Bug bounties

experience from both sides

@davwwwx

@davwwwx

PoC || GTFO


COMPANIES
PENTEST
BOUNTIES



@davwwwx


EMPLOYEES


hackerone


bugcrowd


INTIGRITI
ETHICAL HACKING PLATFORM


Synack


YES WE HACK



https://hackerone.com/security?type=team



https://hackerone.com/krisp?type=team



https://krisp.ai/security/#responsible-disclosure

@davwwwx



https://hackerone.com/deptofdefense?type=team


g.co/vrp


MICROSOFT BOUNTY PROGRAM
MSRC
aka.ms/bugbounty


Facebook
Bug Bounty Program

HackerOne external programs



https://docs.hackerone.com/hackers/create-a-directory-page.html


Openbugbounty

security.txt

```
# Our security address
Contact: mailto:security@example.com

# Our PGP key
Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt

# Our security policy
Policy: https://example.com/security-policy.html
```

https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt



https://firebounty.com/

Live Hacking Events


START

https://www.hackerone.com/ethical-hacker/hack-hard-have-fun-increase-security



https://www.hackerone.com/ethical-hacker/hack-hard-have-fun-increase-security

@davwwwx

ArmBounty

@davwwwx

FILTERS

HOW TO GET STARTED IN BUG BOUNTY (9x PRO TIPS)

473K views • 2 years ago

STÖK

So here are the tips/pointers I give to anyone that's new to **Bug bounty** / bounties and apptesting. 1. Sign up for Hackerone to get ...

The Truth About Bug Bounties

74K views • 1 year ago

The Cyber Mentor

*We are a participant in the Amazon Services LLC Associates Program, an affiliate advertising program designed to provide a ...

NahamCon2021 - Putting Your Mind to It: Bug Bounties for 12 Months - @zseano

11K views • 4 months ago

Nahamsec

NahamCon2021 - Hosted by TheCyberMentor, John Hammond and NahamSec Sponsors ---------- WiCys ...

Past videos

Trying to find $20,000 bug bounties

Kingsharpe
War Zone
6 views · 19 hours ago



Hacks & Chips - Chill Dev/AMA...work on Homelab, bug bounties...who knows....!socials !root !commands

Cyber_Insecurity
Science & Technology
1.7K views · 2 months ago
Desktop Development · Software Development · AMA



Episode 17: Bug Bounties

hardchat
158 views · 3 years ago

Episode 17.5: Bug Bounties Part 2

hardchat
57 views · 3 years ago

Highlight: Continuing Bug Fables Chapter 6 & Bounties || !discord

SheepyAmaya

IT & Software › Network & Security › Ethical Hacking

Intro to Bug Bounty Hunting and Web Application Hacking

Insiders guide to ethical hacking and bug bounty hunting with Ben Sadeghipour (@NahamSec)

4.6 ★★★★½ (988 ratings) 10,979 students

Created by Ben Sadeghipour

Last updated 2/2021 English English [Auto]

Wishlist ♡ Share ↗ Gift this course



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- ✓ Learn 10+ different vulnerability types
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- ✓ Write better bug bounty reports
- ✓ Includes practical hands on labs to practice your skills
- ✓ Hack Websites for Ethical Hacking

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- 5 hours on-demand video
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- Access on mobile and TV
- Certificate of completion

https://www.udemy.com/course/intro-to-bug-bounty-by-nahamsec/



https://www.bugbountyhunter.com/

#bugbounty

2.2M views



Remote Code Executio...

I LOVE this find. SO cle...



This was a tough vulner...





Recon subdomains and gau to search vuls DalFox

- Explaining command

```
assetfinder testphp.vulnweb.com | gau |  dalfox pipe
```

Recon subdomains and Screenshot to URL using gowitness

- Explaining command

```
assetfinder -subs-only army.mil | httpx -silent -timeout 50 | xargs -I@ sh -c 'gowitness single @'
```

Extract urls to source code comments

- Explaining command

```
cat urls1 | html-tool comments | grep -oE '\b(https?|http)://[-A-Za-z0-9+&@#/%?=~_|!:,.;]*[-A-Za-z0-9+&@#/%=~_
```

https://github.com/KingOfBugbounty/KingOfBugBountyTips

Patrik Fehrenbach🤖 @ITSecurityguard · 21h

Yay, I was awarded a $10,000 bounty on @Hacker0x01!
hackerone.com/patrik **#TogetherWeHitHarder**

Usually I don't **yay** but this time, I had to

Merry Christmas 🎁🎄

HackerOne profile - patrik
- http://www.it-securityguard.com
hackerone.com

10 4 208

Akshay Kerkar @AkshayKerkar13 · Dec 21

Yay, I was awarded a @Sony❤️ swag for reporting a vulnerability.

