’s IP address, 2) encapsulating the IP packet in an Ethernet packet whose source is a random address as described in [42] and destination is the LAN’s gateway, and 3) sending the packet via the physical Ethernet device. The IP swap is required or the gateway will not route the packet properly. The issue of sending the Ethernet packet is not trivial as Windows lacks support this operation. Our platform independent solution uses a second TAP device bridged to the physical Ethernet device, allowing Ethernet packets to be sent indirectly through the Ethernet device via the TAP device. This solution currently only works for UDP packets, because all incoming packets will be directed towards the bridge and not the faked Ethernet address. TCP packets will send a TCP reset in this environment. All other packets enter the system same as before. This method has been verified to work on both Linux and Windows using OS dependent TAP devices and bridge utilities.

While this method effectively resolves the lingering problem of ensuring that all packets in a full tunnel will be secure, it raises a couple of issues 1) could the effect of having all packets traverse the VPN application be prohibitively expensive and 2) why not have the P2P application write LAN destined Ethernet packets directly avoiding the VPN client. The cost of passing all packets through the VPN application should be negligible since they are destined for the wide area, where the time to traverse the network will be orders of magnitude larger than passing through the VPN’s packet processor. Adding an Ethernet writer to the P2P system creates an unclean abstraction as a VPN portion of the system now becomes library dependent and reduces VPN software portability.

4.4 Autonomic Relays

When NAT traversal using STUN [34] fails or there are other connectivity issues some P2P VPNs [27, 26] support relaying, similar to Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) [33] provided by a managed relay infrastructure. Centralized and decentralized VPNs do not suffer from this problem as all traffic passes through the central server or managed links. To address the management and overhead concerns in these systems, we propose the use of distributed, autonomic relaying system based upon previous work [18, 30]. Our previous work involved the use of triangular routing that allowed peers next to each other in the node ID space to communicate despite being unable to communicate directly because of firewall, NAT, or Internet fragmentation issues.

The process for forming local relays or “tunnels” [18] begins with two nodes discovering each other via existing peers and determining the need to be connected. If a direct connection attempt fails, the peers exchange neighbor sets through the overlay. Upon receiving this list, the two peers use the overlap in the neighbor sets to form a two-hop connection. In this work, we further extend this model to support cases when nodes do not have an overlap set. This involves having the peers connect to each other’s neighbor set proactively creating overlap, as represented in Figure 4.

Additionally, we added the feature to exchange arbitrary information along with the neighbor list. So far we have implemented systems that pass information about node stability (measured by the age of a connection) and proximity (based upon ping latency to neighbors). Additionally, when overlap changes, we make it optional to select to use only a subset of the overlap, thus only the fastest or most stable overlap is used with many more in reserve.

To verify the usefulness of two-hop over overlay routing, we performed experiments and share the results in Section 5.1. In a live system, we verify the accuracy and usefulness of our latency-based relay selection algorithm in Section 5.2.




Figure 4: Creating relays across the node address space, when direct connectivity is not possible. Two members, 0000 and ABCD, desire a direct connection but are unable to directly connect, perhaps due to NATs or firewalls. They exchange neighbor information through the overlay and connect to one of each other's neighbors, creating an overlap. The overlap then becomes a relay path (represented by dashed lines), improving performance over routing across the entire overlay.

5 Evaluation of VPN Models

In this section, we evaluate our proposed P2P VPN as described in Section 4 implementing the features into IPOP [42] and Brunet [5]. We present the advantage of using relays over overlay routing when NAT traversal does not work. Then we examine the effects of using different relay selection mechanisms. Afterwards, we evaluate the system overheads of OpenVPN, Hamachi, and our P2P VPN to determine the OS resource costs and the cost of each in a distributed environment.

