Read-Ahead Material for New Faces XIV

"Law, Security, and Ethnic Profiling: Italians in the United States During World War II."

Mary Beth Basile Chopas.

The balance between the protection of national security interests and the affording of civil liberties has historically been a challenge in our democratic society and continues to be so today. During times of crisis, the U.S. government has identified particular groups as posing a national security risk based upon constructed profiles of dangerousness. My dissertation examines how agencies of the federal government interacted with one another in creating and enacting various restrictions on Italians residing in the United States during World War II, including selective internment. Through reference to case studies of the Justice Department litigation files for alien enemies and records kept by hearing board members, I argue that there were inconsistencies in the hearings before alien enemy hearing boards which made recommendations of internment. Like non-punitive deportation hearings, in that they did not require the constitutional protections granted alleged criminals, the alien enemy hearings were informal and did not follow evidentiary standards of a criminal trial. The Justice Department's efforts to respond to complaints about the process through a series of remedial instructions to the hearing boards, beginning in February 1942 and continuing through 1943, are the best evidence that the alien enemy hearings could have been uniformly fairer. Unfortunately, for the majority of Italian internees already serving their internment within the first six months of the alien enemy hearing program, the affording of greater due process did not affect the initial determination of internment.

Some of the case studies illustrate the types of defective process that the Justice Department addressed, such as the lack of formal charges against the subjects, while others exhibit the failure of the board to admit available testimony favorable to the subject. In other instances, cultural biases of board members and the political influence of witnesses compromised institutional standards and prevailed over objectively measurable threats, sometimes serving to disadvantage a subject and at other times positively affecting outcomes, such as cases where Italian American hearing board members and government attorneys were involved. Still other cases offer narratives of a more thoughtful process, of hearing boards grappling with the meaning of due process as it pertained to alien enemies and striving for a contextualized adjudicatory process, and the Justice Department carefully reviewing board recommendations. Cases where multiple hearings were held, particularly when individuals were interned longer, not only gave subjects the opportunity eventually to address the government's concerns, but also allowed boards to more thoroughly examine the behavior and mindset of the subjects.

In addition to setting forth discrepancies between what the Justice Department expected hearing boards to do and how they actually functioned, this study reveals the tension between what internees felt was a just process for deciding whether they posed a danger to society and the then-existing legal guarantees for alien enemies. The fact that hearings were provided at all when the law did not require them for nationals of countries at war with the United States indicates a commitment, even in the atmosphere of war, to the democratic ideals of justice.

"Selective Leviathans: Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation – with Evidence from Pakistan."

Sameer Lalwani.

This project seeks to explain why states adopt certain strategies within civil war. Rationalists observe state incumbents often select seemingly "sub-optimal" strategies, either brutal or half-hearted, to combat rebellion. Most of civil war literature ignores state strategy while the counterinsurgency literature is plagued by a Western-model bias that over studies foreign expeditionary forces and neglects domestic incumbents fighting rebellion on their own soil. As a result both these literatures become dislodged from the challenging context of state-building. To correct this bias, my dissertation theorizes a new dependent variable of counterinsurgency strategy, and identifies four values or approaches—attrition, population control, enfeeblement, and co-optation—that encompass a distinct set of military tactics and political objectives, as well as ways to measure them. It then identifies a theory of center-periphery relations based on the value of territory and sub-group identity to explain the conditions under which each strategy will be adopted by a state incumbent.

This paper then tests this theory on a number of observations from Pakistan as well as some preliminary tests of larger, cross-national data. Understanding indigenous incumbents' strategic constraints and incentives is central to explaining the sometimes destabilizing internal actions of insecure states and emerging powers, actions that pose implications for civil conflict dynamics and international relations spillovers.

"Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve."

Danielle Lupton.

Abstract: Can individual leaders develop reputations for resolve independent from the state? Scholars of international relations focus nearly exclusively on how states develop these reputations for resolve. However, recent scholarship questions this state-centric view, indicating that leaders are important actors in international bargaining and crises. My dissertation bridges these two literatures by examining whether leaders may develop their own reputations for resolve. Drawing from cognitive psychology, I argue leaders can develop such reputations of their own as decision-makers will look to leader-based characteristics when making assessments of resolve. I further argue reputations for resolve will be based on a leader's behavior while in office, but will be conditioned by cognitive constraints. Due to the ways in which individual decision-makers seek out and internalize information, early actions will matter more in assessments of resolve, making initial reputations difficult to change. Through experimental surveys and qualitative case studies, I find robust evidence that leaders do develop reputations for resolve independent of their state's reputation. Further, while these reputations can be conditioned by other factors, these effects are inconsistent. These results have strong implications for the study of state conflict behavior and for the relative importance of leaders to international relations.

"When and Why State Project Power."
Jonathan Markowitz.

