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The Indonesian Army as an Instrument of Repression

Apart from the West Pakistani troops in East Bengal, no military force in this world has ever committed so many atrocities and crimes against humanity as the Indonesian Army.¹ From October 1965 to the present, the Indonesian military has killed in Java, Bali, North Sumatra, West Borneo, the Moluccas and West Irian approximately 700,000 peasants, workers, youth, women, teachers, and guerrilla fighters against the present fascist Government. And the killings continue, although on a smaller scale. About 150,000 other innocent Indonesians are held without trial in more than 300 concentration camps scattered over the whole territory of the Republic from Atjeh in the West to West Irian in the East.² Despite this horrifying criminal record the Indonesian military elite shamelessly claims that the Army is a "people's army". It has defended, its leaders claim, the integrity of the Indonesian nation in many dangerous situations, despite the fact that since 1950 the Indonesian Army has been a counter-revolutionary force that holds up badly needed structural changes in nearly every section of society (economic, political, agricultural, etc.). But for the decadent military elite the Army still embodies the spirit as well as the fighting strength of the Indonesian revolution.

It is true that during the revolution of 1945-9, that is, during the armed nationalist uprising against the Dutch authorities, the Indonesian Army was, indeed, a people's military force. At that time the Indonesia military for the greater part consisted of guerrilla fighters or partisans,³ recruited from the peasantry, the working class in the cities, and revolutionary youth. The 'regular' soldiers, consisting of former members of the Japanese trained Peta,⁴ former members of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) who as early as 1945 took the Republic's side,⁵ and former students,⁶ formed the much smaller part.

In 1946 and 1947, the first two years of the Republic, the various armed groups operated more or less independently. The partisans had their own officers, the majority of them people from the lowest strata of society who had never taken a military training course. Partisan commanders like Bedjo and Sjafi'i were even illiterate. Some of the groups, for instance the Pesindo, had some kind of socialist leadership.

But in 1948 the "intellectuals" among the officers of the Army, in particular former members of the KNIL, advocated a "reorganisation and rationalisation"

(*re-dan-ra*). They had learnt from the first Dutch military attack⁷ that as long as an army lacks central command it is quite worthless. It had also become clear that even partisans need some basic military training. But the reorganisation and rationalisation schemes of 1948 were never implemented partly because Dutch military forces attacked the Republic again in December 1948.⁸ *Re-dan-ra* had to be postponed till after the Transfer of Sovereignty on the 27th December 1949.

During the second Dutch military attack, Indonesians carried out a real but weak guerrilla war. It was in this war that partisan leaders, who in many an area closely co-operated with the local peasantry, showed their value. Some of the military "intellectuals" not only went into hiding in the towns but even defected to the enemy.⁹

In 1950, after the Transfer of Sovereignty, the central army command, with the full support of the Minister of Defence and Vice-President Hatta, commenced a large-scale reorganisation and rationalisation.¹⁰ The army "intellectuals", particularly the ex-KNIL 1945 group and the former students, played a leading role. They wished to establish a modern professional army, because in their opinion this would raise the prestige of the Republic and consolidate their newly won positions.¹¹ They decided that those among the military who could not meet their requirements would have to leave the Army or at least go in for retraining. They tended to minimize the merits of the partisans during the revolution of 1945-9. Because they looked down on the politicians, who (according to their view) had only quarrelled among themselves, and even rebelled against the Republic's leadership, and negotiated disadvantageous concessions to the Dutch, they also refused to accept the principle of civilian control over military affairs. But this view was wrong. Not only did they forget that independence was not won on the battle-field — in January 1949 the Dutch military forces had almost annihilated Indonesian military resistance — but at the conference table,¹² they also needlessly created a conflict with the politicians. This conflict widened in later years and in the end isolated military leadership from the people. Professionalisation and the fact that the greater part of the army leadership was descended from the gentry and the lower court nobility¹³ transformed the military into a privileged and antagonistic class: in social and political terms, an enemy of the people!

The 17 October 1952 Affair and its aftermath

The first real effort to carry out effectively the *re-dan-ra* ended in an explosion. Half the partisans, officers and lower ranks alike, left the Army voluntarily. They resumed the jobs they had left in 1945. Students continued their studies. Most peasants returned to their villages or sought new occupations in the towns. Workers returned to the Dutch-owned factories and plantations.

