The Devil's Handwriting

PRECOLONIALITY AND THE GERMAN COLONIAL STATE IN QINGDAO, SAMOA, AND SOUTHWEST AFRICA

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[ONE]

Introduction & Ethnography and the Colonial State

Social theorists have often treated colonialism as a monolithic object, a uniform condition. Yet even a cursory overview of the historical literature indicates that colonialism is actually an extremely capacious category, encompassing everything from pillage and massacre in the Spanish conquest of the New World to the peaceful coexistence between British rulers and Chinese subjects in late colonial Hong Kong.[1] The colonies that made up the German overseas empire, which lasted from 1884 until the end of World War I, exemplify the enormous variability even within the more delimited category of modern colonialism. This specifically modern variant of European colonialism, as opposed to the early modern (or earlier) forms, is my focus in this book. I have selected three colonies to illustrate the wide spectrum of colonial native policy, which, I will argue below, was the core activity of the modern colonial state. These colonies are German Southwest Africa, forerunner of modern-day Namibia; German Samoa, precursor of the contemporary nation-state of Samoa; and Kiaochow, a colony that consisted of the city of Qingdao and its surrounding hinterland in China's Shandong Province.[2] These three cases also represent three of the main

1. For general overviews of colonial history see Fieldhouse 1966; Reinhard 1996; and Ferro [1994] 1997; a comparative history of early modern colonialism from America to Macao by way of Goa is provided by Bitterli 1989; Albertini 1982 and Gustav Schmidt 1989 are comparative histories starting with the late-nineteenth-century scramble; Osterhammel 1995 is an excellent general overview of theoretical and conceptual issues. On late colonial Hong Kong see Chiu 1997.

2. Gründer 2004 provides the most comprehensive overview of the German colonial empire and the current state of historical research; see also Eckert 2003. Other comparative treatments of the German overseas empire are Townsend 1930; Brunschwig 1957; Gann and Duignan 1977; W. Smith 1978; and Henderson 1993. The essays in Gifford, Lewis, and

zones of intensive European colonial activity in the worldwide "scramble" for colonies that started in the 1880s—sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and (after 1897) the Chinese coast. Germany did not have any colonies in South Asia, Southeast Asia, or the Near East.[3]

In order to evaluate the claim that precolonial ethnographic representations shaped colonial native policy it is important to compare colonies whose inhabitants were defined in divergent ways by nineteenth-century Europeans. This criterion is already met by the single case of China, since the Chinese were discussed in increasingly Sinophobic ways in the nineteenth century but also continued to be regarded through the lenses of early modern European Sinophilia. Southwest Africa allows for internal comparisons, given the multiplicity of ethnic groups and communities. I examine the colonial treatment of three Southwest African peoples: the Khoikhoi (known as "Hottentots" in colonial jargon); the Ovaherero (or "Herero"); and the "Basters," a population descended from Boers and Khoikhoi and classified by Europeans as a "mixed race." Variability is further enhanced by the inclusion in the analysis of "Polynesians," who were perceived by many nineteenth-century Europeans as the ultimate noble savages living in an earthly paradise.

The central problem that I try to account for in this book—my "explanandum"—is colonial native policy. Four determining structures or causal mechanisms were especially important in each of these colonies: (1) precolonial ethnographic discourses or representations, (2) symbolic competition among colonial officials for recognition of their superior ethnographic acuity, (3) colonizers' cross-identification with imagos[4] of the colonized, and (4) responses by the colonized, including resistance, collaboration, and everything in between. Two other mechanisms influenced colonial native policy to varying degrees: "economic" dynamics related to capitalist profit seeking (plantation agriculture, mining, trade, and smaller-scale forms of business) and the "political" pressures generated by the international system of states.

Smith 1967 and Gifford and Louis 1971 are useful but often apologetic. The most valuable earlier overview is Hempenstall 1987, p. 94, which reads German colonialism as unsystematic, with no consistent "structures of administration" or uniform national model. This diagnosis should hold for *all* modern colonial empires, for reasons elaborated in this chapter.

3. On German imperial interventions in the Near East before 1914 see Trumpener 1968, chap. 1; and McMurray 2001.

4. *Imago,* suggesting a culturally and psychically constructed image, rather than *image,* which suggests a more direct "mirror of nature." See Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, p. 211; and Liliane Fainsilber, "Le pouvoir des 'imagos': Notes de lecture sur les premiers texts de Lacan psychanalyste," online at http://perso.wanadoo.fr/liliane.fainsilber/pages/imagos.htm.

This book does not attempt to identify any singular, general model of colonial rule. Indeed, general theory and general laws are widely recognized as implausible goals in the social sciences. Historians have always preferred complex, overdetermined, conjunctural accounts, but sociologists and some other social scientists have been reluctant to abandon the chimerical goals of parsimony and "general theory."[5] Rather than attempt to use colonial comparisons to fabricate a uniform model of the colonial state, I will seek instead to identify a limited set of generative social structures or mechanisms and to track the ways they interacted to produce ongoing policies. Even though each instance of colonial native policy was shaped by a different constellation of influences, the four primary mechanisms named above were always present and efficacious to varying degrees.

Three Colonies

The beginnings of the German overseas empire are shrouded in historical mist, even if colonial propagandists attempted to invent a coherent tradition during the 1870s in order to fortify their argument that the newly unified German nation should embark on colonial adventures. The Great Elector of the state of Brandenburg, Frederick William, had established a trading post on the Danish-owned Caribbean island of Saint Thomas in 1685, but operations ended in 1731. He had also founded a Brandenburg-African trading company, which built a slave-trading fort called Großfriedrichsburg on the West African Gold Coast in 1682. The fortress was sold to the Dutch West Indies Company in 1721.[6] The next official German colonial endeavor began in 1879, when Germany signed a "friendship treaty" with Samoa that initiated two decades of informal, quasi-colonial influence on those islands by Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. The conventional date marking the beginning of the formal German colonial empire is April 24, 1884, when Southwest Africa was declared a "protectorate." The full extent of the German colonial empire at the beginning of the twentieth century is shown in figure 1.1. At this point the empire encompassed nearly one million square miles of territory. The empire came to an end three decades later, when the German colonies fell to the invading armies of France, Britain,

5. The implausibility of general laws is due to ontological peculiarities of the social world—above all, to its *openness,* in the sense of containing a multiplicity of irreducible causal mechanisms (Bhaskar 1986). See also the essays in Steinmetz 2005f.

6. Van der Heyden 2001; Schück 1889; Grosser Generalstab für Kriegsgeschichte 1912; Durchhardt 1986. We can disregard the Prussian territorial gains in the eighteenth-century partition of Poland, which were primarily of a noncolonial character, at least according to the definitions proposed below.

FIGURE 1.1 The German colonial empire in 1914, with circles showing locations of Samoa, Southwest Africa, and Kiaochow and black patches showing all colonies. From *Deutsche Kolonien* (Dresden: Cigaretten-Bilderdienst Dresden, 1936).

Japan, Belgium, South Africa, and New Zealand. The last German colony to capitulate was East Africa, where a mixed African and German force led by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered to Allied forces on November 25, 1918, more than two weeks after the armistice in Europe.[7] Although the fate of the empire was still uncertain through 1918 and it remained possible that Germany would regain at least partial possession of some of its colonies, the Versailles Treaty of 1919 deprived Germany "of all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions." The colonies were distributed to their new owners under article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which established the mandates system.[8]

Despite the relatively short life span of this colonial empire, there was a longer history of German *protocolonial* machinations in each of the regions examined in this book. German missionaries entered Southwest Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century and paved the way for the region's annexation in the 1880s. German merchants and political envoys dominated

7. Iliffe 1979, p. 245. On the 1914–18 military campaign in East Africa see Hordern and Stacke 1941; and Louis 1963, chap. 19.

8. The German colonial successors were Belgium in Ruanda-Urundi, Japan in Qingdao (until 1922) and on the islands north of the equator in the western Pacific, and Britain in East Africa/Tanganyika. Togo and Cameroon were divided between France and Britain, and control over of the other mandate colonies was assumed by Britain's southern dominions: South Africa in Namibia, Australia in New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealand in Western Samoa. See chap. 8 for a discussion of the mandate system.

precolonial Samoa starting in the 1860s. German Catholic missionaries were active in Shandong Province beginning in 1880.

It was relevant for the colonized populations that Germany was the *first* formal colonial ruler in their territories, though not because German colonialism took the same form in each colony. The colonizers who succeeded the Germans after 1918 in Namibia, Ruanda-Urundi, Samoa, and Tanzania preserved many of the basic structures of colonial administration and native policy that had been introduced by their predecessors.[9] In older historiography colonialism was usually described as taking nationally specific forms: the British practiced "indirect rule," the French preferred "direct rule" and later "associationism," the Americans engaged in "democratic tutelage," and the Germans pursued a colonial style that was described variously as "scientific," "economic," "emigrationist," or exceptionally brutal.[10] The sheer variability among the colonies of the German empire should immediately lay to rest any hypothesis of a national colonial style, even if there were nationally specific processes that combined with more general, pan-European ones and with local forces to give each colony its specific characteristics. Any putative "German effects" played themselves out differently in each site. Specifically, configurations of elite class conflict based in Germany were transferred to the colonies, where they were transformed according to the logics of the colonial field of power.

The German overseas empire has sometimes been dismissed as being unworthy of serious historical attention. This empire was unprofitable, except for a few particular investors. The German colonies had smaller military forces than other colonies in Africa and attracted a relatively small number of settlers, with the exception of Southwest Africa. The German empire emerged later than the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese empires and was short lived; and its officials lacked the competence that supposedly came with centuries of colonial experience. This view ignores the global political situation in the decades before World War I, which was one in which disputes over faraway places like Samoa or Morocco could escalate into conflicts among the great powers, transform alliances, and shift the international bal-

9. One reason for continuity revolved around the fact that the colonies had been "mandated" rather than conquered or annexed. British legal advisers determined that German law should remain in force in formerly German East Africa "until altered by the Mandatory power" (Callahan 1999, p. 41). The entire German administrative structure was preserved until 1925 (Iliffe 1979, p. 318). The New Zealanders broke with the German model in Samoa in certain respects (Field 1991) but also retained some of the key institutions of native policy, such as the Land and Titles Commission.

10. See Knoll 1978, p. 4; W. Smith 1978; and Union of South Africa 1918.

ance of power.[11] This view also ignores the fact that Bismarck triggered the first phase of the scramble for Africa among the European powers with the Berlin West Africa Conference and that Germany initiated the scramble for Chinese coastal colonies in 1897 by seizing Qingdao.[12] Another reason to reexamine this history is related to arguments that trace the Holocaust and German techniques of government in occupied Poland during World War II to pre-1918 colonialism.[13] But these justifications for focusing on German colonialism are still Eurocentric. For the colonized, the salient facts were subjugation, exploitation, and loss of sovereignty, not the merits or demerits of Germans relative to other imperialists. It matters little to a mugging victim whether his assailant has a bad haircut or speaks a provincial dialect. The populations that were harrowed by German colonizers cannot be assuaged by the fact that their conquerors were inexperienced latecomers or early leavers or that Europeans found their lands less lucrative or beguiling than, say, Sri Lanka, Tahiti, Brazil, or New England. Contemporary Namibians and independent Samoans are acutely aware of the fact that it was Germany and not some other power that first deprived them of their liberty. According to Marshall Sahlins, the "moment of domination" that is "most marked in historical consciousness" in the global peripheries is the "advent of the colonial state."[14] But what exactly did this momentous transition entail?

COLONIAL GROTESQUE: GERMAN RULE IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

The boundaries of Southwest Africa during the German era were almost identical to those of contemporary Namibia (map 1).[15] The Namibian population encompassed numerous Khoikhoi communities that were differentiated

11. On the international crisis around Samoa in 1898–99 see P. Kennedy 1974; on the 1911 Agadir crisis see most recently Meyer and von Kiderlen-Wächter 1996.

12. Förster, Mommsen, and Robinson 1988.

13. See Zimmerer 2003. For a similar argument focused on French colonial atrocities in Algeria and their relationship to "total war" and French "state anti-Semitism" culminating in the Vichy government's law on the "statut des Juifs," see Le Cour Grandmaison 2005, p. 337–38.

14. Sahlins 1993, p. 16. Some historians have insisted that British colonial rule in India entailed a sharp and discontinuous break, even if South Asians were not supine victims of exterior powers and even if some Indians profited from the Raj; see Chatterjee 1993, pp. 27–32.

15. Southwest Africa included the areas known to nineteenth-century Europeans as Damaraland (later "Hereroland") in the center, the southern regions inhabited mainly by Nama and Orlams, part of Ovamboland along the northern border, and the arid Kalahari in the east. An exchange of territories with Britain in 1890 added the Caprivi Strip in the northeast. When referring to the colonial state and its territory I will use the term "Southwest Africa." "Namibia" indexes the contemporary postcolonial nation-state as well as the historical region.

from one another mainly by the identity of their leaders. The nineteenth-century Namibian Khoikhoi were also subdivided into Nama (Namaqua) communities that had long been present in the region and various Orlam (or Oorlam) communities that had migrated overland from the Cape Colony into the areas called Greater Namaqualand, north of the Orange River.[16] Orlam typically spoke a mixture of Cape Dutch and Khoisan languages, were partly integrated into European markets, and relied on commodities like guns and textile clothing. Their mode of life (or "mode of production") was pastoralism; some engaged in livestock rustling from other Namibian communities and from white settlers. In the next two chapters I focus on one particular Orlam "commando group" that was politically dominant over other Namibian Khoikhoi during the first two decades of German colonial rule: the Witbooi, or /Khobesin people. These chapters also analyze ethnographic representations and native policies concerning two other Namibian nations, the Rehoboth Basters and the Ovaherero. The region designated "Hereroland" on map 1 was the nineteenth-century center of Ovaherero habitation, but Ovaherero extended northward all the way into Portuguese Angola. Some escaped into British Bechuanaland during the 1904 war, establishing Ovaherero communities there as well.[17] The Rehobothers were mixed descendants of Khoikhoi and European (mainly Dutch) settlers, and in the late nineteenth century they were the largest of several "Baster" communities north of the Orange River. Another ethnic group was the Berg Damara, who were also called "Hill Damara" or "Bergdama" at the time, and nowadays simply "Damara." They resembled the Ovaherero physically and were often enserfed by them during the nineteenth century but spoke a Khoisan language rather than Otjiherero or another Bantu tongue. Other ethnic groups included the Ovambo (Ambo) in the northern regions along the Angolan border, the Bushmen, and various communities in the northeastern Caprivi Strip. The Germans devised specific policies for most of these groups, but their administrative and military energies were focused on the Ovaherero, Witbooi, Rehobothers, and other Orlam and Nama populations.[18]

16. The five main Orlam groups in nineteenth-century Namibia were the Afrikaners, Witbooi, and the Bethany, Khauas, and Berseba peoples; see Dedering 1993a, p. 55 n. 4.

17. The eastern Ovambanderu spoke a different dialect of Otjiherero and also differed from other Ovaherero in terms their kinship system and clothing (Henrichsen 1997, p. 15). They are still considered a branch of the Ovaherero nation (Sundermeier, Tjituka, and Lau 1985). On the post-1905 Ovaherero community in Botswana see Durham 1993; 1995, p. 184; on the Angolan Ovaherero, see Estermann 1981.

18. The Caprivi Strip remained a distant outpost and was never effectively brought under the colonial state's control before 1914 (Fisch 1999). The Ovambo were employed in the

The Rhenish Mission Society (Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft, abbreviated RMG) was founded in 1828 and based in Barmen, Germany, modeling itself on the London Missionary Society (LMS).[19] The first missionaries sent abroad by the RMG worked in the Cape Colony. During the 1840s the RMG began expanding northward into the regions that were incorporated four decades later into the German colony. This close correspondence between the missionaries' field of operations and the boundaries of the Southwest African colony was no mere coincidence. The mission played a central role in the 1863 "war of liberation" in which Ovaherero freed themselves from the Afrikaners, or //Aixa//ain, who at the time were the most powerful Orlam group in central Namibia. The immediate result of this uprising was seven years of continuous warfare between the two groups, until the missionaries brokered a peace treaty in 1870. In 1864 the RMG created a "mission colony" of white artisans and shopkeepers at Otjimbingwe, in the center of Ovaherero territory, adumbrating the formal colonial process that started two decades later. In 1869 the RMG founded a "mission trading company" in Namibia, further blurring the boundaries between missionaries and settlers. Hugo Hahn, founder and head of the "Herero mission," became a practicing merchant at this time.[20] In 1879 the director of the RMG in Germany, Friedrich Fabri, published his manifesto for the nascent colonial movement, *Does Germany Need Colonies?* His answer was a resounding yes: Germany "must no longer hesitate to *resume* its colonising vocation."[21] When fighting broke out again between Ovaherero and Orlams in 1880 the RMG called on the German government to extend protection to its missionaries.

Three years later a representative of a Bremen trading firm owned by Franz Adolf Eduard Lüderitz met with tribal leaders and began collecting signatures on treaties that granted the German company a monopoly on trade along the coast and the right to create "factories, farms, or plantations" in exchange for an annual tribute and the German government's promise of protection.[22] In April 1884 Bismarck agreed to extend German "protection"

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colonial copper mines and after 1908 in the diamonds mines. This led to increasing scrutiny of Ovamboland by the colonial state and the beginnings of native policy there (Eirola 1992).

19. See Strassberger 1969; and Rohden 1888.

20. Lau 1987b, p. 93; Esterhuyse 1968, pp. 12–13; Vedder [1938] 1966, pp. 400–401. The formation of a trading company was a technique used by other German mission societies in Africa; see, for example, Quartey 2004 on the Basel Missionary Society's trading company on the Gold Coast during the nineteenth century.

21. Fabri [1879] 1998, p. 181 (my emphasis). Fabri went on to become the leader of the German colonial movement (Bade 1975).

22. Külz 1909, p. 8.

to the territories claimed by Lüderitz. The colony was initially called Angra Pequeña after the bay and town of the same name (later renamed Lüderitzbucht, or Lüderitz Bay).[23] These "protection treaties" stipulated that the Namibians would not sign treaties with any other foreign government or alienate land to "a different nation or members thereof" without the German emperor's consent.[24] Lüderitz eventually gained tenuous title to the entire coastal area stretching from the Orange River to the Kunene River and reaching inland twenty geographic miles. Just one year later, however, a bankrupt Lüderitz sold his entire interest to a chartered company, the German Colonial Society for South West Africa, which had been created by leading financial interests at Bismarck's behest. In May 1885 the first German government official, "Imperial Commissary" Heinrich Göring, or Goering (father of Nazi Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering), accompanied by two assistants, was dispatched to oversee the new protectorate. Goering's official charge was to administer justice, issue proclamations, train African constables, and conclude protection treaties with the remaining Namibian communities. During the next five years German sovereignty existed mainly on paper. Only after 1890 did the Germans begin extending effective control over the colony's inhabitants.

The German massacre of the Ovaherero in 1904 is widely recognized as the first genocide of the twentieth century.[25] Ovaherero grievances against their colonial overlords had increased steadily in the decade leading up to the 1904 war due to ongoing expropriation of land and livestock, railway construction through tribal lands, mounting indebtedness to German traders, and an accumulation of incidents of violence and humiliation at the hands of German settlers and the *Schutztruppe* (colonial army).[26] Most of the soldiers and officers in the *Schutztruppe* and most German settlers were opposed to the government's plan to set aside land for Ovaherero reservations (*Reservate*)—fixed territories restricted to members of a particular "tribe."[27] Rumors of an imminent Ovaherero uprising began circulating at the end of 1903. The Ovaherero-German war effectively started when German troops opened fire on Ovaherero at Okahandja on January 12, 1904,

23. Külz 1909, p. 11; Rohlfs 1884.

24. W. Werner 1993, p. 137.

25. See Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, introduction to Totten, Parsons, and Charny 1995, p. xv; and Bridgman and Worley 1995.