#bugbounty **#togetherwehitharder** #hackerone

3 1 24

Daniel @danilabs · Oct 24, 2017

Thanks @ncsc_nl for the t-shirt **#bugbounty #swag**



5 18 35

Jenish Sojitra @_jensec · 20h

Yay, I was awarded a $6,000 bounty on @Hacker0x01 for a CORS!

To make a CORS critical you can scrape account info of victim's accounts via this tool with requests relay. It will use value from response.
bugpoc.com/testers/other/...

hackerone.com/jensec **#TogetherWeHitHarder**

HackerOne profile - jensec
Security & Finance -
hackerone.com

13 70 389



https://hackerone.com/grammarly?type=team


YOU GET IN FOR
FREE, YOU GET IN FOR FREE
FREE ENTRY FOR EVERYONE!!!

@davwwwx

@davwwwx



Program	Launch date	Reports resolved	Bounties minimum	Bounties average
Node.js Bounty splitting	03 / 2018	37	$500	$250

https://twitter.com/ghidraninja/status/1432668917412028420



Rank	Hacker	Reputation	Impact	Signal
1	 Eric todayisnew	112826	16.57	5.49
2	 Mr Hack try_to_hack	53338	17.21	5.27
3	Sergey Markov sergeym	37802	15.37	5.27
4	 d0xing d0xing	30053	19.90	6.67
5	 Sean Melia meals	28512	19.41	5.80
6	Black Ashes nullelite	26435	16.13	3.78

http://bugbounty.space/

@davwwwx

@davwwwx

...zzz
EAT
PEELS
NWP
TAEPER

CTFTIME | CTFs | Upcoming | Archive | Calendar | Teams | FAQ | Contact us | About | Sign in

Team rating

2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011

Place	Team	Country	Rating
1	perfect blue		965.598
2	DiceGang		747.557
3	More Smoked Leet Chicken		732.093
4	Bushwhackers		713.743
5	Super Guesser		705.564
6	Plaid Parliament of Pwning		694.231
7	Never Stop Exploiting		551.385
8	C4T BuT S4D		537.756
9	organizers		524.657
10	Katzebin		517.758

Full rating | Rating formula

Past events

With scoreboard | All

WMCTF 2021

Aug. 30, 2021 01:00 UTC | On-line | Weight voting in progress

Place	Team	Country	Points
1	Ph0t1n1a		50.000
2	Nu1L		34.806
3	r3kapig		26.448

192 teams total | Tasks and writeups

YauzaCTF 2021

Aug. 29, 2021 12:00 UTC | On-line | Weight voting in progress

Place	Team	Country	Points *
1	SPRAVEDLIVAЯ RUSH A		0.000
2	fargate		0.000
3	Bulba Hackers		0.000

227 teams total | Tasks and writeups

https://ctftime.org/

@davwwwx

Learning materials and labs

Latest

OAuth authentication

6 labs

HTTP Host header attacks

6 labs

Business logic vulnerabilities

11 labs

Web cache poisoning

13 labs

Featured

SQL injection

Cross-site scripting (XSS)

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

XXE injection

https://portswigger.net/web-security

@davwwwx



https://pentesterlab.com/exercises

Some Terminology

Severity



https://hackerone.com/security?type=team



https://app.intigriti.com/programs/intigriti/intigriti/detail

@davwwwx

CVSS

https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.0/user-guide

https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.0/examples

https://kb.intigriti.com/en/articles/5041991-intigriti-s-contextual-cvss-standard

Weakness

CWE



https://cwe.mitre.org/

States

NEW	TRIAGED	RESOLVED	
TRIAGE	PENDING	ACCEPTED	RESOLVED

NEEDS MORE INFO	ACCEPTED RISK	INFORMATIVE	RETESTING
DUPLICATE	OUT OF SCOPE	NOT APPLICABLE	SPAM

https://docs.hackerone.com/hackers/report-states.html

https://kb.intigriti.com/en/articles/3379382-submission-lifecycle


In-Scope
Out-of-Scope
BUG HUNTERS

Triage

@davwwwx

davwwwx created the submission

[redacted]

Unread messages

voljin [triage]

[redacted]

Hi davwwwx,

Thank you for the great written report and all the time you are making to look into the security of our new and fresh program!

We reviewed your report and were able to reproduce it. Therefore, we are going to forward your submission towards the security team of [redacted]. They will take a deeper look into this and come back at you as soon as possible!

Keep up the good work and have a lovely weekend,

Voljin

voljin changed the **severity** from Exceptional to Exceptional (10.0)

[redacted]

[redacted] [company]

Thank you davwwwx for reporting this one to us. As part of the program details, please do not communicate about this vulnerability, or even one found in our program. We're on it, and will solve this as soon as possible.

Kristof

[redacted] changed the **status** from Pending to Accepted

[redacted] rewarded a **bounty** of [redacted] to **davwwwx**

davwwwx [researcher]

[redacted]

How to write a report

Description *

What is the vulnerability? In clear steps, how do you reproduce it?