5.1 Motivation for Relays in the Overlay

The purpose of this experiment is to quantify the performance benefits of autonomic relays. For this experiment we use the MIT King data set [23], a data set containing all-to-all latencies between 1,740 well-distributed Internet hosts. We reviewed many different sizes of networks up to 1,740 nodes, evaluating each network size 100 times. Our experiments were executed by running the VPN software in simulated mode, which reuses the code base of IPOP to faithfully implement its functionality, but using event-driven simulated times to emulate WAN latencies in a LAN environment. Once at steady state, we then calculate the average all-to-all latency for all messages that would have taken two overlay hops or more, the average of our low latency relay model, and the average of single hop communication. In the low latency relay model, each destination node form a connection to

the source node's physically closest peer as determined via latency (in a live system by application level ping). Then this pathway is used as a two-hop relay between source and node. We only look at two overlay hops and more, as a single hop would not necessarily benefit from the work and would be the cause of a triangular inequality. The simulations were performed on a distributed grid platform, Archer [15], that uses IPOP for its virtual networking component.




Figure 5: A comparison of the average all-to-all overlay routing, two-hop relay, and direct connection latency in a Structured P2P environment, Brunet, using the King data set.

Our results are presented in Figure 5. We performed the tests for varying network sizes. We began our tests at 25, because network sizes around 20 and under tend to be fully connected due to the connectivity requirements of the system. It is not until the network size expands past 100 and towards 200 nodes that relays become significantly beneficial. At 100 nodes, there is approximately an 54% performance increase, whereas at 200 there is an 87% increase and it appears to grow proportionately to the size of the pool. The key take away is that latency-bound applications using a reasonably sized overlay would significantly benefit from the use of two-hop relays.

5.2 Comparing Relay Selection

In this experiment, we share our experience of testing the use of latency-aware relays using our public P2P pool running on Planet-Lab as well as Hamachi-Free and Hamachi-Pro relays. Due to Hamachi not supporting relays in Linux, this experiment was performed in Windows Vista 64-bit. The testing platform consists of two virtual machine located on the same host with a firewall preventing them from establishing direct connections. All experiments were repeated 5 times using a clean configuration each time. In Hamachi, this meant that the server would need to re-evaluate NAT traversing capabilities and the optimal relay to use. In IPOP, this meant that the VPNs would generate a new node ID and

become peers with different members of the overlay. Our results are presented in Table 3.

	Latency		Bandwidth	
	(ms)	stdev	Kbit/s	stdev
Hamachi-Free	60.8	2.54	40.2	0.87
Hamachi-Pro	60.2	1.68	1000	1.29
Latency-aware	58.1	35.5	2245	1080

Table 3: Results of the evaluation comparing latency and bandwidth of Hamachi relays and IPOP latency-aware autonomic relay selection.

As Hamachi was started and figured out that NAT traversal was not possible, it began using multiple different relays as evident by several different ping times. Eventually Hamachi settled on a relay server and it appeared to be the same one every time, for both Hamachi-Free and Hamachi-Pro. The only difference between Hamachi-Pro and Hamachi-Free is that in Pro there is a bandwidth cap of approximately 1 Mbit/s whereas Free is limited to 40 Kbit/s.

The P2P system IPOP used has nodes both on Planet-Lab but also dedicated systems for Archer [15]. These machines are at Universities and thus have a high bandwidth and low latency connection to the testing site. As witnessed by the results, it appears that in most if not all these experiments peers had a low latency connection to a University compute resource and it was chosen ahead of Planet-Lab.

The two apparent take aways are 1) the benefit of being able to deploy your own relay servers and to reuse compute nodes as relay systems and 2) as our network grows, we too may need to implement some form of bandwidth limit at relay nodes.

5.3 Comparing System Overheads

In this experiment, we attempt to understand the bounds imposed by OpenVPN, Hamachi, and IPOP. We used Amazon EC2 [2] to dynamically create various sized networks ranging from 1 to 129 with one client used as the control. In the bootstrap phase, the control machine initiates communication with a subset of the remaining clients in the VPN. Once the system has warmed, the control continues pinging this subset every 15 seconds for the next 10 minutes. We capture bytes transmitted into and out of the system, as well as the memory size of the VPN application at the end of each stage. As we test the varying network sizes, we begin by communicating with 0 peers and exponentially increase the amount (powers of two) until the control is communicating with all members of the VPN. For these evaluations, we used a licensed version of Hamachi, but due to very recent changes in Hamachi, the Linux client will not support networks larger than 16. Due to amount of data

collected and space limitations, we only present figures for results that provide interesting data and summarize the rest in the text.