The other half of the partisans wanted to stay in the Army. But many of them failed to pass screening. Their school education had been too poor. It

was obvious that the doors to the new professional army were to be open only to the privileged, that is, to those who came from the lower middle, middle and upper strata of Indonesian society. For those who could not be accepted the Government had set up agricultural projects in Sumatra, South Borneo, the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Moluccas. But these projects were not very popular. And among those who could not meet the requirements and had to leave the Army, there were many who wanted to stay at any cost. Many a famous guerrilla leader belonged to this group. Some of these leaders sought the support of the political parties, hoping that Parliament would intervene. In turn, many political leaders sought famous guerrilla leaders' co-operation in order to use the leaders' influence to win votes in the 1955 election. The partisans' case was also defended by one of their own officers who at that time was second in the Army's central command, Col. Bambang Supeno.¹⁴

In the eyes of this true partisan officer, the way the Government had implemented the professionalisation of the Army could only "create a deep cleft between the military and the people and this would be against the aim of the Revolution".¹⁵ Besides, the Army's co-operation with the Dutch Military Mission¹⁶ had alarmed Bambang Supeno. Such co-operation could destroy the Army's cohesion and seriously damage the Army's own national identity. He vehemently attacked the Mission and the authorities who had allowed the Mission to carry out its task.

By 1952 the professionalisation of the Army had become a controversial issue on which the political parties had their own views. The majority of the politicians sided with the partisans. Those who wanted to continue professionalisation as it had been carried out from the beginning, in particular army leaders Major-Gen. T.B. Simatupang, Col. Abdul Haris Nasution and Lt.-Col. Sutoko, Minister of Defence Sultan Hamengkubuwono of Jogjakarta, and Secretary-General of Defence Ali Budiardjo, were backed by the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). When pressure by the opposition became stronger, the army leaders who opposed Parliament's interference decided to hold a demonstration to force President Sukarno to dissolve Parliament. The demonstration was held on the 17th October.¹⁷ Although one of the regimental commanders loyal to Nasution, Lt.-Col. Kemal Idris, had aimed at the presidential palace, Sukarno firmly refused to comply with the request of the rebellious army leaders to dissolve Parliament. After Sukarno's refusal, the organisers and supporters of the 17 October 1952 demonstration had to resign from their posts and in the areas of three divisions the seconds-in-command took their commanders into custody. According to Sundhaussen this was done "at the instigation of Sukarno"¹⁸ This is not true. Long before the demonstration was held, there already existed conflict (in some divisions) between the leaders and their lower ranks. The turmoil after the demonstration gave the dissenters a splendid opportunity to terminate these conflicts to their own advantage. For instance, in Makassar, the headquarters of the 7th Division of "Wirabuana", commander Col. Gatot Subroto was hated by many among his

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lower ranks because of the sexual improprieties of which he was guilty with the wives of a number of his junior officers and non-commissioned officers who had been sent to the frontline to fight against rebel Kahar Muzakkar. The lower ranks pushed the Chief-of-Staff of the 7th Division, Lt.-Col. J.F. Warouw, to take over the command. Gatot Subroto and Major Sudirgo of the Military Police were arrested and sent to Djakarta.

The consequences of the 17 October 1952 Affair were severe. *Re-dan-ra*, which had progressed only half-way, could not be resumed until 1958. The Dutch Military Mission was kicked out of the country.¹⁹ But the most serious fact was that the Army was split up into two groups, the "pro-17 October 1952 military" and the "anti-17 October 1952 military". The new army commander, Major-Gen. Bambang Sugeng, did his utmost to reconcile the two groups. A special Collegial Meeting called in February 1955 in Jogjakarta established standing committees which were to handle controversial issues involving military personnel. One of the committees drew up the *Jogja Charter*, in which it was stated that in the future all military personnel had to be appointed by seniority only. The existing hierarchy had to be respected. Interference by the political parties was no longer to be tolerated.