Please replace **all** the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!

Summary:
[add summary of the vulnerability]

Steps To Reproduce:
[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]

1. [add step]
1. [add step]
1. [add step]

Supporting Material/References:
[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]

* [attachment / reference]

TIMELINE

haxta4ok00 submitted a report to HackerOne. Mar 23rd (5 months ago)

Summary:

Hi team,

Our team noticed that you(program) can attach files to the policy page. These files can be anything, images, text, archive, etc.In other words, these files may or may not contain sensitive information. Our team believes that the data that can be attached in different vectors is high . Therefore, in the CVSS calculator, we set Confidentiality: `High` .

Also, the HackerOne platform slightly confuses customers in this situation. When the client tries to delete a file from the tab where the file is attached, the page shows that the file was deleted, and after clicking the "Update policy page" button, it shows that it was successfully updated. But the page does not reload, and the client sees that the file was indeed deleted. We also tested this on the endpoint, and indeed. The update takes place without the involvement of the Attachment file. But after you refresh the policy edit page, this file will appear again. But visually, the client initially believes that the file was deleted, until he refreshes the page and sees it. We believe this is misleading to the customer

Image F1239141: file_1.png 20.48 KiB

Zoom in Zoom out Copy Download



https://hackerone.com/reports/1132606

IMPACT > EVERYTHING


™ & © Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (s17)
LOONEY TUNES

What to not report

Blindly pasting automatic scanner reports

BUG REPORT 1:

Issue: **SSL cookie without secure flag set**
Severity: **Medium**
Confidence: **Certain**
Host: **https://krispai.zendesk.com**
Path: **/embeddable/config**

REQUEST:

GET /embeddable/config HTTP/1.1
Host: krispai.zendesk.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Origin: https://krisp.ai
Connection: close
Referer: https://krisp.ai/security/

Best practices

Missing DNS records

13

#410245 Missing Certificate Authority Authorization rule

Share:

TIMELINE

171217 submitted a report to HackerOne. Sep 16th (3 years ago)

Certificate Authority Authorization (supported by LetsEncrypt and other CAs) allows a domain owner to specify which Certificate Authorities should be allowed to issue certificates for the domain. All CAA-compliant certificate authorities should refuse to issue a certificate unless they are the CA of record for the target site. This helps reduce the threat of a bad guy tricking a Certificate Authority into issuing a phony certificate for your site.

The CAA rule is stored as a DNS resource record of type 257. You can view a domain's CAA rule using a DNS lookup service:

https://dns.google.com/query?name=hacker101.com&type=257&dnssec=true

https://dns.google.com/query?name=ctf.hacker101.com&type=257&dnssec=true

hacker101 should set a CAA record to help prevent misissuance of a certificate for its domains.

Reference Report : https://hackerone.com/reports/129992

Impact

Misissuance of a certificate

Reported September 16, 2018 10:34am +0400

171217

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to HackerOne Managed

Disclosed April 11, 2019 10:29pm +0400

Severity None (0.0)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

@davwwwx

paragonie-scott Paragon Initiative Enterprises staff closed the report and changed the status to ● Spam. Nov 3rd (5 years ago)

paragonie-scott Paragon Initiative Enterprises staff requested to disclose this report. Nov 3rd (5 years ago)

paragonie-scott Paragon Initiative Enterprises staff disclosed this report. Nov 3rd (5 years ago)

hackerone_hero posted a comment. Updated Nov 4th (5 years ago)

Any reason ? why did you close this as spam ?

How can you close without giving any reason ?

Don't you see , detailed report with image explanation of vulnerability ?

paragonie-scott Paragon Initiative Enterprises staff posted a comment. Nov 4th (5 years ago)

1. Your report is way out of scope. For the purposes of our Hacker One program, we don't care one bit if paragonie.com gets owned up, we only care that people who use our open source software don't.
2. You plagiarized an dmarc.org article instead of linking to it.
3. You indicated that this is a "very critical" bug and checked off the following categories:

- Authentication
- Command Injection
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

hackerone_hero

Participants

State ● Spam ()

Reported to Paragon Initiative Enterprises

Disclosed November 3, 2016 9:30am +0400

Severity Critical (9 ~ 10)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

TIMELINE

fabiothebest89 submitted a report to Skyliner. Sep 16th (5 years ago)

