

Corruption and Cooptation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Supplementary Appendix

David Szakonyi
George Washington University

November 14, 2023

Contents

A Descriptive Statistics	APP-1
B Data Construction: Hidden Assets and Income	APP-5
C Robustness Checks: Shirking	APP-14
D Robustness Checks: Varying Kompromat Measures and Standard Errors	APP-19
E Robustness Checks: Subsets and Interactions	APP-23
F Robustness Checks: Mechanisms and Re-election	APP-27

A Descriptive Statistics

TABLE A1: LITERATURE ON RETURNS TO PUBLIC OFFICE

Paper	Country	Government	Office Type	Data	Years
Mahzab (2020)	Bangladesh	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2009-2020
Cunha (2019)	Brazil	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2008-2016
Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)	Finland	National and local	Elected	Disclosures	1970-2008
Peichl, Pestel, and Sieglösch (2013)	Germany	National	Elected	Disclosures	2005-2009
Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2012)	India	State	Elected	Disclosures	2003-2012
Olejnik (2020)	Poland	State	Elected	Disclosures	2010-2018
Klašnja (2015)	Romania	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2008-2012
Jung (2020)	South Korea	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2016
Berg (2020)	Sweden	Local	Elected	Household data	1991-2006
Eggers and Hainmueller (2009)	UK	National	Elected	Estate records	1950-1970
Querubin and Snyder Jr (2013)	USA	National	Elected	Census records	1850-1880
Lenz and Lim (2009)	USA	National	Elected	Disclosures	1995-2005
Fahey (2018)	USA	State	Elected	Disclosures	1995-2014
Eggers and Hainmueller (2014)	USA	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2008

Notes: This table lists literature on the returns to public office, either analyzed as an outcome variable or analyzed as a predictor of other policy outcomes.

TABLE A2: REQUIRED INFORMATION IN RUSSIAN DISCLOSURES

Type of Asset or Income	Description	What Information is Made Public?
Income	Broken out by source: employment, investment, etc.	Total income
Expenses	Both assets and source of income used to purchase	
Real Properties	Type, address, square meters, leased or owned	Type, square meters, country location, leased or owned
Transportation	Make/model and registered location	Make/model
Bank Accounts	Currency, balance, flows	
Company Shares	Equity name, address, share	
Short-term Liabilities	Creditor, term, balance	
Sales of Real Property and Transportation	Buyer(s)	

FIGURE A1: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, ORIGINAL RUSSIAN

Фамилия и инициалы лица, чьи сведения размещаются	Должность	Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в собственности				Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в пользовании			Транспортные средства (вид, марка)	Декларированный годовой доход (руб.)
		вид объекта	вид собственности	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения	вид объекта	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения		
ОСАДЧИЙ Николай Иванович	член комитета Государственной Думы					квартира	80,10	Россия		9581810,44
						квартира	107,21	Россия		
супруга		квартира	индивидуальная	107,21	Россия	квартира	80,10	Россия	автомобили легковые: ТОЙОТА RAV- 4	412875,03
		квартира	индивидуальная	52,30	Россия					
		гаражный бокс	индивидуальная	20,90	Россия					

Note: This figure gives a original version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

FIGURE A2: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

Last Name, First Name, Patronymic	Position	Real Estate Ownership				Real Estate in Use			Transportation Assets (make, model)	Declared income
		Type of Property	Ownership	Sq. meters	Country	Type of Property	Sq. meters	Country		
OSADCHY Nikolay Ivanovich	Committee member, State Duma					apartment	80,10	Russia		9581810,44
						apartment	107,21	Russia		
spouse		apartment	individual	107,21	Russia	apartment	80,10	Russia	passenger car: TOYOTA RAV- 4	412875,03
		apartment	individual	52,30	Russia					
		garage box	individual	20,90	Russia					

Note: This figure gives a translated version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

TABLE A3: DEPUTIES UNDER INVESTIGATION

Deputy	Year Indicted	Party	Crime	Found guilty?	Punishment
Vladimir Bessonov	2012	Communist Party	Use of violence against a public official causing minor injury to health	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years in a minimum security penal colony
Gennady Gudkov	2012	Just Russia	Illegal entrepreneurial activity	No	
Konstantin Shirshov	2012	Communist Party	Attempted fraud	Yes	5 years in a minimum security penal colony
Oleg Miheev	2013	Just Russia	Large scale fraud and obstruction of justice	On the run	
Aleksey Mitrofanov	2014	Just Russia	Large scale fraud committed by an organized group	On the run	
Nikolay Parshin	2014	Communist Party	Fraud committed by a group of persons	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years of imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 roubles
Ilya Ponomarev	2015	Just Russia	Aiding and abetting embezzlement	On the run	
Vadim Belousov	2018	United Russia	Bribe-taking by an organized group	Yes	10 years in a strict regime penal colony
Nikolay Gerasimenko	2019	United Russia	Violation of traffic rules resulting in significant harm to victims	Yes	Deprived of the right to drive a vehicle for 1 year and six months
Valery Rashkin	2021	Communist Party	Illegal hunting	Yes	3 years suspended sentence with 2 years probation

Note: This table lists the 10 deputies who served during the analysis period (2010-2021) and were deprived of their parliamentary immunity in order to face criminal investigations.

TABLE A4: CHANGES TO FEDERAL DISCLOSURES POLICIES OVER TIME

Date	Policy Change
May 2009	All ministers, Federation Council members, and Duma deputies as well as an array of other federal and regional officials are now required to publicly report data on the entirety of their incomes and assets.
January 2010	A condensed version of the income and asset disclosures for each official must be made available on the government website for the agency or institution where they work.
January 2011	President Medvedev orders the Tax Service and Prosecutors Office to check all disclosures previously collected over the past two years within three months.
November 2011	Punishments for failing to submit disclosures or reporting inaccurate information are strengthened.
April 2012	The leadership of the Central Bank, Pension Fund, Fund for Social Insurance, and many state-owned companies are now required to report their incomes and assets for themselves and their families. More leaders of state-owner companies are then required to report the next year.
January 2013	All officials are now required to report their large expenditures, in addition to their income and assets. This includes any land plots, real estate, cars, equities, or other financial instruments if the acquisition exceeded their income for the previous three years.
August 2013	Officials can no longer have any foreign bank accounts.
November 2015	Officials can be removed from their position if they do not submit their disclosures on time. Prior to this no punishment mechanism was in place. Also all deputies served on a part-time basis in regional and municipal legislatures are now required to report.
July 2019	Punishments for municipal deputies that submit inaccurate disclosures are weakened. Prior these individuals could be removed from their positions, but now a warning is considered sufficient punishment.
April 2022	A new information service Poseidon is set up to centralize the collection and analysis of disclosures within the federal government
December 2022	Regional and municipal deputies serving on a part-time basis are no longer required to submit complete disclosures, but only have to report about large purchases.
February 2023	Duma deputies and Federation Council members no longer have to publicly declare income and assets. Although they still will report them to authorities, the only information made public will be in generalized form.

Note: This table lists the major changes in disclosures law since 2009. Dates in some cases are approximate since they are based on media reporting of changes in enforcement or coverage.

B Data Construction: Hidden Assets and Income

The first red flag looks at assets that were not reported by deputies in their disclosures. To verify the disclosures data (as well as uncover unreported luxury cars), I first used a list of 129 million 17-digit vehicle identification numbers (VIN) registered in Russia that was leaked online from the Russian traffic agency in May 2020. The unknown leaker claimed the dataset covered approximately 95% of the entire car registration database for the country; several journalists analyzed random samples and confirmed its accuracy.¹ Importantly, this dataset only contains information on car registration numbers and characteristics, rather than owners.

To learn about car ownership, I ran each VIN number through the online portal of the Russian Union of Auto Insurers which allows drivers and government agencies to check the validity of their insurance, for example after car accidents or other traffic disputes. These insurance records include information from nearly every insurance company active in Russia. Because insurance is mandatory, this dataset covers the driver and owner of the vast majority of vehicles driven in Russia.² Any person can enter a VIN number and date of interest into the portal, and receive back partially anonymized information about the name of the owner, the person(s) insured to drive it, the insurance provider, policy number, and location of registration (region).³

Separate queries for each VIN were run using December 31 of each year from 2011-2019 to see ownership over time. Because of the significant costs of running these queries, I limited the analysis to just the 19 luxury brands included in the list from the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (covering 2,742,113 unique VIN numbers); hiding luxury, rather than economy, cars should be a stronger indicator of corruption.⁴ For example, accessing ownership data on all makes and models of cars in Russia would cost over \$1 million, an impossible sum for social science researchers. I also identified any cars that deputies owned using leaked data on 43 million entries of car ownership from 2010-2020 from the Moscow and Moscow

¹Kinyakina, and Yekatyerina Angyelina Kryechyeva “V otkritom dostoope okazalas’ baza dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev” *Vedomosti*, May 14, 2020. Lenta.Ru “Bazoo dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev vistavili na prodazhoo v darknyetye” *Lenta.ru*, May 15, 2020.

²Stepanov, Dmitriy. “V Rossii zarabotala infosistyema avtostrahovshnikov, pyeryepisannaya za 2 milliarda «s noolya»” *cnews.ru*, June 29, 2020

³Owners are partially anonymized in that the only the first name, middle name (patronymic), first letter of the last name, and the full birthdate are given. Matching even without the complete last name data is not introducing significant noise into the corruption measure. This issue should not cause issues for the measurement since individuals (as defined by unique values across these variables) only own on average only 1.43 luxury cars from 2011-2019.

⁴The brands are Aston Martin, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Cadillac, Ferrari, Genesis, Hummer, Infiniti, Jaguar, Lamborghini, Land Rover, Lexus, Lincoln, Maybach, Maserati, Mercedes, Porsche, Rolls Royce, and Volvo.

Oblast GIBDD⁵. As a validation check, I was able to locate 81.2% of deputies' reported cars in either the insurance or the GIBDD data, a positive sign that together these two leaked datasets have strong coverage of the automobile market in Russia.

