

apache mina *

Description:

The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java's native deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks. This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4. It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the `IoBuffer#getObject()` method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a `ProtocolCodecFilter` instance using the `ObjectSerializationCodecFactory` class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library. Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the `ObjectSerializationDecoder` instance, using one of the three new methods: /** * Accept class names where the supplied `ClassNameMatcher` matches for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param `classNameMatcher` the matcher to use */ public void accept(`ClassNameMatcher` `classNameMatcher`) /** * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param `pattern` standard Java regexp */ public void accept(`Pattern` `pattern`) /** * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization, * unless they are otherwise rejected. * *

@param `patterns` Wildcard file name patterns as defined by * {
(String) `FilenameUtils.wildcardToRegex(String)` public void accept(
String... `patterns`) By default, the decoder will reject *all*