

# RIISING WAGE INEQUALITY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SEARCH FRICTIONS

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## ABSTRACT

I investigate whether labor market frictions can explain the level and growth of skill premiums in the US. I develop a novel model where skill premiums are driven both by capital skill complementarity and by differences in the search frictions faced by skilled and unskilled workers. The presence of search frictions, and hence monopsonistic power, provides a range of explanations for rising skill premiums not present in competitive models i.e. changes to relative job offer rates, firm heterogeneity or bargaining power between skill groups. I find college graduates enjoy substantially lower job destruction rates and higher job offer rates than non-graduates, which generates the presence of a significant, and relatively stable, skill premium in wages in my model. I also find that bargaining strength, as captured by unionization rates, starts off at similar levels for graduates and non-graduates but declines more severely for non-graduates. This trend can explain a substantial portion of the growth in the skill premium in my baseline model.

Keywords: Search Frictions, Monopsony, Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, Technological Change.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper develops and estimates a novel structural model featuring capital skill complementarity and on-the-job search with wage bargaining. This allows me to assess whether changes to search frictions provide an alternative explanation for increasing skill premiums to the traditional technological explanations emphasized in the literature.<sup>1</sup>

Including search frictions as a potential explanation for rising skill premiums is motivated by a number of empirical findings that, while suggestive of some degree of monopsony power, have so far not been grounded in theory. For example, the importance of firm heterogeneity in explaining growing wage inequality found in Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and von Wachter (2018) or Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) would be difficult to incorporate in a perfectly competitive model where workers would instantly relocate to more productive firms. Similarly the quantitative importance of institutions such as the minimum wage and trade unions for explaining the rise in wage inequality, as documented in Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lee (1999), is difficult to reconcile with perfectly competitive models. Differences in the level and growth of job offer rates between skill groups has received less attention however it seems a priori plausible that innovations such as web-based job platforms (e.g. LinkedIn) represent a form of skill biased technological change in the matching function that contributes to the skill premium in wages.

I therefore relax the assumption of perfect competition between employers, which runs through much of the literature that seeks to explain the rise in US wage inequality over the last four decades. This assumption is present both in relatively early studies such as Katz and Murphy (1992) and later contributions such as Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). A competitive labor market framework, while restrictive in some dimensions, does not preclude a rich variety of explanations for the rise in wage inequality; ranging from the capital-skill complementarity channel in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) to cohort specific supply changes emphasized in Card and Lemieux (2001). However, in a competitive framework these explanations are naturally restricted to two broad categories: those based on technological change; and those based on changes to the skill distribution of workers.

A key contribution of this paper is to develop a structural model that can incorporate both technological and supply based explanations for rising skill premiums alongside explanations reflecting labor market frictions and institutional change as outlined above. The benefit of nesting these explanations in a structural setting

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) attribute the growth in the skill premium to skill-biased technological change in labor efficiency. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) explain the rising premium by the increased use of capital equipment and a production function where capital equipment is more complementary to skilled labor than to unskilled labor.

is that I can use counter-factual model predictions to quantify the relative importance of each channel. Specifically I do this by developing a model that features capital skill complementarity in the spirit of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) and labor markets with on-the-job search and sequential auction wage bargaining model as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). Both frameworks have been very influential in explaining different dimensions of inequality: dynamics of inequality *between* different skill groups in the case of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) and cross-sectional levels of inequality *within* given skill groups in the case of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006).

Developing a model featuring both capital skill complementarity and a sequential auction model of labor markets has value for two main reasons. First, introducing a production framework with imperfect substitution between factor inputs into the sequential auction model makes the latter relevant for questions concerning the level and growth of between-group inequality where before the sequential auction model had principally been used to examine the level of within group inequality. The crucial issue here is that relaxing the assumption of perfect substitution between labor inputs means that relative scarcity of labor inputs influences relative wages, which is clearly an important channel when considering between group inequality.<sup>2,3</sup> The second main benefit to including both capital skill complementarity and search frictions in the same framework is it allows us to examine if the strength of the capital skill complementarity channel found in competitive models - such as Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) - remains valid when allowing for labor market imperfections. This is a crucial question for policy since the degree of substitution between labor inputs of differing skill levels and capital determines the employment and wage effects of many labor market policies such as the minimum wage.

The empirical part of my paper focuses on the contribution of differences in job offer rates, unionization rates and the distribution of match quality between skilled and unskilled workers to the level and rise in the graduate wage premium. It also examines whether the estimates of capital skill complementarity are materially different once these factors are accounted for, as compared to an equivalent model assuming perfect competition (e.g. the original model of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000)). My strategy for taking the model to the data has been to maintain consistency with Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) by focusing on the (college) graduate wage premium as my measure of labor market inequality, and by using data from the U.S National Accounts and the Current Population Survey (CPS).

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<sup>2</sup>For example, see Goldin and Katz (2008) and Card and Lemieux (2001).

<sup>3</sup>Bilal, Engbom, Mongey, and Violante (2019) also develop a sequential auction model of the labor market in an environment with decreasing returns to labour input, where the latter allows them to have a well defined notion of firm size.

My first key finding is that differences in search frictions between graduates and non-graduates can explain all of the *level* of the graduate wage premium averaged over my sample period (1976-2016). This is in large part due to graduates facing estimated job contact rates in employment more than double those for non-graduates, and job destruction rates that are less than half those of non-graduates.<sup>4</sup> However, the advantages graduates enjoy in terms of higher job contact rates and lower job destruction rates stay relatively constant over the sample period meaning they cannot explain the *growth* of the graduate wage premium. This stands in contrast to relative bargaining strength, which I set equal to unionization rates of graduates relative to non-graduates. This is done as an illustrative scenario to investigate the impact of one form of institutional change.<sup>5</sup> At the start of my sample period, unionization rates are similar for graduates and non-graduates but then decline more severely for non-graduates. My second key finding is therefore that the relative decline in unionization of non-graduates can explain a substantial part of the rise in the graduate wage premium, and means estimates of capital-skill complementarity in the production framework of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) are somewhat lower than in an equivalent competitive model.

This second finding is driven by the fact that rising relative bargaining strength for graduates means my baseline model can match the rise in the graduate wage premium with somewhat less capital skill complementarity than the equivalent competitive model i.e. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000). However, it is notable that the parameter estimates in my baseline model are in the same order of magnitude to those in the equivalent competitive model. Both models require the capital skill complementarity channel to be present and relatively strong as, without it, both predict a counter-factual fall in the graduate wage premium in response to the growing supply of college graduates.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present the model, starting first with an overview of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) (henceforth KORV) before explaining how I incorporate search frictions and wage bargaining as per Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) into the production environment in KORV. Section 3 discusses the data I use to estimate the combined

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<sup>4</sup>Job offer rates are not directly observable in the CPS: these estimates therefore refer to model estimates. The estimated average monthly job offer rate for graduate employees is 0.07 over my sample period versus 0.03 for non-graduate employees. In contrast, job destruction rates are estimated directly from employment to unemployment (EU) flow rates in the data: the average monthly EU rate is 0.007 for graduates and 0.018 for non-graduates.

<sup>5</sup>The absence of matched employer employee data with an education variable in the U.S means conventional ways of estimating bargaining strength, e.g. as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), are not available. I therefore examine how institutional change has influenced bargaining strength and hence the graduate wage premium by tying relative bargaining strength of college graduates and non-graduates to their relative unionization rates.

model, before Section 4 presents my econometric approach. Section 5 presents findings and Section 6 concludes.

## 2. THE MODEL

Introducing search frictions and wage bargaining into the production technology in KORV presents a key theoretical challenge: doing so directly would mean firms bargaining with many workers i.e. a multi-player game as per Stole and Zwiebel (1996). These multi-player games seem unlikely to be relevant for considering aggregate dynamics in the labor market. I therefore abstract from such effects by specifying a competitive final good firm, where production is as in KORV, and an intermediate good sector with a labor market structure identical to the sequential auction model of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) i.e. with random search by unemployed and employed workers, firm heterogeneity, and where incumbent employers can respond to job offers made to their employees by rivals. There are segmented intermediate goods sectors for unskilled and skilled labor, and firms within each intermediate goods sector have heterogeneous quality.

I will first present an overview of the KORV model in its original form, before explaining how I incorporate intermediate goods sectors with search frictions into the KORV production environment. Finally, I explain how search frictions and wage bargaining operate within the intermediate goods sector.

### 2.1. KORV Production Function: No Frictions or Intermediate Goods.

In the original formulation of KORV, final good in period  $t$ ,  $Y_t$  is produced using capital structures,  $K_{st,t}$ , capital equipment,  $K_{eq,t}$ , and skilled and unskilled labor,  $S_t$  &  $U_t$ , as inputs, as shown in equation (1).

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= A_t G(K_{st,t}, K_{eq,t}, U_t, S_t) \\ (1) \quad &= A_t K_{st,t}^\alpha [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\sigma}} \end{aligned}$$

with  $\sigma, \gamma < 1$  and  $\alpha, \lambda, \mu \in (0, 1)$ . The elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor input and capital equipment, denoted by  $\varepsilon_{u,keq}$ , is equal to  $1/(1 - \sigma)$ . The elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor inputs, denoted  $\varepsilon_{u,s}$ , is also equal to  $1/(1 - \sigma)$ . Finally, the elasticity of substitution between the skilled labor input and capital equipment, denoted by  $\varepsilon_{s,keq}$ , is equal to  $1/(1 - \gamma)$ . Capital-skill complementarity is present if and only if  $\sigma > \gamma$ . The parameter,  $\alpha$ , together with  $\lambda$ , determine the capital share of output, and  $\mu$  determines the output share of unskilled workers.

Unskilled and skilled labor input are hours worked by non-graduates and graduates in efficiency units e.g  $U_t \equiv \Psi_{u,t} h_{u,t}$ ,  $S_t \equiv \Psi_{s,t} h_{s,t}$ , where  $\Psi_{i,t}$  is the efficiency of labor input of skill type  $i \in \{u, s\}$ , and  $h_{i,t}$  is the total amount of hours worked by that skill type. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), in their baseline

model, impose that  $\Psi_{u,t}$  and  $\Psi_{s,t}$  both follow stationary stochastic processes. They do not allow for any time trend in relative labour efficiency as this would introduce an unexplained source of skills-biased technical change, contrary to the aim of their paper which is to examine the contribution of increased capital use to the rise in the graduate wage premium.

The final good is used for consumption  $c_t$ , investment in capital equipment  $x_{eq,t}$  and investment in capital structures  $x_{st,t}$ , as shown in equation (2), where  $q_t$  is the relative efficiency of producing capital equipment from the final good (or equivalently  $1/q_t$  is the relative price of capital equipment).

$$(2) \quad Y_t = c_t + x_{st,t} + \frac{x_{eq,t}}{q_t}$$

The final good producer has the following profit maximisation problem, where  $(w_{u,t}, w_{s,t})$  denote the wages for unskilled and skilled workers respectively, and  $(r_{st,t}, r_{eq,t})$  denote the rental rates for capital structures and equipment respectively:

$$(3) \quad \max_{K_{st,t}, K_{eq,t}, h_{u,t}, h_{s,t}} \Pi = A_t K_{st,t}^\alpha [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\sigma}} - w_{u,t} h_{u,t} - w_{s,t} h_{s,t} - r_{st,t} K_{st,t} - r_{eq,t} K_{eq,t}$$

In both KORV's original model and in my adaptation the final good producer is assumed to be competitive, so the first order conditions (FOCs) for its profit maximisation problem are as shown in equations (4) through (7).

$$w_{u,t} = A_t (1 - \alpha) K_{st,t}^\alpha [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha-\sigma}{\sigma}} \times \mu U_t^{\sigma-1} \Psi_{u,t} \quad (4)$$

$$w_{s,t} = A_t (1 - \alpha) K_{st,t}^\alpha [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha-\sigma}{\sigma}} \times (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma-\gamma}{\gamma}} (1 - \lambda) S_t^{\gamma-1} \Psi_{s,t} \quad (5)$$

$$r_{eq,t} = A_t (1 - \alpha) K_{st,t}^\alpha [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha-\sigma}{\sigma}} \times (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma-\gamma}{\gamma}} K_{eq,t}^{\gamma-1} \quad (6)$$

$$r_{st,t} = \alpha A_t K_{st,t}^{\alpha-1} [\mu U_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu)(\lambda K_{eq,t}^\gamma + (1 - \lambda) S_t^\gamma)^{\frac{\sigma}{\gamma}}]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\sigma}} \quad (7)$$

In the absence of frictions, growth in the graduate wage premium (denoted by  $\pi_t = w_{s,t}/w_{u,t}$ ) is given in equation (8), where  $g_z$  denotes the growth rate in variable  $z$ .<sup>6</sup>

$$(8) \quad g_{\pi_t} \simeq (1 - \sigma)(g_{h_{u,t}} - g_{h_{s,t}}) + \sigma(g_{\Psi_{s,t}} - g_{\Psi_{u,t}}) + (\sigma - \gamma)\lambda \left( \frac{K_{eq,t}}{S_t} \right) (g_{K_{eq,t}} - g_{\Psi_{s,t}} - g_{h_{s,t}})$$

<sup>6</sup>This is derived by taking logs of the graduate wage premium - given by the final goods firm's FOCs - and then differentiating with respect to time to give equation (8).