First of all I will start with some theory.
DNS is a system to translate a domain name to an ip address. Normally a computer automatically trust a DNS server and connects to the IP provided by the DNS server. This is prone to security issues because a malicious wifi network, an attacker on your router, a compromised ISP, or any other man-in-the-middle attack can redirect a DNS request to a server of their choice (a fake one) and this can allow phishing, malware spreading, botnets and can also cause Denial of Service in a way because the original server will become unreachable unless you know its IP address and you use it for establishing a TCP connection. An attacker can do domain hijacking, create forged DNS updates, unauthorised zone transfers, cache poisoning and DoS.
How can we solve all these problems? The answer is: implementing DNSSEC.
And you did it, but you did it wrong.
If you want to read about the DNSSEC standard check RFC4034(https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4034.txt) and RFC4035(https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4035.txt). Besides I recommend you to read the NIST Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, (NIST Special Publication 800-81-2) (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-81-2.pdf).
DNSSEC validates the source of the DNS response, ensures the response hasn't been altered in transit and authenticates replies of non-existence. It works by adding digital signatures to DNS responses, adding chan of trusts to validate responses and identifying bogus responses.
To facilitate signature validation, DNSSEC adds a few new DNS record types:

RRSIG – Contains a cryptographic signature
DNSKEY – Contains a public signing key

Participants

State ● Informative ()

Reported to Skyliner

Disclosed September 30, 2016 10:39pm +0400

Severity No Rating (---)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Missing HTTP headers

6

#343928 Session Cookie Without Secure Flag

Share:

SUMMARY BY CYBERTIGER

Hello Everyone,
It's not a report.
In a comment, Ed @edoverflow said that the cookie Missing 'Secure' Flag requires XSS.
But I think that the cookie missing Secure Flag doesn't require XSS. It requires MITM(Man-In-The-Middle).
Cookie missing 'HttpOnly'Flag requires XSS.
If u think that I'm correct so plz vote up this report.
Thanks.

TIMELINE

cybertiger submitted a report to Ed. Apr 27th (3 years ago)

Hi Ed,

The bug mentioned in the report #343095 is not yet correctly patched I believe

Reported April 27, 2018 4:50pm +040

cybertiger

Participants

State Not-applicable ()

Reported to Ed

Disclosed April 28, 2018 3:44pm

Severity None (0.0)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

16 #225833 www.hackerone.com website CSP "script-src" includes "unsafe-inline"

Share:

SUMMARY BY ROOTKID

The www.hackerone.com website was missing a strict "script-src" value. Albeit just a low profile risk, a sound "script-src" value should be considered best practice.

TIMELINE

rootkid submitted a report to HackerOne. May 3rd (4 years ago)

Summary:

The HTTP header of the hackerone.com website includes an unsafe CSP parameter for "script-src".

Description:

The hackerone.com website (https://www.hackerone.com) has a Content-Security-Policy configured, as pointed out on the Bug Bounty page of their program:

> We utilize a strict Content Security Policy and a safe-by-default templating language to effectively neutralize Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Reported May 3, 2017 5:58pm +0400

rootkid

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to HackerOne Managed

Disclosed May 23, 2017 10:24am +0400

Severity None (0.0)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

3

#187225 Web Browser XSS Protection Not Enabled

Share:

TIMELINE

snicker2812 submitted a report to Open-Xchange. Dec 1st (5 years ago)

Web Browser XSS Protection is not enabled, or is disabled by the configuration of the 'X-XSS-Protection' HTTP response header on the web server

http://www.dovecot.fi/s=..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5Csystem.ini&submit=Search
http://www.dovecot.fi/60/indexd7de.html?full-site=c%3A%2FWindows%2Fsystem.ini
http://www.dovecot.fi/?s=%2F..%2FWEB-INF%2Fweb.xml&submit=Search

The X-XSS-Protection HTTP response header allows the web server to enable or disable the web browser's XSS protection mechanism. The following values would attempt to enable it:
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-XSS-Protection: 1; report=http://www.example.com/xss
The following values would disable it:
X-XSS-Protection: 0
The X-XSS-Protection HTTP response header is currently supported on Internet Explorer, Chrome and Safari (WebKit).

Reported December 1, 2016 10:27am +0400

snicker2812

Participants

State ● Not-applicable ()

Reported to Open-Xchange

Disclosed February 9, 2017 9:09am +0400

Severity Medium (4 ~ 6.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Clickjacking

2

#1301113 CLICKJACKING LEADS TO DEACTIVATE ACCOUNT

Share:

TIMELINE

scianto05 submitted a report to UPchieve. Aug 12th (22 days ago)

Hello UPCHEIVE SECURITY TEAM,

I'm Anto

Vulnerability :
Clickjacking in (https://hackers.upchieve.org/profile)

Steps to Reproduce:
1). Create a HTML file with following code

```
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
```

Code 550 Bytes Wrap lines Copy Download

```
1    <html lang="en-US">
2    <head>
3    <meta charset="UTF-8">
4    </head>
```

Reported August 12, 2021 11:03am +0400

scianto05

Participants

State ● Duplicate ()

Reported to UPchieve

Disclosed August 16, 2021 9:21pm +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*



https://hackerone.com/reports/85624

Weak cipher suites

3

#223350 Web server is vulnerable to Beast Attack

Share:

TIMELINE

mrr3boot submitted a report to Weblate. Apr 24th (4 years ago)

Supported versions:

TLSv1.0 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2

Deflate compression: no

Supported cipher suites (ORDER IS NOT SIGNIFICANT):

TLSv1.0

RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Reported April 24, 2017 1:56pm +0400

mrr3boot

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Weblate

Disclosed April 25, 2017 12:37am +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Host header injection

0

#170333 **Host Header Injection/Redirection**

Share:

TIMELINE

gorkhali submitted a report to **RubyGems**. Sep 19th (5 years ago)

rubygems.org is vulnerable to host header injection because the host header can be changed to something outside the target domain.

Attack vectors are somewhat limited but depends on how the host header is used by the back-end application code. If code references the hostname used in the URL such as password reset pages, an attacker could spoof the host header of the request in order to trick the application to forwarding the password reset email to the attackers domain instead, etc. Other attack vectors may also be possible through manipulation of hyperlinks or other misc. code that relies on the host/domain of the request.

nc rubygems.org 80
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: google.com

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: nginx
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 06:44:25 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

Reported September 19, 2016 10:45am +0400

gorkhali

Participants

State Duplicate ()

Reported to RubyGems

Disclosed February 9, 2018 3:15am +0400

Severity None (0.0)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

67 #698416 Host Header Injection

Share:

TIMELINE

masterhackor submitted a report to New Relic. Sep 20th (2 years ago)

Reproduction

1- open reset link https://login.newrelic.com/passwords/forgot

2- Enter the victim's email address and click Reset and Email Password

3- Intercept the HTTP request in Burp Suite & add X-Forwarded Host Header and write attacker.com/.newrelic.com

link will be like

https://testing-now.000webhostapp.com/.newrelic.com/passwords/reset/a248d8b06e7b25a116859729cbc0e07e180d9fb197dadc04f30185512eecc811

Impact

The victim will receive the malicious link in their email, and, when clicked, will leak the user's password reset link / token to the attacker, leading to full account takeover.

Reported September 20, 2019 4:49am +0400

masterhackor

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to New Relic

Disclosed January 27, 2020 8:13pm +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

Bounty $500

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

https://hackerone.com/reports/698416

Information disclosure

Product, version

1

#23447 Version Disclosure (NginX)

Share:

TIMELINE

stalker submitted a report to Mail.ru.

Aug 10th (7 years ago)

POC :

url : https://calendar.mail.ru

Open up your google chrome browser.
Click right mouse button and choose Inspect Element.
Put website url in address bar. (https://calendar.mail.ru)
Now choose network option from Inspect Element menu.

Response Headers
Connection:close
Content-Security-Policy:default-src *.mail.ru* .imgsmail.ru *.yadro.ru* .facebook.com *.vk.com* .odnoklassniki.ru *.tns-counter.ru* .youtube.com; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' *.mail.ru* .imgsmail.ru *.yadro.ru* .facebook.com *.vk.com* .odnoklassniki.ru *.tns-counter.ru* .youtube.com *.twitter.com; style-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'* .mail.ru *.imgsmail.ru* .youtube.com; img-src data: *; report-uri https://cspreport.mail.ru/calendar/;
Content-Type:text/html; charset=utf-8

Reported August 10, 2014 4:09pm +0400

stalker

Participants

State — Informative ()

Reported to — Mail.ru

Disclosed — September 10, 2014 1:13pm +0400

Severity — No Rating (---)

Weakness — *None*

CVE ID — *None*

Account de... — *None*

5

#1245055 XSS DUE TO CVE-2020-3580

Share:

TIMELINE

veshrajghimire submitted a report to U.S. Dept Of Defense. Jun 26th (2 months ago)

Hello Team,

During my research, I found the following host to be vulnerable to CVE 2020-3580 which is POST BASED XSS.

Vulnerable URL: https://[redacted]/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a

Impact

Attackers can steal cookies and even takeover accounts and perform different malicious activities.

System Host(s)

[redacted]

Affected Product(s) and Version(s)

CVE Numbers

Steps to Reproduce

Save following code as xss.html and open in browser:

Reported June 26, 2021 3:42pm +0400

veshrajghimire

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to U.S. Dept Of Defense

Disclosed July 29, 2021 11:46pm +0400

Severity Medium (4 ~ 6.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

https://hackerone.com/reports/1245055



https://hackerone.com/reports/1003980

Directory listing

8

#690796 Directory listing is enabled that exposes non public data through multiple path

Share:

TIMELINE

tibin_sunny submitted a report to **Nextcloud**. Sep 9th (2 years ago)

Directory Listing is enabled on https://try.nextcloud.com and it shows out a few files on the server + The server version.