26. Bley [1971] 1996; Drechsler [1966] 1980; Krüger 1999.

27. "Foreigners," a category that included other indigenous Southwest Africans, were generally prohibited from settling within reservations, with the exception of missionaries (Sudholt 1975, p. 151).

although missionaries and military writers contributed afterward to the myth of a long-planned revolt.[28] The ensuing war was devastating for the Ovaherero in physical and cultural terms. Estimates of Ovaherero deaths in the actual fighting and its aftermath in an archipelago of "concentration camps" (*Konzentrationslager*) run as high as 80 percent of the population, although there are no exact figures. Following their decisive military defeat at the battle of Hamakari (Waterberg) on August 11, 1904, most of the surviving Ovaherero fled with their livestock into the Omaheke (Kalahari) Desert, where countless numbers died of thirst.[29] General Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the German military campaign, issued a "proclamation" to the Ovaherero on October 2, 1904—his infamous "annihilation order"—which declared that every Ovaherero man, woman, and child had to leave the colony or face death. Ovaherero men were executed by public lynching, sometimes stripped of their clothing, in a manner reminiscent of the American South during the same period (fig. 3.12). Ovaherero survivors who remained in the colony or returned after the extermination order was lifted in December 1904 became prisoners in the concentration camps and were used as forced laborers until the end of 1907 (figs. 3.8–3.11). The most devastating blow, for a pastoralist people whose community and spiritual life revolved around their cattle, was the ban on ownership of land and livestock. In the decade after the 1904 genocide the government focused on transforming the Ovaherero into an abject proletariat. Individuals and small groups of Ovaherero were attached as workers to German employers. By 1913, 90 percent of adult males living in the so-called Police Zone—the majority of whom were Ovaherero—were engaged in wage employment.[30] Various writers have used Southwest Africa as an illustration of Hannah Arendt's thesis concerning the colonial roots of European totalitarianism and Nazism. This argument is implicit in Thomas Pynchon's novels *V* and *Gravity's Rainbow*.[31]

28. See Gewald 1999, p. 154. Settlers also opened fire on Ovaherero, ignoring protestations of their loyalty, in Otjimbingwe. The term "Ovaherero-German war" is preferred to names like "Herero uprising" or "Herero revolt" by historians who see it as a defensive war against German aggression.

29. Pool 1991, pp. 251–81; Steinmetz 2005b.

30. W. Werner 1993, p. 140. The Police Zone, officially designated in 1907, encompassed "those areas which fall within the sphere of influence of the railway line or main roads" (W. Werner 1993, p. 139). It included most of the colony with the exception of "the northern regions of Kaoko, Ovambo, Kavango, and Caprivi" (Prein 1994, p. 103).

31. Bley [1971] 1996; Olusoga 2004. Of course, Arendt's argument in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* deals with South Africa, not with German Southwest Africa. More important,

The Witbooi people, whose leader Hendrik Witbooi (!Nanseb Gabemab) rallied many of the colony's Khoikhoi against their Teutonic oppressors in mid-1904, were also decimated by the colonizers' violence. Witbooi soldiers had been been integrated into the *Schutztruppe* after their defeat in 1894 at the hands of colonial governor Theodor Leutwein. In the decade that followed the Witbooi were described by German officials and writers as noble savages and heroic warriors and were frequently compared to Native Americans. In October 1904, however, Witbooi soldiers fighting in the *Schutztruppe* against rebellious Ovaherero were cunningly disarmed before they were able to learn of their leader's decision to change sides and declare war on the Germans. These Witbooi members of the *Schutztruppe* were deported to German Togo and were subsequently moved to German Cameroon. Most of them succumbed to the harsh conditions of imprisonment and drastic change in climate. Other Witbooi prisoners were dispatched to the concentration camp on Shark Island, which soon became known as "Death Island" (fig. 3.6).[32] Prisoners' conditions there were so atrocious that the commanding officer protested in 1907 that he was reduced to playing the role of a "hangman."[33] All land and property belonging to the Witbooi were expropriated by the colonial government. In proportional terms the devastation of the Witbooi was even greater than the vengeance wreaked upon the Ovaherero. The size of the Witbooi community fell from more than two

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it does not actually connect *colonial policy* to totalitarianism. Rather, Arendt describes the descent of the Dutch Boers to the allegedly precivilizational level of African natives as prefiguring the rootlessness, antistatism, racism, and hordelike behavior of the European "pan" movements that spawned fascism. She characterizes Africans as "vegetating" "savages" who lack not only "a culture and history of their own" but even a "specifically human character" (Arendt [1950] 1958, pp. 194, 190, 186, 192). The Boers' failing, according to Arendt, was to have moved *outside* the ambit of the colonial state. Indeed, colonialism for Arendt *contributed* to the civilizing process by changing "the country into a normal producing part of Western civilization" ([1950] 1958, p. 205), even if imperialism more generally was symptomatic of the dissolution of the European nation-state (Grosse 2006). The connection between South Africa and totalitarianism for Arendt is therefore not so much causal as comparative. Nonetheless, by depicting colonies as breeding grounds for race thinking and as the sites of ubiquitous massacre, Arendt opened up the possibility for readings of overseas colonialism as the seedbed of Nazism, elaborated by writers like Schmitt-Egner (1975) and Theweleit ([1977–78] 1987–89) and continued into the present by Zimmerer (2003).

32. The most complete study of the German concentration camps in Namibia between 1904 and 1908 is Erichsen 2004; Hull 2005 also discusses Shark Island but did not access the Namibian archive sources.

33. Telegram from Oberleutnant Estorff to Foreign Office in Berlin, April 10, 1907, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2140, p. 88v.

thousand people before the fighting to a mere thirty-eight in 1913—a loss of almost 98 percent.[34]

Not all of the colony's subjects were the targets of this murderous wrath. The Rehoboth Basters received preferential treatment throughout the German colonial period. They supported the Germans steadfastly during the Ovaherero and Nama wars (1904–7) and broke with them only when troops of the Union of South Africa marched into the territory in 1915. In return for their loyalty the Basters were allowed to remain self-governing and to keep the land they had claimed after their migration to Namibia from the northern Cape in 1870–71.[35] Many settlers saw Rehoboth as one of the most desirable pieces of real estate in the colony, and by 1910 officials were beginning to argue that the Basters would eventually have to be separated from their homeland.[36] But no significant moves had been made in this direction prior to the outbreak of World War I. The Rehobothers' ability to ensconce themselves in their "ancestral" territory reflected their favored status within the colonial system of rule.[37]

SAMOA: THE "LOTOS ISLANDS" AND SALVAGE COLONIALISM

For Robert Louis Stevenson, writing in the late 1880s, Samoa represented the "lotos islands": The lotus of Greek legend, described by Homer, was so delicious that those who ate it "left off caring about home and did not even want to go back."[38] Samoa, German's prize possession in Polynesia, consisted of the western islands of ʻUpolu, Savaiʻi, Apolima, and Manono. Taken together these islands make up the present day nation-state of Samoa, known until recently as Western Samoa (maps 2–3). Samoa was the site of the first modern German overseas plantation economy, created by the Hamburg firm Godeffroy in the 1860s and 1870s (the firm was reorganized in 1880 under the name German Trade and Plantation Society for the South

34. Jod 1961–62. The Nama and Orlam peoples of Southwest Africa counted perhaps twenty thousand people in 1904 before the fighting began and ten to thirteen thousand people in 1911 (A. Bühler 2003, pp. 337–38).

35. On the historical origins of the Rehoboth community, see missionary Heidmann, "Gemeindechronik der Bastardgemeinde Rehoboth," VEM, RMG 3.538b.

36. Hoffmann 1911, p. 59; Zwergern 1911; Rohrbach 1907, p. 144; and Hölscher to State Secretary of the Colonies von Lindequist, "Report on the Mood and Situation in Bastardland," November 30, 1910, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2124, p. 129.

37. See Kurd Schwabe 1899, pp. 38–39; Bayer [1906] 1984; and chap. 3.

38. Stevenson [1890] 1998, p. 33.

Sea Islands in Hamburg, or DHPG).[39] Samoa was also often referred to as Germany's "first colony" because of the 1879 "friendship treaty" between the two countries. In 1887–88 there had been a short-lived attempt to take control of the islands by Eugen Brandeis, a former Bavarian cavalry officer and DHPG employee. The following year a conference in Berlin involving Germany, Britain, and the United States concluded that consuls from those three powers and a selected European or American chief justice would administer the port city of Apia, where most Europeans and Americans lived, and advise the Samoan king, who would retain sovereignty over the rest of the country.[40] Germany became the sole ruler of the western islands in 1900, raising the flag at Mulinu'u Peninsula in Apia on March 1. The United States took over the eastern islands, which remain in a state of semicolonial limbo to this day.[41]

Some historians have described German Samoa as a living ethnographic museum in which the colonizers protected traditional culture from the depredations of capitalist modernity. The truth is more complicated. On the one hand, the colonial regime attacked any aspect of Samoan culture that threatened German authority. The German rulers were less concerned with immoral behavior than the missionaries, but they did try to suppress customs that were repellent to European mores.[42] On the other hand, many of the colonial government's interventions attempted to stabilize an imagined corpus of Samoan custom and to protect Samoans against induction into a culture-leveling version of capitalist modernity. In this respect the German colonial project in Samoa can be described as a form of *salvage colonialism*.[43] For example, the colonial government created an office whose job was to distinguish between heirloom-quality fine woven mats and mats that were used as currency and to affix an official stamp on the latter. This intervention worked against the incipient mingling of monetary and sacred value systems—a mixing that did not make sense from a European perspective and that threatened the project of preserving a tropical utopia alongside the modernized sector. The government tried to coax Samoans back into traditional customs that were being abandoned. For example, Samoans were urged to use traditional roofing materials on their houses rather than

39. P. Kennedy 1974.

40. Gilson 1970, chap. 16.

41. "Hoisting of the Flag," *Samoa Weekly Herald,* March 3, 1900; Shaffer 2000.

42. See BA-Koblenz, Nachlass Solf, vol. 20, p. 45, for one example of a ban on a "bad custom," namely, the power of Samoan elites to drive people out of their homes. The text of the order of September 1901 is in NZNA AGCA XVII A 1, pt. 2, p. 183.

43. I proposed this concept in Steinmetz 2004b.

corrugated metal.[44] Reliance on manufactured materials would limit the legendary mobility of Samoans, since Western-style houses involved greater sunk costs than a traditional *fale* (house).[45] Colonial governor Wilhelm Solf (fig. 5.1) is somewhat notorious for his opposition to intermarriage between Samoans and *papalagi* (whites), a stance that led eventually to an outright ban on mixed marriage. But this did not necessarily stem from racial animus against Polynesians. The policy also "prohibited Chinese labourers from setting foot in Samoan houses as well as forbidding Samoan women from entering Chinese quarters."[46] In light of Solf's well-documented disdain for the white settlers in Samoa and his fondness for Samoans, which led him to form an imaginary identification across the cultural boundary with an imago of a Samoan chief and to give his children Samoan names, his rejection of mixed marriage seems to have flowed mainly from a concern to defend the islanders against the sort of "racial" corruption that he believed was occurring in Tahiti and elsewhere in the Pacific.[47] Settlers in Samoa, like those in Southwest Africa, demanded that the colonial state alienate native-owned land and compel Samoans to work for wages. Instead, the government imported Chinese laborers to meet the plantations' needs.[48]

Samoan uprisings against the German state prompted settlers to call repeatedly for increased security. In contrast to Southwest Africa, however, the government positioned itself against the settlers and refused to strike an aggressive military pose. There were no colonial troops or German policemen in Samoa, and punishment by flogging was never considered appropriate for Samoans. A movement against German rule, the Lafoga 'Oloa, arose in 1904 among the chiefs of the Mālō which was the highest institution of nominal Samoan self-government at the time. The movement's aim was to start an independent copra-marketing company that would bypass European middlemen and generate the resources that would permit Samoans to free themselves from German control.[49] In response, the Mālō was disbanded and replaced with a body of salaried officials appointed by the

44. NZNA AGCA XVII A 1, pt. 6, p. 145.

45. See Salesa 2003 on the Samoan "love of travel."

46. Shankman 2001, p. 129.

47. See Solf's "Report on Mixed Marriage," September 15, 1907, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5432, p. 29.

48. NZNA AGCA VII 14; also Moses 1972; and Tom 1986.

49. See Hempenstall 1978, chap. 1; "Statement by Lauaki FK. before Imperial Amtmann Williams of Savai'i , as to the Origin of the 'Oloa," BA-Koblenz, Nachlass Solf, vol. 30, pp. 148–75. Also "Bekanntmachung" concerning "Die Selbstverwaltung der Samoaner," in *Samoanisches Gouvernements-Blatt* 3 (4, September 5, 1900): 15–17.

governor. One of the rebels, Lauaki (fig. 5.4), was placed on probation; another was deported. These punishments were less harsh than in Southwest Africa, since Samoans were familiar with the German practice in the South Seas of banishing rebels only to repatriate them as soon as they were needed for political purposes.[50]

Samoa was still a colony, however, not an ethnographic nature park. The government's aim was to *stabilize* Samoan custom rather than simply allow it to exist and evolve undisturbed. The German regime introduced subtle changes by translating and codifying Samoan customary law.[51] They introduced more dramatic changes by banning certain institutions, including the position of Samoan king, or *tupu*. The Germans' overarching assumption of Samoan difference and "savagery"—even if that savagery was "noble"—prevented the colonized from being construed as legal equals suited for genuine self-government. The idiom that Governor Solf adopted for his relations with Samoans was explicitly paternalistic. In contrast to Kiaochow, the Germans never expressed any interest in civilizational exchange with Samoans. Within the dominant German and European racial imagination the Samoans never escaped from the category of *Naturvolk* (natural or primitive people) into the category of the *Kulturvolk* (cultural or civilized people).[52] But in contrast to the systematic demonization of the Ovaherero, German officials followed the ethnographers in idealizing Samoans. This provided the colonized with some measure of protection from aggression and gave a very different cast to colonial rule.

QINGDAO (KIAOCHOW): FROM SEGREGATION TO SYNCRETISM

In 1879 the first German missionaries from the Societas Verbi Divini, the Steyl Mission, arrived in Hong Kong, moving from there into southern Shandong Province, which became their base of Chinese operations. The head of the Steyl Mission in China was Johann Baptist von Anzer (fig. 6.10). A decade later the German navy began to search for a base on the Chinese coast for use as a coaling station and as the launching point for carving out a German sphere of influence in China. In 1882 geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen (fig. 6.7) called Jiaozhou Bay the "biggest and best ocean harbor

50. Hempenstall 1978, p. 47.

51. Translations by Schultz-Ewerth (1905, 1911).

52. The opposition between *Kulturvölker* and *Naturvölker* was ubiquitous in German ethnological writing during the second half of the nineteenth century, even if the terms were given varying definitions (compare, e.g., Klemm 1843–52, vol. 1; and Vierkandt 1896).

in all of northern China" and emphasized its "past and *future* importance."[53] Bishop Anzer's repeated provocations of Chinese officials led to a series of attacks on missionaries and Chinese Christians in Shandong. The murder of two Steyl missionaries in 1897 provided Germany with its eagerly awaited pretext for seizing Qingdao.

The German coastal colony in Shandong, Kiaochow (maps 4–6) was not identical to the treaty ports like Canton and Shanghai which were jointly administered by Chinese and foreigners, even if Kiaochow did begin sliding in that direction in the years leading up to World War I.[54] Rather, it was a formal colony under European rule, like Hong Kong, which tolerated only minor infringements by China on its sovereignty. The Germans referred to the leasehold as the Kiautschou protectorate. To avoid confusion I will use the older English-language transliteration Kiaochow (rather than Jiaozhou) to designate the German leasehold in the 1897 boundaries. I will use Jiaozhou (the transcription of 胶州 in the contemporary Pinyin system of Romanization) when referring to the city that fell inside the fifty-kilometer zone but outside the boundaries of the Kiaochow leasehold (see map 5).[55] The name Qingdao (青岛) refers here not to the entire colony but rather to the city where the colonial government was headquartered, which was the place of residence for most Europeans in the colony (see maps 6 and 7). The Germans called that town Tsintau during the first year of their leasehold and Tsingtau later on; in English it is known as Tsingtao. The colonial city was located on Jiaozhou Bay and was constructed on the site of an ancient Chinese village (also called Qingdao) and of a recently built Chinese army barracks. The village and the barracks were razed by the Germans.[56]

Qingdao was invaded by the German navy in 1897, and the Kiaochow colony was coercively leased from China for ninety-nine years. Germans retained full sovereignty over Chinese inhabitants within the leasehold. They also had the right to intervene in a fifty-kilometer buffer zone surrounding the leasehold, to build two railroads through Shandong Province, and to mine for coal along the railway lines.

53. Richthofen 1877–1912, vol. 2, p. 262 (my emphasis). Von Richthofen had traveled extensively in China during the 1860s and 1870s and played a major role in shaping German perceptions of China and official colonial policy there; see chap. 6.

54. Fairbanks [1953] 1969, p. x. Fairbanks's pioneering analysis of the assault on Chinese sovereignty in the nineteenth century has been criticized for its reliance on a "modernization" framework; see Barlow 1997.

55. The city known as Jiaozhou in the colonial period is now called Jiaoxian.

56. On the history of the Chinese army base at Qingdao, which had been built after 1892, see Zhang Shufeng 1991.

Colonial interventions in Kiaochow and Shandong Province during the first seven years of German rule unfolded under the sign of segregation and anti-Chinese hatred, recalling the treatment of the Namibian Ovaherero. The preexisting Chinese settlements in Qingdao were demolished to make room for the planned colonial city, which was laid out in quasi-apartheid fashion, with segregated districts for Europeans and Chinese. A dualistic legal system was crafted, in which the Chinese were subject to harsh punishments for violating both German and Chinese laws. Their sentences were determined by a German district commissioner, or *Bezirksamtmann*, who acted single-handedly as policeman and judge.

After establishing themselves in the colony the Germans quickly took advantage of the treaty's fifty-kilometer clause in ways that signaled their intention to establish a permanent presence in that zone.[57] Almost immediately they began construction of the railway that would eventually reach the provincial capital of Ji'nan and connect to the north-south line running up to Tianjin. Villagers began erecting reinforced walls around their towns, sabotaging the railway tracks, harassing railroad employees, and opening fire on railway company workers. During the next three years the Germans responded by burning and sacking temples and villages, seizing local mandarins as hostages, massacring villagers, and installing garrisons in towns lying outside the leasehold boundary.

All of this took place against the backdrop of the uprising of the Yihetuan (Boxers) secret society, a movement that emerged in Shandong and other northern provinces in the 1890s and began attacking Western missionaries and Chinese Christians at the end of the decade. This rebellion was provoked partly by the German missionary and colonial presence in Shandong.[58] Germany was heavily involved in the joint expedition of the great powers against the Yihetuan, eventually dispatching twenty thousand troops to China, and the Kiaochow colony was directly involved in this campaign. The German Third Naval Infantry Battalion that was stationed permanently in Qingdao sent divisions to Tianjin and Beijing, where the main battles against the Yihetuan were being fought. There were also expeditions against Boxers and alleged Yihetuan supporters in Kiaochow's hinterland. Sinophobic ideology that positioned the Chinese under the sign of the generic racial inferior had been gaining power since the second half of the eighteenth century, and it reached its apogee with the anti-Boxer campaign, just as the German colonial regime was taking shape in Qingdao.

57. Schrecker 1971; Stichler 1989; Mühlhahn 2000.
58. Esherick 1987; Cohen 1997.

German Sinophobia was epitomized by Kaiser Wilhelm's *Hunnenrede* (Hun speech) to the East Asian Expeditionary troops being dispatched from Bremerhaven to China on July 27, 1900. The emperor called on his soldiers to emulate "King Etzel's Huns of a thousand years ago" and vowed that "no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German."[59] He had already declared in a June telegram to the Foreign Office that Beijing should be "razed" to the ground.[60]

By 1905, however, German policy in Kiaochow had become less violently expansionist and segregationist. German troops pulled back into the leasehold and stopped provoking the provincial government. New colonial institutions embodying a program of cultural rapprochement and exchange with China were superimposed on the preexisting apartheid foundation, although they never entirely displaced it. This shift was alluded to in a speech in November 1904 by a German bank director in Qingdao who praised the governor for giving the Chinese *Bürger* (citizens) "their civil rights" and involving "them in the affairs of the colony."[61] Indigenous Southwest Africans and Samoans were referred to as subjects (*Untertanen*) but never as citizens (*Bürger*). Although Chinese elites in Qingdao never gained legal rights that were fully equal to those of Europeans in the colony, many wealthier Chinese were allowed to participate in elections to a mixed European-Chinese council of advisers to the governor. Other German colonies had advisory boards or elected assemblies of European settlers, as well as institutions of native "self-government," but nowhere else did colonizer and colonized work together in the same council.

The ban on Chinese residence in the European district was partially lifted due to the influx into Qingdao of Chinese elites associated with the deposed Qing dynasty during the 1911 republican revolution.[62] The colonial government worked with a progressive missionary society, the Weimar Mission, to create Chinese schools at all levels with a mixed Chinese and European curriculum. The culmination of this educational policy was the

59. The actual text of this speech, quoted here, was suppressed by the German government at the time but has been verified and reconstructed by Soesemann (1976).