A century ago, most great powers built power projection capabilities to compete over access to and control over resources and trade. However, since 1945, most of the world's economically powerful states have stopped projecting military force globally. Asia's rapid economic development has increased interdependence while dramatically shifting the distribution of power, overturning the geopolitical chessboard in the region. Fears over a rising China and a declining U.S. have resulted in the distant rumblings of a naval arms race as governments scramble to upgrade their naval forces. Why have some leaders stopped projecting military power around the globe and why do some new powers appear to be starting again? This puzzle motivates my two research questions: 1) when do leaders project power? and 2) why do leaders project power? I argue that domestic political interests and institutions explain why (for what objectives) leaders project power and international geopolitical competition explains when leaders project power. I test my theory of *why* leaders project power with case studies of how leaders reacted to the exogenous exposure of resources in the Arctic, North Sea and the South China Sea. I test my theory on *when* leaders project power using a quantitative analysis of whether leaders build power projection capabilities.

In my presentation at the 2013 New Faces Conference, I discuss my theory and then focus on my study of the Arctic. I look at how different types of leaders reacted to the exogenous exposure of Arctic resources and whether or not they projected power to compete over maritime energy reserves in the region. Leaders' foreign policy choices are examined before and after the shock in 2007, the year that Arctic sea-ice receded dramatically, even more than the most aggressive climate models had predicted. The second half of this chapter focuses on a cross-regional comparison of how leaders reacted to the exposure of resources in the Arctic vs. the North Sea. In the North Sea, rapid advances in offshore drilling technology allowed states to drill for resources in areas
previously believed to be inaccessible. This comparison allows for a test of the theory's predictions regarding how leaders should behave in a region in which leaders have *incompatible* interests (the Arctic) vs. *compatible* interests (the North Sea). Confirming the predictions of the theory, in the Arctic, I find that the liberal leaders (U.S., Canada, and Denmark) project little power, while nonliberal leaders (states that are resource-dependent and/or autocratic, i.e. Norway and Russia) reacted to the shock by projecting power with greater intensity and frequency. The predictions of the theory are also supported in the cross-regional comparison; Arctic leaders projected power while those in the North Sea did not.

"The Determinants of Volatility in Foreign Policy."
Eleonora Mattiacci.

To the casual observer of states' relations, countries like the United States appear to always clearly define other countries as either allies (e.g., Canada) or enemies (Cuba). This neat separation makes it easier to deal with everyday matters such as trade tariffs, because it allows countries to quickly discern whom to sanction and whom to support. There exists, however, a sizable subset of states—India and Pakistan among them—whose relations are more *volatile*, that is, they are characterized by inconsistent shifts between episodes of intense cooperation and episodes of bitter violence. For instance, in January 2011 Pakistan issued a military threat to India to desist from its nuclear program. A mere week later, India forcibly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorist attacks on Indian soil. In April of the same year, the two countries instituted a joint working group to enhance trade ties between them. Yet, at the beginning of May, India started conducting military exercises at the border with Pakistan, causing Pakistan's violent retaliation. *What propels states' relations to be volatile*?

This dissertation investigates the presence of volatility in states' foreign policy, and it offers a theory of its determinants. Specifically, it presents a conceptualization of volatile foreign policy as being characterized by inconsistent shifts between cooperative and conflictual actions, distinguishing volatility from other characteristics of unstable foreign policy—such as the presence of cycles or of positive and negative trends (Chapter I). It demonstrates that understanding volatility is crucial because volatile relations breed violence by increasing states' uncertainty over the likelihood of conflict recurrence, which in turn increases the probability of conflict recurrence (Chapter II). It also shows that volatile relations are pivotal relations, in that volatile dyads are more likely both to be more involved in crises and to share membership of a greater number of International Organizations (Chapter II).
This dissertation advances a theory of volatility that integrates dynamics present both at the domestic and at the international arena: states will be willing to explore cooperative policy options with an opponent when they can negotiate from a position of power. Yet, contrary to common expectations, the presence of multiple institutional constraints will lead to *more*, not less, volatility: when foreign policy-making authority responds to multiple and heterogeneous domestic interests, states will be less likely to establish a coherent foreign policy, because satisfying those domestic interests will often require to engage in a diverse set of activities. Thus, the interaction between heterogeneous domestic institutions and the power position in the international system will make states more subject to volatile behavior (Chapter III). I test this theory of volatility complementing existing event datasets with originally collected event data on the foreign policy interactions of rivals for the years 1948–2009. I then build an index *I* of institutions' heterogeneity, to measure the degree to which the foreign policy of a country is the reflection of an heterogeneous set of multiple domestic interests (Chapter IV). Finally, I set to analyze the impact of volatile relations on a recent episode of foreign policy: the developments of the "Six Party Talks," the ongoing negotiations between South Korea, North Korea, China, US, Russia and Japan over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities on the part of North Korea (Chapter V).

To investigate volatility in the international arena, this dissertation utilizes a number of diverse methodological tools: the definition of the concept of volatility is obtained through concept formation analysis (Chapter I); the impact of volatile behavior on uncertainty is tested with a heteroskedastic probit model, and the pivotal role of volatile relations is assessed through a bivariate probit (Chapter II); the identification of volatility in the relations between states is obtained through the Box-Jenkins analysis of the time series of foreign policy interactions; the theory of volatility is tested with panel data models—such as the Arellano-Bond specification of dynamic models, as well as panel data models with fixed effects, random effects and panel corrected standard errors. Finally, I set to analyze the impact of volatile relations in the case of North Korea's nuclear weapons acquisition process applying a longitudinal social network analysis perspective on the interactions between the parties to the "Six-Party Talks" through Temporal ERGMs (TERGMs) and SIENA models.