**2.2. KORV production function: Incorporating Intermediate Goods.** I incorporate search frictions into the model by introducing two segmented intermediate goods sectors that employ unskilled and skilled workers respectively, with the sector and corresponding skill group indexed by  $i \in \{u, s\}$ . I now interpret  $U_t$  and  $S_t$  as the effective amount of intermediate goods produced in the unskilled and skilled intermediate goods sectors respectively. Specifically I define  $U_t \equiv \Psi_{u,t} y_{u,t}$  and  $S_t \equiv \Psi_{s,t} y_{s,t}$  where  $y_{i,t}$  is the volume of intermediate goods produced in skill sector  $i$  and  $\Psi_{i,t}$  is, analogously to the original KORV environment, the efficiency level of that intermediate good.

In each segmented intermediate goods market, unemployed workers are randomly matched to intermediate firms of quality  $\nu$  (I refer to this as match quality), and with a sampling distribution  $F_{i,t}(\nu)$  and pdf,  $f_{i,t}(\nu)$ . I denote the cdf and pdf of the cross-section distribution of match quality across all employed workers as  $L_{i,t}(\nu)$  and  $l_{i,t}(\nu)$ , which differs from the sampling distribution as workers can search for higher quality matches on the job.

A worker in a match of quality  $\nu$  produces exactly  $\nu$  units of intermediate good for every hour they work, though hours worked are assumed to be fixed within each skill type of worker i.e. hours do not vary with match quality.<sup>7</sup> The effective input of intermediate goods from the unskilled and skilled intermediate sectors are therefore as shown in equation (9), where  $h_{i,t}$  is again the raw total amount of hours worked by workers of skill type  $i$ .

(9)

$$U_t \equiv \Psi_{u,t} y_{u,t} = \Psi_{u,t} h_{u,t} \int_{\nu_{inf,u}}^{\nu_{max}} \nu \ell_{t,u}(\nu) d\nu, \quad S_t \equiv \Psi_{s,t} y_{s,t} = \Psi_{s,t} h_{s,t} \int_{\nu_{inf,s}}^{\nu_{max}} \nu \ell_{t,s}(\nu) d\nu$$

Final good producers are again assumed to be competitive and so pay a price,  $p_i$ , for a unit of type  $i$  intermediate good given by  $p_i = \frac{\partial Y}{\partial y_i}$ . An intermediate good firm of match quality  $\nu$  in intermediate sector  $i$  receives revenue equal to  $p_i \nu$ . The following subsection describes how search frictions and wage bargaining operates within the intermediate goods sectors.

**2.3. Intermediate Goods Sectors.** All intermediate firms and workers have common discount rate,  $\rho$ , and are risk neutral. As is standard in the search literature, I assume firms can employ a maximum of one worker so intermediate firms become synonymous to matches or jobs. Job destruction rates are exogenously given, but allowed to vary by skill sectors and are denoted by  $\delta_{i,t}$ . Workers receive

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<sup>7</sup>I make this assumption to maintain consistency with the original formulation of the KORV production function where labor inputs are measured in efficiency units of total hours worked.

flow income in unemployment equal to  $b_{i,t} * p_{i,t}$ , where  $b_{i,t}$  is their replacement rate and  $p_{i,t}$  is the price of the intermediate good they produce as defined above.<sup>8</sup>

The job offer arrival rates in unemployment and employment are denoted  $\lambda_{0,i,t}, \lambda_{1,i,t}$  and will be assumed to be exogenously given.

### *Intermediate Goods Sector: Wage Bargaining with Unemployed Workers*

Equation (10) represents the Bellman equation for an unemployed worker of skill type  $i$ , where  $V_{0,i}(p_i)$  is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker,  $\phi_0(p_i, \nu)$  is the wage paid to a previously unemployed worker now in a match of quality  $\nu$  and  $V(p_i, \phi_0(p_i, \nu), \nu)$  is the expected lifetime utility of that worker.

$$(10) \quad (\rho + \lambda_{0,i}) V_{0,i}(p_i) = p_i b_i + \lambda_{0,i} \int_{\nu_{inf_i}}^{\nu_{max}} V(p_i, \phi_0(p_i, x), x) dF_i(x)$$

Unemployed workers receive flow income  $b_i p_i$  in the current period and in the next period, which is discounted at rate  $\rho$ , they encounter a match with probability  $\lambda_{0,i}$ , where the match quality is drawn from the distribution  $F_i(\nu)$  and lies in the interval  $[\nu_{inf_i}, \nu_{max}]$ .

As in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), I assume that there is a latent vacancy posting cost, which ensures that intermediate firms won't post a match unless it will be accepted by a worker, so the lower bound of the match quality distribution is the workers reservation match quality  $\nu_{inf_i}$ .

Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) propose a generalized form of Nash bargaining both for unemployed and employed workers. Previously unemployed workers ('entrant' workers) are paid a wage,  $\phi_0(p_i, \nu)$ , that equalizes the expected lifetime utility of working at a match of quality  $\nu$  with the expected lifetime utility of being unemployed plus a share,  $\beta$  (the bargaining parameter), of match surplus  $V(p_i, p_i \nu, \nu) - V_{0,i}(p_i)$ , as expressed in equation (11).<sup>9</sup>

$$(11) \quad V(p_i, \phi_0(p_i, \nu), \nu) = V_{0,i}(p_i) + \beta [V(p_i, p_i \nu, \nu) - V_{0,i}(p_i)]$$

From equations (11) and (10), Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) derive the closed form solution for entrant wages shown in equation (12), where  $\bar{F} \equiv 1 -$

<sup>8</sup>This implies that unemployment income is independent of the match quality that the worker had in their previous employment. Re-employment wages are therefore not path dependent, which aids tractability in the model - see Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) for further discussion.

<sup>9</sup>I have assumed there is zero value to a firm from having a vacancy i.e. a free entry condition holds, which when combined with the assumption of a common discount rate for firms and workers and risk neutrality of all agents means the match surplus can be expressed as  $V(p_i, p_i \nu, \nu) - V_{0,i}(p_i)$  i.e. the match surplus equals the worker surplus when they are paid a wage equal to their marginal product.



$F$ .

$$(12) \quad \phi_0(p_i, \nu) = p_i \cdot \left( \nu_{inf_i} - (1 - \beta) \int_{\nu_{inf_i}}^{\nu} \frac{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{F}_i(x)}{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \beta \bar{F}_i(x)} dx \right)$$

Note that Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) also use equation (11) and 10 to derive the expression for the reservation match quality,  $\nu_{inf_i}$ , shown in equation (13).

$$(13) \quad \nu_{inf_i} = b_i + \int_{\nu_{inf_i}}^{\nu_{max}} \frac{\beta(\lambda_{0,i} - \lambda_{1,i}) \bar{F}_i(x)}{\rho + \delta_i + \beta_i \lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(x)} dx$$

### *Intermediate Goods Sectors: Wage Bargaining with Employed Workers*

A key novelty in the sequential auction model of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) is that incumbent employers can respond to rival job offers made to their employees, in contrast to wage posting models such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998). In this environment, the wage paid to an employee will depend on (i) the match quality of the highest ranked match they have encountered in their employment spell,  $\nu^+$ , which will be at their current employer, (ii) the match quality at their outside option,  $\nu^-$ , which is the second highest match they have encountered in their employment spell, and (iii) the price of the intermediate good they produce,  $p_i$ , which will be the same for all workers in a given skill group  $i$ . I denote this wage  $\phi(p_i, \nu^-, \nu^+)$ .

Suppose a worker employed at a match of quality  $\nu$  encounters a match of quality  $\nu'$ , and is currently paid a wage  $w$ . If  $\nu' > \nu$ , the employee moves to higher quality match and gets wage  $\phi(p_i, \nu, \nu')$ . Encountering a match of quality  $\nu' < \nu$  will trigger a renegotiation of the employees wage contract at their current employer if  $\nu'$  exceeds a threshold, denoted  $\chi(p_i, w, \nu)$ , where  $\chi(p_i, w, \nu)$  is defined by the equality  $\phi(p_i, \chi(p_i, w, \nu), \nu) = w$ .

The Bellman equation for a worker of skill type  $i$  employed at a match of quality  $\nu$  and paid a wage  $w$  is shown in equation (14).

$$\begin{aligned} & [\rho + \delta_i + \lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\chi(p_i, w, \nu))] V_i(p_i, w, \nu) \\ &= w + \delta_i V_{0,i}(p_i) + \lambda_{1,i} \int_{\chi(p_i, w, \nu)}^{\nu} V_i(p_i, \phi(p_i, x, \nu), x) dF_i(x) \\ &+ \lambda_{1,i} \int_{\nu}^{\nu_{max}} V_i(p_i, \phi(p_i, \nu, x), x) dF_i(x) \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

The worker, after receiving wage  $w$  in the current period, will either lose their job with probability  $\delta_i$  or, failing that, make contact with a match that triggers a renegotiation of their wage in the next period with probability  $\lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\chi(p_i, w, \nu))$ . If the match quality at the alternative match,  $x$ , lies in the region  $(\chi(p_i, w, \nu), \nu]$

the worker stays at their current employer and receives a pay rise  $\phi(p_i, x, \nu) - w$ . If  $x > \nu$  the worker moves to the alternative match and gets a wage  $\phi(p_i, \nu, x)$ . Note that this wage need not be greater than their previous wage as workers may be willing to take a pay cut if the possibility of future wage increases at the higher quality match is sufficiently greater than at their incumbent employer.

Equation (15) shows the result of the wage bargaining that occurs when an employee encounters a match of sufficient quality to trigger a wage renegotiation. I denote the higher of the incumbent and rival employer's match quality as  $\nu^+$ , and the lower match quality as  $\nu^-$ . The worker will supply their labor to the higher quality match, and the lower quality match becomes their outside option. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) adapt the Nash bargaining game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) to an environment with rival bidders, and show the bargained wage must satisfy equation (15).

$$(15) \quad V(p_i, \phi(p_i, \nu^-, \nu^+), \nu^+) = V(p_i, p_i \nu^-, \nu^-) + \beta [V(p_i, p_i \nu^+, \nu^+) - V(p_i, p_i \nu^-, \nu^-)]$$

The worker receives their outside option, which is the value of working at the firm with productivity  $\nu^-$  at a wage equal to their marginal product,  $p_i \nu^-$ , plus a share,  $\beta$ , of the match surplus from working at the higher productivity firm.

Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) prove that the wage,  $\phi(p_i, \nu^-, \nu^+)$ , satisfying equation (15) has the form shown in equation (16) when value functions are as defined as in equation (14).

$$(16) \quad \phi(p_i, \nu^-, \nu^+) = p_i \left( \nu^+ - (1 - \beta) \int_{\nu^-}^{\nu^+} \frac{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{F}(x)}{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \beta \bar{F}(x)} dx \right)$$

### *Intermediate Goods Sectors: Wage and Employment Distributions*

The key objects of interest in the model are the wage distributions for each skill type of worker. The analysis of the preceding sections indicates that a worker's wage depends on two stochastic variables: their current match quality,  $\nu$ , and that of their outside option,  $\chi$ . As in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), I impose that the labor market is in steady state in order to derive expressions for the cross section distributions of  $\nu$ ,  $L_i(\nu)$ , and of  $\chi$  conditional on  $\nu$ ,  $L_i(\chi|\nu)$ .