For the second red flag, I calculated the ratio of total income earned by a deputy and his or her family each year to the total imputed market value of disclosed cars, using the methodology outlined in the main text. One concern with using this approach to identify illicit income is that deputies may be able to obtain car loans to finance their luxury car purchases. The red flag would then be mischaracterizing deputies with such access to finance as having kompromat. According to the Russian website Autostat.ru, indeed roughly one-third of Russian car buyers used a loan to finance their vehicle purchases from 2010-2021.⁶

To address this concern, I collected data on whether car buyers used a loan using publicly available information. One all-too-common problem on the used car market in Russia happens when a buyer purchases a vehicle, only to later learn that there is still an outstanding loan on the car or that the car is being used as collateral for another loan. Sellers often hide information about the outstanding loan and accept the money for the vehicle without paying it off, leaving buyers to deal with the financial institution which wants to be paid back. There are many stories in media covering this common type of fraud and types of civil cases that banks initiate against both past and current owners to get repaid.⁷ In response, dozens of online services in Russia allow potential car buyers to check the histories of their vehicles to ensure there are no outstanding loans.

In 2017, the Russian government set up a publicly available "Register of Collateral of Transportation Assets". Like the insurance register used to identify car drivers, this service allows anyone to freely inquire whether a vehicle is being used as collateral (either because of an initial loan to purchase it or because a 'personal car loan' being taken out on it where the owner receives cash). Banks enter information about both types of loans immediately, and the register allows any user to query based on the name and birthdate of any individual to inquire about their car-related credit history, with data going back to January 2013.

To detect whether deputies were buying cars using loans, I queried this collateral register for each of the 1,034 individual deputies using their full name and birthdate. In all, just 8 deputies purchased a car from

⁵GIBDD translates to the 'General Administration for Traffic Safety' and is the equivalent to the Department of Motor Vehicles in the US.

⁶Autostat "Skolko avtomobiley rossiyane pokupayut v kredit?", October 21, 2020

⁷Natalya Kozlova "VS RF: Chto delat, yesli kuplennaya mashina okazalas v zaloge" *Rossisskaya Gazeta*, August 11, 2019; Anastasia Manukhina. "Kak proverit avto na zalog: vse vozmozhnyye sposoby i instruktsii", *Autonews* November 10, 2021; Igor Telezhkin, "Kupil mashinu, a yeye zabirayet bank kak zalog. Chto delat vladeltsu avto — otvechayet yurist" *59.ru* September 11, 2021.

2013 to 2021 using a car loan. Importantly we see that the banks listed on the entries include “Toyota Bank” and “Mercedes Benz Bank Rus”, indicating that these buyers obtained their loans directly from the dealer. In addition, the VIN (car identification) numbers listed match to the data from the disclosures. Given their cash on hand, deputies do not appear to be using car loans as frequently as the general public. I have updated all the results in the paper to include an indicator for whether a deputy ever took out a loan to buy a car. In Appendix Table D4, I also adopt a more conservative approach of removing the kompromat designation from any deputies who ever used a loan to buy a car (even if it was in relation to just one of the multiple cars owned). Finally, as an additional check, I include a control for the number of real estate assets owned, which presumably would be used as collateral for any car loans. The results are robust to all of these steps.


Second, car loans in Russia, like in many Western countries, are on average of a duration of three years. Therefore, even if the collateral-based measure above was missing some financing arrangements, we should expect deputy income to be sufficient over the course of those three years to fully pay off the cars purchased. The measure of kompromat used in the paper looks at the average ratio of income to car valuations over a deputy’s years in office, with those having average car values greater than their average income receiving a red flag. Take an example of deputy earning the equivalent of \$100,000 in 2014. If she was to buy a car worth the same amount that year using a three-year loan at a 12% interest rate and 10% down payment, she would owe a total of \$117,614.36 over the three years, or just under 40% of her annual salary of \$100,000 each of those years. It is very unclear whether banks would even lend based on that debt to income ratio. In addition, I account for salary raises by looking at the ratio of income over car values over an entire term, and flag deputies that on average drive cars that are more expensive than the money they earned every year. Given the lending example above, that threshold may even seem conservative. I also show in Appendix Table

TABLE B1: TOP 15 MOST COMMON CAR MAKES OWNED BY DEPUTIES

Make	Num. Cars	Mean Price (Rub)	Mean Price (USD)
Mercedes-Benz	591	4,564,839	70,228
Toyota	352	4,182,133	64,341
Lexus	218	5,114,164	78,679
BMW	198	3,275,173	50,387
Audi	118	3,106,638	47,794
Volkswagen	99	2,260,263	34,773
VAZ	99	431,895.5	6,645
Land Rover	90	4,879,530	75,070
Nissan	81	1,767,380	27,190
Porsche	74	4,743,235	72,973
GAZ	70	667,974.6	10,277
Mitsubishi	57	2,253,686	34,672
Hyundai	53	1,713,944	26,368
Volvo	48	3,224,480	49,607
Chevrolet	39	2,292,166	35,264


Note: This table shows the 15 most common car makes (manufacturers) owned by deputies from 2010-2021. Mean price is calculated using the methodology described in [Braguinsky, Mityakov, and Liscovich \(2014\)](#), with prices shown in rubles and dollars (at an exchange rate of 65 rubles per dollar). Where manufacture year is missing, I assumed that the manufacture year was three years prior to the first year the car appeared on a disclosure. Beyond the car makes shown here, deputies declared 21 Bentleys, 14 Jaguars, 5 Maybachs, and 2 Ferraris.

FIGURE B1: MEAN DEPUTY HOUSEHOLD INCOME OVER TIME BY PARTY



Note: This figure plots the mean total deputy household income broken out by party over time. All income has been converted to thousands of USD using annual ruble-dollar exchange rates from the OECD. Convocations are distinguished by the dotted lines.

FIGURE B2: HIDDEN WEALTH RED FLAGS OVER TIME



Note: This figure plots the percentage of deputies that either had undeclared cars or had an hidden earnings ratio of above 1 during their time in office. Convocations are distinguished by the dotted lines.

TABLE B2: PREDICTORS OF CORRUPTION MEASURE

	Kompromat Deputy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	1.59*** (0.368)	1.33*** (0.380)		2.98*** (0.445)	2.79*** (0.455)	
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.008 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
Age (log)	-0.274*** (0.071)	-0.229*** (0.076)	-0.222*** (0.076)	-0.295*** (0.070)	-0.264*** (0.075)	-0.259*** (0.075)
Died in Office	-0.069 (0.093)	-0.065 (0.092)	0.0001 (0.087)	-0.091 (0.128)	-0.097 (0.129)	-0.018 (0.110)
Female	-0.118*** (0.033)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.121*** (0.034)	-0.104*** (0.034)	-0.107*** (0.034)	-0.107*** (0.034)
Attended Top University	-0.035 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.032 (0.041)
Committee Leader	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.056** (0.024)	-0.064*** (0.024)	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.050** (0.024)	-0.055** (0.024)
Fraction Chair	0.010 (0.064)	0.012 (0.064)	0.018 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.065)	0.0008 (0.065)
SMD Deputy	-0.099*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.027)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.081*** (0.027)	-0.091*** (0.027)	-0.041 (0.034)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.029)	0.032 (0.035)	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)	0.059 (0.043)
Celebrity	0.063 (0.061)	0.061 (0.062)	0.069 (0.062)	0.083 (0.060)	0.081 (0.061)	0.085 (0.061)
Significant Business Interests	0.020 (0.036)	0.014 (0.037)	0.015 (0.036)	0.071* (0.038)	0.066* (0.038)	0.062* (0.038)
Health Care	-0.181*** (0.043)	-0.187*** (0.044)	-0.155*** (0.047)	-0.196*** (0.047)	-0.206*** (0.049)	-0.172*** (0.051)
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.043 (0.103)	0.047 (0.102)	0.037 (0.099)	0.003 (0.105)	0.005 (0.104)	0.003 (0.102)
Civil Society	-0.071 (0.053)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.045 (0.053)	-0.096* (0.054)	-0.095* (0.055)	-0.079 (0.055)
Education	-0.019 (0.060)	-0.016 (0.061)	-0.011 (0.060)	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.059)	-0.046 (0.059)
Government	0.007 (0.038)	0.003 (0.039)	0.015 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.039)	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.039)
Blue Collar Worker	-0.155 (0.098)	-0.170* (0.099)	-0.145 (0.098)	-0.163 (0.104)	-0.183* (0.105)	-0.164 (0.104)
Member: United Russia		0.051 (0.046)	0.047 (0.046)		0.065 (0.047)	0.062 (0.047)
Member: Communist Party		-0.022 (0.058)	-0.016 (0.058)		0.001 (0.060)	0.010 (0.060)
Member: LDPR		0.114 (0.071)	0.133* (0.071)		0.103 (0.071)	0.112 (0.071)
Change in Income Over Term				-0.004 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.011)
Deputy Income, First Year (log)				-0.083*** (0.011)	-0.083*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.011)
R ²	0.053	0.059	0.073	0.094	0.099	0.109
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,325	1,325	1,325
Convocation fixed effects			✓			✓


Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table analyzes the predictors of being flagged as a kompromat deputy based on either of the two red flags. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models use OLS with standard errors are clustered on the deputy level.

TABLE B3: BALANCE TABLE

Kompromat Deputy:	No	Yes		
	Mean	Mean	Difference	
Age (log)	3.947	3.882	-0.065	*
Member: United Russia	0.660	0.641	-0.019	
Member: Communist Party	0.154	0.107	-0.047	
Member: LDPR	0.088	0.172	0.084	*
Member: Just Russia	0.097	0.080	-0.018	
Attended Top University	0.150	0.138	-0.012	
Died in Office	0.011	0.006	-0.005	
Female	0.170	0.074	-0.096	*
Committee Leader	0.389	0.319	-0.070	*
Fraction Chair	0.051	0.061	0.010	
SMD Deputy	0.184	0.101	-0.083	*
Years in Office	5.806	5.804	-0.002	
Celebrity	0.071	0.083	0.012	
Significant Business Interests	0.331	0.390	0.059	
Health Care	0.013	0.000	-0.013	
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.014	0.015	0.002	
Civil Society	0.071	0.049	-0.022	
Education	0.046	0.040	-0.006	
Government	0.702	0.721	0.019	
Blue Collar Worker	0.009	0.003	-0.006	

Note: * $p < 0.05$. This table shows the means and differences in means for deputy covariates based on whether they were coded as a 'kompromat deputy' or not.

