Phil/LPS 31 Introduction to Inductive Logic Lecture 5

David Mwakima dmwakima@uci.edu Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science University of California, Irvine

April 12th 2023

Topics

- ► Inference in Quantified Relational Logic
- Models
- Witnesses and Counterexamples
- ▶ The Rules of Quantified Relational Logic are truth-preserving
- Tying things up

- ► The goal is to say why this argument in quantified relational logic is valid.
- 1. All logicians are wise.
- 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
- :. 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.

- ► The goal is to say why this argument in quantified relational logic is valid.
- 1. All logicians are wise.
- 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
- :. 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
 - So we need to discuss the mechanics of inference in quantified relational logic.

▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- ▶ An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- ▶ An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.
- ► For each of these formulas: what is the scope of each quantifier? Provide an instance of each formula.

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- ▶ An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.
- ► For each of these formulas: what is the scope of each quantifier? Provide an instance of each formula.
 - $1 \exists xGx$

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.
- ► For each of these formulas: what is the scope of each quantifier? Provide an instance of each formula.
 - $1 \exists xGx$
 - $2 \forall x \neg Gx$

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.
- ► For each of these formulas: what is the scope of each quantifier? Provide an instance of each formula.
 - $1 \exists xGx$
 - $2 \forall x \neg Gx$
 - 3 $\forall x (\neg Qx \rightarrow \exists y Sxy)$

- ▶ In order to do inference in quantified relational logic we need the notions of (1) the scope of a quantifier and (2) an instance of a formula in quantified relational logic.
- ► The scope of quantifier are all the free variables, which it binds, in a formula.
- ▶ An instance of a formula in quantified relational logic is a formula that is obtained by freeing a bound variable within the scope of a quantifier and uniformly replacing every occurrence of this free variable by a constant.
- ► For each of these formulas: what is the scope of each quantifier? Provide an instance of each formula.
 - $1 \exists xGx$
 - $2 \forall x \neg Gx$
 - $\exists \forall x (\neg Qx \rightarrow \exists ySxy)$
 - 4 $\forall x \forall y (Lxy \rightarrow \exists z (Lxz \land Lzy))$

► Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.

- Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.
- Rule 1. All the truth-preserving rules of inference covered in sentential logic are truth-preserving rules of inference in quantified relational logic.

- ► Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.
- Rule 1. All the truth-preserving rules of inference covered in sentential logic are truth-preserving rules of inference in quantified relational logic.
- Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.

- ► Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.
- Rule 1. All the truth-preserving rules of inference covered in sentential logic are truth-preserving rules of inference in quantified relational logic.
- Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.
- ► Here is an example of an inference that uses Existential Generalization:

- ► Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.
- Rule 1. All the truth-preserving rules of inference covered in sentential logic are truth-preserving rules of inference in quantified relational logic.
- Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.
- Here is an example of an inference that uses Existential Generalization:
 - 1. Hypatia is wise. Wh

- ► Finally we can state the inference rules of quantified relational logic which turn it into a deductive logic.
- Rule 1. All the truth-preserving rules of inference covered in sentential logic are truth-preserving rules of inference in quantified relational logic.
- Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.
- Here is an example of an inference that uses Existential Generalization:
 - 1. Hypatia is wise. Wh
 - \therefore 2. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$ (From 1 and By Existential Generalization)

▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:

- ▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known as Universal Instantiation

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known as Universal Instantiation
- ► Here is an example of an inference that uses Universal Instantiation.

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known as Universal Instantiation
- ► Here is an example of an inference that uses Universal Instantiation.
 - 1. All logicians are wise. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known as Universal Instantiation
- ► Here is an example of an inference that uses Universal Instantiation.
 - 1. All logicians are wise. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$
 - \therefore 2. If Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician, then she is wise. ($La \rightarrow Wa$) (From 1 and By Universal Instantiation)

▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- ► Here is an example of Existential Supposition:

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- Here is an example of Existential Supposition:
 - 1. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$

- Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- Here is an example of Existential Supposition:
 - 1. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$
 - 2. Suppose Cavendish is wise. *Wc* (From 1. and Existential Supposition)

- ▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- Here is an example of Existential Supposition:
 - 1. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$
 - 2. Suppose Cavendish is wise. *Wc* (From 1. and Existential Supposition)
 - 3. Wise people use logic. (Additional Premise)

- ▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- Here is an example of Existential Supposition:
 - 1. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$
 - 2. Suppose Cavendish is wise. *Wc* (From 1. and Existential Supposition)
 - 3. Wise people use logic. (Additional Premise)
 - ∴ 4. Cavendish uses logic. (G)

- ▶ Inference rules continued from previous slide:
- Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before. This rule is known as Existential Supposition.
- Here is an example of Existential Supposition:
 - 1. Someone is wise. $\exists xWx$
 - 2. Suppose Cavendish is wise. *Wc* (From 1. and Existential Supposition)
 - 3. Wise people use logic. (Additional Premise)
 - ∴ 4. Cavendish uses logic. (G)
- ► These are the only truth-preserving rules of inference that we will avail for ourselves in quantified relational logic but other rules of inference can be derived from these.

For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.

- For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ▶ Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.

- For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ▶ Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.

- ► For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ▶ Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$

- For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ▶ Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
 - \therefore 2. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall xWx$

- ► For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ► Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
 - \therefore 2. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x Wx$
- And

- ► For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ► Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
 - \therefore 2. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x W x$
- And
 - 1. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x Wx$

- For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ▶ Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
 - \therefore 2. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x W x$
- And
 - 1. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x W x$
 - \therefore 2. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$

- For example, although many authors include a rule for Universal Generalization corresponding to the rule for Existential Generalization, we shall not do so here.
- ► Here's the brief answer why. It can be shown that for any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free, $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$ is logically equivalent to $\neg \forall x \mathcal{F}$ in classical logic.
- ► To see why, think about this logical equivalence with actual English sentences.
 - 1. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
 - \therefore 2. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x Wx$
- And
 - 1. Not everyone is wise. $\neg \forall x W x$
 - \therefore 2. Someone is not wise. $\exists x \neg Wx$
- So combining the first and second arguments we can conclude that something is not wise if and only if not everything is wise, i.e, $(\exists x \neg Wx \leftrightarrow \neg \forall xWx)$

▶ Useful Equivalence: For any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free:

$$\boxed{\left(\neg\exists x\neg\mathcal{F} \leftrightarrow \forall x\mathcal{F}\right)}$$

▶ Useful Equivalence: For any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free:

$$\boxed{\left(\neg\exists x\neg\mathcal{F} \leftrightarrow \forall x\mathcal{F}\right)}$$

is a theorem of quantified relational logic.

▶ So, to infer the Universal Generalization, $\forall x \mathcal{F}$, here are the steps.

▶ Useful Equivalence: For any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free:

$$\boxed{\left(\neg\exists x\neg\mathcal{F} \leftrightarrow \forall x\mathcal{F}\right)}$$

- ▶ So, to infer the Universal Generalization, $\forall x \mathcal{F}$, here are the steps.
 - 1. Use Existential Supposition with $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$.

▶ Useful Equivalence: For any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free:

$$\boxed{\left(\neg\exists x\neg\mathcal{F}\leftrightarrow\forall x\mathcal{F}\right)}$$

- ▶ So, to infer the Universal Generalization, $\forall x \mathcal{F}$, here are the steps.
 - 1. Use Existential Supposition with $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$.
 - 2. If you can show that $(\mathcal{F}(a) \land \neg \mathcal{F}(a))$, which is contradictory, then you can conclude $\neg \exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$, i.e., that your supposition is false.

▶ Useful Equivalence: For any formula \mathcal{F} in which x is free:

$$\boxed{\left(\neg\exists x\neg\mathcal{F} \leftrightarrow \forall x\mathcal{F}\right)}$$

- ▶ So, to infer the Universal Generalization, $\forall x \mathcal{F}$, here are the steps.
 - 1. Use Existential Supposition with $\exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$.
 - 2. If you can show that $(\mathcal{F}(a) \land \neg \mathcal{F}(a))$, which is contradictory, then you can conclude $\neg \exists x \neg \mathcal{F}$, i.e., that your supposition is false.
 - 3. Infer $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ using the Useful Equivalence.

An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- Here's how we show it.