But the Government did not take the *Jogja Charter* seriously. The stubborn Minister of Defence, Iwa Kusumasumantri, who planned to purge the Army of "pro-17 October 1952 elements", continued his policy of appointing military functionaries on mere political considerations. "I had to do that because almost every senior officer was an adherent of the dangerous 17 October 1952 movement and a sympathizer of the PSI", he once declared to the author.²⁰

The continued interference with military affairs by the political parties through the Government did not only exacerbate the cleavages inside the Army, but also aroused insubordination by senior officers against the Government. Well-known are the acts of insubordination committed by the Acting Commander of the Army, Col. Zulkifli Lubis. After he had boycotted the formal installation of a new army commander, he planned to overthrow the Government as well as the army leadership. In order to achieve that end he co-operated with some of the discontented regimental commanders of the "Siliwangi" Division, who were also annoyed by the Government's personnel policy. The Lubis movement failed because the Commander of the Army, Major-Gen. A.H. Nasution, who this time enjoyed the full support of the partisan officers, stood firmly by the Government. He also showed his notorious skill at fomenting division in officers' groups who opposed his policies.²¹

The 1958 armed rebellion

The victory of the PKI (Indonesian communist party) in the 1955 and 1957 elections worsened the conflict between the army leadership and the political parties. A part of the military elite feared the influence of the communists not only on the affairs of the Government in general, but also

specifically on the cleavages inside the Army. However, the numerous rifts among the politicians themselves in the period which immediately followed the elections and Sukarno's growing dislike for the unstable party system diminished the "threat" expected from the PKI and its associated mass organisations. Army leaders like Nasution vehemently attacked the parties and advocated their abolition.

At the same time, as a consequence of the Government's neglect of the interests of the Outer Islands, the scene of army dissent began to shift to North, West and South Sumatra, Celebes and the Moluccas. In these areas anti-Communist military leaders assumed political control by unilaterally declaring martial law. Influenced by anti-communist politicians, particularly members of the reactionary Masjumi party, officers openly defied the Government in Djakarta on issues having to do with greater regional autonomy and trade with the outside world which had been conducted too centrally and very much to the disadvantage of these areas. These officers set up barter trade links with Singapore and Hong Kong which seriously harmed the national economic system. As a consequence of the double role played by the treacherous and unpopular Nasution, the Government was unable to reach a solution. Because Nasution badly needed the support of military commanders in the Outer Islands in order to consolidate his rather weak position in Djakarta — besides the growing conflict between him and his former friends who had joined his 17 October 1952 movement, he was disliked by many members of the Cabinet — he could not afford those involved in the illegal barter trade being punished.²² When the situation of deadlock came to a head in February 1958 and the rebels, who took seriously the promises given to them by the American CIA which wanted to get rid of the Sukarno regime, proclaimed a "revolutionary government" (the PRRI) Nasution, for the second time, betrayed his supporters by sending troops to crush the uprising.²³ After the 1958 rebellion the Javanese element in the army leadership became absolutely dominant.

The rise of a new class, the military entrepreneurs

In 1958 professionalisation of the Army was resumed. Two important events created favourable conditions. The rebellion in the Outer Islands offered the long-awaited opportunity to commence a new "reorganisation and rationalisation" plan. Another favourable fact was that the Government had just nationalised all Dutch property in Indonesia. The former Dutch companies, plantations and other investments offered much needed employment for those who had to leave the Army because of "military disability". And by placing the military in the management of former Dutch enterprises the Army would also control a number of sections of the national economy. So the nationalisation of Dutch property gave rise to a new class, the military entrepreneurs.²⁴

But most of these new entrepreneurs did not have the skill and the know-how to run effectively a commercial undertaking. So the majority of former Dutch companies and plantations fell into the wrong hands. Consequently, by

1963 most of the companies and plantations were completely ruined by the military's mismanagement and corruption. All over the country there were vehement conflicts between corrupt military managers and workers who were exploited worse than during the Dutch colonial period. In 1959 the military elite obviously consisted of two groups, the so-called "field-officers" and the "managers". Because the first group occupied the key positions in the military leadership, the second group had to provide the first with money, usually derived from corruption, in order to maintain their lucrative position. It is still this relationship between "field-officers" and "managers" that makes it impossible for any Indonesian government to deal effectively with the phenomenon of corruption. It is impossible for President Suharto, who belongs to the "field-officers", to take measures against corruption as long as his wife, who is now generally called "Ibu Tien Persen" (Mother Ten Percent), is involved in corruption committed by the "military entrepreneurs".