FIGURE B3: DEPUTY IDEAL POINTS BY PARTY AND CONVOCATION



Note: This figure plots the ideal points for deputy-convocations in the analysis database, using the United Russia fraction leader as the reference point. Each color represents members of the four political parties with representation during 2010-2021, which random noise introduced across the x-axis to better illustrate variation. Greater scores indicate closer voting affinity with United Russia leadership.

C Robustness Checks: Shirking

TABLE C1: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, PARTY HETEROGENEITY

	Absenteeism (all)		Bills (ihs)		Questions (ihs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Kompromat Deputy	0.222 (0.333)	2.39** (1.00)	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.165 (0.109)	-0.155 (0.173)	-0.146 (0.219)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.158 (0.259)	0.478 (0.759)	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.066)	-0.176 (0.109)	-0.162 (0.175)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.188 (1.76)		-0.053 (0.084)		-0.391 (0.699)	
Age (log)	-0.505 (0.694)	-1.16 (2.42)	-0.051 (0.065)	-0.317 (0.242)	0.154 (0.304)	-0.436 (0.455)
Died in Office	9.99** (3.99)	6.57* (3.51)	0.092 (0.143)	-0.375** (0.168)	-0.925** (0.362)	-0.356 (0.799)
Female	-0.902*** (0.341)	-0.757 (1.29)	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.199 (0.151)	0.202 (0.144)	0.503 (0.311)
Attended Top University	0.131 (0.439)	2.37** (1.11)	0.051 (0.066)	0.110 (0.108)	0.377* (0.203)	-0.068 (0.256)
Committee Leader	-0.607** (0.256)	-0.309 (0.942)	0.063** (0.032)	0.129 (0.082)	1.09*** (0.120)	0.254 (0.184)
Fraction Chair	-2.05*** (0.579)	-2.83** (1.33)	0.025 (0.095)	0.322* (0.176)	0.820** (0.357)	1.50*** (0.300)
SMD Deputy	1.70** (0.708)	-2.96 (2.10)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.131 (0.218)	0.051 (0.174)	0.623** (0.267)
Years in Office	0.246*** (0.054)	0.114 (0.095)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.009 (0.023)
Number of Votes (log)	0.190 (0.654)	-1.36 (1.32)	-0.089* (0.048)	0.104* (0.061)	1.09*** (0.149)	0.800*** (0.136)
Celebrity	1.18* (0.638)	3.24* (1.87)	0.033 (0.072)	0.039 (0.146)	-0.976*** (0.238)	-0.393 (0.402)
Significant Business Interests	0.137 (0.362)	2.82** (1.13)	0.033 (0.039)	0.056 (0.132)	-0.623*** (0.167)	-0.773*** (0.267)
Member: Communist Party		4.51*** (1.10)		-0.105 (0.105)		-0.303 (0.278)
Member: LDPR		14.2*** (1.15)		0.162 (0.135)		0.151 (0.298)
R ²	0.319	0.400	0.035	0.129	0.240	0.221
Observations	927	487	927	487	927	487
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	-1.11	2.17	-19.6	-6.46	1.44	2.85
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation, subset by whether the deputy is the member of the ruling party United Russia (odd columns) or a systemic opposition party (even columns). Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the weighted number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 5 and 6 measure the number of questions asked during debates. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE C2: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, UNTRANSFORMED OUTCOMES

	Bills (alone)		Questions		Bills (alone, log)		Questions (log)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.187 (0.120)	-0.182 (0.120)	-19.7** (8.22)	-18.9** (8.55)	-0.060* (0.034)	-0.060* (0.034)	-0.234* (0.129)	-0.181 (0.123)
Family Real Estate Assets (iht)	-0.070 (0.077)	-0.088 (0.079)	-15.3*** (5.33)	-14.5** (5.94)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.255*** (0.085)	-0.179** (0.085)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.218 (0.134)	-0.225 (0.141)	12.3 (40.4)	16.3 (39.5)	-0.082 (0.076)	-0.083 (0.071)	-0.252 (0.720)	-0.193 (0.675)
Age (log)	-0.289 (0.202)	-0.354 (0.216)	39.6** (17.5)	5.63 (17.2)	-0.104* (0.062)	-0.135** (0.068)	0.386 (0.244)	0.027 (0.229)
Member: United Russia	-0.711*** (0.211)	-0.637*** (0.208)	-60.0*** (15.4)	-38.4*** (13.0)	-0.281*** (0.062)	-0.250*** (0.060)	-0.897*** (0.194)	-0.754*** (0.176)
Member: Communist Party	-0.428* (0.231)	-0.343 (0.225)	4.34 (25.8)	19.3 (25.2)	-0.137* (0.073)	-0.109 (0.071)	-0.287 (0.256)	-0.253 (0.234)
Member: LDPR	0.729* (0.428)	0.768* (0.422)	18.7 (26.1)	34.9 (24.4)	0.128 (0.104)	0.145 (0.102)	0.080 (0.260)	0.234 (0.242)
Died in Office	-0.126 (0.157)	-0.092 (0.206)	-54.9*** (18.2)	-50.8*** (17.1)	-0.018 (0.088)	-0.024 (0.100)	-1.30*** (0.410)	-0.798** (0.349)
Female	-0.276*** (0.091)	-0.263*** (0.091)	-1.99 (9.33)	-2.17 (9.12)	-0.092*** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.035)	0.362*** (0.127)	0.242** (0.121)
Attended Top University	0.137 (0.153)	0.122 (0.154)	5.04 (13.3)	2.13 (12.2)	0.060 (0.048)	0.054 (0.048)	0.241 (0.158)	0.188 (0.148)
Committee Leader		0.306*** (0.096)		28.3*** (7.96)		0.076*** (0.027)		0.697*** (0.093)
Fraction Chair		0.367 (0.268)		120.3*** (33.4)		0.155* (0.085)		1.14*** (0.208)
SMD Deputy		-0.060 (0.119)		2.40 (10.4)		-0.020 (0.041)		0.171 (0.135)
Years in Office		-0.009 (0.011)		1.92** (0.940)		-0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.012)
Number of Votes (log)		0.168* (0.099)		33.9*** (5.60)		0.029 (0.033)		0.790*** (0.094)
Celebrity		0.063 (0.128)		-40.2*** (15.0)		0.025 (0.052)		-0.729*** (0.181)
Significant Business Interests		0.180 (0.144)		-9.55 (9.44)		0.029 (0.039)		-0.599*** (0.127)
R ²	0.098	0.121	0.078	0.168	0.113	0.135	0.095	0.240
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	-6.12	-6.53	11.66	9.89	-8.38	-8.71	4.96	2.97
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ This table shows results using different measures of legislative shirking as the outcome variables. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 3 and 4 measure the number of questions asked during debates. All outcome measures are untransformed, unlike the main text which applies an IHS transformation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE C3: CORRUPTION AND ABSENTEEISM, BROKEN OUT BY VOTE

	Absenteeism (all)		Absenteeism (1st)		Absenteeism (2nd)		Absenteeism (3rd)		Sessions Attended (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Kompromat Deputy	1.14** (0.462)	1.02** (0.453)	1.03** (0.422)	0.947** (0.415)	1.26** (0.616)	1.13* (0.602)	1.31*** (0.473)	1.16** (0.459)	-0.570* (0.317)	-0.424 (0.302)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.582* (0.319)	0.358 (0.332)	0.426 (0.281)	0.321 (0.297)	0.845** (0.427)	0.408 (0.442)	0.456 (0.338)	0.179 (0.349)	-0.310 (0.188)	-0.113 (0.197)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.132 (2.00)	0.108 (1.93)	-0.688 (1.94)	-0.888 (2.05)	1.80 (2.03)	1.91 (1.70)	1.06 (2.38)	1.20 (2.19)	-1.67 (2.28)	-1.99 (2.07)
Age (log)	0.774 (0.795)	-0.110 (0.908)	0.583 (0.710)	-0.264 (0.810)	0.712 (1.10)	0.236 (1.22)	0.793 (0.864)	0.104 (0.974)	-0.571 (0.515)	-0.054 (0.559)
Member: United Russia	-2.82*** (0.789)	-2.92*** (0.810)	15.5*** (0.819)	15.5*** (0.844)	-23.3*** (0.825)	-23.6*** (0.843)	-21.6*** (0.804)	-21.9*** (0.809)	1.79*** (0.567)	1.94*** (0.580)
Member: Communist Party	3.44*** (0.950)	3.29*** (0.979)	5.05*** (0.956)	4.91*** (0.980)	2.17** (1.02)	2.13** (1.05)	0.983 (0.982)	0.757 (1.01)	3.15*** (0.606)	3.19*** (0.620)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.19)	14.5*** (1.16)	11.7*** (1.17)	11.5*** (1.14)	26.1*** (1.58)	26.3*** (1.55)	8.39*** (1.16)	8.35*** (1.11)	1.81*** (0.668)	1.69*** (0.641)
Died in Office	9.67*** (3.20)	8.30*** (3.10)	7.64*** (2.60)	6.25** (2.53)	9.71*** (3.67)	8.77** (3.61)	8.52** (3.43)	7.22** (3.34)	-6.55* (3.85)	-5.77 (3.71)
Female	-0.655 (0.441)	-0.559 (0.458)	-0.376 (0.399)	-0.258 (0.422)	-0.728 (0.580)	-0.680 (0.600)	-1.00** (0.442)	-0.973** (0.454)	0.917*** (0.303)	0.955*** (0.317)
Attended Top University	1.25** (0.582)	1.09* (0.571)	1.32** (0.546)	1.18** (0.537)	1.13 (0.742)	0.967 (0.725)	0.877 (0.603)	0.716 (0.591)	-0.422 (0.380)	-0.303 (0.350)
Committee Leader		-0.704* (0.387)		-0.323 (0.367)		-1.17** (0.518)		-1.04*** (0.390)		0.862*** (0.234)
Fraction Chair		-2.86*** (0.826)		-2.27*** (0.740)		-3.40*** (1.13)		-3.40*** (0.799)		1.29** (0.549)
SMD Deputy		1.02 (0.729)		-0.475 (0.599)		3.32*** (1.07)		2.17** (0.859)		-2.18*** (0.657)
Years in Office		0.178*** (0.047)		0.144*** (0.040)		0.195*** (0.060)		0.175*** (0.053)		-0.100*** (0.038)
Number of Votes (log)		-0.826 (0.962)		-1.06 (1.07)		-0.155 (0.934)		-0.875 (0.871)		0.392 (0.350)
Celebrity		1.85** (0.755)		1.36* (0.714)		2.39*** (0.875)		2.30*** (0.832)		-2.03*** (0.642)
Significant Business Interests		1.07** (0.462)		0.867** (0.423)		1.35** (0.601)		1.12** (0.486)		-0.643** (0.326)
R ²	0.411	0.433	0.443	0.459	0.771	0.780	0.741	0.753	0.347	0.384
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	5	3.77	24.14	13.26	2	1.75	17.81	9.48	-2	-1.78
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation, with models breaking out all votes and then by the reading. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE C4: LEGISLATIVE HETEROGENEITY