60. Quoted in P. Fischer 1996, p. 351.

61. "Festive Speech of Bank Director Homann on the Occasion of the Onset of Governor Truppel's Vacation, November 6, 1904," BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 59, p. 3.

62. The expansion of the Chinese population and Chinese-owned business is another indicator of the difference between Qingdao and Southwest Africa. Southwest Africa suffered proportionately huge population losses between 1904 and 1908, while Qingdao continued to grow, from just a few hundred inhabitants in 1897 to over fifty-five thousand in 1913 (Matzat 1998a, p. 106).

Qingdao German-Chinese college. This college had German and Chinese teachers and granted degrees that were recognized by the Chinese government for admission to examinations at the national university in Beijing. Within the college's Department of Law and Political Economy, students studied Chinese and European law and the faculty encouraged a process of transculturation in which the Chinese would fill German legal forms with Chinese contents and Germans would learn from Chinese legal traditions.[63] Middle-class translators and Sinologists working inside or together with the colonial administration and the German foreign service in China tended to admire and even identify with Chinese mandarins. Such educated, middle-class Germans became more influential within the Kiaochow administration in the decade before 1914. These changes were encouraged by the German Foreign Office, the navy, and the Beijing Legation, all of whom agreed that Germany should move away from direct colonialism in China and toward less obtrusive methods of influencing rather than bullying that potential ally.

Making Sense of Colonial Variations

The patterns of variation among these three colonies are as puzzling as is the sheer degree of heterogeneity. The German depredations in Namibia might not seem so paradoxical if one believed that colonialism always leads to massacre, or if one subscribed to the theory that German colonialism was singularly hideous. But the comparison with Samoa and Kiaochow instantly refutes both of these simple accounts. This is not to deny that massacre was always a possibility in a system predicated on the intrinsic inferiority of the Other, but it was by no means the norm, at least in the period after 1884. Indeed, the Germans' genocidal actions against the Ovaherero and Witbooi stand out as exceptionally brutal even in a century of "racial" slaughter and ethnic "cleansing."[64] But there was no singular German approach to colonial governance.[65]

These three cases pose a series of puzzles that cannot be resolved by the leading theoretical approaches. Current explanations of colonialism in sociology, political science, and history tend to focus on broadly socioeconomic or material determinants: a colony's location in the global economy, colonizers' economic interests, or environmental conditions. But not even the

63. See Romberg 1911, p. 25.
64. Steinmetz 2005b.
65. Gann and Duignan (1997, p. 74) agree.

economic policies that were promoted by colonial states—policies concerning the kinds of export products, modes of production, and existence and power of settler economies—can be derived from metropolitan economic interests or socioeconomic conditions in the colony. World-system theory locates the causally relevant social classes in the global "core" and derives political structures from economic functions. This approach is too coarse grained to account for variations among different parts of the raw-material-producing periphery. If colonies are all the same, a uniform category, the difference between the slaughter of the Ovaherero and the paternalistic protection of the Samoans becomes invisible. This is not to say that individual world-system theorists are indifferent to colonial genocide, but that their theory makes no room for these fateful differences.

Neo-Marxist theorists expect states to correspond broadly in their form and function to the interests of dominant social classes. Structuralist versions of neo-Marxism attribute a sort of capitalist omniscience to the state, which is seen as balancing or mediating among competing class fractions or groupings.[66] But it is not clear which classes are relevant in the colonial context, that is, whether it is the classes dominant in the metropole or in the colony that are structurally dominant.[67] Indeed, the reason this cannot be determined "economically" is that such dominance is assigned politically, that is, by the central and colonial states. Structuralist neo-Marxism is unable to make sense of the fact that overseas colonies *created* their own European class structures and were not mere transmission belts for preexisting metropolitan power configurations.

Even if we were able to define the relevant ruling classes or "historical blocs" in the colonies, these configurations would not necessarily explain colonial state policy. Colonial rulers in German Samoa, Qingdao, Southwest Africa, Togo, and Cameroon often disregarded or directly flouted the demands of European investors, capitalists, and settlers.[68] One problem, as with structural Marxism more generally, is that it is impossible to identify any mechanisms that would be responsible for adjusting policy to the needs of capitalist development in a given colony. Most German colonial states

66. See Berman and Lonsdale 1992 for an application of a structural Marxist state theory to colonial settings.

67. Poulantzas 1975, 1978.

68. On German officials' opposition to "the very European merchants whose interests they presumably [in a Marxist view] represented" in Cameroon, see Austen and Derrick 1999, p. 130. On the preference given to indigenous farmers on small plots in Togo, against the plantation model preferred by German capitalist interests, see Erbar 1990, pp. 63–67, 97; and Sebald 1988, p. 258.

relied heavily on revenues from the metropolitan government. There was no guarantee that these resources would be used in ways that benefited capitalist investors or European property owners. In this respect, colonial states were more akin to despotic "Third World states," insofar as their structural ability to *ignore* the interests and demands of their own dominant social classes, including local economic elites, was rooted in the availability of resources from sources external to their own territory.[69]

Another class-analytic or Marxian approach suggests that *settler colonies* are especially brutal because competition for land is a zero-sum game.[70] One empirical problem with this account is that there were actually *more* white settlers in Samoa than in Southwest Africa at their respective moments of colonial annexation (1900 and 1884). This situation was reversed after a decade of German rule in the two colonies, pointing to the fact that colonial policies shaped modes of production and class structures as much as they reflected them.[71] A focus on settlers would expect policy to have been harsher in Samoa than in Southwest Africa, but the opposite was actually the case. Agrarian settlers may be prone to brutal displacement and repression of indigenous landholders, but the German colonies remind us that settlers' interests were not necessarily translated into policy. Settlers were quite peripheral to colonial government in several instances, including German Togo, Kiaochow, and Samoa.

69. Tilly 1990, chap. 7. Nor was there any systematic articulation between the colonial state and the needs of metropolitan German capital. The institutional structure that might have promoted such an alignment was the Kolonialrat, an advisory board to the government consisting of economic, political, and scientific elites that was created in 1890. But the Kolonialrat was never more than just one among many competing agencies with a voice in central colonial policymaking. The German Reichstag had a surprising degree of influence on national-level colonial policy as compared to its weakness in other areas, but the kaiser was constitutionally granted a much greater say in colonial than in domestic policymaking (Hoffmann 1911, pp. 11, 37–39).

70. Osterhammel 1995, p. 48; Bley 1995; Büttner 1885c.

71. There were 137 Europeans in Southwest Africa during the 1870s (Esterhuyse 1968, p. 13). In the western islands of Samoa on the eve of annexation there were 400–800 white settlers. The number of whites in Southwest Africa in 1884 was well below the 498 recorded in the same colony in 1891, which included about 100 traders (Walther 2002, p. 58; "Excerpt from Annual Report, 1900–1901," NZNA AGCA, G.S.A. IV 5.a, p. 21; Bochert 1980, p. 38). By 1912 there were 500 whites (294 Germans) in German Samoa and 14,816 whites (12,135 Germans) in Southwest Africa (*Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee,* 1911/12, Statistischer Teil, pp. 7, 22, 33). This reversal was the result of the aggressive promotion of settlement in Southwest Africa and antisettler politics in Samoa, and of the fact that many soldiers who fought in the German-Namibian war (1904–7) stayed in the colony.

A related theoretical approach suggests that the direction of colonial policies is determined by ecological or environmental considerations.[72] This is broadly correct with respect to the sorts of export products that characterize a given colony: Southwest Africa was too arid and Kiaochow too cold in the winter for plantation agriculture; Samoa was unsuited for ranching, and so on. It is also correct that the economies of modern European colonies emphasized the production of raw materials rather than manufacturing, and that indigenous manufacturing was often suppressed. And it is correct that colonial agriculture tended to become less diverse and more monocultural due to its alignment with the needs of the core. But ecological preconditions cannot predict the contours of the indigenous class relations that emerge under colonial rule. The comparison among the German colonies forces us to ask why some colonies became sites of European settlement while others emphasized plantation agriculture or indigenous smallholder farming. Looking forward from 1880, an ecologically inclined historian would expect Samoa to continue developing along its earlier path toward a plantation economy, with Samoans increasingly drawn into employment as agricultural laborers. The same historian would also predict an increase in the number of settlers, since Europeans obviously found the islands appealing in the second half of the nineteenth century. And she would expect Southwest Africa to remain a barren desert populated by indigenous herders and a few missionaries and scattered white traders, with a desultory copper-mining industry.[73] The fact that the colonial economy actually became *less* oriented toward proletarianization and raw material extraction in Samoa than in Southwest Africa suggests that the colonial state's selection of models for economic development and class relations did not flow automatically from environmental conditions. Samoa's precolonial copra sector was much more profitable than Southwest Africa's precolonial copper mines. The alienation of Samoan soil had proceeded apace from midcentury until 1889, when the Berlin Conference on Samoa halted all further land sales outside Apia. After 1900 the new German administration reasserted the 1889 Samoa Act and the ban on long-term land leasing and land sales to foreigners. In Southwest Africa, by contrast, the colonial state pushed for maximal expropriation of land and cattle from the Ovaherero starting

72. See W. Smith 1978, p. 53; and Emmett 1999, pp. 39–41, for examples of this; Sahlins 1958 provides a strong statement of the ecological-determinist model (one that his more recent work has abandoned).

73. Even the RMG Trading Company that was created in 1870 had a difficult time and eventually "died a natural death" (Vedder [1938] 1966, p. 401).

in the 1890s. Samoa and Southwest Africa were both initially understood as having suitable climates for European settlement, but it was Southwest Africa that came to be seen as the primary target for emigration. Fanon was thus correct in writing that "in the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure."[74]

It would be absurd to deny that capitalism shaped German colonialism. Adolf Lüderitz was motivated by expectations that he would discover precious minerals. Even if the chartered companies and settler societies were originally creatures of the German state, they immediately voiced "private" interests. Yet even where the colonial state consisted of little more than a chartered company—that is, where state policies were *identical* with the interests of "capital," as in early German Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and East Africa—we still need to reconstruct the ways in which company officials defined their own interests. One cannot assume that these interests were narrowly "economic" in any conventional sense.[75] The investors in the company that bought Lüderitz's land in 1885 were motivated at least in part by a desire to please Bismarck and to prevent the colony from falling into British hands. At its first meeting, that chartered company concluded cautiously that the "possibility of profitability" should *not be excluded altogether*. The investors described their money as being spent in "fulfillment of patriotic duty, in a certain sense as a sacrifice." An exhaustive study of all of the land-speculating and mining companies in Southwest Africa finds that only three of them produced dividends, and only after 1900.[76] This does not mean that we should dismiss the German Colonial Society for South West Africa as unimportant, even if it did little more than sit on its property holdings for two decades.[77] Starting in 1904 the company suddenly became very profitable by supplying consumer goods to the thousands of German soldiers who were brought to the colony for the war and to the masses of workers building the Otavi railway line.[78] Economic interests and pressures

74. Fanon [1961] 2004, p. 5.

75. Adams (1994, 2005) shows that the leading figures in the Dutch East Indies Company understood their interests in ways that led them to define their time horizons in much longer terms than simple economic or class-based models would expect.

76. Sander 1912, pp. 20–21, quoted by Dreschsler (1996, p. 21); Dreschsler 1996, pp. 274–77.

77. In 1892 the Colonial Society got involved in promoting the earliest wave of German settlement in the colony, but this enterprise was underfunded and unprofitable.

78. Esterhuyse 1968, pp. 171–79. The SWAC, founded in 1892 by Dr. Julius Scharlach and soon purchased by Cecil Rhodes's agents, had a more exclusively economic focus; see Drechsler [1966] 1980, p. 47; 1996, pp. 56ff. and chap. 2.

were certainly important, but even in a colony like Southwest Africa their impact on policy was indirect. And the colonial government's emphasis on native governance often trumped calculations of profitability and reframed economic considerations.

If broadly socioeconomic and materialist theories cannot make sense of the main patterns of variation in native policy, what about the perspective that emphasizes colonialism's cultural determinants, including the role of ethnographic discourse? Here the foundational text is Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), which established two central hypotheses. First, Said followed Michel Foucault in suggesting that Orientalist discourse should be defined quite broadly, rather than being restricted to the writings of professional historians of the Orient. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot notes, we often "claim to distinguish clearly between travelers' accounts, colonial surveys, ethnographic reports, and fictional utopias . . . [but] the line between these genres was not always clear-cut" in the past.[79] Second, Said accepted the distinction between discourse and practice that structures most of Foucault's work (contrary to the view of some of his epigones), a distinction that underlines his vision of psychoanalysis creating the neurotic body or Jeremy Bentham's ideas helping to forge the panoptical society. The relevant field of discourse for Said is the Orientalist "library of *idées reçues*." The effects of this "library," he suggests, include Napoleon's Egyptian expedition and later colonial endeavors. In Said's succinct formula, "from travelers' tales . . . colonies were created." Said thus posits not only an "absolute unanimity" between Orientalism and empire but also a causal relationship between the two. When he writes that "an observation about a tenth-century Arab poet multiplied itself into a policy towards . . . the Oriental mentality in Egypt, Iraq, or Arabia," the verb "multiplied" points to a determining connection between an order of discourse and an order of political practice.[80] Orientalism preexisted the colonization of the "Orient," or Near East, and gave it form. By extension we should expect early modern Sinology to provide the lineaments of nineteenth-century efforts to penetrate China, we should trace the connections between accounts of early explorations and missionary endeavors in Africa and subsequent systems of colonial rule, and we should examine the effects of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century narratives of Oceanic exploration and tropical romance on late-nineteenth-century colonization of Polynesian islands.

Said's intervention marked an important break with the so-called handmaiden of colonialism thesis, which emphasized the effects of colonialism

79. Trouillot 1991, p. 23.
80. Said 1978, pp. 123, 104, 96, 94, 117.

on anthropology rather than focusing on causal arrows running in the opposite direction. After being introduced to the English-speaking world by Talal Asad and the contributors to his *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (1973), this idea became something of a commonplace in anthropology.[81] Said hewed more closely to Foucault than to the sociology of knowledge in this respect. I refer to this claim that colonies were created from "travelers' tales" as the "devil's handwriting" hypothesis.

Writing inspired by Said and Foucault has emphasized the effects of European representations of the non-West on subsequent colonial and imperial activities. In *Colonizing Egypt,* Timothy Mitchell argues that a generic European modern consciousness was replicated in the self-modernization of nineteenth-century Egypt and other parts of the Near East. In *The Cunning of Recognition,* Elizabeth Povinelli suggests that the ways in which early anthropologists in Australia situated "the indigenous . . . within extant discourses of the wild and reasonable and the civil and savage" shaped the subsequent "formulation of state policy in relation to Aboriginal persons and white settlers." In *Colonial Fantasies,* Susanne Zantop portrays German myths about overseas colonization in the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries as giving form to practical German colonial activities in the late nineteenth century.[82] Blueprints for colonialism were prepared not so much in Europe's official foreign ministries as in the scholar's study, the traveler's diary, and the playwright's tale of Oceanic shipwreck and African adventure.

How does this thesis fare with respect to the German colonies? In chapters 2, 4, and 6 I will demonstrate that the Germans who established colonial states in Samoa, Kiaochow, and Southwest Africa did, in fact, come equipped with well-wrought images of the colonized cultures, images that were derived from earlier writers and artists. In Qingdao the German colonial founders established an actual library of *idées reçues* during the first year of the colony. That library's Asia section was stocked with European classics on China ranging from Marco Polo to Karl Gützlaff.[83] During the thirty years of colonial rule examined in this book native policy rarely went beyond suggestions that were already present in precolonial ethnographic discourse.

At first glance there also seems to be a strong correlation between the dominant precolonial representations of Samoans, Chinese, and Southwest

81. Stocking 1991, p. 4; Leiris (1950) and Leclerc (1972) had already analyzed the connections between anthropology and colonialism.

82. Mitchell 1988; Povinelli 2002, p. 77; Zantop 1997, p. 203.

83. *Buecher-Verzeichnis der Kiautschou-Bibliothek* 1898.

Africans within each of the relevant discursive formations and the policies that were subsequently imposed on them. The Germans' assault on the Ovaherero in 1904 seems almost to leap off the pages of the missionary and traveler accounts from the middle decades of the nineteenth century. A society that had been regularly defamed as cruel and brutal was dealt with in a commensurately cruel and brutal manner; a culture that had been dismissed as lacking value and destined for extinction was immorally annihilated. Along parallel lines, the Germans' expressed desire to preserve the Samoans in a pristine "natural" condition appears to flow directly from prevailing nineteenth-century European depictions of Samoans as noble savages. Said's thesis thus receives some initial support at the level of these crude empirical correlations between precolonial ethnographic perceptions and the contours of colonial native policy.

This simple model falters immediately, however, once we turn to German Kiaochow, and it stumbles if we examine the history of colonial Namibia or Samoa in more detail. German thinking about China at the end of the nineteenth century was extremely heterogeneous and protean, even if Sinophobia had been gaining strength for over a century (chap. 6). Late-nineteenth-century writers revised their view of China from one book to the next, or combined contradictory tropes within a single narrative. Without further investigation it is impossible to understand why colonial policy expressed one of these visions of China rather than another. Even where the ethnographic archive was relentlessly repetitive and monolithic, as with the Ovaherero, the linkages between precolonial discourse and colonial practice need to be specified in more detail. We need to know why colonizers acted in accordance with received ethnographic wisdom rather than developing novel approaches in response to ongoing events. Without further specification of the links between "travelers' tales" and colonial policy, Said's thesis becomes as reductionist as the socioeconomic approaches that it was meant to supplant.[84] More specifically, it is reductionist in its causal imagery and its lack of attention to social and psychic levels of causality, and even in its textual interpretation of Orientalist discourse. Following the lead of Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* Said argues that Orientalism in its entirety was derived from a common set of premises. But this is belied by European discourse on China, which was radically heterogeneous. Said's claim that Orientalism after the eighteenth century "could never revise itself" is contradicted by the overarching change from Sinophilia to Sinophobia as the leading approach.[85]

84. Comaroff and Comaroff 1991–97, vol. 1, p. 9.

85. Said 1978, p. 96.

It follows that Orientalism's effects on colonial practice must have been complexly mediated and not simply the execution of preexisting scripts.

I define *ethnographic discourse* as any representation, textual or visual, that claims to depict the character and culture of a given sociocultural collective, regardless of whether that collective is described as a race, a culture, a society, an ethnic group, a community, or something else. Said is correct in suggesting that precolonial ethnographic discourse often contained explicit or implicit recommendations for the practical governance of the people being represented. What he failed to acknowledge was that many if not most formations of ethnographic discourse are multivocal or multiaccentual. Within some of these formations, competing authors painted radically differing pictures of the non-Western Other and thus suggested differing techniques of colonization. European observers of China ranged from those who reviled it as the source of a "yellow peril" suited only "to be sliced up by the different powers" to those who believed that Europe needed "missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of practical religion."[86] There were diametrically opposing visions of the Khoikhoi and Samoans as well. Only in exceptional cases were Orientalist or ethnographic discourses seamless and uniform. We need to discover how and why one particular strand of precolonial discourse rather than another was mobilized in colonial policy.

There were at least three crucial links in the chain of determinations leading from ethnographic representations to native policy: (1) patterns of resistance and collaboration by the colonized, (2) symbolic competition among colonizers, and (3) colonizers' imaginary cross-identification with images of their subjects. Before discussing these three mechanisms, however, I want to step back for a moment and define the modern colonial state and justify the focus in this book on native policy.

The Specificity of the Colonial State

The fact that most extant states are descendants of colonies suggests that the colonial state needs to be integrated into theoretical discussions of organized forms of political domination. But theorists and historians have been slow to recognize the uniqueness or even the existence of the colonial form of the state.[87] There is no generally accepted definition of the colonial state. Some writers reduce it to an appendage of the metropoli-

86. Heyking 1926, p. 199; Leibniz 1994, p. 51.

87. For recent exceptions see the special issue "L'Etat coloniale" of the journal *Politix: Revue des Sciences Sociales du Politique* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences

tan state, a conveyor belt carrying out tasks formulated at the center.[88] Yet colonial governors often enjoyed a great deal of independence from their metropolitan supervisors in elaborating and executing day-to-day policy.[89] Some writers deny that colonial regimes are really states at all, and Hannah Arendt described nineteenth-century "colonial-imperialism" as the antithesis, even the "suicide," of the European nation-state.[90] From a strictly legal standpoint, colonial regimes do lack sovereignty, which is the defining feature of stateness.[91] Colonial governments were dependencies of metropolitan states and were not recognized as autonomous entities within the international state system. They did not send diplomatic or consular representatives to other states or to international bodies and did not represent themselves in international negotiations. European powers frequently entertained the possibility of trading entire colonies or parts of colonies, treating them as chess pieces in a global game with much greater stakes. Colonial governors and officials typically had no voice in such deliberations.[92] Colonial governors were not elected or appointed locally by the settlers or natives of a colony but were chosen by the metropolitan state and could be discharged at will. Indeed, any regime whose heads of state are selected locally, by local residents, has already exited from colonial status by definition.