Guided Democracy

Sukarno's disagreement with the unstable party system after the 1955 election resulted in his proclaiming Guided Democracy on 5 July 1959.²⁵ He was fully supported by the army elite who also desired a strong central government. But the military leaders had other reasons. They sought a system that would protect their newly won control over an important part of the national economy. In other words, they sought a system that would enable them to have a say in civil government. In fact, Sukarno's Guided Democracy turned out to be partial military take-over.

The political parties could do little against this take-over. The populist²⁶ leader Sukarno, who rejected the Marxist class struggle concept, had contained all activities of the political parties in his Nasakom²⁷ alliance,²⁸ an involuntary coalition of the nationalist, religious, and communist political organisations. To the Army was given the role of watch-dog to see to it that the organisations would not break out of the Nasakom containment. In Java, Bali, and Lombok the Nasakom alliance caused a tense situation during the implementation of the 1960-2 land reform regulations.²⁹ Dissatisfaction among the peasants about the slow and reluctant implementation of the land reform regulations forced the PKI to reverse its policy towards its Nasakom partners by suddenly adopting a class struggle strategy. It supported the poor peasants when they carried out their so-called "one-sided actions" (*aksi sepihak*). The military as well as the police misused the moderate state of War and Siege to take strong measures against those peasants who had involved themselves in such revolutionary actions. The struggle for West Irian and the confrontation with Malaysia enabled the Army to continue the state of War and Siege which was first declared in 1957. It was exactly during the period of Guided Democracy that the Indonesian military elite strengthened its position enormously and that the military leadership started to use the Army as a powerful instrument of repression. This was demonstrated, for instance, in the Djengkol affair in 1963 when about 50 innocent landless peasants, who cultivated plantation land without the consent of the owner of the plantation, were cold-bloodedly

killed by two platoons commanded by a fanatic Moslem captain who during the revolution of 1945-9 had joined the Hisbullah group.³⁰

The abortive military coup of 1 October 1965 and its aftermath

The military elite was now not only estranged from the people but also from the lower ranks of the Army. As a result of neglect of the interests of the Army's lower ranks by their superiors during more than a decade, there now existed inside the Army a kind of class struggle which the military leaders tried to suppress. The first explosion occurred on 1st October 1965. A number of exploited and impoverished soldiers of the two big Javanese army divisions, "Diponegoro" and "Brawidjaja", revolted against the decadent army leaders in Djakarta. Six top army generals, among them the Commander of the Army, were captured and murdered in a military training camp a few miles outside Djakarta. Quite by chance in the camp a number of communist-oriented volunteers were being trained for the confrontation with Malaysia. So the anti-communist military leaders took it for granted that the revolt was communist-inspired.³¹ After the revolt had been quickly broken, the remaining army leaders started to eliminate the PKI and its adherents. In spite of President Sukarno's attempts to protect innocent communists and pro-communists, and to restrain the Army and fanatic Moslem organisations led by revengeful landlords and hysterical religious leaders, the hunt for communists and other leftists took the form of an unprecedented human slaughter. Throughout the whole territory of the Republic about 500,000 PKI members and sympathizers, and their wives and children, were rounded up and put to death.

In January 1966 the army elite, supported by the anti-communist United Action Fronts (Kami, Kapi, Kappi, Kasi, etc.), fanatic religious groups and members of the PSI which has been banned in 1960, started an action to oust Sukarno as president. At that moment Sukarno still had many supporters, not least in the armed forces, which made the situation tense, particularly in Djakarta and Bandung. Deceived by false rumours that a civil war was imminent Sukarno ordered Suharto "to take every possible step to insure security, order and stability, and in particular the personal safety of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution/Mandatory of the MPRS (Provisional People's Congress) and see to it that the teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution were applied correctly".