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- ► Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- ► Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.
 - 2. $\neg \forall x (Tx \to Sx)$ is equivalent to $\exists x (Tx \land \neg Sx)$ by Useful Equivalence and $((\mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{G}) \leftrightarrow \neg (\mathcal{F} \land \neg \mathcal{G}))$

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- ► Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.
 - 2. $\neg \forall x (Tx \to Sx)$ is equivalent to $\exists x (Tx \land \neg Sx)$ by Useful Equivalence and $((\mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{G}) \leftrightarrow \neg (\mathcal{F} \land \neg \mathcal{G}))$
 - 3. From 2., suppose $(Ta \land \neg Sa)$ by Existential Supposition.

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- ► Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.
 - 2. $\neg \forall x (Tx \to Sx)$ is equivalent to $\exists x (Tx \land \neg Sx)$ by Useful Equivalence and $((\mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{G}) \leftrightarrow \neg (\mathcal{F} \land \neg \mathcal{G}))$
 - 3. From 2., suppose $(Ta \land \neg Sa)$ by Existential Supposition.
 - 4. From 3. we can infer *Ta*. But *Ta* implies *Sa*. (By definition of tautology and satisfiable)

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- ► Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.
 - 2. $\neg \forall x (Tx \to Sx)$ is equivalent to $\exists x (Tx \land \neg Sx)$ by Useful Equivalence and $((\mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{G}) \leftrightarrow \neg (\mathcal{F} \land \neg \mathcal{G}))$
 - 3. From 2., suppose $(Ta \land \neg Sa)$ by Existential Supposition.
 - 4. From 3. we can infer *Ta*. But *Ta* implies *Sa*. (By definition of tautology and satisfiable)
 - 5. But from line 3 and 4 this means we have $(Sa \land \neg Sa)$, which is a contradiction.

- An example of Universal Generalization. We want to show that every tautology is satisfiable, i.e., $\forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$. Here Tx paraphrases "x is a tautology" and Sx paraphrases "x is satisfiable."
- Here's how we show it.
 - 1. Suppose $\neg \forall x (Tx \rightarrow Sx)$.
 - 2. $\neg \forall x (Tx \to Sx)$ is equivalent to $\exists x (Tx \land \neg Sx)$ by Useful Equivalence and $((\mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{G}) \leftrightarrow \neg (\mathcal{F} \land \neg \mathcal{G}))$
 - 3. From 2., suppose $(Ta \land \neg Sa)$ by Existential Supposition.
 - 4. From 3. we can infer *Ta*. But *Ta* implies *Sa*. (By definition of tautology and satisfiable)
 - 5. But from line 3 and 4 this means we have $(Sa \land \neg Sa)$, which is a contradiction.
 - 6. So $\neg\neg\forall x(Tx \to Sx)$, which is logically equivalent to $\forall x(Tx \to Sx)$.

We know why the truth-preserving rules of sentential logic are truth-preserving. But since ∃ and ∀ are not truth-functional we cannot use truth tables to check whether the rules of inference given above are truth-preserving.

- We know why the truth-preserving rules of sentential logic are truth-preserving. But since ∃ and ∀ are not truth-functional we cannot use truth tables to check whether the rules of inference given above are truth-preserving.
- ➤ So, in order to say why the rule Existential Generalization, the rule Universal Instantiation and the rule Existential Supposition are truth-preserving rules of inference, we need to discuss the semantics, interpretation or meaning of sentences in quantified relational logic.

- We know why the truth-preserving rules of sentential logic are truth-preserving. But since ∃ and ∀ are not truth-functional we cannot use truth tables to check whether the rules of inference given above are truth-preserving.
- So, in order to say why the rule Existential Generalization, the rule Universal Instantiation and the rule Existential Supposition are truth-preserving rules of inference, we need to discuss the semantics, interpretation or meaning of sentences in quantified relational logic.
- ► This will require a tool which we will call a model or intended interpretation of some sentences in quantified relational logic.

- We know why the truth-preserving rules of sentential logic are truth-preserving. But since ∃ and ∀ are not truth-functional we cannot use truth tables to check whether the rules of inference given above are truth-preserving.
- So, in order to say why the rule Existential Generalization, the rule Universal Instantiation and the rule Existential Supposition are truth-preserving rules of inference, we need to discuss the semantics, interpretation or meaning of sentences in quantified relational logic.
- ► This will require a tool which we will call a model or intended interpretation of some sentences in quantified relational logic.
- ▶ I emphasize the word sentence because truth and falsity are properties of sentences, not formulas. A sentence in quantified relational logic is a formula with no free variables (Definition).

