

# On the Use of Public Overlays to Bootstrap Secure, Private Overlays

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**Abstract**—Using P2P overlays in distributed applications can significantly reduce the cost for maintenance by their automated configuration, maintenance, and optimization features. Widespread adoption of P2P systems for home and small business purposes has been limited to read-only data services such as data transfer and streaming purposes in large part due to security concerns and difficulty bootstrapping in constrained environments. The requirements for a P2P system in this context are structure, NAT traversal, point-to-point overlay security, and a distributed data store. Using these mechanisms, we propose a novel way of creating secure, private overlays by using a public overlay to coordinate discovery, security, and NAT traversal. Peers use the public overlay’s distributed data store to discover each other and then use the public overlay to assist with NAT hole punching and as a relays providing STUN and TURN NAT traversal techniques. Security is provided by a group web site available through either the Internet or the public overlay. The group acts as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) relying on the use of a centrally managed web site providing an automated Certificate Authority (CA). To qualify our design, we investigate different usage models and present a reference implementation providing a P2P VPN (Virtual Private Network). Additionally, we evaluate our contributions using both the P2P VPN in a live environment as well as event-based simulated time.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Structured P2P overlays are largely self-managing though there has been a slow adoption rate outside the using them for discovery services in data distribution services such as BitTorrent and eDonkey and only as an optimization as the systems are still reliant on centralized systems. General use of structured P2P systems, especially in home and small businesses, has been limited in large part due to the difficult nature of securing such systems with a sufficient level of trust. Much previous work in securing these systems has focused on using decentralized techniques for free-to-join systems. Though home and small businesses may need a greater level of trust than what can be guaranteed by anonymous contributors in free-to-join overlays but lack the resources for bootstrapping private overlays due to constrained environments, such as when a significant amount of or all peers are behind Network Address Translation devices (NAT).

There are many different applications for P2P use in home and small business including data storage, media sharing, chat, and system maintenance and monitoring. While there are applications in this realm, they fall into two categories, pure P2P systems that rely on anonymous sources and distributed systems that rely on a third party to provide discovery and management. While using a third party service may reduce

delivery time and provide a desirable level of trust, it may also have long term effects such as vendor lock-in, which may result in lost data, down time, and scalability constraints, all of which create significant headaches.

An example of a useful small business application is LogMeIn’s [1] software products LogMeIn Pro and Hamachi. LogMeIn Pro allows users to remotely manage and connect with their machines so long as they are willing to use LogMeIn’s software and infrastructure. Hamachi allows users to establish decentralized VPN links using centralized session management. Both applications assist in the remote maintenance and monitoring of computers without requiring the user to implement the networking infrastructure provided by LogMeIn.

Some examples of P2P applications in development are P2PSIP and P2Pns, rapidly evolving applications that have significant usefulness for homes and small businesses. P2PSIP enables users to initiate visual and audio communication decentrally, while a P2Pns allows users to deploy a decentralized naming service. Both applications allow users to contribute and benefit from all members of the system without the regulation of a third party but lack the ability to allow users to centrally secure and manage their own subset of the systems.

Distributed data store applications like Dynamo [2] and BigTable [3] have the ability to store data using a completely decentralized system. Though these systems are highly scalable and fault tolerant, the software uses an untrusted overlay. Therefore all instances should be run in a secure environment, whether that be in a single institution or across a largely distributed environment using a VPN.

In this paper, we present a design and implementation of a system that attempts to balance the benefits of third party services with P2P infrastructures. Our system relies on a completely open infrastructure using mechanisms that reduce the maintenance and deployment burden that exist with decentralized P2P systems without the loss of ownership due to use of third party systems. The components of our system follow:

- 1) a group web interface providing an automated front-end handler for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that allows users to create their own secure systems relying on P2P overlays;
- 2) an application layer security system similar to DTLS to provide secure end-to-end (EtE) and point-to-point (PtP)

in P2P overlays while transparently handling security concerns of relay NAT traversal;

- 3) the bootstrapping of private P2P overlays using existing public overlays, because applying the concepts in this paper to a public free-to-join pool is non-trivial.