Suharto took this "Command of 11th March" as an unconditional transfer of power and used it for purposes other than those Sukarno had intended. Suharto frequently abused the confidence Sukarno put in him by successively banning the PKI by Presidential Decree No. 1/3/1966, by legalizing the suppression of the "left wing" that had taken place, by detaining Sukarno's closest companions (15 ministers among them), by purging the government apparatus of elements either really or supposedly opposing the so-called "New Order" and by putting all those people in concentration camps. After that, he organised the MPRS in such a way that Sukarno could be "legally" dis-

missed and Suharto could be "legally" appointed Sukarno's successor. And, finally, Suharto opened the doors wide to foreign investments, which are now plundering Indonesia's resources.³² In short the "Command of 11th March" was made use of to strengthen the position of the army elite and to do away with its opponents.

The Army a danger to society

Indonesia is being governed now by the Army. Civilian officials only serve as technical advisors. Decisions are taken by the military. This situation does not only prevail in the sphere of central Government in Djakarta but also on a regional level via the regional army commanders.

In October and November 1969 a reshuffle was carried out among the top military so as to reduce the power of the regional army commanders. But this had little result. In the first place, there was controversy inside the Army between the circle around Suharto on the one side and the few supporters of Nasution on the other. Continuously we are informed of generals and colonels being arrested by their own colleagues. Another reason the Army is developing into a threat to society is the fact that the downward command lines no longer function well. Low-ranking commanders frequently display indisciplinary behaviour and in many places terrorize the local population. They meddle in economic life by levying illegal taxes or by forcing the peasants to grow certain crops in which they are trading themselves, in order to make lucrative bargains. Only now and then are lower-ranking military personnel arrested for irresponsible behaviour. More frequently they are imprisoned because of voicing their dissatisfaction with their poor living conditions. Discontented military are easily accused of "being involved in the abortive coup" (*terlibat*). Such events tend to cause unrest among the military as well as among civilians.

Corruption in the military elite is rampant and it forms a serious threat to the economic development of the country.

Ways of repression

Some remarks have to be made on the forms of repression used by the Indonesian Army at present. In addition to the use of physical force, like arresting opponents, putting them into prisons and concentration camps or even killing them, the Army has also at its disposal so-called "legal methods". For instance, it still continues Sukarno's *musjawarah* system. When Indonesia's first president started Guided Democracy, he abolished the system of decision-making by voting and adopted a new system of "consulting and deliberating", the so-called *musjawarah* system. According to *musjawarah*, decisions have to be taken unanimously, that is, with the approval of all sides. In order to reach that end, during the lobbying, and sometimes even in the discussions, the stronger party uses intimidations and threats. After the weaker side has been forced to accept the will of the stronger, at closing the last formal meeting between the parties the chairman has only to state officially that all sides have unanimously taken a decision.³³ One can imagine how

"perfectly" *musjawarah* is now operating in the new parliament with its 227 Golkar members and 100 appointees representing the Armed Forces. And in order to get the process of *musjawarah* going much more smoothly, in October 1971 the political parties were forced again to accept a new concept of political structure, the Army's latest brainchild. At present Parliament consists of four factions, the Golkar (227 seats); representatives of the Armed Forces (100 seats); the "Persatuan Pembangunan" factions formed by the four Moslem parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti) (94 seats); and the "Demokrasi Pembangunan" factions consisting of the PNI (Indonesian nationalist party), Parkindo (Protestants), and the Partai Katolik (Catholics) (30 seats).

By maintaining the system of "surat bersih" or "surat tidak terlibat" the Army has the masses of the Indonesian people under rather firm control. Every Indonesian, and in certain areas even every citizen of the People's Republic of China, has to prove that he was "not involved in the G-30-S/PKI movement", that is, not involved in the abortive military coup of 1 October 1965. After being "purified" he will get from the local military authorities a so-called "surat bersih" or "surat tidak terlibat", a certificate in which it is stated that he was "not involved". Even a child who at the time of the coup was only 6 years old has to be in the possession of such a letter. And even persons, who never heard about the coup but for some unclear reasons have failed to pass screening, are regarded as "being involved". Those persons who cannot produce a "surat bersih" are treated as outlaws by the authorities and sometimes also by their own community. It is made impossible for them to find work, to finish their studies or, even, to marry.