Steady state in the labor market requires equations (17) through to (19) to hold (where  $e_i^{ue}$  denotes the unemployment rate of skill type  $i$ , and I have suppressed that there is a total population,  $N_i$ , of type  $i$  workers that would multiply both

sides of each equation).

$$(17) \quad \delta_i(1 - e_i^{ue}) = \lambda_{0,i}e_i^{ue}$$

$$(18) \quad \lambda_{0,i}F_i(\nu)e_i^{ue} = [(\lambda_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\nu) + \delta_i)](1 - e_i^{ue})L_i(\nu)$$

$$(19) \quad \lambda_{0,i}f(\nu)e_i^{ue} + \lambda_{1,i}L_i(\chi)f(\nu)(1 - e_i^{ue}) = [(\lambda_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\chi) + \delta_i)] \times (1 - e_i^{ue})L_i(\chi|\nu)\ell_i(\nu)$$

Equation (17) requires that the inflows of workers into unemployment, which is shown in the left hand side (LHS) of the equation, equals the outflow from unemployment which is shown on the right hand side (RHS). Equation (18) requires the inflow (LHS of the equation) into the measure of workers employed at a match of quality less than  $\nu$  equals the outflow (RHS of the equation): the inflow consists of unemployed workers who make contact with a match of quality less than  $\nu$  with probability  $\lambda_{0,i}F_i(\nu)$ , and the outflow is employed workers with match quality below  $\nu$  who either lose their job with probability  $\delta_i$  or make contact with a higher quality match with probability  $\lambda_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\nu)$ . Finally equation (19) requires that the inflow (LHS of the equation) into the measure of workers employed at a match of quality  $\nu$  and with an outside option of match quality less than  $\chi$  equals the outflow (RHS of the equation): the inflow consists of unemployed workers meeting a match of quality  $\nu$  with probability  $\lambda_{0,i}f(\nu)$  (by definition their outside option, i.e. unemployment, has a match quality less than all feasible values of  $\chi$ ), plus workers previously employed at a match of quality less than  $\chi$  who make contact with a match of quality  $\nu$  with probability  $\lambda_{1,i}L_i(\chi)f(\nu)$ ; the outflow is employed workers with a match quality equal to  $\nu$  and with an outside option of match quality less than  $\chi$  who either lose their job with probability  $\delta_i$  or receive an offer of a match of quality exceeding  $\chi$  with probability  $\lambda_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\chi)$ .

The expressions for the steady state cross sectional distribution of workers across matches and outside options derived from the steady state requirements above are shown in equations (20) and (21), where  $\kappa_{1,i} \equiv \frac{\lambda_{1,i}}{\delta_i}$ .

$$(20) \quad L_i(\nu) = \frac{F_i(\nu)}{1 + \kappa_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\nu)}$$

$$(21) \quad L_i(\chi|\nu) = \left[ \frac{1 + \kappa_{1,i}L_i(\chi)}{1 + \kappa_{1,i}L_i(\nu)} \right]^2$$

The expected wage for a worker of type  $i$  is given by:

$$(22) \quad E(w_i) = p_i \int_{\underline{\nu}}^{\nu_{max}} \left[ \nu - [1 + \kappa_{1,i}\bar{F}_i(\nu)]^2 \times \right.$$

$$\int_{\nu_{inf}}^{\nu} \frac{(1 - \beta)[1 + \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i + \rho} \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(x)]}{[1 + \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i + \rho} \kappa_{1,i} \beta \bar{F}_i(x)][1 + \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(x)]^2} dx \Big] \ell_i(\nu) d\nu$$

The graduate wage premium in the model ( $E(w_s)/E(w_u)$ ) will therefore depend on the same variables as in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), which influence the price of the intermediate good produced by skill type  $i$ ,  $p_i$ , but also on relative job mobility rates, outside options in unemployment, distributions of match quality, and bargaining strength. In this paper I use the same data as in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) which limits my ability to identify the impact of all these potential channels on the graduate wage premium. I focus on the impact of changes to relative job mobility rates, outside options in unemployment and to the distribution of match quality.

### 3. DATA

This section describes the data I use to estimate the parameters in the KORV production function and in the sequential auction labor markets in the intermediate goods sectors. I then present my estimation approach in detail in Section 4 with identification further examined in Appendix B.

**3.1. Data: Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000).** In keeping with KORV's original approach, I use labor market data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and data on capital inputs and the labor share of income from U.S national accounts. Skilled (unskilled) labor is defined as total hours worked by graduates (non-graduates).<sup>10</sup> The authors split each skill type down further into education, gender and race cells to impute hours for those with missing data. I follow their exact approach for comparability.<sup>11</sup>

The authors differentiate between capital equipment, such as machinery, hardware and software, and capital structures e.g. buildings, as capital-skill complementarity is more likely to occur with the former than the latter.<sup>12</sup> An important element

<sup>10</sup>All CPS data is taken from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) distribution: <https://cps.ipums.org/cps/>


<sup>11</sup>See Appendix 1 of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) for details of this approach

<sup>12</sup>The capital stock series are constructed recursively as per Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000): I use a starting stock of capital equipment and structures in 1963 using data from National Accounts data and add annual investment data in equipment and structures also from the National Accounts. Both investment series are deflated by the non-durable consumption deflator used in DiCecio (2009) (available on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' Economic Data website (FRED): <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CONSDEF>). Capital equipment investment is additionally deflated using the relative capital equipment deflator from DiCecio (2009) (also available on FRED: <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PERIC>), which is based on the approach

of KORV's approach is using a relative price deflator for capital equipment that is based on the approach of Gordon (1990), which they use to calculate the real value of the stock of capital equipment (all other variables are deflated using a GDP deflator). This relative price of equipment falls significantly over KORV's sample period, which in turn implies that the real value of capital equipment used by firms increases appreciably faster than capital structures. Polgreen and Silos (2008) show that use of alternative price series suggest significantly less capital skill complementarity.

The key trends driving results in KORV are summarised in Figure 1. The rise in the graduate wage premium shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1 happens despite the increase in relative supply of skilled labor shown in Panel (b): given the authors assume constant relative labor efficiency in their baseline specification, the only possible driver of the rise in the graduate wage premium is the growing use of capital equipment shown in Panel (c) combined with some degree of capital skill complementarity, which is indeed what their results suggest. The authors estimate an elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor of 1.67 vs an equivalent elasticity of 0.67 for skilled labor.

FIGURE 1. Key Data Trends in KORV




Notes: The grey dashed line in all panels represents the end of the sample period used in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000). Wage and hours worked data (shown in panels (a) and (b) respectively) are taken from the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement of the CPS, and modified as per Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000). Panel (c) shows the relative stock of capital equipment to capital structures.

of Gordon (1990). I apply the same depreciation rates for capital stock as Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000): 12.5% for equipment and 5% for structures.

**3.2. Data: Labor Market Frictions.** I supplement the data used by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) with data on labor market frictions, also from the CPS. With each measure of labor market friction, the key dimension of interest will be the time trend in frictions for skilled workers relative to the trend faced by unskilled workers. In the absence of distinct trends in relative frictions it is unlikely that incorporating labor market frictions into KORV will offer a different explanation for the rise in the graduate wage premium than the original KORV specification.

A crucial search friction is the degree of competitive intensity,  $\kappa_{1,i}$  which is the rate of job to job contact rates relative to job destruction rates ( $\kappa_{1,i} \equiv \frac{\lambda_{1,i}}{\delta_i}$ ). This determines how quickly workers proceed up the job ladder. I take job destruction rates from the monthly panel element of the CPS, as shown in Figure 2. While skilled workers have lower job destruction rates than unskilled workers in all years, this difference has narrowed over time as unskilled workers' job destruction rates have trended downwards while those of skilled workers have a relatively stable trend.




Notes: Job destruction rates are the average monthly transition rates of workers from employment to unemployment for a given year. Panel (a) shows the series separately for unskilled and skilled workers, Panel (b) shows the series for skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers. Source: Basic Monthly files of the CPS.

Job contact rates are not readily observable in the CPS and there has only been a question on change of employers since 1994, which hampers comparison with

KORV since their original sample period finished in 1992. Since in any case job-to-job transitions would be used to infer job contact rates (not all contacts result in a transition), I use an alternative measure of job mobility which is the proportion of continuously employed individuals that report having at least two non-concurrent employers in the previous year (the ‘multiple employer’ rate) which is shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows that movements in the multiple employer rate track movements to job-to-job mobility rates very closely.<sup>13</sup>

In absolute terms, skilled workers have generally had slightly higher multiple employer rates than unskilled workers. This difference has been broadly stable over time, though it appears to be relatively counter-cyclical. Both job-to-job mobility and multiple employer rates have declined significantly since the early 2000s for skilled and unskilled workers alike.<sup>14</sup>




Notes: The multiple employer rate is the proportion of workers with no spells of unemployment who have had more than one non-concurrent employer in the previous year. Panel (a) shows the series separately for unskilled and skilled workers, Panel (b) shows the series for skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers. Source: Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the CPS.

The importance of movements up and down the job ladder for mean wages depends on the dispersion of match quality. I use the standard deviation of log residual

<sup>13</sup>The CPS question on number of employers in the last year started in 1976.

<sup>14</sup>The aggregate trend of declining job flows is documented in e.g. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2016) and Molloy, Smith, Trezzi, and Wozniak (2016)

FIGURE 4. Multiple Employer and Job-to-Job Mobility Rates



Notes: The figure compares the multiple employer rate defined in Figure 3 to the average monthly transition rate of employees to new jobs ('Job-to-Job Mobility Rate') from the Basic Monthly files of the CPS. Panel (a) shows this comparison for unskilled workers, Panel (b) shows the comparison for skilled workers. Both series are normalised with reference to their value in 1995.


wages as a target to identify the distribution of match quality (Section 4 and Appendix B discuss estimation and identification in more detail). I calculate the residual wage after controlling for years of education, race, sex and year in Mincer type wage regression. I do this separately for skilled and unskilled workers. I do not control for age since there are some endogenous returns to job tenure and total employment duration in my model, both of which are correlated with age (and are not directly measured in the CPS over the duration of my sample period).<sup>15</sup> This measure of dispersion increases in relative terms for skilled workers as shown in Figure 5.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup>This risks attributing some variance in wages driven by human capital returns to experience to job ladder effects. However, I find that my estimates of the parameters of the KORV production function do not change if I control for age when calculating residual wage variance - see Appendix C for this and other robustness checks. Nevertheless there may still be some unobservable human capital differences not picked up by either years of education or age that get attributed to job ladder effects using this approach. This represents a disadvantage of maintaining consistency with KORV by using employee data only rather than using matched employee-employer data to better distinguish worker and firm fixed effects.

<sup>16</sup>Note that using other measures of wage dispersion, such as the interquartile range, does not change my estimates of the KORV production function parameters - see Appendix C.



FIGURE 5. Residual Log Wage Dispersion




Notes: The figure shows the variance of residual log hourly wages from a Mincer wage regression of wages against education, race, sex and year. Hourly wages are again calculated as per Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) using ASEC CPS data, but are now trimmed (by dropping hourly wages in the bottom and top percentiles) to minimise measurement error. Panel (a) shows the series separately for unskilled and skilled workers, Panel (b) shows the series for skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers.

A key advantage of investigating skill premiums in a labor market model with wage bargaining is that this environment allows us to explore the impact of institutions that influence the relative wage bargaining strength of skilled and unskilled workers. As an illustrative scenario, I focus on the evolution of unionization rates as a measure of institutional change and will assume bargaining strength for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers moves in line with their relative unionization rates, as described in further detail in Section 4.2.<sup>17</sup> Figure 6 shows that unionization rates (% of individuals in a trade union) start off at similar levels for skilled and unskilled workers but decrease more severely for unskilled workers, a pattern which is documented using a number of data sources in Farber, Herbst, Kuziemko, and Naidu (2018).