Memory, for the most part, exhibited an intuitive behavior: for each additional connection there was more memory used. The OpenVPN control client showed negligible additional memory usage for additional nodes, though the server showed a linear increment, around 1 MB, for each additional client in the system, while activity had negligible effect on the results. Hamachi had a base line of a less than 1 MB and like OpenVPN, each additional client in the system had a linear effect on memory, on the order of 4 KB, there was no change based upon activity. The effect of additional inactive nodes in an IPOP network had negligible effect on memory, unlike Hamachi and OpenVPN. The only time IPOP’s memory consumption increased was during activity and it scaled at a 200 KB per additional node.




Figure 6: Comparison of bandwidth costs for member activity versus network size. As stated in the text, Hamachi limits the system to network sizes of 16, so to estimate the Hamachi bandwidth we used the following formula using a linear regression model based upon our data sets: $.049 + .002KB/s * N + .02KB/s * A$, $.049$ the bandwidth in a network size of 0, i.e., keep-alives with the central server, N is the network size, and A is the active links.

In Figures 6, we present the bandwidth results for client network sizes of 128. Our evaluation scaled from having the control communicate with 0 to 128 clients exponentially, though as mentioned already, Hamachi only supports network sizes of 16, so we used a linear regression to extrapolate the bandwidth results. The results are somewhat predictable as Brunet, IPOP’s P2P infrastructure, primarily uses UDP connections and thus must maintain application layer connections and NAT mappings. It is not obvious that Hamachi is doing the same, which may be due to the fact that the peers all have public IP addresses. In fact, Hamachi’s behavior appears to be similar to that of OpenVPN. Additionally, OpenVPN does not need to maintain NAT mappings as the servers

are location on public addresses, thus a client does not need to be as proactive about ensuring the connection like in IPOP and Hamachi.

The important take-aways from this experiment are: 1) each additional member in a VPN requires more memory, but the structured P2P approach places this burden only on the individual client and only when there is active communication; 2) maintaining NAT mappings through keep-alive messages (a ping every 15 seconds) requires very little bandwidth; and 3) all traffic routes through the OpenVPN server and it pays twice for each inter-client packet thus as inter-client communication increases OpenVPN server’s bandwidth becomes a bottleneck.

6 Experiences

Our work on the P2P VPN model presented in this paper is based on four years of work spent developing, deploying, and maintaining VN software for grid computing [17, 42, 15]. In this section, we first present our different deployments of our P2P VPN, then we present our experiences in debugging such a structured P2P VPN system.

6.1 Deployments

Initially IPOP was designed to assist in self-configuring ad hoc grid deployments using virtualization, as part of the “Grid Appliance” project [41]. Over the years, the Grid Appliance has matured and so has our usage of IPOP. Currently, the Grid Appliance is used as the basis for a free-to-join computer architecture consisting of over 400 compute resources spanning 5 seed universities with users across the United States and abroad. The Grid Appliance allows easy creation of ad hoc, distributed grids through the use of the IPOP and the structured P2P DHT. Experienced users can use the system to create large grids in less than an hour with most of the time spent waiting for virtual machines to boot. Non-expert users can quickly access the distributed grid in a matter of minutes by downloading a virtual machine manager and the Grid Appliance. The comment we receive most often in our polls is “I was surprised at how it just works.”

Motivation for a significant portion of our work lies in a desire to integrate other resources, not only virtual appliances, in the same “just works” manner. The GroupVPN described in this paper is the same software stack that runs inside Grid Appliance but also allows services the Grid Appliance to connect with external NFS and external grid resources.

Our experience with P2P VPN software also includes SocialVPN [14]. The SocialVPN places each client in their own private network, where they are only addressable by their friends as defined by third party social net-

work. Unlike GroupVPN, this makes each user the master of who does and does not have access to their resources. While SocialVPN targets the creation of “personal” VPNs, which are often asymmetrical, it does not lend itself well to environments that require some form of central management and symmetric connectivity such as a computing grid or a small to medium businesses.