Our approach provides an easy mechanism to create trusted overlays in constrained environments using a publicly available untrusted overlay. This model allows developers to focus on the application not concerning themselves with the security of the system. This approach also has benefits for system deployers, whereas insecure systems would require the deployment of a decentralized and scalable VPN as well as the overlay software. Most importantly our model provides a clean abstraction, which should make porting applications sufficiently easy.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II-A provides background on our and related work with emphasis on P2P systems. Section III describes our contributions. In Section IV, we present different usage models and present a real system using the techniques described in this paper, the GroupVPN. In Section V, we use both real and simulated systems to provide further understanding of the approach. We conclude the paper in Section VI.

## II. BACKGROUND

In this section, we begin by reviewing structured P2P overlays, followed by constraints that make the creation of secure and private P2P overlays difficult, wrapping up with related work.

### A. Structured P2P Systems

Structured P2P systems provide distributed look up services with guaranteed search time in  $O(\log N)$  to  $O(\log_2 N)$  time, in contrast to unstructured systems, which rely on global knowledge/broadcasts, or stochastic techniques such as random walks [4]. Some examples of structured systems can be found in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. In general, structured systems are able to make these guarantees by self-organizing a structured topology such as a 2D ring or a hypercube.

The node ID, drawn from a large address space, must be unique to each peer, otherwise an address collision occurs which can prevent nodes from participating in the overlay. Furthermore, having the node IDs well distributed assist in providing better scalability as many algorithms for selection of shortcuts depend on having node IDs uniformly distributed across the entire address space. A simple mechanism to ensure this is to have each node use a cryptographically strong random number generator. Another mechanism for distributing node IDs involves the use of a trusted third party to generate node IDs and cryptographically sign them [10].

As with unstructured P2P systems, in order for an incoming node to connect with the system it must know of at least one active participant. A list of nodes that are running on public addresses should be maintained and distributed with the application, available through some out-of-band mechanism, or possibly using multicast to find pools [5].

Depending on the protocol, a node must be connected to either the closest neighbor smaller, larger, or both. Optimizations for fault tolerance suggest that it should be between 2 to  $\log(N)$  on both sides. If a peer does not know the address of its immediate predecessor or successor and a message is routed through it destined for them, depending on the message type, it may either be locally consumed or thrown away, never arriving at its appropriate destination. Thus having multiple peers on both sides assist in stabilizing when the experiencing churn, particularly when peers leave without warning.

Overlay shortcuts enable efficient routing in ring-structured P2P systems. The different shortcut selection methods include: maintaining large tables without using connections and only verifying usability when routing messages [5], [8], maintaining a connection with a peer every set distance in the P2P address space [6], or using locations drawn from a harmonic distribution in the node address space [7].

Most structured P2P overlays support the storing of arbitrary information by mapping it to specific node IDs in an overlay. At a minimum, the data is stored at the node ID either smaller or larger to the data's node ID and for fault tolerance the data can be stored at other nodes nearby. This sort of mapping and data storage is called a distributed hash table (DHT) and is a typical component of most structured P2P systems.

### B. Constraints in Structured P2P Systems

1) *Communication Between Nodes*: There are two mechanisms for message passing in a P2P overlay, iterative or recursive. In iterative routing, a peer sending a packet will contact each successive member in a path directly until it find the destination node. At which point, it sends the packet directly to the destination. In recursive routing, messages are sent through the overlay via forwarding from one peer to the next until arriving at the destination. Iterative routing can easily be secured using socket based security concepts such as TLS [11] and DTLS [12], because there is no distinction between PtP and EtE communication. Whereas in recursive routing, EtE communication will be an application primitive and rendering TLS and DTLS not easily applicable.

2) *Private and Secure Overlay Subsets*: Secured ETE does not increase the reliability of a structured overlay. In a free-to-join system, malicious peers can easily intercept packets and throw them away or tamper with them rendering them useless. To deal with this issue, each overlay node participate in a specific, secure EtE session, could maintain a routing table that contains a subset of those involved. The approach would then require that the overlay support what is effectively a second overlay but without an abstraction. Requiring that each node instance maintain multiple routing algorithms, state machines to handle fault tolerance, and a mechanism for using a distributed data store only for the entire pool and this subset.

