CQF Exam One SOLUTIONS

January 2020 Cohort

Instructions

Please review these Solutions. Complete mathematical workings and computation had to be provided to obtain maximum credit. Mathematical techniques appropriate to the given task should have been used.

Solutions provided in the form of correct numerical answers, plots and relevant output. No Excel or code released with this document. 1) To help tracing why/how your computation differs on VaR backtesting, there are two tables which list exact dates of breaches from our computation method. For portfolio computation, we implemented portfolio matrix calculations on a spreadsheet in the relevant Webex. A textbook section with sample code was also distributed.

As a quant, always consider if numbers make sense: sensibility/sanity checks are fundamental to model validation. Optimal allocations can be reconfirmed with Solver/numerical optimiser. VaR $N_{breaches}$ deviating from 1% expected into 4% or even 30% is clearly a signal of wrong result.

Optimal Portfolio Allocation

Portfolio Optimisation Workings

Covariance $\Sigma = diag(\sigma) R diag(\sigma)$, where $diag(\sigma)$ is a diagonal matrix of standard deviations.

Question 1. Efficient Frontier Portfolio: to solve the min variance optimization problem for a target return m formulate the Lagrange function with two multipliers λ_1, λ_2 ,

$$L(\boldsymbol{w}, \lambda_1, \lambda_2) = \frac{1}{2} \boldsymbol{w'} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \boldsymbol{w} + \lambda_1 (\boldsymbol{w'} \boldsymbol{\mu} - m) + \lambda_2 (\boldsymbol{w'} \boldsymbol{1} - 1)$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \boldsymbol{w}} = \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \boldsymbol{w} + \lambda_1 \boldsymbol{\mu} - \lambda_2 \boldsymbol{1} = 0$$
gives $\boldsymbol{w} = \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} (\lambda_1 \boldsymbol{\mu} + \lambda_2 \boldsymbol{1})$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_1} = \boldsymbol{w'} \boldsymbol{\mu} - m = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda_2} = \boldsymbol{w'} \boldsymbol{1} - 1 = 0$$

The required part ends. Three partial derivatives equated to zero give a system of linear

equations as follows:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{\Sigma} & \boldsymbol{\mu} & \mathbf{1} \\ \boldsymbol{\mu}' & 0 & 0 \\ \mathbf{1}' & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{w} \\ \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ m \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
$$\boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{x} = \boldsymbol{b}$$

Solution is obtained using

$$x = A^{-1}b.$$

Inserting the result for allocations into the equations for the multipliers λ_1, λ_2 gives,

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mu' \Sigma^{-1} \mu & \mu' \Sigma^{-1} 1 \\ \mu' \Sigma^{-1} 1 & 1' \Sigma^{-1} 1 \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} m \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Define $A = \mathbf{1}' \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{1}$, $B = \boldsymbol{\mu}' \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{1} = \mathbf{1}' \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\mu}$, and $C = \boldsymbol{\mu}' \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\mu}$, the same as in the Portfolio Optimisation CQF Lecture.

$$\begin{cases} \lambda_1 &= \frac{Am - B}{AC - B^2} \\ \lambda_2 &= \frac{C - Bm}{AC - B^2} \end{cases}$$

Question 2. Tangency Portfolio is one entirely invested in risky assets but does so on the risk-adjusted basis. The original Markowitz thinking did not explicitly consider 'a bank', the ability to borrow and purchase risky assets.

$$\underset{w}{\operatorname{argmax}} \frac{w'\mu - r_f}{\sqrt{w'\Sigma w}} = \frac{\mu_{\Pi} - r_f}{\sigma_{\Pi}}$$
s.t. $w'1 = 1$

Solved in the usual way with the Lagrangian method (derivation was not required). We have provided partial derivatives in the relevant Webex section.

$$L(w,\lambda) = (\boldsymbol{w'\mu} - r_f)(\boldsymbol{w'\Sigma w})^{-\frac{1}{2}} + \lambda(1 - \boldsymbol{w'1})$$

$$w_T = \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\mu} - r\mathbf{1})}{\mathbf{1}'\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\mu} - r\mathbf{1})} \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\mu} - r\mathbf{1})}{B - Ar}$$

Efficient Frontier for the optimisation problem with the risk-free asset (tangency portfolio) is a line, called Capital Market Line. The slope is also a Sharpe Ratio.

$$SR = \frac{\mu_{\Pi} - r_f}{\sigma_{\Pi}}$$
 \Rightarrow $\mu_{\Pi} = r_f + SR \times \sigma_{\Pi}$ is the equation for CML

Computational Summary (January 2020)


		Stressed x1.25	Stressed x1.5
w_A	0.7851	0.8182	0.8762
w_B	0.0539	-0.0094	-0.1461
w_C	0.1336	0.179	0.3257
w_D	0.0275	0.0122	-0.0557
σ_{Π}	0.0584	0.0607	0.0636

While scaling correlation matrix, control for diagonal elements to stay at "1" because they represent correlation of asset to itself.