Finally the environment workers face in unemployment, both in terms of unemployment flow income and job contact rates, has an impact on the average quality

<sup>17</sup>I refer to this as an illustrative scenario since bargaining strength in an model of individual wage bargaining, such as mine, is likely determined by many institutional and individual characteristics other than unionization. A promising avenue for future research would be to estimate relative strength using the labor share in sectors with large concentrations of unskilled and skilled workers.

FIGURE 6. Unionization Rates



Notes: The figure shows the % of individuals in a trade union, as measures in the CPS. A consistent measure of this is available in the CPS from 1984 onward.


of matches and wages for employed workers. This impact is less in models with on-the-job search than in models without, but it nonetheless must be accounted for.

Specifically I will need to estimate or calculate the lower bound of the match quality distribution for each skill type,  $\nu_{inf,i}$ . In principle, this could be done by exploiting the tractable relationship between the lower bound of the sampling distribution of match quality and unemployment replacement rates and job contact rates shown previously in equation (13).

However, replacement rates are determined not only by legislative framework but also by the degree of insurance provided by asset accumulation, family/social relationships and many other factors beyond this making it difficult to observe in practice. I therefore directly estimate  $\nu_{inf,i}$  by targeting the ratio of average wages of workers in the first five percentiles of the wage distribution to the median wage. This empirical moment is shown in Figure 7, where the trends shown suggest changes to outside options have compressed the tail of the unskilled wage distribution more than for skilled workers.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>The estimated parameters of the KORV production function are not sensitive to using different measures of the lower bound of the wage distribution i.e. the actual minimum, or different wage percentiles - see Appendix C.

FIGURE 7. Lower Bound of Wages Relative To Median



Notes: The figure shows the lower bound of the wage distribution (defined as the average wage of workers in the bottom five percentiles of the wage distribution) divided by the median wage. Hourly wages are again calculated as per Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) using ASEC CPS data, but are now trimmed (by dropping hourly wages in the bottom and top percentiles) to minimise measurement error. Panel (a) shows the series separately for unskilled and skilled workers, Panel (b) shows the series for skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers.

Note that when I simply replicate KORV's estimation approach I use exactly the same treatment of the data as they do, however when it comes to incorporating frictions I will trim the bottom and top percentile of the wage distribution out of the sample to minimize measurement error, which is more of a concern for estimating the sequential auction part of my model since I target higher order wage moments than when estimating the KORV parameters.

Overall, the key patterns we see are that job destruction rates are substantially lower for graduates, but that this advantage erodes over the sample period. This stands in contrast to unionization rates - which will drive my baseline scenario for bargaining strength- which start at similar values for unskilled and skilled workers but decline more rapidly for the former. Multiple employer rates - my preferred measure of job mobility - exhibit similar levels and trends for unskilled and skilled workers.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>This does not imply job offer rates are similar for unskilled and skilled workers however since job mobility is a function of job offer rates and job destruction rates: this is discussed further in Section 5.2.

#### 4. ESTIMATION APPROACH

As with my exposition of the model, I will first present the original estimation approach used by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), i.e. under perfect competition and with no intermediate goods sectors. I then set-out a two stage strategy for estimating the KORV parameters in the context of my model. The first stage is to estimate the parameters of the sequential auction model in the intermediate goods markets. The second stage is to incorporate results from the first stage to estimate the parameters of the KORV production function in the final good sector.

**4.1. KORV Estimation: Without Frictions.** Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) estimate their model by simulated pseudo maximum likelihood (SPML), matching the model's predictions for the labor share of output and the wage bill ratio of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, denoted  $lsh_t$  and  $wbr_t$  respectively, to their empirical counterparts.<sup>20</sup> In addition, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) target a no arbitrage condition between capital structures and equipment, i.e. their empirical strategy aims to minimise the difference between the model's predictions for the rate-of-return (RoR) on capital structures and the predicted RoR for capital equipment, alongside the other empirical targets mentioned above.<sup>21</sup> All model moments come from the first order conditions of the final good firm's profit maximisation condition given in equations (4) through (7). This estimation strategy is summarised in equations (23), (24) and (25) respectively, where  $X_t$  is the set of factor inputs  $(K_{st,t}, K_{eq,t}, U_t, S_t)$ ,  $(\kappa_{eq}, \kappa_{st})$  are the depreciation rates for capital equipment and structures respectively, and  $\phi$  is the vector of all parameters to be estimated.

$$(23) \quad \frac{w_{u,t}h_{u,t} + w_{s,t}h_{s,t}}{Y_t} = lsh_t(X_t, \psi_t; \phi)$$

$$(24) \quad \frac{w_{s,t}h_{s,t}}{w_{u,t}h_{u,t}} = wbr_t(X_t, \psi_t; \phi)$$

$$(25) \quad 0 = (1 - \kappa_{st}) + A_{t+1}G_{K_{s,t}}((X_t, \psi_t; \phi) - E_t(\frac{q_t}{q_{t+1}})(1 - \kappa_{eq}) - q_t A_{t+1}G_{K_{eq,t}}((X_t, \psi_t; \phi)$$

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<sup>20</sup>SPML is generally attributed to Laroque and Salanie (1993) and is used when a closed form solution for the exact likelihood or quasi likelihood are both unavailable. Just as MLE can be viewed as a specific form of GMM (where the expectation of the score is the relevant moment), so SPML can be viewed as specific form of SMM where I am taking the expectation of a set of moments across both simulations and across time.

<sup>21</sup>This is done as neither RoR is directly observable in the data.

Equations (23), (24) and (25) can be represented in vector form as  $Z_t = f(X_t, \psi_t, \epsilon_t; \phi)$ , where  $Z_t$  is a vector of the empirical or targeted moments on the left hand side of equations (23), (24) and (25) and  $f(X_t, \psi_t, \epsilon_t; \phi)$  is a vector of the model moments on the right hand side of these equations.

Note that there are two stochastic elements in this system of estimation equations. First  $\psi_t$  is a  $(2 \times 1)$  vector of the log of the efficiency levels of unskilled and skilled labor respectively, and is assumed to follow a stationary process in KORV's benchmark estimation as set out in equation (26).

$$(26) \quad \psi_t = \psi_0 + \omega_t, \quad \psi_t \equiv \log . (\Psi_{u,t}, \Psi_{s,t})$$

$\omega_t$  is a vector shock process to the log of labor efficiency that is assumed to be multivariate normal and *iid* with covariance matrix  $\Omega$  i.e.  $\omega \stackrel{i.i.d}{\sim} N(0, \Omega)$ , and  $\psi_0$  is a vector of the log of initial values of unskilled and skilled labor efficiency  $(\psi_{0,u}, \psi_{0,s})$ . In the benchmark estimation, the authors impose that there is no covariance between the two labor efficiency shocks and that they have a common variance so  $\Omega$  can be rewritten as  $\Omega = \eta_\omega^2 I$ .<sup>22</sup>

The other stochastic process in this estimation procedure is in the no arbitrage condition, equation (25), where the third term on the right hand side of this equation  $E_t(\frac{q_t}{q_{t+1}})(1 - \kappa_{eq})$  is the undepreciated capital equipment multiplied by the expected rate of change in the relative price of equipment. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) make the simplifying assumption that this term can be replaced with  $\frac{q_t}{q_{t+1}}(1 - \kappa_{eq}) + \epsilon_t$ , where  $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \eta_{\epsilon_t})$ .

In principle, the vector of parameters to be estimated,  $\phi$ , contains 11 elements  $:\{\kappa_{st}, \kappa_{eq}, \alpha, \mu, \lambda, \sigma, \gamma, \eta_\epsilon, \eta_\omega, \psi_{0,u}, \psi_{0,s}\}$ . However the authors calibrate  $(\kappa_{st}, \kappa_{eq})$  using estimates from the literature, estimate  $\eta_\epsilon$  separately, and normalize  $\psi_{0,s} = 0$ .<sup>23</sup> This leaves  $\phi = \{\alpha, \mu, \lambda, \sigma, \gamma, \eta_\omega, \psi_{0,u}\}$  to be estimated i.e seven parameters: given the estimation approach targets three moments for each year of their 30 year dataset, the model is over-identified.

Finally, the authors construct an instrument for hours worked,  $\hat{h}_{u,t}, \hat{h}_{s,t}$  to allow for potential endogeneity between relative hours worked and relative wages.<sup>24</sup> While such endogeneity would be irrelevant if the sole goal was to match the model to the

<sup>22</sup>As a robustness check, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) do allow for a non-zero covariance between the two efficiency shocks and differing variances, but the estimated covariance is very small and there is little difference between the estimated variances so they opt for a benchmark estimation with zero covariance and a common variance.

<sup>23</sup>The authors set  $\kappa_{eq} = 0.125$  and  $\kappa_{st} = 0.05$  following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and estimate  $\eta_\epsilon$  via an ARMA regression of  $q_t$ .

<sup>24</sup>The instruments are constructed by regressing hours worked of each skill type against a constant, current, and lagged stock of capital equipment and structures, the lagged relative

data, instrumenting labor inputs means one can more credibly give the parameters economic interpretations, i.e. as elasticities of substitution, and hence use the model for counter-factual analysis. The exogenous factor inputs used in model estimation are therefore  $\hat{X}_t = (K_{st,t}, K_{eq,t}, \hat{h}_{u,t}, \hat{h}_{s,t})$ . Estimation then proceeds in three steps:

- (1) Draw  $S$  values of the vector of shocks to labor efficiency,  $\omega_t^j$ , and of the forecast error in expected price gains of capital equipment,  $\epsilon_t^j$ , (where  $j$  indexes the realization of the shock) to get  $S$  realizations of  $f(\hat{X}_t, \psi_t^j, \epsilon_t^j; \phi)$  from the model for each time period  $t$ ,

- (2) Use these  $S$  realizations to obtain the following moments:

$$m_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi) = \frac{1}{S} \sum_{i=1}^S f(\hat{X}_t, \psi_t^i, \epsilon_t^i; \phi)$$

$$V_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi) = \frac{1}{S-1} \sum_{i=1}^S (f(\hat{X}_t, \psi_t^i, \epsilon_t^i; \phi) - m_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi))(f(\hat{X}_t, \psi_t^i, \epsilon_t^i; \phi) - m_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi))'$$

- (3) Minimise the following objective function:

$$(27) \quad l_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi) = \frac{1}{2T} \sum_{t=1}^T \left\{ (Z_t - m_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi))' (V_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi))^{-1} \right. \\ \left. \times (Z_t - m_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi)) + \log(\det(V_s(\hat{X}_t, \phi))) \right\}$$

In a companion paper to Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), Ohanian, Violante, Krusell, and Ros-Rull (1997) look at how successfully the estimation approach above identifies the true parameters of the model in Monte Carlo simulations, and find very small median and mean biases in estimators even when using relatively few simulations in estimation i.e. for  $S = 10$ . They find that for  $S = 50$  the mean bias is “essentially zero”.

**4.2. Incorporating Frictions into KORV Estimation.** I proceed in two steps to incorporate the sequential auction model of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) into estimation of the KORV production function parameters. First I separately estimate the parameters of the sequential auction model, which include job contact rates for employed workers of each skill type  $\lambda_{1,i,t}$  and the parameters of their match distribution. Appendix B examines identification of these parameters in greater detail, showing exact identification of the job contact rates using the empirical strategy outlined here and providing evidence from Monte Carlo

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price of equipment, a trend, and the lagged value of the U.S. business cycle indicator produced by the Economic Cycle Research Institute: <https://www.businesscycle.com/ecri-reports-indexes/all-indexes>.

simulations that my strategy for estimating the parameters of the match quality distribution also successfully identifies the true parameters of the model.

In the second part of my estimation approach, I estimate the parameters of the KORV production function incorporating the changes to labor market frictions implied by the first stage of my estimation process. This second step is, in econometric terms, a minor modification of the original approach of Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), as presented above, that uses two key outputs from the sequential auction model: the average match quality and wage of each skill type of worker, which are both identified up to a scaling factor in the first stage of estimation. This scaling factor is the price of the intermediate good produced in a given skill sector, which is determined by the parameters of the KORV production function. The rest of this section describes each of these steps in greater detail, starting with estimation of the sequential auction model.

