Integration of Wi-Fi-Only Devices in 5G Core Networks: Addressing Authentication and Identity Management Challenges

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The Core Problem and Its Significance

The Challenge

Current 3GPP standards don't fully address integrating **Wi-Fi-only devices lacking 5G credentials** into the 5G network, preventing standard 5G authentication.

Impact

A significant hurdle for enterprise/residential environments with many such devices.

Motivation

Solving this is crucial for 5G's success, enabling true **5G-Wi-Fi convergence** and extending 5G benefits (eMBB, mMTC, URLLC) to this vast device ecosystem.

Research Objectives

To address this problem, this research aimed to:

1. **Investigate Secure Authentication:** Design a robust local authentication mechanism.
2. **Develop Device Identity Management:** Propose a method for 5GC to recognize and manage these device connections individually.
3. **Propose an Integrated Solution:** Develop a framework for seamless, secure integration with minimal impact.

State of the Art and The Specific Gap

Non-3GPP Capable Device Types Behind RGs

- **N5GC** have limited 5G capabilities but can authenticate
- **NAUN3** have no 5G capabilities and cannot directly authenticate and are often grouped.

A robust mechanism for **individualized**, **secure authentication** of *credential-less* Wi-Fi-only devices and their subsequent per-device management within the 5GC is the focus of this project.

Framework Concept and Architecture

Overview and Guiding Principles

A *smart* 5G Residential Gateway (5G-RG) capable of mediating the secure integration.

Key Design Principles

- Adaptation logic centralized at the 5G-RG.
- Minimal impact on end-devices and 5GC.



Framework Concept and Architecture

Overall Architecture



Framework Concept and Architecture

Authentication Mechanism

EAP-TLS is used for mutual, certificate-based local authentication.

- NAUN3 Device (**Supplicant**): Holds a client certificate.
- 5G-RG (**Authenticator**/Relay): Uses hostapd to relay EAP messages.
- RADIUS **Authentication Server**: ISP-operated, validates the device's certificate.



Framework Concept and Architecture

Identity Management (PDU Session as Proxy)

After successful EAP-TLS authentication:

1. The 5G-RG requests a **new, dedicated** PDU Session.
2. This PDU Session becomes the **dynamic proxy identity** for the NAUN3.
3. The 5G-RG maintains a **mapping table** with NAUN3 MAC Addresses to PDU Session ID.



Framework Concept and Architecture

Traffic Management and Policy-Based Routing

1. **Packet Marking:** Incoming packets from the NAUN3's MAC are marked.
2. **Policy Routing:** Marked packets are directed to a specific table.
3. **Dedicated Route:** Traffic is routed via to a unique PDU interface.
4. **NAT:** Traffic is then masqueraded using the PDU session's 5GC-assigned IP address.



Testbed, Components, and `interceptor` Logic