	Budgets (1)	Constitutional Issues (2)	Defense / Security (3)	Economic Policy (4)	Social Policy (5)
Kompromat Deputy	0.007** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0006 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.0009)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.027*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.002)
Age (log)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)
Member: United Russia	0.238*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.002)	0.059*** (0.002)	0.097*** (0.003)	0.121*** (0.003)
Member: Communist Party	-0.095*** (0.009)	-0.094*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.091*** (0.007)	-0.048*** (0.004)
Member: LDPR	0.158*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.066*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.003)
Died in Office	0.012 (0.013)	0.026** (0.012)	0.009 (0.006)	0.025** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)
Female	-0.003 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Attended Top University	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0010 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Committee Leader	0.016*** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)
Fraction Chair	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.0007 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)
SMD Deputy	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Years in Office	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-8.83×10^{-5} (0.0002)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0007** (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.025 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)
Celebrity	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)
Significant Business Interests	0.0003 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
R ²	0.833	0.642	0.651	0.617	0.863
Observations	1,414	1,411	1,412	1,411	1,413
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table looks at degree of deputy voting support for government-sponsored bills, broken down by issue type based on committee assignment. Bills involved treaty ratifications are omitted. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE C5: CORRUPTION AND BILL SPONSORSHIP, ROBUSTNESS

	Bills (ihs) (1)	Bills (weighted, ihs) (2)	Bills (any, ihs) (3)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.116* (0.065)	-0.074 (0.079)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.081 (0.052)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.107 (0.091)	-0.367* (0.220)	-0.709* (0.367)
Age (log)	-0.174** (0.086)	-0.429*** (0.129)	-0.236 (0.159)
Member: United Russia	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.653*** (0.106)	-0.303*** (0.108)
Member: Communist Party	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.693*** (0.121)	-0.671*** (0.132)
Member: LDPR	0.180 (0.129)	-0.106 (0.147)	-0.502*** (0.148)
Died in Office	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.128 (0.149)	-0.147 (0.208)
Female	-0.117** (0.046)	-0.096 (0.071)	0.142 (0.088)
Attended Top University	0.070 (0.061)	0.093 (0.086)	0.011 (0.097)
Committee Leader	0.096*** (0.035)	0.243*** (0.052)	0.252*** (0.061)
Fraction Chair	0.201* (0.109)	0.704*** (0.128)	0.886*** (0.129)
SMD Deputy	-0.026 (0.052)	-0.223*** (0.073)	-0.187** (0.088)
Years in Office	-0.002 (0.004)	0.011 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.036 (0.042)	0.395*** (0.059)	0.837*** (0.117)
Celebrity	0.034 (0.067)	-0.210* (0.122)	-0.404*** (0.138)
Significant Business Interests	0.036 (0.050)	-0.033 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.076)
R ²	0.134	0.271	0.409
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	-8.89	9.58	0.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of bill sponsorship. Column 1 replicates the results from Table 3 in the Main Test that uses a measure of deputy solo sponsorship of bills. Column 2 uses a weighted measure of bill sponsorship (ihs). Column 3 measures the total number of bills a deputy's name appeared on (ihs). The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

D Robustness Checks: Varying Kompromat Measures and Standard Errors

TABLE D1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH ERRORS CLUSTERED ON PARTY-CONVOCAATION

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy	1.02*	-0.078**	-0.191	-0.025	0.684**	-0.026	0.242**	-0.114***
	(0.509)	(0.033)	(0.120)	(0.048)	(0.270)	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.022)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.358	-0.017	-0.201**	-0.002	0.016	0.004	-0.013	0.010
	(0.311)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.004)	(0.123)	(0.012)	(0.045)	(0.018)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.108	-0.107	-0.273	0.049		-0.015		0.189
	(1.05)	(0.069)	(0.508)	(0.026)		(0.057)		(0.113)
Age (log)	-0.110	-0.174**	0.004	-0.029	0.087	0.012	0.068	-0.331***
	(0.969)	(0.069)	(0.140)	(0.021)	(0.681)	(0.005)	(0.239)	(0.059)
Member: United Russia	-2.92**	-0.323***	-0.797***					0.567**
	(1.25)	(0.045)	(0.125)					(0.231)
Member: Communist Party	3.29	-0.138**	-0.371		-3.76**		-3.56***	-0.044
	(2.31)	(0.059)	(0.263)		(1.39)		(0.548)	(0.234)
Member: LDPR	14.5*	0.180	0.201		5.45***		1.47**	0.053
	(7.25)	(0.113)	(0.170)		(1.24)		(0.510)	(0.203)
Died in Office	8.30***	-0.034	-0.922**	-0.040	1.37	-0.151	0.905*	
	(2.25)	(0.196)	(0.373)	(0.029)	(0.980)	(0.070)	(0.423)	
Female	-0.559	-0.117**	0.353***	0.012	0.790**	0.025	0.249	-0.038
	(0.709)	(0.040)	(0.109)	(0.007)	(0.332)	(0.027)	(0.147)	(0.059)
Attended Top University	1.09*	0.070*	0.317	-0.024	0.204	-0.009	0.150**	
	(0.589)	(0.036)	(0.179)	(0.010)	(0.144)	(0.014)	(0.062)	
Committee Leader	-0.704	0.096**	0.860***	0.011	0.290	0.017	-0.002	0.194***
	(0.645)	(0.035)	(0.170)	(0.004)	(0.172)	(0.023)	(0.063)	(0.031)
Fraction Chair	-2.86**	0.201*	1.31***	0.046*	-0.171	0.108	-0.102	0.332***
	(1.03)	(0.101)	(0.357)	(0.015)	(0.409)	(0.062)	(0.149)	(0.062)
SMD Deputy	1.02	-0.026	0.175	-0.049***	-0.463	-0.096***	-0.266	0.018
	(1.34)	(0.028)	(0.152)	(0.005)	(0.302)	(0.007)	(0.170)	(0.037)
Years in Office	0.178*	-0.002	0.008	-0.002	-0.008	-0.013**	-0.004	0.013***
	(0.092)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.826	0.036	0.943***	-0.019	-0.718	0.898***	-0.416	-0.025
	(0.884)	(0.055)	(0.128)	(0.038)	(0.509)	(0.039)	(0.236)	(0.058)
Celebrity	1.85*	0.034	-0.822***	0.020	-0.178	0.013	0.053	0.127***
	(0.946)	(0.049)	(0.152)	(0.021)	(0.318)	(0.031)	(0.080)	(0.041)
Significant Business Interests	1.07*	0.036	-0.709***	0.002	0.220	0.012**	0.187*	0.075**
	(0.548)	(0.023)	(0.168)	(0.004)	(0.286)	(0.003)	(0.092)	(0.025)
Ideal Point								-0.063**
								(0.026)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005*
								(0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039*
								(0.019)
R ²	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.079	0.825	0.799	0.893	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the party-convocation level rather than the deputy level as shown in the main text.