#### *Sequential Auction Estimation: Job Contact Rates*

The monthly job contact rate for employees,  $\lambda_{1,i,t}$ , is chosen so that the model matches the empirical proportion of individuals continuously employed in a year who have more than one employer (the multiple employer rate, denoted  $\tau_{i,t}$ ). This moment is given in the model by equation (28).

$$(28) \quad \tau_{i,t} = 1 - \int_{\nu_{inf_{i,t}}}^{\nu_{max}} (1 - \lambda_{1,i,t} \bar{F}_{i,t}(\nu))^{12} dL_{i,t}(\nu)$$

In Appendix B, I show that this expression is independent of the match quality distribution meaning I can estimate job contact rates separately of distributional parameters. The expression is also an increasing monotonic function of  $\lambda_{1,i}$  which implies this parameter is indeed identified when I estimate it by simulated method of moments, as set out in equation (29) (where  $\hat{x}$  denotes the empirical counterpart of model moment  $x$ ).

$$(29) \quad \lambda_{1,i,t}^* = \underset{\lambda_{1,i,t}}{\operatorname{argmin}} (\tau_t(\lambda_{1,i,t}) - \hat{\tau}_t)^2$$

#### *Sequential Auction Estimation: Distribution of Match Heterogeneity*

I assume that sampling distribution of match heterogeneity can be characterized by a lower truncated log normal distribution, and therefore can be fully described by three parameters: the mean and variance parameters,  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$ ,  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$ , and lower truncation point,  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}$ . Note that by estimating the lower bounds directly I bypass the need to estimate job contact rates for the unemployed or replacement rates. This follows

because my principal interest is to estimate the distribution of wages and match quality for workers in the intermediate goods market; unemployment conditions influence these variables through the lower bound of the match quality distribution only.

Given I have data on employees only, and not employers, a natural option to estimate  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  is to use moments of the wage distribution for workers of each skill type  $i \in u, s$ . Note, however, that all wages of a given skill type are scaled by the price of the intermediate good,  $p_i$  (see equation (16)), which depends on the parameters of the KORV production function that I have yet to estimate. I therefore require the moment of the wage distribution that I will target to be scale invariant, and so choose the variance of log residual wages.

As both  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  have a positive monotonic impact on match quality dispersion in the model, they will not be separately identified using the variance of log wages. I therefore set the value of  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$  to target the mean of the sampling distribution,  $\mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu)$ , to an arbitrary fixed value ( $= 1$ ). Note that this also avoids introducing a ‘black-box’ source of skills biased technological change via an increase in the relative means of the sampling distribution of match quality  $\mathbb{E}^{F_{s,t}}(\nu)/\mathbb{E}^{F_{u,t}}(\nu)$  (Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) impose that the relative labor efficiency of skilled to unskilled workers is constant for the same reason). This does not rule out an endogenous increase in the mean of the cross section distribution of match quality  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(\nu)$ . The variance parameter of the sampling distribution of match quality,  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$ , is left free to match the dispersion of residual log wages within a skill type  $i$  in the model to its empirical counterpart.

Finally I must estimate the lower bound of the distribution of match quality,  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}$ . Provided the bargaining parameter is sufficiently high, a worker at a match of quality  $\nu = \nu_{inf_{i,t}}$  will earn the lowest wage in the model’s wage distribution, denoted  $\underline{w}_{i,t}$ , where  $\underline{w}_{i,t} = \nu_{inf_{i,t}} \times p_{i,t}$ .<sup>25</sup> Since all wages are scaled by the price of the intermediate good,  $p_{i,t}$ , which will not be estimated at this stage, rather than target the absolute lower bound of the wage distribution I target the ratio of the lower bound to the median wage:  $\underline{w}_{i,t}(\nu_{inf_{i,t}})/Q_{w_{i,t}}^{50}(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf_{i,t}})$ . When it comes to the empirical counterpart of this moment, I choose to use the average wages of

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<sup>25</sup>In the model, the minimum wage in the population of workers will be paid to workers with match quality equal to the lower bound of the match distribution in the model when  $\beta > \frac{\lambda_1}{\rho + \delta + 2\lambda_1}$ . This condition is derived from observing first that the wage expression in equation (16) is always decreasing in  $\nu^-$ , so the lowest wage observable wage will certainly belong to those who have come from unemployment i.e. workers who have  $\nu^- = \nu_{inf}$ . Such workers will have a wage precisely equal to  $\nu_{inf}$  when they are matched with the lowest match quality firms i.e.  $\nu^+ = \nu^- = \nu_{inf}$ . Finally a sufficient condition for this to be the lowest wage in the population is that the derivative of the wage expression with respect to the current match quality,  $\nu^+$ , is positive for this worker and the second derivative is always positive. The latter condition always holds, and former holds when  $\beta$  is greater than the threshold shown above.



workers in the bottom five percentiles of the wage distribution (again relative to the median) rather than the minimum of the empirical wage distribution as this is likely to be subject to significant measurement error.

In summary, I estimate the parameters of the sampling distribution,  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$ ,  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu$ , by solving the minimization problem shown in equation (30), where  $\hat{x}$  denotes the empirical counterpart of model moment  $x$ , and  $W$  is the weighting matrix.<sup>26</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} (\zeta_{i,t}^{\nu*}, \eta_{i,t}^{\nu*}, \nu_{inf_{i,t}}^{\nu*}) &= \underset{\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu}{\operatorname{argmin}} (m_t - \hat{m}_t)^T W (m_t - \hat{m}_t) \\ m_t &\equiv (\operatorname{var}_{\log(w_{i,t})}(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu), \underline{w}_{i,t}(\nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu) / Q_{w_{i,t}}^{50}(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu), \\ &\mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu)(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf_{i,t}}^\nu)) \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

I calculate the moments of the wage distribution in the model for a given guess of parameters by generating a sample of workers using the cross section distributions of workers' match quality and outside options given in equations (18) and (19) respectively, and then using equation (16) to derive the wages of these workers. Note that for notational convenience equation (30) suppresses the dependence of the model moments on job destruction rates,  $\delta_i$ , and job contact rates,  $\lambda_{1,i}$ , which are taken from the data and estimated in the previous step respectively.

#### *Sequential Auction Estimation: Bargaining Parameters*

I examine the impact of changing institutions on the wage bargaining environment by calibrating the bargaining parameters using relative unionization rates in the data. This is meant as an illustrative scenario since unionization rates are likely just one of the many determinants of individual bargaining strength represented by the parameter  $\beta_{i,t}$  in the model. However, the empirical evidence on union wage premiums, e.g. in Farber, Herbst, Kuziemko, and Naidu (2018), does suggest union membership continues to have a significant impact on wages. This evidence also suggests union membership has a more significant effect on the wages of unskilled workers than on the wages of skilled workers, a result that will be consistent with my counterfactual simulations.

Given the illustrative nature of the exercise, I set  $\beta_{s,t} = \beta_{s,0} = 0.95 \forall t$ , and adjust  $\beta_{u,t}$  such that  $\beta_{s,0}/\beta_{u,t}$  equals the empirical ratio of unionization rates in each period.<sup>27</sup> I find lower levels of the bargaining parameters mean the model struggles to simultaneously hit the level of the labor share and the rise in the graduate wage

<sup>26</sup>The weighting matrix  $W$ , is chosen so I effectively minimize the percentage deviation of model moments from their empirical moments, which avoids the scale of absolute moment deviations biasing estimates i.e.  $W = I \cdot \frac{1}{\hat{m}}$ .

<sup>27</sup>An alternative approach is to estimate  $\beta_{s,0}$ , exploiting its impact on the labor share by estimating it jointly with the KORV production parameters. I have found this approach significantly

premium seen in the data. This occurs because the sequential auction part of the model sets an upper bound on the labor share in the overall model: incorporating a final goods sector with capital inputs will always lower the labor share relative to its level in the intermediate goods sector where labor is the only input. The upper bound on the labor share implied by the sequential auction results may be close to or even below the empirical labor share that I am targeting if the bargaining parameter is set too low. This issue is discussed in more detail in Appendix A. Although this calibrated bargaining parameter value appears high compared to some results in the micro literature, for example Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), many of these estimates come from structural models that do not feature capital and so are not directly comparable to ours.

#### *Sequential Auction Estimation: Discount Rate*

Finally, I arbitrarily set the monthly discount rate to 0.004.

#### *Adding Sequential Auction Results to KORV Estimation*

I adopt essentially the same empirical approach as Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) i.e matching the models predictions for the evolution of the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers and the labor share of income to their empirical counterparts and targeting a zero rate-of-return (RoR) difference between capital structure and capital equipment in the model. However, I make two key modifications to incorporate results from the sequential auction stage of my estimation approach.

The first modification is necessary because the unskilled and skilled labor inputs are not simply hours worked by the two types but rather the amount of intermediate goods from each skill type sector. The inputs  $U_t$  and  $S_t$  therefore become as defined in equation (9) where I multiply the labor inputs that KORV use (total hours in efficiency units) by the average match quality in each skill sector. Estimates of average match quality are derived from simulations using estimated parameters from the sequential auction part of my model, and are denoted  $\mathbb{E}^{\hat{L}_{i,t}}(\nu) \equiv \int_{\nu_{inf_{i,t}}}^{\nu_{max}} \nu \hat{\ell}_{i,t}(\nu)$  (where hats denote estimated variables or parameters).

Second average wages for a given skill type  $i$  are no longer simply the marginal product of that skill type in production of the final good, but are determined as specified in equation (22). I decompose this expression into two parts, as shown below.

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increases computation time and the complexity of estimation, without substantially improving model fit. It also yields an estimate of  $\beta_{s,0} = 0.90$  i.e. not far away from my calibrated value.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}) &= p_{i,t} \times \mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1) \\
\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1) &\equiv \int_{\nu_{inf}}^{\nu_{max}} \left[ \nu - [1 + \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}(\nu)]^2 \times \right. \\
&\quad \left. \int_{\nu_{inf}}^{\nu} \frac{(1 - \beta)[1 + \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i + \rho} \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}(x)]}{[1 + \frac{\delta_i}{\delta_i + \rho} \kappa_{1,i} \beta \bar{F}(x)][1 + \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}(x)]^2} dx \right] \ell_i(\nu) d\nu
\end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

Thus average wages are calculated by multiplying the price of the intermediate good  $p_{i,t}$  (its marginal product in the production of the final good) by the average wages in the intermediate good sector when the price of the intermediate good is normalized to one  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$ . As with estimates for average match quality, I estimate  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$  by using estimation results from the sequential auction part of my model.

To summaries, I adapt KORV's original methodology to include intermediate goods sectors with sequential auction labor markets via two modifications. First I scale the labor input of a given skill type  $i$  by a 'productivity scale' which is my estimate of the average match quality in their intermediate good sector,  $\mathbb{E}^{\hat{L}_{i,t}}(\nu)$ . Second, I then calculate average wages by multiplying the marginal product of a given intermediate good in the KORV production function (for a given parameter guess) by a 'wage scale' that is my estimate of average normalized wages in the relevant intermediate goods sector,  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$ . Otherwise, estimation of the parameters of the KORV production function proceeds exactly as described in Section 4.1.


## 5. RESULTS

This section starts by verifying that I can replicate the results provided in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) when I use their estimation strategy and data. I also present the results of replicating KORV's methodology, i.e. with no frictions, for an updated sample period. I then show results from estimation of the sequential auction model of the intermediate goods sectors, and finally I show the impact of incorporating intermediate goods sectors with search frictions into estimation of the KORV production function. When considering this impact my focus will be on how, if at all, estimates of capital skill complementarity change and how that changes explanations for the rise in the graduate wage premium.

**5.1. Replication of KORV methodology.** I am able to replicate results from KORV both in terms of fit to the author provided data (see Figure 8 for my fit to the data and Figure 9 for the equivalent figure in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and

Violante (2000)) and in terms of parameter estimates (see Table 1). In particular, I estimate very similar levels of capital skill complementarity (as measured by the difference in the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment, denoted  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}}$ , and the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital equipment, denoted  $\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ ).