The election of 3 July 1971 strengthened the Army's position once again. It was won by Golkar, the Army-sponsored functional groups.³⁴ Using intimidations and threats, arresting opponents regarded as "dangerous", misusing government facilities, and putting into practice the fraudulent system of "Bebas Parpol",³⁵ Golkar obtained 227 of the 460 seats in the central Parliament (DPR). With the addition of 100 appointees — 75 of them representing the Armed Forces — the military elite will be firmly in the saddle in the new, partly elected, DPR. Golkar's acts of terrorization during the election campaign in which it was supported by the Army, will soon be forgotten by the greater public. And for the world the generals' usurpation of state power on 11th March 1966, the mass murders of innocent peasants, workers, revolutionary youth, women and teachers by the end of 1965, and the establishment of more than 300 concentration camps have been "legalised by the people". So *The New Statesman* was right to speak about "electing Indonesia's generals" instead of general elections.³⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Dipak Mazumbar and Peter Wiles, "Anguished Thoughts on Bangla Desh", *Encounter*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (October 1971), p. 36: "Bangla Desh ranks now below Auschwitz but above the killing of Indonesia Communists in 1965-6. (About 250,000 Bengalis have been killed, excluding those who have died of starvation once in India; the same number were killed in Indonesia, out of a much larger population)".

According to reliable information the number of innocent people killed in Indonesia

- during the period that immediately followed the abortive military coup of 1 October 1965 amounts to 500,000!
2. The author's open letter to Amnesty International in *Vrij Nederland* of 13 November 1971. (English Translation in *Intercontinental Press* of 29 November 1971).
 3. See A.H. Nasution, *Pokok-pokok gerilja*, 1953 (English translation, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, 1965), and *Tjataan-tjataan sekitar politik militer di Indonesia*, 1955; T.B. Simatupang, *Soal-soal politik militer di Indonesia*, 1956, and *Laporan dari Banaran*, 1960.
 4. The Peta or Defender of the Fatherland had been set up in 1943 to aid the Japanese occupation army in case of an invasion of Java by Allied troops. Some of the former members of the KNIL, for instance Suharto, the present Indonesian president, joined the Peta. The Peta was organised only to battalion level.
 5. The former KNIL members in the Indonesian Army form two different groups, those who joined the republican armed forces in 1945 – ex-KNIL 1945 – and those who joined the republican armed forces in 1950 – ex-KNIL 1950. To the first group belong among others ex-KNIL Major Urip, ex-KNIL Captain Didi Kartasasmita, ex-KNIL Lieutenants Hidayat, Surjosularso, ex-KNIL Ensigns Askari, Daan Jachja, Kartakusumah, A.H. Nasution, Satari, ex-Crown Sergeant of the KMA (Royal Military Academy at Bandung) T.B. Simatupang, ex-Cadet-Sergeant A.E. Kawilarang, ex-Cadet-Corporals Abdulkadir, Mokoginta, ex-KNIL Sergenat-Major Gatot Subroto, ex-KNIL Sergeant Suharto, ex-KNIL Corporal J.F. Warouw, Ex-KNIL Lieutenant Suryadharma became Chief of the Indonesian Air Force.
To the second group belong among others the late Claproth, Putiray, Muskita, de Mey. Except Muskita, who a few years ago was promoted to the rank of Major-General, the second group has never been accepted as "loyal" members of the National Army of Indonesia (TNI).
 6. Some of them had joined the Peta, others learned the military profession during the revolution of 1945-9. To this group belong among others Bambang Sugeng (Commander-in-Chief, 1953-5), Ibnu Sutowo (who was already a physician in 1941), Mustopo, Suwondo, G.P.H. Djatikusumo, Sjarif Thajeb, Suwanto, Mashudi.
 7. 21 July-4th August 1947. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1947, pp. 144 ff; *Indonesia in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties*, Vol. I; A.M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 1960.
 8. 19 December 1948-March 1949. See *Indonesie in de Veiligheidsraad*, Vol. V; A.M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence*.
 9. Some of them re-appeared as *pedjuang* (freedom fighter) after the Transfer of Sovereignty. *Komandan-anakbuah* (commander-loyal follower) relationship had enabled them to obtain a certificate in which it was stated that they had "not been absent in the guerrilla", which was a lie. The retired Col. Lubis, once head of the military intelligence, has mentioned to the author quite a number of these persons who are now generals occupying important posts!
 10. See Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army", *Indonesia* (Cornell University), No. 11 (April 1971), pp. 131-76. Although written with great accuracy – by quoting relevant Indonesian newspapers and official reports – Ruth McVey's analysis lacks some background information. Indonesians frequently give written statements that differ from their true intentions.
 11. Conversation with the late Sukarni. This view is confirmed by progressive and honest military leaders.
 12. Admitted by some of the honest military, who object to the falsification of Indonesian military history writing by the Pusat Sedjarah Militer (Centre of Military History).
 13. As Ruth McVey has put it rightly: "The officer corps was thus composed almost from the start of people drawn from the more privileged strata of Indonesian society. They did not, however, come from the highly advantaged group of university educated which served in the top nationalist leadership during the revolution; only very few came from families of aristocratic background, although a small but important group of senior officers, particularly in the Siliwangi Division of West Java, was drawn from the lesser ranks of the traditional bureaucratic elite" ("The Post-Revolutionary Transformation", p. 133). See also Ann Gregory, "Fractionalism in the Indonesian Army", *Journal of Comparative Administration*, Vol. II, No. 3 (November 1970), pp. 343-4.
 14. The now retired Col. R. Djoko Bambang Supeno, a cousin of the late President Sukarno, belongs to the priajaji, the gentry. At the time of the Japanese invasion he