▶ In sentential logic, the model for the formulas was a truth function which took as input the truth value of the simple sentences in the formulas and returned a truth value 1 or 0.

- ▶ In sentential logic, the model for the formulas was a truth function which took as input the truth value of the simple sentences in the formulas and returned a truth value 1 or 0.
- ▶ In the model, the truth value of p is 1 if p is true and 0 if p false. Similarly in the model, the truth value of $\neg p$ is 0 if p is true and 1 if p is false. And so on for the other formulas formed using the rest of the truth functional connectives.

- ▶ In sentential logic, the model for the formulas was a truth function which took as input the truth value of the simple sentences in the formulas and returned a truth value 1 or 0.
- ▶ In the model, the truth value of p is 1 if p is true and 0 if p false. Similarly in the model, the truth value of $\neg p$ is 0 if p is true and 1 if p is false. And so on for the other formulas formed using the rest of the truth functional connectives.
- ▶ Thus, the model for sentential logic can be visualized as a table, which specifies the truth value conditions of the sentences in sentential logic. This is the powerful idea behind Tarski's definition of truth for formalized languages, which influenced truth conditional semantics in philosophy, where we think of the actual world as a model for a natural language like English.

Formula	Truth value conditions
(F)	1 if F is true; 0 otherwise.
(¬ <i>F</i>)	1 if F is false, 0 otherwise.
$(F \wedge G)$	1 if both F and G are true, 0 otherwise.
$(F \vee G)$	0 if both F and G are false, 1 otherwise.
$(F \rightarrow G)$	1 if both F and G are true, 0 otherwise. 0 if both F and G are false, 1 otherwise. 1 if either F is false or G is true; 0 otherwise.
$(F \leftrightarrow G)$	1 if truth value of $F = \text{truth value of } G$; 0 otherwise.

➤ Since quantified relational logic formalizes natural language to reveal more grammatical or internal structure, namely, proper names for individuals or terms and relations between these terms (in the right order); a model for quantified relational logic will necessarily be more complex.

- Since quantified relational logic formalizes natural language to reveal more grammatical or internal structure, namely, proper names for individuals or terms and relations between these terms (in the right order); a model for quantified relational logic will necessarily be more complex.
- But the idea is the same as the model for sentential logic. We will specify the truth value conditions for sentences in quantified relational logic. Importantly, the truth conditions for truth functional connectives in sentential logic carry over.

- Since quantified relational logic formalizes natural language to reveal more grammatical or internal structure, namely, proper names for individuals or terms and relations between these terms (in the right order); a model for quantified relational logic will necessarily be more complex.
- But the idea is the same as the model for sentential logic. We will specify the truth value conditions for sentences in quantified relational logic. Importantly, the truth conditions for truth functional connectives in sentential logic carry over.
- ▶ But! The crucial difference now is that we add more structure to the model in order to account for (1) terms, (2) predicates and relations, (3) the order in which the terms stand in various relations and (4) quantifiers.

➤ To account for terms we introduce the notion of a domain or universe of discourse, U.

- ► To account for terms we introduce the notion of a domain or universe of discourse, U.
- ► To account for relations we introduce the notion of an extension.

- ► To account for terms we introduce the notion of a domain or universe of discourse, U.
- ► To account for relations we introduce the notion of an extension.
- ▶ If P is a predicate symbol in quantified relational logic, the extension of P is a set of those terms to which the predicate applies. We write this set as $[P] = \{a \in \mathcal{U} \mid Pa\}$ "The set of those a's in \mathcal{U} that are P"

- ➤ To account for terms we introduce the notion of a domain or universe of discourse, U.
- ► To account for relations we introduce the notion of an extension.
- ▶ If P is a predicate symbol in quantified relational logic, the extension of P is a set of those terms to which the predicate applies. We write this set as $[P] = \{a \in \mathcal{U} \mid Pa\}$ "The set of those a's in \mathcal{U} that are P"
- ▶ If R is a relation, the extension of R is a set of ordered pairs of terms that stand in that relation to each other or themselves. We write this set $[R] = \{ \langle a, b \rangle \text{ for } a, b \in \mathcal{U} \mid Rab \}$ "The set of those a's and b's in \mathcal{U} such that Rab"