6.2 Discovering Faults

In this section, we share our experiences in managing and finding faults in a deployed P2P VPN overlay bootstrap service we run on Planet-Lab [9]. Planet-Lab serves as a challenging environment environment that stresses our system and helps us assess its reliability, stability, and consistency. The basic consistency check we use to discover faults is to compare peers knowledge of the pool and test each peer for congruence with both its first and second left and right neighbors. We call this a crawl. This information is stored in a database, which we can later use to find nodes that have been inconsistent many consecutive times. If a node is able to fix inconsistencies in future crawls, experience suggests the inconsistency was probably due to churn in the system. Otherwise, it will probably still be in an inconsistent state and we are able to query the node and other nodes nearby for additional state information. At a minimum, this would be help us determine if there exists a problem and potentially the stale state causing the connectivity issue. If this reveals little information, we either retrieve a log or request it from the user who owns node, the log typically provides some useful information. Additionally, as with all multithreaded applications, deadlocks happen, we found it useful to add liveness states to threads to assist in finding deadlocks.

Other information we monitor includes peer count, memory, and CPU usage. Node count can be quite difficult to keep track of in Planet-Lab as machines at a rate of 5 to 20 per day are restarted and our software is not automatically restarted on these machines, thus the case to watch for is non-linear loss of nodes. Planet-Lab also places challenges on memory, as the systems can often be I/O starved causing what appears to be memory leaks as Brunet’s internal queue can grow without bound. In these cases, we have the node disconnect from the overlay and sleep before returning. The advantage of Planet-Lab as a test ground is that it presents so many unique situations that can be very difficult to reproduce in a lab controlled test system. It is our belief that any system that uses large scale Planet-Lab deployments as a testing ground will be quite reliable.

We are still actively seeking better ways to check and verify the state of our system. For example, the cost of doing a crawl can take $O(N \log(N))$ time, since we have to communicate with every single node with an average routing time of $O(\log(N))$. Future work in the arena is

focused on Brunet’s MapReduce [10] framework, which can be used to provide system wide searches and status checks in $O(\log(N))$ time.

7 Related Works

Our work is not the first to propose using a group like mechanism for regulating members in a VPN. Hamachi presently offers the ability to create and join a network from either a VPN client or through their Web site. To create a group, a user can either form a private invite only VPN or a password protected public VPN. Users must exchange out of band both the password and the VPNs name and both registered and unregistered users (guest) can join Hamachi VPNs. Also, Hamachi uses a model similar to a key distribution center (KDC) as opposed to a PKI, thus it is quite easy for Hamachi to do man-in-the-middle attacks. Hamachi’s server is not redistributable and all users must use LogMeIn’s (Hamachi’s owner) KDC and relays. Our model ensures that each user is traceable and has to be authenticated by the group administrator. Groups entrance is further secured by giving each user a unique key to retrieve signed certificates. Most importantly our PKI is open and redistributable, so users can self-host the group VPN web server, and our relays are built into the VPN and require no management.

Our group system is not the first to provide an automatic PKI. Previous work in this field includes RobotCA [1]. A RobotCAs receives request via e-mail, verifies that the sender’s e-mail address and embedded PGP key match, signs the request, and mails it back to the sender. RobotCAs are only as secure as the underlying e-mail infrastructure and provide no guarantees about the person beyond their ownership of an e-mail address. In certain cases, this model could be used in our use cases, such as a SMB or for universities if it enforces that all users use university e-mail addresses, then the RobotCA would only sign e-mails if they come from a specific domain. Our experience suggests that is not rare for an academic to use a non-university e-mail for university purposes. Another concern is that the RobotCA would require management to limit allowed users to members of a class or an organization whose e-mail addresses do not contain domain names.

VINI [4], a network infrastructure for evaluating new protocols and services, uses OpenVPN along with Click [24] to provide access from a VINI instance to outside hosts, as an ingress mechanism. OpenVPN only supports a single server and gateway per a client and does support distributed load balancing. VINI may benefit from using a VPN that uses a full tunnel model similar to ours, as it lends itself readily to interesting load balancing schemes.

Our work is not the first to suggest using a P2P infrastructure to enable the discovery of physically close TURN-like relays. Skype [22] queries super nodes in an attempt to find physically close relays. The primary difference in our work is that our model could easily be configured to let users create and select their own relays.