"Progressives in Navy Blue: U.S. Naval Professionalization and the Birth of a New Strategic Paradigm, 1873-1923"

Scott Mobley.

My dissertation traces how intellectual and institutional developments within the U.S. Navy forged new concepts of strategy, strategy-making, and strategic culture between 1873 and 1923. Within this context of strategical transformation, I also examine how the progressive movement influenced naval officers.

Traditionally, strategy was treated by naval officers as an ancillary discipline—a skill set practiced during wartime, but largely neglected when peace prevailed. However, during the 1870s a new "strategic consciousness" emerged as part of a larger professionalizing project instigated by a small but energetic group of progressive naval reformers. Supported by civilian navalists, these reformers established new institutions which incubated fresh approaches to maritime strategy and strategy-making.

The strategic metamorphosis was not a smooth process, as contending forces vied to control the navy's future. Both "old guard" conservatism and a strong inclination to measure "real" progress in technical terms shaped alternative cultures of advocacy which contested the strategical agenda. Following several decades of "churn" the new ideas and practices of strategy ultimately permeated U.S. naval culture, transformed its professional identity, and fundamentally reordered the navy's organization and force structure. As the twentieth century unfolded, the new strategy-centered navy exercised unprecedented influence on U.S. foreign policy and civil-military relations.

My presentation at the 2013 New Faces Conference highlights important aspects of my dissertation research. Entitled **"A Peculiar Beginning: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Birth of a New Strategic Paradigm, 1869-1889,"** my conference essay links the nascent Office of Naval Intelligence to a "strategical awakening" within the U.S. Navy following the Civil War. Within this context, I address the historical forces and personalities behind ONI's founding, and its pivotal role as the nation's first dedicated strategic institution.

"**Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression and the Enforcement of Political Order." Oliver Murphey.**

This study examines attempts by authorities to undermine overt collective challenges by targeting activities that precede and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and resistance develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests confirm that 1) government forces anticipate challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely on to initiate and sustain overt collective challenges; and 2) that the use of repression to undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., highly transformative) mobilization. Implications are drawn for how we understand and study political conflict and order.

[See attached paper]

"Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order."

Christopher Sullivan.

My dissertation examines the use of political repression in Guatemala from 1975-1985. Three intricately related questions are investigated: why do governments repress their citizens; what impact does repression have on citizen decisions to engage in dissent; and when does repression end. The project develops a novel theory of government repression that focuses specifically on attempts by authorities to undermine overt collective challenges, such as protest or terrorism, by targeting activities that precede and/or support such behavior. While it is often suggested that one of the key reasons that challenges are not observed in a particular situation is because expectations of repression prevent dissidents from organizing, existing theory provides few details on how governments might anticipate the development of overt collective challenges or how they attempt to undermine this behavior. What this project argues is that governments are able to subvert the development of challenges by applying repression against mobilization (i.e., forming and supporting an opposition organization from which overt collective challenges can be initiated and sustained). Governments do not attempt to address all challengers but focus their efforts on those mobilizing in support of highly transformative redistributions of political power. Indeed, repressing radical mobilization is actually more effective for governments than repressing challenges because it undercuts the organizations that support and sustain collective challenges. As a result, repression does not end once overt challenges have been eliminated, but persists until the government has eliminated all forms of mobilization that support of radical redistributions of political or economic power.

The investigation provides empirical evidence to support these claims by analyzing new data collected from the confidential records of Guatemalan National Police. During most of the 20th century, the Guatemalan National Police employed a central depository to store the records produced by the inner workings of their bureaucracy (e.g., memos passed up and down the chain of command, arrest records, log files summarizing daily activity, and investigative reports produced by local divisions, the central command, or other specialized units). This warehouse and the millions of documents it contains were abandoned in 1996 and lingered for approximately ten years before being discovered and archived into newly formed *Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional (AHPN).*

This archive provides unprecedented details on both the myriad of covert mobilization as well as overt collective activities engaged in by challengers and the spectrum of repressive behavior employed by the government. The digitization and archiving processes have recently been completed, and this study is one of the first to have been granted access. During my field research at the AHPN, I constructed an events database of political behavior participated in by mobilizers and challengers as well as all forms of repressive behavior directed at such groups. In total, the project coded more than seven thousand acts of state and dissident behavior. Analysis of the police data reveals how government forces employ coercion to subvert challenges by directing repression against radical mobilization.

My paper at the 2013 New Faces Conference examines attempts by authorities to undermine overt collective challenges, such as riots, protests, and acts of terror, by targeting activities that precede and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and resistance develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests demonstrate that 1) government forces anticipate challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely on to initiate and sustain overt collective challenges; and 2) that the use of repression to undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., highly transformative) mobilization. Implications are drawn for how we understand and study political conflict and order.