- ► To account for terms we introduce the notion of a domain or universe of discourse, U.
- ► To account for relations we introduce the notion of an extension.
- ▶ If P is a predicate symbol in quantified relational logic, the extension of P is a set of those terms to which the predicate applies. We write this set as $[P] = \{a \in \mathcal{U} \mid Pa\}$ "The set of those a's in \mathcal{U} that are P"
- ▶ If R is a relation, the extension of R is a set of ordered pairs of terms that stand in that relation to each other or themselves. We write this set $[R] = \{ \langle a,b \rangle \text{ for } a,b \in \mathcal{U} \mid Rab \}$ "The set of those a's and b's in \mathcal{U} such that Rab"
- ▶ To account for $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ we consider every x-variant \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} and to account for $\exists x \mathcal{F}$ we consider some x-variant \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} (Soon to be made precise).

Finally we can specify the form of an interpretation or model of quantified relational logic. The form of every model of some sentences in quantified relational logic will have two things: (1) the interpretation of symbols and (2) the truth conditions of sentences in the model.

Symbols	Interpretation
Constant	Term in the universe of discourse
Predicate, P	$P] = \{a \in \mathcal{U} \mid Pa\}$
Relation, R	$[R] = \{ \langle a, b \rangle \text{ for } a, b \in \mathcal{U} \mid Rab \}$

	Truth value conditions in the model
Pa	1 if $a \in [P]$, 0 otherwise.
Rab	1 if $a \in [P]$, 0 otherwise. 1 if $\langle a, b \rangle \in [R]$, 0 otherwise. 1 if for some x -variant \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} , the truth value of \mathcal{F}' is 1.
$\exists x \mathcal{F}$	1 if for some x-variant \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} , the truth value of \mathcal{F}' is 1.
$\forall x \mathcal{F}$	1 if for every x-variant \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} , the truth value of \mathcal{F}' is 1.

Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:

Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:

```
1. \mathcal{U} = \{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago \}
```

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago

Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:

```
1. \mathcal{U} = \{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago \}
2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
3. [L] = \{ <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> \}
```

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:
 - 1. Lab "a is larger than b."

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:
 - 1. Lab "a is larger than b."
 - 2. Lbc "b is larger than c."

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:
 - 1. Lab "a is larger than b."
 - 2. Lbc "b is larger than c."
 - 3. Wca "c is west of a."

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:
 - 1. Lab "a is larger than b."
 - 2. Lbc "b is larger than c."
 - 3. Wca "c is west of a."
 - 4. $\exists x Lbx$ "There exists an x such that b is larger than x."

- Here is an example of how we use models to check whether sentences in quantified relational logic are true in a model. The model is:
 - 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
 - 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
 - 3. [L] = { <New York, Los Angeles>, <New York, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, Chicago> }
 - 4. [W] = { <Los Angeles, Chicago>, <Los Angeles, New York>, <Chicago, New York> }
- Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model:
 - 1. Lab "a is larger than b."
 - 2. Lbc "b is larger than c."
 - 3. Wca "c is west of a."
 - 4. $\exists x Lbx$ "There exists an x such that b is larger than x."
 - 5. $\exists y Wyc$ "Some y is west of c."

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model (Continued from previous slide):

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model (Continued from previous slide):
 - 6. $\forall x Lax$ "a is larger than every x"

- 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model (Continued from previous slide):
 - 6. $\forall x Lax$ "a is larger than every x"
 - 7. $\exists yWyb$ "Some *y* is west of *b*"

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} > \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model (Continued from previous slide):
 - 6. $\forall x Lax$ "a is larger than every x"
 - 7. $\exists yWyb$ "Some y is west of b"
 - 8. $\forall x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ "For every x some y is larger than x and y is west of x."

- 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Determine whether the following sentences are true in the model (Continued from previous slide):
 - 6. $\forall x Lax$ "a is larger than every x"
 - 7. $\exists yWyb$ "Some y is west of b"
 - 8. $\forall x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ "For every x some y is larger than x and y is west of x."
 - 9. $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ "There is an x such that x is larger than every y and y is west of x."

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Consider (4) $\exists xLbx$. We said that (4) is true because for some x-variant of Lbx, < b, $c > \in [L]$, i.e., "Los Angeles is larger than Chicago". The term c =Chicago here is called a witness of the existentially quantified sentence $\exists xLbx$.