TABLE D2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF CAR EARNINGS

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (lhs)	Questions (lhs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat: Ratio of Cars to Income	0.442* (0.255)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.091 (0.080)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.317*** (0.115)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.134*** (0.046)	-0.089*** (0.017)
Family Real Estate Assets (lhs)	0.719* (0.371)	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.367*** (0.114)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.045 (0.180)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.017 (0.073)	-0.007 (0.024)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.365 (2.16)	-0.207*** (0.047)	-0.771 (0.586)	0.033 (0.023)		-0.024 (0.053)		0.155 (0.164)
Age (log)	0.063 (0.977)	-0.226** (0.107)	0.118 (0.316)	-0.022 (0.027)	0.318 (0.586)	0.040 (0.045)	0.089 (0.228)	-0.263*** (0.081)
Member: United Russia	-2.91*** (1.01)	-0.357*** (0.090)	-0.792*** (0.230)					0.561*** (0.156)
Member: Communist Party	3.00** (1.19)	-0.126 (0.108)	-0.201 (0.288)		-3.66*** (0.304)		-3.60*** (0.121)	-0.049 (0.110)
Member: LDPR	14.7*** (1.31)	0.167 (0.144)	0.096 (0.319)		5.69*** (0.296)		1.58*** (0.106)	0.089 (0.072)
Died in Office	6.47* (3.60)	-0.137 (0.138)	-0.506 (0.396)	-0.017 (0.039)	2.01* (1.07)	-0.149 (0.114)	0.952 (0.631)	
Female	-0.113 (0.553)	-0.125*** (0.047)	0.207 (0.160)	0.012 (0.011)	0.867** (0.364)	0.008 (0.022)	0.225* (0.136)	-0.041 (0.048)
Attended Top University	1.16* (0.663)	0.108 (0.071)	0.433** (0.198)	-0.023* (0.014)	0.004 (0.261)	-0.018 (0.028)	0.126 (0.109)	
Committee Leader	-0.850* (0.442)	0.080** (0.040)	0.994*** (0.129)	0.010 (0.010)	0.026 (0.277)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.094 (0.103)	0.190*** (0.032)
Fraction Chair	-2.72** (1.10)	0.241* (0.134)	1.26*** (0.269)	0.040** (0.016)	-0.038 (0.401)	0.094*** (0.033)	-0.126 (0.144)	0.355*** (0.061)
SMD Deputy	0.916 (0.825)	-0.031 (0.061)	0.187 (0.181)	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.141 (0.715)	-0.075** (0.037)	-0.083 (0.240)	0.029 (0.052)
Years in Office	0.203*** (0.054)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.012*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.859 (1.09)	0.012 (0.052)	0.838*** (0.136)	-0.007 (0.042)	-0.454 (0.386)	0.897*** (0.027)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.035 (0.043)
Celebrity	2.09** (0.875)	0.011 (0.062)	-0.918*** (0.234)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.103 (0.444)	0.012 (0.038)	0.123 (0.148)	0.120** (0.056)
Significant Business Interests	0.988* (0.513)	0.075 (0.057)	-0.564*** (0.167)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.233 (0.316)	0.006 (0.018)	0.207** (0.103)	0.099*** (0.036)
Ideal Point								-0.062*** (0.021)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004** (0.002)
Bills (lhs)								-0.049** (0.023)
R ²	0.440	0.155	0.244	0.099	0.822	0.821	0.901	0.149
Observations	1,108	1,108	1,108	735	373	735	373	1,051
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using a continuous measure to identify kompromat deputies. This measure is the ratio of the total value of reported cars to the total family earnings the kompromat measure. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE D3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CHANGE IN INCOME RATHER THAN KOMPROMAT

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Change in Income Over Term	-0.079 (0.161)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.042 (0.042)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.115** (0.052)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.058** (0.024)	-0.013 (0.010)
Deputy Income, First Year (log)	0.086 (0.169)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.200*** (0.069)	0.0007 (0.003)	-0.074 (0.138)	0.0004 (0.006)	-0.057 (0.054)	0.056*** (0.013)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.429 (0.302)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.112 (0.108)	-0.006 (0.009)	0.060 (0.173)	0.017 (0.015)	0.036 (0.070)	-0.010 (0.022)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.590 (1.66)	-0.099 (0.078)	-0.367 (0.730)	0.037 (0.031)		-0.019 (0.050)		0.177 (0.159)
Age (log)	-0.637 (0.856)	-0.141 (0.089)	0.097 (0.280)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.108 (0.544)	0.002 (0.037)	-0.118 (0.223)	-0.317*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-3.01*** (0.846)	-0.297*** (0.078)	-0.675*** (0.209)					0.643*** (0.139)
Member: Communist Party	2.83*** (0.987)	-0.099 (0.093)	-0.240 (0.273)		-3.88*** (0.271)		-3.69*** (0.107)	-0.089 (0.093)
Member: LDPR	15.0*** (1.24)	0.246* (0.135)	0.228 (0.290)		5.42*** (0.282)		1.47*** (0.107)	0.045 (0.069)
Died in Office	10.9** (5.23)	0.157 (0.206)	-0.598 (0.584)	-0.077** (0.038)	-0.359 (0.372)	-0.154 (0.106)	-0.558*** (0.144)	
Female	-0.565 (0.454)	-0.090* (0.047)	0.332** (0.143)	0.009 (0.012)	0.945*** (0.351)	0.037* (0.021)	0.279** (0.130)	-0.013 (0.039)
Attended Top University	0.915 (0.557)	0.086 (0.064)	0.374** (0.180)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.257 (0.237)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.140 (0.097)	
Committee Leader	-1.19*** (0.380)	0.129*** (0.035)	0.946*** (0.113)	0.013 (0.011)	0.082 (0.251)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.061 (0.096)	0.181*** (0.029)
Fraction Chair	-3.30*** (0.920)	0.206* (0.117)	1.29*** (0.274)	0.053*** (0.017)	-0.233 (0.384)	0.114*** (0.032)	-0.179 (0.141)	0.336*** (0.047)
SMD Deputy	1.05 (0.720)	0.015 (0.053)	0.122 (0.164)	-0.051* (0.026)	-0.466 (0.654)	-0.097** (0.039)	-0.267 (0.233)	0.022 (0.046)
Years in Office	0.206*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.0009 (0.009)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	2.96*** (0.763)	0.054 (0.058)	1.21*** (0.188)	-0.077*** (0.017)	0.362 (0.424)	0.892*** (0.028)	-0.278 (0.201)	0.063 (0.057)
Celebrity	1.73** (0.819)	0.029 (0.068)	-0.762*** (0.232)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.151 (0.371)	0.016 (0.036)	0.037 (0.142)	0.125** (0.054)
Significant Business Interests	0.724 (0.485)	0.041 (0.050)	-0.607*** (0.157)	0.0007 (0.012)	0.279 (0.294)	0.012 (0.019)	0.179* (0.102)	0.046 (0.034)
Ideal Point								-0.075*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.020 (0.022)
R ²	0.451	0.141	0.230	0.079	0.833	0.799	0.897	0.158
Observations	1,325	1,325	1,325	880	445	880	445	1,288
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	2.34	-6.23	6.76	5.29	2.37	-0.97	2.24	20.32
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using change in deputy income over their time in convocation rather than the indicator used in the main text for kompromat. Change is calculated as a deputy's income in their first full year in office subtracted from their income in their last full year in office, divided by the first year income. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE D4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS REMOVING ALL DEPUTIES WITH LOANS

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy (without loans)	0.984** (0.453)	-0.078* (0.044)	-0.190 (0.149)	-0.025 (0.025)	0.684*** (0.217)	-0.026 (0.037)	0.242*** (0.088)	-0.111*** (0.032)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.361 (0.332)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.201* (0.103)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.016 (0.164)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.065)	0.010 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.411 (1.97)	-0.131 (0.085)	-0.331 (0.764)	0.042 (0.026)		-0.023 (0.048)		0.155 (0.163)
Age (log)	-0.118 (0.908)	-0.174** (0.086)	0.004 (0.272)	-0.029 (0.023)	0.087 (0.565)	0.012 (0.038)	0.068 (0.212)	-0.330*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-2.92*** (0.810)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.797*** (0.210)					0.568*** (0.133)
Member: Communist Party	3.29*** (0.980)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.371 (0.275)		-3.76*** (0.258)		-3.56*** (0.101)	-0.044 (0.089)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.16)	0.180 (0.129)	0.201 (0.284)		5.45*** (0.268)		1.47*** (0.099)	0.053 (0.063)
Died in Office	8.30*** (3.10)	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.923** (0.418)	-0.040 (0.028)	1.37* (0.700)	-0.151* (0.080)	0.905** (0.406)	
Female	-0.563 (0.458)	-0.117** (0.046)	0.353** (0.138)	0.012 (0.011)	0.790** (0.318)	0.025 (0.021)	0.249** (0.116)	-0.038 (0.038)
Attended Top University	1.08* (0.571)	0.070 (0.061)	0.317* (0.178)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.204 (0.226)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.150 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.710* (0.387)	0.096*** (0.035)	0.860*** (0.110)	0.011 (0.009)	0.290 (0.236)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.089)	0.194*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.86*** (0.827)	0.201* (0.109)	1.31*** (0.243)	0.046*** (0.017)	-0.171 (0.341)	0.108*** (0.031)	-0.102 (0.117)	0.332*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.03 (0.730)	-0.026 (0.052)	0.174 (0.160)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.463 (0.630)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.266 (0.217)	0.018 (0.045)
Years in Office	0.178*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.823 (0.963)	0.036 (0.042)	0.943*** (0.115)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.718** (0.330)	0.898*** (0.023)	-0.416*** (0.123)	-0.026 (0.038)
Celebrity	1.85** (0.755)	0.034 (0.067)	-0.822*** (0.223)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.178 (0.393)	0.013 (0.035)	0.053 (0.131)	0.127** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.07** (0.462)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.708*** (0.155)	0.003 (0.011)	0.220 (0.273)	0.012 (0.018)	0.187* (0.096)	0.075** (0.032)
Ideal Point								-0.064*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.022)
R ²	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.079	0.825	0.799	0.893	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	3.77	-8.89	2.66	5.68	2.07	-0.79	1.93	-17.81
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office but labelling all deputies who ever took out a car loan (see Appendix Section B) as not being corrupt. This conservative approach acknowledges that some deputies may be using loans to purchase cars, thus reducing the validity of the income-based red flag. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