3) *NATs*: Another issue present in P2P systems is the handling of NATs. In environments where there are NATs, iterative routing can be significantly more difficult to deploy, since each message sent may require multiple NAT traversals. With an added layer of security, iterative routing can easily

be too expensive to deploy. Additionally, TURN or relay style NAT traversal presents issues similar to EtE in recursive routing, where each individual may authenticate itself with the relay, they will not be able to easily use TLS and DTLS to verify each other.

### C. Related Works

BitTorrent [13], a P2P data sharing service, supports stream encryption between peers sharing files. The purpose of BitTorrent security is not to keep messages private but to obfuscate packets to prevent traffic shapping due to packet sniffing, thus BitTorrent security uses a weak stream cipher, RC4, and lacks peer authentication as symmetric keys are exchanged through an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman process.

Hamachi [14] provides central group management and a security infrastructure through a web interface. Their security system has gone through two revisions as documented in [15]. Initially peers learn of each other through Hamachi's central system, which leads to the creation of secure links. In their original approach, they use a system similar to a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which requires that all security sessions initiate through Hamachi's central servers. In the latest version, this model has been retained but with the addition of an external PKI, which avoids the man-in-the-middle attack but with has the additional cost of maintaining both an external CA and certificate revocation list (CRL). Hamachi also supports STUN and TURN style NAT traversal though TURN, again, requires the use of Hamachi's own relay servers. Because Hamachi is closed, it disables users from hosting their own infrastructures including session management and relay servers.

Skype [16] like P2PSIP allows for decentralized audio and video communication, though unlike P2PSIP Skype is well established and has millions of users and is also closed. While Skype does not provide documentation detailing the security of its system, researchers [17], [18] have discovered that Skype supports both EtE and PtP security. Though similar to Hamachi, Skype uses a KDC and does not let users setup their own systems.

The RobotCA [19] provides an automated approach for decentralized PKI. A RobotCA receives request via e-mail, verifies that the sender's e-mail address and embedded PGP key match, signs the request, and mails it back to the sender. RobotCAs are only as secure as the underlying e-mail infrastructure and provide no guarantees about the person beyond their ownership of an e-mail address. A RobotCA does not provide features to limit the signing of certificates nor does it provide user-friendly or intuitive mechanisms for certificate revocation.

[20] proposes the use of a universal overlay as a discovery plane for service overlay. The argument is that as a participant of an overlay, you must support all services provided by that overlay such as multicast, DHT, or distributed search. Our work has the same foundations as this proposal but takes the idea further by using the universal overlay for NAT traversal; the service overlays become limited access, private overlays;

and we have a prototype implementation, which is reflected in our well-defined design.

Distributed data store applications like [2], [3] require that all machines have symmetric connectivity additionally like [21] suggest the use of a third party application to ensure trust amongst all overlay participants. This is an example use case that is explicitly targeted by our system on the presumption that there are not sufficiently easy to use decentralized VPN software applications [?] and even if there were it is undesirable to have additional setup requirements.

### III. BOOTSTRAPPING SECURE AND PRIVATE OVERLAYS

In this section, we explain the individual components of our contribution. We begin by describing how apply a DTLS like protocol for EtE and PtP security in P2P systems, which leads to a discussion of using a group web interface to provide a user-friendly PKI, and conclude with our approach to bootstrapping private and secure overlays in constrained environments using public overlays.

#### A. Secure Overlays

Securing EtE and PtP communication in overlays using iterative routing with servers using static IP addresses can easily be done using TLS or DTLS with certificates bound to the servers static IP address. This approach does not port well to systems that use recursive routing, TLS cannot easily be used because overlay routing is traditionally done through datagrams not streams, which would require overlays to implement a reliable stream to use TLS. Where as DTLS can be applied though it must support being used without a socket. The problem then becomes how to deal with identity. In this section, we discuss how to bind security protocols and a certificate model to an overlay system.

The key to our approach is abstracting the communication layer making EtE and PtP traffic appear identical, thus all messages are datagrams that are sent over abstracted senders and receivers, as illustrated in Figure 1. This allows us to use secure tunnels over these links with no application changes.