- 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Find a witness for (5) $\exists yWyc$.

- 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Find a witness for (5) $\exists yWyc$.
- ▶ Is there a witness for $(7) \exists yWyb$?

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- ▶ Find a witness for (5) $\exists yWyc$.
- ▶ Is there a witness for (7) $\exists yWyb$?
- ▶ Is there a witness for (9) $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$?

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Consider (5) $\forall x(Lax)$. We said this sentence is false because for some x-variant of Lax, < a, $a > \notin [L]$, i.e., "New York is not larger than New York". The term a = New York here is called a counterexample of the universally quantified sentence $\forall x Lax$.

- 1. $U = \{ \text{ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago } \}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Find a counterexample for $\forall x Wxa$

- 1. $\mathcal{U} = \{$ New York, Los Angeles, Chicago $\}$
- 2. a = New York, b = Los Angeles, c = Chicago
- 3. $[L] = \{ < \text{New York, Los Angeles} >, < \text{New York, Chicago} >, < \text{Los Angeles, Chicago} \}$
- 4. $[W] = \{ \langle Los Angeles, Chicago \rangle, \langle Los Angeles, New York \rangle, \langle Chicago, New York \rangle \}$
- Find a counterexample for $\forall x Wxa$
- ▶ Is there a counterexample for (8) $\forall x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ "For every x there is some y that is larger than x and y is west of x."?

► The case of (9) $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ and (10) $\exists x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ illustrate something important. (10) is true because we just need to find at least one witness; $(Lab \land Wba)$ is a witness. But (9) is false because we have to verify that there are no counterexamples. So we had to check every y-variant of $(Lay \land Wya)$ including $(Laa \land Waa)$, which is a counterexample.

- The case of (9) $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ and (10) $\exists x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ illustrate something important. (10) is true because we just need to find at least one witness; $(Lab \land Wba)$ is a witness. But (9) is false because we have to verify that there are no counterexamples. So we had to check every y-variant of $(Lay \land Wya)$ including $(Laa \land Waa)$, which is a counterexample.
- ► In general a witness to an existentially quantified sentence is a term in the domain that makes the sentence true.

- ▶ The case of (9) $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ and (10) $\exists x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ illustrate something important. (10) is true because we just need to find at least one witness; $(Lab \land Wba)$ is a witness. But (9) is false because we have to verify that there are no counterexamples. So we had to check every y-variant of $(Lay \land Wya)$ including $(Laa \land Waa)$, which is a counterexample.
- ► In general a witness to an existentially quantified sentence is a term in the domain that makes the sentence true.
- ▶ In general, for a non-empty domain \mathcal{U} , a counterexample to an universally quantified sentence is a term in \mathcal{U} that makes the sentence false.

- ▶ The case of (9) $\exists x \forall y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ and (10) $\exists x \exists y (Lxy \land Wyx)$ illustrate something important. (10) is true because we just need to find at least one witness; $(Lab \land Wba)$ is a witness. But (9) is false because we have to verify that there are no counterexamples. So we had to check every y-variant of $(Lay \land Wya)$ including $(Laa \land Waa)$, which is a counterexample.
- ► In general a witness to an existentially quantified sentence is a term in the domain that makes the sentence true.
- ▶ In general, for a non-empty domain \mathcal{U} , a counterexample to an universally quantified sentence is a term in \mathcal{U} that makes the sentence false.
- Note that in the case of counterexamples, the domain has to be non-empty. Think about it. If the domain is empty, then there is nothing to check. So there is trivially no counterexample!

► Finally, we can say why the rules of quantified relational logic are truth-preserving. We will not give a formal proof here. But we will reason in terms of witnesses and counterexamples.

- ► Finally, we can say why the rules of quantified relational logic are truth-preserving. We will not give a formal proof here. But we will reason in terms of witnesses and counterexamples.
- ▶ Consider Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.

- ► Finally, we can say why the rules of quantified relational logic are truth-preserving. We will not give a formal proof here. But we will reason in terms of witnesses and counterexamples.
- ▶ Consider Rule 2. From an instance \mathcal{F} , infer $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. This rule is known as Existential Generalization.
- ▶ This rule is truth-preserving because the instance \mathcal{F} automatically acts as a witness to the existentially quantified sentence $(\exists x \mathcal{F})$. So the sentence $(\mathcal{F} \to \exists x \mathcal{F})$ is a tautology in the model.