E Robustness Checks: Subsets and Interactions

TABLE E1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Absenteeism (all) (1)	Bills (ihs) (2)	Questions (ihs) (3)	Govt Bills (all) (4)	(5)	Ideal Point (6)	(7)	Re-elected (8)
Female	-0.621 (0.482)	-0.121** (0.050)	0.337** (0.149)	0.005 (0.011)	0.554* (0.316)	0.024 (0.021)	0.161 (0.118)	-0.031 (0.041)
Kompromat Deputy	0.979** (0.479)	-0.080* (0.047)	-0.202 (0.159)	-0.030 (0.026)	0.572*** (0.213)	-0.027 (0.040)	0.200** (0.089)	-0.109*** (0.033)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.360 (0.332)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.200* (0.103)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.016 (0.164)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.065)	0.010 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.115 (1.94)	-0.107 (0.091)	-0.271 (0.764)	0.051* (0.030)		-0.015 (0.051)		0.188 (0.156)
Age (log)	-0.091 (0.914)	-0.173** (0.087)	0.009 (0.273)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.560)	0.012 (0.037)	0.028 (0.211)	-0.333*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-2.92*** (0.811)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.797*** (0.210)					0.568*** (0.133)
Member: Communist Party	3.29*** (0.980)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.371 (0.275)		-3.73*** (0.256)		-3.55*** (0.101)	-0.044 (0.089)
Member: LDPR	14.6*** (1.17)	0.181 (0.129)	0.203 (0.285)		5.46*** (0.268)		1.47*** (0.099)	0.052 (0.063)
Died in Office	8.30*** (3.10)	-0.034 (0.127)	-0.921** (0.418)	-0.039 (0.028)	1.36** (0.680)	-0.151* (0.080)	0.902** (0.401)	
Attended Top University	1.09* (0.571)	0.070 (0.061)	0.317* (0.178)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.195 (0.226)	-0.009 (0.025)	0.147 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.703* (0.388)	0.096*** (0.035)	0.860*** (0.111)	0.011 (0.009)	0.287 (0.235)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.088)	0.194*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.86*** (0.827)	0.201* (0.110)	1.31*** (0.243)	0.046*** (0.017)	-0.164 (0.338)	0.108*** (0.031)	-0.099 (0.117)	0.333*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.02 (0.730)	-0.026 (0.052)	0.174 (0.160)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.440 (0.626)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.258 (0.215)	0.018 (0.045)
Years in Office	0.178*** (0.047)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.826 (0.963)	0.036 (0.042)	0.943*** (0.116)	-0.018 (0.034)	-0.737** (0.331)	0.898*** (0.023)	-0.423*** (0.122)	-0.025 (0.038)
Celebrity	1.85** (0.756)	0.035 (0.067)	-0.822*** (0.223)	0.020 (0.021)	-0.142 (0.383)	0.013 (0.035)	0.066 (0.129)	0.127** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.07** (0.462)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.708*** (0.155)	0.003 (0.011)	0.243 (0.274)	0.012 (0.018)	0.195** (0.096)	0.074** (0.032)
Female × Kompromat Deputy	0.486 (1.23)	0.027 (0.097)	0.126 (0.363)	0.054* (0.030)	2.17 (1.32)	0.007 (0.045)	0.808** (0.365)	-0.067 (0.094)
Ideal Point								-0.064*** (0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039* (0.022)
R ²	0.433	0.134	0.231	0.081	0.826	0.799	0.894	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	3.87	-8.75	2.59	5.62	2.09	-0.79	1.94	-17.51
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with whether the deputy is female. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE E2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH CONVOCAATION INTERACTIONS

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
6th Conv.	0.054	0.065*	-0.175	0.011	7.51***	0.281***	2.94***	0.017
	(0.557)	(0.038)	(0.120)	(0.012)	(0.363)	(0.019)	(0.145)	(0.048)
7th Conv.	3.54***	0.097*	0.143	0.145***	6.91***	-0.966***	0.399**	-0.094**
	(0.833)	(0.054)	(0.168)	(0.024)	(0.568)	(0.034)	(0.199)	(0.046)
Kompromat Deputy	2.37***	-0.076	-0.058	0.035***	1.99***	0.043**	0.665***	-0.106**
	(0.807)	(0.050)	(0.197)	(0.012)	(0.569)	(0.017)	(0.219)	(0.051)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.343	-0.016	-0.196*	-0.001	0.034	0.005	-0.005	0.011
	(0.332)	(0.028)	(0.103)	(0.009)	(0.165)	(0.018)	(0.065)	(0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.098	-0.100	-0.213	0.069		0.008		0.193
	(1.91)	(0.094)	(0.766)	(0.043)		(0.062)		(0.156)
Age (log)	-0.266	-0.173**	-0.003	-0.034	-0.020	0.006	0.039	-0.331***
	(0.904)	(0.087)	(0.272)	(0.023)	(0.566)	(0.040)	(0.210)	(0.071)
Member: United Russia	-2.92***	-0.323***	-0.795***					0.570***
	(0.806)	(0.077)	(0.209)					(0.134)
Member: Communist Party	3.34***	-0.138	-0.362		-3.72***		-3.55***	-0.045
	(0.979)	(0.092)	(0.275)		(0.255)		(0.100)	(0.090)
Member: LDPR	14.6***	0.180	0.199		5.43***		1.46***	0.053
	(1.16)	(0.129)	(0.283)		(0.270)		(0.099)	(0.063)
Died in Office	8.15***	-0.035	-0.945**	-0.048	1.24*	-0.160**	0.853**	
	(3.14)	(0.127)	(0.419)	(0.029)	(0.728)	(0.072)	(0.409)	
Female	-0.558	-0.117**	0.354**	0.012	0.747**	0.025	0.235**	-0.038
	(0.458)	(0.046)	(0.138)	(0.011)	(0.311)	(0.021)	(0.114)	(0.038)
Attended Top University	1.07*	0.070	0.317*	-0.024*	0.194	-0.009	0.148	
	(0.572)	(0.061)	(0.178)	(0.013)	(0.227)	(0.025)	(0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.723*	0.097***	0.864***	0.013	0.285	0.020	-0.005	0.194***
	(0.385)	(0.035)	(0.111)	(0.010)	(0.235)	(0.017)	(0.089)	(0.028)
Fraction Chair	-2.77***	0.200*	1.31***	0.050***	-0.226	0.111***	-0.121	0.332***
	(0.833)	(0.110)	(0.241)	(0.017)	(0.335)	(0.033)	(0.118)	(0.050)
SMD Deputy	1.04	-0.027	0.169	-0.050**	-0.461	-0.098***	-0.266	0.018
	(0.732)	(0.052)	(0.160)	(0.025)	(0.621)	(0.037)	(0.212)	(0.045)
Years in Office	0.181***	-0.002	0.009	-0.001	-0.001	-0.012***	-0.002	0.013***
	(0.046)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.802	0.035	0.939***	-0.023	-0.683**	0.892***	-0.405***	-0.025
	(0.944)	(0.042)	(0.115)	(0.034)	(0.332)	(0.024)	(0.131)	(0.038)
Celebrity	1.83**	0.034	-0.825***	0.020	-0.156	0.013	0.055	0.127**
	(0.764)	(0.067)	(0.223)	(0.021)	(0.400)	(0.035)	(0.131)	(0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.10**	0.035	-0.708***	0.003	0.213	0.013	0.185*	0.075**
	(0.460)	(0.050)	(0.154)	(0.011)	(0.269)	(0.018)	(0.095)	(0.032)
6th Conv. × Kompromat Deputy	-3.06**	0.025	-0.060	-0.051**	-2.02***	-0.054	-0.612**	-0.004
	(1.21)	(0.082)	(0.226)	(0.022)	(0.624)	(0.060)	(0.241)	(0.073)
7th Conv. × Kompromat Deputy	-1.04	-0.042	-0.456	-0.166**	-1.72*	-0.194*	-0.658*	-0.029
	(1.36)	(0.083)	(0.287)	(0.084)	(0.988)	(0.114)	(0.373)	(0.082)
Ideal Point								-0.064***
								(0.018)
Absenteeism (all)								0.005**
								(0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.039*
								(0.022)
R ²	0.436	0.135	0.232	0.105	0.829	0.802	0.895	0.141
Observations	1,414	1,414	1,414	927	487	927	487	1,344
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	3.52	-9.11	2.52	6.02	2.18	-0.81	2	-18.43
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with the convocation being analyzed. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE E3: REGIME SUPPORT AND CORRUPTION, BROKEN OUT BY CONVOCACTION

	Govt Bills (all)			Ideal Point			Govt Bills (close)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kompromat Deputy	0.238 (0.263)	-0.010 (0.139)	0.603 (0.410)	0.060 (0.095)	0.024 (0.079)	0.103 (0.098)	1.25 (1.17)	0.657 (1.23)	1.68 (1.53)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.106 (0.123)	0.093 (0.157)	-0.013 (0.241)	0.013 (0.044)	-0.063 (0.073)	0.056 (0.052)	0.187 (0.458)	-1.43 (0.942)	-0.890 (0.822)
Age (log)	-0.019 (0.541)	-0.263 (0.644)	-0.255 (0.641)	-0.044 (0.228)	0.059 (0.255)	0.111 (0.185)	0.197 (2.16)	2.11 (2.61)	3.06 (2.76)
Member: Communist Party	-8.98*** (0.266)	-3.30*** (0.203)	1.37*** (0.326)	-5.65*** (0.129)	-3.20*** (0.115)	-1.85*** (0.114)	-48.1*** (0.972)	-19.1*** (1.86)	-9.52*** (1.66)
Member: LDPR	6.48*** (0.289)	5.18*** (0.220)	5.56*** (0.585)	1.62*** (0.103)	1.68*** (0.105)	1.25*** (0.104)	19.4*** (1.08)	44.4*** (1.82)	11.6*** (1.79)
Female	0.634* (0.334)	0.097 (0.221)	0.334 (0.273)	0.185* (0.100)	-0.093 (0.105)	0.013 (0.159)	2.70** (1.31)	0.180 (1.85)	0.605 (1.32)
Attended Top University	-0.485* (0.267)	0.053 (0.206)	-0.056 (0.282)	-0.068 (0.070)	0.093 (0.110)	-0.012 (0.090)	-1.61 (1.10)	-0.170 (1.67)	-1.93 (1.33)
Committee Leader	-0.043 (0.176)	-0.038 (0.168)	0.586 (0.547)	0.009 (0.066)	-0.153 (0.101)	0.107 (0.106)	-1.12 (0.788)	-2.21* (1.18)	0.438 (1.05)
Fraction Chair	-1.01* (0.592)	0.059 (0.233)	0.427 (0.358)	-0.120 (0.126)	-0.028 (0.093)	-0.090 (0.148)	-4.44* (2.49)	-0.421 (1.71)	1.17 (1.51)
Years in Office	-0.015 (0.017)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.024 (0.068)	0.014 (0.107)	-0.118* (0.071)
Number of Votes (log)	-1.07*** (0.371)	0.595 (0.371)	-0.769 (0.504)	-0.348 (0.309)	-0.300** (0.128)	-0.653*** (0.132)	-4.19** (1.73)	5.48** (2.19)	-6.59** (2.65)
Celebrity	-0.926 (0.652)	-0.269 (0.550)	0.147 (0.574)	-0.038 (0.149)	0.099 (0.230)	-0.042 (0.185)	-3.62 (2.58)	0.893 (3.09)	-1.56 (1.80)
Significant Business Interests	-0.035 (0.191)	0.255 (0.191)	-0.567 (0.767)	0.0006 (0.099)	0.251** (0.104)	-0.068 (0.107)	0.407 (0.732)	3.38** (1.56)	-2.64 (1.76)
SMD Deputy			0.135 (0.293)			-0.057 (0.101)			-0.363 (1.63)
R ²	0.978	0.903	0.703	0.979	0.923	0.946	0.981	0.915	0.810
Observations	139	232	116	139	232	116	139	232	116
Convocation(s)	5	6	7	5	6	7	5	6	7
Party Subset	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR	Non-UR
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.91	0.91	0.91	1.5	1.5	1.5
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with the convocation being analyzed. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE E4: CORRUPTION AND REGIME LOYALTY: PARTY HETEROGENEITY, CLOSE VOTES