had almost finished his high school education at Malang in East Java. In 1943 he joined the Peta in East Java and later one of the military groups in that province. In co-operation with other partisan leaders he established the "Brawidjaja" Division, at present Indonesia's strongest army unit. Before the *re-dan-ra* he was a major-general. In the first reorganisation and rationalisation of the Army his rank was downgraded to that of colonel.

Bambang Supeno is known for his heroic behaviour during the first Dutch military attack. He was extremely loyal to his partisans and the *Sapta Marga* (the military code), his brainchild.

In 1958 Bambang Supeno was dropped by Sukarno in a conflict with Nasution, the most criminal army hawk. Although in 1961 he was re-appointed in a high post, his conflict with the fascist army leadership could not be ended. In 1964 he decided to retire after having returned to Sukarno an appointment as general.

On 11th May 1967, after the fall of Sukarno, Bambang Supeno was arrested. He was released only a month ago.

15. Conversation with Bambang Supeno in 1956.

16. By the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreement, which ended the armed conflict with the Dutch, the Indonesians were forced to accept a 600-man Netherlands Military Mission. The main duty of the Mission was to give the Indonesian military authorities the needed technical support in their effort to build a modern military force.

17. *Dokumentasi disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952, 1953.*

18. Ulf Sandhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army", *Asia Quarterly*, 1971, 2, pp. 181-212. Sundhaussen came to Indonesia in 1967 to study the West Java "Siliwangi" Division which at that time had exploded into a fury against Sukarno. The inexperienced Sundhaussen became totally influenced by the criminal "New Order" hawks like H.R. Dharsono and Kemal Idris.

19. Since then military cadres have been sent to training schools in the United States, West Germany, Pakistan, and Australia.

20. Conversation with the late Professor Iwa Kusumasumantri in January 1958.

21. For the Lubis coup see Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation", pp. 157 ff.

The now retired Col. Zulkifli Lubis, architect of the Army's Intelligence Service and a cousin of Nasution, belonged to the partisan group. At the time of the Japanese invasion he had just finished his high school education at Jogjakarta. He joined the Peta and was placed in Bali as an intelligence non-commissioned officer under Japanese guidance. In 1946 he was attached to the Army's Headquarters and ordered to set up an army intelligence service.