In other respects, however, these colonial regimes were eminently statelike. One of the defining features of colonialism was that it involved a *transfer* of sovereignty from indigenous inhabitants to foreigners. Of course, if one considers sovereignty from a strictly legal standpoint, power was transferred to the metropole, not the local European administration. But we also need to consider the effective, ongoing exercise of power when locating sovereignty. As Carl Schmitt argued, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception" or the emergency.[93] Colonial governance consisted of an endless,

politiques), vol. 17 (66, September 2004); Trotha 1994; Bertrand 2005; and Le Cour Grandmaison 2005.

88. Carl Schmitt interprets the Belgian Congo in strictly legal terms as being fully assimilated into the Belgian state after its 1908 "annexation" ([1950] 2003, pp. 221–26).

89. This independence is demonstrated not only in the three cases explored here but also in British Malaya and the U.S. Philippines (Goh 2005).

90. H. Arendt 1945/1946; Grosse 2006.

91. C. Young 1994, p. 10.

92. An exception was the South African minister of defense Jan Smuts, who "played a major role in determining British policy in Africa" during World War I as part of the British War Cabinet (Yearwood 1990, p. 317).

93. Schmitt [1922] 1985, p. 5.

even a permanent series of exceptions and emergencies, and the responses to these emergencies were usually formulated by the governing authorities *sur place*. Metropolitan governments, at least in this period, did not attempt to micromanage daily activities in the colonies, due to the long distances and relatively crude communication and transportation technologies. It was common practice to allow a great deal of leeway to the local governor even after telegraph communication became available to colonial governments—something that happened very late in the period examined in this book (for example, in 1914 for Samoa).[94] The governor of Kiaochow was required to get prior approval from his superiors in Berlin only for "the most important and far-reaching regulations," and in fact, none of his regulations were ever overturned.[95] The German Colonial Department minuted in 1900 that "it would not be appropriate for the Foreign Office to determine the further details of native policy given that conditions are really only visible on the spot."[96] Only once, at the height of the war in Southwest Africa in 1904 and after months of battle and the death of scores of German civilians, did the metropolitan government decide to assume direct control of the ongoing affairs of a colony.

Beneath the administrative level of the governor, effective sovereignty resided with the legendary "men on the spot," the "real chiefs of the empire," or "little governors," who were in direct contact with indigenous leaders and communities.[97] In the German colonial empire these "little governors" included the district commissioners (*Berzirksamtmänner*), military commanders, policemen, and judges. The local power of the district commissioners was so extensive than in German Togo one of them replaced all 544 chiefs in his district during his twenty years in office.[98] The district commissioners in Kiaochow adjudicated most legal cases involving Chinese defendants and could send a Chinese subject to jail for life without consulting anyone else. They needed the governor's authorization only when recommending the death penalty.[99] The autonomy of colonial officials from

94. Klein-Arendt 2001, 189–90.

95. The navy administration and Foreign Office overruled colonial governor Truppel's opposition to the German-Chinese university and eventually replaced him (Seelemann 1982, p. 87, 106 n. 123; Schrecker 1971, p. 60).

96. Ausw. Amt to Solf, May 31, 1900, NZNA AGCA XVII.A.1, vol. 1, p. 90.

97. See Delavignette 1939; and Trotha 1994, pp. 109–10.

98. Trotha 1994, p. 268. Of course, each Togolese chief had an average of only 320 subjects (ibid., p. 270), but this still meant that a single district commissioner appointed the indirect rulers of approximately 174,080 people.

99. Crusen 1914.

the metropolitan state was coupled with a significant level of independence from the local "civil society," including the European propertied class.[100] A governor's autonomy extended to long-range planning for his colony and did not simply concern daily crisis management. The leading officials in a given colony were sometimes able to "colonize" the responsible section of the Colonial Department, further diminishing control from the European center. For example, the Southwest African "native ordinances" of 1907 (discussed in chap. 3) were drawn up in Berlin by veterans of Southwest African politics, all of whom later returned to the colony to occupy key administrative roles.[101] The officials in the Foreign Office in Berlin who were in charge of overseeing German Samoa were former envoys to those islands.

The Reichstag was empowered to discuss colonial politics and to interpellate colonial administrators in the course of its annual budget negotiations and to influence colonial policy in broad terms. But the Reichstag did not participate in naming colonial officials or in the daily activities in the colonies. The emperor was legally empowered to dissolve the Reichstag, and he exercised this power in December 1906 in response to the Reichstag's refusal to appropriate funds for the ongoing "Hottentot" war in Southwest Africa.[102]

The central government pressured the colonies to increase the revenues they raised locally and demanded that they become self-sustaining. But Berlin could generally be counted on to pay for ongoing operations. This

100. In Southwest Africa before the 1904 war colonial governors could largely ignore the demands of the settlers; after the war a Gouvernementsrat (later called the Landrat) was created which allowed for advisory input from the settlers. The main legislation on native policy was drawn up by von Lindequist and other officials and presented to the Landrat for commentary. See "Verhandlungen des Gouvernementsrats in Windhuk, 1906," BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2174, for discussions with the Governing Council; and Eingeborenen-Verordnungen etc. (1907–14), BA-Berlin, R. 1002, vol. 2597, p. 3.

101. These officials were von Lindequist, Hintrager, and Golinelli (Zimmerer 2001).

102. When the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party refused to approve funds to continue operations against the Nama rebellion, the chancellor dissolved the Reichstag. The so-called Hottentot elections that were held afterward, in January 1907, resulted in a new bloc favorable to the government and a reduction in the number of Social Democratic seats from eighty-one to forty-three (Crothers 1941; Reinhard 1978). The Social Democrats' opposition to colonialism was usually tepid in any case, focusing mainly on "the current negative rentability of the colonies and the disproportionately high public outlays for them" (Mergner 1988, pp. 76–77) and on instances of egregious brutality or sexual abuse by colonizers (Schröder 1968, 1973; Hyrkkanen 1986). There were important exceptions, and occasionally the Social Democrats and Center Party challenged some of the worst abuses (see chap. 3 on the 1913 Reichstag resolution on the Witbooi prisoners in Cameroon). In general, the circles within the Social Democratic Party that were prepared to cooperate with the government on colonial questions became stronger after the 1907 electoral debacle.

exempted the colonial state from the sorts of structural constraints and censoring effects to which even the most centralized modern European states were exposed due to their reliance on economic growth and tax revenues.[103] Colonial governments were therefore better positioned than governments in Europe to resist demands from European civil society. The colonized populations did not participate directly in making the policies that were imposed on them, even if they inflected these policies through the "subaltern" political logics discussed below.

Colonial states' dual independence—from metropolitan and local interests—was extremely consequential for the formation of native policy. A typical colonial state was staffed by a tiny number of European officials and had an undemocratic, even despotic constitution. The result was that a single official could have an enormous impact on the direction of policy. The colonial state's dual autonomy enhanced the *agency* of individual colonial officials relative to the efficacy of officials operating within the confines of metropolitan states. This is not to say that colonial officials were unconstrained in their decision making, but that a much smaller group of actors was involved in the process and that the familiar constraints and pressures were attenuated. The colonial state was able to resist structural pressures of the sort that often force metropolitan states to align their policies *grosso modo* with the perceived needs of capitalist development and the expressed interests of economic elites.

Salaried colonial state officials and civil servants were not completely immune to colonial civil society or separate from it. What is needed is a more *sociological* account of the colonial state as a *field* in Pierre Bourdieu's sense—specifically, as a state field that was itself located within an environing colonial field of power. This suggests that colonial officials were engaged in a competitive struggle with one another and with other Europeans in the colony.[104] Emphasizing the colonial state's "fieldness" is compatible with the argument about the state's relative autonomy, since the logic of any social field is irreducible to that of other fields. At the same time, the definition of the actors within the colonial state field was homologous to that of the German metropolitan state field. I will return to this redescription of the colonial state as a field in a moment.

What about the colonial state as a material "apparatus"? Most colonial states, including the ones discussed here, were extremely weak in terms of material resources and their ability to penetrate indigenous society.[105] The

103. Block 1988; Offe 1984.

104. Especially, but not exclusively, with others of the same nationality: colonial fields were exceptionally and paradoxically national despite their location in transnational contact zones.

105. Mann 1986–93.

German colonial regimes had only a small number of full-time officials and employees. In Southwest Africa in 1912, for example, there were 824 civil servants (a number that included 488 employees of the police force) and 2,172 members of the *Schutztruppe,* covering a territory that was larger than Germany. There were fewer than 40 civil servants in the Samoan colony in 1912.[106] In Togo the "entire German personnel—from the Governor down to the last of the assistant gardeners—numbered less than ninety men," in a country almost as big as the former German Democratic Republic.[107] There were not enough resources to refashion the entire colonial landscape or to confront each colonial subject with a direct European presence in an ongoing way. As Anthony Appiah remarks, "the experience of the vast majority of [the] citizens of Europe's African colonies was one of an essentially shallow penetration by the colonizer."[108] This was also true of the Asian and Pacific colonies, outside the main cities.

Nonetheless, the colonial state was usually able to put its stamp on the annexed territory and to broadcast its presence widely. It met Max Weber's criteria of stateness by wielding coercion and operating permanently. One guarantee of the *permanence* of the state's operations was the written rules specifying who was to assume the office of the governor when he was absent from a colony.[109] The colonial state tried to gain control over the means of violence, even if it was never able to monopolize the means of coercion completely (but neither were metropolitan states). In Samoa, where German coercion was minimal, the government's first act in 1900 was to conduct a largely successful campaign to disarm Samoans by offering to buy their guns. In Southwest Africa the colonial government issued decrees in 1888, 1890, 1892, and 1897 making the sale of arms without a license punishable by fines or imprisonment. Every gun in the colony was to be stamped and registered, and the widespread English Martini-Henry rifles had to be exchanged for the German M71 in order to give the colonizers "a better idea of how much ammunition was actually in the possession of Africans." Africans were required to pay "double the price for guns and ammunition that Europeans were required to pay." These policies were not entirely suc-

106. There were 31 civil servants in Samoa in 1912, according to *Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee,* 1911/12, Statistischer Teil, pp. 22, 32. A larger number of civil servants (37) is given in a memo of 1912, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 5432, p. 105. These numbers do not include indigenous leaders who were paid a salary by the colonial state or native policemen, soldiers, and employees.

107. Gann 1987, p. 10.

108. Appiah 1992, p. 7.

109. This was codified in a series of national regulatives and laws, such as the Law on the Substitute Representation of Civil Servants from May 31, 1901.

cessful, but the Cape government cooperated by stopping arms imports via British Bechuanaland.[110] Charles Tilly's formula for the state in general is applicable to the colonial state: it exercised "clear priority *in some respects* over all other organizations within substantial territories."[111]

Colonial states often had a strong *symbolic* presence, even if this presence did not necessarily meet another Weberian criterion for stateness, "legitimacy."[112] None of the states examined made a serious effort to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects, but all of them made a socio-ontological claim on locals' beliefs. The colonial state demanded acknowledgment of its existence and its distinctness from other institutions, especially indigenous ones. The state's symbolic self-construction took various forms. The effort to define a bounded territorial space already rendered the state visible, even if it involved an injury to indigenous understandings of space in those places where absolute private property in land was unknown before the arrival of Europeans.[113] In China, where permanent political boundaries and private land ownership were well entrenched long before the colonizers arrived, the cultural affront involved the very act of carving colonies like Kiaochow out of the Chinese geobody in ways that ignored or destroyed preexisting roads and structures (see maps 4–5 and plate 9). Shandong Province contained some of the most significant Chinese national and religious sites, including the birthplace and temple of Confucius at Qufu (曲阜) and the holiest of the Daoist sacred mountains, Taishan (泰山). The Germans placed physical markers around the borders of the Kiaochow colony. These acts of resculpting settled space and containerizing state territory contributed to the colonial "state effect."[114]

Despite its institutional weakness the colonial state succeeded in liberally distributing symbols of its presence. Roads and railways brought the colonial state into remote villages and sutured territories that had been arbitrarily cobbled together. Transportation routes and hubs signaled which locations were considered most important by the colonial overlords. In Togo the simple act of posting a sign in German at the entrance to every village

110. Bochert 1980, pp. 99, 106, 133.

111. Tilly 1990.

112. For his "mature" definition of the state see M. Weber 1978, vol. 2, p. 909; [1919] 1958, p. 78.

113. See Trotha 1990.

114. On the state as "container" see Giddens 1985; Brenner 1999; Lefebvre 2003; Taylor 2003; and for Southwest Africa, Noyes 1992. On the "state effect" see Mitchell 1991. The Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren, Belgium, displays a boundary stone erected in 1910 between Kisenyi (Gisenyi) in Rwanda (German East Africa) and Goma (Belgian Congo).

reminded inhabitants of the colonizers' presence and intention to stay.[115] The colonial state in Togo created a network of district "stations" and mandated the creation of a network of rudimentary shelters, spaced at one-day intervals throughout the country, for traveling German officials. Local inhabitants were required to keep these shelters clean.[116] The annual birthday celebrations for the German kaiser that were held in all of the German colonies arranged the subject populations around the figure of the emperor, as in the infamous cover illustration from the German colonial newspaper *Kolonie und Heimat* captioned "The people of the German colonies pay homage to the kaiser" (fig. 1.2). Legalism was another crucial component of the colonial state's self-elicitation. This involved drawing up treaties, writing legal codes, appointing judges, delegating judicial power to selected indigenous figures, and holding court hearings in the most remote corners of the land. Currency and postage stamps were issued bearing the name and symbols of the colony. Colonial space was permeated with signifiers of modern stateness and foreign sovereignty. Some of the larger colonial towns, including Windhoek, Swakopmund, and Lüderitzbucht in Southwest Africa, Apia in Samoa, and Qingdao, were physically reconfigured and outfitted with a modern infrastructure of roads, sewers, telephones, and the like. Each colonial state tended to become an independent reality in the eyes of its subjects, settlers, and administrators.

Naturally we cannot assume that all colonized subjects were prepared to read these state signifiers in the way they were intended. John Iliffe's discussion of the dances performed in German East Africa on the occasion of the kaiser's birthday celebrations underscores this point: "One circle performed *robata,* a dance from the north-east which imitated the actions of decorticating and bailing sisal. Another danced *bom*—from the Swahili *bombom* for a cannon or machine-gun—which was doubtless one of the many dances imitating German military drill."[117] One visitor gave an account of Samoans performing a night dance that mimicked and mocked the visit of a German naval officer to a native village.[118] The state's ability to project itself was also limited by the minimal levels of investment in many of the colonies. When Heinrich Goering landed in Southwest Africa in May 1885

115. Sebald 1988, p. 207.

116. Trotha 1994, p. 123; Sebald 1988, p. 206. Von Trotha 1990 extrapolates from the German West African experience, calling the "station" *the* "original unit of the colonial state." Colonial states actually grew out of different sorts of institutions, ranging from mission stations—in Southwest Africa, for example—to mercantile settlements, as in Samoa.

117. Iliffe 1979, p. 238.

118. Churchill 1902, p. 76.

FIGURE 1.2 *The People of the German Colonies Pay Homage to the Kaiser* (1913). Cover illustration from *Kolonie und Heimat,* vol. 6, no. 28, Ausgabe A.

with a single adjutant, for example, he was poorly positioned to put any sort of mark on the immense territory claimed by Germany. Ovaherero leaders effectively expelled Goering from the colony in 1888.[119] Yet it is equally remarkable that Goering had succeeded in getting most Namibian leaders to act as if the German "protection" treaties were valid before there were any German troops in the colony. At a minimum, the sheer presence of signs of alien sovereignty and the reputation of European powers led the colonized to orient their own activities toward the foreigners' presence and their obvious intention to stay. By acquiescing at this minimal level and by continuing to participate in daily interactions within the new colonial

119. Esterhuyse 1968, p. 138.

space rather than assaulting it frontally, or exiting from it, nominally colonized people helped to will the colony into existence.

At the opposite pole from theorists who deny the stateness of colonial regimes are those who suggest that *all* states or states in formation are somehow colonial in nature. The creation of ancient, medieval, and early modern states involved the annexation of culturally distinct regions by a core power. Some historians have therefore described these states, as well as crusading states and the expanding states of the nineteenth century, as colonial.[120] Historian Eugen Weber argued that French statesmen at the beginning of the Third Republic viewed the mass of Frenchmen as uncivilized wildmen, even as a different race, which contrasted unfavorably with colonized peoples in North Africa and the New World. French Continental state making, even in the nineteenth century, therefore seemed to be a sort of colonialism.[121]

Against this inflation of the concept of colonialism, we should keep in mind the specific ways in which modern invaders justified *to themselves* their subjugation of the colonized. Partha Chatterjee has convincingly argued that the assumption of the essential difference and incorrigible inferiority of the subject population is structurally inherent in the modern colonial state. Barriers are erected against recognizing the colonized as civilizational or human equals. Along with the seizure of sovereignty by a foreign power, this so-called rule of difference is a defining characteristic of modern colonialism. Modern colonial states were permeated by the assumption of an unbridgeable difference between themselves and their subjects and of the ineradicable inferiority of the colonized.[122] The rule of difference explains why "assimilation taken to its extreme meant, quite simply, the ending of colonialism," as Sartre commented.[123]

120. See Given 1990, p. 251; Bartlett 1993; and the forthcoming dissertations by Lenny Ureña (University of Michigan) on late-nineteenth-century Germany's colonial treatment of its eastern Prussian provinces and by Markus Roth (Bochum) on the General Government of Nazi-occupied Poland (also Roth 2004).

121. E. Weber 1976, pp. 3, 6, 7.

122. The colonial versus noncolonial distinction is less useful for the premodern period. Feudal ruling classes tended to understand themselves in protoracialist terms as fundamentally different from their "own" peasantry, such that a homogenizing (national) identity was often the furthest thing from their minds (Foucault 1980). To the extent that early modern politics was permeated by Christianity, there was also less insistence on the inextinguishable otherness of conquered non-Christian peoples, who were amenable to conversion. Thus, the crusading Teutonic Knights of the *Deutscher Ritterorden* converted and assimilated the people they conquered in Prussia, for instance.

123. Sartre 2001, p. 46.

Chatterjee's thesis is mainly descriptive, however, and does not explain the *necessity* of a rule of difference. It seems to me that without this ubiquitous "rule"—a rule that was often bent or broken, like all other rules—modern colonial domination ran the risk of appearing arbitrary to the colonizers and to the metropolitan populations who were being asked to pay for the colonies' budget. From the mid-eighteenth century onward it became necessary in Europe to actively defend conquest, subjugation, and the establishment of conditions of permanent domination and inequality. These concerns were linked to discourses of democracy, political secularism, cultural relativism, abolitionism, and even explicit anticolonialism.[124] As Hannah Arendt wrote (exaggerating only slightly), no nation state by the nineteenth century could "try to conquer foreign peoples" "*with a clear conscience,*" much less keep foreigners in a permanent state of unequal rights, unless it could define those peoples as inherently inferior. Arguments for treating the colonized this way drew on concepts of biological race, civilizational decline, social underdevelopment, and cultural shortcomings such as the absence of "this-worldly asceticism," which was Max Weber's criterion of civilization.[125] International conventions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries limiting aggression had excluded the "noncivilized" states.[126] But by 1896 the governor of German Southwest Africa felt compelled to defend the *nonapplicability* of the first Geneva Convention of 1864 to colonial warfare, thereby demonstrating that the applicability of such conventions outside Europe had entered the realm of the thinkable.[127] Colonies were given euphemistic labels like "protectorate" or "mandate" (after 1919), and colonialism was disguised as an educational or civilizing mission, implying that the foreign rulers would leave as soon as they had accomplished their pedagogical task.

The rule of difference was expressed in dual structures for the governance of Europeans and "natives." Although colonial strategists frequently tried to fragment their subject populations by emphasizing internal ethnic differences, a strict dualism was usually imposed on top of this fissured population. However great the number of invented tribes, ethnicities, and races within a given colony, all of the indigenous inhabitants were typically gathered together under a common heading of tradition, custom,

124. The fact that the same period saw the rise of scientific racism and allied theories illustrates the general point about the multiaccentuality of social-cultural fields.