Fig. 1

Exchanged certificates need a mechanism to verify authenticity. Like an Internet browser, this verification should happen

automatically with no user intervention. Typically for TLS and DTLS certificates have the web sites IP address or domain name as part of the certificate's common name field. In our system, we bind the certificate to each individual node ID. That way, a single certificate cannot be used for multiple peers in the overlay slowing down potential sybil attacks.

1) *Forming the Connection:* In overlay systems, a peer's connection manager requests to make an outgoing connection to another peer in the system. This triggers the creation of a UDP or TCP socket, which are wrapped in the abstracted sender and receiver models. The abstracted models arrive into the security handler, which authenticates in both directions and create a secure session. The session is wrapped in the same abstracted model and presented to the overlay system as a direct connection to the remote peer. To keep the system abstract, the security model and the wrapped sockets know nothing about the overlay, and so the overlay should verify the certificate to ensure identity.

Because EtE communication is application specific and not run-time, it requires a slightly different path. For that purpose, we have a specific module that allows an application to request a secure EtE sender but will deal with the process of handling verification. Once an application requests the sender, the module passes a sender / receiver model to the security handler, like the PtP process. Once the security initialization has completed, the resulting sender / receiver is verified automatically for proper identity. If that succeeds, messages sent using the EtE sender will arrive at the remote party, decrypted and authenticated by the security handler, and delivered to the overlay application who will deliver to remote party's handler for such messages. Creating one issue, since overlay application will be sending and receiving unencrypted as well as encrypted EtE traffic, the handler must verify that the packet was sent from a secure end point. This assumes that an application using an overlay has already implemented verification of node ID to some application mapping. For example, an application could be aware that node ID X maps to user Y, therefore if a secure message coming from node ID Z says that it is user Y, an application should throw the packet away.

2) *Datagram Constraints:* Since UDP is connectionless, applications that use it can easily be victims of denial of service attacks. This is because, packets sent to the receiver can have a spoofed source address unless the outgoing gateway prevents this from occurring. Whereas with TCP, it would be significantly harder to perform the same attack unless performed as a man-in-the-middle. To reduce the potential of these spoofing attacks prior to establishing a secure connection, DTLS like Photuris [22] uses a stateless cookie for each remote peer. In DTLS, the cookie is usually based upon the remote peers IP and the current time. In our model, which deals with abstracted systems, this approach will not work. Though because we are building on existing senders and receivers that already have state, we can use the objects memory pointer or hash value instead.

Since symmetric keys work on limited block size, they use modes of operation to encrypt or decrypt large sets of blocks. Because DTLS uses an unreliable transfer mechanism, each message should be able to be decrypted without the use of previous messages. As suggested in the DTLS paper, we used cipher-block chaining (CBC) with a new initialization vector (IV) for each message. During analysis, we discovered that generating a truly random IV was expensive but the initialization of an additional CBC state machine was even more. To reduce these costs, the sender always uses the same CBC state machine and prepends the last cipher-block to the beginning of the next message. Upon reception, a receiver compares the prepended message to a cache of CBC state machines stored by the current state, if there is a match, then the CBC state machine can be used, otherwise, if the packet is received out of order the receiver can start a new CBC state machine to decrypt the packet. Table I compares the overhead with the default implementation and with our revised version.

	Latency (ms)	Bandwidth (Mbit/s)
DTLS CBC	0	0
Our CBC	0	0

TABLE I

## B. Group Overlays

To establish trusted links, we use the PKI model, where a centralized CA signs all client certificates and clients can verify each other without CA interaction by using the CA's public certificate. However, setting up, deploying, and then maintaining security credentials can easily become a non-negligible task, especially for non-experts. Most PKI-enabled VPN systems require the use of command-line utilities and the setting up your own methods for securely deploying certificates and policing users. While this can be applied to an overlay, our experience with real deployments indicates that usability is very important, leading us to find a model with easy to user interfaces. In this section, we present our solution, a partially automated PKI reliant on a redistributable group based web interface. Although this does not preclude other methods of CA interaction, our experience has shown that it provides a model that is satisfactory for many use cases.

