Income Insufficiency, Party Misperception and Political Distrust

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Puzzles

Survey: Trust in British government has dropped to lowest level in decades

A third said they "almost never" trust the government





Why do people express dismay towards the Parliament?

Citizens' trust in the British government has dropped to the lowest point since 2019, according to the annual British Social Attitudes Survey.



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Motivation I

- A large number of studies have drawn attention to the implication of economic inequality and its effects on democracy, such as the effect of education on voter perception about party (e.g., Carroll and Kubo, 2018).
- The literature have been studied about how different aspects of inequality shape voters' political interests (Han, 2016; Medve-Bálint and Boda, 2020; Moene and Wallerstein, 20; Goubin, Hooghe and Leeuw, 2016), disagreement among party positions (Muraoka and Rosas, 2020), and its influence of polarization (Pontusson and Rueda 2008; Winkler, 2019; Fenzl, 2018; Han, 2015).

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Motivation II

- An essential, related topic that has received less attention is whether misperceptions concerning party positions caused by income insufficiency deteriorate people's trust in politicians and the government.
- With abundant literature on misperception (Muraoka and Rosas, 2020; Orr and Huber, 2021; Ahler and Sood, 2018; Ahler, 2014; Dahlberg, 2013; Luskin, 1990), we however know less about how its harmful effects threaten our democratic system and public trust.





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Data

Table: Data Structure of British Election Survey and Chapel Hill Expert Survey

	BES Respondents	Administered in	CHES Experts	Administered in
Waves 4-6	92,080	2015	337	2014-2015
Waves 7-10	124,752	2016	228	2014-2015
Waves 15	30,842	2018	228	2017-2018
Waves 16-17	72,325	2019	277	2019-2020
	289,157		842	

Source: British Election Study and Chapel Hill Expert Survey.



Survey Items: BES & CHES

- To measure the most accurate left-right position of each British parties across time, we use the mean ideological position obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), by pooling the individual expert's responses in 2014, 2017, and 2019, respectively (Bakker et al., 2015, 2018, 2020).
- We match these accurate positions from CHES with the BES responses based on the closest year.



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Measuring Misperception

- Chapel Hill Expert Survey:
 LRGEN: position of the party in 2014 (2017 and 2019) in terms of its overall ideological stance (Bakker et al., 2015, 2018, 2020, 14).
- British Election Study:
 Ir: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the following parties on this scale (Schmitt et al., 2021, 161)?

0 = Extreme Left — 5 = Center — 10 = Extreme Right



Definition of Misperception

 Misperception is defined as the absolute perceptional gap (difference) between individual respondent's perception held on a party's position and the corresponding average perception from the CHES.
 Particularly, it is calculated as

$$\gamma_{i,t}^{\rho} = |\alpha_{i,t}^{\rho} - \bar{\alpha}_{t}^{\rho}|,\tag{1}$$

where $\alpha_{i,t}^p$ denotes respondent i's perception on the party p's left-right ideological position in wave t and $\bar{\alpha}_t^p$ is the average position of the party p's in wave t reported by CHES experts. Therefore, the resulted distance, $\gamma_{i,t}^p$, between respondent and experts measures respondent i's misperception on party p's position in wave t.

Visualizing Misperception Gaps I





Figure: Average Expert and British Respondent Perception on Ideological Positions of Three Major Parties.

Note: C = Conservatives, L = Labour, D = Liberal Democrats.



Visualizing Misperception Gaps II

Figure: Income Gap and Party Misperception by Party, Wave and Education Level





Measuring Misperception about Party Positions

Table: Average Party Misperception, by Income Groups

	Overall: average	Cons	Lab	LD	UKIP	Green
Income: low middle	1.98 1.73	1.87 1.57	1.94 1.73	1.62 1.47	2.37 1.97	2.10 1.89
high	1.49	1.32	1.54	1.34	1.62	1.62
Observations	198806	196573	196468	189207	148213	175499

Source: British Election Study



Hypothesis I

H1 Higher probability of facing income insufficiency leads a higher degree of misperception about party positions

First stage:
$$\mathbb{1}\{\text{Low earner}\}_{i,t} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \mathbb{1}\{\text{House owner}\}_{i,t} + \eta C_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
 (2a)

Second stage:
$$\bar{\gamma}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbb{1}\{\text{Low earner}\}_{i,t} + \Theta C_{i,t} + e_{i,t}$$
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Regression Result for Hypothesis I

Table: Income Gap and Misperception of Overall and Each Party

	Overall	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	Green	UKIP
1{Low earner}	0.15***	0.24***	0.14***	0.15***	0.08*	0.12**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Affiliation:						
Conservative	-0.38***	-0.45***	-0.22**	-0.95***	-0.10	0.17
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Labour	-0.32***	0.07	-0.50***	-0.99***	0.04	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)
Liberal Democrat	-0.48***	-0.26***	-0.48***	-1.32***	-0.11	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Green	-0.51***	-Ò.23*´*	-0.43***	-1.10***	-0.37***	-0.26
	(0.05)	(80.0)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(80.0)	(0.14)
UKIP	-0.02	0.37***	-0.04	-0.35***	0.15	-0.06
	(0.05)	(80.0)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.02***	1.89***	1.89***	2.66***	1.83***	1.78***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(80.0)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Observations	77913	77913	77913	77913	44637	61309

Source: British Election Study.

Note: * p < 0.10,*** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is party misperception. For each party, OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimation are used.



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Hypothesis II

H2 Respondents' level of political trust decreases as a result of larger misperception about party positions.

$$\begin{split} \textit{Trust}_{i,t} &= \omega_0 + \omega_1 \bar{\gamma}_{i,t} + \omega_2 \mathbb{1}\{\text{Middle earner}\}_{i,t} + \omega_3 \mathbb{1}\{\text{High earner}\}_{i,t} \\ &+ \omega_4 \bar{\gamma}_{i,t} * \mathbb{1}\{\text{Middle earner}\}_{i,t} + \omega_5 \bar{\gamma}_{i,t} * \mathbb{1}\{\text{High earner}\}_{i,t} + \Phi C_{i,t} + u_{i,t} \end{split} \tag{3}$$





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Regression Result for Hypothesis II

Table: Party Misperception, Income Level and Trust in Member of Parliament

	Trust in MP				
	OLS	ordered logit	OLS	ordered logi	
Misperception	-0.05***	-0.13***	-0.03***	-0.11***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	
Income: middle	0.02*	0.05**	0.02	0.01	
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	
high	0.02**	0.06***	0.10***	0.15***	
-	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	
Income: middle × Misperception			0.00	0.02	
			(0.01)	(0.03)	
Income: high × Misperception			-0.04***	-Ò.05* [*] *	
			(0.01)	(0.02)	
Constant	-0.90***		-1.54***	. ,	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	78315	78315	78315	78315	
Adjusted R ²	0.117		0.117		

Source: British Election Study.

Note: * p < 0.10,*** p < 0.05, **** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is semi-standardized trust in Member of Parliament.



Preliminary Results

- From our analysis, income insufficiency causes the widening disagreement about British parties with CHES experts: the poor demonstrates larger perceptional biasedness in judging political positions than the rich.
- Party's deviation from households' perceived position challenges their beliefs and confidence. This perceptional gap further transmits to deteriorate their trust towards the political system, contributing to a larger extent of dismay from the lower income families.





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Thank You





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CONCLUSION

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