125. Arendt [1950] 1958, p. 126 (my emphasis). See K. Marx 1969; Mandair 2006; and Zimmerman 2006. Mosse 1985 is a pioneering treatment of modern theories of "race."

126. Schmitt [1950] 2003.

127. Leutwein to Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst, June 8, 1896, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 1489, pp. 35v–36r.

backwardness, or racial inferiority, counterposed to the colonizer's modernity, rationality, development, and racial superiority. As the acting governor of German Southwest Africa wrote in a memo in 1905, the "natives" had to be treated as a "unified mass."[128] Over and above the proliferation of petty chiefdoms in a colony like German Togo or Cameroon, racial dualism was reasserted every time the chiefs from a given district were called together by the district officer for a meeting. At the banquets that were held in official headquarters the Germans sat together upstairs and the African chiefs downstairs.[129] At the so-called fraternization parties that took place at the end of British rule in India, according to the journalist Gupta in Paul Scott's novel *Six Days in Marapore,* "at one end of the lawn there will be gathered the representatives of the Raj, and at the other those of us who have passed some test of whose nature we are not aware but the reward for which is the invitation to the party. . . . Then, at a signal, perhaps that of a raised eyebrow from the Sahib to his Memsahib, the Raj will cross the lawn *en bloc* and they will then—I am thinking the expression is *mingle*. . . . After the mingling has gone on for, say, half-an-hour . . . the Raj will return across the lawn."[130] Even in the colonies that relied most heavily on strategies of divide and conquer, indirect rule, and enforced tribalism, the *legal system* revealed an overarching binarism. An imported, unified German legal code applied to all Europeans and others defined as "foreigners" or "whites" and existed alongside one or more systems of customary or newly minted "native" law.[131] Non-Europeans who were integrated into the society of the colonizers, such as Japanese businessmen in Asia and the Pacific or Samoans who married Europeans, were usually lumped into the "foreigner" or "white" category rather than being fitted into some third, in-between status. Colonial cities bore the physical stamp of this binary logic, even though tribal or religious distinctions were sometimes allowed to complicate this pattern. The capitals of German East Africa, Cameroon, and Togo were all characterized by residential segregation and distinct building styles and

128. Thus, when a white settler was in debt to a member of one native group but was owed something by a member of another, he could pass his debt on to the second (Tecklenburg to RKA, July 17, 1905, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 1212, pp. 34r–v).

129. Trotha 1994, p. 301.

130. P. Scott [1953] 2005, pp. 57–58.

131. German colonial law typically distinguished between natives, who were usually defined in racial terms, and nonnatives, a category that included groups like the Christian Goanese in German East Africa, "half-castes" in early German Samoa (Salesa 1997; Wareham 2002, chap. 5), and the Japanese in all German colonies.

codes for the European and non-European districts.[132] No matter how many distinct "tribes" were said to exist in the hinterlands of German East Africa, all of the Africans were clustered in the same neighborhoods in the capital city of Dar-es-Salaam. A 1911 regulation in Swakopmund required natives "to leave the sidewalk when they encountered a European."[133] The planners of German Qingdao designed separate neighborhoods for the Chinese middle-class and laborers, but none of the Chinese were allowed to live in the European quarter except for servants. Combined with the assault on native sovereignty, these practices of legal and institutional dualism defined the colonizer and colonized as opposing blocs. Although recent scholarship on colonial societies has focused on the "fragile and porous character of the binary identities . . . on which the colonial order depended," the state's continual efforts to reinforce this simplifying logic set the parameters for much activity in the colony.[134]

In contrast to this colonial pattern, modern *noncolonial* states usually try to turn their conquered and subjected internal Others into assimilated national subjects. The Third Republic's Parisian elites may well have regarded the French peasantry as savages, but Eugen Weber's book is concerned precisely with efforts to turn those "savages" into Frenchmen. By contrast, even those colonized subjects who came to believe that they were fully French were almost never treated as equals, as French, by their colonizers.[135] The fact that individual colonial subjects could sometimes move into the colonizer category through marriage, education, or economic success does not gainsay the argument for an overarching binarism. Or rather, once the trickle of isolated individuals across the colonizer-colonized boundary becomes a flood, the political situation is already becoming noncolonial. Colonial rule is perfectly compatible with partial or pseudoassimilation and with forms of acculturation that retain indelible signs of ascriptive inferiority, as in the German treatment of the Ovaherero after 1904 as abject partial copies of their colonizers. British-occupied Ireland in the nineteenth century seems to be more colonial under this definition than, say, the former East German provinces (*Bundesländer*) in postunification Germany. Even if many East Germans experienced unification as a "colonial" takeover, their

132. Sometimes in the African colonies there were additional districts for Indian, Lebanese, or Hausa traders. The residential distinctions among non-European groups, such as the separate Hausa quarters in Lomé and other West African colonial cities, were often holdovers from the precolonial era.

133. Gaydish 2001, p. 68.

134. The quote is from Saada 2002, p. 363.

135. Fanon [1952] 1967; also Memmi [1965] 1991.

legal rights immediately became almost identical to those of former West Germans.[136]

Colonial and noncolonial forms of rule are the extreme poles on a fluid continuum. Some colonial states moved toward the noncolonial form by violating one of the two criteria—foreign sovereignty or the politics of enforced hierarchical difference. Indeed, some colonial states shared power with locals or moved toward legal and social equality.[137] Kiaochow toward the end of the German colonial period saw a transition toward some sort of noncolonial partnership. In 1913 the Germans "voluntarily" renounced their right to build any more railways in Shandong Province, and in August 1914, after war had broken out in Europe but before the Japanese had conquered Qingdao, the Germans offered to return Kiaochow to China in exchange for "compensation."[138] Sometimes the period of foreign sovereignty was defined from the start as brief, as in U.S.-occupied Iraq in 2003.

In sum, the modern colonial state was a permanently operating, coercion-wielding apparatus exercising effective sovereignty—"clear priority over all other organizations" with respect to law and policymaking—within a substantial territory. Like other states, it existed not just as apparatus but as "idea"; it inscribed its existence on the landscape, minds, and bodies; it broadcast its presence through legal texts and political rituals. Compared to metropolitan states, the colonial form often achieved a greater degree of independence from dominant interests in "civil society"—in this case, from the interests of the local European colonials. Its independence from the metropolitan state was also typically greater than that of regional and municipal governments within the metropole. The modern colonial state is defined by (1) foreign sovereignty and (2) state institutions and practices that define, express, and reinforce a cultural difference and fundamental inferiority of the territorial natives. This second definitional criterion is linked to the colonial state's emphasis on native policy, to which I will now turn.

136. Put differently, a Samoan or Cameroonian could never have become governor of German Samoa, much less German chancellor, during the colonial era, but a former East German became chancellor of the Federal Republic in 2005. German unification recalls familiar processes of state expansion via incorporation of new territories, processes that may be imperial but are not colonial. For the relations among the terms *empire, imperialism,* and *colonialism* see Steinmetz 2005e. Present-day uses of the term *colonialism* frequently draw on an older stock of meanings having to do with tilling the soil and settling on reclaimed agricultural lands.

137. See, for example, Belmessous 2005 on an early modern case of assimilationism in French Canada.

138. Kirby 1984, p. 12. French colonialism in Africa was also beginning to shift away from a politics of difference after World War II, and it was partly for this reason that it could not sustain itself as colonialism; see F. Cooper 1996; and Wilder 2005.

Precolonial Mimicry and the Centrality of Native Policy

Native policy encompasses the core activities that differentiate the modern colonial state from other state forms. The masthead of a German colonial journal called *Die deutschen Kolonien* (The German Colonies) proclaimed as its "motto" that "colonial policy is, above all, native policy."[139] Although native policy is a political and folk category (and perhaps a racist one), it can also be defined *analytically* as the site at which the colonial state identifies, produces, and reinforces the alterity that is required by the rule of hierarchical difference. Because of the uncertainties and difficulties for the colonial state in this process, due especially to the code-switching abilities of the colonized and their resistance to being defined by the outsider, native policy came to be concerned specifically with the *stabilization* of the culture, subjectivity, and activities of the colonized on the basis of clear definitions.[140]

By projecting Homi Bhabha's concept of colonial "mimicry" backward into the *pre*colonial context we can see why modern colonizers were compelled to look for ways to stabilize their new subjects from the moment they laid claim to a foreign territory. Bhabha situates the condition he calls mimicry within colonial and postcolonial settings.[141] But mimicry was also a precolonial paradox that confronted would-be colonizers, at least in the modern period, from the later eighteenth century onward. The colonialisms that emerged from the scramble for Africa and the Pacific in the last third of the nineteenth century confronted populations that had already been exposed to Europeans for decades and even for centuries.[142] Even for the most "remote" cultures it was nearly impossible to remain untouched and unobserved by the legions of restless missionaries, explorers, traders, and pioneer ethnologists who were released by the expanding Euro-American capitalist core. By the time the Berlin West Africa Conference ratified Germany's entry into the colonial game, many of the people in Africa, Oceania, and Asia who were destined to become German subjects were already familiar with Europeans and sometimes even with Germans. The Namibian Ovaherero, Khoikhoi, and Rehobothers had interacted with Rhenish missionaries for decades prior to the hoisting of the German flag; Samoans had gotten to

139. See *Die deutschen Kolonien* 1 (1, 1902): 1.

140. By contrast, noncolonial imperialist powers sometimes pursue *destablization* for its own sake; see T. Mitchell 2002 for an example of this in American foreign policy.

141. See Bhabha 1994a, 1994b, 1994c.

142. Needless to say, this prior familiarization with Europeans was even more pronounced in the case of the former Ottoman territories of the Middle East that became European colonies after World War I.

know the managers of the German Godeffroy firm after 1860 and various German consuls and would-be rulers starting in 1879; and the Chinese residents of Shandong Province had encountered German missionaries from the Societas Verbi Divini since the 1880s.[143] The victims of modern colonial conquest were rarely as mistaken about the identity of their Western conquerors as the Aztec ruler Montezuma.[144] In an effort to ward off colonial takeover, societies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific developed new concepts of statehood and national sovereignty, adopted Western religious practices and beliefs, studied European military strategies and weapons, and created written languages.[145] Many non-Westerners learned to move fluidly between indigenous and European cultural codes. As Marshall Sahlins writes, in the era "before the flag" "western commodities and even persons could be encompassed within [the] 'development schemes'" of traditional cultures.[146]

European conquerors and their candidates for subjection related differently to this condition of precolonial familiarity with the invading culture. The would-be rulers tended to view partially "Westernized" people as threateningly ambiguous, shifting between similarity and strangeness. One German specialist on Southwest Africa warned that "the Hottentot knows us better than we know him."[147] Nineteenth-century European depictions of not-yet-colonized Africans, Asians, and Pacific islanders referred frequently to a putative disjuncture between essence and appearance, words

143. Spanish Franciscan missionaries had worked in Shandong during the eighteenth century; see Willeke 1947; and Maas 1932.

144. See Todorov 1984. Whether or not Todorov is correct about the role of literacy in the fall of the Aztecs, they failed to recognize Cortés as a conquistador rather than the Aztec god Quetzalcoatl. Captain Cook's reception at Hawai'i does not refute the idea that modern colonial subjects are rarely confused about the identity of their conquerers. Even if Cook and the sailors of the *Resolution* and *Discovery* were misidentified by the Hawai'ians (Sahlins 1981), the Hawai'ians had plenty of time to get to know Europeans and Americans and their commodities before they were formally colonized. A significant amount of time elapsed between first contact and colonial annexation in all of the Pacific islands. See Linnekin 1991a for a comparison between Hawai'i and Samoa that emphasizes the lasting impact of "first contact."

145. For Africa, see Bley 1995; Samoans' defensive deployment of practices of kingship and Christianity are discussed in chaps. 4 and 5. King Njoya of Bamum in German Cameroon created a written language starting around 1895, wrote a history of the kingdom, and created forty-seven schools to teach the Bamum syllabary, and "in 1913 he commissioned a member of his court to prepare a printing press using it." Although this development occurred during the German colonial period, it was clearly an effort on Njoya's part to expand his independence. See "Bamum," *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online,* http://search.eb.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/eb/article-9012088 (accessed September 16, 2005); Geary 1988.

146. Sahlins 1993, pp. 16–17.

147. Schultze 1907, p. 335.

and deeds, ostensible and hidden meanings. The recurrent complaints by European merchants and missionaries about lying, cheating, dissimulation, and mimicry index the perceived chasm between a partly Westernized "exterior" and a recalcitrant and unfathomable "interior." The act of lying was made out to be an intrinsic part of Samoan culture while truth telling was said to be "un-Samoan."[148] Sinophobic commentators returned incessantly to the tropes of Chinese "cunning," "forked-tonguedness" (*Doppelzüngigkeit*), and double-dealing. Chinese society was allegedly more concerned with saving "face" than with telling the truth.[149] The South African Khoikhoi were described in the nineteenth century as being "cultivated in deceit" and afflicted by a disturbing "talent for mimicry."[150]

Colonial states were "contact zones," fields of interaction between radically different cultures.[151] Europeans perceived the ability of the colonized to move suddenly and strategically between positions of cultural similarity and stark difference as a menace to colonial hegemony. The overarching goal of native policy, therefore, was to arrest the mobility of the colonized within this slippery cultural space, to put an end to the maddening oscillation between local and European signifying systems. Native policy was an attempt to identify a uniform cultural essence beneath the shimmering surface of indigenous practice and to restrict the colonized to this unitary identity. Native policy can thus be defined as any official intervention directed toward stabilizing a colonized group around a particular definition of its culture, character, and behavior.[152]

148. Werner von Bülow, "Die Verwaltung der Landgemeinden in Deutsch-Samoa," NZNA ACGA XVII A 1, vol. 3, p. 32; also NZNA AGCA XVII A 1, pt. 3, p. 32. According to a very recent study of Samoa, "one of the first things a stranger notices about Sāmoans is they may not mean what they say" (Love 1991, p. 1).

149. See BA-MA-Freiburg, Nachlass Diederichs, vol. 24, p. 39; chap. 8; and, above all, Anson [1748] 1974; and Hevia 1992, p. 316, for a discussion of the European theory of the Chinese understanding of "face."

150. "German South-West Africa," *Owl,* November 18, 1904, p. 11; second quote from Friedrich Müller 1873, p. 79.

151. On the concept of the (pre)colonial contact zone see Pratt 1992.

152. It is not relevant to this definition whether colonizers actually used the phrases *native policy, politique indigène,* or *Eingeborenenpolitik.* The core problem for the modern colonial state—uncontrollable code switching by the subject population—was identified by Europeans before this terminology emerged. It would be a nominalist methodological mistake to proscribe the use of concepts that were not available to the historical actors in question. Moreover, the concept did eventually emerge in situ. Social science concepts typically ply the waters between everyday and conceptual language; see Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron [1968] 1991.

Native policy was not just a program of enforced cultural essentialism but was also premised on the inferiority of the governed. Complete identity and genuine assimilation were incompatible with the rule of difference. Colonial programs ostensibly geared toward assimilation were usually organized around a second-class or degraded version of likeness. Identity with the colonizers was held out as a deferred promise. At the same time, colonial rulers could not tolerate incommensurable difference, which eluded their understanding and control. Even in the most hands-off versions of indirect rule based on "tradition" and "customary law" the colonized were expected to present an unchanging, recognizable version of their own culture. In order to stabilize the subject culture it had to be translated, codified. Colonizers needed to find some basis of agreement with indigenous leaders about cultural categories. Native policy attempted to lock the colonized into a position located somewhere along the spectrum running from absolute difference to complete identity. Between these extremes there was a wide range of possible policy approaches. The colonized could be framed as an earlier version of one's own culture, as in social-evolutionary perspectives,[153] or as children; as a degenerate or fallen civilization; or as permanently inferior, a suggestion that was backed by theories of polygenesis and scientific racism.[154]

Colonial massacre marks another boundary condition on native policy. For Joseph Conrad, massacre was not just the most extreme face of colonialism, but its essence.[155] Sartre claimed that colonialism was a contradictory system that "wills simultaneously the death and the multiplication of its victims."[156] But the German governor Theodor Leutwein protested General von Trotha's 1904 annihilation order with the argument that colonialism without the colonized was a contradiction in terms. Another contemporary emphasized the incongruity between Southwest African settlers' desire to exterminate the Africans and their complaints about labor shortages, writing, "As long as there are only a few white 'masters' in the land—and this situation will last for a long time—and as long as the European, even if he was only a serf back home—refuses all menial labor as unsuited for a member of the master race, we will be unable to forgo the colored laborer."[157] As Leutwein had warned, the postwar colonial economy struggled for a decade

153. E.g., J. Forster [1778] 1996; Fabian 1983.

154. See Stocking 1987.

155. Trotha 1994, p. 42. On colonial massacre as a general category see Lindquvist 1996; Cocker 1998; Palmer 2000; and Le Cour Grandmaison 2005.

156. Sartre quoted in Memmi [1965] 1991, p. xxvii.

157. Spectator Germanicus 1913, p. 251. For a similar formulation by a more recent historian see Eckert 2003, p. 234.

with severe labor shortages.[158] Colonialism may make massacre more likely, but it does not follow that massacre is the inevitable telos of colonialism.

Toward an Explanation: The Colonial State as a Social Field

We can now return to the empirical conundrum presented by the three German colonies. On the eve of colonial annexation, Southwest Africa seemed less hospitable to European settlement and less economically promising than Samoa, but it was transformed into the main target of German colonial settlement.[159] The German government in Samoa consistently repelled settler demands and worked to fortify its chosen version of traditional native culture. The number of foreign residents in Samoa actually fell from about 800 to 347 during the first two years of German rule and barely rose between 1902 and 1912.[160] In Samoa the indigenous population was handled mildly, while Southwest Africa became the stereotypical settler colony, marked by displacement, ethnocide, and genocide. This difference seems explicable at first glance in terms of divergent precolonial representations of Samoans and Southwest Africans, but the Kiaochow case undermines the straightforward "devil's handwriting" explanation. Precolonial German representations of the Chinese were heterogeneous, and colonial policy in Qingdao was mercurial. There was no simple circuit running from "travelers' tales" to colonialism.

To make sense of this historical puzzle we need to theorize the colonial state as a *field* and to situate it in relation to the metropolitan field of power. In addition to offering the tools for constructing a theoretical account of the colonial field of power, Bourdieu's framework explains why ethnographic discourse is usually multivocal, pace Said. Social fields are organized around differences—differences of perception and practice. It is difficult to imagine what sorts of materials actors could use in their efforts to carve out

158. Other sources of labor were available, from Ovamboland in the north and from the British Cape Colony, requiring the state to develop new forms of native policy. But these alternate sources proved unsatisfactory to many employers in the colony; see *Jahresbericht der Windhuker Handelskammer* (1913).

159. So was the difference due to a German colonial emphasis on emigration and settlement, as W. Smith (1978) argued? Smith's argument that German colonialism was driven by a desire for outlets for settlement has not stood the test of historical scrutiny. It cannot explain why Samoa and the South Sea islands did not become sites of settlement after 1900, or why many German colonial officials disliked and disadvantaged settlers.

160. There were 400–800 foreigners in Samoa in 1900 (NZNA AGCA, "Excerpt from Annual Report, 1900–1901," G.S.A. IV 5.a, p. 21) and 347 in 1902 (*Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee,* 1911/12, Statistischer Teil, p. 7); see note 71.

hierarchies of cultural distinction if they were faced with cultural formations as flat and uniform as Saidian "Orientalism." According to Said, there were diverse "idioms" at the surface of Orientalist discourse but a homogeneous "layer of doctrine about the Orient" underneath, "*converging* upon . . . essential aspects of the Orient."[161] If this were true, Orientalism would not have been able to organize itself around differences of status distinction, as a hierarchical field. But social theorists and researchers have shown that heterogeneity and stratification complicate even the most apparently unstriated discursive formations.[162]

Writers inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin/Valentin Volosinov look for associations between particular voices or "accents" within a linguistic formation and specific social groups or classes.[163] Once we locate ethnographic discourse within social fields, our attention is drawn to these sorts of filiations between particular tropes or ways of speaking and specific social groups. European discourse on the Southwest African Ovaherero was indeed monotonously repetitive, so much so that colonizers were unable to deploy its tropes against one another in demanding recognition of their superior ethnographic taste. But portrayals of the Namibian Ovaherero were located at a univocal extreme. Most ethnographic formations, including the ones concerned with Samoa and China, were much more multivocal.