In the 17 October 1952 Affair Lubis sided with the partisans, because he saw the movement led by Nasution as an attack on the Army's unity. Later for the sake of that unity Lubis became the most ardent defender of the *Jogja Charter*. He was convinced that interference with army affairs by politicians could only affect the Army's cohesion disastrously. Lubis was even prepared to suppress completely his own feelings. Although he disliked his cousin Nasution and was fiercely criticised by his friends, for instance Col. A.E. Kawilarang, the discontented Commander of the "Siliwangi" Division, he put Col. Nasution at the top of a hierarchical list of officers sent to the new Minister of Defence, Burhanuddin Harahap, who had to appoint a new commander of the Army. "I know that my cousin has a bad character, but, following the *Jogja Charter*, I had to take his seniority into consideration fully", he said (conversation with Col. Lubis at the time the author was detained in the same prison where Lubis was held, 1966). According to the author's opinion Lubis was the most honest of all officers at that time, in important posts.

22. The now retired Col. Herman Pieters, till 1961 Commander of the "Pattimura" Division, told the author the following remark by General Nasution: "It will be O.K., Colonel, if you are prepared to support me and stop in the future the barter trade, we will forget all illegal barter business you were involved in up to now" (conversation with Col. Pieters in January 1959).

23. On the PRRI-Permesta rebellion: Rudy Pirngadie, *Peristiwa P.R.R.I. ditinjau dari sedjarah T.N.I.*, 1958, and *Rebels without a Cause: The Permesta Affair*, no date; James Mossman, *Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War*, 1961. For the role of the American CIA, see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government*, 1964, pp. 136-44.

24. See the author's standard work on Indonesian law, *Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia*, fifth edition (1959), pp. 450 ff.
25. See Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*, 1966.
26. On populism: Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, 1964.
27. Nasakom is formed from the front letters of Nasionalisme, Agama, and Komunisme, that is, nationalism, religion, and communism.
28. See Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism" *Indonesia*, No. 8 (October 1969), pp. 1-20, and "The Downfall of the PKI", *Socialist Register* 1969.
29. For the implementation of the 1960-2 land reform regulations see the author's article "Land Reform in Indonesia", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, November 1969, pp. 71-88.
30. For the bloody Djengkol crime see Panitya 3 Menteri tentang Masalah Agraria, *Laporan (Lengkap) tentang Pelaksanaan Landreform*, 1965, Djawa Timur, pp. 50-1.
31. On the abortive military coup of 1 October 1965: B.R.O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Djakarta*, 10 January 1966; Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup, *Asian Survey*, February 1966; W.F. Wertheim, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1/2, pp. 115-27, and "The Missing Link - Suharto and the Untung Coup", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 50-57, and Ismail Saleh, *The Military's view (which is false): Nugroho Notosusanto, The Coup Attempt of the 'September 30 Movement' in Indonesia*, no date (1967); Arnold C. Brackman, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, 1969.
32. See for instance Malcolm Caldwell, "Oil and Imperialism in East Asia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 5-35.
33. On *musjawarah* see the author's article, "Musjawarah: Een Indonesische wijze van besluitvorming", in *Intermediair* of 23 October 1970.
34. Since Sukarno's Guided Democracy - which, in fact, finds its continuation in the present system of military government - legislative bodies have always consisted of three groups which keep each other in balance: representatives of the political parties, representatives of the "functional groups" (peasants, workers, national entrepreneurs, youth, women, teachers, journalists, etc.) and representatives of the provinces. After the abortive military coup of 1 October 1965 the functional groups were brought under rigid control of the military. They are now used by the army elite in order to reduce the influence of the political parties.
35. In a number of villages army platoons moved in during the night, bringing with them voter registration lists. All adults in the village were forced to sign or make a thumb mark indicating that they would vote for Golkar. Having finished their "special operation", Golkar leaders declared the village closed to all political parties since all the villagers had already declared their allegiance to Golkar. The village chief then placed a sign board at the entrance of the village, indicating that the village was "bebas partai politik" (or "parpol") which means "freed from political parties" (S. Jasa, "Dorp vrij van politieke partijen: Hoe op Bali de Golkar de macht krijgt", *De Groene Amsterdammer* of 7 August 1971; the author's article, "Definitieve verkiezingscijfers bewijzen: Militaire dictatuur van Soeharto gelegaliseerd", *De Nieuwe Linie* of 19 August 1971).
36. Francis Hope, "Electing Indonesia's Generals", *The New Statesman* of 18 June 1971.