POC: https://try.nextcloud.com/assets/
https://try.nextcloud.com/css/
https://try.nextcloud.com/js/

Impact

This could leak sensitive information on the server and it also allows an attacker to gain knowledge about the web-technology used by the website

1 attachment:
F578277: nextcloud.PNG

Reported September 9, 2019 12:59pm +0400

tibin_sunny

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Nextcloud

Disclosed February 1, 2020 8:39am +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Verbose errors

1

#1082521 Full Path Disclosure of Server through 500 Server Error

Share:

TIMELINE

bugera submitted a report to Kartpay. Jan 20th (8 months ago)

Hello team,

EXPLANATION

I found a interesting vulnerability into your site that it unexpected disclosing the server path where the PHP files are being hosted. When application sends account verification links in email then if anyone tries to verify his account with that link at a twice then on the title of the website the whole server path is disclosing through 500 Server Error.

Vulnerable Path :

```
/usr/share/ngnix/website/resources/view/auth/create_password.blade.php
```

I have added a POC .

Impact

1. Server Information Disclosure

Reported January 20, 2021 7:41pm +0400

bugera

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Kartpay

Disclosed August 16, 2021 9:46pm +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*



https://hackerone.com/reports/1083543

Leaks in services

21 #631529 Listing of Amazon S3 Bucket accessible to any amazon authenticated user (vector-maps-e457472599)

Share:

TIMELINE

zer0ttl submitted a report to TomTom. Jun 28th (2 years ago)

Summary:

It's possible to get a listing of every files in the S3 bucket `vector-maps-e457472599`

Description:

The problem is using the AWS command line, it's possible to get a listing of files in the Amazon S3 Bucket with an AWS authentication. See screenshot `vector-maps-e457472599_public_s3_bucket.png`

This user authentication is easy to get and it's free from Amazon.

The good news is that the ACL on the files are set the way that's impossible at moment to create any file from the bucket using my authentication. I did not test removing any file from the bucket.

A secure amazon S3 bucket would show Access Denied like your other bucket named `brda-vector-maps` in screenshot `brda-vector-maps_access_denied_s3_bucket.png`

Reported June 28, 2019 6:48pm +0400

zer0ttl

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to TomTom Managed

Disclosed August 9, 2019 4:38pm +0400

Severity Medium (4 ~ 6.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*



https://hackerone.com/reports/911606

Content spoofing on error pages

ak1t4 submitted a report to LocalTapiola.

Nov 11th (5 years ago)

Hi team!

I want to report a context spoofing or text injection at the new scope added [viestinta.lahitapiola.fi]

Vulnerability Description: The new scope allows users to inject any content on the 404 not found webpage

Vulnerable Location:

http://viestinta.lahitapiola.fi/!!!ATENTION!%20This%20server%20is%20on%20Maintenance%20please%20go%20to%20WWW.EVIL.COM%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20

Image F134122: Captura_de_pantalla_2016-11-11_a_las_13.48.26.png 51.46 KiB

Zoom in Zoom out Copy Download



Reported November 11, 2016 8:51pm +0400

ak1t4

Participants

State	Resolved ()
Reported to	LocalTapiola
Disclosed	January 9, 2017 1:12pm +0400
Severity	Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)
Weakness	*None*
Bounty	$100
CVE ID	*None*
Account de...	*None*

@davwwwx

Wordpress

XMLRPC enabled

29

#448524 xmlrpc.php file is enable it will used for (DOS) and bruteforce attack

Share:

TIMELINE

meepmerp submitted a report to FormAssembly. Nov 21st (3 years ago)

Wordpress that have xmlrpc.php enabled for pingbacks, trackbacks, etc. can be made as a part of a huge botnet causing a major DDOS. The website https://www.formassembly.com/ has the xmlrpc.php file enabled and could thus be potentially used for such an attack against other victim hosts.

In order to determine whether the xmlrpc.php file is enabled or not, using the Repeater tab in Burp, send the request below.

```
POST /wp/xmlrpc.php HTTP/1.1
Host: www.formassembly.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,/;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Cache-Control: max-age=0
```

Reported November 21, 2018 9:29pm +0400

meepmerp

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to FormAssembly

Disclosed December 27, 2018 7:55am +0400

Severity High (7 ~ 8.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Marked Safe From

XMLRPC.php open

Today

wp-json origin reflection

141

#768151 Bypassing CORS Misconfiguration Leads to Sensitive Exposure

Share:

TIMELINE

koaladev submitted a report to U.S. Dept Of Defense. Jan 4th (2 years ago)

Hi! Security Team @deptofdefense,
It's possible to get information about the users registered (such as: id, name, login name, etc.) without authentication in Wordpress via API on
*. [redacted].

Description:
By default Wordpress allow public access to Rest API to get informations about all users registered on the system.