1) *Joining the Group Overlay:* Membership of an overlay maps a set of users as a group, this led us to the model of using a group infrastructure as a means to apply a PKI. Using our system, a user can host an individual or multiple groups per a web site. The creator of the group becomes the default administrator and users can request access to the group. Upon an administrator approving, users are able to download configuration data containing overlay information and a shared key used by the overlay application to communicate securely with the web interface. The shared key uniquely identifies the user to the web site allowing the application to securely send certificate requests. By default, the web site automatically signs all certificate requests, but the application and web site support different models. Two other models are 1) require

the user to submit a request and wait for an administrator to verify each request and 2) set a maximum amount of automatic request signings and then require the administrator to reset the value upon using all of them.

As stated in Section III-A, the certificate request is bound to the applications node ID, which can be generated by the CA or the application. Additionally in the group system, the certificate also contains the user who made the request and the group for which the certificate is valid. Not only does this ensure that a single certificate can only be used for each node instance, but it reduces the amount of state necessary to revoke a user from a system. Specifically, to revoke a user, the CA would only need to provide a signed revocation notice containing the user's name and not every one of the previously signed certificates.

Upon receiving a signed certificate, the overlay application can connect to the overlay where all PtP traffic will be secured and, optionally, so can EtE traffic. It is imperative that any operations that involve the exchanging of secret information, such as the shared secret, be performed over a secure transport, such as HTTPS, which can be done with no user intervention.

2) *Handling User Revocation*: Unlike decentralized systems that use shared secrets, in which the creator of the overlay becomes powerless to control malicious users, a PKI enables the creator to effectively remove malicious users. The methods that we have incorporated include: use of a user revocation list hosted on the group server, DHT events requesting notification of peer removal from the group, and broadcasting to the entire P2P system the revocation of the peer.

A user revocation list offers an out of band distribution mechanism that can not easily be tampered, whereas communication using the overlay can be hampered by sybil attacks. The revocation list is maintained on the website and updated whenever an administrator removes a user or a user leaves the group, additionally it is updated every 24 so that user can verify that the revocation list is up to date.

Though because the user revocation list requires centralization, users should not query it prior to every communication nor periodically during conversations. As such, the use of the DHT and broadcast assist provide active notification of user revocation. The DHT method allows users to request notification if a peer is revoked from the group. The method for doing this is for the user to place their node ID at the peer's revocation notification key. Whereupon revocation, the CA will query the key for its values and notify all the users of the revocation. Whereas the broadcast mechanism notifies all active peers in the overlay of the revocation.

When the group is securing PtP traffic, the DHT approach does not effectively seal the rogue user from the system until all peers have updated the revocation list. Due to this issue, we do not employ this model in the group overlay. Instead a broadcast will ensure that all peers in the system do know about the revocation. The strength of the DHT approach exists when using a public free-to-join and an application secured by the group, as we did with a VPN in [?].

In Figure 2, we present the cost of revoking a peer in varying sized networks. To evaluate the cost, we estimate that the average size of a revocation is 300 bytes, which includes information such as the user's name, the group, time of revocation, and a signature from the CAs private key. We then evaluate the bandwidth and latency cost using a network modeler that reuses the same code base, i.e. routing tables and routing algorithms, as our structured P2P overlay software. For latency estimation, we apply the MIT King data set [23].




Fig. 2

Another approach would be to use the additional certificate revocation list (CRL) used in most CA systems. The advantage of a CRL and revoking individual certificates is the ability to remove a subset of a user's node, particularly useful in the case that the user was not malicious but that some of their nodes had been tampered or hijacked.

### C. Private Overlays

The main components involved in the starting and maintaining a private overlay are 1) dissemination of the groups security credentials and its name, 2) connecting with and storing data in the public overlay, and 3) discovering and connecting with peers in the private overlay. 1) is taken care of by the group interface as described in Section III-B. For 2), we presume the usage of a structured overlay as described in Section II-A. In this section, we discuss 3), the steps involved in creating and connecting to a private overlay after the user has obtained group information and has connected to a public overlay.

To connect with and create a private overlay, the application does the following steps:

- 1) connects with the public overlay
- 2) queries the public overlay's DHT at the key "private:groupname", where groupname is the GroupVPN's name
- 3) start an instance of the private overlay with the well-known end points being those of the node IDs retrieved from the DHT

- 4) upon forming a link with a member in the private overlay, the node follows the general approach for connecting to overlays

#### IV. APPLICATIONS

#### V. EVALUATION

#### VI. CONCLUSION

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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