Now consider Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known an Universal Instantiation.

- Now consider Rule 3. From $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ you may infer any of its instances. This rule is known an Universal Instantiation.
- ▶ This rule is truth-preserving because if \mathcal{U} is not empty and if $\forall x \mathcal{F}$ is true, then there is no counterexample. So the sentence $\forall x \mathcal{F} \to \mathcal{F}$, where \mathcal{F} is any instance of $(\forall x \mathcal{F})$, is a tautology in the model.

Finally consider Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before.

- Finally consider Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before.
- This rule is truth-preserving for the following reason. Suppose $\mathcal U$ is not empty. Either there is a witness for $\exists x \mathcal F$ or there is no witness for $\exists x \mathcal F$. If there is a witness, then $(\exists x \mathcal F \to G)$ is a tautology in the model because the inference to G is arrived at using other truth preserving rules of inference. If there is no witness, then $(\exists x \mathcal F \to G)$ is a tautology in the model because the antecedent is never satisfied.

- Finally consider Rule 4. From $\exists x \mathcal{F}$, you may suppose that $\mathcal{F}(a)$ and use $\mathcal{F}(a)$ together with other premises to infer a sentence G using other truth preserving rules of inference. Here $\mathcal{F}(a)$ is the result of uniformly replacing every free occurrence of x in \mathcal{F} with an arbitrary constant a, which has not occurred before.
- ▶ This rule is truth-preserving for the following reason. Suppose $\mathcal U$ is not empty. Either there is a witness for $\exists x \mathcal F$ or there is no witness for $\exists x \mathcal F$. If there is a witness, then $(\exists x \mathcal F \to G)$ is a tautology in the model because the inference to G is arrived at using other truth preserving rules of inference. If there is no witness, then $(\exists x \mathcal F \to G)$ is a tautology in the model because the antecedent is never satisfied.
- ▶ In either case the inference from $\exists x \mathcal{F}$ to G is truth preserving. So, $(\exists x \mathcal{F} \to G)$ is a tautology in the model.

► We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - ... 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - : 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
- ► This argument has the following form.

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - :. 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
- ► This argument has the following form.
 - 1. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - .: 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
- ▶ This argument has the following form.
 - 1. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$
 - 2. *La*

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - : 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
- ▶ This argument has the following form.
 - 1. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$
 - 2. La
 - ∴ 3. Wa

- We can now say why the argument we started the discussion of quantified relational logic with is valid.
 - 1. All logicians are wise.
 - 2. Ruth Barcan Marcus is a logician.
 - : 3. Ruth Barcan Marcus is wise.
- ▶ This argument has the following form.
 - 1. $\forall x(Lx \rightarrow Wx)$
 - 2. La
 - ∴ 3. Wa
- But it is not immediately obvious why it is valid.

▶ We can now say that his argument is valid because we can infer (Wa) using truth-preserving rules of inference as follows:

1.	$\forall x (Lx \rightarrow Wx)$	Premise
2.	La	Premise
3.	$(\mathit{La} ightarrow \mathit{Wa})$	From 1. and Universal Instantiation
4.	Wa	From 2. and 3. and Modus Ponens.

We can now say that his argument is valid because we can infer (Wa) using truth-preserving rules of inference as follows:

1.	$\forall x (Lx \rightarrow Wx)$	Premise
2.	La	Premise
3.	$(\mathit{La} ightarrow \mathit{Wa})$	From 1. and Universal Instantiation
4.	Wa	From 2. and 3. and Modus Ponens.

See Homework 4 for more exercises.

We can now say that his argument is valid because we can infer (Wa) using truth-preserving rules of inference as follows:

1.	$\forall x (Lx \rightarrow Wx)$	Premise
2.	La	Premise
3.	$(\mathit{La} o \mathit{Wa})$	From 1. and Universal Instantiation
4.	Wa	From 2. and 3. and Modus Ponens.

- See Homework 4 for more exercises.
- We have now covered enough of deductive logic to understand its strengths. Next time we will begin discussing its limitations using Hume's Problem of Induction and Goodmans's Riddle of Induction in order to motivate inductive logic.