	Govt Bills (all, close)		Govt Bills (1st, close)		Govt Bills (2nd, close)		Govt Bills (3rd, close)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.403 (0.302)	3.01** (1.23)	-0.541 (0.402)	3.01** (1.22)	-0.299 (0.207)	2.97* (1.52)	-0.448 (0.336)	2.77** (1.30)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.021 (0.092)	-0.619 (0.776)	0.007 (0.117)	-0.931 (0.807)	0.021 (0.064)	-0.910 (0.992)	0.024 (0.097)	-0.669 (0.863)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.624** (0.268)		0.493 (0.330)		0.203 (0.168)		0.460 (0.298)	
Age (log)	-0.115 (0.137)	1.75 (2.65)	-0.124 (0.149)	1.85 (2.98)	-0.111 (0.081)	0.342 (3.53)	-0.199 (0.137)	1.53 (2.99)
Died in Office	-0.177 (0.336)	7.60 (5.30)	0.073 (0.482)	9.89* (5.12)	0.192 (0.153)	9.54 (6.87)	0.355 (0.344)	8.99 (6.06)
Female	0.030 (0.083)	2.77* (1.53)	0.032 (0.103)	3.00* (1.65)	0.016 (0.054)	4.20** (1.96)	0.065 (0.083)	3.01* (1.79)
Attended Top University	-0.065 (0.113)	-0.541 (1.32)	-0.040 (0.145)	0.147 (1.36)	-0.004 (0.075)	-0.844 (1.67)	0.017 (0.118)	-0.042 (1.39)
Committee Leader	0.045 (0.074)	-0.356 (1.16)	0.022 (0.093)	0.321 (1.28)	0.054 (0.051)	-1.16 (1.47)	0.047 (0.079)	-0.090 (1.33)
Fraction Chair	0.297 (0.192)	-0.678 (1.65)	0.409* (0.246)	0.891 (1.70)	0.167 (0.129)	-1.04 (2.20)	0.314 (0.202)	-1.17 (1.92)
SMD Deputy	-0.483 (0.304)	-1.90 (3.58)	-0.563 (0.406)	-2.31 (3.94)	-0.300 (0.208)	-2.32 (3.90)	-0.459 (0.337)	-2.00 (3.68)
Years in Office	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.105)	-0.044 (0.043)	-0.132 (0.128)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.115)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.055 (0.113)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.276** (0.137)	-1.15 (1.83)	-0.074 (0.140)	2.40 (1.95)	-0.092 (0.057)	4.50* (2.57)	0.181 (0.292)	0.179 (2.09)
Celebrity	0.303 (0.233)	0.550 (1.74)	0.424 (0.307)	1.63 (1.64)	0.185 (0.154)	0.445 (1.80)	0.267 (0.264)	1.10 (1.97)
Significant Business Interests	-0.017 (0.119)	1.34 (1.33)	0.036 (0.157)	1.06 (1.42)	0.007 (0.082)	0.961 (1.56)	-0.077 (0.131)	1.44 (1.41)
Member: Communist Party		-24.8*** (1.40)		-28.3*** (1.50)		-25.5*** (1.64)		-26.6*** (1.57)
Member: LDPR		28.0*** (1.46)		28.7*** (1.54)		34.0*** (1.94)		26.7*** (1.59)
R ²	0.055	0.812	0.036	0.819	0.032	0.767	0.043	0.789
Observations	927	487	927	485	927	483	927	486
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	-50.14	0.97	-8.83	0.97	-14.71	0.67	-9.72	0.75
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of loyalty to the regime as the outcome variables. Only votes on government-initiated bills which received less than 90% are included. The Govt Bills column measures the percentage of government-initiated bills that deputies voted for during the convocation, either altogether (Columns 1-2) or broken out into 1st, 2nd or 3rd readings. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

F Robustness Checks: Mechanisms and Re-election

TABLE F1: CORRUPTION AND LOBBYING

	Lobbies for Federal Gov			Lobbies for Regional Gov			Lobbies for Other Org		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kompromat Deputy	0.033 (0.046)	0.016 (0.054)	0.080 (0.094)	0.033 (0.046)	0.016 (0.054)	0.080 (0.094)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.046 (0.087)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.081 (0.055)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.081 (0.055)	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.049 (0.042)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.138*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.055)		-0.138*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.055)		-0.059 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.045)	
Age (log)	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.097)	0.168 (0.142)	-0.037 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.097)	0.168 (0.142)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.072 (0.075)	-0.198 (0.160)
Member: United Russia	0.115 (0.071)			0.115 (0.071)			-0.048 (0.070)		
Member: Communist Party	0.007 (0.077)		-0.032 (0.085)	0.007 (0.077)		-0.032 (0.085)	-0.120 (0.079)		-0.161* (0.095)
Member: LDPR	0.032 (0.087)		0.039 (0.093)	0.032 (0.087)		0.039 (0.093)	0.012 (0.089)		-0.053 (0.099)
Female	0.035 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.034 (0.089)	0.035 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.034 (0.089)	-0.013 (0.033)	0.0006 (0.038)	-0.124** (0.061)
Committee Leader	0.102*** (0.038)	0.125*** (0.048)	0.060 (0.050)	0.102*** (0.038)	0.125*** (0.048)	0.060 (0.050)	-0.015 (0.030)	0.007 (0.033)	-0.063 (0.066)
Fraction Chair	0.033 (0.082)	0.036 (0.147)	-0.006 (0.075)	0.033 (0.082)	0.036 (0.147)	-0.006 (0.075)	0.069 (0.084)	0.051 (0.122)	0.060 (0.134)
SMD Deputy	-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.085*** (0.032)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.046* (0.025)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.106* (0.055)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.008 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.091*** (0.027)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.040)	0.091*** (0.027)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.040)	0.127*** (0.031)	0.097*** (0.034)	0.183*** (0.059)
Celebrity	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.085 (0.061)	0.282* (0.149)	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.085 (0.061)	0.282* (0.149)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.058)	0.104 (0.133)
Significant Business Interests	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.097 (0.072)	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.097 (0.072)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.088)
R ²	0.071	0.088	0.198	0.071	0.088	0.198	0.106	0.102	0.184
Observations	470	354	116	470	354	116	470	354	116
Party Subset	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation were classified by TI-Russia as lobbying for the interests of other federal government agencies not working in security (Columns 1-3), the interests of regional governments (Columns 4-6), and the interests of non-government organizations such as churches, unions, and environmental groups (Columns 7-9). For each outcome, results are shown first using all deputies and then broken out by ruling party or systemic opposition. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE F2: CORRUPTION AND DEPUTY REQUESTS

	Publicly Shares Deputy Requests	
	(1)	(2)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.054*	-0.051*
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.008	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.095***	-0.092***
	(0.036)	(0.035)
Age (log)	-0.165**	-0.160**
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Member: United Russia	0.048	-0.029
	(0.052)	(0.127)
Member: Communist Party	0.057	0.041
	(0.059)	(0.078)
Member: LDPR	-0.004	-0.067
	(0.057)	(0.109)
Female	0.001	0.003
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Committee Leader	0.024	0.017
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Fraction Chair	0.057	0.042
	(0.066)	(0.071)
SMD Deputy	0.034	0.032
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Years in Office	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	0.038	0.035
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Celebrity	-0.035	-0.034
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Significant Business Interests	0.020	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Govt Bills (all)		0.010
		(0.010)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.0003
		(0.002)
Bills (ihs)		0.038
		(0.027)
R ²	0.059	0.065
Observations	430	430
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation had subpages on their personal websites on www.duma.gov.ru that make available their deputy requests in PDF form. The sample is limited to only deputies serving in the 7th convocation who were in office on January 27, 2021 when the new site format was introduced and encouraged by Chairman Volodin. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE F3: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION, PARTY HETEROGENEITY

	Ran for Re-election		Re-elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.122*** (0.038)	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.137*** (0.037)	-0.098** (0.049)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.035 (0.026)	0.007 (0.026)	0.007 (0.028)	0.003 (0.030)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.060 (0.157)		0.179 (0.155)	
Age (log)	-0.343*** (0.079)	-0.305*** (0.101)	-0.336*** (0.082)	-0.285** (0.116)
Female	0.035 (0.043)	-0.130** (0.060)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.138** (0.066)
Committee Leader	0.223*** (0.035)	0.186*** (0.037)	0.198*** (0.036)	0.236*** (0.044)
Fraction Chair	0.235*** (0.082)	0.110** (0.046)	0.353*** (0.071)	0.248*** (0.074)
SMD Deputy	-0.075 (0.052)	0.064 (0.086)	-0.016 (0.051)	0.020 (0.105)
Years in Office	0.008** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)
Number of Votes (log)	0.049 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.030)	0.042 (0.066)	-0.027 (0.036)
Celebrity	0.049 (0.060)	0.119* (0.069)	0.080 (0.064)	0.235*** (0.072)
Significant Business Interests	0.086** (0.037)	-0.041 (0.046)	0.065* (0.037)	0.081 (0.052)
Govt Bills (all)	-0.098 (0.080)	0.016** (0.007)	-0.156** (0.070)	0.035*** (0.008)
Absenteeism (all)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)	-0.016 (0.037)	0.0006 (0.021)	-0.027 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.026)
Member: Communist Party		0.108* (0.058)		0.355*** (0.063)
Member: LDPR		-0.113* (0.063)		-0.087 (0.069)
R ²	0.125	0.166	0.135	0.325
Observations	918	482	918	482
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	8477.28	20.64	-21.66	-399.61
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table looks at deputy re-election rates broken out by whether the deputy was a member of the ruling party (Columns 1 and 3) or the non-systemic opposition (Columns 2 and 4). The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE F4: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION, MECHANISMS