Platform(s) Affected: [website]
*. https://[redacted]/wp-json/

Steps To Reproduce:

1) Repreat URL Vulnerable to Burp Suite
2) If you add the `Origin-parameter` to the `Request-header`, the responsive header will reject
3) Bypassing Using Exploit CORS-With Sensitive

Reported January 4, 2020 7:52pm +0400

koaladev

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to U.S. Dept Of Defense

Disclosed May 14, 2020 9:16pm +0400

Severity Medium (4 ~ 6.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Open redirect

50 #1073565 **Open Redirect on https://www.twitterflightschool.com/widgets/experience?destination_url=https://evil.com**

Share:

SUMMARY BY TWITTER

This report details an open redirect issue that enabled crafting potentially malicious URLs which could be used to redirect users to a site specified in a URL parameter of the URL creator's choosing. This may allow an attacker to exploit a user's trust by leveraging open redirect on the affected subdomains (flightschool.twitter.com and takeflight.twitter.com) to launch phishing scams by masquerading as the legitimate websites.

SUMMARY BY NAGLI

This vulnerability is part of a study I have been conducting about "Vulnerability inheritance - Attacking companies and scoring bounties through 3rd party integrations".

twitterflightschool.com was pointing towards a 3rd party vendor as a CNAME, I managed to find Stored Open Redirect on an endpoint which belongs to the vendor that allowed me to achieve Stored Open Redirects on 2 domains under *.twitter.com which are

Code 26 Bytes

```
1 flightschool.twitter.com,
```

Reported January 7, 2021 8:14pm +0400

nagli

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Twitter

Disclosed May 5, 2021 1:09am +0400

Severity Low (0.1 ~ 3.9)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

Open redirectors

Open redirectors take you from a Google URL to another website chosen by whoever constructed the link. Some members of the security community argue that the redirectors aid phishing, because users may be inclined to trust the mouse hover tooltip on a link and then fail to examine the address bar once the navigation takes place.

Our take on this is that tooltips are not a reliable security indicator, and can be tampered with in many ways; so, we invest in technologies to detect and alert users about phishing and abuse, but we generally hold that a small number of properly monitored redirectors offers fairly clear benefits and poses very little practical risk.

Of course, some improperly designed redirectors can lead to more serious flaws, and we often see it used to trigger the following vulnerabilities:

- Content Security Policy bypass
- Referrer check bypass
- URL whitelist bypass
- Angular ng-include bypass
- Working redirect to *javascript:* URL

If you notice the above issues, use the found open redirector in the exploit chain and let us know! On its own though, the open redirector will not be accepted for the VRP.

https://sites.google.com/site/bughunteruniversity/nonvuln/open-redirect


open redirect is
not a vulnerability
CHANGE MY MIND

123 #206591 **Open Redirect on central.uber.com allows for account takeover**

Share:

SUMMARY BY UBER

An error in our OAuth2 flow for `central.uber.com` allowed an attacker to leverage an open redirect that allowed for a full account takeover. When logging into `central.uber.com`, the `state` parameter for login.uber.com contained a redirect location instead of a CSRF token. As a result, an attacker could modify the state parameter to have a poisoned `central.uber.com` path which would redirect to a custom domain after login and allow them to steal an account OAuth access token.

Thanks, @ngalog!

TIMELINE

ngalog submitted a report to Uber. — Feb 15th (5 years ago)

ngalog updated the severity to Critical. — Feb 15th (5 years ago)

ngalog posted a comment. — Updated Feb 15th (5 years ago)

jovon-uber posted a comment. — Feb 15th (5 years ago)

Reported February 15, 2017 1:48pm +0400

ngalog

Participants

State: Resolved ()

Reported to: Uber Managed

Disclosed: January 25, 2019 9:41pm +0400

Severity: High (7 ~ 8.9)

Weakness: *None*

Bounty: $8,000

CVE ID: *None*

Account de...: *None*

Server Side Request Forgery

18 #145524 **Server side request forgery (SSRF) on nextcloud implementation.**

Share:

TIMELINE

paglababa submitted a report to Nextcloud. Jun 17th (5 years ago)

An admin of nextcloud server can add other trusted nextcloud server in his own installation. The following request passes when a new add request is processed:

Code 829 Bytes Wrap lines Copy Download

```
1  POST /nextcloud/index.php/apps/federation/trusted-servers HTTP/1.1
2  Host: myown.nextcloudserver.com
3  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
4  Accept: */*
5  Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
8  requesttoken: GAFcYDUGGyM0CCYeIlk4b19ADhwOFgcLOy4kERdDL1Q=:AL1VmGJMGqQsVhw59y9yE/wsjGJWMtc8DJljyuFMaI4=
9  OCS-APIREQUEST: true
10 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
11 Content-Length: 27
12 Cookie: oc6wp9sjado5=nnofa4hfq2esn7anu70hg3c2h0; oc_sessionPassphrase=dvniWxtCrcQk4Nbt4eXXmyZu5wUk3JoHziCUaCBcmeQFaM0333bS8HBwvFO
13 Connection: close
```