FIGURE 8. Replication of KORV



Notes: All model moments displayed in the figure are generated using estimated parameter values using my replication of KORV's methodology. Panel (a) of the figure compares the ex-post rates of return (RoR) on capital structures and equipment predicted by the model. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

When I include more recent data in my replication of the KORV methodology, rather than using only their original sample period of 1963-1992, I find the model

FIGURE 9. KORV's original fit




Figure 5. Ex post rates of return on capital equipment and structures (%).




Figure 6. Labor's share of aggregate income (%).




Figure 7. The wage-bill ratio: Skilled vs. unskilled total wages (normalized with 1963=1).




Figure 8. The skill premium: Skilled vs. unskilled wages per hour (normalized with 1963=1).

Notes: I am unable to directly provide model predictions using KORV's parameter estimates, as the author's only provide a subset of the relevant estimates, so I directly reproduce the figure from Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) showing the fit of their model to the data.

again fits the data well - see Figure 10.<sup>28</sup> Table 2 shows inclusion of more recent data decreases estimates of capital skill complementarity. A potential explanation for this is that the empirical growth in the graduate wage premium remains steady after 1992 despite an sharp acceleration in capital equipment growth (see Figure 1); to reconcile these two patterns the model requires a lower estimate of capital skill complementarity than in the original sample period.

## 5.2. Sequential Auction Results.

<sup>28</sup>I have to switch from author provided data to publicly available data to extend the time period, which is why the parameter estimates for the original sample period shown in Table 2 differ from those in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Parameter Estimates: KORV vs Replication

Parameter	KORV findings	Replication Estimates
$\alpha$	0.117	0.122
$\gamma$	-0.495	-0.45
$\sigma$	0.401	0.402
$\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \gamma)$	0.669	0.689
$\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \sigma)$	1.669	1.674
CSC Strength: $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$	1.001	0.984

Notes: Rows 2-4 show estimates of the subset of primitive parameters of the KORV production function that were published in Krusell et al. (2000). Row 5 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ . Row 6 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}}$ . Row 7 shows the implied strength of the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel, as measured by  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ .

TABLE 2. Parameter Values with Extended Sample Period

Parameter	Original Sample Period	Extended Sample Period
$\lambda$	0.557	0.529
$\mu$	0.489	0.345
$\alpha$	0.111	0.123
$\gamma$	-0.463	-0.266
$\sigma$	0.453	0.427
$\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \gamma)$	0.684	0.79
$\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \sigma)$	1.829	1.746
CSC Strength: $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$	1.145	0.956


Notes: Rows 2-6 show estimates of the primitive parameters of the KORV production function. Row 7 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ . Row 8 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}}$ . Row 9 shows the implied strength of the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel, as measured by  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ .

### *Sequential Auction Results: Job Contact Rates*

The first row of Figure 11 shows my estimates of job contact rates for unskilled and skilled workers, in absolute and relative terms (I plot a six year rolling average of estimated relative contact rates to emphasize the time trend). The second row of the same figure shows the empirical targets these estimates are based on - the multiple employer rate - and the corresponding model moments.

I am able to exactly match the model moments to their empirical counterparts. Estimated job contact rates do not exactly track the data on multiple employer rates

FIGURE 10. Replication of KORV: Extended Sample Period




Notes: All model moments displayed in the figure are generated from estimated parameter values using my replication of KORV's methodology and updating sample data to the latest available. Panel (a) of the figure compares the ex-post rates of return (RoR) on capital structures and equipment predicted by the model. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

because job contact rates are not the sole determinant of the multiple employer rate: job destruction also plays a role, as shown in equation (28). The intuition here is that workers who exit the labor market more frequently will spend more time at the bottom of the job ladder and hence move employers more often due to favorable job offers. This explains why skilled workers are estimated to have significantly higher job contact rates than unskilled workers despite similar multiple employer rates: the higher job contact rate for skilled workers offsets their lower job destruction rates to leave the multiple employer rate at a similar level to unskilled workers. So while casual inspection of multiple employer rates alone might suggest similar levels of employer competition for skilled and unskilled workers, the findings here illustrate that interpreting the data through a structural model

leads to a quite different conclusion i.e. that skilled workers enjoy much higher job contact rates than unskilled workers.

However, the time trend is for estimated job contact rates for skilled workers to increase relative to those of unskilled workers until the late 1990s and then decrease thereafter.

FIGURE 11. Job Mobility



Notes: The first row of the figure shows estimated job contact rates for employees,  $\lambda_{1,i,t}$ , in absolute terms for unskilled workers and skilled workers - Panel (a) - and for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers - Panel (b). The second row shows implied model predictions for the multiple employer rate, and their empirical counterparts, shown in absolute and relative terms in Panels (c) and (d) respectively.

### *Sequential Auction Results: Distribution of Match Quality*

For each of my two skill types, I estimate three parameters of the match quality distribution, which is assumed to take a truncated log normal form: the mean, variance and lower bound parameters,  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$ ,  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}$  respectively. I am able




to match the model to the targeted empirical moments precisely in the case of both  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}$  where the relevant targets are log residual wage variance and the ratio of average wages of workers in the bottom five percentiles of the wage distribution to median wages respectively. Figures 12 and 13 show parameter estimates for  $\eta_{i,t}^\nu$  and  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}$  respectively, and illustrate the close fit of the model moments to the data. Estimates of  $\zeta_{i,t}^\nu$  are in a sense less relevant since they are simply set at the level necessary to keep the mean of the sampling distribution of match quality constant at an arbitrary target ( $\mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu) = 1$ ).

The estimated variance parameter of the sampling distribution of match quality,  $\hat{\eta}_{i,t}^\nu$ , for skilled workers increases over time relative to the equivalent parameter for unskilled workers, mirroring changes in the empirical target (residual log wage variance). Estimates of the lower bound of the match quality distribution,  $\hat{\nu}_{inf_{i,t}}$ , decrease in relative terms for skilled workers, again mirroring the trend in the empirical target.

**5.3. KORV production function: parameter estimates.** As argued in Section 4.2, the results of my estimation of the sequential auction structure of the intermediate goods market can be fully summarized by two series for the purposes of estimating the parameters of the KORV production function. The first series is the ‘productivity scale’, which is the estimate of the average match quality by skill  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(\nu)$  that I use to scale labor inputs. The second series is the ‘wage scale’,  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$ , which relates to average wages of skill type  $i$  via the identity  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}) = p_{i,t} \mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$ . These series are plotted in absolute and relative terms in Figure 14, with a rolling 6 year average of the relative series added to emphasize the relevant trends.

Figure 14 shows that the presence of search frictions can explain a positive skill premium since the relative wage scale is estimated to be consistently above one (see Panel (d)). Reflecting trends in estimated job contact rates and match quality distributions, the average match quality (the ‘productivity scale’) of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers (see Panel (b)) increases moderately until the late 1990s but then decreases after this. The upwards trend in the wage scale of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers (Panel (d)) is more pronounced due to the increase in their relative bargaining strength, driven by increasing relative unionization rates. This trend means my baseline model is less reliant on the capital skill complementarity channel for generating an increase in the graduate wage premium, as compared to an equivalent competitive model (i.e with no frictions). In particular, the estimate of capital skill complementarity is smaller in my baseline model (column 2 of Table 3) compared to the equivalent model without frictions

FIGURE 12. Match Quality Dispersion




Notes: The first row of the figure shows estimates of the variance parameter of the match quality distribution,  $\eta_{i,t}^v$ , in absolute terms for unskilled workers and skilled workers - Panel (a) - and for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers - Panel (b). The second row shows implied model predictions for the variance of log wages and their empirical counterparts (where the empirical variance is given for residual log wages, after controlling for education, race, sex and year). This moment is shown in absolute and relative terms in Panels (c) and (d) respectively.

(column 3 of Table 3). This is driven largely by a lower estimate of the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment in my baseline model. This finding is very policy relevant since this parameter is likely key when considering the impacts of labor market policies to help low skilled workers e.g. minimum wages.

The extent to which estimates of capital skill complementarity are lower in my baseline model than in an equivalent model with no frictions is demonstrated in Figure 15. This plots the counterfactual scenario where search frictions are as estimated in my baseline model but the parameters of the KORV production function are as estimated in a model without frictions. The predicted rise in

FIGURE 13. Match Quality Lower Bound




Notes: The first row of the figure shows estimates of the lower bound of the match quality distribution,  $\nu_{inf,i,t}$ , in absolute terms for unskilled workers and skilled workers - Panel (a) - and for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers - Panel (b). The second row shows implied model predictions for the lower bound of the wage distribution as ratio of the median wage, and their empirical counterparts, shown in absolute and relative terms in Panels (c) and (d) respectively.

the graduate wage premium is stronger in this counterfactual scenario than in my baseline model precisely due to stronger capital skill complementarity channel when the model is estimated without allowing for search frictions.

The model with frictions fits the data more accurately than the original KORV formulation as shown in Figure 16. Both models predict a counter-factual decline in the graduate wage premium from the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis due to a slowdown in the growth rate in the capital equipment seen in the data, and an increase in the relative supply of graduates.

FIGURE 14. Scale Factors



Notes: The first row of the figure shows estimates of the mean of the match quality distribution,  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(\nu)$  (the ‘productivity scale’), in absolute terms for unskilled workers and skilled workers - Panel (a) - and for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers - Panel (b). The second row of the figure shows estimates of the mean wage of workers when the price of the intermediate good they produce is normalized to one,  $\mathbb{E}^{L_{i,t}}(w_{i,t}, p_{i,t} = 1)$  (the ‘wage scale’), in absolute terms for unskilled workers and skilled workers - Panel (c) - and for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers - Panel (d).

**5.4. Model Simulations: Counterfactual Analysis.** I now consider which channels in my baseline model make the greatest contribution to the level and growth of the graduate wage premium. This is again done by using counterfactual scenarios: Figures 17 and 18 show that eliminating the differences between graduates and non-graduates’ job destruction rates and job offer rates respectively lower the predicted level of the graduate wage premium by roughly similar amounts, without changing it’s growth rate. Figure 19 shows the impact of eliminating differences in bargaining parameters between skilled and unskilled workers, which are entirely driven by differences in their respective unionization rates. We see that the differences in bargaining parameters are responsible for a substantial

TABLE 3. KORV parameter values: the importance of frictions

Parameter	With Frictions	Without Frictions
$\lambda$	0.474	0.521
$\mu$	0.52	0.442
$\alpha$	0.098	0.127
$\gamma$	-0.327	-0.202
$\sigma$	0.241	0.347
$\varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ ( $= 1/1 - \gamma$ )	0.754	0.832
$\varepsilon_{U,Keq}$ ( $= 1/1 - \sigma$ )	1.318	1.531
CSC Strength: $\varepsilon_{U,Keq} - \varepsilon_{S,Keq}$	0.564	0.699


Notes: Rows 2-6 show estimates of the primitive parameters of the KORV production function. Row 7 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ . Row 8 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{U,Keq}$ . Row 9 shows the implied strength of the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel, as measured by  $\varepsilon_{U,Keq} - \varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ .

component of both the average level of and growth of the predicted graduate wage premium in my model.

Despite the importance of search frictions found in the above analysis, my baseline model is still reliant on the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel to generate an increase in the graduate wage premium. This can be seen by examining model predictions when I shut down the CSC channel by imposing  $\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\gamma}$ : Figure 20 shows that both the model with frictions and without in fact predict large falls in the graduate wage premium, due to the increase in the relative supply of graduates, when there is no CSC. This illustrates that the CSC channel is responsible for offsetting the negative impact of the rise in the relative supply of skilled workers in my baseline model.

Table 4 summarizes the impact of all the key channels in my baseline model on the level and growth of the graduate wage premium ( $GWP \equiv \% \text{ difference in hourly wages: college graduate - non-graduate}$ ). First we see my baseline model almost exactly matches the average level of the graduate wage premium seen in the data over my sample period (1976-2018): the average GWP is 17.5% in my model versus 18.1% in the data. Absent any differences in search frictions, my baseline model suggests graduates would have 3% lower average hourly wages than non-graduates. In other words, the model suggests search frictions make a positive contribution of

FIGURE 15. Strength of Capital Skill Complementarity Channel




20.4% points to the average level of the GWP, with that contribution being roughly equally due to graduates' higher job offer rates, higher bargaining strength and lower job destruction rates.