	Re-elected			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.076 (0.050)	-0.051 (0.121)	-0.107*** (0.031)	-0.114*** (0.035)
Years in Office	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.013 (0.021)	0.018 (0.024)	0.012 (0.021)	0.013 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.169 (0.159)	0.178 (0.156)	0.182 (0.157)	0.175 (0.157)
Age (log)	-0.339*** (0.070)	-0.339*** (0.070)	-0.337*** (0.070)	-0.341*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	0.391*** (0.078)	0.391*** (0.078)	0.402*** (0.148)	0.391*** (0.078)
Member: Communist Party	0.072 (0.065)	0.076 (0.064)	0.069 (0.101)	0.074 (0.064)
Member: LDPR	0.134* (0.069)	0.138** (0.070)	0.135* (0.070)	0.136* (0.069)
Female	-0.042 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.037)
Committee Leader	0.201*** (0.028)	0.202*** (0.028)	0.200*** (0.028)	0.201*** (0.028)
Fraction Chair	0.335*** (0.051)	0.333*** (0.050)	0.335*** (0.050)	0.332*** (0.050)
SMD Deputy	6.85×10^{-5} (0.046)	0.003 (0.046)	0.002 (0.046)	0.002 (0.046)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.045 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.044 (0.037)
Celebrity	0.126** (0.051)	0.124** (0.052)	0.127** (0.051)	0.123** (0.051)
Significant Business Interests	0.071** (0.032)	0.072** (0.032)	0.072** (0.032)	0.071** (0.032)
Govt Bills (all)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.030*** (0.007)
Absenteeism (all)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)	-0.036* (0.022)	-0.037* (0.022)	-0.035 (0.022)	-0.040* (0.024)
Kompromat Deputy \times Years in Office	-0.006 (0.007)			
Kompromat Deputy \times Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)		-0.023 (0.048)		
Ideal Point			-0.0002 (0.030)	
Kompromat Deputy \times Ideal Point			-0.011 (0.008)	
Kompromat Deputy \times Bills (ihs)				0.019 (0.055)
R ²	0.147	0.147	0.148	0.147
Observations	1,344	1,344	1,344	1,344
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes, with the main corruption measure interacted with other deputy characteristics. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE F5: CORRUPTION AND POST-DUMA CAREERS

	Found Another Job		Worked Again in Gov.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	0.103** (0.043)	0.082* (0.044)	-0.002 (0.059)	-0.004 (0.060)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.018 (0.027)	0.036 (0.027)	0.037 (0.036)	0.047 (0.037)
Member: United Russia	0.186 (0.207)	0.179 (0.203)	-0.185 (0.326)	-0.178 (0.325)
Member: Communist Party	-0.111 (0.124)	-0.075 (0.122)	0.310* (0.187)	0.308* (0.185)
Member: LDPR	0.030 (0.094)	-0.035 (0.096)	0.109 (0.145)	0.081 (0.143)
Female	0.013 (0.048)	0.001 (0.048)	0.031 (0.076)	0.027 (0.076)
Committee Leader	-0.0006 (0.040)	0.002 (0.039)	0.008 (0.067)	0.007 (0.067)
Fraction Chair	0.083 (0.122)	0.092 (0.124)	-0.145 (0.162)	-0.128 (0.155)
SMD Deputy	0.076 (0.051)	0.081 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.123)	-0.081 (0.121)
Years in Office	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.0006 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.267*** (0.068)	-0.257*** (0.068)	-0.179** (0.082)	-0.176** (0.083)
Celebrity	0.188** (0.080)	0.146* (0.080)	-0.213* (0.127)	-0.231* (0.129)
Significant Business Interests	0.015 (0.042)	-0.013 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.069)	-0.043 (0.071)
Ideal Point	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.028)	0.040 (0.048)	0.038 (0.048)
Absenteeism (all)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Bills (ihs)	0.023 (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	0.037 (0.049)	0.033 (0.048)
Age (log)		-0.356*** (0.095)		-0.176 (0.157)
R ²	0.101	0.120	0.107	0.114
Observations	707	707	225	225
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓


Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 use as an outcome whether the deputy ever worked again after leaving the Duma in a formal position based on data from RuPEP, a database of biographical information for Russian elites. Columns 3 and 4 code up all positions for deputies who did find a job after leaving the duma, with the outcome being an indicator for whether that job was in any governmental position (federal, regional, or municipal). All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

TABLE F6: DEPUTY ACCOUNTABILITY

	Elected (SMD)		List Number (PR)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.047 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.045)	-0.120 (0.259)	-0.155 (0.261)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.015 (0.032)	0.017 (0.032)	0.054 (0.156)	0.038 (0.155)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.106** (0.048)	0.108** (0.044)	-2.46*** (0.306)	-2.30*** (0.329)
Age (log)	-0.056 (0.082)	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.382 (0.591)	-0.303 (0.589)
Member: United Russia	0.721*** (0.069)	0.455*** (0.164)	2.77*** (0.256)	1.79*** (0.483)
Member: Communist Party	-0.012 (0.080)	0.086 (0.097)	0.411 (0.288)	0.826** (0.358)
Member: LDPR	-0.023 (0.077)	-0.189 (0.133)	-0.441 (0.305)	-1.13*** (0.379)
Female	0.094 (0.058)	0.085 (0.058)	0.145 (0.343)	0.136 (0.346)
Committee Leader	0.048 (0.033)	0.036 (0.033)	0.161 (0.204)	0.077 (0.204)
Fraction Chair	0.078 (0.106)	0.077 (0.110)	-1.03*** (0.289)	-1.06*** (0.288)
Years in Office	0.011** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	-0.064*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.021)
Number of Votes (log)	0.045 (0.051)	0.058 (0.054)	0.118 (0.161)	0.195 (0.168)
Celebrity	0.035 (0.105)	0.032 (0.107)	-1.24*** (0.408)	-1.23*** (0.410)
Significant Business Interests	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.036)	-0.073 (0.237)	-0.091 (0.235)
Govt Bills (all)		0.036* (0.020)		0.110*** (0.040)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.013)
Bills (ihs)		0.0005 (0.021)		0.118 (0.113)
Spot on PR Common List			4.30*** (0.539)	4.29*** (0.517)
R ²	0.676	0.682	0.322	0.330
Observations	361	361	733	733
Oster's δ for $\beta = 0$	1.28	1.24	-4.12	-3.91
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓


Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table shows results about the different channels of deputy accountability. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the outcome of whether a deputy was elected from a single-member district; the sample only includes those that ran. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the placement of each deputy on the party list, with lower numbers indicating a higher likelihood of receiving a seat in the Duma. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

FIGURE F1: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES



Note: This figure plots mean number of more kompromat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time.

FIGURE F2: COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES



Note: This figure plots mean number of leadership positions held by kompromat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time. Committee Leadership positions include Chair, First Deputy Chair, and Deputy Chair.

References

- Berg, Heléne. 2020. "On the returns to holding political office (Is it worth it?)." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 178: 840–865.
- Braguinsky, Serguey, Sergey Mityakov, and Andrey Liscovich. 2014. "Direct Estimation of Hidden Earnings: Evidence From Russian Administrative Data." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 57 (2): 281–319.
- Cunha, Gabriel. 2019. "Financial Gains from Legislative office: Evidence from Brazilian Municipal Councilors." *Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper Forthcoming* .
- Eggers, Andrew C, and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. "MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics." *American Political Science Review* 103 (04): 513–533.
- Eggers, Andrew C, and Jens Hainmueller. 2014. "Political capital: Corporate connections and stock investments in the US congress, 2004-2008." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* pp. 2012–26.
- Fahey, Kevin. 2018. "The Perks of Being a Lawmaker: Returns to Office as a Legislative Goal." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 37–68.
- Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz, and Vikrant Vig. 2012. "Private Returns to Public Office." *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (4): 806–862.
- Jung, Hoyong. 2020. "Examining Politicians' Wealth Accumulation in South Korea." *Asian Survey* 60 (2): 290–322.
- Klašnja, Marko. 2015. "Corruption and the incumbency disadvantage: Theory and evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 77 (4): 928–942.
- Kotakorpi, Kaisa, Panu Poutvaara, and Marko Terviö. 2017. "Returns to office in national and local politics: A bootstrap method and evidence from Finland." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 33 (3): 413–442.
- Lenz, Gabriel S, and Kevin Lim. 2009. Getting rich (er) in office? Corruption and wealth accumulation in Congress. In *Corruption and Wealth Accumulation in Congress*.
- Mahzab, Moogdho. 2020. "Dishonest Politicians and Public Goods Provision." *Job Market Paper* .

- Olechnik, Łukasz Wiktor. 2020. “Why ruling politicians grow rich faster—Rent-seeking or selection bias?” *Society and Economy* 42 (1): 74–97.
- Peichl, Andreas, Nico Pestel, and Sebastian Sieglöcher. 2013. “The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament.” *Public Choice* 156 (3-4): 653–676.
- Querubin, Pablo, and James M Snyder Jr. 2013. “The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen, 1850-1880.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (4): 409–450.