The linkages between ethnographic visions and social divisions are contingent and historically variable. In the chapters that follow I will trace various examples of the forging and reforging of linkages between European social classes and representations of non-European cultures. Between the sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, for example, Sinophilia was dominant in Europe and was associated with the educated middle classes and Jesuit missionaries, while Sinophobia was correlated with the merchant capitalists operating along the Chinese coast. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the educated middle classes began to lose their affinity for Sinophilia and to gravitate toward the "merchant" view of China. This is evident in the writings of Montesquieu, Herder, Cornelius de Pauw, Hegel, and even Karl Marx, all of whom paraphrase or quote directly from the merchant accounts. At the end of the nineteenth century Sinophobia again became less attractive for educated middle-class Europeans, many of whom began to realign themselves with an updated version of Sinophilia.[164]

161. Said 1978, p. 203 (my emphasis).

162. Bakhtin 1981; Volosinov 1985.

163. E.g., S. Hall 1983; Bell and Gardiner 1998.

164. German examples of this neo-Sinomania include Paquet 1911, 1912; Boerschmann 1911–14; Schmitz 1924; Keyserling 1925; Hesse (see Hsia 1974); and R. Wilhelm 1926.

Thus, while ethnographic images often had a well-defined social base in any given time and place, such correlations were rooted in changing constellations of political, ideological, and economic processes rather than some omnihistorical logic of social class and its impact on mentalities.[165] The evolving connections between social divisions and ethnographic visions can be illuminated by reconstructing the social fields in which social actors expressed their contending representations of the colonized Other. These affinities reflected the dynamics of intraelite class struggle that were imported into the colonies, where they underwent patterned transformations. This transposition of metropolitan class configurations is one reason why modern colonial empires actually did vary according to the national identity of their European colonizer: dominant classes were organized differently in the European metropoles, even if all of them worked with roughly similar pan-European precolonial ethnographic discourses once in the colony. For example, the *Bildungsbürgertum* was an unusually powerful social group in imperial Germany, not simply a theoretical "class on paper."[166] The hereditary nobility had a greater political presence in Germany and Britain than in France at this time, and it was nonexistent in the United States.[167] Articulations between social location and ethnographic posture

165. There is another unspoken but necessary condition for the causal link between Orientalism and colonial policy. A particular ethnographic or Orientalist perspective could not influence colonial policy unless its bearers were represented within, or at least recognized by, the colonial administration. The colonial state was thus a determinant of its own policies. Given the undemocratic and autonomous nature of these states, those Europeans located in the colony but outside the governing apparatus were in a very weak position to influence policy.

166. See Bourdieu 1987 for the notion of "classes on paper" and Steinmetz 1992 for further elaboration of this point.

167. The formation of social classes or groups should not be understood in objectivist terms as a function of preexisting resource distributions, but neither should it be understood in subjectivist terms as entirely a product of ideological interpellations (e.g., in Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Instead, it involves "material," corporeal, ideal, and psychic dimensions. "Materialism" and "idealism" make sense only as analytical abstractions or in a purely synchronic analysis that freezes historical time. Social class, expressed as patterned practices and identifications, is indeed built upon a foundation of different sorts of "capital" (Bourdieu 1987). But the values of cultural *and* economic capital are set and reset continuously in the course of ongoing conflicts within an interactive and intersubjective social context, rather than determined in advance by material conditions. Because the present analysis begins with formations of ethnographic discourse, which appear as a "cause" of colonialism, it might seem to be privileging the "ideal" over the "material." But ethnographic discourse was itself a material process located in specific social "fields" such as Sinology or travel literature. My decision to treat ethnographic discourse as a given rather than tracing its formation is a heuristic choice, since my main goal is explaining native policy. As Hedström and Swedberg observe, "Faced with a world consisting of causal histories of nearly infinite length, in prac-

varied partly in line with these metropolitan arrangements of dominant social classes and groups.

But what is a field? It is only possible to speak of social practices and perceptions as arranging themselves into a patterned social field when all of the "practitioners" recognize the same stakes of competition and the same criteria of distinction or signs of honor. A precondition for the existence of a field is that all social actors share the same *illusio,* that they all perceive the same perceptions (tastes) and practices as markers of field-specific cultural capital. It is this mutuality of perception, this web of mutual recognition (*erkennen* and *wiedererkennen*) of status differences, which transforms cultural capital into symbolic capital.[168] Recognition of hierarchies of distinction may not be fully conscious, and it may be accompanied by a defiant embrace of one's own dominated taste, that is, by a "taste for necessity" or *amor fati,* a love of ones fate. The field should best be thought of as a variable and not as an either-or condition. Spheres of activity in which participants disagree about what counts as distinguished are less fieldlike than others.

Was the colonial state characterized by common perceptions of distinction and stakes of conflict? German colonial administrators did in fact compete for a specific form of cultural distinction within the ambit of the colonial state, and this struggle guided each individual toward particular kinds of native policy. More specifically, officials within the colonial state competed for recognition of their *ethnographic acuity,* their discernment in understanding "natives." Colonial officials demanded recognition from one another of their ethnographic perceptiveness. Given the colonial state's inbuilt emphasis on finding a way to stabilize native culture, it is clear why this particular talent would be so highly valued. Every official was compelled by the force of the situation to develop an ethnographic vision, however rudimentary, in order to develop a course of action and to legitimate his presence as a foreign conqueror. The ability to understand the natives, to judge their character and gauge their responses, became a widely recognized criterion of value among members of the colonial elite. Ethnographic acuity was structurally comparable to notions of good taste in art, a "musical ear" in classical music, or "soul" in popular American music. This does not mean that the dominant actors in the colonial state field

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tice we can only hope to provide information on their most recent history" (1998, pp. 12–14). A separate analysis that took ethnographic discourse as its central object would need to reconstruct precolonial contact zones.

168. Bourdieu 1985. I discuss the role of recognition in the Bourdieuian concept of symbolic capital in Steinmetz 2006b.

actually had a superior grasp of the colonized; ethnographic perceptions and representations were wielded as markers of distinction regardless of their fictiveness, offensiveness, or even absurdity.

Control of the field of the state in Wilhelmine Germany was precariously balanced between three elite classes or class fractions, each of them rooted in a different social source of status: the modern economic bourgeoisie, based in wealth and property; the nobility, based in titles and land; and the middle-class intelligentsia or *Bildungsbürgertum,* based in educational culture. Each group struggled to impose its definition of the "dominant principle of domination."[169] Discussions of so-called German exceptionalism have tried to determine which of these social elites was *generally* dominant within the imperial German state. In fact, no particular source of capital was all-powerful. Urban government was dominated by the liberal bourgeoisie and its values. The aristocracy remained well entrenched in the army and the diplomatic corps. Middle-class intellectuals prevailed in most of the cultural fields, and they were also well represented in the overseas colonial administrations. This was partly because these posts were considered relatively unimportant, but in some instances middle-class "academics" were preferred because of the emphasis on understanding foreign cultures.[170] This does not mean that *Bildungsbürger* were always able to dominate the colonial elite class struggle. Compelling claims to "native expertise" could also be made by noblemen, military officers, settlers, and even capitalists. But university-trained philologists or lawyers were sometimes able to attain a level of political power in the colonial states that was inaccessible to their class in metropolitan national politics.

The colonial stage thus became an exaggerated version of imperial Germany's three-way intraelite class struggle. Given the structural pressures that pointed to ethnographic sagacity as the common coin of the colonial state field, officials were virtually compelled to emphasize the excellence of their understanding of indigenous ways. As a result, each group selected tropes and narratives from the ethnographic archive that promised to showcase its socially constructed strengths, its existing holdings of capital. Thus, university-educated colonial officials tended to emphasize interpretations

169. Bourdieu [1989] 1996, p. 376.

170. For the foundational critique of the thesis of German exceptionalism, see Blackbourn and Eley 1985; for its genealogy see Steinmetz 1997. I discuss the power of the Wilhelmine bourgeoisie in municipal politics in Steinmetz 1993; for class relations inside the army see Craig 1955, p. 235; on class and the German diplomatic service see Philippi 1985, p. 63; and Preradovich 1955.

of the colonized that relied on hermeneutic and linguistic skills and that were distant from motives of money and violent military domination, which they dismissed as undignified and unrefined. Many of the officials who took this broadly "hermeneutic" approach had been trained as Orientalists, Sanskritists, philologists, translators, or lawyers.[171] Career military men tended to describe the colonized using martial categories, and their preferred native policies emphasized the arts of coercive command, which was the traditional specialty of the German nobility. Nonetheless, they too claimed a superior grasp of the natives. As General Lothar von Trotha wrote, "My *exact knowledge* of so many central African tribes, Bantu and other, has always demonstrated to me with absolute necessity that the Negro never bows to treaties but only to raw violence."[172] This suggests that von Trotha was swimming in the same social waters as his more "humanistic" opponents, seeking recognition in the same register. Settlers and investors typically wanted to transform the colonized into interchangeable laborers or versions of *Homo economicus* and were therefore attuned to evaluative categories like idleness and usefulness. Although they were relatively uninterested in extant indigenous culture, they too claimed insight into it.[173]

171. The ethnographic tendencies of missionaries were extremely heterogeneous. Some show evidence of a broadly hermeneutic approach, but they were usually discouraged from being curious about non-Christian cultures except where it would facilitate their educative campaigns and help diagnose barriers to conversion (Gewald 1998b, p. 140). Todorov (1984) argued that missionaries like Las Casas were poor ethnographers because they saw all humans as potential Christians. This applies to a subset of the missionaries discussed in this book. Most of the Rhenish missionaries were indeed poor ethnographers, but this was not necessarily because they sympathized with the Ovaherero. The more alert missionaries, like Gottlieb Viehe, Philipp Diehl, and Jakob Irle, provided invaluable historical information on Ovaherero culture, even if one has to disentangle the useful parts of their writing from stereotypical formulas. Missionary Viehe (1879, p. 372) wrote that most Europeans were too impatient to find out about Ovaherero customs and assumed that native practices were simply random (*Willkur*), whereas in fact custom was "regulated in the smallest details, and when you ask several Hereros they will give you the same details in almost the same words." This passage is interesting not just for its precocious anthropological "structuralism" but also because it demonstrates that missionaries were themselves involved in making claims to ethnographic acuity. Missionaries like Richard Wilhelm in China (see chap. 7) immersed themselves in the local culture for quite different reasons, but they also tended to frame their pronouncements in terms of ethnographic expertise.

172. Von Trotha to Schlieffen, October 4, 1904, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2089, p. 5v (my emphasis).

173. See, for example, the report "Education of Samoans to Industriousness," by Herr A. Kraus, a member of the opposition to Governor Solf in Samoa, in BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 3065, pp. 174ff.

Of course, there were countless exceptions to these sociological regularities. Ethnographic preferences were not stamped like number plates on the backs of European actors, even within a particular historical and geographic context. The peculiar sense that an individual made of her personal social position and class dilemma could lead her away from what might have been the more strategically astute approach in terms of the schematics of symbolic capital. Many colonizers were located in *contradictory* class positions. Others were more interested in *changing* their class status than in capitalizing on their current one. The German writer and traveler Count Hermann von Keyserling enthused about Asia and China in ways that were more typical of the intellectuals and artists with whom Keyserling associated in the "School of Wisdom" that he created in Darmstadt after the war—men like Rabindranath Tagore, Thomas Mann, Carl Jung, Leo Baeck, Leo Frobenius, and Alfred Adler—than of his aristocratic class of birth.[174] Keyserling described China as possessing an ideal form of government and advanced aesthetic sensibilities.[175] Richard Wilhelm introduced Keyserling to his own circle in Qingdao, the Confucius Society, and wrote that his "old men of Qingdao" were "not a little impressed" with Keyserling, who was "very earnest about learning something of Chinese culture."[176] But Keyserling had transformed himself, as he later wrote, from a dueling member of the fraternity at the University at Dorpat (Tartu) into an "aesthete,"[177] rather than easing into the role of state official to which he was destined as a member of the Courland aristocracy with family connections to the upper reaches of the German nobility. An opposing example is the middle-class professor Max Weber, who held sociologically anomalous views of China. Weber argued that Confucianism was oriented toward "adjustment to the world" rather than "rational transformation of the world," a cultural handicap preventing rational capitalism from emerging in China.[178] This argument closely followed the Sinophobia that was more typical of German military and business elites than of the *Bildungsbürgertum,* but it corresponded to Weber's racism with respect to

174. Boyer 1979, pp. 142–49, 545; Gahlings 1992, pp. 89–96; 2000. Georg Lukács attacked Tagore as a colonial apologist in 1922 in a review in *Die rote Fahne;* Thomas Mann disparaged Tagore as effeminate (Kämpchen 1999).

175. Keyserling enthused about the writer Ku Hung-Ming (see chap. 7) as "a man of such wit and such a fiery temperament that I am sometimes reminded of a Latin" (1925, vol. 2, pp. 106–7).

176. R. Wilhelm 1928, p. 183.

177. Keyersling 1926, p. 32; Boyer 1979, chap. 1.

178. M. Weber 1964, pp. 235, 242.

Poles.[179] In many biographies, however, there were pervasive associations between social class and ethnographic posture.[180]

Attending to social "distinction strategies" takes us part of the way toward understanding how colonial officials selected from a preexisting array of ethnographic and policy options. Native policymaking was directed not only toward the colonized but was intended to signal something to other Germans, both at home and in the colony. The fields of ethnographic perception and overseas colonial rule were not sweepingly dominated by any of the elite class fractions vying for power in states Germany. Because of the unsettled nature of the German colonial state field and the German "field of power" more generally, such struggles were pervasive and intense.

Postcolonial theorists have argued that metropolitan dynamics are imported into the colony, and vice versa.[181] Contrary to the "mirror" of Europe that some used as a description of overseas colonies,[182] however, the colonizers' social field was not a simple replica, or even a reversed mirror image, of the metropolitan one. Nor was the overseas colonial realm a garbage can for the detritus of elite European society. The colonial state field, unlike

179. Zimmerman 2006.

180. Settlers constituted the other European social group in the German colonies, but they were rarely able to do more than inflect or comment on existing native policies. Nonetheless, it is important that they too framed their policy preferences in terms of their superior "knowledge of the native" (see, e.g., Deeken 1901; Gordon 1998).

181. The German overseas colonial empire was too small and short lived to decisively shape "metropolitan" society or culture in the Kaiserreich in the ways usually discussed by colonial and postcolonial theorists (Kiernan 1980; Said 1993; Spivak 1988; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1989; McClintock 1995). The significant German literary texts from this period that are structured by the colonial margin, such as Gustav Freytag's *Soll und Haben* (1855), Wilhelm Raabe's *Stopfkuchen* (1891), and Theodor Fontane's *Effi Briest* (1895) integrate a more generic *pan-European* colonial mentality or culture with metropolitan German themes. Writers from the Kaiserreich who *were* explicitly oriented toward German colonies, such as Frieda von Bülow (see Wildenthal 2001) and Elisabeth von Heyking (see chap. 6), are less convincing examples of the argument that the *canonical core* of European culture is constituted by the imperial margin. Most of the writers discussed by Noyes (1992), for example, were virtually unknown in Germany during the colonial era and never became part of the German canon. Some trivial German colonial literature was extremely popular, of course, including the novels of Friedrich Gerstäcker, Karl May, Gustav Frenssen, and Hans Grimm, but their texts were partly constituted vis-à-vis a pan-European imperial outside, rather than a specifically German one. Indeed, not a single novel by Gerstäcker or May is concerned with a *German* colony. The only German colony that significantly influenced metropolitan German culture was Southwest Africa.

182. E.g., Kiernan 1980; and Cannadine 2001.

the metropolitan one, was compelled to focus on native policy, and this placed a premium on claims to ethnographic acuity. This in turn enhanced the power of the educated middle class, or *Bildungsbürgertum,* which could make a reasonable claim to be best suited for penetrating the world of the colonized. Thus, a solidly middle-class governor like Wilhelm Solf, a trained Sanskritist and lawyer, could describe a group of discontented settlers in Samoa as being too uneducated to "find their way into" (sich hineinfinden) the Samoans' peculiar "logic" and "foreign ways of thought."[183] Sinologist Otto Franke, who was involved at two decisive moments in policymaking in the Kiaochow colony, was extremely respectful of China and cross-identified strongly with Chinese mandarins. Franke disparaged Europeans who adopted the discourse of the "yellow peril" or exhibited an "artificially heightened race feeling." Franke translated during the negotiations over the leasing of Kiaochow, and his superior was the aristocratic German envoy to China, Baron Edmund von Heyking. According to Franke, von Heyking and his novelist wife, Elisabeth von Heyking, arrogantly positioned themselves "beyond good and evil" and regarded their Chinese counterparts in the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office) as "dirty, cowardly, retarded, and disgusting."[184] Setting aside the question of the accuracy of these judgments, they throw into sharp relief the churning cultural class struggle within the German elite in the overseas imperial milieux. Because both Solf and Franke achieved major successes in their colonial settings against representatives of the ethnographic views they despised,[185] their cases illustrate the ways in which the structural peculiarities of the German colonial state could allow members of the "dominated fraction of the dominant class" to triumph against the dominant sectors. This was less true in Southwest Africa. Theodor Leutwein, an official of middling social origins, was forced out of power after a decade as governor by a representative of the old German aristocracy, General Lothar von Trotha. One reason for von Trotha's success in this epic battle was that inherited German visions of the Ovaherero were too monolithic to allow Leutwein to apply an appreciative hermeneutic approach to their culture. The monotonous negativity of Ger-

183. BA-Koblenz, Nachlass Solf, vol. 27, p. 66. Solf's social position is discussed in chap. 7, and in Hempenstall and Mochida 2005.

184. O. Franke 1911a, p. vi; 1954, p. 98. Indeed, both Baron von Heyking and his wife described their Chinese government counterparts as barely human (see chap. 6).

185. Franke's main success came while conducting negotiations with the Chinese Ministry of Education over the creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese university (see chap. 7). Against vehement resistance by Qingdao's colonial governor, Franke accepted that the Chinese would become coequal partners in running the school.

man ethnographic views was itself a function of Ovaherero resistance to being culturally penetrated, to "confessing"—but that story will not figure centrally in this book.[186]

We can often begin to understand why one strand of precolonial discourse rather than another guided colonial practice once we know who was put in charge of a given colony. As it happens, German Samoa was run by middle-class intellectuals with advanced degrees in Sanskritology and law (Erich Schultz, the second governor, was a trained lawyer). This does not mean, however, that we should actually be studying the processes by which governors were appointed rather than the ongoing creation of polices in the colonies. As noted above, the relevant sections of the Foreign Office (or, later, Colonial Office) bureaucracy in Berlin were often synchronized with the dominant views in the foreign colonies that they supervised. The specialists in the Foreign Office who appointed Solf as governor of Samoa in 1899 were oriented, like him, toward a "salvage" colonialism organized around an ethnographic discourse of noble savagery, and they knew exactly what they were getting with Solf.[187] But they could not anticipate how Solf would translate this generic vision into specific policies. It was not a foregone conclusion, for example, that Solf's liberal "hermeneutic" approach would lead him to embrace what seemed to be a jarringly racist stance on the question of mixed marriage. Moreover, officials' ethnographic postures were often transformed by interactions in the colony.

186. On this entire problematic of ethnographic confession see Goh 2005.

187. This is not to say that the field within the metropolitan Foreign or Colonial Office was constructed around the same stakes and forms of cultural capital as the overseas colonial state. Questions of ethnographic "taste" did surface inside the colonial and foreign service bureaucracy, and many of the same officials circulated between overseas postings and the bureaucracies in Berlin. But for the most part these metropolitan battles were carried out in a different register. The conflict over the conduct of the Ovaherero war in 1904, for example, pitted supporters of a genocidal course—the General Staff (von Schlieffen) and the kaiser himself—against the chancellor and some in the Foreign Office who advocated a more conciliatory and "colonial" course with a longer time horizon and an emphasis on native policy. But this was a struggle over broadly differing German goals for the colony, not over differing interpretations of Ovaherero character. The language of von Trotha and Leutwein, both of whom claimed superior knowledge of the "natives," did not structure these internal discussions in Berlin. Similarly, the debate over the creation of the Qingdao German-Chinese university pitted the colony's governor, Truppel, against a broad front (the Foreign Office, navy secretary, and the German envoy in Beijing), but the discussion never involved opposing interpretations of the Chinese. In debates with his metropolitan interlocutors Truppel never insisted that the Chinese were not culturally suited for treatment as equals but instead argued that treating colonial subjects as equals was contrary to colonialism. Those inside the Berlin ministries who hoped to cultivate China as an ally ignored discussions about Chinese cultural decline or civilizational greatness.