Turning to the growth of the graduate wage premium, my model predicts just under two thirds of the growth seen in the data, predicting a rise of 18.8% points in the GWP over the sample period versus 31.1% point growth in the data.<sup>29</sup> The decline in the relative bargaining strength of unskilled workers to skilled workers - set equal to the decline in their relative unionization rates - increases predicted GWP growth by 17.8% points i.e close to all of the growth predicted in the model. However, as suggested in Figure 20, capital skill complementarity is the dominant channel when it comes to explaining the growth in the graduate wage premium, increasing predicted GWP growth by 48.1% points relative to a counterfactual model with no capital skill complementarity.

<sup>29</sup>Note this calculates GWP growth as the % point difference between the average GWP in the first and last ten years of my sample period e.g  $GWP_{2007-2016} - GWP_{1976-1985}$ .

FIGURE 16. Model Fit: With and Without Frictions



Notes: The model moments displayed in the figure are generated both from estimated parameter values using my replication of KORV's methodology i.e without frictions (the 'w/o frictions' series) and using estimates when incorporating frictions (the 'with frictions' series). Panel (a) of the figure compares the difference in ex-post rates of return (RoR) between capital structures and equipment predicted by the two versions of the model. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

## 6. CONCLUSION

This paper develops a structural model that nests a rich range of explanations for the level and growth of skill premiums. This includes technological explanations, such as capital skill complementarity, relative labor scarcity, as well as monopsonistic channels arising from the presence of search frictions e.g. differences in job offer rates, job destruction rates and bargaining strength between skilled and unskilled workers. The model can therefore provide a theoretical grounding for findings from the growing empirical literature suggesting the importance of monopsonistic forces and wage bargaining institutions (e.g. see Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and von

FIGURE 17. The Impact of Differences in Job Destruction Rates




TABLE 4. Counterfactuals: Level &amp; Growth of Graduate Wage Premium (GWP)

	GWP level, % (mean: 1976-2016)	GWP level impact, % pt	GWP growth, % pt (1976-2016)	GWP growth impact, % pt
Data	0.181		0.31	
Baseline model	0.175		0.188	
Counterfactual scenarios:				
Equal job destruction rates	0.093	-0.082	0.166	-0.022
Equal job offer rates (employed)	0.103	-0.072	0.183	-0.005
Equal match quality distribution	0.17	-0.005	0.174	-0.014
Equal bargaining strength	0.095	-0.08	0.01	-0.178
Equal search frictions (all)	-0.029	-0.204	0.029	-0.158
No capital skill complementarity	0.012	-0.163	-0.293	-0.481
Equal Labor Supply	-0.279	-0.454	0.426	0.239
Equal Labor Efficiency	1.369	1.194	0.391	0.203


Column 2 shows the mean level of the graduate wage premium (GWP, defined as the percentage difference between graduate and non-graduate wages) in the sample period, 1976-2016. This is shown for the GWP level in the data, the baseline model, and under the counterfactual model scenarios indicated. In each counterfactual scenario, the relevant parameter for unskilled workers (job destruction rate, job offer rate etc) is set equal to that of skilled workers in each time period. Column 3 shows the difference between the mean GWP (as defined in column 2) in each counterfactual model scenario and the mean GWP in the baseline model. Column 4 shows the % point growth in the mean level of the GWP between the first and last tens of the sample period (1976-1985 and 2007-2016). Column 5 shows the difference between the GWP growth (as defined in column 3) in each counterfactual model scenario and the GWP growth in the baseline model.

Wachter (2018), Bassier, Dube, and Naidu (2020) and Farber, Herbst, Kuziemko, and Naidu (2018)).

The quantitative application of my model suggests search frictions make a substantial contribution to the average level and growth of the skill premium over my




FIGURE 18. The Impact of Differences in Job Contact Rates



sample period. In my estimated model, graduates enjoy more stable jobs - i.e. face less job destruction - receive higher job offer rates and have a more favorable wage bargaining environment due to higher unionization rates. Graduates' advantages in terms of lower job destruction rates and higher job offer rates are large and relatively stable over my sample period, and so make a substantial contribution to the average level of the graduate wage premium but not its growth. In contrast, I calibrate the bargaining strength of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers to their relative unionization rates; while both skill types see unionization rates decline, the fall is more severe for unskilled workers. This force can explain a substantial part of the growth of the skill premium in my model. It also means my estimated model suggests a somewhat weaker capital skill complementarity channel than an equivalent competitive model. However, my model still relies on this channel to offset the impact of the rising relative supply of graduate workers, which, without some form of capital skill complementarity, would lead to substantial decline in the skill premium in my model.


Fruitful areas for future research include incorporating more firm side information, which would allow a more comprehensive approach to identification of bargaining parameters, e.g. by targeting the evolution of the labor share in sectors where

FIGURE 19. The Impact of Differences in Bargaining Parameters



unskilled and skilled workers are concentrated. Incorporating firm side data could also allow identification of sorting channels e.g. to investigate whether there is stronger sorting of skilled workers to higher productivity or higher mark-up firms or sectors.

FIGURE 20. Model Fit: No Capital Skill Complementarity (CSC)



Notes: The model moments displayed in the figure are generated both from estimated parameter values using my replication of KORV's methodology i.e without frictions (the 'w/o frictions' series) and using estimates when incorporating frictions (the 'with frictions' series). Panel (a) of the figure shows model predictions for the graduate wage premium with all parameters at their baseline estimated values. Panel (b) of the figure shows model predictions for the graduate wage premium when I shut down the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel both for the model with and without frictions, by setting  $\hat{\sigma} = \hat{\gamma}$ .

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## APPENDIX A. MODEL RESULTS AND BARGAINING POWER

This Appendix discusses the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the bargaining parameter. In my baseline estimation I impose a high level of bargaining power for both worker types ( $\beta_u = \beta_s = 0.95$ ). I find that when I set the bargaining parameter at significantly lower levels, i.e. 0.75 or 0.5, and estimate the parameters of the KORV production function there is an acute tension between the model’s ability to match both the rise in the graduate wage premium and the level of the labor share of output. The rest of this Appendix explains this tension and its quantitative impact. Overall I find that only a relatively high bargaining parameter allows the model to match the relevant trends in the data.


I first consider the intuition for why there might be a tension between matching the rise in the graduate wage premium and level of the labor share at lower levels of the bargaining parameter. First recall that the original, competitive, version of the KORV model is relatively successful at matching both the rise in the graduate wage premium and the labor share: see Figure 21. When I introduce the sequential auction model into this set-up, average wages will now be lower than the marginal product of labor if the bargaining parameter is significantly less than unity and for realistic job contact rates. In other words, the labor share will be lower in the model with frictions than in the original KORV environment for a given set of production function parameters. When I estimate the KORV parameters in my frictional labor market model, and have a low level of bargaining power, the estimation approach compensates for the downwards pressure this puts on the labor share by making labor more important (and capital less important) in the production of output. However, this jeopardizes the ability of the model to match the graduate wage premium since the increased use of capital equipment is the main channel that pushes the wage premium up.

To illustrate this quantitative impact of this tension, consider estimates of the KORV production function parameters when I set the bargaining parameter to 0.5 for both unskilled and skilled workers - see Table 5 and Figure 22 for the corresponding model predictions. The estimate of  $\alpha$ , the exponent of capital structures ( $K_{st}$ ), hits the zero lower bound, and it also delivers lower levels of  $\lambda$ , the coefficient of capital equipment since this too increases the labor share. However a lower level of  $\lambda$  limits the channel of capital skill complementarity - see equation (8) - and means that although the model can fit the labor share to a reasonable approximation, it completely misses the rise in the graduate wage premium: see Figure 22. Indeed the fit is much worse than that of the purely competitive set-up in KORV: see Figure 21. Increasing the bargaining parameter from 0.5 to 0.95 improves the results significantly - see Figure 23. While much of the micro evidence points to much lower levels of the bargaining parameter, generally such estimates are highly model dependent.

## APPENDIX B. IDENTIFICATION

There are two sets of parameters to identify in my model: the parameters of the KORV production function, and those in the sequential auction model of the labor markets in the intermediate goods sectors. While Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) do not explicitly discuss identification in their paper, they do refer to the results of a companion empirical paper Ohanian, Violante, Krusell, and Ros-Rull (1997) which shows their estimation strategy is successful at identifying the true parameters in Monte Carlo simulations. As my estimation of the parameters of the KORV production function very closely follows their method, and is done separately and subsequently to estimation of the sequential auction parameters, I do not repeat that exercise here and instead rely on their identification results.

FIGURE 21. KORV with perfect competition



Notes: The model moments displayed in the figure are generated using estimated parameter values when I replicate KORV's methodology i.e. with perfect competition and no search frictions. Panel (a) of the figure shows predicted ex-post rates of return (RoR) on capital structures and equipment. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

The sequential auction structure of the labor market in my model is no different from Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), however I use employee reported data (from the CPS) to estimate the relevant parameters, whereas Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) used matched-employee-employer (MEE) data. I chose to use CPS data because a key motivation for this paper is to test the robustness of findings in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) to incorporating frictions; I therefore sought to maintain as much consistency as possible to their estimation approach which used CPS data for wages and labor input. However, the MEE data that Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) use plays a key role in their identification strategy so it is worth considering whether the parameters I wish to identify in the sequential auction model are identified when using employee data only.

TABLE 5. KORV parameter values: bargaining parameter impact

Parameter	No Frictions (KORV)	Baseline ( $\beta = 0.95$ )	$\beta = 0.5$
$\lambda$	0.521	0.462	0.219
$\mu$	0.442	0.462	0.742
$\alpha$	0.127	0.118	0.0
$\gamma$	-0.202	-0.187	-0.277
$\sigma$	0.347	0.316	0.187
$\varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ ( $= 1/1 - \gamma$ )	0.832	0.843	0.783
$\varepsilon_{U,Keq}$ ( $= 1/1 - \sigma$ )	1.531	1.462	1.23
CSC Strength: $\varepsilon_{U,Keq} - \varepsilon_{S,Keq}$	0.699	0.619	0.447

Notes: Rows 2-6 show estimates of the primitive parameters of the KORV production function. Row 7 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ . Row 8 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{U,Keq}$ . Row 9 shows the implied strength of the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel, as measured by  $\varepsilon_{U,Keq} - \varepsilon_{S,Keq}$ .


First bargaining parameters by worker skill level are much more difficult, if not impossible, to identify without some form of employer information. In the absence of such data, neither match output nor firm fixed effects are observable or estimable and hence reliable estimates of bargaining parameters are not readily available. This is why I choose to set bargaining parameters by assumption.<sup>30</sup> The remaining objects of interest in the sequential auction model are job contact rates, (note job destruction rates come straight from the data) and the distribution of match quality, where I will consider the possibility of both non-parametric and parametric identification.

**B.1. Job Contact Rates.** There are two job contact rates in the sequential auction model for each skill type of worker: those for the unemployed and employed:  $\lambda_{0,i}$  and  $\lambda_{1,i}$  respectively.  $\lambda_{0,i}$  determines the unemployment rate and, because it influences the outside option of workers, the minimum match quality of firm that a worker will accept an offer at. However, the unemployment rate does not play a role in the estimation of the KORV parameters (since labor input is total hours worked by workers and is taken straight from the data) or in the estimation of any other parameters in the sequential auction model, and I will estimate the lower bound of acceptable match quality directly, as described in the next section. I therefore have no need to estimate  $\lambda_{0,i}$ .

I instead focus on estimation of  $\lambda_{1,i}$ , which is key for determining both average match quality, and average wages of worker of a given skill type. Both variables play a role in estimating the parameters of the KORV production function, as described in Section 5.4.

<sup>30</sup>The analysis of Appendix A suggests the labor share of income is informative about the average bargaining power of all workers, however it would not help to estimate bargaining parameters by skill level.