7.1 P2P VPN in Other Structured Overlays

The purpose of this work is to develop a P2P VPN model that can easily be applied to other structured P2P systems. In this section, we focus on the portability of our platform to other structured P2P systems, namely Pastry and Chord by analyzing FreePastry and NChord respectively. FreePastry can easily reuse our C# implemented library through the use of IKVM.NET, which allows the porting of Java code into the CLR. NChord is a Chord implementation written in C#. In Table 4, we compare the features of the structured P2P systems as they apply to the use as a VPN. The specific focus of this section is to understand how discovery and VPN connections would work. Our discovery model for mapping node ID to IP works through the use of a DHT. During the IP address allocation, the VPN client will place in the DHT a key, value pair mapping a virtual IP to a node ID, as described in [42].

The bootstrapping of a connection in NChord begins by finding the owner of the DHT key containing the mapping of virtual IP address to node ID through “find_successor”. After establishing a connection with the owner of that key, the owner needs to query for its value, which would be the node ID of the node owning the virtual IP. After executing “find_successor” and retrieving the destination nodes physical IP address, the VPN can “connect” to the remote node using either a UDP or TCP socket. Virtual IP messages would then be sent and received through this “connection”. Unlike our system, NChord does not support sending messages through the overlay, thus a separate “connection” for application purposes will need to be created.

FreePastry begins by looking up the mapping of virtual IP to node ID in PAST. To form a connection through overlay, the VPN client would use “route” to send packets and “deliver” to receive incoming packets. In fact, the model is very similar to Brunet. Furthermore, FreePastry has knowledge of proximity in shortcuts, so it may be very easy to apply high-performance autonomic relays in pastry potentially reusing some of their work from ePost [30]. FreePastry does not have the ability to form shortcuts based upon communication demands, so if two peers were actively communicating, they may always have to route traffic over the overlay, which in most cases will be significantly slower than if they were directly connected. Though one could argue that since FreePastry does not support NAT traversal, all nodes will already be public and thus an application, as in the NChord exam-

System	Overlay messaging	NAT Traversal	DHT	Secure PtP	Secure EtE
Brunet	Yes (AHSender)	UDP and overlay relaying	Yes with reliability	Yes	Yes
FreePastry	Yes (route)	Only with port-forwarding enabled	Yes, PAST [36], reliable	No	No
NChord	No, only look up	No	Simple, non-fault tolerant DHT	No	No

Table 4: A comparison of structured P2P systems. PtP stands for point-to-point communication, such as communication between physical connections in a P2P overlay. EtE stands for end-to-end communication, such as messages routed over the overlay between two peers.

ple, could form a direct connection bypassing the overlay.

8 Conclusions

This paper presents a novel VPN approach that has been designed from the ground up to facilitate ease of use while maintaining a reasonable level of security. At the core of the VPN is a structured P2P system that provides decentralized peer discovery, NAT traversal, relays, full tunnel clients and gateways, and secure point-to-point (PtP) and end-to-end (EtE) links. In the paper, we focus primarily on relays, full tunnels, and group security. The relay seekers can use arbitrary information, such as connection age or latency, to assist in finding suitable overlap. With overlap sets formed, relays will be created automatically using an existing infrastructure. We present a novel method for client full tunneling that works in P2P and provides a level of security not present in prior works by ensuring that only secure data is transmitted over the LAN. The PtP and EtE links are secured via an group system using a partially automated PKI with an intuitive web interface, which can be hosted by a group or they may use our public system [41].

Through the use of the group interface, users can create their own VPNs with private P2P pools while using public pools as a bootstrap. Users are able to join the system by downloading a stock VPN and loading it with their user specific configuration or binary blob. The VPN will automatically connect to the appropriate web server and both parties will verify each other's authenticity. The user is then quickly connected to the VPN. Administrators are able to police the system through the web interface and offending users are eventually removed from the system through one of the following mechanisms: CRL, DHT events, and broadcast messages.

The paper introduces many new interesting research problems: 1) distributed load balancing of full tunnel gateways, 2) understanding the long term effects of different automatic relay selection models, 3) understanding the benefits beyond security of using a private over-

lay for a VPN. We believe that this work provides both a position and a model on how to design VPNs.

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