Increase in correlation is associated with 'risk off' mode of today's markets. Observe that increased correlation leads to less-balanced allocations – even as changes to portfolio risk are minuscule.

Table 1: Tangency Portfolio (the last column gives negative risk premium rhs)


	50bps	$75 \mathrm{bps}$	$100 \mathrm{bps}$	$150 \mathrm{bps}$	$175 \mathrm{bps}$
w_A	0.0168	-0.2533	-0.746	-8.645	8.104
w_B	-0.2294	-0.3289	-0.511	-3.423	2.752
w_C	0.8143	1.0537	1.490	8.490	-6.351
w_D	0.3982	0.5285	0.766	4.578	3.504
μ_{Π}	0.186	0.236	0.326	1.777	-1.299
σ_Π	0.197	0.251	0.351	1.972	1.474



In the presence of bank account/bond asset, the actionable Efficient Frontier is not the concave envelope itself (Markowitz Bullet) but a set of tangent lines (CMLs). When the risk-free rate is above the return on Global Min Variance portfolio, Sharpe Ratio turns negative.

$$r_f > \mu_G$$
 $\mu_G \approx 0.01607$

When risk premium $(\mu_{\Pi} - r_f)$ is negative the Capital Market Line is tangent to the parabola from the bottom (negative slope), and the portfolio is non-feasible. For each additional unit of risk taken, the investor reduces their excess return!



Quesiton 1 also required simulation of Markowitz Bullet, which transpires if randomly generated allocations \boldsymbol{w} are inserted into analytical solution for Min Variance portfolio. It is difficult to generate portfolios that have risk > 20%, which was the maximum asset risk given (Asset D).

B. Backtesting Value at Risk Solutions:

Question 3

- For historical standard deviation method (rolling window of 21 returns), there were 25 breaches out of 1,219 eligible observations to compare VaR_t and r_{10D} forward return. Percentage of VaR_t breaches 2.05%. There were 14 consecutive breaches, and so conditional probability of the next breach 14/25 = 56%.
- For EWMA smoothed variance method, there were 32 breaches out of 1,219 eligible observations. The percentage of VaR breaches was, therefore, 2.63%. There were 17 consecutive breaches, and so conditional probability of the next breach 17/32 = 53.1%.

Some implementations began EWMA computation for the initial 20 days, just as r_{t-1} became available. Those likely to have resulted in 36 breaches and 19 consecutive breaches. That way of computation **incorrectly** assumed $\sigma_{t-1} = 0$. The past volatility is not zero but an unknown quantity due to sample cut.

Better way was to substitute a reasonable value for σ_{t-1} , as many have done for Day 22 to make eligible observations count the same for SD and EWMA methods.

Most implementations applied r_{t-1} but where r_{t-2} was used due to how EWMA equation was given in exam task paper – that was acknowledged.




Figure 1: VaR Backtesting (22D rolling sample (21 was on this exam)). Python matplotlib used.




Figure 2: VaR Backtesting (22D EWMA recursive volatility (21 was on this exam)).

Question 4

$$\begin{split} \text{LVaR} &= \text{VaR} + \Delta_{Liquidity} \\ &= \text{Portfolio Value} \times \left[\underbrace{-\mu + \text{Factor} \times \sigma}_{} + \frac{1}{2} (\mu_{Spread} + \text{Factor} \times \sigma_{Spread}) \right] \end{split}$$

where braced expression is our analytical VaR formula (percentage), and $\Delta_{Liquidity}$ is effectively half VaR of the spread itself.

(a) Technology company example (exact factor value was used, rounded up for presentation)

$$LVaR_{99\%/1D} = 16,000,000 \times [-0.01 + 2.32635 \times 0.03 + \frac{1}{2}(0.0035 + 2.32634787 \times 0.0150)]$$

= \$1,263,809

within that computation, classical VaR contribution 75.7%, and liquidity adjustment contribution 24.3%.

