

Game Output

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15 Simulations of the Game

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#### run all
game_simulations(15, best_resp="Yes")

## Game of 2 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0.0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 1 0.5 0.0 0.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 0 1.5 0.0 0.0
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 2 2 0.0 0.5 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 2 2 0.5 0.5 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 2 2 0.0 0.5 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = 0 , wi
##
## That is:
## 1 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firm chooses 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 3 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.5000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5000000 0.0000000 1.5000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 1 1.5000000 0.0000000 0.5000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.1666667 -0.1666667 0.1666667
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.1666667 -0.1666667 0.1666667
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## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0      1      2 0.0000000 -0.1666667 0.1666667
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1 ]
##
## That is:
## 1 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firm chooses 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 4 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.5 0 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1 ]
##
## That is:
## 2 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 2 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 5 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0.0 1.5

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## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0.0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0.0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.3 -0.1 0.3
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 -0.1 0.3
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 2 ]
##
## That is:
## 2 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 2 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 6 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.5 0 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 2 ]
##
## That is:
## 3 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 3 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
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##

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##
## Game of 7 firms:
##   Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right  Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0      0      2  0.00000000  0.00000000  1.50000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1      0      2  0.50000000  0.00000000  1.50000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2      0      2  1.50000000  0.00000000  1.50000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1      1      2 -0.07142857 -0.07142857  0.3571429
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2      1      2  0.35714286 -0.07142857  0.3571429
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0      1      2  0.00000000 -0.07142857  0.3571429
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1
##
## That is:
## 3 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 3 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 8 firms:
##   Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0      0      2      0.0      0      1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1      0      2      0.5      0      1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2      0      2      1.5      0      1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1      1      2      0.0      0      0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2      1      2      0.5      0      0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0      1      2      0.0      0      0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1
##
## That is:
## 4 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 4 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .

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##
##
## Game of 9 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.05555556 -0.05555556 0.38888889
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.38888889 -0.05555556 0.38888889
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.00000000 -0.05555556 0.38888889
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ----
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1
##
## That is:
## 4 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 4 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ----
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 10 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.5 0 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ----
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1
##
## That is:
## 5 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 5 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ----
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##

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## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 11 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.5000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.50000000 0.00000000 1.5000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.50000000 0.00000000 1.5000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.04545455 -0.04545455 0.4090909
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.40909091 -0.04545455 0.4090909
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.00000000 -0.04545455 0.4090909
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ----
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 2 ]
##
## That is:
## 5 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 5 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ----
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
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## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 12 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.5 0 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ----
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 2 ]
##
## That is:
## 6 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 6 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .

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##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 13 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.03846154 -0.03846154 0.42307692
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.42307692 -0.03846154 0.42307692
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.00000000 -0.03846154 0.42307692
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1 ]
##
## That is:
## 6 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 6 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ---
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 14 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.0 0 1.5
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.5 0 1.5
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.5 0 1.5
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.5 0 0.5
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.0 0 0.5
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ---
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5 , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1 ]
##

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## That is:
## 7 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 0 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 7 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ----
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----
##
##
## Game of 15 firms:
## Scenario Si Sj_left Sj_right Si_Payoff Sj_Payoff_left Sj_Payoff_right
## 1 Sum_Si<K 0 0 2 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 2 Sum_Si<K 1 0 2 0.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 3 Sum_Si<K 2 0 2 1.50000000 0.00000000 1.50000000
## 4 Sum_Si=>K 1 1 2 -0.03333333 -0.03333333 0.43333333
## 5 Sum_Si=>K 2 1 2 0.43333333 -0.03333333 0.43333333
## 6 Sum_Si=>K 0 1 2 0.00000000 -0.03333333 0.43333333
##
## ---- Pareto Equilibrium ----
## Pareto Optimality is reached when: Si = 2 with  $vi(Si, S_i) = 1.5$  , if Sum_Si<K & Sj = [ 0 , 1 ]
##
## That is:
## 7 firms choose 0 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 1 firms choose 1 units, with a payoff of 0 .
## 7 firms choose 2 units, with a payoff of 1.5 .
##
## ---- Nash Equilibrium ----
## There are 2 Nash Equilibriums .
##
## ( 1 ) Nash Equilibrium 1 , for Sum_Si<K :
## 3 firms choose 1 units, each with a payoff of 0.5 .
## ( 2 ) Nash Equilibrium 2 , for Sum_Si=>K :
## 3 firms choose 2 units, each with a payoff of 0.1666667 .
##
##
## -----

```