A central determinant of native policy was conflict among officials for reciprocal recognition of individual ethnographic discernment. The cultural raw materials for these battles were the formations of ethnographic discourse that had been handed down from the precolonial era.[188] The theories of Said and Bourdieu are essential for the explanation of modern colonialism. But there are two more stages in the explanation. The first one overdetermines colonizers' gravitation toward specific framings of the colonized, while the second is concerned with the reproduction and revision of native policies once they are introduced.

Symbolic and Imaginary Identifications

Both Bourdieu and Said ignore or marginalize the psychic level of analysis, which has been at the heart of Homi Bhabha's pathbreaking interventions in postcolonial theory. Said alludes to a deeper level of colonial discourse which he labels *latent* Orientalism and describes as analogous to dreamwork, but he never develops this idea in any detail.[189] Bhabha draws heavily on Jacques Lacan in reconstructing the ambiguous identifications that take place across the colonizer-colonized boundary.[190] What Bhabha does not fully explain is why colonizers, in addition to rejecting fundamental cultural difference and channeling it into more palatable forms, might also *partly identify* with their subjects, that is, why they might also desire difference, even while continuing to keep it at arm's length.[191] Nor is Bhabha

188. Needless to say, these raw materials were not a neutral "toolkit." This metaphor implies that the materials contained in the "kit" are neutral in both semiotic terms (carrying denotations, but no connotations) and social terms (i.e., they are not *always already* located within intersubjective communities of speakers). The connotations of the ethnographic raw materials were already established before any individual German colonist reached for them. It is necessary to return to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* to recover this more sociological, historical, and "structuralist" sense of the "tool" metaphor.

189. Bhabha 1994b, p. 71; Said 1978, pp. 201–25. On this psychic problematic see Fanon [1952] 1967; Bhabha 1994b, 1994c; Sieg 1998; and Macey 2000, chap. 5.

190. Bhabha suggests that colonizers are threatened by the cultural difference that they seek to contain, and that the structure of colonial mimicry resembles Freudian fetishism in both disavowing and acknowledging this difference. The colonized are therefore urged to become similar to the colonizer, but at the same time they are allowed only to become "almost the same, but not quite" (Bhabha 1994c, p. 86).

191. Cannadine (2001) suggests that British colonizers sought a "mirror" for their own grandeur in the colonies. But he fails to elaborate any theoretical account of cultural, sociological, or psychic practice and therefore does not shed light on the nature of cross-identification with the colonized. Cannadine's "mirror" trope refers to simple reflection and lacks the elements of wish-fulfillment, distortion, paranoia, and misrecognition that Lacan introduced with his analysis of the mirror stage (Lacan [1949] 1977).

interested in the ways colonizers' cross-identification might be related to colonial governance.

Although Bourdieu argued forcefully for the role of *habitus* in lending a tentative coherence to human practice, he was relatively uninterested in the psychic forces that motivate practice or generate the unity of the habitus. Bourdieu's avoidance of this area seems to reflect the overarching epistemological-ontological division of labor between psychoanalysis and the social sciences.[192] The reasons for the exorcism of the unconscious from the social sciences have been discussed elsewhere.[193] In recent years, however, a rising chorus of voices scattered across various disciplines has called for reintegrating the unconscious and psychoanalysis more generally into social theory and socioanalysis. Bourdieu's work has been justly celebrated for breaking down untenable divisions between mind and body, language and practice, and sociology and cultural anthropology. Psychoanalytic terminology appears repeatedly in Bourdieu's work, although it is often hedged about with defensive comments. Bourdieu slowly began to acknowledge the similarity between his own thought and psychoanalysis in his later years, but he never deployed its categories systematically.[194] The status of psychoanalysis in Bourdieu's work is extremely uneasy, suffering from denegation (*Verneinung*) or disavowal (*Verleugnung*) of its relevance for and contributions to his own approach.[195] And as Slavoj Žižek remarks with respect to another contemporary social theorist on the other side of the Rhine, there is a "curious detail concerning Lacan's name" in Bourdieu's writing: it is mentioned only rarely and usually in the context of puns or anecdotes. In *Homo Academicus,* Lacan figures only as a data point, and elsewhere in Bourdieu's writing he is studiously avoided.[196]

192. We can see this in the deference to Lacan by both Lévi-Strauss and Althusser, and in Lacan's reciprocal delegation of the realm of the social to those theorists (Althusser 1996). In the United States, psychoanalysis was becoming central to social science around the middle of the twentieth century but later was almost completely suppressed or presented in a truncated, oversocialized version centered on superego control.

193. See Jacoby 1983; and Steinmetz 2006b.

194. See de Gaulejac 2004, p. 83. The most explicit discussion of psychoanalysis occurs in Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination* ([1998] 2002, p. 17). See also the interview with Jacques Maître (1994) and Bourdieu (1980) for earlier explorations of the relations between psychoanalysis and Bourdieu's theory. I am grateful to Francine Muel-Dreyfus for bringing these texts to my attention.

195. Fourny 2000; Muel-Dreyfus 2003; de Gaulejac 2004; and Steinmetz 2005a.

196. One of the peculiarities of Bourdieu's relationship to psychoanalysis is that when he actually engages with its internal logic (as opposed to borrowing its terminology), he tends to draw on Anglo-American ego psychologists rather than Freud or the Lacanian school. As

Bourdieu's theory has been criticized for the vagueness of some of its central concepts. Indeed, the categories of habitus and cultural capital make sense only when their psychoanalytic understructure is made explicit. Specifically, the concepts of cultural and symbolic capital, on the one hand, and habitus, on the other, become more compelling and precise once they are articulated with the Lacanian concepts of symbolic and imaginary identification. Rather than a mechanical combination of the Bourdieuian and Lacanian approaches, however, the former has to undergo a thorough theoretical reconstruction. Symbolic and imaginary identification then turn out to be fruitful categories for making sense of the practices of colonial officials.

The most significant aspect of Lacanian theory in the present context is that it allows us to reground Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital in Lacan's notion of the symbolic order and in the related dynamics of recognition and misrecognition that are so central to symbolic identification for Lacan. The symbolic in Lacan is the realm of language, difference, metonymy, and the law—the realm of socially sanctioned, official ego ideals. The *ego ideal* for Lacan is the "position of the subject within the symbolic, the norm that installs the subject within language." Subjects seek to *recognize* the normative injunctions of the symbolic order, and they seek *to be recognized* by those who issue these injunctions.[197] Symbolic identifications are linked to the construction of an ego ideal (*Ichideal*) which "constitutes a model to which the subject attempts to conform."[198] In Lacan's later writings, symbolic identification is understood more specifically as identification with *the place from which we are observed:* the "demand of the *Ichideal* takes up its place within the totality of the demands of the law."[199] The first symbolic identification, for the young boy, is with the father. Given the Oedipal structure, however, this identification is in a fundamental way

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Bertrand Geay remarks, Bourdieu is generally closer to psychology than to psychoanalysis, and his notion of the unconscious is similar to the *preconscious* in Freudian terms, rather than *the repressed* (*le refoulé*). Bourdieu came much closer in *Weight of the World,* his systematic study of individualization using actual individual cases, to a psychoanalytic analysis of the habitus as stemming partly from the "repression of the image of the father and contradictory injunctions tied to parental images" (Geay in Corcuff 2004, pp. 96–97).

197. Julien 1994, p. 167. This is *recognition* in Hegel's sense, as *Anerkennen* or *Wiedererkennen,* rather than simply *Erkennen* (or knowledge). In his Jena *Realphilosophie* Hegel observes that "in recognition, the Self ceases to be this individual, it exists by right in recognition. . . . Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition. . . . He *is* recognition" (Hegel 1983, p. 111). See Siep 1979; Honneth 1995.

198. Laplanche and Ponatalis 1973, p. 144.

199. Žižek 1989, p. 105; Lacan 1991, p. 134.

an impossible one: "There issues forth an impossible double command: to be like the father, but not to be like the father with respect to his sexual power."[200] Symbolic identification is thus structured by the desire for recognition but is forever undercut by difference. Identification is the attempted "resolution of desire."[201] At the same time subjects seek to be recognized by those agencies issuing the injunctions to identify.

Along parallel lines, Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital is based on the premise of the reciprocal recognition by all actors in a field of the cultural positions, the habituses and tastes, of all the other actors. Without mutual recognition by all actors of the value of differing forms of cultural capital there is no guarantee that they will all misrecognize the arbitrariness of these values and thereby ratify their own social domination. Without this dialectic of recognition and misrecognition there would be no reason for Bourdieu's theoretical "stuttering," that is, his doubling of the concept of cultural capital (which is a sort of "capital on paper") by symbolic capital—capital as it is interactively lived and socially understood.[202] It is only by attending to processes of symbolic identification that we can understand the source of the desire for recognition that motivates cultural competition in Bourdieu's framework.

200. Bryson 1994, p. 233; see also Freud [1923] 1961, p. 34.

201. Butler 1997, pp. 86, 102.

202. Symbolic capital, Bourdieu says, represents cultural capital insofar as it is recognized by others in the field, that is, insofar as it is "doxic." A well-structured, or doxic field thus resembles Lacan's symbolic order. A doxic field is hierarchically differentiated. All actors in the field, including the dominated, acknowledge a common definition of cultural capital and develop a taste for their own domination. Bourdieu's understanding of symbolic capital is thus akin to Lacan's notion of the symbolic, which is dominated by the law of the father. Indeed, Lacan often uses the same terms as Bourdieu (*champ, enjeu*) in describing the operations of the symbolic. By desexualizing the Oedipal crisis and reframing it as the entry into language and culture, Lacan makes the parallels between the law of the father and the doxic structure in Bourdieu's field even more evident. What Bourdieu's theory lacks is an account of the ontogenesis of this constantly repeated subjection to doxa, and of the motivation underlying competition for distinction (although Bourdieu did seem to recognize the need for such an account; see his comments in Bourdieu [1997] 2000, p. 166). Just as the foundation of imaginary identifications and "habitus" lies in the mirror phase, the foundation of symbolic identifications and "subjection to doxa" lies in the Oedipal crisis. Lacan's theory can of course be subjected to a parallel critique: it is a sociologically generic account that cannot name the "name of the father" as a specific social class or class fraction (a problem that Althusser [1971a, 1971b] addressed but failed to resolve). Although it may once have been useful heuristically for Lacan and Lévi-Strauss to allocate the psychic and the social objects to distinct human sciences, this division of labor has since become an intellectual hindrance.

If misrecognition for Bourdieu means misrecognition of social inequality, what does it mean for Lacan? To answer this we need to attend to the other two dimensions of Lacan's tripartite ontological division: the imaginary and the real. The subject's fundamental ontological separation from the real begins with the mirror phase, when the fragmented consciousness identifies with its own reflected image, alienated but satisfyingly totalizing.[203] Such primordial identifications are located in the realm of the imaginary, the realm of plenitude and wholeness. Imaginary identification is identification with an image that Lacan (following Freud) calls the ideal ego, or *Idealich* (as opposed to ego ideal, or *Ichideal*). This is an image that represents "what we would like to be."[204] The earliest imaginary identifications in the mirror phase thus provide a psychic template for a whole series of future images of bounded and embodied selfhood similarly characterized by a striving for wholeness and unity, including those body images that are central to Bourdieu's notion of habitus.[205] The misrecognition in the mirror stage, then, involves misrecognition of the fundamentally fictional character of this ur-identification (the image is reversed in the reflection, it presents a subject who is already in control of its boundaries and bodily functions, etc.) and of all of the further identifications that are constructed on the model of this roughcast. Unlike symbolic identifications, which work through difference or metonymy, the specular operations of the mirror phase function via sameness or metaphor.[206]

Whereas the symbolic is the sphere of the law, the imaginary, according to Julia Hell, is the realm of "illegal identifications," identifications that are forbidden from the standpoint of the present social-symbolic order.[207] The imaginary is "preoccupied" with and "structured by the law" but it does "not immediately obey the law." For example, Hell analyzes non-Jewish German writers' identification with the victims of the Holocaust as a form of symbolically illegal imaginary identification. Daniel Lagache points out that the ideal ego serves as the basis of "heroic identifications" with "great personalities from history or contemporary life characterized by independence,

203. Lacan [1949] 1977; Hell 1997, pp. 160–62, discusses the notion of an "acoustic mirror" that may precede the (visual) mirror stage described by Lacan.

204. Žižek 1989, p. 105; also Lagache 1961; Lacan 1991, pp. 134–48.

205. Freud already recognized that identifications need not involve explicitly erotic cathexes (Freud [1921] 1955; Padel 1986).

206. Saussure [1915] 1986.

207. Hell 2002.

pride, success."[208] Of course, not all imaginary identifications are "illegal"; the culture industry encourages an incessant stream of such identifications, harnessing them to the needs of capital, while the public machinery of official patriotism generates imaginary identification with national founders and leaders. But these identifications are still illegal from the standpoint of the symbolic (as opposed to the imaginary) order: I cannot appear before the law as George Washington or George Clinton or Bill Clinton without suffering repercussions, even if I am encouraged to identify with them in the movie theater or the concert hall.

The psychoanalytic emphasis on the doubling of conscious processes and motives by unconscious ones opens up a line of political analysis that is distinct from the Marxist, Saidian, and Bourdieuian ones. Lacan suggests an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of the colonizer's cross-identifications with the colonized. The categories of the imaginary, imaginary identification, and ideal ego are central here, although they are always working simultaneously with the symbolic. In the colonies, however, identification with the colonized *was* culturally forbidden, due to the racist rule of colonial difference—the colonizers' insistence on the irrefragable inferiority of colonized subjects—which prohibits the *metaphoric* logics of the imaginary. Such identifications were illegal from the standpoint of the prescriptions of the social-symbolic order of empire, which insisted on the inferiority of the colonized. Hence the many derogatory terms for "going native" in German colonial discourse: *Verkaffern* (going Kaffir), *Verchinesung* (going Chinese), *Verkanackern* (going Kanak), and *Verniggern* (going nigger).[209]

Lacan recognized that the contents of imaginary identifications later in life are provided by suggestions coming from the symbolic order. Similarly, colonizers' choices for imaginary identifications make sense only in terms of

208. Lagache 1961, pp. 41–42. The notion of imaginary identification can also be connected to the overarching psychoanalytic concept of fantasy, which has been used to great avail by theorists of nationalism, communism, totalitarianism, and postfascism (see Žižek 1989; Silverman 1992; Hell 1997; J. Rose 1998). Fantasy scenarios express a conscious or unconscious wish. Imaginary identification is one site for such wishful scenarios. For a recent overview see Levy and Inderbitzin 2001.

209. These phrases are discussed in the relevant chapters. Needless to say, the symbolic order of the colonized was structured differently. While the German traveler and geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen objected to the adoption of Chinese clothing, food, and other customs by European missionaries as a "descent into the customs of a lower race" and insisted that missionaries should "assume a superior standpoint to the native in every respect" (1907, vol. 2, p. 140), Chinese officials were encouraging European missionaries to wear Chinese clothing.

the broader repertoire of ethnographic discourses. How else can we understand that Wilhelm Solf identified with a Samoan chief and Bishop Anzer with a Chinese mandarin, rather than with native commoners, or for that matter with European settlers? These identifications were also corporeal. Solf commented on the fact that his own corpulence, which he sometimes experienced as an embarassment in European contexts, actually enhanced his status in Samoan society. Similarly, Bishop Anzer was extremely awkward in European society,[210] but in his mandarin masquerade he appeared self-assured (see fig. 6.10). This points to the way in which imaginary identifications are organized at the level of the body and body images.

This argument needs to be distinguished from the Conradian view of the colonizer as actually becoming decivilized—"going troppo"—and of the colony as a laboratory of European madness.[211] It is also necessary to distinguish the argument that Europeans cross-identified with imagos of the colonized from the claim that German colonial officials' *tastes* for specific ethnographic viewpoints (and hence for different native policies) were guided by their socially acceptable symbolic identifications with socially prestigious positions. Colonizers engaged in both symbolic projects and narcissistic, imaginary ones.

This doubling of symbolic and illegal identifications is not specific to "offstage" or colonial settings but is characteristic of subjectivity in general. Nonetheless, the peculiarities of overseas colonialism encouraged the proliferation of imaginary identifications by colonizers. The subjugated status of the colonized made them appear to be particularly available for mobilization as props in colonizers' fantasy scenarios. A colonial official in Africa or Oceania was better positioned than a city councilor in Berlin or Hamburg to engage his subjects in scenarios linked to imaginary identifications. The built-in power imbalance between colonizers and the colonized made it easier for Europeans to imagine themselves as omnipotent. And anything the colonial official did that involved the colonized became de facto part of native policy. Interactions with colonized people were viewed by many Europeans as lying outside the rules of behavior that held sway in the metropole. As Jürgen Osterhammel notes, colonial wars were understood

210. Rivinius 1979.

211. See Césaire [1950] 2000, p. 35; H. Arendt [1950] 1958, p. 193; and most recently, Fabian 2000. "Going troppo" is used to describe someone adopting a "primitive" lifestyle or succumbing emotionally to the pressures of a tropical climate. *Tropenkoller* is the title of a novel by Frieda von Bülow based on the case of Carl Peters, the German explorer of Africa who paved the way for the German annexation of East Africa and was dismissed from his post as district commissioner for Kilimanjaro in 1897 due to his "mad" abuse of Africans.

as being fought against "an enemy who did not seem to adhere to the same cultural code."[212] In European eyes this legitimated techniques that would be disdained in "civilized" warfare. Many Europeans regarded "primitive people" as less than fully human, and, in Freud's words, as being "led almost exclusively by the unconscious."[213] Of course, there are also contexts in metropolitan life in which the defense mechanisms that normally limit the expression of wishful fantasies are attenuated and a dreamlike sense of omnipotence is encouraged. What is distinctive about modern colonies is that for many colonizers, especially those in the most powerful positions, *all* of these conditions were present, almost all of the time. Colonial contexts were therefore particularly conducive to the acting out of imaginary identifications whenever a psychologically useful imago or framing of the colonized was available.[214]

Struggles among German elite groups shaped the contents of German colonizers' imaginary identifications. The army and the foreign service, especially the diplomatic corps, were arenas in which the venerable cultural capital of the aristocracy was still dominant, if increasingly embattled, in the German Kaiserreich.[215] This was true even though capitalist modernity

212. Osterhammel 1995, p. 50.

213. Freud [1921] 1955, p. 77. For a more redemptive reading of Freud on Africa see Berman 1998; for the standard "postcolonial" critique see Brickman 2003.

214. No German or European before 1915 seems to have identified with the imago of the "Baster." Even if the Basters were generally regarded as a reliable colonial ally, their very name focused attention on their extreme illegitimacy (see Kjæret and Stokke 2003). European men in Southwest Africa who sought indigenous wives were often drawn to Rehobother women, but this followed different psychic rules from those of cross-cultural identification.

215. The upper echelons of the German army continued to be dominated by traditional noble values, even as officer recruitment was becoming more bourgeois. Middle-class officers were admitted under the condition that they display a "nobility of temperament" (*Adel der Gesinnung*), in Kaiser Wilhelm's revealing phrase, which underscored the sorts of symbolic identifications that were officially encouraged (Craig 1955, p. 235; Kehr 1977). The administration of colonial affairs was located until 1907 within the German Foreign Office, and was initially closely tied to the diplomatic service. The first imperial commissary for Southwest Africa, for example, Goering, came from the diplomatic corps and reentered it after he left the colony for Jamaica. Diplomacy had always been a thoroughly aristocratic arena, but in Prussia and Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the number of educated nonnoble experts within the diplomatic corps increased over the course of the nineteenth century. Yet the most important positions, those of the representational diplomats, remained largely in the hands of nobles. The German diplomatic service in 1909 was said to have seventy officials from the ancient nobility (*Uradel*), twenty-five from the old *Briefadel* (nobility by letter-cachet), thirty-five from the modern *Briefadel,* and nine bourgeois (Philippi 1985, p. 63; Preradovich 1955). The growing influence of the translating branch of the Foreign Office within the Qingdao colonial administration was resisted and resented by the more aristocratic representational

had come to dominate most aspects of everyday life and even domestic policymaking in imperial Germany. As a result many middle-class Germans continued to focus on the nobility as an object of imaginary identification even as a different set of symbolic identifications urged them to compete with and displace those same aristocrats. Wilhelm Solf discovered a means of dealing with both of these imperatives by openly attacking German settlers, military men, and aristocrats while forming an imaginary identification with Samoan notables. This provided an attractive, if realistically unworkable, solution to the social dilemma of the German *Bildungsbürger*. Samoan elites were seen as attaining their noble status through merit and struggle rather than mere inheritance—a sort of *noblesse de robe* (nobility of the gown) whose titles were not necessarily passed on to their biological heirs. The Chinese mandarins had a similar status, since they had risen to the pinnacles of state power by passing university examinations rather than being born to power. Numerous Europeans identified with this imago. Bishop Anzer wore Chinese clothing and led a partly Chinese lifestyle, and was eventually able to attain the rank of first-class mandarin, which allowed him to use the Chinese title "Excellence" and to use the "green state sedan-chair with a retinue of ten riders and bearers of his insignia."[216] While serving as a translator for the German consular service in China, Otto Franke requested permission to publicly wear a badge signifying his promotion by the Chinese state to the rank of the "Third Stage of the Second Class of the Order of the Double Dragon."[217] Richard Wilhelm, who headed part of the school system in colonial Kiaochow, did not dress in Chinese clothing, but he apprenticed himself to a distinguished member of the Qing dynasty literati and was described by contemporaries Carl Jung and Hermann Hesse as having acquired the bodily habitus of a Chinese mandarin.[218] The most famous example of German cross-identification in this period is Eduard Schnitzer, who began his career as a medical officer in the Ottoman army in 1865 and then served the Ottoman governor of northern Albania (1870–74), at which time he adopted a Turkish lifestyle and name. Schnitzer received an administrative post at Khartoum in the British Sudan in 1876 and was

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branch. See von Kemnitz to Foreign Office, March 12, 1917, PA-AA, R 2167 (discussed in chap. 7), in which von Kemnitz rails against these inferiors.