FIGURE 22. KORV with frictions:  $\beta = 0.5$ 

Notes: The model moments displayed in the figure are generated using estimated parameter values when I incorporate frictions but now with the bargaining parameter set uniformly at 0.5 (rather than 0.95). Panel (a) of the figure shows predicted ex-post rates of return (RoR) on capital structures and equipment. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

I estimate  $\lambda_{1,i}$  using SMM and targeting the proportion of continuous employed workers in a given year who have moved employers at least once (the multiple employer rate). I denote this proportion  $\tau_i$ . In the model, the expression for this moment is given in equation 32, which is obtained by substituting the expression for the cross section distribution of match quality in equation (20) into equation (28).

$$(32) \quad \tau_i = 1 - \int_{\nu_{inf_i}}^{\nu_{max}} (1 - \lambda_{1,i}, \bar{F}_i(\nu))^{12} \frac{1 + \kappa_{1,i}}{[1 + \kappa_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\nu)]^2} f_i(\nu) d\nu$$

As I am estimating  $\lambda_{1,i}$  separately, and prior to, the estimation of the match quality distribution  $F$ , I require that equation (32) is independent of  $F$ . This can be proven by

FIGURE 23. KORV with frictions - baseline bargaining power:  $\beta = 0.95$ 

Notes: The model moments displayed in the figure are generated using estimated parameter values when I incorporate frictions and set the bargaining parameter at its baseline value of 0.95. Panel (a) of the figure shows predicted ex-post rates of return (RoR) on capital structures and equipment. Panels (b) through (d) compare model moments to their empirical counterparts for the labor share of income, the wage bill of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers, and the graduate wage premium respectively.

integrating by change of variable i.e. if I let  $r = \bar{F}_i(\nu)$  so that  $\frac{dr}{d\nu} = -f(\nu)$  the expression for  $\tau$  becomes as shown in equation (33), which is independent of  $F$ .

$$(33) \quad \tau_i = 1 - \int_0^1 (1 - \lambda_{1,i,t}r)^{12} \frac{1 + \kappa_{1,i}}{[1 + \kappa_{1,i}r]^2} dr$$

The presence of the twelfth order polynomial in equation (33) hinders an analytical proof of identification, however it is easy to verify with a symbolic equation solver that this expression is a positive monotonic function of  $\lambda_{1,i}$  which given the quadratic objective function in SMM proves identification of  $\lambda_{1,i}$ . This result is not surprising given it

is possible to prove (analytically) that the monthly steady state job mobility rate is increasing in  $\lambda_{1,i}$ .

**B.2. Distribution of Match Quality.** There are two key considerations in the identification of the distribution of match quality. The first consideration is whether the distribution can be non-parametrically identified or not. I will argue that it can be, but only by relying heavily on the structure of the model. Therefore when it comes to estimation I prefer to assume a log normal distribution of match quality. The second consideration is then whether the parameters of this distribution are identified. I will estimate the parameters of the match quality distribution by targeting moments of the empirical wage distribution. However, higher order moments of the wage distribution in the model are not tractable, hindering an analytical proof of identification. I instead present evidence from Monte Carlo simulations that my estimation strategy can identify the ‘true’ parameters of the match quality distribution.

I start by showing that, in theory, the match distribution could be identified non-parametrically. A worker’s wage depends both on their current employer’s match quality  $\nu^+$  and their outside option match quality (the second highest quality match they’ve had contact with, denoted  $\nu^-$ ) as shown in equation (34). I therefore can’t simply invert the wage equation to back out the quality of the current match,  $\nu^+$ . Note I assume that the other parameter values in the equation are known due to the identification arguments presented above for job contact rates, and because other parameters either come straight from the data, like job destruction rates, or are set by assumption, like the bargaining parameter and discount factor.

$$(34) \quad \phi(p_i, \nu^-, \nu^+) = p_i \left( \nu^+ - (1 - \beta) \int_{\nu^-}^{\nu^+} \frac{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{F}(x)}{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \beta \bar{F}(x)} dx \right)$$

While the general wage equation for workers is not immediately helpful for identification, workers who were unemployed in the previous period and then get a job (‘entrant workers’) have a common level of  $\nu^-$ , which equals  $\nu_{inf_i}$ , the lower bound of the match quality distribution. Entrants will therefore be paid the wage shown in equation (35).

$$(35) \quad \phi(p_i, \nu_{inf_i}, \nu^+) = p_i \left( \nu^+ - (1 - \beta) \int_{\nu_{inf_i}}^{\nu^+} \frac{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \bar{F}(x)}{\rho + \delta + \lambda_1 \beta \bar{F}(x)} dx \right)$$

I argued previously that if the bargaining parameter is high enough to guarantee that wages are an increasing function of the employer’s match quality (which is the case in my baseline), then  $\nu_{inf}$  is identified as the lower bound of wages in the empirical wage distribution. Therefore, in principle, I could identify the distribution of  $\nu$  by inverting equation (12) for each wage in the empirical distribution of entrants’ wages. This inversion can be done as follows: I start by letting  $w = \phi(p_i, \nu_{inf_i}, \nu^+)$  and differentiating  $w$  with respect to  $\nu^+$  to get:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dw}{d\nu+} &= p_i \left[ 1 - (1 - \beta) \frac{\rho + \delta_i + \lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)}{\rho + \delta_i + \lambda_{1,i} \beta \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)} \right] \\
&= p_i \left[ \frac{\beta(\rho + \delta_i) + (2\beta - 1) \lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)}{\rho + \delta_i + \lambda_{1,i} \beta \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)} \right] \\
(36) \quad \implies \frac{d\nu+}{dw} &= \frac{1}{p_i} \frac{\rho + \delta_i + \lambda_{1,i} \beta \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)}{\beta(\rho + \delta_i) + (2\beta - 1) \lambda_{1,i} \bar{F}_i(\nu^+)}
\end{aligned}$$

Further note that under the assumption I have made about the bargaining parameter, a worker's wage is an increasing function of the match quality of their employer ( $\nu^+$ ), which implies that  $\bar{F}_i(\nu^+) = \bar{F}_i^w(w(\nu^+))$ . This is helpful since, while  $\bar{F}_i(\nu^+)$  is not observable in the data,  $\bar{F}_i^w(w(\nu^+))$  is. Substituting  $\bar{F}_i(\nu^+) = \bar{F}_i^w(w(\nu^+))$  into equation (36) I can then derive an expression for  $\nu^+$  in terms of  $w$  by solving this differential equation.

However, this relies heavily on the structure of the model and, moreover, on part of the structure - the entrant wage distribution - that was not a particular focus of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). I therefore choose to make a parametric assumption for the distribution of match quality, and assume it is log normal.


I must now show that I can identify the parameters of this log normal distribution i.e. the mean parameter,  $\zeta_i^\nu$ , the variance parameter,  $\eta_i^\nu$ , and the lower bound,  $\nu_{inf,i}$ . Recall that my estimation of these parameters is based on a SMM approach as summarized in equation (37), where  $\underline{w}_i$  is the lowest wage in the wage distribution,  $Q_{w_i}^{50}$  is the median wage and  $\mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu)$  is the mean of the match quality sampling distribution, which will be targeted at a fixed value (I impose  $\mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu) = 1$ ).

$$\begin{aligned}
(\zeta_{i,t}^{\nu*}, \eta_{i,t}^{\nu*}, \nu_{inf,i,t}^*) &= \underset{\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf,i,t}}{\operatorname{argmin}} (m_t - \hat{m}_t)^T W (m_t - \hat{m}_t) \\
m_t &\equiv (var_{\log(w_{i,t})}(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf,i,t}), \underline{w}_{i,t}(\nu_{inf,i,t}) / Q_{w_{i,t}}^{50}(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf,i,t}), \\
&\quad \mathbb{E}^{F_{i,t}}(\nu)(\zeta_{i,t}^\nu, \eta_{i,t}^\nu, \nu_{inf,i,t}))
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

Proof of identification is hindered by the lack of tractability of the higher order moments of the wage distribution so I test whether my estimation procedure correctly identifies the true parameters of the model using Monte Carlo methods. That is I simulate a cross-section sample of wages for 50,000 workers (i.e. slightly less than the 60,000 that feature in the CPS) from the model with an arbitrary choice of parameters (the 'true' parameters). I then estimate the model using this simulated data to see if I recover the true parameters. Job contact rates, which also affect the cross-sectional distribution of workers wages, are set at their estimated values for the first year of my sample (1976) though the results of this exercise are not sensitive to their level.

Recall that I estimate the lower bound of the match quality distribution by targeting the ratio of the lower bound of wages in my sample relative to the median. As argued above this gives exact identification of the  $\nu_{inf,i}$ . I therefore feed the true parameter for

FIGURE 24. Monte Carlo Analysis of Identification



Notes: The dotted line in each panel represents the true parameter value used to simulate data for estimation. 500 sets of data were simulated to generate 500 estimates for each parameter. The red line in each panel represents the kernel density of estimated parameter values. The top (bottom) row shows the variance parameter ( $\eta_i^\nu$ ), mean parameter ( $\zeta_i^\nu$ ) and lower bound parameter  $\nu_{inf,i}$  of the log normal match quality distribution for the unskilled (skilled) worker.

the lower bound of the match quality into my estimation procedure directly, since it is exactly identified, rather than the minimum of simulated wages i.e. I set  $\underline{w_{i,t}}/Q_{w_{i,t}}^{50}$  - the empirical moment I am targeting - to  $\nu_{inf_{i,t}}/Q_{w_{i,t}^{sim}}^{50}$ , where the superscript *sim* denotes simulated wage data.<sup>31</sup>

I estimate 500 sets of parameters corresponding to 500 simulations of data from the true model, producing the results shown in Figure 24. My estimation strategy is reasonably successful in recovering the true parameters, though not perfect: while there are some biases in the estimates, in each case they are very small in size.

## APPENDIX C. ROBUSTNESS

This section tests the robustness of parameter estimates of the KORV production function in my model to changes to my empirical strategy for estimating the parameters of the sequential auction model of the intermediate goods markets. In particular, I consider the impact of: (i) estimating the lower bound of the match quality distribution by targeting the average wage of workers in the first percentile of the wage distribution (rather

<sup>31</sup>As in my actual empirical estimation of the sequential auction parameters, I normalize the price of the intermediate good,  $p_i$ , to one when performing the Monte Carlo test of identification.

TABLE 6. KORV parameter values with frictions: robustness

(1) Parameter	(2) Without Frictions	(3) With Frictions: Baseline	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\lambda$	0.521	0.462	0.461	0.461	0.461	0.464	0.462
$\mu$	0.442	0.462	0.451	0.533	0.512	0.508	0.594
$\alpha$	0.127	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118
$\gamma$	-0.202	-0.187	-0.185	-0.185	-0.184	-0.189	-0.185
$\sigma$	0.347	0.316	0.315	0.315	0.315	0.317	0.311
$\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \gamma)$	0.832	0.843	0.844	0.844	0.844	0.841	0.844
$\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} (= 1/1 - \sigma)$	1.531	1.462	1.46	1.46	1.46	1.465	1.451
CSC Strength: $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$	0.699	0.619	0.616	0.616	0.616	0.624	0.607

Notes: Rows 2-6 show estimates of the primitive parameters of the KORV production function. Row 7 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ . Row 8 shows the implied elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labor input,  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}}$ . Row 9 shows the implied strength of the capital skill complementarity (CSC) channel, as measured by  $\varepsilon_{U,K_{eq}} - \varepsilon_{S,K_{eq}}$ .

than average wage of the bottom five percentiles) - see column 4 of Table 6, (ii) estimating the lower bound of the match quality distribution by targeting the average wage of workers in bottom two percentiles - see column 5, (iii) estimating the lower bound of the match quality distribution by targeting the minimum of the empirical wage distribution (after trimming, as is done in my baseline specification) - see column 6, (iv) estimating the variance parameter of the (log normal) sampling distribution of match quality by targeting residual wage variance, where I now control for age as well as race, sex and years of education in calculating this residual variance - see column 7, (v) estimating the variance parameter of the sampling distribution by targeting the interquartile range of residual log wages, rather than the variance - see column 8. None of these changes to my empirical strategy make a significant difference to my results, as illustrated in Table 6.