(b) UK Gilts (government bonds) portfolio example (exact factor value was used)

$$LVaR_{99\%/1D} = 40,000,000 \times [2.32635 \times 0.03 + \frac{1}{2}(0.0015)]$$

= £2,821,617

within that computation, classical VaR contribution 98.9%, and liquidity adjustment contribution 1.1%.

(c) if the spread increases to from 15bps 125bps,

$$LVaR_{99\%/1D} = 40,000,000 \times [2.32635 \times 0.03 + \frac{1}{2}(0.0125)]$$

= £3,041,614

within that computation, classical VaR contribution 91.8%, and liquidity adjustment contribution increases to 8.2%.

Question 5. The Basel Framework, can now be found on the website of the Bank for International Settlement in interactive form. https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/index.htm. Study regulation MAR32 Internal models approach: backtesting and P&L attribution test requirements and answer the following:

- (a) Which types of P&L the firm-wide VaR backtesting operates with?
 Answer: these are set in section 32.4 Backtesting requirements, the actual P&L (APL) and hypothetical P&L (HPL). Hypothetical P&L tells how good the bank's modelling of risk factors is that is, if returns from modelled factors predict/correlate well with returns from the actual position P&L.
- (b) What are two key metrics chosen to compare the risk-theoretical P&L (RTPL) and hypothetical P&L (HPL)?

Answer: these are set in section 32.34 on profit and loss attribution test (PLA) intended for a trading desk level: **Spearman correlation** and **Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test**. The statistical metrics chosen for their properties: Spearman is rank correlation (vs linear), and KS test is distribution-independent to compare two samples of returns.

(c) How many exceptions are allowed in a trading desk-level backtesting at 99th percentile before it will be forced to exercise the standardised approach?

Answer: section 32.19 states, If a trading desk experiences either more than **12 exceptions** at the 99th percentile in the most recent 12-month period, the capital requirement must be determined using the standardised approach. The same holds for 30 exceptions at the 97.5th percentile.

Extra on independence of breaches (22 rolling sample).

```
Closing Price
                                    LogReturn
                                                       SD
                     1707.140015
1694.160034
                                    -0.001481
0.002772
     2013-08-05
                                                0.004827 -0.035512
     2013-08-13
                                                0.004000
                                                          -0.029430
250
     2014-01-17
                     1838.699951
                                    -0.003903
                                                0.006135 -0.045130
     2014-01-21
                     1843.800049
                                     0.002770
252
     2014-01-22
                     1844.859985
                                     0.000575
                                                0.005060 -0.037227
                     1987.979980
2011.359985
     2014-07-24
                                     0.000488
                                                0.005203
     2014-09-18
                                     0.004879
                                                0.003625 -0.026665
425
     2014-09-29
                     1977.800049
                                    -0.002550
                                                0.005876 -0.043229
     2014-09-30
                     1972.290039
                                    -0.002790
468
     2014-11-28
                     2067.560059
                                    -0.002546
                                                0.003456 -0.025425
     2014-12-02
                     2066.550049
470
                                     0.006364
                                                0.003880 -0.028546
     2014-12-03
2015-08-07
                     2074.330078
                                    0.003758
-0.002879
                                                0.003214
0.006396
                                                          -0.023642
-0.047051
     2015-08-10
                     2104.179932
                                     0.012727
                                                0.006889 -0.050681
     2015-08-11
                     2084.070068
                                     -0.009603
644
     2015-08-12
                     2086.050049
                                     0.000950
                                                0.006346 -0.046688
     2015-08-13
                     2083.389893
                                     -0.001276
                                                0.006260
     2015-08-14
                     2091.540039
                                                0.006331
                                                          -0.046575
                                     0.003904
     2015-08-17
                     2102.439941
                                     0.005198
                                                0.006183 -0.045484
                     2096.919922
     2015-08-18
                                                0.006189
                                    -0.002629
                                                          -0.045528
     2015-08-19
                     2079.610107
                                    -0.008289
                                                0.006389 -0.046998
1144 2017-08-07
                     2480,909912
                                     0.001646
                                                0.002595 -0.019094
```

Figure 3: Breaches list (22D rolling sample)