216. H. Gründer 1982, p. 288.

217. Franke to Chancellor Hohenlohe, June 19, 1889, PA-AA, Personnel Documents, Otto Franke, vol. 3905 (no pagination).

218. See chap. 8. In German Togo, the district commissioner and novelist Richard Küas wore Hausa shoes and gown (Küas 1939, p. 85).

appointed governor of Equatoria (southern Sudan) in 1878, with the Ottoman title of bey. Eventually he was elevated to the rank of pasha. Mehmed Emin Pasa (or Emin Pasha), as Schnitzer was now known, was "rescued" from the Mahdist uprising by Stanley in a famous expedition in 1888.[219]

Threatened by the onslaught of political modernization, the nobility also pursued imaginary identifications across the colonial boundary while waging defensive rearguard campaign to slow down the sweeping shift of societal power to the bourgeoisie. Nondemocratic systems of rule—of which colonial administration was a prime example—had been the nobility's traditional stronghold. But this was not the case in Germany's colonial empire, whose officials were drawn more or less equally from the nobility, bourgeoisie, and *Bildungsbürgertum*. This did not mean that aristocrats formed imaginary identifications with the rising middle classes, but it did create the preconditions for strange identifications across cultural boundaries, including ethnic ones. A member of the German nobility like Ferdinand von Richthofen might unconsciously identify with a positively coded image of the Chinese mandarin elite, as Jürgen Osterhammel has suggested,[220] while another aristocrat, Lothar von Trotha, in his struggle against the middle-class upstart Leutwein, could form an imaginary identification with a negatively coded imago of the ferociously cruel Ovaherero.

Attention to processes of imaginary identification sheds some light on the spiral of seemingly hysterical violence in von Trotha's discourse and conduct of the war. Von Trotha used the term *Vernichtung* deliberately in his *Vernichtungsbefehl* or "extermination order" against the Ovaherero, issued on October 2, 1904. Von Trotha relished the dual resonance of *Vernichtung* with traditional German military language, in which the *Vernichtungskrieg* referred to a "war of annihilation," and with the specifically colonial connotations of massacre, which he emphasized with his lurid language of "rivers of blood and rivers of money" and exerting "violence with blatant terrorism and cruelty." Von Trotha's conflict with Leutwein was fueled by the class hostility that arose "naturally" in Wilhelmine Germany between a Prussian aristocrat and a pastor's son who flaunted his classical education.[221] The tension between the two men was heightened by the way in which von Trotha entered the colonial arena as usurper of power from Leutwein, who had himself replaced Curt von François as the colony's head administrator

219. Caillou 1974; Kraft 1976. As a German Jew in anti-Semitic Germany Schnitzer/Emin Pasha was doubly driven to overcome his symbolic domination.

220. Osterhammel 1987.

221. Quotes from BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2089, p. 100v; and Pool 1991, pp. 243–44.

in March 1894. (Von François was a member of the nontitled nobility and the son of *Generalmajor* (Major General) Bruno von François, a hero of the Franco-Prussian War). Von Trotha was therefore reasserting the authority of the traditional Prussian nobility and its specific cultural capital, its specialization in the arts of violent domination. His aggressive identification with an imago of the Ovaherero was directed as much against "liberal" adversaries like Leutwein who opposed his annihilation order as against the putative African enemy. Soon after arriving in the colony von Trotha wrote that if Leutwein did not agree with his plans he would "make short work of him."[222] And indeed, von Trotha did make short work of the governor, bringing his career to an abrupt and ugly end.[223] Von Trotha seems to have taken seriously Kaiser Wilhelm's injunction to emulate "King Etzel's Huns," becoming as barbaric as the received image of the Ovaherero. This should not be understood as a wallowing in fantasies of downward social mobility, however, but as an identification connected to terrorizing the would-be challenger from the middle class.

Such imaginary identifications were more closely related to daydreaming than to any real bid for power, and indeed they were sometimes symbolically counterproductive, inviting sanction or ridicule. Bishop Anzer wore his mandarin costume publicly and crafted a hybrid self-presentation using Catholic and Chinese symbols, seeking respect in the eyes of the Chinese elites, but he was correspondingly disrespected by Europeans. Wilhelm Solf was ridiculed by German settlers for his evident identification with Samoan chiefs.[224] Psychoanalysis helps to make theoretical sense of the psychic enjoyment, the otherwise inexplicable energy dedicated to identifications that promised little in the way of symbolic recognition from relevant actors in the field. And if such identifications failed to yield any fungible cultural capital, they could reinforce or contradict the ethnographic leanings that were produced by the field of competition for symbolic capital. Because they could involve large numbers of real people as supporting actors, they were sometimes directly relevant for native policy.

222. Von Trotha diaries, quoted by Pool 1991, p. 247.

223. Leutwein's conflict with von Trotha is discussed by Bley ([1971] 1996) and in chap. 3. Von Trotha and his supporters marginalized Leutwein in the colony, forcing him to give up his position and return to Germany. Having fallen from grace, Leutwein was never again able to work for the colonial administration (P. Leutwein 1934, p. 42) and was reduced to begging the government for access to reports on his earlier performance (see letter from Leutwein to chancellor from February 17, 1909, BA-Berlin, RKA, vol. 2119, pp. 90–91). In 1909 Leutwein was still seeking "restitution of his official honor" (ibid., p. 92v).

224. Tyszka 1904.

Resistance, Cooperation, and Inflections of Native Policy by Its Addressees

The selection of particular native policies was a result of precolonial ethnographic representations, the symbolic positioning of colonizers vis-à-vis one another, and imaginary identifications with the colonized—in addition to economic considerations and international relations. The relative importance of each of these mechanisms varied from place to place and from moment to moment. But in every instance, responses by the colonized shaped the ability of a particular framework of native policy to be implemented and perpetuated. On the one hand, the entire theater of native governance could not even exist without a rudimentary willingness on the part of the colonized to play their assigned parts. Foot-dragging and recalcitrance—the miniature tactics of the weak analyzed so trenchantly by James C. Scott—were rarely sufficient to eliminate a given regime of native policy.[225] The mere act of showing up at work or agreeing to pay a "hut tax" meant that a colonial subject was colluding in native policy and colonial rule. The "half-castes" in Samoa who applied for legal status as "foreigners" or "whites" ratified the colonial state's dualistic racialism.[226] Locals who accepted official functions within the colonial state as "tribal leader" or "native policemen" fortified the existing native policy system. This also suggests that the term *cooperation* should probably be used instead of *collaboration*. Indigenous cooperation was a necessary condition for the success of any regime of native policy, but it had little to do with the initial selection of one policy rather than another by the colonizers.

Resistance is located on the opposite side from cooperation. Colonized peoples were able to modulate and revise native policies. By signing up as a native policeman one might be able to temper colonial abuses of power. More frontal forms of resistance could bring a regime of native policy to an abrupt halt and force the colonial state to seek a new approach. In Qingdao in 1912 the students at the German-Chinese university changed the school's policy by threatening to resign if they were not allowed to meet with republican leader Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian), who was opposed to both colonial rule and the traditionalist Qing government elites to whom the Germans had granted refuge in Qingdao. The students' protest nudged official German policy even farther away from the "rule of difference," as they were granted rights of assembly and political expression. The differing ef-

225. J. Scott 1985.

226. See Laitin 1986 and Comaroff 1987 on individual strategizing with regard to ethnic or racial reclassification.

fects of indigenous cooperation and resistance are illustrated sharply by the changing strategy of the Witbooi people. After the Germans defeated the Witbooi militarily in 1894, they were allowed to keep their horses and rifles and were enlisted as trackers and sharpshooters in the colonial army. As a result of their cooperation the Witbooi were no longer described as abject "Hottentots" or deculturated mimic men but were equated with James Fenimore Cooper's noble Mohicans. When the Witbooi broke their pact with the Germans and rebelled in 1904, however, they were ultimately unsuccessful.[227] This does not mean that unsuccessful uprisings always resulted in harsher policies. Although the rebellions in Shandong in 1899–1900 and in Southwest Africa in 1904–7 were followed by a sharp increase in repression, this was not the case after the defeated uprisings in Samoa in 1904 and 1908–9. Colonizers' reactions cannot be understood independently of the cultural context. In the metropolitan German setting, the effects of extraparliamentary resistance on social policymaking were mediated by the interpretative frameworks of the men in charge of the local and central states,[228] and the same was true in the colonies.

Collective resistance was more often a response to heightened repression than a stimulus to it. Groups that had peacefully cooperated with colonial rulers sometimes suddenly found themselves the targets of state violence. The Maji-Maji rebellion in German East Africa (1905–7) was triggered by grievances connected to a new scheme of the colonial government to grow cotton using forced labor.[229] The colonial state expropriated the land of the Duala people in Cameroon in the 1910s despite their moderate and collaborative stance, resulting in bitter protest and petitioning of the German Reichstag by the Duala.[230]

227. The agency of the colonized affected native policy indirectly in other ways, just as the pressure of the "native" can be detected within ethnographic discourse. The ethnographic representations that shaped native policy were a coproduction of the observer and the observed. Because ethnographic discourse is treated here mainly as a determinant of native policy, I do not systematically reconstruct the processes that Raymond Firth (2001) called the "creative contribution of indigenous people to their ethnography." Many of the ethnographers discussed in this book had "native informants" who effectively coauthored their work, even if their contribution was disavowed or minimized. Perhaps the most egregious example is Lao Naixuan, a "neo-Confucian scholar and Government official known for his scholarly account of the Boxer movement" (Forsman 1979, p. 102), who worked with Richard Wilhelm on his famous translation of the Yi Jing but whose full name was not given in Wilhelm's published account of his Qingdao years (1924).

228. I provide statistical and qualitative evidence for this claim in Steinmetz 1993.

229. Iliffe 1967; Seeberg 1989, chap. 4; Sunseri 1993.

230. The German decision to seize this land in the center of the city of Douala did not occur in response to an uprising but actually sparked the first open movement of anticolonial

Imperial Germany and the German Empire

One of this book's historiographic interventions concerns the supposed peculiarities of metropolitan Germany. As in most other areas of German studies, the history of German colonialism and colonial discourse has been strongly informed by theories of German exceptionalism. Rather than arguing that any particular fraction of the German elite was dominant I will show that all fractions were engaged in the same struggle for supremacy and that none was "structurally" more powerful than any another. Indeed, the orientation of the colonial field to the criterion of ethnographic acuity helps explain why the educated middle classes were able to compete culturally in a sphere ostensibly dominated by the Foreign Office and the army, which were still strongholds of the traditional nobility. These *Bildungbürger* presented themselves as uniquely possessed of the qualities needed to understand exotic cultures, such as cultural sensitivity, subtlety of judgment, and familiarity with literary and scientific sources. They tended to drape their ethnographic pronouncements with the markers of a "hermeneutic" sensibility. This does not mean that other groups of colonizers agreed that the educated middle classes were the most discerning ethnographers. Although most colonizers acknowledged the common currency of the colonial state field, they disagreed vigorously on what counted as ethnographic discernment. But the *Bildungsbürger* at least had some chance of political success here, whereas they were *hors compétition* in political fields defined as mainly military or economic.[231] Historians who have focused on specific German colonies (post-1904 Southwest Africa, Qingdao before 1904, New Guinea in the first several years of German rule, or the Marshall Islands) have overestimated the military and capitalist character of German colonialism.[232]

The other reason educated middle-class Germans were more influential in overseas colonial government than in national politics was the centralized

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resistance among the Duala. See Ralph Austen 1977, Eckert 1999, and Austen and Derrick 1999, pp. 128–37.

231. It is important to note that the fact that German Southwest Africa was dominated at all levels before 1907 by military men does not mean that the state was a military field. The position of colonial governor was defined as a "personal union" of civilian and military functions. Leutwein's struggle with von Trotha in 1904 made this dualism visible, and as a result the post-1904 colonial state had more clearly defined military and civilian offices. A police force distinct from the colonial army was created. The post-1904 governors von Lindequist, Schuckmann, and Seitz were not career military men.

232. On the thoroughgoing exploitation of the Marshall Islands by the Jaluit-Gesellschaft see Treue 1976.

and quasi-despotic structure of the colonial state. Middle-class statesmen like Solf seized the opportunity to defy the settlers, commanders, and capitalists and to translate their disdain for these groups into policy.[233] The nondemocratic political structure could also boost the authority of men from the nobility or the bourgeoisie, of course, once they were placed in power by the national authorities. As commander in chief and ruler of the Southwest African colony Lothar von Trotha was able to implement his ultraracist vision of Africans to devastating effect. Only after the Ovaherero had been massacred was von Trotha reigned in by his superiors in Berlin. Yet he stayed in power for almost another year and issued an equally threatening proclamation to the rebellious Nama in 1905.[234] The constitution of the colonial state and its position in the overall German political structure put great power in the hands of the colonial governor and a small number of officials.

A different exceptionalism argument concerns the nature of German colonialism per se. Some writers have identified nationally specific styles of colonization.[235] But the stark differences among the three colonies examined here and in the treatment of different communities within Southwest Africa cautions against placing too much weight on the national factor. The theme of German *colonial* exceptionalism dates back to the campaign to justify the post–World War I British takeover of the German colonies.[236] Even earlier, British and American writers had described German colonialism as especially brutal and militarized, but this did not yet influence official publications or policy.[237] Yet the differences between French, British, and German colonial policies directed at populations that Europeans categorized as culturally similar were less striking in any given historical period

233. After governing the colony for an entire decade Leutwein was replaced, but this was due to the disastrous turn of the Ovaherero war and the mobilization of metropolitan opinion due to the murder of German settlers, as well as von Trotha.

234. Reprinted in Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung 1 des Grossen Generalstabs 1906–7, vol. 2, p. 186.

235. E.g., Miles 1994. See J. Go 2000 for an analysis of the supposed exceptionalism of U.S. overseas colonialism.

236. See Union of South Africa 1918. As Yearwood (1999, p. 316) notes, before 1914 "Africa appeared as a continent where deals might be struck to appease the Anglo-German antagonism or create precedents for Anglo-German co-operation." This was illustrated in the stance of the South African government during the 1904–7 Namibian war. Top-level British discussions during World War I about the future of the German colonies demonstrate that statements of concern about German brutalism were motivated by the desire to wrest the colonies, above all Southwest Africa, from Germany's grasp (Callahan 1999).

237. See, for example, Bigelow 1900.

than broader patterns of similarity.[238] A study of British colonies located in areas construed as culturally similar to these three German colonies—say, British policy in Fiji, British treatment of the Khoikhoi in the Cape Colony, and British practices in Hong Kong—might well discover a similar pattern of variations. Indeed, British policy in Fiji was studied by the first governor of Samoa, British practice in Hong Kong was examined carefully by the architects of Kiaochow, and the Cape Colony and Union of South Africa were looming precedents for German administrators in Southwest Africa. It would be a mistake to attribute any similarities to German mimicry of the British colonies, however, without investigating the possibility of a shared source in European-wide ethnographic and racial ideologies and comparable class conflicts within colonial state fields.

The one colony that may indeed have been a "deviation from the normal"[239] is Southwest Africa. Of course, the colonial massacres by Spain and the United States in the Americas, the British in Tasmania and Kenya, the Belgians in the Congo, the Italians in Libya, and the French in Madagascar and Algeria are too familiar to permit any serious argument about a uniquely German colonial brutality.[240] What is unique, perhaps, at least for twentieth-century colonialism, is the German attempt in 1904 to exterminate an entire people—the men, women, and children of the Ovaherero nation.[241] This decision was related to the nationally specific constellation of elite class structure and struggle discussed above, as well as to the ethnographic representations of the Ovaherero that may have been uniquely hateful (due to characteristics of the Lutheran-dominated Rhenish Mission and their frustrating and largely fruitless efforts in the six decades leading

238. Of course, solid evidence for this hypothesis has to await further comparative research. One of the few explicitly comparative colonial studies is Miles 1994, which explores the long-term effects of French and British colonialism in Niger and Nigeria, respectively. But Miles's excellent study does not demonstrate that French and British colonial practices *in general* fell into these patterns.

239. Bley [1971] 1996, p.xvii.

240. On the massacres in the Americas see Todorov 1984; Jennings 1975; and Stannard 1992. Clendinnen 1987 is an exemplary study of Spanish "totalitarianism" among the Mayans in the Yucatan. On the Pequot War as genocide see M. Freeman 1995. On Tasmania and the United States see Cocker 1998, pt. 2; and Palmer 2000. On the scope of the 1919 massacre at the Jallianawala Bagh in Amritsar see Rai 2000, p. 28. On Italy's slaughter of Libyans between 1912 and 1942 see J. Wright 1982; and Mack Smith 1976. On Kenya and the Mau Mau see the essays in Odhiambo and Lonsdale 2003. On the Belgian Congo see Vangroenweghe 1986; Hochschild 1999; and Marchal 1996. On Madagascar see Rabemananjara 2000. On Algeria see Le Cour Grandmaison 2005. On Kenya see Odhiambo and Lonsdale 2003.

241. Steinmetz 2005b.

up to the genocide to convert Ovaherero). This array of factors was perhaps uniquely German, but it was at best a necessary and not a sufficient condition for pushing a colony toward genocide.[242]

This book also provides a new narrative of the history of three colonies. Chapters 3, 5, and 7 reconstruct the (sometimes implicit) theoretical and analytic claims informing historical writing on these colonies. The debate on German colonialism in Southwest Africa, for instance, has been largely structured around the genocidal war against the Ovaherero in 1904; there has been less interest in the other ethnic groups in the colony, such as the Khoikhoi and especially the Rehoboth Basters. There has been very little research on precolonial ethnographic representations of Southwest Africans, and nothing on the relationship between these discourses and the subsequent activities of German rulers. German Samoa has been described both as ethnocidal and as a benevolent and protective regime.[243] Both approaches fail to capture the colony's distinctiveness. Very little has been written about precolonial European representations of Samoa, and nothing at all about the German literature on those islands.[244] As for Kiaochow, historians have agreed that native policy began to change around 1904 but they have disagreed about the reasons for this shift. None of them has connected this change to precolonial representations of China or to intraelite symbolic struggles. There is an enormous literature on European images of China from the Middle Ages to the present, most of which identifies a transition from Sinophilia to Sinophobia between the early modern and modern eras. I will show that Sinophobia had not completely replaced Sinophilia even by the end of the nineteenth century but that it was in abeyance, a dominated discourse. As a result Sinophilia could quickly reemerge after 1904.

In the following chapters I will reconstruct precolonial ethnographic representations of the Southwest African Khoikhoi, Ovaherero, and Basters (chap. 2), of Samoans and Polynesians more generally (chap. 4), and of the Chinese (chap. 6). These chapters do more than provide "backstory," since precolonial ethnography was one of the main determinants of colonial native policy. The analyses of precolonial discourse are followed in each case by chapters focused on the German colonial era.

242. The argument that the Southwest African genocide and German colonialism more generally laid the groundwork for Nazism and the Holocaust (Roth 2004; Zimmerer 2003) seems to exaggerate the impact of one causal strand for the sake of historiographical novelty.

243. For the former, see Meleisea 1987a, 1987b; for the latter, see Hiery 1995.

244. See Linnekin 1991b, Harms 1991, and Blanton 1995.