Reported June 17, 2016 11:27pm +0400

paglababa

Participants

State Informative ()

Reported to Nextcloud

Disclosed June 17, 2016 11:41pm +0400

Severity No Rating (---)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

@davwwwx



https://medium.com/@d0nut/piercing-the-veal-short-stories-to-read-with-friends-4aa86d606fc5

340 #530974 **Server-Side Request Forgery using Javascript allows to exfill data from Google Meta data**

Share:

SUMMARY BY SNAPCHAT

@nahamsec, @daeken and @ziot found a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in https://business.snapchat.com which they exploit by providing a custom webpage configured to utilize DNS rebinding to access internal web endpoints like the Google Metadata Service. Using this they are able to mint tokens for the service-account assigned to the instance hosting the Chrome instances used for extracting webpages assets for media projects.

TIMELINE

nahamsec submitted a report to Snapchat. Apr 8th (2 years ago)

Hey there,

I was looking at your ads site with @daeken, we found some weird behavior in the import function of the creative app. Here are the steps:

POC

- Login to https://business.snapchat.com/
- Go to creative library -> New Creative
- Under "Topsnap Media", click on "Create"
- Click on any of the templates and load it

Reported April 8, 2019 9:29am +0400

nahamsec

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Snapchat

Disclosed November 30, 2020 10:27pm +0400

Severity No Rating (---)

Weakness *None*

Bounty $4,000

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

https://hackerone.com/reports/530974

XSS

SELF XSS

19

#846931 XSS at go.mail.ru

Share:

SUMMARY BY MAIL.RU

DOM-based self XSS in go.mail.ru social search functionality

TIMELINE

adiosmf submitted a report to Mail.ru. — Apr 11th (about 1 year ago)

kpebetka Mail.ru staff changed the status to ● Triaged. — Apr 11th (about 1 year ago)

Mail.ru has decided that this report is not eligible for a bounty. — Apr 11th (about 1 year ago)

majes7ic Mail.ru staff closed the report and changed the status to ● Resolved. — Apr 22nd (about 1 year ago)

adiosmf posted a comment. — Apr 22nd (about 1 year ago)

Reported April 11, 2020 2:21am +0400

adiosmf

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Mail.ru

Disclosed May 8, 2020 2:49pm +0400

Severity Medium (6.1)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*



https://hackerone.com/reports/1028332



https://hackerone.com/reports/472470



https://xsshunter.com/

Cookie based XSS

2

#83576 [start.icq.com] Reflected XSS via Cookies

Share:

TIMELINE

bigbear_ submitted a report to Mail.ru. Aug 20th (6 years ago)

Request:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Cookie: geo=380; icqsrch_lang=ua; abt=1"> `<script>` alert(document.domain) `</script>` <a href="; icq_pref=medium%3A_blank
Referer: http://start.icq.com/
Host: start.icq.com
Connection: Keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.21 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.21
Accept: /

Response:

Code 619 Bytes Wrap lines Copy Download

```
1  <div class="d3-1-3" id="icq_ads" onmouseover="showIcqAd('block')" onmouseout="showIcqAd('none')">
```

Reported August 20, 2015 7:29am +0400

bigbear_

Participants

State ● Resolved ()

Reported to Mail.ru

Disclosed October 21, 2015 3:27pm +0400

Severity No Rating (---)

Weakness *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*



https://xkcd.com/1200/



https://challenge-0821.intigriti.io/

Sandbox domain XSS

XSS in sandbox domains

Google uses a range of sandbox domains to safely host various types of user-generated content. Many of these sandboxes are specifically meant to isolate user-uploaded HTML, JavaScript, or Flash applets and make sure that they can't access any user data.

For this reason, we recommend using *alert(document.domain)* instead of *alert(1)* as your default XSS payload. In particular, if you see script execution in any subdomains of the domains in this list:

- *ad.doubleclick.net*
- *googleusercontent.com*
- *googlecode.com*
- *codespot.com*
- *feeds.feedburner.com*
- *googleadservices.com*
- *googledrive.com*
- *googlegroups.com*
- *{your-blog-name}.blogspot.com*
- *{your-app-name}.appspot.com*
- *firebasestorage.googleapis.com*
- *storage.googleapis.com*
- *kaggleusercontent.com*
- *translate.goog*

...your report will probably not qualify, unless you can come up with an attack scenario where the injected code could gain access to sensitive user data.

https://sites.google.com/site/bughunteruniversity/nonvuln/xss-in-sandbox-domain
https://sites.google.com/site/bughunteruniversity/nonvuln/

@davwwwx

BOUNTY PLZ !!!

@davwwwx

Thanks !

https://go.xss.am/bbs-owasp