	Date	Closing Price	LogReturn	SD	SDEWMA VAR10D
133	2013-08-01	1706.869995	0.012463	0.004805	0.002255 -0.016585
141	2013-08-13	1694.160034	0.002772	0.004000	0.003753 -0.027609
142	2013-08-14	1685.390015	-0.005190	0.004164	0.003506 -0.025793
245	2014-01-10	1842.369995	0.002304	0.005717	0.003560 -0.026187
250	2014-01-17	1838.699951	-0.003903	0.006135	0.006501 -0.047822
251	2014-01-21	1843.800049	0.002770	0.006061	0.005890 -0.043329
252	2014-01-22	1844.859985	0.000575	0.005060	0.005208 -0.038314
418	2014-09-18	2011.359985	0.004879	0.003625	0.004352 -0.032012
468	2014-11-28	2067.560059	-0.002546	0.003456	0.002893 -0.021280
469	2014-12-01	2053.439941	-0.006853	0.003871	0.002800 -0.020597
470	2014-12-02	2066.550049	0.006364	0.003880	0.004335 -0.031891
526	2015-02-24	2115.479980	0.002755	0.008250	0.004262 -0.031351
527	2015-02-25	2113.860107	-0.000766	0.008129	0.003899 -0.028682
529	2015-02-27	2104.500000	-0.002961	0.007531	0.002934 -0.021586
641	2015-08-07	2077.570068	-0.002879	0.006396	0.005519 -0.040598
642	2015-08-10	2104.179932	0.012727	0.006889	0.004924 -0.036226
643	2015-08-11	2084.070068	-0.009603	0.006787	0.007925 -0.058303
644	2015-08-12	2086.050049	0.000950	0.006346	0.008429 -0.062007
646	2015-08-14	2091.540039	0.003904	0.006331	0.006121 -0.045030
647	2015-08-17	2102.439941	0.005198	0.006183	0.005590 -0.041121
648	2015-08-18	2096.919922	-0.002629	0.006189	0.005483 -0.040335
649	2015-08-19	2079.610107	-0.008289	0.006389	0.004856 -0.035722
740	2015-12-29	2078.360107	0.010574	0.011386	0.008802 -0.064752
741	2015-12-30	2063.360107	-0.007243	0.011481	0.009332 -0.068652
742	2015-12-31	2043.939941	-0.009456	0.011607	0.008797 -0.064718
743	2016-01-04	2012.660034	-0.015422	0.011714	0.008987 -0.066112
853	2016-06-10	2096.070068	-0.009218	0.006159	0.003125 -0.022990
908	2016-08-29	2180.379883	0.005214	0.003592	0.002655 -0.019530
912	2016-09-02	2179.979980	0.004192	0.003393	0.002536 -0.018657
1142		2472.159912	-0.002186	0.003452	0.001612 -0.011857
1143		2476.830078	0.001887	0.003458	0.001791 -0.013177
1144	2017-08-07	2480.909912	0.001646	0.002595	0.001819 -0.013379

Figure 4: Breaches list (22D EWMA recursive volatility).

VaR breaches here **not** independent of the level of volatility: underestimation of volatility is not corrected fast, and use of EWMA does not alleviate the problem.

Statistical tests for Normality and autocorrelation are typically applied to such data as regression residuals – D'Agostino K-squared and Shapiro-Wilk are good choices. However, applying them to *returns that caused VaR breaches is non-informative*: the tests suggest non-Normality because of a slight deviation from Normal skewness and kurtosis. The same applies to Q-Q plots. Empirical asset returns will always show as non-normal, whether they have sequences of out-sized asset returns or not.

There is a simple *iid* check with a lag plot: if returns were *iid*, then all observations would remain within a circle.




Figure 5: Examining location-dispersion ellipsoid (u_t plotted vs. u_{t-1}) gives a robust check for *iid*-ness.

However, lag plots and conditional probability of consecutive breach – all are simple tools. Independence of exceedances (VaR breaches) can be analysed using Christoffersen's 1998 Exceedance Independence test and Loss-Quantile Independence test:

• Christoffersen's test relies on classification of breach following non-breach $I_t = 1, I_{t-1} = 0$, and non-breach following breach $I_t = 0, I_{t-1} = 1$ (as well as two other obvious situations). Likelihood Ratio is computed and compared agaist a critical value from χ^2 distribution. For VaR backtesting with historical standard deviation, it was computed,

LR = 87.825, critical value
$$\chi_{95\%}^2 = 3.84$$

the null hypothesis of breach independence rejected strongly.